Stalin’s Foreign PolicyStalin’s Foreign Policy

Lenin’s Foreign PolicyLenin’s Foreign Policy

Hoped at first to spark and then expand / spread Hoped at first to spark and then expand / spread Communism to EuropeCommunism to Europe

After failure of attempted Communist Revolutions in After failure of attempted Communist Revolutions in 1918 in Germany and Austria, he realized that this 1918 in Germany and Austria, he realized that this would be difficult….would be difficult….CominternComintern

Decided on a policy of promoting Revolution while Decided on a policy of promoting Revolution while accepting reality also and trying to forge a good accepting reality also and trying to forge a good relationship with Western Europerelationship with Western Europe

Called it a policy of Called it a policy of Peaceful CoexistencePeaceful Coexistence

Russia and Germany found themselves isolated Russia and Germany found themselves isolated (outcasts) after WWI – excluded from Versailles (outcasts) after WWI – excluded from Versailles Conference: both signed the Treaty of Rapallo, Conference: both signed the Treaty of Rapallo, 1922, normalized relations between them1922, normalized relations between them

Singed a trade agreement with Britain, which Singed a trade agreement with Britain, which became the first country to recognize the new became the first country to recognize the new Soviet RegimeSoviet Regime

Singed commercial and non-aggression pacts with Singed commercial and non-aggression pacts with the Baltic states in 1923 the Baltic states in 1923

By 1924, the USSR had regular relations with the By 1924, the USSR had regular relations with the chief Western powers - except for the USA, which chief Western powers - except for the USA, which refused to recognize the USSRrefused to recognize the USSR

But he hadn’t quiet given up on his dream of But he hadn’t quiet given up on his dream of international socialisminternational socialism

He quietly promoted international communism He quietly promoted international communism through the through the CominternComintern / Third International / Third International (1919) – with its headquarters in Moscow, which (1919) – with its headquarters in Moscow, which funded and supported international funded and supported international Revolutionary propaganda and activityRevolutionary propaganda and activity

Lenin combined Peaceful Coexistence with the Lenin combined Peaceful Coexistence with the quiet / mild.. promotion of International Socialism quiet / mild.. promotion of International Socialism

Stalin’s Foreign Policy; Peaceful Stalin’s Foreign Policy; Peaceful CoexistenceCoexistence

He eventually adopted the Foreign Policy of the He eventually adopted the Foreign Policy of the right against the left – Socialism in One Country: it right against the left – Socialism in One Country: it was pragmatic, and he defined it as patriotic / was pragmatic, and he defined it as patriotic / nationalistic (the great USSR could do it alone)nationalistic (the great USSR could do it alone)

Thompson says that he took a cautious and Thompson says that he took a cautious and conservative approach to foreign policy: conciliatory conservative approach to foreign policy: conciliatory diplomacy helped to guarantee the short term diplomacy helped to guarantee the short term security of the Soviet Unionsecurity of the Soviet Union

He felt that promoting international communism was He felt that promoting international communism was counter productive; would interfere with his plans for counter productive; would interfere with his plans for rapid Industrialization and Modernization; would only rapid Industrialization and Modernization; would only encourage European countries to retaliate with trade encourage European countries to retaliate with trade embargoes, at a time when the USSR needed them embargoes, at a time when the USSR needed them to buy its grain and sell her machineryto buy its grain and sell her machinery

He didn’t quite disband the He didn’t quite disband the CominternComintern, though, he , though, he just ensured it was less assertive or inactive, just ensured it was less assertive or inactive, instructing it to do nothing drastic, to not give the instructing it to do nothing drastic, to not give the West an excuse to invade the USSR – treated it as a West an excuse to invade the USSR – treated it as a branch of Soviet foreign office branch of Soviet foreign office

Tucker reminds us that Socialism in One Country Tucker reminds us that Socialism in One Country does not involve the abandoning of International does not involve the abandoning of International Socialism, just shelving itSocialism, just shelving it

Hoped for Peaceful Coexistence, like LeninHoped for Peaceful Coexistence, like Lenin

But he was preparing for an eventual showdown? But he was preparing for an eventual showdown? – one of his major goals was militarization through – one of his major goals was militarization through industrialization and collectivization…. he preached industrialization and collectivization…. he preached that survival long term depended on militarizationthat survival long term depended on militarization

He continued to build on the relationship with He continued to build on the relationship with Germany from the Rapallo Pact (trade, German Germany from the Rapallo Pact (trade, German army trained in USSR)army trained in USSR)

FP…not all that different from Lenin’sFP…not all that different from Lenin’s

He continued the normalization of the relationship with He continued the normalization of the relationship with other countries, started by Lenin – except USAother countries, started by Lenin – except USA

Temporary setback when Britain broke off diplomatic Temporary setback when Britain broke off diplomatic relations in 1927 (Baldwin’s Conservative govt.) after relations in 1927 (Baldwin’s Conservative govt.) after the so-called “Zinoviev Letter” (encouraging British the so-called “Zinoviev Letter” (encouraging British Communists to infiltrate Labor Unions and promote Communists to infiltrate Labor Unions and promote Communism during the General Strike of 1927) – but Communism during the General Strike of 1927) – but relationship restored by McDonald’s Labor relationship restored by McDonald’s Labor administration in 1929administration in 1929

Tucker calls Stalin’s focus on Conciliatory Policy in the Tucker calls Stalin’s focus on Conciliatory Policy in the 20s as “Hypercaution” – says he showed “an anxious 20s as “Hypercaution” – says he showed “an anxious concern for the maintenance of international peace.”concern for the maintenance of international peace.”

USSR also collaborated with League of Nations USSR also collaborated with League of Nations efforts to promote cooperation and peaceefforts to promote cooperation and peace

Nov 1927 the USSR deputy commissar for foreign Nov 1927 the USSR deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Litvinov, presented Soviet proposals for affairs, Litvinov, presented Soviet proposals for immediate and complete disarmament among all immediate and complete disarmament among all nations to a League sponsored international nations to a League sponsored international conference in Genevaconference in Geneva

Tucker says that it was a utopian idea (and Tucker says that it was a utopian idea (and probably not a genuine proposal), with no chance probably not a genuine proposal), with no chance of adoption – turned downof adoption – turned down

But Tucker says it benefited the USSR in two But Tucker says it benefited the USSR in two ways: ways:

1. advancing the concept put the USSR in a 1. advancing the concept put the USSR in a favorable light before world public opinion, favorable light before world public opinion, demonstrating the peace loving nature of socialism. demonstrating the peace loving nature of socialism.

2. When West rejected the proposal the USSR 2. When West rejected the proposal the USSR could label the Western arm control talks as could label the Western arm control talks as hypocriticalhypocritical

Slight set-back to Stalin’s perception was the Slight set-back to Stalin’s perception was the Treaty of Locarno – between France and Germany, Treaty of Locarno – between France and Germany, respecting each others borders, and promising not respecting each others borders, and promising not to attack each other – and the acceptance of to attack each other – and the acceptance of Germany into the League of Nations in 1925Germany into the League of Nations in 1925

Feeling isolated, he signed agreements with France Feeling isolated, he signed agreements with France and the Czechs promising mutual assistance if one and the Czechs promising mutual assistance if one of them was attackedof them was attacked

In 1928 the USSR ratified the Kellogg Briand pact In 1928 the USSR ratified the Kellogg Briand pact “outlawing war as an instrument of national policy” “outlawing war as an instrument of national policy” - and took the lead in putting the treaty into effect - and took the lead in putting the treaty into effect among its neighbors, signing non-aggression pacts among its neighbors, signing non-aggression pacts with the Baltic states, Poland and Finlandwith the Baltic states, Poland and Finland

1930 USSR signed non-aggression pacts with the 1930 USSR signed non-aggression pacts with the Baltic states of Poland, FinlandBaltic states of Poland, Finland

Ultimate in Peaceful Cooperation for Stalin was Ultimate in Peaceful Cooperation for Stalin was recognition from the USA in 1933 and admission to recognition from the USA in 1933 and admission to the League of Nations in 1934the League of Nations in 1934

USSR and USAUSSR and USA- USA / USSR recognition agreement of 1933: USA / USSR recognition agreement of 1933:

USSR to repay pre-1917 debts to USA, to cease USSR to repay pre-1917 debts to USA, to cease seditious propaganda against the USA, not to seditious propaganda against the USA, not to seek damages by US involvement with Whites in seek damages by US involvement with Whites in Russian Civil WarRussian Civil War

- FDR hoped for trade agreements (any trade FDR hoped for trade agreements (any trade partner was a good one – Depression) and protect partner was a good one – Depression) and protect Open Door in China by co-operation with USSR Open Door in China by co-operation with USSR against Japanese expansionagainst Japanese expansion

- Stalin also hoped to counterbalance increasingly Stalin also hoped to counterbalance increasingly aggressive Japanese policies in East Asia aggressive Japanese policies in East Asia (invasion of Manchuria), and maybe US loans (invasion of Manchuria), and maybe US loans

USSR and China USSR and China (also a topic for Section 5, Exam Paper 2)(also a topic for Section 5, Exam Paper 2)

Stalin discouraged Communist Revolution in China.Stalin discouraged Communist Revolution in China.

Civil War in China between the Nationalists / Civil War in China between the Nationalists / Kuomintang / Chiang or Jiang vs Communists / Kuomintang / Chiang or Jiang vs Communists / MaoMao

Nationalists and Communists had co-operated to Nationalists and Communists had co-operated to defeat war lords, Lenin had encouraged this and defeat war lords, Lenin had encouraged this and sent military assistance – he hoped they would sent military assistance – he hoped they would combine to form a left wing govt. but Jiang turned combine to form a left wing govt. but Jiang turned on Communists after defeat of war lords in 1927on Communists after defeat of war lords in 1927

His new Nationalist govt. terrorized his former Communist His new Nationalist govt. terrorized his former Communist allies: the Shanghai Massacre almost wiped them out, with allies: the Shanghai Massacre almost wiped them out, with just a small number of Communists, inc. Mao, escaping into just a small number of Communists, inc. Mao, escaping into hiding in the countrysidehiding in the countryside

Under Mao the Communist regrouped and rebuilt and Under Mao the Communist regrouped and rebuilt and basically from 1927 to 1949 Nationalists and Communists basically from 1927 to 1949 Nationalists and Communists engaged in a Civil War….except for alliance against Japanengaged in a Civil War….except for alliance against Japan

Jiang’s govt. – betrayed its promises to establish Democracy, Jiang’s govt. – betrayed its promises to establish Democracy, re-distribute land – undemocratic and corrupt re-distribute land – undemocratic and corrupt

Mao / Communists expanded as peasants became Mao / Communists expanded as peasants became disillusioned with Jiang’s govt. Mao divided land in areas of disillusioned with Jiang’s govt. Mao divided land in areas of Communist control, attracting more peasant support Communist control, attracting more peasant support

Mao began to develop his own brand of Mao began to develop his own brand of Communism in these years; flexible, adapting Communism in these years; flexible, adapting Marx’s idea, like Lenin incorporating peasants as a Marx’s idea, like Lenin incorporating peasants as a revolutionary group, then focusing exclusively on revolutionary group, then focusing exclusively on themthem

Civil War: Mao used guerrilla warfare tactics: Civil War: Mao used guerrilla warfare tactics:

Jiang launched an all out attack on the key Jiang launched an all out attack on the key Communist base in the South, in 1933, with army of Communist base in the South, in 1933, with army of 700,000700,000

Forced Communists to undertake the Long March, Forced Communists to undertake the Long March, over a journey of 6,000 miles, with 100,000 of his over a journey of 6,000 miles, with 100,000 of his followers – approx. 10,000 survived followers – approx. 10,000 survived

Mao builds a base in North West and expands his Mao builds a base in North West and expands his Red Army and movement againRed Army and movement again

Civil War suspended during Japanese invasion; Civil War suspended during Japanese invasion; first Manchuria, then East Coast of China…Asian first Manchuria, then East Coast of China…Asian Holocaust / Rape of NanjingHolocaust / Rape of Nanjing

Fought Japanese together, with $1.5 b in aid from Fought Japanese together, with $1.5 b in aid from the USA: Nationalists actually fought few battles the USA: Nationalists actually fought few battles against the Japanese, saving themselves for the against the Japanese, saving themselves for the war with the Communists after WWII ended.war with the Communists after WWII ended.

