Southern California International Review Fall 2014 Publication

8/9/2019 Southern California International Review Fall 2014 Publication

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S CI R

Volume 4, Number 2 Fall 2014


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Te Southern Caliornia International Review(SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-ciplinary print and online journal o scholarship in the field o international

studies generously unded by the School o International Relations at the

University o Southern Caliornia (USC). In particular, SCIRwould liketo thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.

Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to oster and enhance discussion betweentheoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.SCIRis managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates

valuable experience in the fields o editing and graphic design.

Copyright 2014 Southern Caliornia International Review.

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in anyorm without the express written consent o the Southern Caliornia International

Review.

Views expressed in this journal are solely those o the authors themselves and do not necessarilyrepresent those o the editorial board, aculty advisors, or the University o Southern Caliornia.

S C I RSCIR.org

Staff

Editor-in-Chie:

Peter Hughes

Editors:

Brad McAuliffe

Aaron Riind

Reid Tom

Cristina Patrizio

Natalie ecimer

Layout: Peter Hughes

Cover: Samir Kumar

ISSN: 1545-2611


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We dedicate this journal to Joshua Wong, the students o Hong Kong,and all those whopeaceullyadvocate or democracy.


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Contents

1. Te ies Tat Bind

owards a Greater Scottish Role in Europe and the RegionsAlexander Beck

11

2. Explaining Variations in Development OutcomesTe RENI Factor

Michael Zoorob

30

3. CSCE as a Model or Cooperative Security

Te Case or IranKerry Goettlich

52

4. Syria and the Security CouncilSameen Zehra

72

5. Joint Intelligence or New Age WarareTe Balkans War o the Former Yugoslavia Jessica Blakely

82


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Dear Reader,It is with great pleasure that I introduce you to the eight edition o the Southern CaliorniaInternational Review (SCIR). Tis semesters issue continues our mission o providing aplatorm or undergraduate scholars o international affairs to provide their work to a largeraudience.

We are incredibly ortunate to have had a vast pool o articles to select rom. We readsubmissions rom all across the country and several rom throughout the world. O themany impressive submissions, the ollowing five stood out to be outstanding. In reading this

journal you will understand why.Our five scholars tackle a wide range o issues rom big to small, old to new, and with ageographical scope rom Scotland to Nigeria. Despite the varied topics o the papers, all areorward-looking. Tey interpret ailures o the past to provide solutions or the uture. Tesearticles are ar rom ivory-tower academia, but offer tangible solutions moving orward.

In the creation o this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative o the supportive role thatthe University o Southern Caliornias School o International Relations has played. Teschools director, Robert English, the Associate Director, Linda Cole, and the rest o theaculty and staff gave us the guidance we needed to grow. I also extend our thanks to Ms.Robin Friedheim or her generous scholarship, which provides the oundation upon whichour endeavor thrives.Finally, we would like to thank you, the reader. Without the relationship with our readers,

we are nothing. Remember, this journal is just one part o a much larger dialogue. Tere isa lot o inormation to digest and theories to pick-apart over the next 90 or so pages. Teonus is now on you to keep the dialogue going.Please read, think, discuss, and enjoy.Sincerely,Peter HughesEditor-in-Chie

Editors Note:


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he ies hat Bindowards a Greater Scottish Role in Europe and the Regions

Alexander Beck

Te Scottish independence reerendum brought attention to Scotlands role in the interna-tional community. Tough Scotland did not ultimately break rom the United Kingdom, it canstill increase its standing in Europe and beyond by changing its current relationship with theUK and reorming European Union policy that dictates the role o the regions in Europe. Tis

paper examines the role o regions in Europe, as well as avenues or Scotland to increase itsinternational profile and, consequently, more effectively project its interests to the world.

Introduction

Te recent reerendum on Scottish independence rom the United Kingdom drew in-ternational attention to Scotland, a country traditionally known more or its haggis andbagpipes than its international political standing. One o the many issues discussed duringthe reerendum debate was Scotlands control over its international relations and oreignpolicy. Te pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) contended that completeScottish independence rom the UK was the only avenue or an effective independent or-

eign policy. While the reerendum ultimately ell short o its target, the question o an in-creased Scottish presence in international affairs remains a salient one. At this point, policy-makers in Scotland and the United Kingdom must examine the current relationship o thesetwo bodies to ensure political parity between them. One way in which Scottish interests,the strongest o which is desire or democratic legitimacy, might be realized is through anincrease in Scotlands international profile.

Broadly speaking, Scotland has benefited rom its association with the United Kingdomwhen dealing with the European Union (EU), either in the Council o Ministers or whilelobbying specific EU offices. Te Scotland-UK relationship has been imperect, however,

and a host o actors have limited Scotlands ability to express its interests on the suprana-tional stage. Tis paper will demonstrate the potential or Scotland to reorm its relation-ship with the United Kingdom (while remaining part o the UK) vis--vis the EU, in orderto become a more significant international actor and a potential leader amongst Europeanregions. It will do so by exploring the role o regions in European politics, presenting thepros and cons o the current Scotland-UK relationship, and offering suggestions as to how

A is a senior at the University o Wisconsin-Madison majoring

in political science and history, ocusing primarily on European internationalrelations and history.


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Alexander Beck

Scotland can reorm its relationships with the United Kingdom and the EU to gain greaterinfluence on the international stage.

Regions in the European Context Regions occupy a curious space within the European Unions economic and politi-cal landscape. Tey are difficult to define, have limited legislative power, and are structurallyinfluenced by a variety o entities. At the same time, these regions represent an importantlevel o government within EU member states, and their place within the EU serves as aplatorm or voicing the concerns o millions o Europeans citizens. Tis section examinesthe role o regions in the European Union by defining what constitutes a region, mapping theactors that define regional roles, and examining Scotlands experience with other regions toexplain the sociopolitical constraints that limit Scotlands current role in Europe.

What Constitutes a European Region?

Te definition o the term region is ambiguous in the context o the European Union,and defining precisely what a European region is is a decidedly difficult task. o understandEU regional policy and the dynamics o interregional relations, however, it is critical to rec-ognize the unctional ways in which politicians view the regions.

Te European Union itsel employs a standardized, statistical system to demarcatedifferent regional levels across the Union. Te so-called NUS system (coming rom theFrench phrase nomenclature des unites territoriales statistiques) divides Member States into

three different regional tierslabeled NUS1, NUS2, and NUS3to accumulate statisti-cal data in a somewhat systematized manner. Tis three-layered breakdown is importantto the unction o the EU, because a European Union o twenty-eight states is a union o agreat number o regions, and statistical data can otherwise be hard to acquire. Indeed, thereare currently 97 NUS

1regions, 270 NUS

2regions and 1,294 NUS

3regions. While this

concept can be conusing in the abstract, Scotland provides a working example o its logic,in that:

Scotland is a NUS1region, but is itsel made up o our NUS

2regions. NUS

3de-

lineates yet smaller units o territory. Scotlands 32 unitary local authorities orm thebasis either individually or in combination or 23 NUS3regions. It is important

to note that there is no necessary relationship between the borders o these regions (bethey NUS 1, 2 or 3) and the meaningul loci o political authority. So while the ScottishNUS

1does indeed have it devolved parliament and executive, the our NUS

2regions


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Te ies Tat Bind

in Scotland have no real administrative personality. Furthermore some o the coun-trys NUS

3regions represent a combination o existing administrative units.1

It is noteworthy that in most cases, the link between these statistical regions and theregional administrative authorities o individual states is tenuous at best (Scotland is, inact, one o the exceptions to this rule). Different NUS regions have been overlaid ontolocal government structures that embody markedly different state traditions o political andadministrative organization, meaning that the political agencies o these regions vary mas-sively across the continent.2

Te NUS regions, urthermore, do not accurately delineate the extent o different cul-tural identities within Europe, such as the transnational Catalonian identity or the Cornishidentity, which is subsumed by the greater South West England region. Scotlands NUS

status is atypical in comparison to these regions, as its NUS1region covers the territory oboth its enduring administrative borders as well as its distinct national identity.3

Ultimately, a region o the European Union can be defined in a number o ways. First,some observers consider regions rom a statistical perspective, organized primarily throughthe EUs NUS system. Tis top-down approach offers a standardized view o Europes vary-ing regions by organizing them along the boundaries o local governmental administrations.While this approach offers a degree o standardization, the reality o European regions isthat they are incredibly numerous and have highly variant levels o political and economicpower within their respective countries. Second, other spectators study the EUs regions

through an administrative perspective. Viewed through this perspective, European regionsare defined by the borders set by their respective national and subnational authorities, ratherthan the supranational authority o the European Union. Tis perspective allows observersto consider regions within the context o their national governmental structure, rather thancomparing them in a European vacuum. Finally, commentators who view European regionsthrough the affective perspective consider regions as spaces populated by a certain nationaland cultural identity, rather than national or supranational borders. Tis perspective con-ceptualizes regions in terms o the national identities they represent, rather than their pre-cise political standings. None o these perspectives is necessarily the correct view, but an un-

derstanding o all three allows regionalists to consider the complexity o European regions.

