Special Issue: Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs || US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure

US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy FailureAuthor(s): Bruce Michael BagleySource: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2/3, Special Issue:Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs (Summer - Autumn, 1988), pp. 189-212Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165986 .

Accessed: 08/05/2014 19:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:51:59 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=miami

http://www.jstor.org/stable/165986?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS: ANALYSIS OF A

POLICY FAILURE

BRUCE MICHAEL BAGLEY

Us CHIEF EXECUTIVE RONALD REAGAN DECLARED WAR on

drugs in February 1982, and pledged his administration to the task of curtailing the burgeoning drug epidemic in the United States. To accomplish this urgent "national security" objective, the federal

government rapidly increased expenditures for narcotics control

programs during the ensuing seven years of his two-term presidency, reaching $4.3 billion annually in 1988. Enthusiastically backing the president's initiative, the US Congress approved tougher national drug legislation, widened the US military's involvement in the war, supported the administration's drive to

intensify interdiction efforts along US borders, and expanded US-

designed eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement

programs in foreign source and transit countries. First Lady Nancy Reagan launched her "Just Say No" campaign, flooding the American educational system and the public media with anti-drug messages. Ostensibly, all sectors of American society enlisted in the war on drugs and the country began mobilizing for battle.1

Rhetorical pledges and war proclamations aside, however, at the end of President Reagan's watch, the United States was losing

Bruce M. Bagley is Associate Professor of Interamerican Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami (FL). He is editor of CONTADORA AND THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA (Westview Press, 1987) and author of "Colombia and The War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs(Fall 1988). His current research interests include the effect of the international drug trade upon Latin American source countries and upon their relations with the United States.

US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS: ANALYSIS OF A

POLICY FAILURE

BRUCE MICHAEL BAGLEY

Us CHIEF EXECUTIVE RONALD REAGAN DECLARED WAR on

drugs in February 1982, and pledged his administration to the task of curtailing the burgeoning drug epidemic in the United States. To accomplish this urgent "national security" objective, the federal

government rapidly increased expenditures for narcotics control

programs during the ensuing seven years of his two-term presidency, reaching $4.3 billion annually in 1988. Enthusiastically backing the president's initiative, the US Congress approved tougher national drug legislation, widened the US military's involvement in the war, supported the administration's drive to

intensify interdiction efforts along US borders, and expanded US-

designed eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement

programs in foreign source and transit countries. First Lady Nancy Reagan launched her "Just Say No" campaign, flooding the American educational system and the public media with anti-drug messages. Ostensibly, all sectors of American society enlisted in the war on drugs and the country began mobilizing for battle.1

Rhetorical pledges and war proclamations aside, however, at the end of President Reagan's watch, the United States was losing

Bruce M. Bagley is Associate Professor of Interamerican Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami (FL). He is editor of CONTADORA AND THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA (Westview Press, 1987) and author of "Colombia and The War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs(Fall 1988). His current research interests include the effect of the international drug trade upon Latin American source countries and upon their relations with the United States.



190 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 190 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

the war on virtually every front. Illicit drugs of all types - especially marijuana, cocaine, and heroin - were more readily available and cheaper in the United States in January 1989 than they had been at the outset of the Reagan Presidency in 1981. Drug use and abuse in US society had increased dramatically over the 1980s, and the US drug market remained the biggest and most lucrative in the world (GAO, 1988: 3-18). Drug-related crimes and violence had reached epidemic proportions in many US cities, greatly ex- acerbated by the introduction and rapid spread of a highly addic- tive form of cocaine known as "crack." The national public health system was unable to cope with the surging demand for treatment and rehabilitation. Law enforcement agencies were overworked, underfunded, often outgunned, increasingly demoralized, and plagued with corruption. The nation's courts and prisons were overwhelmed by the influx of drug-related trials and convictions. In addition, the enormous economic and political power of the drug traffickers threatened - or already had compromised - the institutional integrity and political stability of several Latin American governments; consequently, vital US security interests in the hemisphere were jeopardized (GAO, 1988: 19-40).

What went wrong? Why has the most powerful nation on the globe been unable to turn the tide, much less "win" its war against drugs? The conditions for conducting a frontal assault on drugs had never been more auspicious: outspoken public leadership by a charismatic and popular president, virtually unanimous congressional support, widespread public approval, massive deployment of economic and human resources, cooperation from the public media and the private sector, and considerable diplomatic leverage with many supply and transit country governments. Why has the Reagan administration's unquestionably impressive anti- drug crusade produced such negligible results?

This essay seeks to explain this perplexing policy failure. Brief- ly stated, the key reason lies not in inadequacies of leadership, resources, or implementation (although problems in each area certainly have arisen), but rather in the deficiencies and distortions embedded in the underlying premises or conceptual paradigm upon which the entire anti-drug campaign has been based: "realism." The principal conclusion is that to "win" the war on drugs, Washington cannot simply stay the course; the entire anti- drug effort must be reconceptualized and redirected. Realism's an-

the war on virtually every front. Illicit drugs of all types - especially marijuana, cocaine, and heroin - were more readily available and cheaper in the United States in January 1989 than they had been at the outset of the Reagan Presidency in 1981. Drug use and abuse in US society had increased dramatically over the 1980s, and the US drug market remained the biggest and most lucrative in the world (GAO, 1988: 3-18). Drug-related crimes and violence had reached epidemic proportions in many US cities, greatly ex- acerbated by the introduction and rapid spread of a highly addic- tive form of cocaine known as "crack." The national public health system was unable to cope with the surging demand for treatment and rehabilitation. Law enforcement agencies were overworked, underfunded, often outgunned, increasingly demoralized, and plagued with corruption. The nation's courts and prisons were overwhelmed by the influx of drug-related trials and convictions. In addition, the enormous economic and political power of the drug traffickers threatened - or already had compromised - the institutional integrity and political stability of several Latin American governments; consequently, vital US security interests in the hemisphere were jeopardized (GAO, 1988: 19-40).

What went wrong? Why has the most powerful nation on the globe been unable to turn the tide, much less "win" its war against drugs? The conditions for conducting a frontal assault on drugs had never been more auspicious: outspoken public leadership by a charismatic and popular president, virtually unanimous congressional support, widespread public approval, massive deployment of economic and human resources, cooperation from the public media and the private sector, and considerable diplomatic leverage with many supply and transit country governments. Why has the Reagan administration's unquestionably impressive anti- drug crusade produced such negligible results?

This essay seeks to explain this perplexing policy failure. Brief- ly stated, the key reason lies not in inadequacies of leadership, resources, or implementation (although problems in each area certainly have arisen), but rather in the deficiencies and distortions embedded in the underlying premises or conceptual paradigm upon which the entire anti-drug campaign has been based: "realism." The principal conclusion is that to "win" the war on drugs, Washington cannot simply stay the course; the entire anti- drug effort must be reconceptualized and redirected. Realism's an-



BAGLEY: US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS BAGLEY: US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

tiquated and simplistic assumptions and the flawed policy recommendations which flow from them must be replaced by a more refined analytic framework that adequately conceptualizes the magnitude and complexity of the drug problem, and thus provides a reliable base for policy. In sum, this essay contends that real progress in the US war on drugs will require not only better tactics, but also a new, more appropriate battle plan.

EXPLAINING THE FAILURE

PERHAPS THE MOST COMMON LINE of explanation claims that the Reagan administration, despite its tough anti-drug rhetoric, never actually went to war. Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), for example, in the mid-1980s repeatedly criticized the Reagan White House for its unwillingness to allocate sufficient resources for drug prevention programs (e.g., education, treatment, rehabilitation), its lack of a coherent strategy for prosecuting the war at home and overseas, and its failure to provide consistent leadership at the level of policy implementation.

In a similar vein, Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) insistently denounced Reagan's conduct of the war on drugs for not being "tough enough" on drug traffickers. To correct this perceived weakness in the administration's approach, in the Senate in 1988 he personally led the fight to enact the death penalty for those convicted of murders arising from the sale of illicit drugs. This provision was intended to serve as a deterrent and to highlight the intensity and sincerity of the US government's mission to save the nation.

Still other hardline critics faulted President Reagan for not or- dering the US military to take a lead role in the drug war. Indeed, in 1986, the US House of Representatives approved a bill which specifically directed the US Armed Forces to "seal" the country's borders against drug trafficking within forty-five days. Although the Senate subsequently deleted this "mission impossible" direc- tive, the final version of the 1986 Anti-Drug Act did call for an expanded role for the Armed Forces in support of civilian interdiction and law enforcement efforts at US borders and on the high seas.

A second, by no means incompatible, line of explanation for the failure of the war on drugs contends that the Reagan ad-

tiquated and simplistic assumptions and the flawed policy recommendations which flow from them must be replaced by a more refined analytic framework that adequately conceptualizes the magnitude and complexity of the drug problem, and thus provides a reliable base for policy. In sum, this essay contends that real progress in the US war on drugs will require not only better tactics, but also a new, more appropriate battle plan.

EXPLAINING THE FAILURE

PERHAPS THE MOST COMMON LINE of explanation claims that the Reagan administration, despite its tough anti-drug rhetoric, never actually went to war. Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), for example, in the mid-1980s repeatedly criticized the Reagan White House for its unwillingness to allocate sufficient resources for drug prevention programs (e.g., education, treatment, rehabilitation), its lack of a coherent strategy for prosecuting the war at home and overseas, and its failure to provide consistent leadership at the level of policy implementation.

In a similar vein, Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) insistently denounced Reagan's conduct of the war on drugs for not being "tough enough" on drug traffickers. To correct this perceived weakness in the administration's approach, in the Senate in 1988 he personally led the fight to enact the death penalty for those convicted of murders arising from the sale of illicit drugs. This provision was intended to serve as a deterrent and to highlight the intensity and sincerity of the US government's mission to save the nation.

Still other hardline critics faulted President Reagan for not or- dering the US military to take a lead role in the drug war. Indeed, in 1986, the US House of Representatives approved a bill which specifically directed the US Armed Forces to "seal" the country's borders against drug trafficking within forty-five days. Although the Senate subsequently deleted this "mission impossible" direc- tive, the final version of the 1986 Anti-Drug Act did call for an expanded role for the Armed Forces in support of civilian interdiction and law enforcement efforts at US borders and on the high seas.