Communists emerged as the real heroes of Communists emerged as the real heroes of victory over Japanvictory over Japan

Civil War resumes in 1945: US tried to mediate, Civil War resumes in 1945: US tried to mediate, gave $2b more in aid to KMT, encouraged co-gave $2b more in aid to KMT, encouraged co-operation with CCPoperation with CCP

Mao triumphed in 1949 over increasingly unpopular Mao triumphed in 1949 over increasingly unpopular govt. Jiang fled to Taiwan – Mao set up People’s govt. Jiang fled to Taiwan – Mao set up People’s Republic of China – Jiang set up Republic of China, Republic of China – Jiang set up Republic of China, with US assistancewith US assistance

Mao proceeded to introduce Communism – Great Mao proceeded to introduce Communism – Great Leap Forward…nationalized land, formed huge Leap Forward…nationalized land, formed huge collectives….little industrialization, modernization, collectives….little industrialization, modernization, little improvement in lives of peasants, crop failures, little improvement in lives of peasants, crop failures, famine, death of 20m from famine…. famine, death of 20m from famine….

Later Cultural Revolution, 1966 -1976, renewed Later Cultural Revolution, 1966 -1976, renewed effort to established Communism, purify nation of effort to established Communism, purify nation of anti-Communists…likes Stalin’s Purges….anti-Communists…likes Stalin’s Purges….

Stalin’s attitude to Communism in ChinaStalin’s attitude to Communism in ChinaFrom 1927 Stalin urged the Chinese Communists, From 1927 Stalin urged the Chinese Communists, through the through the CominternComintern, to continue to collaborate , to continue to collaborate with Nationalists , even in spite of the Shanghai with Nationalists , even in spite of the Shanghai Massacre – did so again after Japanese invasion, Massacre – did so again after Japanese invasion, and again after Japanese were expelled, during and again after Japanese were expelled, during the renewed Civil War. the renewed Civil War.

Judge and Langdon “Moscow, having invested its Judge and Langdon “Moscow, having invested its hopes in the KMT, insisted that the CCP should hopes in the KMT, insisted that the CCP should maintain the alliance in spite of Chiang’s maintain the alliance in spite of Chiang’s persecution. This callous Soviet pragmatism, persecution. This callous Soviet pragmatism, which would manifest itself repeatedly in the which would manifest itself repeatedly in the course of the next several decades, created a course of the next several decades, created a legacy of resentment and distrust on the part of legacy of resentment and distrust on the part of the Chinese Communists towards their Soviet the Chinese Communists towards their Soviet mentors.”mentors.”

Stalin gave little or no assistance to the CCP in the Civil War, Stalin gave little or no assistance to the CCP in the Civil War, even signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Nationalists govt. even signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Nationalists govt. of Jiang. of Jiang.

Even when Mao triumphed, Stalin choose not to recognize Even when Mao triumphed, Stalin choose not to recognize Mao’s regime at first, sending the Soviet ambassador to follow Mao’s regime at first, sending the Soviet ambassador to follow the Nationalist govt. after it moved to Canton. the Nationalist govt. after it moved to Canton.

DeutscherDeutscher describes Stalin’s attitude towards the Chinese describes Stalin’s attitude towards the Chinese Revolution as evidence of his willingness to “sacrifice the Revolution as evidence of his willingness to “sacrifice the Chinese Revolution in what he believed to be the interest of Chinese Revolution in what he believed to be the interest of the consolidation of the Soviet Union.”the consolidation of the Soviet Union.”

Pragmatic. Soviet interests would be best served by a CCP-Pragmatic. Soviet interests would be best served by a CCP-KMT alliance….ironically, the same goal / hope for China that KMT alliance….ironically, the same goal / hope for China that the USA had the USA had

Why so little encouragement, so little help from Stalin Why so little encouragement, so little help from Stalin to the Communists in China?to the Communists in China?

1. feared it might arouse fears of the West if there 1. feared it might arouse fears of the West if there were two major Communist countrieswere two major Communist countries

2. might have supported it if he felt he could control 2. might have supported it if he felt he could control Mao – but Mao was too independent minded. Mao Mao – but Mao was too independent minded. Mao represented a potential rival and Stalin was not represented a potential rival and Stalin was not comfortable with any communist leader who was comfortable with any communist leader who was independent of Moscow’s control (Judge and independent of Moscow’s control (Judge and Langdon p.98) Langdon p.98)

3. Communism in China was somewhat different from 3. Communism in China was somewhat different from Communism in the USSR – less industrialized and Communism in the USSR – less industrialized and more rural, more emphasis on Peasant Culture and more rural, more emphasis on Peasant Culture and Society.Society.

In China, “The Communists to be sure, spoke the In China, “The Communists to be sure, spoke the language of Marxism-Leninism and professed language of Marxism-Leninism and professed allegiance to the principles of Soviet style allegiance to the principles of Soviet style socialism. But they were by no means Soviet socialism. But they were by no means Soviet puppets. They had come to power on their own, puppets. They had come to power on their own, with little support and even less encouragement with little support and even less encouragement from Stalin and his cronies. And theirs was a from Stalin and his cronies. And theirs was a peasant revolution, rural and anti-urban in tone, peasant revolution, rural and anti-urban in tone, which did not entirely resemble either the which did not entirely resemble either the proletarian dictatorship envisioned by Marx and proletarian dictatorship envisioned by Marx and Lenin or the industrialized behemoth created by Lenin or the industrialized behemoth created by Stalin,” Judge and Langdon…(page 98)Stalin,” Judge and Langdon…(page 98)

Stalin was not thrilled with the outcome of the Civil War, he Stalin was not thrilled with the outcome of the Civil War, he had already established a solid working relationship with the had already established a solid working relationship with the Nationalists and had received important concessions in Nationalists and had received important concessions in Manchuria from Jiang’s govtManchuria from Jiang’s govt

Only after the Peoples Republic of China was formally Only after the Peoples Republic of China was formally declared, did Stalin officially recognize the new Chinese declared, did Stalin officially recognize the new Chinese regime – probably only after Stalin realized that the US was regime – probably only after Stalin realized that the US was not going to rescue Jiang and that China’s future was in the not going to rescue Jiang and that China’s future was in the hands of Maohands of Mao

Mao visited Moscow in Dec 1949 to negotiate a Treaty, he Mao visited Moscow in Dec 1949 to negotiate a Treaty, he was welcomed with something less than open arms, greeted was welcomed with something less than open arms, greeted on arrival by Foreign min Molotov not Stalin himself, was on arrival by Foreign min Molotov not Stalin himself, was referred to in the newspapers as Mr. Mao not Comrade Mao referred to in the newspapers as Mr. Mao not Comrade Mao and was treated “more as a supplicant than a heroic partner” and was treated “more as a supplicant than a heroic partner” - Judge and Langdon p. 98- Judge and Langdon p. 98

The negotiations were difficult and it was not until The negotiations were difficult and it was not until Feb of 1950 that an agreement was reached, Feb of 1950 that an agreement was reached, Mutual Assistance Treaty - thanks largely to the Mutual Assistance Treaty - thanks largely to the efforts of China’s new prime minister, Zhou Enlai. efforts of China’s new prime minister, Zhou Enlai.

The Soviets agreed to provide limited credits and The Soviets agreed to provide limited credits and aid to their allies and eventually to return the aid to their allies and eventually to return the railway and seaport concessions that had been railway and seaport concessions that had been granted them in Manchuria by the Nationalists granted them in Manchuria by the Nationalists

Aid to Mao / China from the USSR was in reality Aid to Mao / China from the USSR was in reality very little. And the aid would last only until 1960 very little. And the aid would last only until 1960 when the Soviets cut it off because of border / when the Soviets cut it off because of border / territorial disputesterritorial disputes

USSR and Germany / HitlerUSSR and Germany / Hitler

Most of Stalin’s foreign policy decisions Most of Stalin’s foreign policy decisions strengthened the security of the USSR – but in the strengthened the security of the USSR – but in the case of Germany, his policy backfired.case of Germany, his policy backfired.

In Germany, Stalin, through the In Germany, Stalin, through the CominternComintern, , ordered the German Communist Party, not to enter ordered the German Communist Party, not to enter into any anti-Nazi alliance with the German Social into any anti-Nazi alliance with the German Social Democratic Party. Democratic Party.

German Communists attacked Social Democracy German Communists attacked Social Democracy and cooperated with the Nazi party against it. and cooperated with the Nazi party against it.

At first Stalin’s policy may have made sense since At first Stalin’s policy may have made sense since the Nazis were weakthe Nazis were weak

But then they grew in strength due to the But then they grew in strength due to the Depression: won one third of seats in the Depression: won one third of seats in the Reichstag in 1932… Chancellor of coalition govt. in Reichstag in 1932… Chancellor of coalition govt. in a “legal revolution” a “legal revolution”

Communists suffered from a wave of Nazi terror, Communists suffered from a wave of Nazi terror, and after the Nazis success (now majority party) in and after the Nazis success (now majority party) in the 1933 elections (after the Reichstag fire of 28 the 1933 elections (after the Reichstag fire of 28 Feb), with the dictatorial powers given him by the Feb), with the dictatorial powers given him by the Enabling Act, Hitler campaign of repression of Enabling Act, Hitler campaign of repression of Communists intensified Communists intensified

The German SD’s had called on the German The German SD’s had called on the German Communists to ally with them against the rise of Communists to ally with them against the rise of Hitler, but Stalin would not allow it.Hitler, but Stalin would not allow it.

““A united left – SD’s and Communists -A united left – SD’s and Communists -mightmight have stopped the rise of the Nazis, but the policy have stopped the rise of the Nazis, but the policy foisted by Stalin on the German Communists foisted by Stalin on the German Communists eased the Nazis seizure of power in early 1933. eased the Nazis seizure of power in early 1933. Hitler soon turned on the German Communists Hitler soon turned on the German Communists arresting many and breaking up the movement.” arresting many and breaking up the movement.” ((ThompsonThompson p. 277) p. 277)

TuckerTucker – the Nazi party rose to power because of – the Nazi party rose to power because of the weaknesses of the center in the Weimar the weaknesses of the center in the Weimar Republic, the absence of political leadership in the Republic, the absence of political leadership in the new govt. and “not least, the tactics pursued by the new govt. and “not least, the tactics pursued by the German Communists on orders from Moscow – German Communists on orders from Moscow – from Stalin.” Tucker p.228.from Stalin.” Tucker p.228.