1 Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones, Introduction: Europe, Regions, and European Regionalism, inEurope, Regions andEuropean Regionalism, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

2 Scully and Jones, Introduction, 7.

3 Ibid,1-7.


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What is the Organizational Structure o the Regions?

While this paper has considered the complex nature o the actors that define Europeanregions, it has yet to describe the manner in which they interact within the larger structure

o the European Union. Historically, the regions have played a minimal role in Europeanpolicymaking, particularly during the early, state-centric periods o European integration.Following lobbying efforts o regional governments, particularly the German Lnder, and agrowing understanding among European officials o the importance o regional strength toeconomic growth, however, regional authorities grew in prominence and took on new roles.

Te first step towards regional institutionalization in Europe came when the EuropeanParliamentary Assembly ormed a consultative committee on regional economies on May9, 1960. Tough this committee lacked any true power in the burgeoning European politi-cal landscape o the mid-20thcentury, it laid the groundwork or the Consultative Council

o Regional and Local Authorities (CCRLA)which provided territorial authorities witha genuine European orum on issues relating to regional developmenton June 24, 1988under the 1986 Single European Act.4Tis trend o institutionalizing regions into increas-ingly ormalized units culminated in 1994 with the oundation o the Committee o theRegions (CoR) under the Maastricht reaty.

Te institution o the CoR in 1994 ushered in a new way o viewing the regions abili-ties to influence European policy. For some observers, the CoR represented the first steptowards a Europe o the Regions, in which the European Union could bypass state struc-tures by implementing policy directly through regional actors. Other observers estimated

that regionalism and European integration would strengthen the state by off-loading theless gratiying unctions and externalizing difficult tasks like agricultural and industrial re-structuring [to the EU], coping with the social and political all-out o economic change or,more recently, maintaining monetary and fiscal rectitude and exchange-rate stability.5In re-ality, the CoR has developed somewhere between these extremes since its ounding in 1994.

Tough its existence represents a significant step towards the institutionalization oregions within the ramework o the EU, the CoRs current powers and responsibilities areadvisory rather than legislative. oday, ollowing the signing o the Lisbon reaty in 2009,the CoR is consulted at all stages o the legislative process by the Council o Ministers, the

European Parliament, or the European Commission and is also able to bring actions to theurt o Justice i it has not been properly consulted in the EUs legislative process.6In this

4 European Union Committee of the Regions, The Committee of the Regions: Key Dates, (Brussels: European UnionCommittee of the Regions, 2010).

5 Barry J. Jones and Michael Keating, The European Union and the Regions, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 9.

6 The areas in which the CoR must be consulted include economic and social cohesion, trans-European networks,health, education and culture, employment, social policy, the environment, vocational training, transport, civil protection,

climate change, and energy.


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way, the CoR embodies three undamental principles o the European Union: subsidiarity(EU decisions must be taken as close to the citizen as possible), proximity (all governmentallevels must be close to citizens), and partnership (the EU, national, regional, and local levels

o government must all cooperate to ensure effective governance).7

Ultimately, CoRs strictlyadvisory role within the EU has constrained its capacity to play a particularly significant rolein the creation o European legislation.

Aside rom the CoR, inormal organizations contribute to the organization o Europeanregions. Foremost o these organizations is the Conerence o European Regions withLegislative Power (REGLEG). REGLEG was ormed by the European constitutional re-gionsregions ormally recognized by the constitutions o their respective statesand hasattempted to lobby orinter aliagreater representation or the regions at the Union leveland a direct right o appeal or the regions to the European Court o Justice. 8Scotland was

deeply involved in REGLEGs early stages, though it was unclear whether its leadership wasbehind the region-centric objectives set orth in the Laeken Declaration.9Tis apprehensionover REGLEG was displayed when then-first minister Jack McConnell reused to commenton whether or not regional governments should be able to bring cases beore the EuropeanCourt o Justice due to the UK governments disapproval o the measure.10Much like CoR,REGLEGs influence in Brussels remains primarily consultative and organizational or theregions o Europe with legislative powers.

A final institution that plays an interesting role in coordinating the regions o the EUis the system o regional inormation offices (RIOs) in Brussels. In his chapter Regional

Inormation Offices in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A UK-GermanComparison in the edited work Te Regional Dimension o the European Union, CharlieJeffery notes that the recent rise o RIOsthe first RIO was established in 1984, and rough-ly 250 had opened by 2012represents a new maniestation o subnational governmentin Europes system o multilevel governance. Tese offices unction primarily as lobbyinggroups, which generally channel their unding rom local authorities into dispersing andacquiring inormation to and rom contacts in official European offices. Overall, however, itis difficult to determine the efficacy o RIOs and other lobbying groups in Brussels, simply

7 European Union Committee of the Regions, A New Treaty: A New Role for Regions and Local Authorities, (Brussels:European Union Committee of the Regions).

8 Scully and Jones, Introduction, 9.

9 The Laeken Declaration was a product of the 2001 meeting of the European Council known as the Convention of the Futureof Europe. This conventions purpose was to draft a Constitution for Europe aimed at making the Union more democratic,

transparent, and effective. One of the products of this constitutional draft, which aimed in part to empower European regions,

rst inscribed the term regions with legislative power as a means of dening more inuential European regions.

10 Noreen Burrows, Scotlands European Strategy,Europe, Regions and European Regionalism,ed. Roger Scully andRichard Wyn Jones, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 125.


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because there are so many competing organizations. Te continued growth o RIOs, how-ever, suggests that European regions believe they are effective lobbying tools.11

Tere has been a Scottish RIO in Brussels since 1992, when a consortium o local

governmental authorities, universities, the Scottish Enterprise agency, and a host o otherpartners came together to orm Scotland Europa to represent the interests o all regions oScotland. In this way, Scottish leaders acknowledged the need to network, lobby, and gatherinormation in Brussels to advance Scottish interests. Afer the establishment o Scotlandsdevolved parliament, the Scottish Executive established the Scottish Executive EU Office(SEEUO) and its permanent residence in Brusselslocated alongside Scotland Europa inthe so-called Scotland Houseto accrue continental political influence or the Scottishgovernment.12

It is important to note that the SEEUO also coordinates closely with UKRep, the body

charged with representing the views o the entirety o the UK in Brussels. Tis carries bothpositive and negative repercussions or Scottish representation. On the one hand, Scotlandis uniquely well-placed in Brussels because [it is] treated as [a separate unit] within theUK Representation to the EU. Tis gives [it] a diplomatic status and a much higher level oaccess to the EU institutions than is enjoyed by most other regional representations, includ-ing the German Lnder offices.13At the same time, SEEUO is obligated to ollow the samepolicy objectives as UKRep, and in this way, its position is thereore subordinate to that oUKRep. Te Scottish Executive is thereore unable to pursue every policy that is in its bestinterest.14

Beyond the primary regional bodies listed above, there exists a bevy o other organi-zations that seek to increase the influence o regions, such as the Conerence o PeripheralMaritime Regions (CPMR), the Assembly o European Regions (AER), the Council oEuropean Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the Congress o Local and RegionalAuthorities o Europe (CLARE), and the Council o Europe. Tese groups, working along-side the CoR, REGLEG, and RIOs, play an important role in recognizing regional interestsin the EU and, ideally, inorming policy with regional perspectives.

What is the Regional Policy o the EU?