A second, by no means incompatible, line of explanation for the failure of the war on drugs contends that the Reagan ad-

191 191




ministration failed to "get tough" with Latin American and other Third World source- and transit-country goverments. For critics like former US Senator Paula Hawkins (R-FL), Washington's reluc- tance to bring the full range of US economic and political power to bear on foreign governments and force their cooperation with US anti-drug programs abroad, was the critical flaw in Reagan's conduct of the war on drugs. Senator Hawkins energetically pushed her "punish them into submission" approach, and won a 1986 congressional decision to suspend US aid to Bolivia on the grounds of non-compliance - in spite of the Reagan administration's protests that such sanctions would be counterproductive for future Bolivian cooperation against drug trafficking and other US foreign policy goals in that country.

Illustrative of the Reagan administration's ambivalence regarding the punishment line was the battle waged in the Congress - over executive branch objections - to decertify the notorious Noriega government in Panama. Though General Noriega already had been indicted by a US prosecutor in Florida, key Reagan administration officials opposed decertification because the US intelligence community (especially the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEAl, the National Security Council [NSC], and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), considered Noriega to be an "asset" whose usefulness to US intelligence-gathering operations outweighed the threat which his involvement in drug trafficking posed to the American populace. Reagan's commitment to waging the war on drugs was further called into question in the Congress during early 1988 when his administration mounted a vigorous lobbying effort to block the decertification of several other Latin American countries deemed by congressional critics to be uncooperative in the war on drugs. Also troubling was the criticism advanced by US Senator John Kerry (D-MA) regarding the laxity of the government's investigation into allegations that some fac- tions of the CLA-backed contras had smuggled drugs into the United States to finance their war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

For Rangel, D'Amato, Hawkins, and other hardline critics of the Reagan administration's anti-drug policies, the bottom line was that President Reagan talked tough, but never really got tough. In practice, they contended, the high priority rhetorically assigned to the anti-drug crusade was undercut or diluted by

ministration failed to "get tough" with Latin American and other Third World source- and transit-country goverments. For critics like former US Senator Paula Hawkins (R-FL), Washington's reluc- tance to bring the full range of US economic and political power to bear on foreign governments and force their cooperation with US anti-drug programs abroad, was the critical flaw in Reagan's conduct of the war on drugs. Senator Hawkins energetically pushed her "punish them into submission" approach, and won a 1986 congressional decision to suspend US aid to Bolivia on the grounds of non-compliance - in spite of the Reagan administration's protests that such sanctions would be counterproductive for future Bolivian cooperation against drug trafficking and other US foreign policy goals in that country.

Illustrative of the Reagan administration's ambivalence regarding the punishment line was the battle waged in the Congress - over executive branch objections - to decertify the notorious Noriega government in Panama. Though General Noriega already had been indicted by a US prosecutor in Florida, key Reagan administration officials opposed decertification because the US intelligence community (especially the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEAl, the National Security Council [NSC], and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), considered Noriega to be an "asset" whose usefulness to US intelligence-gathering operations outweighed the threat which his involvement in drug trafficking posed to the American populace. Reagan's commitment to waging the war on drugs was further called into question in the Congress during early 1988 when his administration mounted a vigorous lobbying effort to block the decertification of several other Latin American countries deemed by congressional critics to be uncooperative in the war on drugs. Also troubling was the criticism advanced by US Senator John Kerry (D-MA) regarding the laxity of the government's investigation into allegations that some fac- tions of the CLA-backed contras had smuggled drugs into the United States to finance their war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

For Rangel, D'Amato, Hawkins, and other hardline critics of the Reagan administration's anti-drug policies, the bottom line was that President Reagan talked tough, but never really got tough. In practice, they contended, the high priority rhetorically assigned to the anti-drug crusade was undercut or diluted by




federal budgetary constraints and competing domestic and foreign policy concerns. Consequently, the Reagan administration failed to mobilize US resources and power to press the war on drugs either at home or abroad.

While these critics frequently differed among themselves on specific tactics, the general thrust of their multiple policy recommendations reflected a broad consensus in the Congress that the US government could and should escalate the war effort on all fronts: harsher US laws against both consumption and trafficking; more resources, manpower, and firepower to combat traffickers; tougher law enforcement and interdiction programs nationally and internationally; and intensified political-diplomatic pressures on (or sanctions against) uncooperative source and transit country governments. The hardliners also agreed that the US Armed For- ces and their counterparts in the trafficking countries could and should assume key roles in the conduct of the war against drug trafficking.3

There were, of course, critics of the war on drugs who did not share the hardliners' optimistic conviction that the "solution" to the drug epidemic lay in further escalation of the drug war: e.g., civil libertarians, proponents of drug legalization or decriminalization, and those analysts (including many Latin American leaders) who claimed that "demand" rather than "supply-side" policies provided the only real hope for long-term success in suppressing the drug trade. Such dissident voices notwithstanding, the hardliners were clearly in the majority, and their "get tougher" at- titudes dictated the direction and pace of the escalation in the war on drugs undertaken by President Reagan during his second term.

Proof of the hardliners' dominance in this issue-area was evi- dent in the Anti-Drug Act passed by the Congress and signed by the president in late October 1986, just before the mid-term elec- tions. Unquestionably the most comprehensive initiative in modem US history to lower domestic demand and reduce the flow of drugs from abroad, this legislation increased by $1.7 billion the total federal budgetary authorizations for the anti-drug campaign, bringing the total to an unprecedented $3.9 billion for FY 1987. Nonetheless, almost three-quarters of these new funds were ear- marked for expanded enforcement, interdiction, and eradication/substitution programs (supply) versus approximately one-quarter for education, prevention, treatment, and rehabilita-

federal budgetary constraints and competing domestic and foreign policy concerns. Consequently, the Reagan administration failed to mobilize US resources and power to press the war on drugs either at home or abroad.

While these critics frequently differed among themselves on specific tactics, the general thrust of their multiple policy recommendations reflected a broad consensus in the Congress that the US government could and should escalate the war effort on all fronts: harsher US laws against both consumption and trafficking; more resources, manpower, and firepower to combat traffickers; tougher law enforcement and interdiction programs nationally and internationally; and intensified political-diplomatic pressures on (or sanctions against) uncooperative source and transit country governments. The hardliners also agreed that the US Armed For- ces and their counterparts in the trafficking countries could and should assume key roles in the conduct of the war against drug trafficking.3

There were, of course, critics of the war on drugs who did not share the hardliners' optimistic conviction that the "solution" to the drug epidemic lay in further escalation of the drug war: e.g., civil libertarians, proponents of drug legalization or decriminalization, and those analysts (including many Latin American leaders) who claimed that "demand" rather than "supply-side" policies provided the only real hope for long-term success in suppressing the drug trade. Such dissident voices notwithstanding, the hardliners were clearly in the majority, and their "get tougher" at- titudes dictated the direction and pace of the escalation in the war on drugs undertaken by President Reagan during his second term.

Proof of the hardliners' dominance in this issue-area was evi- dent in the Anti-Drug Act passed by the Congress and signed by the president in late October 1986, just before the mid-term elec- tions. Unquestionably the most comprehensive initiative in modem US history to lower domestic demand and reduce the flow of drugs from abroad, this legislation increased by $1.7 billion the total federal budgetary authorizations for the anti-drug campaign, bringing the total to an unprecedented $3.9 billion for FY 1987. Nonetheless, almost three-quarters of these new funds were ear- marked for expanded enforcement, interdiction, and eradication/substitution programs (supply) versus approximately one-quarter for education, prevention, treatment, and rehabilita-

193 193




tion (demand) - reflecting the same basic ratio maintained by the Reagan administration from the outset of its war on drugs (Kerr, 1987).

Given the overall rise in the absolute levels of federal funding authorized by the 1986 anti-drug legislation, the resources tar- geted for domestic, demand-reduction programs naturally rose as well, lending some credence to congressional claims that the new bill recognized the need to address the demand and supply sides of the problem simultaneously. In practice, however, even this modest gesture toward policy balance soon evaporated. Just a few months after passage, confronted by a severe fiscal deficit and constrained by Graham-Rudman budget reduction requirements, the Reagan administration opted to cut roughly $1 billion from the drug budget. The bulk of these cuts were made in the areas of education, treatment, rehabilitation, and local enforcement; federal enforcement and interdiction programs survived largely unscathed. Although some individual legislators vociferously opposed such reductions, the Congress allowed them to stand with only minor exceptions - thereby reaffirming the administration's supply-side priorities (Hogan, 1987).

REALISM AND RATIONALES: THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

HARSH RHETORIC, PUBLIC DENUNCIATIONS, and partisan politics aside, the policy gap between President Reagan and his hardline critics on the drug issue was never as great as publicized, and ultimately proved relatively easy to bridge. In essence, the critics proposed that the US government do "more of the same," only faster, better, and on a larger scale. Along with Reagan, they agreed that the US drug epidemic warranted a declaration of "war" and shared his predilection for supply-side strategies and tactics to combat it. In short, they conceptualized both the threat presented by the drug problem and the appropriate US policy responses in fundamentally similar terms. Thus the Congress' 1986 push for escalation of the war effort was in the end enthusiastically embraced by President Reagan.

This underlying consensus on supply-side strategies and escalation tactics in Washington's design and implementation of the

tion (demand) - reflecting the same basic ratio maintained by the Reagan administration from the outset of its war on drugs (Kerr, 1987).

Given the overall rise in the absolute levels of federal funding authorized by the 1986 anti-drug legislation, the resources tar- geted for domestic, demand-reduction programs naturally rose as well, lending some credence to congressional claims that the new bill recognized the need to address the demand and supply sides of the problem simultaneously. In practice, however, even this modest gesture toward policy balance soon evaporated. Just a few months after passage, confronted by a severe fiscal deficit and constrained by Graham-Rudman budget reduction requirements, the Reagan administration opted to cut roughly $1 billion from the drug budget. The bulk of these cuts were made in the areas of education, treatment, rehabilitation, and local enforcement; federal enforcement and interdiction programs survived largely unscathed. Although some individual legislators vociferously opposed such reductions, the Congress allowed them to stand with only minor exceptions - thereby reaffirming the administration's supply-side priorities (Hogan, 1987).

