CHAPTER 5

RAMIREZ vs CA

- Private respondent insulted and humiliated petitioner

- Presented in verbatim transcript of the event to court because she recorded said conversation

- Private respondent filed criminal case against petitioner for violating Anti Wiretapping Act

- Petitioner contended she was exempted since she was a party to the conversation

- Law clearly provided “any person” not authorized by all parties to any private communication is liable

- Law did not distinguish (exempted) whether the party sought o be penalized ought to be party other than or different from those involved in the private communication

Ramirez v. CASTATUTE: “Act to Prohibit & Penalize Wire Tapping and Other related Violations of Private Communications and Other Purposes”

“It shall be unlawful, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement…”ISSUE: Whether violation thereof refers to the taping of a communication other than a participant to the communication or even to the taping by a participant who did not secure the consent of the party to the conversations.HELD: Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be penalized ought to be party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to make any such recording, underscored by “any”

Socorro D. Ramirez vs. CA and Esther GarciaGR No. 93833 September 28, 1995

FACTS

A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against private respondent Esther Garcia alleging that the latter “vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript of the event alleged. The transcript was taken from a tape recording of the confrontation made by Ramirez.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Respondent Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez alleging that the recording of the event was illegal and thus, a violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other

related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Ramirez filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The trial court agreed with her and granted the motion to quash, reasoning that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed reasoning that the allegations sufficiently constituted an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200.

ISSUES

Whether Section 1 of RA 4200 applies to the taping of private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation and not only to the unauthorized taping of a private communication by a party other than those involved in the communication

Whether the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information

Whether RA 4200 penalizes a “private communication” only and not a “private conversation”

HELD and RATIO

1. Section 1 of RA 4200 applies to the taping of private conversations by one of the parties to the conversation. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves

or by third persons.

2. The substance or content of the conversation need not be alleged in the information. The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

3. The taping of both private communications and private conversations are penalized as there is no difference between the two. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts.”

PILAR VS COMELEC

- RA 7166: “every candidate shall within 30 days after the day of the election file true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election

- Law did not distinguish between a candidate who pushed through and one who withdrew it

- “every candidate” refers to one who pursued and even to those who withdrew his candidacy

     STATUTE: RA 7166 provides that “Every candidate shall, within 30 days after the day of the election file xxx true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.

         HELD: Law did not distinguish between a candidate who pushed through and one who withdrew it.“Every candidate” refers to one who pursued and even to those who withdrew his candidacy.

FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position

of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three dayslater, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commissionimposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions andexpenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate musthave entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.

ISSUE:W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributionsand expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”, having withdrawn his certificateof candidacy three days after its filing.

HELD:Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to filehis statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction orqualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew thesame, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidatewho pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of

Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificateof candidacy”

FRANCISCO VS CA

CARANDANG VS SANTIAGO- Petitioner survived attack of respondent thus was charged with frustrated homicide

- Petitioner filed civil case to recover damages

- Respondent argued that frustrated homicide was not included as basis for a civil case under Article 33

- Term “physical injuries” means “any bodily injury”

- It should not be construed as a specific crime falling under RPC other words associating it “fraud” and “defamation” do not have specific definition and provisions in the RPC

- Noscitur a sociis (associated words)

FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial

of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.

HELD:Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

PEOPLE vs SANTIAGO

- Accused of besmirching the name of the Mayor with malicious intent

- Contended it was only oral defamation

- Amplifier was used by defendant in the act

- Amplifier vs Radio

- Amplifier: uses a conducting wire intervening between the transmitter and receiver

- Radio: involves transmission of electromagnetic waves without wires. Cannot be interpreted to include amplifier

· Libel: committed by means of “writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,

cinematographic exhibiton.” It is argued that “amplifier” similar to radio.

· ISSUE: Whether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier system constitutes slander or libel?

· HELD: No. Radio should be considered as same terms with writing and printing whose common characteristic is the “permanent means of publication.”

MUTUC vs COMELEC

- Act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods, materials and the like.

- “and the like” does not embrace taped jingles for campaign purposes

- Ejusdem generis

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from

using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD: The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.

VERA vs CUEVAS

- Petitioner ordered the withdrawal; of private respondent’s filled milk products from the market which do not bear inscription required by Tax Code

- “all milk” should be understood within the meaning of skimmed milk since headnote (skimmed milk) and the text (condensed skimmed milk)talk about this.

- Tax Code does not apply to filled milk

- Ejusdem generis

STATUTE: all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers  with words: “This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than 1 year of age”HELD: restricts the phrase “all milk in whatever form,” excluded filled milk.

Facts:Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable

for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.

The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and

filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."

Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.

CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES vs CA

- “other lawful beverages”: does it include liquor?

- The title of the act “An Act to regulate the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, caska, kegs, barrels, and other similar containers” shows intent to give protection to all marked bottles of lawful beverages even liquor which although regulated, is not prohibited (unlawful)

ISSUE: whether the phrase “other lawful beverages” which gives protection to manufacturer with the Phil. Patent Office  its duly stamped or marked bottles used for “soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages,” includes hard liquor?Statute title: “An Act to regulate the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, & other similar containers.”HELD: The title clearly shows intent to give protection to all marked bottles of all lawful beverages regardless of nature of contents.

ASTURIAS VS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

US vs STO. NINO- Ejusdem generis cannot be used because the intent is clear on prohibition of carrying concealed and deadly weapons (limitations)

- Ejusdem generis can be used only in determining legislative intent

- Deadly weapons include an unlicensed revolver (proviso)

STATUTE: It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie, knife, dagger, kris or other deadly weapon. Provided prohibition shall not apply to firearms who have secured a license or who are entitled to carry the same under the provisions of this Act.”ISSUE: does “the deadly weapon” include an unlicensed revolver?HELD:  Yes! Carrying such would be in violation of statute. By the proviso, it manifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein specified.

E.B Villarosa vs Benito

- Summons for a case of breach of contract was served upon the defendant through its branch manager

- Defendant moved to dismiss the case on ground of

improper submission of summons

- Rules of Court amended by Rules of Civil Procedure saying that only a “general manager”, “corporate secretary”, “treasurer” may be summoned

- Does not include branch manager

- Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Facts: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and with branch offices at Parañaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. Summons,

together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office atCagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is

very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager

Held: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or

any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

GOMEZ vs Ventura

ISSUE: whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a patient whose physical condition did not require the use of such drug constitutes “unprofessional conduct” as to justify revocation of physician’s license to practice

HELD: Still liable! Rule of expressio unius not applicable.

Court said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified, there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed ‘unprofessional.’ Nor can it be convincingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out all other forms of ‘unprofessional’ conduct therefore deemed grounds for revocation of licenses

- Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its provision to particular persons or things enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice will follow by not including them.

- If it will result in incongruities or a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

- If adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship and injury to the public interest.