Now that the nature and organization o the European regions have been examined,it is appropriate to consider the policy areas that affect them. EU regional policy, aimed at

11 Charlie Jeffery, Regional Information Ofces in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A UK-GermanComparison, The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe?(London: Frank Cass, 1997),

183-203.

12 Burrows, Scotlands European Strategy,121-123.

13 Ibid,123.

14 Ibid.


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reducing disparities between EU regions and encouraging transnational and interregion-al cooperation, plays a highly significant role in the internal politics and budgetary com-mitments o the Union. Te financial levers o the EUs regional policy are the Structural

Fundsconsisting o the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which providesinrastructure and job-creating investment, and the European Social Fund (ESF), whichhelps the unemployed and economically disadvantaged find work by unding training mea-sures and tackling discriminationand the Cohesion Fund, which is intended or coun-tries whose per capita GDP is below 90% o the community average. Te purpose o theCohesion Fund is to grant financing to environment and transport inrastructure projects.However, aid under the Cohesion Fund is subject to certain conditions. For example, i amember states public deficit exceeds three percent o national GDP, no new projects will beapproved.15EU regional policy currently accounts or over one-third o the EUs total budget

(surpassed in spending only by the Common Agricultural Policy), o which 201 billion($256 billion) is allocated to the ERDF, 76 billion ($97 billion) to the ESF, and 70 billion($89 billion) to the Cohesion Fund.

Beyond the economic effects o EU regional policy, it is also important or the Union todemonstrate its political value to its peripheral areas, such as Portugal, Greece, and Irelandin the 1980s and 1990s. Contemporary survey data revealed a sharp rise in support or[European Community] membership in Portugal and Greece in the 1980s, linked to a grow-ing awareness and appreciation o the structural unds. Irelands large positive vote or theMaastricht reaty had much to do with the eeling that Ireland stood to gain rom enlarged

unds.16

oday, the promise o the Structural and Cohesion Funds proves an attractive lureto potential member states in Eastern and Southern Europe. Interestingly, in the earlyyears o the [enlargement] process, the impression was given that, to be a modern Europeancountry, it was necessary to have a regional government on the Western model[and]that regional government [was] needed in order to receive and manage Structural Funds. 17While this belie was ultimately debunkedthe commission clariying in 2000 that the onlyormal condition or receiving Structural Funds was or accession countries to have an ad-ministrative tier at the NUS

2levelthe act that many accession countries believed that

regional governments were necessary to join the EU spurred a number o new, traditionally

centralized states to establish regional authorities. Tese regional authorities remain veryweak, however, in comparison to the more established regional governments o WesternEuropean states.

15 European Union, Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund, Summaries of EU Legislation.

16 Jones and Keating, The European Union and the Regions, 19.

17 Liesbet Hooghe and Michael Keating, Bypassing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy process,European Union:Power and policy-making, ed. J. J. Richardson, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 283.


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Te Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund represent the critical economic controlso the European Union. Teir allocation is highly coveted by regional and national govern-ments alike, and the Union employs them to encourage EU membership and maintain a

political presence in Europes more peripheral regions, while simultaneously using their al-lotment as a bargaining chip to influence policy in member states. Te EU regional policyis vital to the three objectives in its ramework, namely convergence o the more and lessdeveloped EU Member States and regions, regional competitiveness and employment, andEuropean territorial cooperation.

What is Scotlands Experience with Other European Regions?

Some final aspects o regions in the European Context worth considering in this paperis are Scotlands interregional experiences since devolution. According to Schedule 5 o the

Scotland Act o 1998, EU and Foreign Affairs are reserved issues or the UK Governmentand Parliament: Relations with territories outside the UK, the European Communities (andtheir institutions) and other international organisations, regulation o international trade,and international development assistance and co-operation are reserved matters.18Te ex-planatory notes continue that:

Te reservation o international relations does not have the effect o precluding theScottish Ministers and officials rom communicating with other countries, regions orinternational or European institutions, so long as the representatives o the Scottish

Parliament or the Scottish Ministers do not purport to speak or the United Kingdomor to reach agreements which commit the UK.19

Due to this clariying note, the devolved Scottish government is permitted to engagein diplomatic relationships with other political bodies around the world. Te ScottishParliament, moreover, has exercised this right to negotiate with other European regions onmultiple occasions during the early 2000s. Tese negotiations include a protocol o coop-eration with Catalonia in May 2002, a cooperation agreement with Bavaria in June 2002, aprotocol o cooperation with uscany in November 2002 and an action plan in June 2003,

and a cooperation agreement with North Rhine Westphalia in February 2003 that was ol-lowed by an action plan in January 2005. Tese cooperation agreements and action plansdid not breach the Schedule 5 o the Scotland Act because they were not legally binding anddid not hold any penalty or non-compliance.

18 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Scotland Act 1998, (London: Stationery Ofce, 1998).

19 Ibid.


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In the years ollowing devolution and the first signing o cooperation agreements withother European regions, the Scottish Government has reiterated its commitment to work orthe mutual benefit o Scotland and the other autonomous regions o Europe. First, in 2004,

the Scottish Executive published its European Strategy, intended to outline the Executiveswork on EU issues or the next our years. It emphasized that:

[Scotland] will build on the last 4 years and our rise in influence as a key EU regionalplayer, particularly through our membership o the Committee o the Regions, ourwork with our MEPs and our leading role in REGLEG. We will develop our co-oper-ation agreements with Catalonia, uscany, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria andconsider entering into urther partnerships where they are likely to deliver benefits orScotland.20

In subsequent years, the Scottish Parliament would maintain its commitment to robustrelations with political actors in Europe. In its Scottish Parliament UK and InternationalStrategy: Session 4 o 2013, the Scottish Executive noted that:

[Te Scottish Executives] commitment to our role within the UK, and Europe as awhole, continues to be a key priority and will remain so during the ull term o theSession. It is firmly within the interests o the Scottish Parliament to maintain and osterinterests and relationships across the institutions o the United Kingdom, the existing

(and developing) European Union and the representatives o Europes Member Statesand regions.21

From the above governmental maniestos to the existing cooperation agreements be-tween Scotland and a variety o prominent European regions, it is apparent that Scotlandhas had a lasting desire to be an active member o the community o European authori-ties, whether it be through relations with subnational regional authorities, the national gov-ernment o the United Kingdom, or the supranational institution o the European Union.Scotland has urther iterated this desire through its continued participation in organizations

such as the CoR and REGLEG. While Scotlands international ambitions are both admi-rable and reasonable, its relationship with the UK has somewhat restricted its capacity tomake decisions pertinent to its interests on the international stage. In the ollowing section,I will examine the positive and negative aspects o Scotlands relationship with the UnitedKingdom.

20 The Scottish Government, The Scottish Executives European Strategy, (The Scottish Government, 2004).

21 The Scottish Parliament, Scottish Parliament UK And International Strategy: Session 4, (The Scottish Parliament, 2013).


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Pros and Cons of Scotland in the United Kingdom

Scotland has been a member o the United Kingdom since 1707, and this long-stand-ing association has bound together the nations o England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern

Ireland. Te recent independence reerendum put this relationship in the international spot-light, and undamentally questioned its worth in the 21stcentury. Tis section weighs thepros and cons o Scotlands current membership in the UK, paying special attention to itsstatus in the EU.

Scotland in the UK: Pros

UK membership has brought with it a host o advantages during Scotlands 307-yearassociation, including, among other things, a larger domestic market, international influ-ence and impact, strong security orces, better universities and more investment in educa-

tion, lower uel bills, and maintenance o the pound with lower interest rates. Te devolvedScottish Parliament has likewise proven a tremendous success since its ormation in 1998,and the government o the United Kingdom ofen considers Scottish concerns when or-mulating national policy.

As a part o the UK, moreover, Scotland is part o one o the most influential states inthe EU, alongside France and Germany. Economically, Scotland benefits rom the UKs EUrebate, which accounts or 135 a year to every household in Scotland.