REALISM AND RATIONALES: THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

HARSH RHETORIC, PUBLIC DENUNCIATIONS, and partisan politics aside, the policy gap between President Reagan and his hardline critics on the drug issue was never as great as publicized, and ultimately proved relatively easy to bridge. In essence, the critics proposed that the US government do "more of the same," only faster, better, and on a larger scale. Along with Reagan, they agreed that the US drug epidemic warranted a declaration of "war" and shared his predilection for supply-side strategies and tactics to combat it. In short, they conceptualized both the threat presented by the drug problem and the appropriate US policy responses in fundamentally similar terms. Thus the Congress' 1986 push for escalation of the war effort was in the end enthusiastically embraced by President Reagan.

This underlying consensus on supply-side strategies and escalation tactics in Washington's design and implementation of the




war on drugs during the 1980s, in turn, derived directly from the premises and logic of "realist" analyses of the international system and of the US role within it - widely-accepted by US foreign policy elites from both parties and branches of government. At base, the realist paradigm posits an international system in which 1) nation-states are key actors in international politics; 2) state elites (as rational actors) design and implement foreign policy strategies intended to defend and promote vital national interests; 3) national security interests always rank highest on national foreign policy agendas/ priority lists; and 4) threats to national security emanating from the international system warrant the invocation of the full range of national power resources (including force) to obtain desired responses from hostile or uncooperative nation-states: "self-help" is both a right and the ultimate recourse of every sovereign nation in defense of its national interests and security.

Taking the inherently anarchic and conflictual nature of the interational system as a given, realists contend that hegemonic powers, such as the United States, must assume responsibility for enforcing international law and preserving order, or run the risk of allowing the international system to lapse into chaos, instability, and inter-state warfare. From this perspective, the United States not only has the right but also the duty to use its dominant leadership position and superior power capabilities to persuade (compel) subordinate states to cooperate on issues such as the war on drugs, for failure to do so could endanger US national security and, ultimately, the stability of the international system as a whole.

Adoption of the realist perspective, in effect, inexorably leads to the supply-side strategy and unilateral escalation tactics advo- cated by Reagan and his hardline critics alike as central com- ponents of the US anti-drug campaign. In view of the predominance of the realist paradigm among US foreign policy elites, the basic thrust of the US war against drugs under Reagan was eminently predictable; however, the question is not one of the internal consistency but rather of explanatory power: does the realist approach accurately reflect the structure and dynamics of the contemporary international system and correctly interpret the role of the United States within it, or not? If not, policy recommendations which flow logically from the realist framework are des-

war on drugs during the 1980s, in turn, derived directly from the premises and logic of "realist" analyses of the international system and of the US role within it - widely-accepted by US foreign policy elites from both parties and branches of government. At base, the realist paradigm posits an international system in which 1) nation-states are key actors in international politics; 2) state elites (as rational actors) design and implement foreign policy strategies intended to defend and promote vital national interests; 3) national security interests always rank highest on national foreign policy agendas/ priority lists; and 4) threats to national security emanating from the international system warrant the invocation of the full range of national power resources (including force) to obtain desired responses from hostile or uncooperative nation-states: "self-help" is both a right and the ultimate recourse of every sovereign nation in defense of its national interests and security.

Taking the inherently anarchic and conflictual nature of the interational system as a given, realists contend that hegemonic powers, such as the United States, must assume responsibility for enforcing international law and preserving order, or run the risk of allowing the international system to lapse into chaos, instability, and inter-state warfare. From this perspective, the United States not only has the right but also the duty to use its dominant leadership position and superior power capabilities to persuade (compel) subordinate states to cooperate on issues such as the war on drugs, for failure to do so could endanger US national security and, ultimately, the stability of the international system as a whole.

Adoption of the realist perspective, in effect, inexorably leads to the supply-side strategy and unilateral escalation tactics advo- cated by Reagan and his hardline critics alike as central com- ponents of the US anti-drug campaign. In view of the predominance of the realist paradigm among US foreign policy elites, the basic thrust of the US war against drugs under Reagan was eminently predictable; however, the question is not one of the internal consistency but rather of explanatory power: does the realist approach accurately reflect the structure and dynamics of the contemporary international system and correctly interpret the role of the United States within it, or not? If not, policy recommendations which flow logically from the realist framework are des-

195 195




tined to fail in practice, no matter how much money and manpower are mobilized to implement them.

REALISM REVISED: NEOREALISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERDEPENDENCE FOR THE WAR ON DRUGS

REALIST PREMISES AND LOGIC indisputably inspired the 1986 Anti-Drug Act. It specifically sought to provide the economic resources, personnel, administrative structure, and policy guidelines whose absence or ambiguity the hardliners believed had hobbled the Reagan administration's ability to effectively prosecute the war on drugs. With spirits buoyed by this new legislation, optimistic predictions and high expectations regarding corers soon to be turned and victories to be won in the war against drugs became the order of the day in Washington.

Just two years later, however, visibly frustrated by the lack of tangible progress in curbing drug production, trafficking, consumption, and related violence - and under pressure to "do something" about drugs in advance of the November 1988 presidential election - the Congress enacted and Reagan signed, a second major anti-drug initiative: the Omnibus Drug Act of 1988. While retaining the long-standing emphasis on supply-side strategies typical of earlier legislation, this law also included a new focus on demand and backed it up by earmarking 500/ of the federal anti-drug funding in FY 1989 for domestic demand control programs. The ratio was mandated to rise to 60%/o-40% in subsequent years.5 This shift was not merely cosmetic or tactical, it revealed growing disappointment and disillusionment in Con- gress with the ineffectual supply-side emphasis of existing US anti- drug policies. In effect, by late 1988 many hardliners had reluctantly concluded that the realist approach did not adequately capture the complex realities of the increasingly interdependent international system and, consequently, was unable to provide a reliable basis for drug policy. In short, the shift was driven by failure.

A key flaw in the realist paradigm is embedded in the overly simplistic assumption that nation-states are always the primary actors in international politics, including the arena of international

tined to fail in practice, no matter how much money and manpower are mobilized to implement them.

REALISM REVISED: NEOREALISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERDEPENDENCE FOR THE WAR ON DRUGS

REALIST PREMISES AND LOGIC indisputably inspired the 1986 Anti-Drug Act. It specifically sought to provide the economic resources, personnel, administrative structure, and policy guidelines whose absence or ambiguity the hardliners believed had hobbled the Reagan administration's ability to effectively prosecute the war on drugs. With spirits buoyed by this new legislation, optimistic predictions and high expectations regarding corers soon to be turned and victories to be won in the war against drugs became the order of the day in Washington.

Just two years later, however, visibly frustrated by the lack of tangible progress in curbing drug production, trafficking, consumption, and related violence - and under pressure to "do something" about drugs in advance of the November 1988 presidential election - the Congress enacted and Reagan signed, a second major anti-drug initiative: the Omnibus Drug Act of 1988. While retaining the long-standing emphasis on supply-side strategies typical of earlier legislation, this law also included a new focus on demand and backed it up by earmarking 500/ of the federal anti-drug funding in FY 1989 for domestic demand control programs. The ratio was mandated to rise to 60%/o-40% in subsequent years.5 This shift was not merely cosmetic or tactical, it revealed growing disappointment and disillusionment in Con- gress with the ineffectual supply-side emphasis of existing US anti- drug policies. In effect, by late 1988 many hardliners had reluctantly concluded that the realist approach did not adequately capture the complex realities of the increasingly interdependent international system and, consequently, was unable to provide a reliable basis for drug policy. In short, the shift was driven by failure.

A key flaw in the realist paradigm is embedded in the overly simplistic assumption that nation-states are always the primary actors in international politics, including the arena of international




drug trafficking. In fact, there are multiple subnational and transnational actors involved in this international industry, many of whom operate outside of, or in direct defiance of, national authorities throughout the hemisphere. It is simply unrealistic to

expect effective implementation of narcotics-control policies from Latin American countries whose weak governments do not control the entire national territory; they do not have the power or

authority to rein in, much less totally suppress, the well-financed, heavily armed, and ruthless drug mafias operating in their midst, no matter how insistent or painful US efforts to persuade or punish may become. In the real world, neither the US government nor

any of its Latin American counterparts has demonstrated the will or capacity needed to prevent the rise and consolidation of criminal drug enterprises (e.g., the Medellin Cartel in Colombia or the Cosa Nostra in the United States) nor to permanently dis-

rupt their operations and profits once they have taken root. If the

relatively powerful US government has failed to destroy New York's famous "five families" despite a decades-long campaign to do so, can the comparatively much weaker goverments of, for

example, Colombia or Mexico be expected to do better? Assertion of state control over the various transnational actors

directly or indirectly involved in US-Latin American drug traffick-

ing networks is equally problematic in most cases. A variety of

private, multinational, commercial banks, and other international financial institutions engage in illicit money-laundering activities that few, if any, Latin American governments are equipped to control effectively. Similarly, state monitoring and law enforcement

capabilities in most areas are generally insufficient to control the unauthorized importation and use of chemical inputs from abroad. In fact, even though US businesses have been identified as the source of up to 90% of these inputs, until the enactment of the 1988 anti-drug legislation, not even the US government had made a serious effort to control the export of these basic chemical products. While US financial and technical assistance might help improve state capacities to control some aspects of this transnational involvement in the drug trade, to believe that the in-

stitutionally underdeveloped, financially-strapped governments of Latin America will be in a position to gain or maintain effective control over these actors within the next decade is out of touch with reality. To sanction them for failing to do so is both hypocriti-

drug trafficking. In fact, there are multiple subnational and transnational actors involved in this international industry, many of whom operate outside of, or in direct defiance of, national authorities throughout the hemisphere. It is simply unrealistic to

expect effective implementation of narcotics-control policies from Latin American countries whose weak governments do not control the entire national territory; they do not have the power or

authority to rein in, much less totally suppress, the well-financed, heavily armed, and ruthless drug mafias operating in their midst, no matter how insistent or painful US efforts to persuade or punish may become. In the real world, neither the US government nor

any of its Latin American counterparts has demonstrated the will or capacity needed to prevent the rise and consolidation of criminal drug enterprises (e.g., the Medellin Cartel in Colombia or the Cosa Nostra in the United States) nor to permanently dis-

rupt their operations and profits once they have taken root. If the

relatively powerful US government has failed to destroy New York's famous "five families" despite a decades-long campaign to do so, can the comparatively much weaker goverments of, for

example, Colombia or Mexico be expected to do better? Assertion of state control over the various transnational actors

directly or indirectly involved in US-Latin American drug traffick-

ing networks is equally problematic in most cases. A variety of

private, multinational, commercial banks, and other international financial institutions engage in illicit money-laundering activities that few, if any, Latin American governments are equipped to control effectively. Similarly, state monitoring and law enforcement

capabilities in most areas are generally insufficient to control the unauthorized importation and use of chemical inputs from abroad. In fact, even though US businesses have been identified as the source of up to 90% of these inputs, until the enactment of the 1988 anti-drug legislation, not even the US government had made a serious effort to control the export of these basic chemical products. While US financial and technical assistance might help improve state capacities to control some aspects of this transnational involvement in the drug trade, to believe that the in-

stitutionally underdeveloped, financially-strapped governments of Latin America will be in a position to gain or maintain effective control over these actors within the next decade is out of touch with reality. To sanction them for failing to do so is both hypocriti-

197 197




cal and counterproductive in the long run. In general, Latin American governments do not merit sanctions; they need consistent and sustained help in strengthening state institutions and regulatory capabilities, and in providing alternative economic opportunities for their populations.

