1. Florentino v. PNB Doctrine: Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. Petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines Payment for an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P6,800 secured by a real estate mortgage on certain properties. Law in question: Section 2 of RA 897 xxx for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.

ISSUE: W/N qualifying clause who may be willing to accept the same for settlement refers to all antecedents the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," (PNBs contention) or only the last antecedent any citizen of the Philippines, or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. (Florentinos contention)?

RATIO: LAST ANTECEDENT ONLY. Florentino is correct. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. It should be noted that there is a comma before the words or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. Also, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional. Note: PNB does not fall under the last antecedent. Therefore, it does not have the option to deny the acceptance of the backpay certificate.

2. Mapa v. Arroyo Doctine: Same Mapa seeks the reversal of the decision of the Office of the President which dismissed his appeal from the resolution of the Commission Proper, Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and affirming the decision of Office of Adjudication and Legal Affairs of HSRC. Petitioner avers that public respondent gravely transcended the sphere of his discretion in finding that PD 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in this case and in consequently dismissing the same. SEC. 20. Time of Completion.Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisements, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.

ISSUE: WON the demonstrative phrase which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc. refer only to other forms of development and not to facilities, improvements and infrastructures.? NO.

RATIO: And is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. We reject petitioners strained and tenuous application of the so called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc. refer only to other forms of development and not to facilities, improvements and infrastructures. While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation, whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word and between facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, far from supporting petitioners theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that and is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.

3. People v. TamaniDoctrine: REDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS (refering each to each; distributive) This is an appeal of Teodoro Tamani from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, sentencing him to life imprisonment for the murder of Jose Siyang and attempted murder of Domingo and ordering him to indemnify the victims heirs. The lower courts decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14, 1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel on February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963 he filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail on July 13, 1963 on defendants counsel through his wife. He had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the reglementary fifteenday period for appeal should be computed from the date of notification and not from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or fortyeight days from July 24th. Law in question: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period, for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.

ISSUE: WON the appeal must be counted from the date of the notification and not from the date of promulgation, if the counting would refer to the issuance of the decision? NO.

RULING: Appeal lies 15 days from promulgation of judgment in criminal cases. The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served en appellants counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word promulgation in section 6 should be construed as referring to judgment, while the word notice should be construed as referring to order. That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively.

4. Amadora v. CADoctrine: REDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS Law in question: Article 2180 of the Civil Code: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.

ISSUE: WON the heads of establishment should be liable for the acts of the pupils and students? NO.

RULING: Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices.

5. Atienza v. Villarosa Doctrine: Doctrine of necessary implication Basically, the question is whether it is the Governor or the Vice-Governor who is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Law in question: Vice Governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

ISSUE: WON the authority granted to the Vice Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the SP as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same? YES.

RULING: The doctrine of necessary implication states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressedevery statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an allembracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the future. So called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.

The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

6. Calawag v. UPDoctrine: Doctrine of necessary implicationThe petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship from DOST. They were eligible to start their thesis in the first semester of their second year. They enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balea to be their thesis adviser, as well as the other faculty members consent to constitute their respective thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the petitioners sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of their thesis committees. Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos questioning the propriety of the thesis topics and disapproved the composition of the petitioners thesis committees and their tentative thesis topics. Dean Baylon informed them that he is forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the role of the adviser and of the thesis committees.

ISSUE: WON the deans power to approve includes the power to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee? YES.

RULING: Under the University of the Philippines (UP) Systems faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. By necessary implication, the deans power to approve includes the power to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP Systems faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CAs interpretation that the thesis committees composition needs the approval of the dean after the students have complied with the requisites provided in Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual and Section IX of the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.

7. Lopez v. CTADoctrine: Correcting clerical errorsRULING:As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. This is not judicial legislation. Section 7 Commissioner of customs grants the CTA jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of CustomsSection 11 Collector of customs refers to the decision of the Collector of Customs that may be appealed to the tax court Commissioner prevails Commissioner of Customs has supervision and control over Collectors of Customs and the decisions of the latter are reviewable by the Commissioner of Customs.

Summary: Collector Commissioner CTASection 11 of RA 1125 may well be regarded as a mere complement or implementation of Section 7. Since Section 7 provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, and decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, so Section 11 naturally provides that persons adversely affected by said decisions may appeal to the Tax Court.

