Summary: Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)

En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed

with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of

the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to

initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of

Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

G.R. No. 83896194 SCRA 317February 22, 1991

Petitioner: Civil Liberties UnionRespondent: Executive Secretary

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.

Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.

Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of

the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or

controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. 

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment. 

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

D E C I S I O N(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II.    THE ISSUES

1.   Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;2.     Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;3.    Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and4.   Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III.   THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1.    YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style.  But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.  Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

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Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed.  If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.  A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.  From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.  It is per se judicially enforceable.  When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to

qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.  And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.  Where there is a right there is a remedy.  Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2.    YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

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For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and  failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.  Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.  For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel.  In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.  Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3.    YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.  [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.”  In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.  It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.”  Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State.  After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial.  Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government.  It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4.    YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.  The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be

declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.  Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.  Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.  For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

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Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason  the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid.  In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.  And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino.  It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.  For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.  To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.