Tucker: In Germany, the parties of the Left - Social Tucker: In Germany, the parties of the Left - Social Democrats and Communists - combined, had about Democrats and Communists - combined, had about 40% of the Reichstag seats in Nov. 1932. Together 40% of the Reichstag seats in Nov. 1932. Together could have been a powerful force….whether they could have been a powerful force….whether they could have prevented the Nazi victory is an could have prevented the Nazi victory is an unanswerable question…. unanswerable question….

What is certain is that the absence of such What is certain is that the absence of such cooperation, indeed the strife between the two cooperation, indeed the strife between the two parties during that critical time, facilitated the parties during that critical time, facilitated the downfall of the constitutional order….by forcing the downfall of the constitutional order….by forcing the German Communist Party to adopt a policy of German Communist Party to adopt a policy of uncompromising belligerence against Social uncompromising belligerence against Social Democracy, he abetted the Nazi victory.” Tucker Democracy, he abetted the Nazi victory.” Tucker

A former German Communist wrote that the saying A former German Communist wrote that the saying current in antifascist German circles at the time current in antifascist German circles at the time was “Without Stalin, no Hitler.” was “Without Stalin, no Hitler.”

Zinoviev is supposed to have said “Apart from the Zinoviev is supposed to have said “Apart from the German Social Democrats, Stalin bears the main German Social Democrats, Stalin bears the main responsibility to history for Hitler’s victory.”responsibility to history for Hitler’s victory.”

Stalin’s reasoning may have beenStalin’s reasoning may have been1. He may have seen the Social Democrats as the 1. He may have seen the Social Democrats as the chief rival of German Communist Party – its chief rival of German Communist Party – its competition on the left.competition on the left.

2. He may have believed the SD’s were too 2. He may have believed the SD’s were too moderate, if they succeeded then it would be moderate, if they succeeded then it would be impossible to engineer a Communist Revolution in impossible to engineer a Communist Revolution in Germany later when the USSR was ready to Germany later when the USSR was ready to encourage international revolution encourage international revolution

3. A Communist Germany would not be good for 3. A Communist Germany would not be good for the USSR (like China) – would attract too much the USSR (like China) – would attract too much attention: Soviet interests came firstattention: Soviet interests came first

4.4. Nazi success in Germany would be helpful to Nazi success in Germany would be helpful to the USSR – Nazism was hostile to the West, the USSR – Nazism was hostile to the West, West to Nazism; it would bring tension, if not a West to Nazism; it would bring tension, if not a new war between Germany and the West. The new war between Germany and the West. The West would be so preoccupied with Germany West would be so preoccupied with Germany that the USSR could build up socialism in that the USSR could build up socialism in peace. peace.

5. As the Nazi party rose to power, Stalin 5. As the Nazi party rose to power, Stalin believed that Fascism represented the last believed that Fascism represented the last gasp effort of capitalism – he concluded that a gasp effort of capitalism – he concluded that a brief bout of Fascism would drive the brief bout of Fascism would drive the European peoples in flocks to Communism. European peoples in flocks to Communism. “He clung to this grave misconception into “He clung to this grave misconception into 1934.” Thompson p.275. 1934.” Thompson p.275.

6.6. Stalin underestimated Hitler. Never envisaged Stalin underestimated Hitler. Never envisaged Nazis becoming as strong as they did.Nazis becoming as strong as they did.

7. Appears to have been misled by their title - 7. Appears to have been misled by their title - National Socialism - into thinking that they National Socialism - into thinking that they might perform a useful function in preparing might perform a useful function in preparing ground for a workers revolution in Germany. ground for a workers revolution in Germany.

Relationship Between Stalin and Hitler After Relationship Between Stalin and Hitler After Nazi Take OverNazi Take Over

Soon after taking over power, Hitler and Stalin Soon after taking over power, Hitler and Stalin both sought cooperation and a good relationship both sought cooperation and a good relationship between Germany and the USSRbetween Germany and the USSR

Hitler met with the USSR ambassador to Hitler met with the USSR ambassador to Germany and spoke of the common interests of Germany and spoke of the common interests of the USSR and Germany – they both had the USSR and Germany – they both had economic difficulties and common enemies, and economic difficulties and common enemies, and could be of assistance to each other. could be of assistance to each other.

In early May 1933 Hitler agreed to ratify a In early May 1933 Hitler agreed to ratify a proposal to extend the 1922 Rapallo Treaty – proposal to extend the 1922 Rapallo Treaty – agreed in 1931 but left unsigned since then: agreed in 1931 but left unsigned since then: Stalin welcomed thisStalin welcomed this

But Stalin became anxious and concerned as But Stalin became anxious and concerned as Hitler solidified his power in Germany, re-armed, Hitler solidified his power in Germany, re-armed, signed alliances with Italy, Japan, Spain, and signed alliances with Italy, Japan, Spain, and began to expand into the Rhineland, Austria, began to expand into the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, CzechoslovakiaSudetenland, Czechoslovakia

Hitler also ordered attacks on German Hitler also ordered attacks on German Communists and issued anti-Soviet propaganda Communists and issued anti-Soviet propaganda

Stalin began to feel that the USSR was Stalin began to feel that the USSR was surrounded by enemies and vulnerablesurrounded by enemies and vulnerable

TuckerTucker: “If the victory of fascism in Germany had : “If the victory of fascism in Germany had a place in Stalin’s policy design, further spread of a place in Stalin’s policy design, further spread of fascist power did not. A tidal wave of fascism fascist power did not. A tidal wave of fascism would not give Stalin the division of Europe into would not give Stalin the division of Europe into rival camps that he wanted, but could also expose rival camps that he wanted, but could also expose Soviet Russia to a deadly danger of attack by a Soviet Russia to a deadly danger of attack by a fascist phalanx of states. He had therefore to do fascist phalanx of states. He had therefore to do everything possible to keep the remaining everything possible to keep the remaining European democracies and above all France from European democracies and above all France from going Fascist, and to encourage them to take a going Fascist, and to encourage them to take a stand against German aggression”. stand against German aggression”.

Hitler therefore introduced a switch or an Hitler therefore introduced a switch or an addition / new aspect to his existing foreign addition / new aspect to his existing foreign policy : Added policy : Added Collective Security Collective Security to Peaceful to Peaceful Coexistence (more activist)Coexistence (more activist)

Faced in the mid-30s with an emerging powerful Faced in the mid-30s with an emerging powerful Germany, Stalin began to pursue a policy of Germany, Stalin began to pursue a policy of Collective Security with the Western PowersCollective Security with the Western Powers

Stalin ordered the Stalin ordered the CominternComintern to shift positions; to shift positions; told Communist parties of Europe to cooperate told Communist parties of Europe to cooperate with other left wing Socialist parties against with other left wing Socialist parties against Fascist parties, in an anti Fascist alliances, esp. Fascist parties, in an anti Fascist alliances, esp. in France, and in Spain, in Popular Front in France, and in Spain, in Popular Front governments – success in both countries in governments – success in both countries in 1936 elections1936 elections

Policy of Collective Security Diplomacy Policy of Collective Security Diplomacy continued with the USSR signing mutual continued with the USSR signing mutual assistance pacts with France and with assistance pacts with France and with Czechoslovakia in May 1935. Czechoslovakia in May 1935.

Also engaged in talks with Britain – encouraged Also engaged in talks with Britain – encouraged all these countries to militarize in preparation for all these countries to militarize in preparation for Hitler’s attack.Hitler’s attack.

Really hoped for conflict in the future between Really hoped for conflict in the future between Western Europe and Nazi Germany (which Western Europe and Nazi Germany (which USSR would not be part of)USSR would not be part of)

Tucker: “It would suit him if Germany and these Tucker: “It would suit him if Germany and these Western powers that he was encouraging to arm Western powers that he was encouraging to arm would at some stage engage in a protracted would at some stage engage in a protracted inconclusive struggle that would weaken both sides inconclusive struggle that would weaken both sides while turning Germany against the democracies in while turning Germany against the democracies in what Stalin envisaged as a replay of WW1. what Stalin envisaged as a replay of WW1.

For the war to be protracted he wanted Br and Fr For the war to be protracted he wanted Br and Fr to be militarily strong enough to withstand the to be militarily strong enough to withstand the onslaught that Germany under Hitler would onslaught that Germany under Hitler would unleash against them – this is why he encouraged unleash against them – this is why he encouraged them to arm, and urged French communist to them to arm, and urged French communist to support the French military build-up.”support the French military build-up.”

Tucker: “Stalin’s collective security diplomacy Tucker: “Stalin’s collective security diplomacy was a calculated effort of coalition building in was a calculated effort of coalition building in Europe. He earnestly sought to bring about the Europe. He earnestly sought to bring about the formation of a strong politico-military anti-formation of a strong politico-military anti-German grouping based on Fr and Br. But, it German grouping based on Fr and Br. But, it was not a coalition in which he wanted the was not a coalition in which he wanted the Soviet Union to participate when war came. He Soviet Union to participate when war came. He was using anti-fascism for his own political was using anti-fascism for his own political purposes.”purposes.”

Double Standard / Two Faced Nature of his Double Standard / Two Faced Nature of his Foreign Policy (like the internal power struggle Foreign Policy (like the internal power struggle with Left and Right, used both sided)with Left and Right, used both sided)

While building this coalition with Fr, Br, etc. While building this coalition with Fr, Br, etc. Stalin still engaged in talks with Germany, Stalin still engaged in talks with Germany, pursuing diplomacy with Germany concurrently pursuing diplomacy with Germany concurrently with the coalition building diplomacy of collective with the coalition building diplomacy of collective securitysecurity

Stalin sought a non-aggression pact with Stalin sought a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1935 but Hitler was not yet Germany in 1935 but Hitler was not yet interested: needed to promote anti-Communism interested: needed to promote anti-Communism to help strengthen Germany – needed this to get to help strengthen Germany – needed this to get West to allow him to keep Rhineland and West to allow him to keep Rhineland and Czechoslovakia – so he didn’t want an Alliance Czechoslovakia – so he didn’t want an Alliance with the USSR at this stagewith the USSR at this stage

Tucker; “Tucker; “ Hitler appealed to the anti-Communism of Hitler appealed to the anti-Communism of the West when he began to militarize. He was the West when he began to militarize. He was practicing divisive diplomacy of his own, at Russia’s practicing divisive diplomacy of his own, at Russia’s expense, by playing the card of anti-Bolshevism in expense, by playing the card of anti-Bolshevism in seeking Western acquiescence in his moves to seeking Western acquiescence in his moves to restore German power. restore German power.

