ROAPE Publications Ltd.

Peace in the Horn of AfricaAuthor(s): Lionel CliffeSource: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 91, Sovereignty, Democracy &Zimbabwe's Tragedy (Mar., 2002), pp. 124-127Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006866 .

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124 Reviezo of African Political Economy

The President and his inner circle or- dered the arrest of several Eritrean elders, many veteran freedom fighters whom they suspected of being supportive of or sympathetic with the fifteen signa- tories of the open letter, several journal- ists and students. They shut dozwn all private nezwspapers. In short, they im- posed an undeclared state of emergency contrary to the constitution. They di- vided the people by employing religious, regional, clannish and other backward sentiments. All this in order to prevent the peoplefrom uniting to protest against the deteriorating economic and social condition which has hit rock bottom. Any chance of popular protest or any form of expression of dissatisfaction is doomed to failure because of the reign of terror and intimidation imposed by the regime.

The sole remaining alternative to reform and democratic transition is thus toform a new party to challenge the autocratic and incorrigible regime of PFDIJ Accord- ingly, zwe have decided to release our- selves from any obligations of party membership by ceasing to be members of PFDI and instead declaring the impera- tive offorming a nezw party.

The reformists have embarked on what is likely to be a long and very difficult road. The strength of the EPLF was that it managed to remain united in the long fight for independence, and then to lead the country to independence. President Afeworki has been held in esteem and great affection by most ordinary Eritreans, and continues to enjoy the support of very wide sections of the population. Those who now challenge his hold on power were themselves associated with his rule. Some question why they waited so long before they finally rejected the policies that he currently pursues. Others have asked why they chose a moment when parts of the country are still under Ethiopian occupation. It is certainly a tragedy that so many men and women, who had worked all their lives for the liberation of their country, now find

themselves at odds with the movement that they served for so many years. It also denies Eritrea of the skills and energies of some of its most talented and dedicated citizens.

References

Isaias Afeworki (1984), Never Kneel Down by J Firebrace & S Holland, Nottingham: Spokesman.

David Pool (2001), From Guerrillas to Govern- ment. the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, Oxford: James Curry.

Dan Connell (1993), Against All Odds, New Jersey: Red Sea Press.

Bereket Habte Selassie (2001), 'Eritrea's "Special Court" and Universal Principles of Justice', 5 July, awate.com

Peace in the Horn of Africa

Lionel Clorfe

April 2002 may prove to be a critical watershed in the Horn of Africa. A set of separate but related initiatives has the potential for moving the log jam which has impeded peace prospects in the region. In particular, three key events with the potential to help resolve major belligerent situations or plunge them deeper into war will take place before the next issue of ROAPE comes out:

* The international Mediation Com- mission on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border is due to make public its findings on 13 April;

* A reconciliation conference bring- ing together all major factions in Somalia is due to start in Kenya in April;

* In Sudan, several peace initiatives are coming together into one main push.

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Briefing. Peace in the Horn 125

Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission

In the December 2000 Algiers Declara- tion, brokered by the OAU, under the leading role of the Algerian government, which ended the fighting in the Eritrean- Ethiopian War, an International Commis- sion was set up in The Hague with third-country nominees from both sides and a neutral chair person nominated by the UN. Both sides are committed by the Algiers accord to abide by whatever decision comes out of the independent commission. However, both have re- cently voiced qualifications. The UN Security Council went to the unusual extent of sending a full delegation to each country in February, seeking to get them to reinforce their commitment to abide peaceably by the decision. The two gov- ernments' responses after 13 April will dictate whether tension, and possibly even open conflict, re-emerges or whether a period of return to peaceful, normal relations may begin.

The Algiers agreement charges the Com- mission with 'delimitation' - deciding where international treaties (and to some extent realities of administration) say the border should go - and 'demarcation' - banging in posts to show where the agreed border goes on the ground. The April announcement will stipulate the first. If there is acceptance of its findings, the second process can begin. That too would take some time, for technical reasons, and a neutral or joint body would have to be created to do it. But further delays can be expected as the affected areas would have to be de- mined, as they have been extensively planted with anti-personnel devices. This task would take technical assistance and finance - and also for the Ethiopians to furnish the maps indicating mined areas, which they have not so far made avail- able to the UN Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). But if this process can get under way, it can also provide a prolonged period of transition during

which UNMEE and other international actors can hopefully play a role in pro- moting peace and normal relations.

However, it is possible that the findings will not be accepted. Eritrea's position militarily, and in international circles and even internally is such that the govern- ment will most likely accept any formula that is not a major departure from the three early 20th century treaties the Ital- ians, who colonised the territory, made with the Ethiopian empire. In Ethiopia and among its diaspora, there is a strong current of opinion that is urging war unless certain claims are met: part of the southwestern highlands of Eritrea be- yond the disputed area of Badume, or even a corridor to the port of Assab to guarantee access to the Red Sea. There are even groups who argue that the Border Commission and UNMEE itself are 'ille- gitimate' as there should not be any 'international' border between the two. Prospects for peace may depend on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi ignoring such public opinion (as he does on most matters!), if the findings do not give Ethiopia any 'gains' for the human and financial costs of war, and for their military advantage at the end of the war, in pushing their way into Eritrea on one of the three battlefronts. Some cynics even suggest that given such an outcome, the 'international community' would be unlikely to sustain a long-term presence to police the border and would merely urge Ethiopia quietly to absorb the diplo- matic niceties for 'a decent interval' before it absorbed the present buffet zone, the Transitional Security Zone (TSZ).