Scotland in the UK: Cons

Te current dynamics o the Scotland-UK relationship, specifically in regards to or-eign policy, are ar rom ideal. First, as mentioned above, Scotland association with the UKis a double-edged sword in terms o lobbying in Brussels. On one hand, Scotland and theScottish Executive European Union Office (SEEUO) gain legitimacy through their rela-tionship with the UK. On the other, the SEEUO must ollow the policy line advocated byUKRep, and is subordinate to the interests o the wider United Kingdom. According to theMemorandum o Understanding and Supplementary Agreements, including the Concordaton Co-ordination o EU Policy Issues (hereafer the Concordat) between Westminster andHolyrood:

(B1.3) As all oreign policy issues are non-devolved, relations with the European Unionare the responsibility o the Parliament and Government o the United Kingdomthe UK Government wishes to involved the Scottish Executive as directly and ully aspossible in decision making on EU matters, which touch on devolved areas (includ-ing non-devolved matters which impact on devolved areas and non-devolved matterswhich will have a distinctive impact o importance in Scotland) (B1.4) Participationwill be subject to mutual respect or the confidentiality o discussions and adherence


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by the Scottish Executive to the resulting UK line without which it would be impos-sible to maintain such lose working relationships. Tis line will reflect the interests othe UK as a whole.

While this non-legally binding document promises to involve the Scottish Executive asdirectly and ully as possible, the reality o UK consultation with Scotland over EU issuesalls well short o this promise. Indeed problems are [being] reported due precisely to themarginalization o Scottish interests by Whitehall departments.22

An example o this occurred in 2007, when Michael Aron, ormer Head o the SEEUOand current British Ambassador to Libya, ound himsel at the center o a political scandalafer a report he had written to Jack McConnell was leaked to the press. According to thereport, it hasnt been uncommon or Whitehall to dismiss views o the [Scottish] executive

when ormulating the UK line Te most common complaint is that Whitehall tends toorget about consulting the executive. It can have a disastrous impact on executive policy.23Tough the nature o Scotland and the UKs relationship in Brussels is meant to be built onopen and clear dialogue, moreover, Scottish ministers find themselves out o the loop whendifferent EU policies are discussed with implications or Scotland. Aron specifically men-tioned that ministers had been rozen out o council meetings and humiliated by havingto sit in another room where they can only listen to discussions. Inormation is shared byEdinburgh but without reciprocation rom Whitehall, and officials in Edinburgh are onlytold about vital meetings in London when it is too late to arrange travel and attend.24Arons

report notes that, in the specific case o spirits, a policy area in which Scotland has a keeninterest, the UK government argued against Scottish interests.Scotlands interests have been demeaned more recently as well. Earlier this year, the

Herald reported that UK Energy Minister Michael Fallon approached his Scottish coun-terpart, Fergus Ewing, to discourage him rom complying with investigators rom theEuropean Commission regarding the legality o a controversial plan to build a nuclearpower plant in Somerset, noting that compliance with Europe would constitute a hostileact against Whitehall. Tough the UKs central government is a proponent o the plan,the Scottish Government opposes nuclear power development. Attempts by the UK to dis-

suade Scotland rom cooperating with European investigators were taken as a threat bythe Scottish National Party, though a spokeswoman rom the Department o Energy andClimate Change pointed out that Scotland is part o the UK member state in the EU andcannot act as a separate entity it would not be acceptable or one part o the same Member

22 Burrows, Scotlands European Strategy, 127.

23 Douglas Fraser, Scotland nding Itself Frozen out of Brussels, The Herald, (Herald Scotland, 2007).

24 Ibid.


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State to intervene against policy proposals rom another.25Te act that, in this instance,a Scottish minister was pressured to go against Scottish interests to save British ace inBrussels demonstrates the dysunctional relationship between the two nations.

Tere are still other examples o Scottish interests being either ignored or disrespectedwhen policies are ormulated. UK departments rarely consult with other departments,andin the absence o appropriate mechanisms to prompt Whitehall departments on the needto consult the Scottish Executive, it is treated like any other department o governmentdevolved administrations are kept at arms length in the policy-making process [o somedepartments].26Te Concordat notes that the lead UK minister decides which individualsattend the meetings o the Council o Ministers:

Scottish ministers do not attend Council meetings as o right even where matters

are being discussed which relate directly to Scottish interests. Where they do attendtheir role is to support and advance the single UK negotiation line which they willhave played a role in developing the UK lead Minister will retain overall responsibil-ity or the negotiations. Te lead minister also determines how each minister can bestulfill his/her role in the UK team [which has led to Scottish leaders being consciouslyexcluded rom key negotiations].

Trough this and the other examples that preceded it, it is clear that the institutionalmechanisms that regulate the relationship between Scotland and England in international

affairs are flawed. At the same time, the benefits o remaining in the United Kingdom are nu-merous. Te ollowing section suggests potential reorms to this relationship that will allowScotland to remain a part o the United Kingdom while increasing its influence in Europeand throughout the European Regions.

owards a More Robust Scotland in Europe: Suggestions and Opportunities

In the spirit o increased devolution, engendered by the Scottish Labour Partys Powersor a Purpose Strengthening Accountability and Empowering People, produced by theScottish Labour Devolution Commission, what can be done to increase Scotlands role in in-

ternational politics? o answer this question, one must consider two perspectives: Scotlandsrelationship with the United Kingdom, and Scotlands relationship with Europe and theregions. Trough coordination with these bodies, there is potential or Scotland to play amore prominent role in international affairs.

25 David Leask and Michael Settle, Minister Sought to Dissuade MSP from Role in EU Inquiry, The Herald, (HeraldScotland, 2014).



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Scotland and the United Kingdom in Europe

As noted in the previous section, Scotland receives a host o benefitson both the do-mestic and international stagesrom its current relationship with the United Kingdom.

Despite the act that no suggestions were made in Powers or a Purpose on this matter,there is room in the current climate o increased devolution or Scotland to renegotiate themechanisms that dictate its relationship with the UK in international affairs.

First, Scotland and the UK should recognize that the Concordat is not a sufficient docu-ment to organize the relationship between the two states. While the ideals it lays outsuchas high degrees o consultation and inormation sharingare noteworthy, the execution othe documents ideals has allen well short o its aims. Scotland and the UK, consequently,should agree to make a legally binding agreement that guaranteesScottish representationduring policy negotiations. Tis revised Concordat could specifically ocus on decisions

made in the Council o Ministers (Article 203, originally put orward in the Maastrichtreaty, allows or states to be represented by subnational government authorities in theCouncil) and could give the Scottish Executive power over the selection o Scottish minis-ters or meetings, rather than the head UK representative.

Te new Concordat could also include measures to ensure greater communication be-tween Scotland and the UK departments that are working on international issues relevantto Scottish interests, such as fisheries, agriculture, and energy. Tese measures could includeinstalling a Scottish representative in various UK governmental departments or schedulingregular meetings between the Scottish Executive and departmental ministers.

Second, the United Kingdom could look to different regional models o decision-making in Europe to reorganize its relationship with Scotland and, potentially, Wales andNorthern Ireland. Te Belgian model, in particular, could provide inspiration or a reormedBritish model. In Belgium:

[Te] regions, communities and ederal government have laid down by special lawdetailed arrangements on ederal-subnational representation and decision-making inCouncil o Ministers machinery. Each level represents the Belgian position and caststhe vote in matters exclusively under its own jurisdiction, while both are involved in

matters o join competence, with one taking the lead Belgian regions and commu-nities minimize the need or prior agreement by taking turns in assuming the leadresponsibility or the Councils on matters within their jurisdiction Te Belgian ap-proach minimizes the national mould. Europe is seen as a polity with multiple actors


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Alexander Beck

at multiple levels who interact directly with European institutions on matters withintheir competencies.27

As the United Kingdoms powers increasingly devolve to subnational authorities, amodel similar to Belgiums could provide the most democratic legitimacy. I Scotland werepermitted to take the lead on European policy-making or issues that affected the country,it would significantly reduce the democratic deficit it currently experiences at the interna-tional level. By minimizing the national mould when conronting European issues, theUnited Kingdom could devolve more powers to its constituent parts and, in turn, provideScotland with a greater international profile while simultaneously preserving the union.