To the British he defended his militarization by To the British he defended his militarization by denouncing the USSR, insisting that he had no denouncing the USSR, insisting that he had no claims on Fr or Brclaims on Fr or Br

But the USSR and Germany were only doing what But the USSR and Germany were only doing what everyone else was doing, Western powers included; everyone else was doing, Western powers included; they were all engaged in double standardsthey were all engaged in double standards – – maneuvering, scheming, positioning for the futuremaneuvering, scheming, positioning for the future

Stalin hoped to play Germany and West against Stalin hoped to play Germany and West against each other; each other;

Hitler hoped to play USSR and West against Hitler hoped to play USSR and West against each othereach other

West hoped to play Germany and USSR against West hoped to play Germany and USSR against each other. The West had a vision of Stalin and each other. The West had a vision of Stalin and Hitler neutralizing each other. Hitler neutralizing each other.

Stalin was concerned about the inaction of the Stalin was concerned about the inaction of the West after Hitler began to rearm and then West after Hitler began to rearm and then invaded the demilitarized Rhinelandinvaded the demilitarized Rhineland

The Western powers, as was Stalin, as was The Western powers, as was Stalin, as was Hitler, “were working both sides of the diplomatic Hitler, “were working both sides of the diplomatic street.”street.”

Stalin felt he had an advantage in this chess Stalin felt he had an advantage in this chess match, and that was Hitler’s inclination towards a match, and that was Hitler’s inclination towards a war with France first – Stalin held a card of great war with France first – Stalin held a card of great value in the current diplomatic game: the value in the current diplomatic game: the capacity to assure Germany of Soviet neutrality capacity to assure Germany of Soviet neutrality in the event of war in the West.in the event of war in the West.

Spanish Civil WarSpanish Civil WarProvided an opportunity for the West and the USSR Provided an opportunity for the West and the USSR to display their Collective Security and to see how to display their Collective Security and to see how effective it was against the forces of Nazism. effective it was against the forces of Nazism.

In Spain, the Popular Front govt. / Republic, legally In Spain, the Popular Front govt. / Republic, legally elected, was under pressure from the right wing, elected, was under pressure from the right wing, from a Nationalists / fascist military coup led by from a Nationalists / fascist military coup led by General FrancoGeneral Franco

But Collective Security proved to be a failure. Hitler But Collective Security proved to be a failure. Hitler and Mussolini sent considerable assistance to the and Mussolini sent considerable assistance to the Right, but only Stalin sent any significant help to the Right, but only Stalin sent any significant help to the Popular Front or Left. Br, Fr, US sent minimal and Popular Front or Left. Br, Fr, US sent minimal and ineffective levels of help……ineffective levels of help……

Lack of help from the Western Powers led Stalin Lack of help from the Western Powers led Stalin to doubt their commitment to opposing Fascism. to doubt their commitment to opposing Fascism.

Stalin helped because;Stalin helped because;The addition of another Fascist country would The addition of another Fascist country would seriously weaken France as the anchor state of seriously weaken France as the anchor state of what remained of non-fascist Europewhat remained of non-fascist EuropeHitler’s respect for Russia as a power house Hitler’s respect for Russia as a power house would hardly be enhanced if she stood passively would hardly be enhanced if she stood passively by while Germany and Italy were seeing to the by while Germany and Italy were seeing to the destruction of republican Spain.destruction of republican Spain.

Lynch argues that the lack of support from the Lynch argues that the lack of support from the West was Stalin’s own fault, he turned the West West was Stalin’s own fault, he turned the West away from helping in Spain because he insisted on away from helping in Spain because he insisted on controlling the Popular Front efforts in the war. controlling the Popular Front efforts in the war.

He insisted that the Spanish Republic had to He insisted that the Spanish Republic had to transfer its gold reserves to the USSR ($518m, transfer its gold reserves to the USSR ($518m, shipped to the USSR to finance the Soviet aid shipped to the USSR to finance the Soviet aid effort) and all the Republican contingents were effort) and all the Republican contingents were required to put themselves under the control of the required to put themselves under the control of the USSR – the Spanish left resented this USSR – the Spanish left resented this

The end result was a victory for Franco / The end result was a victory for Franco / Republicans, creating another Fascist / Right Republicans, creating another Fascist / Right Wing military dictatorship in Europe, presenting Wing military dictatorship in Europe, presenting another threat to the USSR. another threat to the USSR.

Stalin was disillusioned with the West and with Stalin was disillusioned with the West and with Collective SecurityCollective Security

Principle of Collect Security was shattered even Principle of Collect Security was shattered even more for Stalin by the events at Munich – Hitler more for Stalin by the events at Munich – Hitler took Austria without being stopped, without took Austria without being stopped, without sanctions, then the Sudetenland, while Mussolini sanctions, then the Sudetenland, while Mussolini took Ethiopia. took Ethiopia.

Munich Agreement, 1938, between Br, Fr, Ger – gave Munich Agreement, 1938, between Br, Fr, Ger – gave Hitler the Sudetenland, in return for a promise to not Hitler the Sudetenland, in return for a promise to not expand any further – to Stalin this was the ultimate in expand any further – to Stalin this was the ultimate in appeasement appeasement

And the USSR was not invited to the Munich talksAnd the USSR was not invited to the Munich talks

The Munich Conference, the Anglo-French sacrifice of The Munich Conference, the Anglo-French sacrifice of part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, in Sept. 1938, marked part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, in Sept. 1938, marked a turning point in Stalin’s thinking. Stalin now saw no a turning point in Stalin’s thinking. Stalin now saw no reason to ally with Fr and Br. reason to ally with Fr and Br. Decided to strike a deal Decided to strike a deal with Hitler – “perhaps the Soviet dictator deemed it with Hitler – “perhaps the Soviet dictator deemed it safer to bargain with a fellow realist than to count on safer to bargain with a fellow realist than to count on the ideologically unreliable democracies.” (Thompson)the ideologically unreliable democracies.” (Thompson)

After the failure of a final attempt to form an anti After the failure of a final attempt to form an anti Fascist alliance with Br and Fr, Stalin began Fascist alliance with Br and Fr, Stalin began pursuing a pact with Hitler in the fall of 1938. pursuing a pact with Hitler in the fall of 1938.

This took enemies and friends of the USSR by This took enemies and friends of the USSR by surprisesurprise

But Stalin, given the threat from Germany and the But Stalin, given the threat from Germany and the indifference of Br and Fr to his offers of a defense indifference of Br and Fr to his offers of a defense alliance, felt he had no alternative left – he was alliance, felt he had no alternative left – he was attempting to nullify the threat of Germany by the attempting to nullify the threat of Germany by the only move open to himonly move open to him

Began to downplay propaganda attacks on Began to downplay propaganda attacks on Nazism / FascismNazism / Fascism

Fired Litvinov and replaced him with Molotov. Fired Litvinov and replaced him with Molotov. Litvinov had strongly advocated collective Litvinov had strongly advocated collective security with Western powers – and he was security with Western powers – and he was Jewish. Jewish.

Hitler responded, advised by his generals to Hitler responded, advised by his generals to neutralize either the Allies or the USSR before neutralize either the Allies or the USSR before launching major military operationslaunching major military operations

Hitler also anxious for an agreement with the Hitler also anxious for an agreement with the USSR – had made up his mind to provoke WWII USSR – had made up his mind to provoke WWII – took rest of Czechoslovakia, set sights on – took rest of Czechoslovakia, set sights on invasion of Poland - warning from Western invasion of Poland - warning from Western powers that this would be the final strawpowers that this would be the final straw

Stalin was not that dissatisfied with the German Stalin was not that dissatisfied with the German take over of Czechoslovakia – Appeasement yes take over of Czechoslovakia – Appeasement yes but, now that Czechoslovakia had fallen, there but, now that Czechoslovakia had fallen, there remained the likelihood of a war in the West remained the likelihood of a war in the West preceded by, and unleashed by, a Moscow-preceded by, and unleashed by, a Moscow-Berlin accordBerlin accord

In Munich’s immediate aftermath his diplomacy In Munich’s immediate aftermath his diplomacy steered straight in that direction – both agreed to steered straight in that direction – both agreed to tone down propaganda attacks, agreed to a tone down propaganda attacks, agreed to a trade agreement, Stalin eased off on his help for trade agreement, Stalin eased off on his help for the Spanish Left, and then wound up his the Spanish Left, and then wound up his intervention in Spain totally. intervention in Spain totally.

““No longer would he allow the Spanish cause to No longer would he allow the Spanish cause to stand in the way of better relations with Berlin.”stand in the way of better relations with Berlin.”

Hitler was now interested in the non-aggression pact Hitler was now interested in the non-aggression pact that Stalin had wanted earlier – Stalin heightened that Stalin had wanted earlier – Stalin heightened pressure on Hitler by having Molotov engage pressure on Hitler by having Molotov engage simultaneously in discussion with the Br and Fr for a simultaneously in discussion with the Br and Fr for a mutual assistance pact between the 3 powers. mutual assistance pact between the 3 powers.

This put Hitler under pressure to come to quick This put Hitler under pressure to come to quick agreement with Stalin. Finally reached agreementagreement with Stalin. Finally reached agreement

In Aug 1939, the impossible happened, Nazi In Aug 1939, the impossible happened, Nazi Germany and Communist USSR, sworn ideological Germany and Communist USSR, sworn ideological enemies, singed a pact – both gave a solemn pledge enemies, singed a pact – both gave a solemn pledge to maintain peaceful relations with each other.to maintain peaceful relations with each other.

Non Aggression for 10 yrs, and secret pact / Non Aggression for 10 yrs, and secret pact / protocol which gave the USSR one third of protocol which gave the USSR one third of Poland, control over Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, control over Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Bessarabia Finland, Bessarabia

Stalin brutally took over these areas, using terror Stalin brutally took over these areas, using terror against the civilian populations after WWII was against the civilian populations after WWII was declared in September 1939 declared in September 1939

with his east flank covered, Hitler launched his with his east flank covered, Hitler launched his invasion of Poland…..WWII. invasion of Poland…..WWII.

Who got the better of the Deal, Stalin or Who got the better of the Deal, Stalin or Hitler? Hitler?

Hitler didn’t have to fight a war on two fronts – Hitler didn’t have to fight a war on two fronts – protected his right flankprotected his right flank

Stalin felt he deferred the Germany invasion of Stalin felt he deferred the Germany invasion of the USSR and when and if it came it would be the USSR and when and if it came it would be weakened because of the prolonged struggle weakened because of the prolonged struggle with the West, and by then the USSR would be with the West, and by then the USSR would be strongerstronger

Stalin boasted that he knew what Hitler was up Stalin boasted that he knew what Hitler was up to, that he knew all along that Hitler planned to to, that he knew all along that Hitler planned to invade the West first and then turn to invade the invade the West first and then turn to invade the USSR afterwards - “he thinks he’s outsmarted USSR afterwards - “he thinks he’s outsmarted me but actually it’s I who have outsmarted him.” me but actually it’s I who have outsmarted him.”

Thought he had averted a Nazi assault on the Thought he had averted a Nazi assault on the USSR, he felt the Allies and Germany would USSR, he felt the Allies and Germany would fight to a standstill, at best. fight to a standstill, at best.

At worst, a weakened Hitler would attack the At worst, a weakened Hitler would attack the Soviet Union, but not for many, many years.Soviet Union, but not for many, many years.