All such scenarios are, of course, pure speculation until 13 April. But neigh- bouring countries must hope that the transition is in the direction of peace, as the belligerents have tended to support their tactics to intervene not only in each other's territories to support internal rebels, but also into Somalia and Djibouti. At the same time, the only 'winners' from the war have included the present regime

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126 Review of African Political Economy

in Sudan, which has found that two formerly antagonistic neighbours have sought friendship to avoid being exposed on two fronts - and in Ethiopia's case this detente has been sweetened by oil deliv- eries.

Somalia Reconciliation Conference

Later in April a conference is due to take place in Kenya, which is supposed to bring together all belligerents in the ongoing conflicts in Somalia. In particu- lar, the Transitional National Govern- ment (TNG), set up a year ago as a result of a similar, but partial conference at Arta in Djibouti, and the coalition of 'war- lords', the Somalia Reconciliation & Res- toration Council (SRRC), are both to be represented. This will be another mile- stone which will decide whether the decade-long internal conflicts in that country might come to an end - or not.

The initiative has come from the regional body, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the confer- ence will be supported by the European Commission. Both these bodies were concerned that the TNG had been seeking recognition without establishing any peaceful conditions in the South of the country nor any dialogue with the estab- lished administrations set up in the North, in Somaliland and Puntland. Nor did it make any overtures to those factions not part of the Arta process, chiefly the set of warlords, including Aideed. As a result its own position in Mogadishu, where its own authority was challenged in fire- fights this year, is far from established The opposing coalition of 15 warlords emerged as they had been marginalised by Arta, which may have seemed a positive feature by the sponsoring Djibouti regime, but it is clear now that these criminals have to be involved in the solution of the problem they have cre- ated. The SRRC meanwhile has enjoyed backing from Ethiopia, whose army has made incursions into the southwest of the

country. The divisions have been further exacerbated since 11 September 2001, as all sides, but especially Ethiopia, has sought to portray the others as Al-Qaeda supporters.

The Nairobi conference has to be wel- comed as broadening dialogue and possi- bly reconciliation between actors across much of the South of Somalia, but it remains to be seen whether it can reach its goal of a single, all-inclusive govern- ment. That seems certain not to include Somaliland, which is peaceable and has a working government, and possibly not Puntland, whose stability has been un- dermined since Arta. As a consequence, it would be premature if any resultant 'government' is given recognition until it enters genuine dialogue with the two territories of the former Somalia Republic that have been at peace. More generally, there is little evidence that an interna- tional conference in a foreign-capital will not repeat the mistakes of its many unsuccessful predecessors. Somaliland resolved its conflicts and set up a consti- tutional governmental authority on the back of long-drawn-out, traditional style negotiations within the country. Arta replicated these methods of giving due time and incorporating clan representa- tives and other 'civil society' elements and keeping the warlords at bay, al- though this was not enough to get a completely successful formula.

Sudan Civil War

In Sudan, not one but several peace processes are at work. One of the longest, the Peace Committee of IGAD and its Mission operating out of Nairobi, had seemed to be dormant. The Ertirea-Ethio- pia War had strengthened the Sudan regime in its efforts to quell the opposi- tion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) operating in the South and its allies in the umbrella National Demo- cratic Alliance (NDA). The success of the regime in its scorched earth tactics to depopulate and gain control of the oil

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Briefing: Peace in the Horn 127

areas in the northern part of what is considered the South has also given it revenues and friends. SPLA has reversed some of the army's gains and begun to threaten the oil fields again. Its relative strength has been enhanced politically with the coming back together in January 2002 of the two factions of the SPLA that split in the early 1990s.

A recent successor to the many peace initiatives from the broader region, the Joint Egyptian Libyan Initiative (JELI), did make some headway in the last two years, but its basis was different from that of IGAD, which had got both Govern- ment and SPLA to sign up to a Declara- tion of Principles', among the most important of which were (to the SPLA) self-determination for the South, and a separation of state and religion. JELI has sought to give emphasis to the goal of maintaining the unity, which is also mentioned in the DoP - a long-standing goal of Egyptian regimes concerned what an independent state might do to imperil Nile waters.

A further change in the context has been the efforts of the Sudan regime to appear more pragmatic and not so Islamicist and to end sanctions and its international isolation. Such efforts have intensified since 11 September, as it had been classi- fied as a state supporting terrorism, and might be on the US hit-list - especially if the Christian fundamentalists so influen- tial in right-wing politics in the US had their way.

However, the US government has also been pragmatic, to the point of sending a special envoy, Senator Danforth, to pur- sue peace initiatives over the last months. The situation on the ground with some strengthening of SPLA/NDA has lead to some advances with agreements for a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains, but this did not prevent the Army shelling civil- ians assembled for food relief distribu- tions on three occasions in February. There has also been a decision to merge

the IGAD and JELI approaches - al- though it is not clear whether this is to be at the expense of the DoP.

In sum the prospects for such initiatives leading on to meaningful negotiations are more hopeful than for some years - but by no means guaranteed. The SPLA may be ready at last to prefer talks to continuing the war, although hopefully this will not be at the expense of the interests of groups like the Nuba and the Beja, who are not in the South, or of the northern opposition in the NDA. Moreo- ver, elements in the government may still feel a military solution is still on.

Regional Dimensions

These notes might help readers to see what is at stake in these countries where interstate or civil war has been going on. But in keeping an eye on these key, up- coming events, readers should also read them in a broader context. These conflicts all impinge on one another in a region, which has been marked by tit-for-tat intervention in neighbours' internal af- fairs for two decades. A solution, even partial, to one of these major conflicts could make the resolution of the others more attainable. Ultimately, however, there will have to a replacement of a systemic regional pattern of insecurity by an alternative reality.

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