PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor RelationsGR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1 May  1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen,” a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous

decisions.  As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.

Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. NLRCGR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring

Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company.  The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.

On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the  complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union

filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.

Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.

The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company.

IBAA Employees Union v. InciongGR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)

Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor

Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment of holiday pay.  Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.

On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of  the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution.  On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void.  So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. OpleGR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)

En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974.

Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.

On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9,

claiming the rule that “If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.”

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or overtime pay differentials.

Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Minister’s 7 September 1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments) the  24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security CommissionGR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)

En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring

Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its Circular 22 providing that “effective 1 November 1958, all employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.” Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.

Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what “compensation” should mean “For the purposes of this Act”. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against appellant.

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur

Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.

1.    Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions set aside due to demands of public interestBecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.

2.    Constitutional ConstructionThe fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

3.    President’s power to appointSection 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;  (2)  all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;  (3)  those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank  4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission.

4.    Express enumeration excludes others not enumeratedIt is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

5.    Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior lawsA constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution,  the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-trading” and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the

authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a “middle ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.

6.    Construction of “also” in second sentence; consideration of different language of proximate sentences to determine meaningThe word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in like manner” which meanings could stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent  or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.

7.    Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations construed strictlyThe power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

8.    The use of word “alone” after “President” in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed redundantAfter a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word “alone” after the word

“President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship.  In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word “alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

9.    President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included with the first group of appointmentThe position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).

10.    Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony with the new oneRA 1937 and PD  34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Perfecto v. MeerGR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)

First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.

Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. It also provides that “until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary.  The latter paid the amount under protest.  He contended that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.

Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof.  If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.  Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege.  It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at

the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Endencia v. DavidGR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)

En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively.  The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.  Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.

Issue:  Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of

interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue  (Resolution)GR L-78780, 23 July 1987

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.  With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.

Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.

Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.  The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.

Aglipay v. RuizGR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)

First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and

elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISGR 122156, 3 February 1997

En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent

Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the

Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that

of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Tanada v. TuveraGR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)

En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of

implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.

Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws

Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)

En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring

Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of

general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

Held: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Primicias v. UrdanetaGR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)

First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.

Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136  (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.

On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964), for overtaking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).

Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case.  On 29 June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiff’s driver’s license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.

Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinance’s validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother statute” (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the foregoing, is void.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.