Thompson….p.328 to be sure Stalin, as he Thompson….p.328 to be sure Stalin, as he intended, temporarily kept the USSR out of war intended, temporarily kept the USSR out of war and won valuable time for the USSR to continue and won valuable time for the USSR to continue defense preparations. defense preparations.

He gained additional territory as a buffer He gained additional territory as a buffer between the USSR and Germanybetween the USSR and Germany

““But he paid an enormous price for these But he paid an enormous price for these benefits”. For one thing he gave Hitler a free benefits”. For one thing he gave Hitler a free hand in Poland, and he helped supply the Nazi hand in Poland, and he helped supply the Nazi war machine with raw materials for the next 22 war machine with raw materials for the next 22 mths, under supplemental Nazi- Soviet mths, under supplemental Nazi- Soviet commercial agreementscommercial agreements. .

He also permitted Hitler to concentrate the might He also permitted Hitler to concentrate the might of the German armed forces against the Fr and of the German armed forces against the Fr and Br the following spring. Thus when Hitler Br the following spring. Thus when Hitler refocused his efforts on Lebensraum to the east, refocused his efforts on Lebensraum to the east, the Red Army had to face the battle tested, the Red Army had to face the battle tested, expert German troops alone.”expert German troops alone.”

Operation BarbarossaOperation Barbarossa

Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, June 1941. Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, June 1941.

Broke Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. Not Broke Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. Not even two years old…even two years old…

Frustrated by losing the Battle of Britain and the Frustrated by losing the Battle of Britain and the defeat of Operation Sea Lion. Hitler turned back defeat of Operation Sea Lion. Hitler turned back East, invading much of Eastern Europe East, invading much of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece..) on his drive towards the USSR…Greece..) on his drive towards the USSR…

Stalin was forewarned six months in advance that Stalin was forewarned six months in advance that Hitler was planning an invasion of the Soviet Union / Hitler was planning an invasion of the Soviet Union / received adequate warning but did nothing to received adequate warning but did nothing to prepare, did not increase USSR’s Western defenses prepare, did not increase USSR’s Western defenses or start mobilization. or start mobilization.

Stalin dismissed the evidence as false; Right up to Stalin dismissed the evidence as false; Right up to the invasion he did nothing, even as the Germans the invasion he did nothing, even as the Germans were marching towards the Russian borders. were marching towards the Russian borders.

And then when the invasion took place and he was And then when the invasion took place and he was informed about it, he lapsed into a long silence, was informed about it, he lapsed into a long silence, was paralyzed with surprise when he heard, unable to paralyzed with surprise when he heard, unable to give directions, instructions for several day.give directions, instructions for several day.

Why did he not respond six months before, or Why did he not respond six months before, or even days before the invasion? even days before the invasion?

Basically he could not or would not believe that Basically he could not or would not believe that his Plan had failed – having Hitler and the West his Plan had failed – having Hitler and the West fight each other to a standstill, buying time, 10 fight each other to a standstill, buying time, 10 years before the invasion by Germany. years before the invasion by Germany.

Could not bring himself to admit that the pact Could not bring himself to admit that the pact had failed, that he had misread Hitler. He could had failed, that he had misread Hitler. He could not accept that he could be so wrong, that not accept that he could be so wrong, that France collapsed much faster and much earlier France collapsed much faster and much earlier than was expected, and Hitler gave up on than was expected, and Hitler gave up on conquering Britain much earlier than anticipated.conquering Britain much earlier than anticipated.

Stalin fell under a Grand Delusion that he could Stalin fell under a Grand Delusion that he could control and neutralize Hitler and control events control and neutralize Hitler and control events outside the USSR to his benefitoutside the USSR to his benefit

According to Tucker, Stalin miscalculated. Due According to Tucker, Stalin miscalculated. Due to his faulty assessment of Hitler’s intentions, he to his faulty assessment of Hitler’s intentions, he was convinced that he could avert or indefinitely was convinced that he could avert or indefinitely postpone Hitler’s offensive. postpone Hitler’s offensive.

The miscalculation grew out of Stalin’s faulty The miscalculation grew out of Stalin’s faulty assessment of Hitler’s intentions and his inability assessment of Hitler’s intentions and his inability to admit that he might have made a mistake. to admit that he might have made a mistake.

Thompson - “Stalin’s misguided diplomacy of the Thompson - “Stalin’s misguided diplomacy of the late 1930s, designed to avert conflict with Hitler, late 1930s, designed to avert conflict with Hitler, in fact permitted the Nazi leader to concentrate in fact permitted the Nazi leader to concentrate all his forces against the USSR in 1941.” all his forces against the USSR in 1941.”

and because he failed to prepare to defend the and because he failed to prepare to defend the USSR adequately he would bring misery and USSR adequately he would bring misery and death to millions of Russians at the hands of the death to millions of Russians at the hands of the GermansGermans

His refusal in the spring of 1941 to believe that His refusal in the spring of 1941 to believe that Hitler would assault the USSR burdened millions Hitler would assault the USSR burdened millions of Soviet citizens with needless hardshipof Soviet citizens with needless hardship

Stalin read too much into the Non Aggression Stalin read too much into the Non Aggression Pact – he may have expected it to last more than Pact – he may have expected it to last more than 2 yrs but to expect it to last 10 year was 2 yrs but to expect it to last 10 year was ridiculously unrealistic – he should have been ridiculously unrealistic – he should have been doing something to prepare to defend the Soviet doing something to prepare to defend the Soviet Union’s Western Borders from Germany from the Union’s Western Borders from Germany from the outbreak of WWII. outbreak of WWII.

Hitler after all had made no secret of his belief Hitler after all had made no secret of his belief that it was German destiny to expand east at that it was German destiny to expand east at expense of Slavs inc. Russia (Mein Kampf, which expense of Slavs inc. Russia (Mein Kampf, which Stalin had read, underlined passages from, about Stalin had read, underlined passages from, about Ger take over of SU). Ger take over of SU).

Stalin chose to ignore this between 1939 and Stalin chose to ignore this between 1939 and 1941. 1941.

Tucker: Russia was exposed to deadly danger of Tucker: Russia was exposed to deadly danger of destruction. “Cunningly careful in the one sphere destruction. “Cunningly careful in the one sphere in which he excelled – accumulating personal in which he excelled – accumulating personal power – Stalin was a gambler and a bungler in power – Stalin was a gambler and a bungler in high politics involving the power and interests of high politics involving the power and interests of the nation. the nation.

The calamity brought on by his gamble with The calamity brought on by his gamble with terroristic collectivization of the peasantry showed terroristic collectivization of the peasantry showed this at the outset of the 1930s, and the fiasco of this at the outset of the 1930s, and the fiasco of his foreign policy showed it now. What made him his foreign policy showed it now. What made him a gambler and a bungler was the sublime faith in a gambler and a bungler was the sublime faith in his own superior judgment that this man of limited his own superior judgment that this man of limited and flawed leadership capacity attributed to and flawed leadership capacity attributed to himself because he believed that he was great himself because he believed that he was great and wise as a political leader.”and wise as a political leader.”

TuckerTucker: “After the signing of the pact with Hitler : “After the signing of the pact with Hitler in Aug. 1939, Stalin boasted that he had in Aug. 1939, Stalin boasted that he had “tricked” Hitler, but in truth, it was the other way “tricked” Hitler, but in truth, it was the other way around. Not only did Hitler, by his quick victory around. Not only did Hitler, by his quick victory over France, invalidate Stalin’s firm assumption over France, invalidate Stalin’s firm assumption that the war in the West would be protracted and that the war in the West would be protracted and thereby work to his advantage. thereby work to his advantage.

Now he had outsmarted Stalin by encouraging Now he had outsmarted Stalin by encouraging him to believe that he was disposed to enter into him to believe that he was disposed to enter into arrangements under which the two of them arrangements under which the two of them would more or less dominate the world in would more or less dominate the world in tandem. Stalin never seems to have tandem. Stalin never seems to have comprehended the full force of Hitler’s fanaticism comprehended the full force of Hitler’s fanaticism and the impossibility of doing that sort of and the impossibility of doing that sort of business with him.”business with him.”

Hitler’s perception of the Nazi-Soviet pact was Hitler’s perception of the Nazi-Soviet pact was different than Stalin’s. Perceived it as a short different than Stalin’s. Perceived it as a short term deviceterm device to give him a free hand in the West, to give him a free hand in the West, and to bolster the German economy until he and to bolster the German economy until he could grasp Russia’s riches for the greater could grasp Russia’s riches for the greater Reich.Reich.

The ideologically driven Nazi dictator had long The ideologically driven Nazi dictator had long determined to subjugate the lowly Slavs and to determined to subjugate the lowly Slavs and to wipe out the Bolsheviks. Hitler had no intention wipe out the Bolsheviks. Hitler had no intention of sharing dominion over Eurasia with Stalin or of sharing dominion over Eurasia with Stalin or with anyone else.with anyone else.

READ TUCKER EXTRACT HEREREAD TUCKER EXTRACT HERE

June 22, 1941. 3.4m soldiers, 3,350 tanks, 2,000 June 22, 1941. 3.4m soldiers, 3,350 tanks, 2,000 warplanes, the largest invasion force in history, warplanes, the largest invasion force in history, invaded over an 800m long front, striking in invaded over an 800m long front, striking in three places, Leningrad to Nth, Moscow in three places, Leningrad to Nth, Moscow in center, Kiev to sth. center, Kiev to sth.

Advanced 300 to 400 mls in 6 weeks, Advanced 300 to 400 mls in 6 weeks, slaughtering and capturing about 1m Soviet slaughtering and capturing about 1m Soviet troopstroops

Consequence – USSR was not as prepared as it Consequence – USSR was not as prepared as it might be, frontier defenses were easily over run might be, frontier defenses were easily over run and Soviet army forced to retreat. and Soviet army forced to retreat.

USSR did not take the initiative, did not put USSR did not take the initiative, did not put armed forces on the alert, Soviet forces were armed forces on the alert, Soviet forces were caught off guard, so the Germans easily overran caught off guard, so the Germans easily overran a USSR that was wholly without effective a USSR that was wholly without effective leadership and direction. leadership and direction.

His mistakes cost millions of Soviet lives, wasted His mistakes cost millions of Soviet lives, wasted billions of rubles in lost equipment and billions of rubles in lost equipment and destruction, and put the entire nation at risk. destruction, and put the entire nation at risk.

Stalin’ s preparations for war were really poor, Stalin’ s preparations for war were really poor, no emergency preparations, no stock pile of no emergency preparations, no stock pile of food, most industrial plants were in western food, most industrial plants were in western USSRUSSR

German soon controlled 40% of the USSR’s German soon controlled 40% of the USSR’s population, one third of mining and population, one third of mining and manufacturing output including half of key manufacturing output including half of key metals such as coal, iron, steel, and aluminum, metals such as coal, iron, steel, and aluminum, 45% or country’s railroads, 45% of livestock – 45% or country’s railroads, 45% of livestock – dealt serious blow to Economy – dealt serious blow to Economy –

USSR did not recover its prewar industrial level USSR did not recover its prewar industrial level until 1949, its grain output until the mid 1950s until 1949, its grain output until the mid 1950s and its livestock until the early 1960sand its livestock until the early 1960s

For days after the Nazi invasion Stalin was For days after the Nazi invasion Stalin was stunned, unable to give instructionsstunned, unable to give instructions..