However, in enumerating the governmental bodies or agencies rendering said decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously listed the Collector, instead of the Commissioner, of Customs. The error is plain.

The Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of dismissal entitled Acting Collector of Customs vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs said, The phrase Collector of Customs appearing in the abovementioned provision (section 11) of Republic Act No. 1125 is clearly an oversight on the part of Congress. It should read Commissioner of Customs to make the provision conform with Section 7 of the said Republic Act and Section 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code.

8. Santillon v. MirandaDoctrine: Number, gender and tenseClaro Santillon filed a petition for letres of administration for the estate of his father, Pedro Santillon. This was opposed by Perfecta Miranda, the widow. Claro invoked Article 892, which provides that if only the legitimate child survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to of the estate. Miranda, on the other hand, invoked Art. 996 of the which provides that the widow and the legitimate CHILDREN are entitled to equal shares.

ISSUE: WON the plural word children includes the singular word child? YES.

RULING: Words in plural includes singular, just as a singular word may embrace two or more things. Also, the masculine gender, not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in which the word is used indicates otherwise. A word in the present tense includes the future tense. 9. Amon Trading v. CADoctrine: Conjunctive and disjunctive wordsThe term and/or was held to mean that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and disjunctive or; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the intended purpose. It was accordingly ordinarily held that in using the term and/or the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.

10. Ombudsman v. CADoctrine: Use of shall and mayThe use of the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word may, when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word may in Section 20(5) of RA 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of the Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.

11. Bermudez v. TorresDoctrine: Mandatory v. Directory

Legality of the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac by President Ramos. Petitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily requires a prior recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

Section 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned.

ISSUE: WON the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit? NO.

RULING: The legislative intent is primordial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in ascertaining whether the language in a statute should be considered mandatory or directory, and the application of a ruling in one particular instance may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and the peculiar circumstances attendant to it. More often than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at the legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed when substantially the same results can be obtained, then the statute should be regarded merely as directory, rather than as mandatory, in character.

Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority.

12. Chinese Flour Importers v. Price Stabilization BoardDoctrine: Provisos The Chinese importers were assailing that the PRISCO refused to give them the proper import commodities pattern allocation provided by RA 426:It provides that 70 per cent, 60 per cent and 50 per cent of the total import quota for the fiscal years 195051, 195152 and 195253 respectively shall be allocated to old importers, and 30 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per cent respectively of said quota for the same fiscal years shall be allocated to new importers (section 14). However, PRISCO assailed that wheat flour importation was not governed by RA 426 but was under the authority by EO 305: regulating the importation of wheat flour into the Philippines by way of implementation of the International Wheat Agreement and authorizing the PRATRA (PRISCO) to control its importation and distribution. PRISCO also used Section 15 of RA 426 to strengthen their point which stated that ..no govt agency shall allocate import quota except Import Control Commission provided that PRISCO shall have exclusive authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers. So inaargue ng PRISCO na dahil sinabi provided that PRISCO shall have exclusive authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers. Ininterpret nila yun to mean na exception ang wheat flour dun sa governed RA 426 so governed siya ng EO 305. Pero mali yun kasi ang rule ng proviso magaapply siya sa clause preceding it which is no govt agency shall allocate import quota except Import Control Commission.. So ang ibig sabihin lang ng Section 15, binibigyan lang yung PRISCO ng authority about allocation hindi ineexclude yung wheat flour sa enumeration.

Issue: Whether or not PRISCO should follow EO 305 or RA 426Ruling: The second part of section 15, which is preceded by the word "provided" can only refer to the clause immediately preceding it in section 15 and can have no other meaning than that the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of being assigned to the Import Control Commissioner was assigned to the Pratra which heretofore has been charged with said duty by Executive Order No. 305. It simply means that the authority to determine and grant flour quota allocations was taken from the Import Control Commissioner and given to the Pratra now Prisco, which must have been done presumably because of the practice and experience heretofore enjoyed by said office in so far as the allocation of wheat flour import quota is concerned under the provisions of Executive Order No. 305, which was issued to implement and carry out the objectives of the International Wheat Flour Agreement.