A Regional Renaissance? Scotland, the Regions, and Europe

While there is a clear path or Scotland to negotiate revisions to its current agreementswith the United Kingdom, the same cannot be said about the European Union. As examinedin the section Regions in the European Context, regions play a complex role in the Union.Regions are difficult to define, lack clear institutionalized powers beyond their consultativeabilities, and, generally speaking, must act through their national governments, rather thanthe EU, to acquire greater powers. Historically speaking, moreover, only the most power-ul European ederal regions, such as those in Austria, Belgium, and Germany, have heldenough sway to influence European politics. Tat being said, there are still some possibili-ties that Scotland could pursue, perhaps with the backing o the UK and other influential

European regions.Within the current settlement, there is potential or Scotland to increase its interna-tional reach. As aorementioned, Scotland has made a number o agreements with otherEuropean regions, such as Catalonia and Bavaria. While these documents have no legalstanding, they are written very much as legal documents. Tey are, or that reason, highlysymbolic quasi-treaties[Tey are] a sign o an outward-looking country, seeking to orgepartnerships to enable each partner to learn rom the success and ailures o the others[they are] a orm o paradiplomacy unmediated by the traditional oreign policy insti-tutions o the state.28Tough the Scottish government has not continued to pursue these

types o relationships that transcend the traditional state model, these relationships havethe potential to transorm regions into legitimate transnational actors. With greater initia-tive, Scotland could increase its international standing by working more closely with otherregions and actively exercising its paradiplomacy.

27 Liesbet Hooghe and Michael Keating, Bypassing the Nation-state? Regions and the EU Policy Process, 274.



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One specific change to EU law that Scotland could lobby or is a change to Article 203o the Lisbon reaty. Tis article, mentioned previously, allows subnational politicians torepresent their national government in the Council o Ministers, but it does not allow or

regions to represent themselves. It might be possible or Scotland to lobby or the revisiono this article in two ways. It could use the influence o the UK to either a) change the treatyto allow regional representation within the Council or b) have Scotland apply or a specialstatus within the Council o Ministers so it could represent itsel or, potentially, split thenumber o votes the UK currently receives (ten) into two blocks (nine and one or eight andtwo). Tis would allow Scotland a measure o voting power. While the ormer option isunlikely, the latter might be possible with consent rom the UK Government. Consideringthat Scotland generally agrees with the UK in a number o policy areas, this avenue mightbe worth pursuing.

Tis paper has also examined a number o political bodies that represent regionalauthorities, and although many o these bodies are unremarkable, the Committee o theRegions offers the best avenue or increasing regional influence. Tough regions have lob-bied or increased powers or the CoR, their petitions have ofen landed on dea ears. Inrecent years, however, the increasing number o regional offices in Brussels has suggestedthat the influence o regions is on the rise. Te rise o RIOsin conjunction with an empow-ered Scotland via reorms to the Scottish-UK relationship and, potentially, the assistanceo other influential regional authorities, such as the German Lnders,could encourageMember States to listen more keenly to regional reorms, such as recognition o the role o

regions with legislative powers by member states and the strengthening o the principle osubsidiarity within these states.Ultimately, EU policy-makers recognize that [the CoR] has a potentially important

role in the policy process i serious reorms are instigated at this early stage in its devel-opment As the history o European integration has clearly demonstrated, EU advisoryorgans have only been considered important actorswhen they have gained more thanmere consultative rights.29 I Scotland actively pursues reorms to increase the legislativecapability o the CoR, possibly with assistance rom other regional authorities with interestin increased power and the UK, change might be possible. I Scotland takes up a strongly

pro-regional approach, it is possible that Scots could lead yet another renaissance; a regionalrenaissance in the halls o the European Union.

29 Rosarie E. McCarthy, The Committee of the Regions: An Advisory Bodys Tortuous Path to Inuence,Journal ofEuropean Public Policy4.3 (1997), 451.


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Conclusions

Scotland is an ambitious nation with a unique history and strong cultural identity. Terecent Scottish independence reerendum brought attention to the question o whether or

not Scotland benefited rom its union with the United Kingdom, both internationally anddomestically. Te Scottish Nationalist Party argued that, in order to increase its internationalprofile, Scotland needed to secede rom the United Kingdom and become and independentcountry. While this would have increased Scotlands profile, the Scottish people decided thata ull-stop break with the United Kingdom was not, on balance, a positive decision. Tereare, however, ways in which Scotland can increase its international influence while remain-ing in the United Kingdom. Trough devolving more power to Scotland and enshriningScottish representation in Europe in a legally binding Concordat, Scotland can be heardmore clearly in Brussels. As this paper has also examined, there are avenues through which

a European region like Scotland might grow in influence. While current structures limit re-gions and their legislative powers, regional authorities desire a greater voice in Europe, anda concentrated effort on the part o Scotland may convince member state governments toconcede some power to their regions.

Tere is potential or Scotland to become a greater orce in the EU while remaining inthe UK. Tough regional structures are currently limiting, reorm is possible, though it mustbe noted that reorm o Scotlands current relationship with the United Kingdom seemsmore easible than reorm o European conventions. I this reorm is pursued, Scotland canreap the benefits o UK membership while, at the same time, more effectively projecting its

interests on the international stage. Fortunately, many Scots can agree to this compromise.


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Works CitedBurrows, Noreen. Scotlands European Strategy. Europe, Regions and European Regional-

ism. Ed. Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 115-33

European Union Committee o the Regions. Te Committee o the Regions: Key Dates. Brus-sels: European Union Committee o the Regions, 2010.

European Union Committee o the Regions.A New reaty: A New Role or Regions and Lo-cal Authorities. Brussels: European Union Committee o the Regions, n.d.

European Union. Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund. Summaries o EU Legislation. Eu-ropean Union, n.d. Web. 25 Apr. 2014.

Fraser, Douglas. Scotland finding Itsel Frozen out o Brussels Te Herald. Herald Scot-land, 22 Jan. 2007. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.

Jeffery, Charlie. Regional Inormation Offices in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance inthe EU: A UK-German Comparison. Te Regional Dimension o the European Union:owards a Tird Level in Europe?London: Frank Cass, 1997. 183-203.

Jones, J. Barry, and Michael Keating. Te European Union and the Regions. Oxord, UK:Clarendon, 1995.

Keating, Michael, and Liesbet Hooghe. Bypassing the Nation-state? Regions and the EUPolicy Process. European Union: Power and Policy-making. Ed. J. J. Richardson. Abing-don: Routledge, 2006. 269-86.

Leask, David, and Michael Settle. Minister Sought to Dissuade MSP rom Role in EU In-quiry. Te Herald. Herald Scotland, 9 Apr. 2014. Web. 17 Apr. 2014.

Mccarthy, Rosarie E. Te Committee o the Regions: An Advisory Bodys ortuous Path toInfluence.Journal o European Public Policy4.3 (1997): 439-54.

Te Scottish Government. Scottish Executive. Te Scottish Executives European Strategy.Te Scottish Government, 20 Jan. 2004. Web. 18 Apr. 2014.

Te Scottish Parliament. Scottish Parliament UK and International Strategy: Session 4.TeScottish Parliament, 27 Nov. 2013. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.

Scully, Roger, and Richard Wyn Jones. Introduction: Europe, Regions, and EuropeanRegionalism. Europe, Regions and European Regionalism. Houndmills, Basingstoke,Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 1-15.

United Kingdom o Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Scotland Act 1998: 1998, Chapter46. London: Stationery Office, 1998.


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Te United Kingdom o Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United Kingdom GovernmentScottish Ministers, the Cabinet o the National Assembly or Wales and the North-ern Ireland Executive Committee.Memorandum o Understanding and Supplementary

Agreements. N.p., 2001. Web. 17 Apr. 2014.


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31/94

Explaining Variations in Development OutcomesTe RENI Factor

Michael Zoorob

Tis paper ties Nigerias slow pace o development into a narrative o how weak nationalidentification catalyzes corruption and instability by delegitimizing the state. Te deleteriouseffects o potent subnational identities on governance have been cited repeatedly as contribut-ing to the weak perormance o many Arican states. Tis theory is tested using both compara-tive cases and a quantitative analysis relating relative ethnic-national identification (RENI) tolevels o corruption and improvements in inant mortality. Te findings suggest that countrieswith higher levels o national identification tend to perorm better on both o these metrics.Implications or indigenous and aid agency policy are also discussed.