Then, a confused and shaken Stalin met Then, a confused and shaken Stalin met regularly with his colleagues but took no public regularly with his colleagues but took no public steps in the first ten days of the war – he mainly steps in the first ten days of the war – he mainly reacted to suggestionsreacted to suggestions

But recovered to provide resolute and inspiring But recovered to provide resolute and inspiring leadership that carried the USSR through to leadership that carried the USSR through to eventual victory in 1945eventual victory in 1945

Set up a Committee of Evacuation, for Set up a Committee of Evacuation, for withdrawing people, factories, and goods withdrawing people, factories, and goods eastward ahead of the German advance. eastward ahead of the German advance.

The State Defense Committee was created to The State Defense Committee was created to coordinate the entire war effort, chaired by Stalin coordinate the entire war effort, chaired by Stalin with 4 other members. The Stavka, a new with 4 other members. The Stavka, a new institution, was created to provide unity of armed institution, was created to provide unity of armed forces command, also chaired by Stalin. forces command, also chaired by Stalin.

Hitler’s mistakesHitler’s mistakesdelays and hesitations, delayed by assisting Italy in delays and hesitations, delayed by assisting Italy in Yugoslavia and GreeceYugoslavia and Greece

no clear goals; failed to define either the immediate no clear goals; failed to define either the immediate or the long range objectives of their offensive: did or the long range objectives of their offensive: did they aim to destroy the Red army and the Soviet they aim to destroy the Red army and the Soviet state, or just occupy and exploit most of eastern state, or just occupy and exploit most of eastern European Russia: should they take Leningrad, European Russia: should they take Leningrad, Moscow, or focus on the Ukraine and the Caucasus Moscow, or focus on the Ukraine and the Caucasus (food supplies). Shifting between these goals led to (food supplies). Shifting between these goals led to indecision, hesitation successfully advancing on at indecision, hesitation successfully advancing on at Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev.

delayed a month before actually attacking delayed a month before actually attacking Moscow, allowing Soviets to improve defenses. Moscow, allowing Soviets to improve defenses. And winter became more severe…had they taken And winter became more severe…had they taken Moscow in the fall of 1941, the war might have Moscow in the fall of 1941, the war might have ended then or the following year. “Hitler’s ended then or the following year. “Hitler’s midsummer irresolution proved a fatal misstep for midsummer irresolution proved a fatal misstep for the Reich.” the Reich.”

he planned on a 6 week campaign, did not listen he planned on a 6 week campaign, did not listen to generals who told him about SU manpower and to generals who told him about SU manpower and resources: felt SU was inferior and that resources: felt SU was inferior and that Communism would collapse Communism would collapse

did not take adv of dissatisfaction among many did not take adv of dissatisfaction among many Soviet citizens, esp. national minorities, with Soviet citizens, esp. national minorities, with StalinStalin

Anti-Stalin movement in USSR, led by Andrei Vlasov, Anti-Stalin movement in USSR, led by Andrei Vlasov, known as the Movement for the Liberation of the known as the Movement for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia – but Hitler, because of his racial Peoples of Russia – but Hitler, because of his racial views and shortsightedness treated Soviet people with views and shortsightedness treated Soviet people with brutality…many executionsbrutality…many executions

Result was Soviet army and people fought harder, Result was Soviet army and people fought harder, steeled the Soviet peoples resolve to repel the steeled the Soviet peoples resolve to repel the invaders. invaders.

““This major political blunder cost Hitler the chance to This major political blunder cost Hitler the chance to undercut Soviet resistance.” Remarkable feature of undercut Soviet resistance.” Remarkable feature of invasion was that local Soviet populations in border invasion was that local Soviet populations in border areas, out of hatred for Communism / Stalinism, would areas, out of hatred for Communism / Stalinism, would have assisted the Germans. have assisted the Germans.

But the Germans over-ran these areas with But the Germans over-ran these areas with brutality, rather than enlist aid of these people in brutality, rather than enlist aid of these people in the occupied areas – blinded by their racial the occupied areas – blinded by their racial theory. DOCUMENT. theory. DOCUMENT.

Soviet people responded to this brutality – Soviet people responded to this brutality – fought back courageously – Soviet army would fought back courageously – Soviet army would get revenge on Germans when the USSR get revenge on Germans when the USSR invaded Germanyinvaded Germany

Stalin’s RecoveryStalin’s Recovery

Stalin used the theme of nationalism to generate Stalin used the theme of nationalism to generate enthusiasm among the masses for the war effort enthusiasm among the masses for the war effort – they must defend the honor of the homeland, – they must defend the honor of the homeland, of heroes and leaders of the past. of heroes and leaders of the past.

References to Socialism dwindled during the war References to Socialism dwindled during the war yrs. yrs.

Enlisted aid of Orthodox Church: church Enlisted aid of Orthodox Church: church preached Nationalism / Patriotism, Resistance, preached Nationalism / Patriotism, Resistance, collected money for the war effortcollected money for the war effort

Stalin used repression and coercion against Stalin used repression and coercion against those suspected of opposing his policies, esp. those suspected of opposing his policies, esp. national minorities. Also announced that soldiers national minorities. Also announced that soldiers captured by the Germans would be treated as captured by the Germans would be treated as traitors – to make them fight harder. traitors – to make them fight harder.

Increased discipline in factories to ensure Increased discipline in factories to ensure greater production in defense industries. greater production in defense industries.

SU did manage to evacuate to the Urals western SU did manage to evacuate to the Urals western Siberia, and Central Asia more than 6m workers Siberia, and Central Asia more than 6m workers and 1,500 factories, several of which were back and 1,500 factories, several of which were back in prod within a few mths. Armaments. in prod within a few mths. Armaments. Impressive record on arms prod during war – in Impressive record on arms prod during war – in 1940 weapons prod grew by one and a half 1940 weapons prod grew by one and a half times from 1937, and bet 1940 and 1944 times from 1937, and bet 1940 and 1944 quadrupled again. At its height the Soviet quadrupled again. At its height the Soviet monthly output was per month, 3,400 aircraft, monthly output was per month, 3,400 aircraft, 1,800 tanks and armored vehicles, 11,000 guns 1,800 tanks and armored vehicles, 11,000 guns and mortars, 200,000 rifles and 19m shells, and mortars, 200,000 rifles and 19m shells, mines, and bombs – but at expense of civilian mines, and bombs – but at expense of civilian economy – shortage of all kinds of goods, economy – shortage of all kinds of goods, services, food, etc….led to starvation, esp in services, food, etc….led to starvation, esp in gulags were rations were severely cut,gulags were rations were severely cut,

Assisted by Lend Lease / USAssisted by Lend Lease / US

Lend Lease provided much needed assistance – Lend Lease provided much needed assistance – aid amounted to between 20- 25% of Soviet net aid amounted to between 20- 25% of Soviet net national product. And freed one seventh of the national product. And freed one seventh of the Soviet workers for war tasks. It also benefited Soviet workers for war tasks. It also benefited the economy at its lowest point and noticeably the economy at its lowest point and noticeably subsidized the postwar reconstruction of the subsidized the postwar reconstruction of the USSR. USSR.

Stalin also made mistakes, did not listen to Stalin also made mistakes, did not listen to advice to evacuate advice to evacuate KievKiev, it was taken in Sept. , it was taken in Sept. with the loss of half a million men and huge with the loss of half a million men and huge quantities of equipment. “The fall of Kiev quantities of equipment. “The fall of Kiev remains the most ghastly defeat of the war and remains the most ghastly defeat of the war and perhaps in all military history. Stalin was clearly perhaps in all military history. Stalin was clearly to blame.” (Thompson)to blame.” (Thompson)

Siege of Siege of Leningrad Leningrad – Hitler decided that he would – Hitler decided that he would besiege it and starve it into submission rather than attack besiege it and starve it into submission rather than attack itit

Stalin was warned and could have evacuated it – so he Stalin was warned and could have evacuated it – so he bears “some responsibility for the disaster as well.” bears “some responsibility for the disaster as well.”

As a result of his failure to act, only about 1m of the 3m As a result of his failure to act, only about 1m of the 3m people were evacuated. He also blocked efforts to send people were evacuated. He also blocked efforts to send food there, insisting that it be sent to Moscow instead. food there, insisting that it be sent to Moscow instead. During the siege 1m died from starvation, cold, disease – During the siege 1m died from starvation, cold, disease – desperate they ate pets, pigeons, rodents, even human desperate they ate pets, pigeons, rodents, even human flesh. But the city never surrendered, after 2 and a half flesh. But the city never surrendered, after 2 and a half yrs of agony the siege was lifted. Only 639,000 people yrs of agony the siege was lifted. Only 639,000 people remained alive. remained alive.

In mid Oct 1941, winter weather slowed the In mid Oct 1941, winter weather slowed the Nazis. Believing that the Russian campaign Nazis. Believing that the Russian campaign would end by fall, the German high command would end by fall, the German high command had failed to order winter clothing and supplies had failed to order winter clothing and supplies until it was too late – they did not arrive until until it was too late – they did not arrive until after the battle of Moscow. after the battle of Moscow.

Weather and Red Army saved Moscow. Weather and Red Army saved Moscow. Germans were driven back. But at huge cost – in Germans were driven back. But at huge cost – in the first 6mths of war over 3m Red Army soldiers the first 6mths of war over 3m Red Army soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured. had been killed, wounded, or captured.

Early 1942 - Germans focused on Stalingrad - Early 1942 - Germans focused on Stalingrad - Stalin was determined to defend the city, partly Stalin was determined to defend the city, partly because of its name, and partly because of its because of its name, and partly because of its importance as a provincial center and importance as a provincial center and transportation hub. transportation hub.

Germans penetrated deep into city, Soviet army Germans penetrated deep into city, Soviet army fought hand to hand combat, house to house, fought hand to hand combat, house to house, and refused to be dislodged. and refused to be dislodged.

Red Army launched counter attack trapping Red Army launched counter attack trapping German 6th army in a pocket in the west part of German 6th army in a pocket in the west part of the city. the city.

Hitler delayed decision about fighting their way Hitler delayed decision about fighting their way out or sending them help – finally surrendered in out or sending them help – finally surrendered in Feb 1942Feb 1942

Only 110,000 of 400,000 survived. Only 110,000 of 400,000 survived.

German defeat here marks a decisive turning German defeat here marks a decisive turning point. Heavy fighting lay ahead but the Germs point. Heavy fighting lay ahead but the Germs lost the strategic initiative. lost the strategic initiative.

By early 1944 the USSR had recovered the By early 1944 the USSR had recovered the territory that Germany had overrun since June territory that Germany had overrun since June 1941. 1941.