In general, the realists' state-primacy assumption ignores, or seriously underestimates, the power and independence of the interational market forces involved in the drug trade and their con- comitant capacity to circumvent, adapt to, or override state efforts to regulate or suppress their illicit but highly profitable industry. Neither totalitarian states (such as the USSR) nor authoritarian regimes (such as Bolivia or Peru under military rule, or Panama) have proven able and willing to control effectively their under- ground economies or "black" markets, despite centralized power structures, statist economies, and the relative absence of legal- democratic constraints on governmental actions. For less statist, more market-oriented and democratic systems (such as the United States or Italy) to control, much less altogether eliminate illegal smuggling and "black market" activity, is inherently more problematic. State authorities are more constrained by the need to respect individual privacy and civil liberties. Political power and law enforcement capabilities are more dispersed and fragmented among the various branches and levels of government. Economic activity tends to be freer of state controls and more open to international trade, both licit and illicit. If a comparatively strong democratic state such as the United States has not managed to dis- mantle the mafia permanently, it is even less likely that Latin America's generally weak and uninstitutionalized democracies will be able to disrupt the enormously wealthy criminal organizations that have sprung from and are sustained by the drug trade. As long as the US market for drugs remains profitable, suppliers will be motivated to find innovative ways to produce and smug- gle narcotics to supply that demand and will be able to marshall the resources required to circumvent or override whatever enforcement efforts Latin America's weak states are able to undertake.

The debt crisis and severe economic contractions that have wracked most Latin Americans economies during the 1980s have further complicated the picture by undermining state authority and reducing fiscal resources available to implement anti-drug programs. At the same time, the booming drug trade has created

cal and counterproductive in the long run. In general, Latin American governments do not merit sanctions; they need consistent and sustained help in strengthening state institutions and regulatory capabilities, and in providing alternative economic opportunities for their populations.

In general, the realists' state-primacy assumption ignores, or seriously underestimates, the power and independence of the interational market forces involved in the drug trade and their con- comitant capacity to circumvent, adapt to, or override state efforts to regulate or suppress their illicit but highly profitable industry. Neither totalitarian states (such as the USSR) nor authoritarian regimes (such as Bolivia or Peru under military rule, or Panama) have proven able and willing to control effectively their under- ground economies or "black" markets, despite centralized power structures, statist economies, and the relative absence of legal- democratic constraints on governmental actions. For less statist, more market-oriented and democratic systems (such as the United States or Italy) to control, much less altogether eliminate illegal smuggling and "black market" activity, is inherently more problematic. State authorities are more constrained by the need to respect individual privacy and civil liberties. Political power and law enforcement capabilities are more dispersed and fragmented among the various branches and levels of government. Economic activity tends to be freer of state controls and more open to international trade, both licit and illicit. If a comparatively strong democratic state such as the United States has not managed to dis- mantle the mafia permanently, it is even less likely that Latin America's generally weak and uninstitutionalized democracies will be able to disrupt the enormously wealthy criminal organizations that have sprung from and are sustained by the drug trade. As long as the US market for drugs remains profitable, suppliers will be motivated to find innovative ways to produce and smug- gle narcotics to supply that demand and will be able to marshall the resources required to circumvent or override whatever enforcement efforts Latin America's weak states are able to undertake.

The debt crisis and severe economic contractions that have wracked most Latin Americans economies during the 1980s have further complicated the picture by undermining state authority and reducing fiscal resources available to implement anti-drug programs. At the same time, the booming drug trade has created




employment opportunities and earned scarce foreign exchange in otherwise stagnant or declining national economies, thereby increasing the relative economic and political clout of the drug barons vis-c-vis traditional economic elites.

Equally revealing even where the US interdiction efforts have had some positive results - for example, in reducing the flow of marijuana smuggled into the United States from Mexico during the 1970s, alternative sources of supply and transshipment quickly emerged to meet continuing demand. In practice, the decline in Mexican marijuana production precipitated a parallel boom in marijuana exports from Colombia. The subsequent success of the South Florida Task Force's mid-1980s interdiction campaign against marijuana and cocaine traffic from Colombia into South Florida, in turn, stimulated a resurgence of Mexican marijuana cultivation and smuggling, along with a dispersion and proliferation of alternate trafficking routes throughout Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

Meanwhile, behind the new non-tariff barriers created by Washington's intensified drug interdiction and overseas eradication programs, the profitability of domestic marijuana cultivation rose exponentially, thus providing new incentives for US producers to enter the market. Whereas in the early 1970s domestic US cultivation accounted for only 1-2% of the marijuana trade, by 1986 US farmers were growing an estimated 2,000 metric tons annually and had captured some 20 to 25% of total US demand. To Washington's chagrin, a considerable proportion of the ex- panding domestic crop was grown on public lands (e.g., forests, parks, and wilderness areas) nominally controlled by federal or state authorities. Furthermore, over the late 1970s, technically innovative US producers developed more potent, hybrid strains of cannabis, such as the now-famous sinsemilla variety grown in Hawaii and California, which more than doubled the potency of the average marijuana joint smoked by consumers in many parts of the United States (GAO, 1988: 15-18)..

Modification of the realists' state primacy assumption to incor- porate other relevant subnational and transnational actors and market forces into the analysis in no way implies that nation-states are unimportant or irrelevant actors in international politics in the 1980s, even in the international drug trade. It means simply that state-state relations must be located and analyzed in the broader

employment opportunities and earned scarce foreign exchange in otherwise stagnant or declining national economies, thereby increasing the relative economic and political clout of the drug barons vis-c-vis traditional economic elites.

Equally revealing even where the US interdiction efforts have had some positive results - for example, in reducing the flow of marijuana smuggled into the United States from Mexico during the 1970s, alternative sources of supply and transshipment quickly emerged to meet continuing demand. In practice, the decline in Mexican marijuana production precipitated a parallel boom in marijuana exports from Colombia. The subsequent success of the South Florida Task Force's mid-1980s interdiction campaign against marijuana and cocaine traffic from Colombia into South Florida, in turn, stimulated a resurgence of Mexican marijuana cultivation and smuggling, along with a dispersion and proliferation of alternate trafficking routes throughout Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

Meanwhile, behind the new non-tariff barriers created by Washington's intensified drug interdiction and overseas eradication programs, the profitability of domestic marijuana cultivation rose exponentially, thus providing new incentives for US producers to enter the market. Whereas in the early 1970s domestic US cultivation accounted for only 1-2% of the marijuana trade, by 1986 US farmers were growing an estimated 2,000 metric tons annually and had captured some 20 to 25% of total US demand. To Washington's chagrin, a considerable proportion of the ex- panding domestic crop was grown on public lands (e.g., forests, parks, and wilderness areas) nominally controlled by federal or state authorities. Furthermore, over the late 1970s, technically innovative US producers developed more potent, hybrid strains of cannabis, such as the now-famous sinsemilla variety grown in Hawaii and California, which more than doubled the potency of the average marijuana joint smoked by consumers in many parts of the United States (GAO, 1988: 15-18)..

Modification of the realists' state primacy assumption to incor- porate other relevant subnational and transnational actors and market forces into the analysis in no way implies that nation-states are unimportant or irrelevant actors in international politics in the 1980s, even in the international drug trade. It means simply that state-state relations must be located and analyzed in the broader

199 199




international economic and political contexts within which they take place. At the policy level, it means that to be credible and ef-

fective, US international narcotics control efforts must be

designed, organized, and implemented on the basis of more realistic assessments of the structure and dynamics of the international

political economy of the drug trade and the extent and limits of individual Latin American governments' economic, technical, and enforcement capabilities vis-d-visintemational drug trafficking organizations.

A second distortion or oversimplification embedded in the realist paradigm lies in its assumption that Latin American govern- ing elites rationally select and implement foreign policies designed to further well-defined and widely accepted national interests. In fact, national policymakers in much of the region must

routinely operate without the luxury of fully elaborated conceptual schemes which define and prioritize their nations' vital interests. Furthermore, they often must cope with fragile political systems of tenuous legitimacy where no viable consensus on vital national interests has ever been forged. Under such conditions, the conduct of foreign policy is commonly reduced to little more than frustrating, ad hoc exercises in damage-control involving painful choices and unpopular trade-offs among sub-optimal al- ternatives which, however resolved, probably will exacerbate domestic tensions and further erode national consensus rather than strengthen state authority.

In many respects, Colombian policymakers in the 1980s have confronted just such a "devil's dilemma" with regard to the issue of extradition of Colombian drug traffickers for prosecution in US courts. On one hand, the Colombian judicial system has clearly been incapable of bringing the country's most powerful drug lords to justice, and US pressures to extradite (often accompanied by implicit or explicit threats of sanctions) have been intense. On the other hand, compliance has aroused fierce nationalist opposition, undercut system legitimacy, and provoked murderous reprisals against government officials by drug traffickers. Caught in these treacherous crosscurrents, Colombia's policymakers first refused to extradite, then yielded to US pressures, subsequently procras- tinated in the face of a withering campaign of mafia violence and intimidation, and ultimately backed away from further com-

international economic and political contexts within which they take place. At the policy level, it means that to be credible and ef-

fective, US international narcotics control efforts must be

designed, organized, and implemented on the basis of more realistic assessments of the structure and dynamics of the international

political economy of the drug trade and the extent and limits of individual Latin American governments' economic, technical, and enforcement capabilities vis-d-visintemational drug trafficking organizations.