Introduction

As Paul Collier explains, a society can unction perectly well i its citizens hold mul-tiple identities, but problems arise when those subnational identities arouse loyalties thatoverride loyalty to the nation as a whole.1Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria hasstruggled both as a nation in uniting its various religious, ethnic, and linguistic cleavagesand as a state in providing security and public services to its citizens. Due to strong ethnic

ties, social variations, political instability, and the resource curse o vast petroleum reserves,Nigeria is marred by very high levels o corruption at all levels o government, characterizedby patterns o patron-client relationships called Prebendalism.2As a result, fify years aferindependence, the advancement o human development in Nigeria has been hindered bythe inefficacy o its political institutions.

Tis paper ties Nigerias slow pace o development into a narrative o how weak nationalidentification may delegitimize the state, thereby catalyzing corruption and instability. Itbegins by detailing a general theory o how governance actors mediate the influence o aidon development. Next, the paper will identiy what is suspected to be a critical intermediary

element o the human development process: relative levels o ethnic and national identifica-tion (RENI). It then compares Nigerias experience with aid to a similar case, Pakistan, anda different case, anzania, finding, as expected, that Pakistan has gained little rom aid whileanzania has benefited significantly rom it. wo quantitative tests then examine the effects

1 Paul Collier. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: Harper, 2009.

2 Richard A Joseph.Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987.

M Zis a junior at Vanderbilt University majoring in political

science and economics and minoring in scientific computing.


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Explaining Variations in Development Outcomes

o RENI on corruption and inant mortality, suggesting that countries with Ethnic RENIhave much higher rates o corruption and a slower pace o human development. Finally, thepaper analyzes the potential public policy implications o these findings and identifies some

uture avenues or research.

Teory

As shown in Figure 1, the effect o aid on development outcomes is mediated by internalgovernance actors.

FIGURE 1: Governance as Mediation for Aid

Official Development Assistance, or ODA, is the standard definition o aid used here,which the IMF characterizes as ollows:3

Flows o official financing administered with the promotion o the economic develop-ment and welare o developing countries as the main objective, and which are conces-sional in character with a grant element o at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percentrate o discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions o donor govern-ment agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (bilateral ODA) and to multilat-eral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multi-lateral institutions.4

In the particular case o Nigeria, it may be that elections incentivize officials to act

corrupt in order to cultivate avor with constituents. Tis effect may be accentuated by thestrong ethnic ties in Nigeria that supersede allegiance to the state or the overwhelming ma-jority o people.5Te countrys large oil revenues also may provide a source o profit ripe orpillaging. Corruption and state weakness may exert mutually reinorcing effects. Stealing isless costly due to state ragility, and the state weakens as its citizens loot resources.

3 External Debt Statistics - Guide for Compilers and Users. International Monetary Fund. 2003.

4 Ibid.

5 Round 3 and Round 4 Survey Data. Arobarometer. 2008.

Aid GovernanceFactors

DevelopmentOutcomes


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Michael Zoorob

Te RENI Variable

A countrys relative ethnic to national identificationthe RENI variableis an im-portant actor in explaining varied development outcomes between countries. RENI is an

indicator derived rom a question asked by the third round o the Arobarometer survey.6

Te data reflects the responses o 20,000 people and about 250 ethnic groups. Te ques-tion asked respondents to suppose whether they would choose to be a member o theirnation (Kenyan, Ghanian, etc.)or their ethnic group i they could only choose one. TeArobarometer survey illustrates that respondents would choose their nation over theirethnic group. Te response to this question demonstrates a nations RENI; higher levels oRENI indicate greater affinity or ethnicity relative to nationality. Employing this relativemeasure o identification coners three particular advantages.7First, the relative measureallows or simple comparison across the sixteen countries studied. Second, RENI is consis-

tent with the constructivist idea that people hold multiple identities simultaneously. Tird,RENI captures the latent variable that we care about more than an absolute measure could,namely the relative importance o the nation vis-a-vis ethnicity.8

Figure 2 illustrates the variability in RENI levels across the sixteen cases studied. Highervalues in RENI indicate a greater relative identification with an ethnic group over the nation.In the maximal caseNigeriaa whopping 83% o respondents reported that they identi-fied more with their ethnicity than theirnationality, the highest o all countries surveyed.In Lesotho, the country with the second highest level o ethnic identification, 75% o peoplereported that they identified more with their ethnicity, and the median case, Ghana, was

60%. At the opposite extreme, in anzania, just 12% o respondents said that they identifiedmore with their ethnic group thantheir nation.

6 Ibid.

7 Amanda Robinson. National versus Ethnic Identity in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territo-rial Nationalism. 2013.

8 Ibid.


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Figure 3 provides a more discriminating picture o the variation in the middle o thedistribution. Te eight percent decline between Mozambique and Botswana appears to be a

tipping point around the 50% mark, which could delineate between low and high levelRENI countries. Tis distinction can be used to convert the continuous RENI variables intotwo categories o low and high RENI countries to perorm comparative analysis, and thisresulted in ten countries in the Ethnic category and six countries in the National cat-egory, as shown in Figure 3.

100

80

60

40

20

0

Tanz

ania

Mali

Benin

Keny

a

Ghan

a

Botsw

ana

Moz

ambiq

ue

Mad

agascar

Sene

gal

Namibi

a

SouthA

frica

Lesoth

o

Nigeria

Malawi

Zambia

Uganda

Figure 2: RENI by Country - Percent Identifying More With Ethnic Group

Tan Nation

Data Source: Afrobarometer (2008)


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Michael Zoorob

Country RENI Nation or Ethnic (0 = Ethnic)

anzania 0.12 1

South Arica 0.37 1

Namibia 0.43 1

Senegal 0.49 1

Madagascar 0.5 1

Mozambique 0.51 1

Botswana 0.59 0

Ghana 0.6 0

Kenya 0.6 0

Benin 0.62 0

Mali 0.68 0

Uganda 0.69 0

Zambia 0.71 0

Malawi 0.72 0

Lesotho 0.75 0

Nigeria 0.83 0

Figure 3: RENI ipping Point

Data Source: (Afrobarometer 2008)


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Summary

Figure 4: Teorized Mechanism for RENI on Human Development

Figure 4 explains the initial expectations or the effect o RENI on development. Teassumption was that RENI would undermine development by contributing to corruption.Greater identification with ones ethnic group over the state promotes a perception o the

state as a source o extraction, leading to client-ocused relationships between ethnic elitesand their co-ethnics in the population. Tis is the causal mechanism tying ethnic RENI tocorruption.

ODA and Human Development in Nigeria: A Brief Summary

Human development remains low in Nigeria in both absolute and relative terms. As aslightly dated United Nations Development Report eloquently points out:

Although Nigeria is relatively rich in natural resources, it has yet to ulfill its economic

and human development potential. Its size, wealth and diversity generate high expecta-tions but it remains a rich country with poor people. Its oil wealth and considerableagricultural potential have not translated into better living conditions or most o itspeople. Over two thirds o the population lives on less than US $1 per day. Furthermore,the number o people living in poverty has doubled in recent years and, according tomost recent economic and social indicators, most Nigerians seem to be worse off thanthey were in the 1970s.9

Conditions have not improved significantly. wice as many Nigerians lived in pov-

erty in 2008 than in the 1980s, the country has the second-highest prevalence o HIV inthe world, and more than 22 million people are illiterate.10Te average number o yearso schooling in Nigeria is 5.3, and lie expectancy is still quite low at just over 50 years. 11Nigerias 2012 Human Development Index (HDI) o 0.471 is below the average o 0.475 or

9 Khalid Malik. Nigeria.Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World.New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2013.

10 Nigeria: United Nations Development Assistance Framework II. Abuja: United Nations Nigeria, 2008.

11 KhalidMalik. Nigeria.Human Development Report 2013.

Aid RENI Corruption Development


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Michael Zoorob

countries in sub-Saharan Arica and places the country in the HDIs low human develop-ment category.12

Moreover, afer accounting or inequality in Nigeria, the countrys perormance on the

HDI declines by a whopping 41.4%, compared to an average loss o 35% or countries insub-Saharan Arica.13Tis adjustment leaves Nigeria with an HDI score o 0.276 comparedto an average score o 0.309 or countries in sub-Saharan Arica.