The USSR survived because of:The USSR survived because of:

dogged resistance of the Red army, despite dogged resistance of the Red army, despite tremendous lossestremendous losses

centralized control of economy and society: centralized control of economy and society: Stalin’s ability to marshal the country’s Stalin’s ability to marshal the country’s resources, inc. a huge propaganda campaign: resources, inc. a huge propaganda campaign: posters, cartoons, filmsposters, cartoons, films

The war strengthened Stalin and the party’s The war strengthened Stalin and the party’s dominant role – the cult of Stalin was enhanced dominant role – the cult of Stalin was enhanced during and after the war during and after the war

Hitler’s errors. USSR success over Germany Hitler’s errors. USSR success over Germany was due more to Hitler’s blunders than Stalin’s was due more to Hitler’s blunders than Stalin’s genius. But for Hitler’s blunders, the Nazis might genius. But for Hitler’s blunders, the Nazis might have subjugated the Soviet U within 6 mths. have subjugated the Soviet U within 6 mths. (Thompson)(Thompson)

Thompson: resources, central structure, Thompson: resources, central structure, industry…all helped the USSR to survive….but industry…all helped the USSR to survive….but the single biggest reason was the toughness the single biggest reason was the toughness and determination of the Soviet people…the and determination of the Soviet people…the fortitude and patriotism of the Soviet people.fortitude and patriotism of the Soviet people.

SU then moved into Rumania, Bulgaria, SU then moved into Rumania, Bulgaria, reconquered / liberated Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, reconquered / liberated Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Poland. S’s cruelty evident in Poland – Polish Poland. S’s cruelty evident in Poland – Polish underground in Warsaw rose up against Gers underground in Warsaw rose up against Gers expecting help from SU, but Sov forces stopped expecting help from SU, but Sov forces stopped outside Warsaw, leaving the Polish resistance to outside Warsaw, leaving the Polish resistance to battle the Gers alone, S claimed his troops battle the Gers alone, S claimed his troops needed rest and to wait for supplies – needed rest and to wait for supplies – meanwhile Gers killed, wounded, or imprisoned meanwhile Gers killed, wounded, or imprisoned 300,000 Poles – there is little doubt he stood by 300,000 Poles – there is little doubt he stood by and let the Gers wipe out the Polish and let the Gers wipe out the Polish underground because it was non-Communist, underground because it was non-Communist, and wd pose a threat to the domination of and wd pose a threat to the domination of postwar Poland by puppet Polish Communists postwar Poland by puppet Polish Communists following the Red Army. following the Red Army.

By early 1945, Sov forces crossed into central By early 1945, Sov forces crossed into central Eur and East Ger, and the Allies had advanced Eur and East Ger, and the Allies had advanced on Ger from the W. Gers surrendered on May 9, on Ger from the W. Gers surrendered on May 9, and S fulfilled his promise to enter the war and S fulfilled his promise to enter the war against Japan on Aug 9th. Soviet troops against Japan on Aug 9th. Soviet troops defeated Japanese forces in Manchuria within defeated Japanese forces in Manchuria within two weeks. This Asian victory at last ended two weeks. This Asian victory at last ended Soviet military participation in WWII. Soviet military participation in WWII. The Grand The Grand Alliance had defeated Germany and JapanAlliance had defeated Germany and Japan..

The Sov’s people’s feat in vanquishing the Nazi The Sov’s people’s feat in vanquishing the Nazi armies perhaps stands as the decisive event of armies perhaps stands as the decisive event of the 20th century. If Hitler had subjugated and the 20th century. If Hitler had subjugated and exploited the SU, the course of WWII and the exploited the SU, the course of WWII and the history of the past five decades wd have taken history of the past five decades wd have taken quite a different road. Soviet survival allowed the quite a different road. Soviet survival allowed the USSR to emerge as a superpower whose rivalry USSR to emerge as a superpower whose rivalry with the US wd dominate world affairs until 1989.with the US wd dominate world affairs until 1989.

Grand AllianceGrand Alliance

Again Br, Fr, SU became allies not through Again Br, Fr, SU became allies not through choice but through circumstance. Soviet alliance choice but through circumstance. Soviet alliance with USA was also not a natural one – were with USA was also not a natural one – were forced into it after Japan bombed USA and dec forced into it after Japan bombed USA and dec war on her. The Grand Alliance was a marriage war on her. The Grand Alliance was a marriage of convenience – bound together by a desire to of convenience – bound together by a desire to defeat the common enemy. Praised each other defeat the common enemy. Praised each other in public but constant bickering in private.in public but constant bickering in private.

A matter of survival, but suspicion, friction A matter of survival, but suspicion, friction marred attempts at cooperation from the marred attempts at cooperation from the beginningbeginning

IssuesIssues1. Second front – allies delayed – N. Africa, then 1. Second front – allies delayed – N. Africa, then Italy – promised at Teheran that it wd be in Italy – promised at Teheran that it wd be in Spring of 44, not until June 44. By then the Red Spring of 44, not until June 44. By then the Red Army had almost completely ousted the Nazis Army had almost completely ousted the Nazis from Soviet territory…- second front – S pleaded from Soviet territory…- second front – S pleaded for this to take pressure of SU, Br response was for this to take pressure of SU, Br response was that military forces were not yet available and that military forces were not yet available and that so to undertake it would be folly. S replied that so to undertake it would be folly. S replied that the Br and US did not realize the intensity of that the Br and US did not realize the intensity of the war on the Eastern front, and that their the war on the Eastern front, and that their caution was at the expense of the Russian dead. caution was at the expense of the Russian dead. When Churchill talked of opening a front in North When Churchill talked of opening a front in North Africa, S taunted him by asking if Br troops were Africa, S taunted him by asking if Br troops were afraid to fight the Germans. C reminded S of the afraid to fight the Germans. C reminded S of the bravery of Br navy in bringing war supplies to the bravery of Br navy in bringing war supplies to the SU from Br and the USA. SU from Br and the USA.

2. Germany’s future – S at the outset 2. Germany’s future – S at the outset favored dismemberment although he favored dismemberment although he finally accepted the idea of a demilitarized finally accepted the idea of a demilitarized unitary Ger state. Recog that if G was unitary Ger state. Recog that if G was divided its richer more ind western regions divided its richer more ind western regions wd accrue to the West and Sov inf wd wd accrue to the West and Sov inf wd cover only the poorer eastern lands. cover only the poorer eastern lands. At At TeheranTeheran S,C,R agreed to control G jointly S,C,R agreed to control G jointly and to estd and advisory commission to and to estd and advisory commission to determine postwar policy towards Gdetermine postwar policy towards G

3. how to treat postwar Eastern Europe grew 3. how to treat postwar Eastern Europe grew esp pressing as the Red Army began to esp pressing as the Red Army began to occupy countries there – Poland, Czech – occupy countries there – Poland, Czech – British supported govts in exile for them British supported govts in exile for them and housed them in London, S did not and housed them in London, S did not want these non Com admins dominating want these non Com admins dominating postwar Czech and Poland and had his postwar Czech and Poland and had his own puppet govts ready to take over.own puppet govts ready to take over.

As war drew to an end the ideological As war drew to an end the ideological differences which had been submerged differences which had been submerged during the war began to resurface. There during the war began to resurface. There was fear in SU was that Br and US might was fear in SU was that Br and US might ally with Ger against SU, fear in Br and ally with Ger against SU, fear in Br and USA was that Sov advance into east Eur USA was that Sov advance into east Eur and Ger heralded the start of a new period and Ger heralded the start of a new period of Communist expansion. of Communist expansion.

When meeting took place in When meeting took place in YaltaYalta to plan post war to plan post war settlement – tension – the agreements they reached settlement – tension – the agreements they reached were temporary compromised that did not settle the were temporary compromised that did not settle the larger issues. Agreed to larger issues. Agreed to divide Ger into 4 zones but there was no agreement on a divide Ger into 4 zones but there was no agreement on a uniform system of govt. in the zones. uniform system of govt. in the zones. No agreement on reparations from Ger – allied wd not No agreement on reparations from Ger – allied wd not agree to Stalin’s demands, made no sense to allow SU agree to Stalin’s demands, made no sense to allow SU to take out reparations while Allies were pouring in relief to take out reparations while Allies were pouring in relief funds. Stalin later claimed, denied by Allies, that he had funds. Stalin later claimed, denied by Allies, that he had been promised 50% of all Ger reparations.been promised 50% of all Ger reparations.SU occupied Poland – pro-Soviet govt there. Vague SU occupied Poland – pro-Soviet govt there. Vague promises to hold free elections there in futurepromises to hold free elections there in futureAgreed on United NationsAgreed on United Nations

Agreements at Yalta were weakened by Agreements at Yalta were weakened by differences over Poland and East Eur. differences over Poland and East Eur. Also USSR slow to join UN – until single Also USSR slow to join UN – until single veto system was introd to Sec Council. veto system was introd to Sec Council.

PotsdamPotsdam……issues: Germany, ……issues: Germany, Reparations, Eastern Eur, Japan…Stalin Reparations, Eastern Eur, Japan…Stalin wd not compromise, strengthened by fact wd not compromise, strengthened by fact that he was the dominate leader – others that he was the dominate leader – others were new…were new…

Cold WarCold War

Who is to blame for cold war – trads say SU Who is to blame for cold war – trads say SU (expansionism and refusal to cooperate with its (expansionism and refusal to cooperate with its former partners), rev say US (sought US former partners), rev say US (sought US dominance in East Eur and rest of world, wanted dominance in East Eur and rest of world, wanted to surround soc’ist countries and ensure western to surround soc’ist countries and ensure western control of vital resources and trade: SU control of vital resources and trade: SU responded to this imperialism by taking steps to responded to this imperialism by taking steps to safeguard its securitysafeguard its security and its and its ec ec independence (took adv of their factories and independence (took adv of their factories and equipment) – sought to dominate them pol equipment) – sought to dominate them pol and ec: sought to prevent them from and ec: sought to prevent them from reintegration into the Western Eur capitalist reintegration into the Western Eur capitalist networknetwork) – probably. Both sides had a point. ) – probably. Both sides had a point.

Breakdown of joint policy of action, the Breakdown of joint policy of action, the mutual recriminations, and the growing mutual recriminations, and the growing hostility between the SU and the West had hostility between the SU and the West had deep roots in ideological mistrust. Each deep roots in ideological mistrust. Each side believed the other to be intrinsically side believed the other to be intrinsically committed to world wide hegemony, to committed to world wide hegemony, to destroying the other. destroying the other.