A second distortion or oversimplification embedded in the realist paradigm lies in its assumption that Latin American govern- ing elites rationally select and implement foreign policies designed to further well-defined and widely accepted national interests. In fact, national policymakers in much of the region must

routinely operate without the luxury of fully elaborated conceptual schemes which define and prioritize their nations' vital interests. Furthermore, they often must cope with fragile political systems of tenuous legitimacy where no viable consensus on vital national interests has ever been forged. Under such conditions, the conduct of foreign policy is commonly reduced to little more than frustrating, ad hoc exercises in damage-control involving painful choices and unpopular trade-offs among sub-optimal al- ternatives which, however resolved, probably will exacerbate domestic tensions and further erode national consensus rather than strengthen state authority.

In many respects, Colombian policymakers in the 1980s have confronted just such a "devil's dilemma" with regard to the issue of extradition of Colombian drug traffickers for prosecution in US courts. On one hand, the Colombian judicial system has clearly been incapable of bringing the country's most powerful drug lords to justice, and US pressures to extradite (often accompanied by implicit or explicit threats of sanctions) have been intense. On the other hand, compliance has aroused fierce nationalist opposition, undercut system legitimacy, and provoked murderous reprisals against government officials by drug traffickers. Caught in these treacherous crosscurrents, Colombia's policymakers first refused to extradite, then yielded to US pressures, subsequently procras- tinated in the face of a withering campaign of mafia violence and intimidation, and ultimately backed away from further com-




pliance while shrouding their retreat in a fog of legal-constitution- al arguments (Bagley, 1988b).

The Colombian extradition example also calls into question the validity of the realist's "rational actor" premise in Latin American countries beset by drug violence. Extralegal assassinations and intimidation undeniably complicate policymakers' efforts to make rational choices among foreign policy options purporting to defend and promote national interests. This rational choice premise becomes even more problematic if the reality of drug-related corruption of, and indirect influence over, both foreign and domestic policymaking is factored into the analysis. The point is that the realist's model of rational decision making based on in- formed and coherent views of national interests cannot be as- sumed as a given in much of Latin America. For US officials charged with carrying out Washington's anti-drug policies, this means that to be effective, they must strive to understand how the "black-box" of policymaking and policy implementation actually functions in each country and adjust US goals and programs ac- cordingly.

A third faulty realist premise is that the US foreign policy agenda (not to mention that of each Latin American nation-state) is characterized by a clear hierarchy or prioritization of issues in which drug trafficking, because of its national security implications, ranks at the top. In practice, the United States has a variety of interests in Latin America which often have inhibited or diluted Washington's commitment to combating international drug trafficking during the 1980s. Among the most obvious of these competing foreign policy interests or objectives are anti-communism, democratization, regime stabilization, and economic develop- ment. Confronted with the need to balance these often contradictory priorities against the war on international drug trafficking, the Reagan administration repeatedly found it prudent to water down or de-emphasize the US anti-drug campaign, at least temporarily, in order to avoid serious setbacks on other fronts (Sciolino and Endelberg, 1988).

Quite predictably, the White House was on such occasions harshly denounced by hardline critics for failing to pressure source and transit countries more vigorously. In the real world of growing interdependence, however, such trade-offs are simply facts of life; to ignore them altogether would be myopic and quite

pliance while shrouding their retreat in a fog of legal-constitution- al arguments (Bagley, 1988b).

The Colombian extradition example also calls into question the validity of the realist's "rational actor" premise in Latin American countries beset by drug violence. Extralegal assassinations and intimidation undeniably complicate policymakers' efforts to make rational choices among foreign policy options purporting to defend and promote national interests. This rational choice premise becomes even more problematic if the reality of drug-related corruption of, and indirect influence over, both foreign and domestic policymaking is factored into the analysis. The point is that the realist's model of rational decision making based on in- formed and coherent views of national interests cannot be as- sumed as a given in much of Latin America. For US officials charged with carrying out Washington's anti-drug policies, this means that to be effective, they must strive to understand how the "black-box" of policymaking and policy implementation actually functions in each country and adjust US goals and programs ac- cordingly.

A third faulty realist premise is that the US foreign policy agenda (not to mention that of each Latin American nation-state) is characterized by a clear hierarchy or prioritization of issues in which drug trafficking, because of its national security implications, ranks at the top. In practice, the United States has a variety of interests in Latin America which often have inhibited or diluted Washington's commitment to combating international drug trafficking during the 1980s. Among the most obvious of these competing foreign policy interests or objectives are anti-communism, democratization, regime stabilization, and economic develop- ment. Confronted with the need to balance these often contradictory priorities against the war on international drug trafficking, the Reagan administration repeatedly found it prudent to water down or de-emphasize the US anti-drug campaign, at least temporarily, in order to avoid serious setbacks on other fronts (Sciolino and Endelberg, 1988).

Quite predictably, the White House was on such occasions harshly denounced by hardline critics for failing to pressure source and transit countries more vigorously. In the real world of growing interdependence, however, such trade-offs are simply facts of life; to ignore them altogether would be myopic and quite

201 201




probably counter-productive. As the major power in hemispheric affairs, the US foreign policy agenda inevitably includes a range of interests which cannot always or easily be reconciled. US overseas anti-drug policies, however, have been driven more by short- run domestic political pressures, partisan posturing, and electoral cycles, than by reasoned calculations of the costs and benefits for US national interests abroad over the long run. The challenge this permanent feature of US democratic politics poses for US policymakers includes the necessity to determine how pursuit of specific goals will affect other priorities, to build public and congressional consensus around balanced and viable strategies, and to minimize counter-productive actions and unintended consequences. In US politics, the brunt of this daunting task inevitably falls on the president.

A final misleading realist assumption is the notion that the use of unilateral force (i.e., self-help) - including pressures and sanctions as well as direct intervention - are appropriate and potentially effective policy instruments in the US war on drugs abroad. In practice, several factors combined to reduce or negate the effectiveness of unilateral actions in the 1980s. First, as noted above, Latin American states (such as Colombia or Peru) were simply incapable of controlling their national territory or the powerful criminal drug organizations active within their national boun- daries; unilateral US efforts to pressure them to do more or to sanction them for not doing enough did not and could not alter this reality.

Second, given the extensive US economic and politico- strategic interests in several Latin American source and transit countries, threats of sanctions often lacked credibility; their application would inflict too much damage on other important US interests. Mexico provides an excellent case in point. Despite deep dissatisfaction in the Reagan administration and in Congress with Mexico's failure to rein in drug trafficking, the US executive con- sistently refused to decertify or sanction the Mexican government on grounds that such measures would reduce rather than improve cooperation from Mexico on drugs and endanger other American interests in the process. The ineffectiveness of sanctions and the limits of US influence over Mexico became starkly clear to Washington when in 1985, after the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena, frustrated and angry US Customs Service officials

probably counter-productive. As the major power in hemispheric affairs, the US foreign policy agenda inevitably includes a range of interests which cannot always or easily be reconciled. US overseas anti-drug policies, however, have been driven more by short- run domestic political pressures, partisan posturing, and electoral cycles, than by reasoned calculations of the costs and benefits for US national interests abroad over the long run. The challenge this permanent feature of US democratic politics poses for US policymakers includes the necessity to determine how pursuit of specific goals will affect other priorities, to build public and congressional consensus around balanced and viable strategies, and to minimize counter-productive actions and unintended consequences. In US politics, the brunt of this daunting task inevitably falls on the president.

A final misleading realist assumption is the notion that the use of unilateral force (i.e., self-help) - including pressures and sanctions as well as direct intervention - are appropriate and potentially effective policy instruments in the US war on drugs abroad. In practice, several factors combined to reduce or negate the effectiveness of unilateral actions in the 1980s. First, as noted above, Latin American states (such as Colombia or Peru) were simply incapable of controlling their national territory or the powerful criminal drug organizations active within their national boun- daries; unilateral US efforts to pressure them to do more or to sanction them for not doing enough did not and could not alter this reality.

Second, given the extensive US economic and politico- strategic interests in several Latin American source and transit countries, threats of sanctions often lacked credibility; their application would inflict too much damage on other important US interests. Mexico provides an excellent case in point. Despite deep dissatisfaction in the Reagan administration and in Congress with Mexico's failure to rein in drug trafficking, the US executive con- sistently refused to decertify or sanction the Mexican government on grounds that such measures would reduce rather than improve cooperation from Mexico on drugs and endanger other American interests in the process. The ineffectiveness of sanctions and the limits of US influence over Mexico became starkly clear to Washington when in 1985, after the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena, frustrated and angry US Customs Service officials




sought to pressure the Mexican government to more vigorously investigate the case by restricting cross-border traffic and com- merce between Juarez and El Paso. As intended, the Mexican economy undoubtedly was hurt by this unilateral measure. Within two weeks, however, the Customs Service was obliged to abandon its strategy, not because of Mexican protests, but because it inflicted serious economic losses on US merchants along the border whose businesses depended on Mexican customers and who were able to mobilize their congressional delegations in Washington to reverse the policy (Treverton, 1988).

The point is that extensive US-Mexican interdependence seriously constrains Washington's ability to bring the full range of its overall power capabilities to bear against Mexico, and thus to compel fuller cooperation or compliance, for to do so inevitably injures US interests also. Moreover, the outpouring of Mexican nationalism and anti-US sentiment, along with the legacy of tensions and frictions in US-Mexican relations manifest in wake of this episode, indicates that the costs of unilateral actions cannot be calculated in dollar terms alone (Bagley, 1988a).

The ineffectiveness of US sanctions against Noriega's Panama provides a second illustration of the limited utility of unilateral pressure as a tactical option in the war on drugs. Despite a full year of intense US economic sanctions which imposed perhaps irreversible damage to the Panamanian economy, Noriega was still in power in January 1989. In practice, General Noriega was able to stave off complete economic collapse by obtaining financial assistance from governments unfriendly to the United States or unsympathetic to US policy toward that country. The assumption that US economic predominance can readily be translated into political control is clearly fallacious. Moreover, Noriega was able to exploit Panamanians' nationalism, anti-Americanism, and anti- imperialist sentiments to tighten his political control over the government (Moss, 1988).

The assumption that the US Armed Forces could - if so or- dered - interdict drug smuggling efficiently, also reflects the realists' consistent overestimation of the effectiveness of force as an instrument of policy. In fact, most analysts have concluded that the US military has neither the specific equipment nor the technical training required to effectively undertake drug interdiction. Despite the use of war analogies and the invocation of national

sought to pressure the Mexican government to more vigorously investigate the case by restricting cross-border traffic and com- merce between Juarez and El Paso. As intended, the Mexican economy undoubtedly was hurt by this unilateral measure. Within two weeks, however, the Customs Service was obliged to abandon its strategy, not because of Mexican protests, but because it inflicted serious economic losses on US merchants along the border whose businesses depended on Mexican customers and who were able to mobilize their congressional delegations in Washington to reverse the policy (Treverton, 1988).