As inequality, poverty, and disease continue to prolierate in Nigeria, aprima acie caseemerges: aid has had limited or, at best, mixed effects on development. Tis is consistentwith an internal audit by the UNDP, which describes the effects o the countrys programsas mixed, stating that despite positive results registered at the community level, evidencerom the ADR (Assessment o Development Results) shows that in terms o sustainabilityand cumulative impact, UNDPs integrated community development programs, with their

wide geographical spread, have led to dispersion, overextension and limited impact.14

Method 1: Comparative Cases

Figure 5 surveys some potentially important country characteristics or human de-velopment, like resource curse, military dominance, large population, and weak nationalidentity. Tese characteristics helped develop an analytical strategy or evaluating why aidhas not helped Nigeria. Aid will likely not help Pakistan, which shares three o these ourcharacteristics with Nigeria, and will likely help anzania, which shares none o these our

characteristics. I this holds, then the actors that have been identified may be capturingimportant components o the human development picture.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results: Nigeria.New York: UNDP, Evaluation Ofce, 2003.

Country

NIGERIA

PAKISAN

ANZANIA

Resource Curse

Yes

No

No

Military Dominant

Yes

Yes

No

Large Population

Yes

Yes

No

Weak National Identity

Yes

Yes

No

Figure 5: Comparative Cases


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Most Similar Case Pakistan

Figure 6: Per Capita Aid in Selected Countries

As Figure 6 indicates, neither Pakistan nor Nigeria has received a significant amount oper capita aid, largely due to the sizable populations o both countries. Pakistan and Nigeriaalso have a history o military dominance and only recently enjoyed their first transitions

between two elected leaders. Te two countries also share equally high levels o corruption:ransparency International (2013) gives Pakistan a 28/100 on its Corruption PerceptionIndex compared to 25/100 or Nigeria. Both Nigeria and Pakistan suffer rom ractionalizedpolitics and powerul insurgencies rom separatist and Islamist groups.15 16

Aid has not been particularly effective in Pakistan. According to the Center or GlobalDevelopment, development assistance to Pakistan has overwhelmingly enriched local elitesand led to widespread corruption without alleviating the suffering o the Pakistani peo-ple.17Development aid has become associated with nepotism and incompetence. USAID,or example, unded the construction o hospitals reliant on electricity in areas that are not

connected to the energy grid.18

Another problem borne out by empirical evidence rom the1990sis that oreign aid to Pakistan diminishes domestic spending on social services. Whenthe World Bank boosted aid to Pakistan significantly in the 1990s, spending rom Pakistans

15 Center for Systemic Peace. 2010a. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Nigeria.

16 Center or Systemic Peace. 2010b. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Pakistan.

17 Nancy Birdsall. Beyond Bullets and Bombs Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan: Report o the Study Groupon a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan. Washington DC: Center or Global Development, 2011.

18 Azeem Ibrahim. U.S. Aid to PakistanU.S. axpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. 2009.

Net ODA received per capita (current US Dollars)

80

60

40

20

01980 1990 2000 2010

Tanzania

Pakistan

Nigeria


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Michael Zoorob

government on social services declined rom 1.9% o GDP to 1.6%.19More broadly, aid mayweaken indigenous institutions or Pakistani development by ostering a culture o ineffi-ciency, corruption,and mismanagement among NGOs.20

Most Dissimilar Case anzania

anzania differs rom Nigeria with a smaller population, a less prominent military, anda low score on the RENI index (Nigeria is highest).Annual per capita Official DevelopmentAssistance receipt in anzania is perhaps five times higher than in Nigeria, and anzaniadoes not suffer rom a resource curse. As a result, it is expected that anzania will have amuch different experience with aid.

In contrast to Pakistan and Nigeria, aid appears to have exhibited salutary effects onanzanias economy. As one study explains, Although there has been much debate about the

relationship between oreign aid and economic development, in anzanias case, economet-ric analysis shows a significant dependence o GDP growth on ODA flows. 21Te research-ers urther ound that,ODA has been the most influential actor in the countrys recentgrowth, surpassing the impact o Foreign Direct Investment, trade, and remittances onanzanias economic development.22

Summary

Problems in Pakistan suggest that the resource curse is insufficient to account or theinefficacy o aid in Nigeria. Moreover, the comparative analysis is consistent with the idea

that weak national identification is playing a role, as Pakistan and Nigeria both have weaklevels o national identification and poor experiences with aid, while anzania has higherlevels o national identification and a salutary experience with aid. Te next section appliesquantitative methods to explore this line o inquiry urther.

Method 2: Quantitative Analysis

Nigeria and Pakistan have received little benefit rom aid while anzania has benefitedsignificantly. Tis is consistent with the hypothesis that RENI plays an important role inhuman development. Quantitative methods will now be used to explore the effects o the

RENI variable on corruption and human development. wo hypotheses in particular willbe explored:

19 Nancy Birdsall, and Molly Kinder. 2010. Te U.S. Aid Surge to Pakistan: Repeating a Failed Experiment? Lessons or U.S.Policymakers rom the World Banks Social-Sector Lending in the 1990s.

20 Masooda Bano.Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective Action. Stanford, CA: StanfordEconomics and Finance, an Imprint of Stanford University Press, 2012.

21 Elena Rotarou and Ueta Kazuhiro. Foreign Aid and Economic Development: Tanzanias Experience with ODA. TheKyoto Economic Review78, no. 2 (2009): 157-89.

22 Ibid.


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H1:Ethnic RENI status will be associated with significantly higher levels o corruption.

H2: Ethnic RENI status will be associated with significantly slower pace o human de-

velopment (operationalized by rate o decline in inant mortality).

It is expected that countries with Ethnic RENI status will be associated with higherlevels o corruption, leading to a less efficient use o resources and a reduced pace o humandevelopment.


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Michael Zoorob

1

RENI (0 = Ethnic)

-0.07

-0.06

-0.05

-0.04

-0.03

-0.02

-0.01

0.00

0.01

A v

e rag

eA

nn

ua

lP

erc e

ntC

ha n

gein

Infa

nt

Mo

rta

lit y

( 200

1- 2

01

1)

0

Figure 7: RENI and Infant Mortality: A Comparison of Means

est 1: RENI and Human Development


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In this second test, which explores the hypothesis that countries with greater levels onational identification will have a aster pace o human development, data rom the WorldBank is used to compare the average annual percentage decline in inant mortality rom

2001 to 2011 (this variable operationalizes human development) between the Ethnic RENIand National RENI categories o countries.23Figure 7 shows the plot comparing changes ininant mortality in the last decade between these two groups.

Figure 8: -test for RENI and Infant Mortality

It is assumed that unequal variances are a result o the very low sample size and the

significant differences in spread between the two groups. As expected, the average decline ininant mortality in the last decade is greater in countries in the National RENI group thanin the Ethnic RENI group, as Figure 8 shows (t = -1.87; p = 0.0422). Te mean differencebetween the two groups was 0.01485, which suggests that, all else equal, a typical NationalRENI country experienced about a 1.5% greater annual decline in inant mortality than atypical Ethnic RENI country.

est 3: RENI and Corruption

Te Corruption Perceptions Index or the years 2011-2013 is used to measure the

levels o corruption in states.24

Te index ranges rom 0 (lowest corruption) to 4 (highestcorruption). Figure 10 plots the relationship between CPI and Ethnic or National RENIstatus. As expected,National RENI countries have lower levels o corruption. A comparisono means between the two groups is shown in Figure 9.

23 World DataBank. Te World Bank DataBank. 2014.

24 Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency International. 2013.

Difference -0.01485Std Err Di 0.00794

-1.87028DF 12.79868t Ratio

Upper CL Di 0.00233

Lower CL Di -.03204

0.0845

Prob > t 0.9578

Prob > |t|

Assuming unequal variances

Confidence 0.95 Prob < t 0.0422

1-0

t est

-0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02-0.02


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Michael Zoorob

Figure 9: RENI and CPI

1

RENI (0 = Ethnic)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

CorruptionPerceptionIndex

(Afro

bar

)

0


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Figure 10: -est for RENI and CPI

A t-test comparing mean CPI scores in Ethnic RENI countries versus National RENIcountries was perormed, and the results are shown in Figure 10. Madagascar is exclud-ed rom this analysis because Arobarometer does not have CPI data or the country. TeNational RENI group has significantly lower scores (i.e. less corruption) on the CPI indexthan the Ethnic RENI group o countries (t = -2.08, p=0.0299). Te mean difference in scoresis about -0.23 on the CPI. It is significant that the coefficient reaches statistical significancedespite the very small samples employed. Te results suggest that RENI exerts a potent effecton levels o corruption.