S’s Foreign Policy guided, not by expansion of S’s Foreign Policy guided, not by expansion of Marxism but by national security. Felt SU was Marxism but by national security. Felt SU was vulnerable, feared Western invasion. Domestic vulnerable, feared Western invasion. Domestic policies of ind and collect directed towards nat policies of ind and collect directed towards nat security too. One cause of Cold War was S’s security too. One cause of Cold War was S’s determination never to be caught out again – determination never to be caught out again – this is why he refused to contemplate the re-this is why he refused to contemplate the re-unification of Ger or the freedom of East unification of Ger or the freedom of East Eur….His suspicion of the outside world in the Eur….His suspicion of the outside world in the post war yrs created an atmosphere of post war yrs created an atmosphere of bitterness and distrust which conditioned bitterness and distrust which conditioned Western attitudes towards the USSR and Western attitudes towards the USSR and shaped the Soviet Union’s perception of itselfshaped the Soviet Union’s perception of itself

East EurEast Eur – yet S hoped to cont cooperative, – yet S hoped to cont cooperative, unhostile relationship with West, need aid in unhostile relationship with West, need aid in rebuilding, wished to avoid armed conflict. But E rebuilding, wished to avoid armed conflict. But E Eur put victors at loggerheads. S at first didn’t Eur put victors at loggerheads. S at first didn’t care what kind of govt E Eur had, as long as care what kind of govt E Eur had, as long as they were not inimical to the SU. But when it they were not inimical to the SU. But when it seemed that the regimes in E Eur might prove seemed that the regimes in E Eur might prove unreliable or fall into Western hands, he brought unreliable or fall into Western hands, he brought them to heel by sovietizing them. This move them to heel by sovietizing them. This move expanded the soc bloc and benefited the SU pol expanded the soc bloc and benefited the SU pol and ideologically, But Rev Expansion was not and ideologically, But Rev Expansion was not S’s chief goal – had discouraged Comms in S’s chief goal – had discouraged Comms in Greece against uprising, lukewarm support for Greece against uprising, lukewarm support for Mao’s rev in China…Driven by SECURITY AND Mao’s rev in China…Driven by SECURITY AND NEED FOR EC RESOURCESNEED FOR EC RESOURCESGermanyGermany

Greece, Comm party, backed by Tito (not Greece, Comm party, backed by Tito (not S), and in Turkey SU demanded bases for S), and in Turkey SU demanded bases for SU at or near the Turkish Straits – T SU at or near the Turkish Straits – T provided ec and military support for both in provided ec and military support for both in Spring 47, and to any other co threatened Spring 47, and to any other co threatened by Cism. Became known as Truman by Cism. Became known as Truman Doctrine and became basis of Am foreign Doctrine and became basis of Am foreign Containment Policy. Containment Policy.

Marshall PlanMarshall Plan – aimed to bring ec stability – aimed to bring ec stability to the war ravaged economies of Western to the war ravaged economies of Western Eur, esp Fr and Italy where Comm parties Eur, esp Fr and Italy where Comm parties were strong. If accepted in Eastern Eur wd were strong. If accepted in Eastern Eur wd help to enfold the German and Eastern help to enfold the German and Eastern Eur economies into the Western system. Eur economies into the Western system.

By midsummer 47 S came to believe that By midsummer 47 S came to believe that the Marshall Plan was primarily directed at the Marshall Plan was primarily directed at undermining Sov domination of E Eur and undermining Sov domination of E Eur and luring a utd G to the Western side – he luring a utd G to the Western side – he abandoned his earlier quest for amicable abandoned his earlier quest for amicable relations and initiated a confrontational relations and initiated a confrontational policy first forbidding Czech and Poland to policy first forbidding Czech and Poland to participate in the plan and then convening participate in the plan and then convening a conf of Eur community parties in Sept a conf of Eur community parties in Sept 47. at this gathering he estd a permanent 47. at this gathering he estd a permanent org, theorg, the Cominform Cominform / Molotov Plan to / Molotov Plan to oppose the Marshall Plan and to block Am oppose the Marshall Plan and to block Am imperialism in Eur..imperialism in Eur..

S blocked adoption of the Marshall Plan in S blocked adoption of the Marshall Plan in Eastern Eur but those economies Eastern Eur but those economies languished while West Eur recipients of languished while West Eur recipients of Am aid prospered. Am aid prospered. “In retrospect, the “In retrospect, the Soviet-Western division over the Soviet-Western division over the Marshall plan clearly marks the start of Marshall plan clearly marks the start of the Cold War.” (Thompson, based on the Cold War.” (Thompson, based on Scott D. Parrish, 1947, Cold War Scott D. Parrish, 1947, Cold War International History Project, Working International History Project, Working Paper #9, March 1994)Paper #9, March 1994)

Evidence for this is that no effort was made Evidence for this is that no effort was made to Sovietize Finland, since F was prepared to Sovietize Finland, since F was prepared to subordinate their foreign policy to Soviet to subordinate their foreign policy to Soviet interests and thereby ensure Soviet interests and thereby ensure Soviet security in that quarter, and they agreed to security in that quarter, and they agreed to provide substantial ec assistance to SU provide substantial ec assistance to SU – – was allowed to remain indep, democ was allowed to remain indep, democ and capitalist.and capitalist.

By the end of 47 S moved vigorously to By the end of 47 S moved vigorously to rebuff what he saw as capitalist efforts to rebuff what he saw as capitalist efforts to encircle the Soviet state. With the encircle the Soviet state. With the Cominform in place, he cemented Soviet Cominform in place, he cemented Soviet control over E Eur. Early 1948 saw a Com control over E Eur. Early 1948 saw a Com coup in Czech that overthrew the last coup in Czech that overthrew the last indep coalition govt in E Eur. The west indep coalition govt in E Eur. The west expressed outrage but cd do little else. expressed outrage but cd do little else. Military intervention was out of the q, for Military intervention was out of the q, for while the Red Army exerted a powerful while the Red Army exerted a powerful presence in the region, the western presence in the region, the western countries had all demobilized.countries had all demobilized.

Germany – blockade, airliftGermany – blockade, airlift

Cold War grew chillier with formation of Cold War grew chillier with formation of NATO in 1949. SU responded in 1955 NATO in 1949. SU responded in 1955 with Eastern alliance system / Warsaw with Eastern alliance system / Warsaw Pact. Pact.

Sept 49, SU own atomic bombSept 49, SU own atomic bomb (Fuch, (Fuch, Rosenbergs) began four decades of Rosenbergs) began four decades of nuclear rivalry, nuclear rivalry,

Mao’s successful Com rev in 1949 – S had Mao’s successful Com rev in 1949 – S had not helped and had maintained ties with not helped and had maintained ties with Chiang until late 49 – but US saw Mao’s Chiang until late 49 – but US saw Mao’s victory as greatly enlarging communism’s victory as greatly enlarging communism’s reach and another step in a Soviet plan for reach and another step in a Soviet plan for world domination – world domination – US felt vindicated in US felt vindicated in their views when Mao and Stalin signed their views when Mao and Stalin signed a mutual assistance treaty in Feb 1950a mutual assistance treaty in Feb 1950. .

June 1950 Cold War turned hot June 1950 Cold War turned hot as N. Korea as N. Korea invadedinvaded Sth K. Am defended Sth, and UN. SU Sth K. Am defended Sth, and UN. SU did not plan the invasion but acquiesced in the did not plan the invasion but acquiesced in the invasion and provided equipment, arms and invasion and provided equipment, arms and advisors only after appeals from the Nth advisors only after appeals from the Nth Koreans. S felt that withholding support wd drive Koreans. S felt that withholding support wd drive k’s into hands of China. When K faced defeat S k’s into hands of China. When K faced defeat S sent air defense forces and supported decision sent air defense forces and supported decision of Chinese to intervene. S may have been of Chinese to intervene. S may have been hoping to get the Ams and Chinese tangled in a hoping to get the Ams and Chinese tangled in a long ground war in Asia, but Mao’s armies long ground war in Asia, but Mao’s armies withdrew after agreement. withdrew after agreement.

S’s reasoning gives particular significance to S’s reasoning gives particular significance to the USSR’s decision not to attend the vital the USSR’s decision not to attend the vital meeting of the UN Security Council in meeting of the UN Security Council in June 1950 which voted to sent UN forces June 1950 which voted to sent UN forces to Korea. Historians once believed that the to Korea. Historians once believed that the USSR had miscalculated at this crucial USSR had miscalculated at this crucial juncture by walking out of the Sec Council juncture by walking out of the Sec Council in protest at the Western powers refusal to in protest at the Western powers refusal to recognize the PRC as the true China. recognize the PRC as the true China.

. It was judged that the walk out left the . It was judged that the walk out left the other 4 Sec Co members (USA, Br, Fr, Nat other 4 Sec Co members (USA, Br, Fr, Nat China) free to vote for the sending of a UN China) free to vote for the sending of a UN army to K, knowing that the USSR cd not army to K, knowing that the USSR cd not use its veto to block the resolution. use its veto to block the resolution. However, Gromyko, the Sov foreign min, However, Gromyko, the Sov foreign min, later admitted that the Sov U’s decision to later admitted that the Sov U’s decision to boycott the Sec Co was a deliberate move boycott the Sec Co was a deliberate move by Stalin to entice the USA into the Korean by Stalin to entice the USA into the Korean conflict.conflict.

In outcome, the war did not fulfill S’s hopes. The In outcome, the war did not fulfill S’s hopes. The SU always denied that it was involved militarily SU always denied that it was involved militarily in K. Technically this was true: Sov forced did in K. Technically this was true: Sov forced did not take part. Nonetheless masses of Sov not take part. Nonetheless masses of Sov weapons were used, and there were large weapons were used, and there were large numbers of Sov advisers on the Nth K side numbers of Sov advisers on the Nth K side throughout the 3 yr conflict. Yet the effort did not throughout the 3 yr conflict. Yet the effort did not repay itself. The war ended in stalemate – K repay itself. The war ended in stalemate – K remained divided – the US remained committed remained divided – the US remained committed to support Taiwan and its occupation of its seat to support Taiwan and its occupation of its seat in the UN (until 1972). Contrary to S’s hopes, the in the UN (until 1972). Contrary to S’s hopes, the prestige of the SU had suffered. Left fighting to K prestige of the SU had suffered. Left fighting to K and China, Mao proudly claimed that it was and China, Mao proudly claimed that it was Chinese not Soviet comrades who had shed Chinese not Soviet comrades who had shed their blood in the cause of international their blood in the cause of international Communism.Communism.

S’s successes in Cold War – extended S’s successes in Cold War – extended control over all of E Eur, served as pol and control over all of E Eur, served as pol and ec satellites of SU, controlled ec through ec satellites of SU, controlled ec through Council on Mutual Ec Assistance. East Council on Mutual Ec Assistance. East Ger brought into Sov bloc too, and China, Ger brought into Sov bloc too, and China, Nth K also became C’ist. Nth K also became C’ist.

On the other hand, the above policies On the other hand, the above policies provoked a strong reaction from Western provoked a strong reaction from Western powers, and led to their rearmament and powers, and led to their rearmament and formation of NATO. Estd of West Ger estd, formation of NATO. Estd of West Ger estd, ending Sov hopes of extending inf into ending Sov hopes of extending inf into Germ as a whole evaporated. Comm Germ as a whole evaporated. Comm parties were weakened in It and Ger.parties were weakened in It and Ger.

S had strengthened Sov security in some S had strengthened Sov security in some ways but the balance sheet showed ways but the balance sheet showed decidedly mixed results. decidedly mixed results.

Stalin / Soviet Union and the Cold WarStalin / Soviet Union and the Cold War

Policies in Eastern Europe: Iron CurtainPolicies in Eastern Europe: Iron Curtain

Role in Conferences: Teheran, Yalta, PotsdamRole in Conferences: Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam

The German QuestionThe German Question

Response to Truman Doctrine, Marshall PlanResponse to Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan

Berlin Crisis Berlin Crisis

Response to Formation of NATOResponse to Formation of NATO

Atomic Arms RaceAtomic Arms Race

Chinese Civil WarChinese Civil War

Korean WarKorean War