The point is that extensive US-Mexican interdependence seriously constrains Washington's ability to bring the full range of its overall power capabilities to bear against Mexico, and thus to compel fuller cooperation or compliance, for to do so inevitably injures US interests also. Moreover, the outpouring of Mexican nationalism and anti-US sentiment, along with the legacy of tensions and frictions in US-Mexican relations manifest in wake of this episode, indicates that the costs of unilateral actions cannot be calculated in dollar terms alone (Bagley, 1988a).

The ineffectiveness of US sanctions against Noriega's Panama provides a second illustration of the limited utility of unilateral pressure as a tactical option in the war on drugs. Despite a full year of intense US economic sanctions which imposed perhaps irreversible damage to the Panamanian economy, Noriega was still in power in January 1989. In practice, General Noriega was able to stave off complete economic collapse by obtaining financial assistance from governments unfriendly to the United States or unsympathetic to US policy toward that country. The assumption that US economic predominance can readily be translated into political control is clearly fallacious. Moreover, Noriega was able to exploit Panamanians' nationalism, anti-Americanism, and anti- imperialist sentiments to tighten his political control over the government (Moss, 1988).

The assumption that the US Armed Forces could - if so or- dered - interdict drug smuggling efficiently, also reflects the realists' consistent overestimation of the effectiveness of force as an instrument of policy. In fact, most analysts have concluded that the US military has neither the specific equipment nor the technical training required to effectively undertake drug interdiction. Despite the use of war analogies and the invocation of national

203 203




security threats, the war on drugs is qualitatively different from the conventional wars the US Armed Forces are prepared to handle. Drug trafficking does not involve the incursion into US territory of large groups of easily detectable, hostile forces. On the contrary, drug smuggling is by definition a clandestine activity undertaken by individuals or small groups with the express intention of penetrating US borders unseen and then disappearing without a trace. Air Force combat planes, naval warships, and army or marine fighting units never were intended to fight this type of enemy; neither is military radar designed for such detection. Moreover, given the US status as one of the preeminent trading nations in the world, the almost infinitely variable channels of entry available to smugglers, and the huge profits to be derived from drug trafficking, interdiction efforts - whether carried out by the military or any US agency - are inherently incapable of seizing more than a small percentage of the total flow of illicit drugs smuggled into the United States. Ironically, unless the US borders can be "sealed" completely, US interdiction programs simply raise the cost of smuggling activities, thus increasing the profits/incentives for future smugglers to engage in drug trafficking (Reuter, Crawford, and Crane, 1988).

INTERDEPENDENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS

IF THE PRESENT ESCALATION STRATEGY and its attendant frustrations and failures can be traced back to the flawed assumptions of the realist paradigm - not just to problems of resource limitations and inadequate or incompetent implementation, what alternative strategies and tactics flow from the proposed interdependence perspective? Unfortunately, it is necessary to recog- nize at the outset that the neorealist approach offers no silver bullet, no policy quickfixto magically resolve the Americas' drug problem once and for all.

The reason lies not in a lack of policy creativity or political will among neorealists, but rather in their awareness of the magnitude and complexity of the task. The roots of drug consumption go deep into the increasingly interdependent economic, social, and political structures of both North and South American societies. They will, therefore, not easily yield to topical treatments directed at symptoms. Victory in the war on drugs will require major so-

security threats, the war on drugs is qualitatively different from the conventional wars the US Armed Forces are prepared to handle. Drug trafficking does not involve the incursion into US territory of large groups of easily detectable, hostile forces. On the contrary, drug smuggling is by definition a clandestine activity undertaken by individuals or small groups with the express intention of penetrating US borders unseen and then disappearing without a trace. Air Force combat planes, naval warships, and army or marine fighting units never were intended to fight this type of enemy; neither is military radar designed for such detection. Moreover, given the US status as one of the preeminent trading nations in the world, the almost infinitely variable channels of entry available to smugglers, and the huge profits to be derived from drug trafficking, interdiction efforts - whether carried out by the military or any US agency - are inherently incapable of seizing more than a small percentage of the total flow of illicit drugs smuggled into the United States. Ironically, unless the US borders can be "sealed" completely, US interdiction programs simply raise the cost of smuggling activities, thus increasing the profits/incentives for future smugglers to engage in drug trafficking (Reuter, Crawford, and Crane, 1988).

INTERDEPENDENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS

IF THE PRESENT ESCALATION STRATEGY and its attendant frustrations and failures can be traced back to the flawed assumptions of the realist paradigm - not just to problems of resource limitations and inadequate or incompetent implementation, what alternative strategies and tactics flow from the proposed interdependence perspective? Unfortunately, it is necessary to recog- nize at the outset that the neorealist approach offers no silver bullet, no policy quickfixto magically resolve the Americas' drug problem once and for all.

The reason lies not in a lack of policy creativity or political will among neorealists, but rather in their awareness of the magnitude and complexity of the task. The roots of drug consumption go deep into the increasingly interdependent economic, social, and political structures of both North and South American societies. They will, therefore, not easily yield to topical treatments directed at symptoms. Victory in the war on drugs will require major so-




cial-structural transformation on both sides of the supply-demand equation.

Acceptance of this interdependence perspective on the drug issue leads directly to two general recommendations regarding the conduct of the US war on drugs. The first involves the need to develop coordinated, multilateral approaches to interational drug trafficking to replace the ineffectual unilateral or bilateral pressure tactics which have typified the realist approach. There will be glitches, frustrations, and backsliding in these efforts, but over the long run, multilateral approaches to the international drug trade provide the only realistic hope for a concerted attack.

A corollary to this collective strategic approach is the need to undertake long-term institution-building efforts both nationally and multilaterally to improve regulatory and enforcement capabilities throughout the hemisphere. To be viable, such institution-building efforts almost certainly will have to be coupled with renewed economic growth throughout the region. To generate the political will and economic wherewithal necessary to get institution-building processes underway, alternative economic opportunities for the hundreds of thousands reliant upon the drug industry are indispensable: compensatory flows of foreign exchange earnings for drug-dependent national economies and higher levels of resources for financially-strapped Third World governments will have to be found. The previous experiences of military-dominated governments in countries like Bolivia and Panama reveal the dangers in reliance on military rather than civilian institutions.

A second strategic recommendation is that both supply and demand facets of the drug problem must be addressed simultaneously to achieve long-term results. In other words, the huge profits that stimulate production and trafficking and fuel the violence and criminality associated with drug dealing, must be eliminated or at least reduced significantly. Otherwise, the logic of supply and demand within the interdependent international economy will inevitably reproduce the conditions that perpetuate drug trafficking, while stacking the deck against efforts by state authorities - in developing and developed nations alike - to rein in the industry.

How can demand be reduced in practice? Neither realism, nor neorealism - both macro-theories of international relations

cial-structural transformation on both sides of the supply-demand equation.

Acceptance of this interdependence perspective on the drug issue leads directly to two general recommendations regarding the conduct of the US war on drugs. The first involves the need to develop coordinated, multilateral approaches to interational drug trafficking to replace the ineffectual unilateral or bilateral pressure tactics which have typified the realist approach. There will be glitches, frustrations, and backsliding in these efforts, but over the long run, multilateral approaches to the international drug trade provide the only realistic hope for a concerted attack.

A corollary to this collective strategic approach is the need to undertake long-term institution-building efforts both nationally and multilaterally to improve regulatory and enforcement capabilities throughout the hemisphere. To be viable, such institution-building efforts almost certainly will have to be coupled with renewed economic growth throughout the region. To generate the political will and economic wherewithal necessary to get institution-building processes underway, alternative economic opportunities for the hundreds of thousands reliant upon the drug industry are indispensable: compensatory flows of foreign exchange earnings for drug-dependent national economies and higher levels of resources for financially-strapped Third World governments will have to be found. The previous experiences of military-dominated governments in countries like Bolivia and Panama reveal the dangers in reliance on military rather than civilian institutions.

A second strategic recommendation is that both supply and demand facets of the drug problem must be addressed simultaneously to achieve long-term results. In other words, the huge profits that stimulate production and trafficking and fuel the violence and criminality associated with drug dealing, must be eliminated or at least reduced significantly. Otherwise, the logic of supply and demand within the interdependent international economy will inevitably reproduce the conditions that perpetuate drug trafficking, while stacking the deck against efforts by state authorities - in developing and developed nations alike - to rein in the industry.

How can demand be reduced in practice? Neither realism, nor neorealism - both macro-theories of international relations

205 205




shed much light on the tactical options available, much less on their relative merits individually or in combination. The central questions on the demand side (why do individuals use drugs and how can they be stopped?) pertain to other disciplines, such as public health, medicine, psychology, sociology, criminology, law enforcement, and law.

Science and the War on Drugs

Unfortunately, after years of "warring" on drugs, neither the scientific nor the policy community in the United States has developed a reliable blueprint for effective demand reduction. The study of "addictionology" (i.e., efforts to understand the genetic, medical, psychological, and sociological factors which lead to drug abuse and to develop appropriate techniques to treat and rehabilitate users) is still very much in its infancy, although some promising possibilities have surfaced. To remedy this deficiency, the calls for a federally-financed "scientific" war on drug addiction have become increasingly frequent in the United States. The 1988 Omnibus Drug Act stepped up support for research on these topics, but did not authorize the funding required for a major federal effort on this front.

Legalization/Decriminalization

Recognition of the importance of removing the profit motive from the drug trade has led some US analysts to propose legalization of some drugs (e.g., marijuana) and decriminalization of most others (e.g., cocaine and heroin). Such a radical policy shift would certainly remove the high profit margins involved in illegal drug smuggling and distribution, and thus eliminate the driving force behind drug-related crime and violence. The potential reductions in budgetary outlays for law enforcement and prisoner main- tenance, along with the possibility of increased tax revenues through government regulation, make this alternative economi- cally attractive. Widespread moral-religious opposition to narcotics consumption and natural fears about the public health and economic productivity consequences of increased drug use in US society, however, make such a move politically infeasible for the foreseeable future. If existing legal prohibitions against drug con-

shed much light on the tactical options available, much less on their relative merits individually or in combination. The central questions on the demand side (why do individuals use drugs and how can they be stopped?) pertain to other disciplines, such as public health, medicine, psychology, sociology, criminology, law enforcement, and law.