Bootstrapping Method

Bootstrapping is a recursive process that utilizes resampling with replacement roma sample to generate a normal distribution. o buttress the results produced by the low-sample t-tests, a bootstrapping procedure with 1000 re-samples in JMP statistical sofwarewas used to compare levels o corruption in the countries with Ethnic RENI preerencesto the levels o corruption in countries with National RENI preerences. Te bootstrappedestimate or the difference o means between the two groups suggests that, with about 95%confidence, there is a difference in corruption levels between the two groups. As Figure 11

demonstrates, the 2.5% estimate is about -0.0006 while the 97.5% estimate is 0.43649. It canbe said with 95% confidence that the true difference in CPI between the RENI categories ocountries alls between these values.

Difference -0.23500

Std Err Di 0.11320

-2.07589

DF 12.15363

t Ratio

Upper CL Di 0.01131

Lower CL Di -.48131

0.0598

Prob > t 0.9701

Prob > |t|

Assuming unequal variances

Confidence 0.95 Prob < t 0.0299*

1-0

t est

-0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2-0.4 0.3 0.4


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Figure 11: Bootstrapped Estimate for CPI Difference in Means

A one-sample t-test using the bootstrapping sample or the difference in mean CPIlevels between the two RENI groups indicates that mean levels on the Corruption PerceptionIndex are much higher in the ethnic group. esting the difference sample against a null-hypothesis o no difference (that is, H

0: x=0) yields a test statistic o t=64.6 (p


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Figure 12: Bootstrapped -test (RENI and CPI)

Bootstrapping is useul or making statistical inerences because the underlying distri-bution o the CPI data is unknown due to the small size. However, bootstrapping does notremedy the underlying issue that the cases used may be unrepresentative or biased in some

way. Consequently, the significance o the bootstrapping findings should not be overstated.However, the results o the bootstrapping procedure coincide with the total evidence, theo-retical and statistical, demonstrating that ethnic RENI countries experience greater levelso corruption.

Analysis

aken together, the tests perormed indicate that RENI influences levels o cor-ruption and human development. -tests between the Ethnic RENI and the National RENI

Hypothesized Value 0

Actual Estimate 0.23117

DF 994

Std Dev 0.11288

est Mean

t est

-0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02-0.02

est Statistic 64.5978

Prob > |t| t


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countries show that Ethnic RENI categories have significantly higher levels o corruptionand significantly slower rates o decline in inant mortality in the last decade. Tese resultsare consistent with the overall theory that RENI levels affect human development by influ-

encing levels o corruption in a country.

Limitations

Tere are several limitations to this analysis. First, the very low sample (n=15 or n=16)size could introduce a whole host o problems, as well as the potential or non-randomsampling in the sixteen or so countries that Arobarometer selected. Te data also cannotexplain causality, and endogeneity between the independent and dependent variables isplausible (it could be the case that corruption or slower human development leads to lessidentification with the nation). Te causal arrow may point in both directions simultane-

ously. Perhaps higher RENI leads to increased corruption, which itsel promotes even higherlevels o relative ethnic identification, a positive eedback loop.

Figure 13: GNI Per Capita in Selected Countries

It is also reasonable to suppose that the countries outlined differ on many met-rics aside rom RENI, and thus the bivariate analyses used are unable to account or suchactors as the quality o democracy or the cultural homogeneity o a society. In an effortto at least partially address this concern, additional tests were run o other potentially

16

GNI Per Capita in PPPCountries (thousands of dollars)

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Botswana

South Arica

NigeriaSudananzaniaUgandaMozambiqueMadagascar

1980 1990 2000 2010


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important variables. Tough the tests are not shown here, interestingly, no strong relation-ships were ound between GNI per capita growth in the last decade and any o the other

variables used (RENI, aid, inant mortality decline, and CPI). Moreover, as Figure 12 dem-

onstrates, the countries in the sample are at such significantly different stages o develop-ment (Madagascars GNI per capita is about one-tenth o Botswanas) such that RENI maynot affect the development o these countries equally.

Conclusion

Tis paper builds on nascent literature analyzing the effect o the RENI variable ondevelopment. With the exception o one other working paper (Amanda RobertsonsNational versus Ethnic Identification in Arica) that looks at correlationso responses tothe Arobarometer question rom which RENI is derived, this paper may be the only ex-

amination o the RENI variable systematically and may be the first that attempts to use itto predict state-level differences in human development outcomes. As Robertson explains,Attachment to the nation, relative to ones ethnic group, increases with education, urban-ization, and ormal employment at the individual level, and with economic developmentat the state level, patterns more consistent with classic modernization theory.25However,with respect to the final point about economic development at the state level, this analysis ismore indicative o causation in the opposite direction. Te theoretical mechanisms that havebeen identified support the idea that ex ante weak national identification delegitimizes thestate and contributes to corruption, which undermines economic development. O course,

this is still very much an open question, and the methods used here are unable to ascertaincausality.Tis paper may inspire urther research that explores the relationship between the

RENI variable and other indicators o human development, such as lie expectancy or risko conflict. Other mechanisms, such as levels o social service spending, could be studied todetermine how RENI affects development. It would be a reasonable prediction that govern-ments in National RENI countries would spend more money on social services like healthcare and education. Whether RENI carries any weight in polities outside o sub-SaharanArica is also o interest, though data limitations complicate this point o inquiry.

Te RENI variable influencing development has important implications or publicpolicy. I national identification leads to less corruption and higher levels o human develop-ment, then states would be wise to promulgate policies that promote greater national iden-tification. Tis is especially true in the anzanian case, which is an outlier in its very highlevels o national identification and perhaps the only nation-state in sub-Saharan Arica.26

25 Amanda Robinson. National versus Ethnic Identity in Arica.

26 Arobarometer. 2009.


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anzania looks at the individual level much like many other countries with correlates orlow levels o national identification, suggesting that state-level policies seem to be playingan important role.27Four such state-level actors identified by scholars include the perva-

sive use o the Kiswahili language, the nationalist curriculum in primary school education,the even-handed distribution o state resources in the early post-independence era, and thestrong personality o anzanias first independence leader, Julius Nyerere.28Contemporarily,a number o Arican states are adopting similar policies to promote national unity, and theeffects o these interventions have not been researched.29

Te implications o these findings or development aid agencies are also interesting.Tough the risk o criticism or cultural imperialism is very real, this analysis suggests thatdevelopment agencies might be well advised to consider projects that promote nationalunity in recipient countries, such as inrastructure projects connecting different parts o

the country with the capital, the dissemination o national icons, and the promotion o anational language.

27 Edward Miguel. ribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus anzania. World Politics 56, no. 3(2004): 327-62.

28 Ibid.

29 Amanda Robinson. National versus Ethnic Identity in Arica.


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Works Cited

Arobarometer. Round 3 and Round 4 Survey Data. 2009.

Bano, Masooda. Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions or Collective Ac-

tion. Stanord, CA: Stanord Economics and Finance, an Imprint o Stanord UniversityPress, 2012.

Birdsall, Nancy. Beyond Bullets and Bombs Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development inPakistan: Report o the Study Group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan. Washington DC: Center or Global Development, 2011.

Birdsall, Nancy and Kinder, Molly. 2010. Te U.S. Aid Surge to Pakistan: Repeating a FailedExperiment? Lessons or U.S. Policymakers rom the World Banks Social-SectorLending in the 1990s.Center or Global Development Working Paper No. 205.

Center or Systemic Peace. 2010a. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Nigeria.http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Nigeria2010.pd

Center or Systemic Peace. 2010b. Polity IV Country Report 2010: Pakistan.

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Pakistan2010.pd

Collier, Paul. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: Harper,2009.

Corruption Perceptions Index. ransparency International. 2013.

Country Evaluation: Assessment o Development Results: Nigeria.New York: UNDP,

Evaluation Office, 2003. http://web.ng.undp.org/documents/NigeriaADR.pd

External Debt Statistics - Guide or Compilers and Users. International Monetary Fund.January 1, 2003.

Ibrahim, Azeem. U.S. Aid to PakistanU.S. axpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption.2009. http://belercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pd

Joseph, Richard A. Democra

Documents

Southern California International Review Fall 2014 Publication