13. ALU-TUCP v. NLRCDoctrine: ProvisosThe petitioners were contending that they were regular employees of National Steel Corporation because they have worked for 6 years working on the 5 year expansion program of NSC. They are basing this argument on the Labor code:Article280. Regular and Casual EmploymentThe provisions of the written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.Petitioners are saying that they have rendered (1) necessary service (2) and has worked for more than a year. Respondents on the other hand are stating that petitioners are project employees because they are hired for the sole purpose of the 5-year expansion project of the NSC (eto yung exception sa provision sa taas)

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are project or regular employees

Held: Petitioners are PROJECT EMPLOYEES. The one year service provided in the second paragraph applies only to casual workers described in that paragraph. The provisos does not extend to the project employees described in the first paragraphGeneral Rule of proviso: The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof.

14. Meralco v. Public UtilitiesDoctrine: ProvisosMeralco is assailing the decision of the CIR, which reads, "Although the practice of the company has been to grant one day vacation with pay to every workingman who had worked for 7 consecutive days including Sundays, the Court considers justified the opposition presented by the workingmen to the effect that they need Sundays and holidays for the observance of their religion and for rest. The Court, therefore, orders the MERALCO to pay 50% increase for overtime work done on ordinary days and 50% increase for work done during Sundays and legal holidays irrespective of the number of days they work during the week."

Meralco claims that the decision is against C.A. 144, which provides that, "No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication."

ISSUE: WON the CIR erred in construing the proviso? YES.

RULING: First part enactment clause; Second part exemption clauseTo hold that the exception or second part of section 4,Commonwealth Act No. 444, only exempts public utilities mentioned therein from the prohibition to compel employees or laborers to work during Sundays and legal holidays, but not from the obligation to pay them an extra or additional compensation for compelling them to work during those days, is to make the exception meaningless or a superfluity, that is, an exception to a general rule that does not exist, because the prohibition in the enactment clause is not an absolute prohibition to compel a laborer or employee to work during Sundays and legal holidays. The prohibition to compel a laborer or employee to work during those days is qualified by the clause "unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration," which is inseparable from the prohibition which they qualify and of which they are a part and parcel. The second portion of section 1 is in reality an exception and not a proviso although it is introduced by the word "provided"; and it is elemental that an exception takes out of an enactment something which would otherwise be a part of the subject matter of it.

15. Tolentino v. Sec. Finance (evat law)Doctrine: Exceptions

Provision in question: Article VI, Setion 26 (2) of the 1987 ConstitutionNo bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.

ISSUE: WON the presidential certification qualifies both the printing and reading in 3 separate days? YES.

RULING: As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc. in Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies not only the requirement that printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed three readings on separate days. There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.

16. Pendon v. Diasnes Doctrine: Exceptions

Petitioner seeks to declare Diasnes as ineligible to holding office as elected municipal mayor of Dumangas, Ilo-ilo for being previously convicted for a criminal offense (estafa, sentenced to one year and one day imprisonment). He claims that he has been granted absolute pardon by the Governor General. Nature of the pardon extended: absolute and plenary, with the purpose of enabling him to exercise the right to suffrage.

The contention is that the court erred in not holding that pardon does not remove the incapacity and disqualifications as voter, in matters of convictions of crime against property. Problem arises from the apparent ambiguity of Sec. 99 of RA 180:

"The ff shall not be qualified to vote:1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to a) suffer one year or more imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon b) any person who has been declared by final judgment guilty if any crime against property xxxx."

ISSUE: WON Diasnes may vote? YES.

RULING: There is no conflict between paragraphs (a) and (b), and paragraph (b) in no way encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Chief Executive.

Paragraph (b) must be construed in conjunction withparagraph (a). Thus construed, it modifies that part of paragraph (a) which refers to sentences for less than a year and not that which refers to the nature of the crime committed. Paragraph (a) is comprehensive, making no distinction between crimes against property and other classes of crimes. By the terms of this clause (paragraph [a]), all persons convicted of crime of whatever nature and sentenced to one year or more are disqualified to vote. But it makes two exceptions each of which is independent of the other, to wit: (1) when the penalty imposed is less than one year and (2) when pardon is granted. Paragraph (b) qualifies or further limits the first exceptions but not the second. It creates an exception to the exception of paragraph (a) that persons sentenced to less than one year may vote. It is not meant to say that conviction for a crime against property bars the convict from voting irrespective of the penalty and irrespective of whether or not pardon has been granted. Construing paragraphs (a) and (b) together, as stated, they should read thus: Absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of imprisonment or more was meted out restores the prisoner to his political rights. Where the penalty is less than one year, disqualification does not attach, except when the crime committed is one against property, in which case, the prisoner has to have a pardon, as in the cases provided in paragraph (a), if he is to be allowed to vote. For illustrations: (1) A was prosecuted for physical injuries and condemned to suffer 10 months imprisonment. Though not pardoned, he is not, under paragraph (a), disqualified. (2) B was prosecuted for theft and sentenced to imprisonment for 10 months. Under paragraph (b) he may not vote unless he is pardoned. (3) C was prosecuted and sentenced to four years for physical injuries or estafa. C has to be pardoned if he is to exercise the right of suffrage. This is the class of cases envisaged by paragraph (a); the nature of the crime is immaterial.

17. Bautista v. Fule Doctrine: Saving clause

Suarez was the owner of a parcel of an unreg coconut land in Laguna. Sold it to Atienza subject to repurchase in 10 years. Atienza sold it to Dimaano subject to redemption in 5 years. 4 years after, land was levied upon to satisfy a judgment rendered against Atienza. Sold to Bautista during the public auction. Atienza has the right to redeem the land within a year from the date of the auction sale, which he did. Then, he sold it to Fule by the original owner Suarez (who acted as vendor a retro). Bautista now wants to recover the land so he filed a case, contending that the it was from him, not from Atienza, that Suarez should have made the repurchase. Dismissed.

ISSUE: WON Fule has, by virtue of the transactions covering the repurchase of the property by Atienza and its sale to Fule, acquired a right superior to that acquired by Bautista as a purchaser in a prior sale that was duly registered.

RULING: In justifying the repurchase of the land from Atienza instead of from Bautista, the lower court cites article 1510 of the Civil Code which provides:

"The vendor may bring his action against any possessor who holds under the vendee, even though in the second contract no mention should have been made of the conventional redemption, saving always the provisions of the Mortgage Law with respect to third persons."

In authorizing the vendor a retro to enforce his right of repurchase against any possessor who holds under the vendee, article 1510 of the Civil Code has provided a saving clause in favor of the rights of third persons under the provisions of the Mortgage Law whose function may, in the case of land not registered either under that law or the Land Registration Act, be deemed to be performed by those of Act No. 3344, and registration under this Act produces its effects against third persons.

It follows from the foregoing that the repurchase of theland from Atienza instead of from Bautista did not divest the latter of his right to said land as purchaser at the auction sale, a right which. must now be deemed to be absolute in view of the nonredemption of the property by the judgment debtor or any other person entitled thereto within the period prescribed by the Rules. Obviously, Fule's remedy is against Atienza for the recovery of the sum paid to him in the repurchase.

18. Ibanez de Aldecoa v. HSBCDoctrine: Saving Clause

Law in question, Sec. 581, which is all a whole the saving clause:"Pending guardianship to proceed in accordance withSpanish law, with certain exceptions.All proceedings in cases of guardianship pending in the Philippine Islands at the time of the passage of this Act, shall proceed in accordance with the existing Spanish procedure under which the guardians were appointed: Provided, nevertheless, That any guardian appointed under existing Spanish law may be removed in accordance with the provisions of section 574 of this Act, and his successor may be appointed as therein provided, and every successor to a guardian so removed shall, in the administration of the person or estate, or either, as the case may be, of his ward, be governed by the provisions of this Act."

RULING:The saving proviso of section 581 of the Code of Civil Procedure was intended to withhold the application of the new law from all those incompetents who were at that time being taken care of under the provisions of the Civil Code and who would otherwise have been affected by the new law. A parent exercising the patria potestad {parental authority) over the property of his minor children was substantially, although not eo nomine, as nearly a guardian within the meaning of that word as used in the Code of Civil Procedure as the Civil Code guardian. The prerogative of parent over the property of his minor children under the patria potestad (parental authority) and the Civil Code guardian have both been abolished by the new law of guardianship. It is therefore held that pending cases of the one and of the other are equally saved from the operation of the new law by section 581.

A saving clause is enacted to save something which would otherwise be lost. When existing procedure is altered or substituted by another, it is usual to save those proceedings pending under the old law at the time the new law takes effect. This was the purpose of section 581. It was designed to save undisturbed all pending proceedings in guardianship cases; that is, those proceedings already begun and still unfinished, which would otherwise have been affected by the .new law, were to be allowed to continue to determination in accordance with the old law. STATCON GUIANG-CUSTODIO Page 1/8