Science and the War on Drugs

Unfortunately, after years of "warring" on drugs, neither the scientific nor the policy community in the United States has developed a reliable blueprint for effective demand reduction. The study of "addictionology" (i.e., efforts to understand the genetic, medical, psychological, and sociological factors which lead to drug abuse and to develop appropriate techniques to treat and rehabilitate users) is still very much in its infancy, although some promising possibilities have surfaced. To remedy this deficiency, the calls for a federally-financed "scientific" war on drug addiction have become increasingly frequent in the United States. The 1988 Omnibus Drug Act stepped up support for research on these topics, but did not authorize the funding required for a major federal effort on this front.

Legalization/Decriminalization

Recognition of the importance of removing the profit motive from the drug trade has led some US analysts to propose legalization of some drugs (e.g., marijuana) and decriminalization of most others (e.g., cocaine and heroin). Such a radical policy shift would certainly remove the high profit margins involved in illegal drug smuggling and distribution, and thus eliminate the driving force behind drug-related crime and violence. The potential reductions in budgetary outlays for law enforcement and prisoner main- tenance, along with the possibility of increased tax revenues through government regulation, make this alternative economi- cally attractive. Widespread moral-religious opposition to narcotics consumption and natural fears about the public health and economic productivity consequences of increased drug use in US society, however, make such a move politically infeasible for the foreseeable future. If existing legal prohibitions against drug con-




sumption are ever lifted in North America, by no means an in- evitability, such action is likely only after a majority of the voting public reach the conclusion that all other approaches purporting to deal with the US drug problem have been tried and failed. The predominance of anti-drug hardliners in Washington policymaking circles during the 1980s provides incontrovertible proof that any such political consensus in the United States is still a very long way off.

Demand-Reduction Policies and the Bush Administration

If major breakthroughs in addictionology and/or a radical reversal of current prohibitionist policies are discounted as im-

probable, at least during the next four years, which demand-control program is Washington likely to pursue? Recent Reagan administration decisions, combined with the new measures mandated by the Omnibus Drug Act of 1988 and President Bush's own well-known anti-drug view, suggest that the demand side will receive substantially more attention and resources under Bush than it did under Reagan. At the same time, considerable ambiguity remains regarding which approaches to demand-reduction will be emphasized. In broad strokes, two separate, potentially contradictory, policy tracks can be identified amid the welter of demand-side plans and programs currently circulating in Washington: 1) an educational/treatment track; and 2) a

criminalization/punishment track. With regard to the first, the 1988 legislation unequivocally

recognizes the urgent need to expand and improve federal drug education and treatment programs. It specifically designates treatment "on demand" (within one week of application) as a national priority and authorizes increased federal funding for construction of the facilities required to meet this ambitious goal. The new law also provides for expanded federal funding for drug prevention and education programs at the local, state, and national levels, involving both public and private sectors(Yang, 1988).

Undercutting the rhetorical commitment to the treatment and education track, however, the funds actually appropriated by the Congress for these programs in the FY 1989 budget fall far short

sumption are ever lifted in North America, by no means an in- evitability, such action is likely only after a majority of the voting public reach the conclusion that all other approaches purporting to deal with the US drug problem have been tried and failed. The predominance of anti-drug hardliners in Washington policymaking circles during the 1980s provides incontrovertible proof that any such political consensus in the United States is still a very long way off.

Demand-Reduction Policies and the Bush Administration

If major breakthroughs in addictionology and/or a radical reversal of current prohibitionist policies are discounted as im-

probable, at least during the next four years, which demand-control program is Washington likely to pursue? Recent Reagan administration decisions, combined with the new measures mandated by the Omnibus Drug Act of 1988 and President Bush's own well-known anti-drug view, suggest that the demand side will receive substantially more attention and resources under Bush than it did under Reagan. At the same time, considerable ambiguity remains regarding which approaches to demand-reduction will be emphasized. In broad strokes, two separate, potentially contradictory, policy tracks can be identified amid the welter of demand-side plans and programs currently circulating in Washington: 1) an educational/treatment track; and 2) a

criminalization/punishment track. With regard to the first, the 1988 legislation unequivocally

recognizes the urgent need to expand and improve federal drug education and treatment programs. It specifically designates treatment "on demand" (within one week of application) as a national priority and authorizes increased federal funding for construction of the facilities required to meet this ambitious goal. The new law also provides for expanded federal funding for drug prevention and education programs at the local, state, and national levels, involving both public and private sectors(Yang, 1988).

Undercutting the rhetorical commitment to the treatment and education track, however, the funds actually appropriated by the Congress for these programs in the FY 1989 budget fall far short

207 207




of the levels required to achieve the objectives outlined in the 1988 legislation. Furthermore, in light of the federal government's severe fiscal deficit, it is uncertain that the necessary financial com- mitments will be forthcoming from the 101st Congress (NYT, 1988).

The second policy track apparent in the 1988 legislation involves heightened emphasis on penalization of both drug users and dealers. For example, the law includes new civil penalties for consumers, authorizes the executive branch to deny federal benefits to citizens convicted of narcotics violations, and estab- lishes a (non-mandatory) federal death penalty for certain drug- related murders. It also increases federal support for local and state as well as federal law enforcement programs, raises the budget for the military's interdiction efforts, and expands federal authority to prosecute money-laundering operations.8

Congressional efforts to reduce demand by more heavily penalizing users are paralleled by new executive measures to identify and punish drug consumers employed by the federal government. Specifically, President Reagan authorized expanded drug testing of federal employees. The scope of the testing program was further enlarged in 1988 to include all transporta- tion-sector workers - more than four million - because of their

responsibility for public safety. Along with expanded testing within the federal bureaucracy, the Reagan administration also has promoted the extension of testing programs to state and local levels and to the private sector (USNews and World Report, 1988).

The education/treatment track conceptualizes drug consumption (demand) as a social and a public health problem and seeks to treat it as such. The criminalization/penalization track, in con- trast, defines both drug use and drug trafficking as criminal activities and seeks to repress them. Philosophically, these two tracks part from fundamentally different premises. In practice, they imply alternative public policy priorities and patterns of resource allocation which, at best, will compete with each other for scarce resources and, at worst, may become mutually incompatible. If drug consumption is primarily a public health problem, some form of decriminalization is probably in order and public policy should assign resources on a priority basis to prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. Alternatively, if it is primarily a

of the levels required to achieve the objectives outlined in the 1988 legislation. Furthermore, in light of the federal government's severe fiscal deficit, it is uncertain that the necessary financial com- mitments will be forthcoming from the 101st Congress (NYT, 1988).

The second policy track apparent in the 1988 legislation involves heightened emphasis on penalization of both drug users and dealers. For example, the law includes new civil penalties for consumers, authorizes the executive branch to deny federal benefits to citizens convicted of narcotics violations, and estab- lishes a (non-mandatory) federal death penalty for certain drug- related murders. It also increases federal support for local and state as well as federal law enforcement programs, raises the budget for the military's interdiction efforts, and expands federal authority to prosecute money-laundering operations.8

Congressional efforts to reduce demand by more heavily penalizing users are paralleled by new executive measures to identify and punish drug consumers employed by the federal government. Specifically, President Reagan authorized expanded drug testing of federal employees. The scope of the testing program was further enlarged in 1988 to include all transporta- tion-sector workers - more than four million - because of their

responsibility for public safety. Along with expanded testing within the federal bureaucracy, the Reagan administration also has promoted the extension of testing programs to state and local levels and to the private sector (USNews and World Report, 1988).

The education/treatment track conceptualizes drug consumption (demand) as a social and a public health problem and seeks to treat it as such. The criminalization/penalization track, in con- trast, defines both drug use and drug trafficking as criminal activities and seeks to repress them. Philosophically, these two tracks part from fundamentally different premises. In practice, they imply alternative public policy priorities and patterns of resource allocation which, at best, will compete with each other for scarce resources and, at worst, may become mutually incompatible. If drug consumption is primarily a public health problem, some form of decriminalization is probably in order and public policy should assign resources on a priority basis to prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. Alternatively, if it is primarily a




criminal problem, funding priority should be placed on testing, criminal prosecution, and incarceration.

If both approaches are pursued simultaneously, US budget realities will dictate inadequate resources for both. If personal consumption is severely sanctioned, users will be less likely to voluntarily undertake treatment. If jobs and government benefits are denied to users, the ranks of the unemployed, and (potentially) criminals will increase and treatment and rehabilitation will become more difficult. More convictions and stiffer jail sentences will further drain public resources, overload the court system, and overcrowd the jails. Under such circumstances, the already dismal rehabilitation record of the US correctional system will likely get worse.

The current debate over alternative approaches to domestic demand control touches on many of the points of contention which have surfaced among realists and neorealists over supply- side policies. Like the realists in the international sphere, domestic advocates of the criminalization/penalization track assume that the state has both a right and a duty to enforce anti-drug laws, that there is a societal consensus to do so, and that repression (state force) is an effective tool for reducing drug use. The key questions are whether or not tougher enforcement and harsher civil and criminal penalties will, in fact, reduce drug consumption? By how much? At what cost to the taxpayer? At what cost to civil liberties in the United States?

Like the neorealists, advocates of the treatment and rehabilitation track, whether or not they endorse decriminalization, tend to see the use of force as costly, ineffective, and potentially counterproductive. They also note that among important seg- ments of society, there is the absence of a social consensus on drug use and trafficking. Key questions on this side of the debate concern the effectiveness of treatment and rehabilitation programs and the potential adverse consequences of increased drug use and abuse for US society as a whole.

THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

THE HEIGHTENED PRIORITY ASSIGNED to demand-side measures in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 lends credence to the notion that a conceptual transition from the realist to the in-

criminal problem, funding priority should be placed on testing, criminal prosecution, and incarceration.

If both approaches are pursued simultaneously, US budget realities will dictate inadequate resources for both. If personal consumption is severely sanctioned, users will be less likely to voluntarily undertake treatment. If jobs and government benefits are denied to users, the ranks of the unemployed, and (potentially) criminals will increase and treatment and rehabilitation will become more difficult. More convictions and stiffer jail sentences will further drain public resources, overload the court system, and overcrowd the jails. Under such circumstances, the already dismal rehabilitation record of the US correctional system will likely get worse.

The current debate over alternative approaches to domestic demand control touches on many of the points of contention which have surfaced among realists and neorealists over supply- side policies. Like the realists in the international sphere, domestic advocates of the criminalization/penalization track assume that the state has both a right and a duty to enforce anti-drug laws, that there is a societal consensus to do so, and that repression (state force) is an effective tool for reducing drug use. The key questions are whether or not tougher enforcement and harsher civil and criminal penalties will, in fact, reduce drug consumption? By how much? At what cost to the taxpayer? At what cost to civil liberties in the United States?

Like the neorealists, advocates of the treatment and rehabilitation track, whether or not they endorse decriminalization, tend to see the use of force as costly, ineffective, and potentially counterproductive. They also note that among important seg- ments of society, there is the absence of a social consensus on drug use and trafficking. Key questions on this side of the debate concern the effectiveness of treatment and rehabilitation programs and the potential adverse consequences of increased drug use and abuse for US society as a whole.

THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

THE HEIGHTENED PRIORITY ASSIGNED to demand-side measures in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 lends credence to the notion that a conceptual transition from the realist to the in-

209 209




terdependence paradigm is currently underway in Washington vis-d-vis the drug issue. The transition, however, clearly is partial and incomplete.

To begin, the new legislation did not abandon supply-side programs. Instead, it renewed funding for these efforts while simultaneously opening a second front directed at demand reduction. The ineffectual realist supply-side policies of the past decade have been retained, and there is no indication that the recently- inaugurated Bush administration or the Congress intends to modify or redirect them. Unless a significant decline in demand occurs, there is little reason to believe that such policies will be any more effective in the future than they have been in the past. In all likelihood, billions will be spent with only marginal effect. Are the new demand-side measures likely to bring about such a decline? The short answer is no, not soon anyway. Education, treatment, and rehabilitation at best are incremental, long-term policies - if they work at all. Demand may go down among mid- dle class users, but not among the urban unemployed. Criminalization and penalization are more likely to exacerbate drug-related crime and violence - at least in the medium-term - than they are to dissuade drug consumption and trafficking. In practice, the contradictions between these two tracks are likely to impede the effective implementation of either. If demand declines at all, it will do so only gradually.

The prognosis for resolving the "drug problem," therefore, is a bleak one. Demand for drugs in the United States will remain high, even if it does not expand further. In addition, demand in Europe is very likely to grow. If there is demand, there will be supply. Intensified repression at home and abroad will increase, rather than decrease, drug-related violence. Over the next decade drug consumption and trafficking are likely to remain as major issues for US domestic and foreign policy.

NOTES

1. President Reagan was not, of course, the first US leader to go after drugs. As early as 1914, passage of the Harrison Act had made the use of cocaine and opiate drugs illegal. Both Presidents Nixon and Carter focused considerable policy attention on the issue during their terms in office. Nonetheless, Reagan's use of national television to dramatize his

terdependence paradigm is currently underway in Washington vis-d-vis the drug issue. The transition, however, clearly is partial and incomplete.

To begin, the new legislation did not abandon supply-side programs. Instead, it renewed funding for these efforts while simultaneously opening a second front directed at demand reduction. The ineffectual realist supply-side policies of the past decade have been retained, and there is no indication that the recently- inaugurated Bush administration or the Congress intends to modify or redirect them. Unless a significant decline in demand occurs, there is little reason to believe that such policies will be any more effective in the future than they have been in the past. In all likelihood, billions will be spent with only marginal effect. Are the new demand-side measures likely to bring about such a decline? The short answer is no, not soon anyway. Education, treatment, and rehabilitation at best are incremental, long-term policies - if they work at all. Demand may go down among mid- dle class users, but not among the urban unemployed. Criminalization and penalization are more likely to exacerbate drug-related crime and violence - at least in the medium-term - than they are to dissuade drug consumption and trafficking. In practice, the contradictions between these two tracks are likely to impede the effective implementation of either. If demand declines at all, it will do so only gradually.

The prognosis for resolving the "drug problem," therefore, is a bleak one. Demand for drugs in the United States will remain high, even if it does not expand further. In addition, demand in Europe is very likely to grow. If there is demand, there will be supply. Intensified repression at home and abroad will increase, rather than decrease, drug-related violence. Over the next decade drug consumption and trafficking are likely to remain as major issues for US domestic and foreign policy.

NOTES

1. President Reagan was not, of course, the first US leader to go after drugs. As early as 1914, passage of the Harrison Act had made the use of cocaine and opiate drugs illegal. Both Presidents Nixon and Carter focused considerable policy attention on the issue during their terms in office. Nonetheless, Reagan's use of national television to dramatize his




anti-drug proclamation and his administration's subsequent mobiliza- tion of substantial levels of federal resources to fight the war on drugs meant that he assigned a higher priority to the anti-drug crusade than his predecessors. See Inciardi, 1986.

2. For a discussion of the role of the military in US anti-drug campaign, see Mabry, this issue.

3. On the role of Congress, see Peri, this issue. 4. For discussions of the realist school see Tucker, 1977, and

Keohane, 1986. 5. For a brief synopsis of the new legislation, see Mohr, 1988. 6. For a review of recent prevention, treatment, and education

programs and research, see Klebe, 1986. 7. For a review of the debate over legalization, see Hogan, 1988. 8. See Peri, this issue.

REFERENCES

BAGLEY, B. (1988a) "Interdependence and US Policy Toward Mexico in the 1980s," pp. 223-242 in R. Roett (ed.) Mexico and the United States: Managing the Relationship Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

(1988b) "Colombia and the War on Drugs." Foreign Affairs, 67, 1 (Fall): 70-92.

HOGAN, H. (1988) "Drug Legalization: Pro and Con." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 88-500 GOV, 22July.

(1987) "Federal Drug Control: President's Budget Request for FY 1988." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 87-479 GOV (1 June).

INCIARDI, J. (1986) The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime and Public Policy. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co.

KEOHANE, R. (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and Its Critics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

KERR, P. (1987) "US Drug Crusade is Seen Undermining Itself." New York Times (26 October): Y13.

KLEBE, E. (1986) "Drug Control and Abuse: Prevention, Treatment, Education." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 86-1052 EPW. December 18.

MOHR, C. (1988) "Drug Bill Passes, Finishing Business of 100th Con- gress." New York Times (23 October): Y1, Y16.

anti-drug proclamation and his administration's subsequent mobiliza- tion of substantial levels of federal resources to fight the war on drugs meant that he assigned a higher priority to the anti-drug crusade than his predecessors. See Inciardi, 1986.

2. For a discussion of the role of the military in US anti-drug campaign, see Mabry, this issue.

3. On the role of Congress, see Peri, this issue. 4. For discussions of the realist school see Tucker, 1977, and

Keohane, 1986. 5. For a brief synopsis of the new legislation, see Mohr, 1988. 6. For a review of recent prevention, treatment, and education

programs and research, see Klebe, 1986. 7. For a review of the debate over legalization, see Hogan, 1988. 8. See Peri, this issue.

REFERENCES

BAGLEY, B. (1988a) "Interdependence and US Policy Toward Mexico in the 1980s," pp. 223-242 in R. Roett (ed.) Mexico and the United States: Managing the Relationship Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

(1988b) "Colombia and the War on Drugs." Foreign Affairs, 67, 1 (Fall): 70-92.

HOGAN, H. (1988) "Drug Legalization: Pro and Con." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 88-500 GOV, 22July.

(1987) "Federal Drug Control: President's Budget Request for FY 1988." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 87-479 GOV (1 June).

INCIARDI, J. (1986) The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime and Public Policy. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co.

KEOHANE, R. (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and Its Critics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

KERR, P. (1987) "US Drug Crusade is Seen Undermining Itself." New York Times (26 October): Y13.

KLEBE, E. (1986) "Drug Control and Abuse: Prevention, Treatment, Education." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 86-1052 EPW. December 18.

MOHR, C. (1988) "Drug Bill Passes, Finishing Business of 100th Con- gress." New York Times (23 October): Y1, Y16.

211 211




MOSS, A. (1988) "Drugs and Politics in Panama." Paper prepared for the

"Drug Trafficking in the Americas" Conference. The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC: (30 September).

New York Times (NYT) (1988) "The Drug Bill's 2.3 Billion Promise." (25 October): Y26.

REUTER, P., G. CRAWFORD, andj. DAVE (1988) Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Military Participation in Drug Interdiction. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

SCIOLINO, E. and S. ENDELBERG (1988) "Narcotics Effort Foiled by US

Security Goals." New York Times (10 April): Y1.

TREVERTON, G. (1988) "Narcotics in US-Mexican Relations," pp. 209- 222 in R. Roett (ed.) Mexico and the United States: Managing the

Relationship. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

TUCKER, R. (1977) The Inequality of Nations. New York, NY: Basic

Books, Inc.

US General Accounting Office (GAO) (1988) Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report. Washington, DC: GAO/GGD-88-39. (1 March).

US News and World Report (1988) "Hitting Kingpins in Their Assets." (5 December).

YANG, J. (1988) "Congress Passes Anti-Drug Bill Including a Death

Penalty." Wall Street Journal (24 October).

MOSS, A. (1988) "Drugs and Politics in Panama." Paper prepared for the

"Drug Trafficking in the Americas" Conference. The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC: (30 September).

New York Times (NYT) (1988) "The Drug Bill's 2.3 Billion Promise." (25 October): Y26.

REUTER, P., G. CRAWFORD, andj. DAVE (1988) Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Military Participation in Drug Interdiction. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

SCIOLINO, E. and S. ENDELBERG (1988) "Narcotics Effort Foiled by US

Security Goals." New York Times (10 April): Y1.

TREVERTON, G. (1988) "Narcotics in US-Mexican Relations," pp. 209- 222 in R. Roett (ed.) Mexico and the United States: Managing the

Relationship. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

TUCKER, R. (1977) The Inequality of Nations. New York, NY: Basic

Books, Inc.

US General Accounting Office (GAO) (1988) Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report. Washington, DC: GAO/GGD-88-39. (1 March).

US News and World Report (1988) "Hitting Kingpins in Their Assets." (5 December).

YANG, J. (1988) "Congress Passes Anti-Drug Bill Including a Death

Penalty." Wall Street Journal (24 October).



Documents

Special Issue: Assessing the Americas' War on Drugs || US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure