IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN

INDIA 

OBJECTIVES:OBJECTIVES: intimidate the state and the civil intimidate the state and the civil

population; population; to demonstrate the inability of the State to to demonstrate the inability of the State to

protect its civilian population; protect its civilian population; generate pressure on the State from its generate pressure on the State from its

population to settle with the terrorists; and population to settle with the terrorists; and create feelings of battle fatigue in the create feelings of battle fatigue in the

State as well as its population. State as well as its population.

OLD OR ‘CLASSICAL’ TERRORISM:OLD OR ‘CLASSICAL’ TERRORISM:

REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS

ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

ON HUMAN LIVES:ON HUMAN LIVES:

Toll on the casualties Toll on the casualties suffered more than the suffered more than the casualties in the four casualties in the four conventional wars fought by conventional wars fought by India. India.

ON THE POLITICAL SCENEON THE POLITICAL SCENE

India has lost two leaders to India has lost two leaders to terrorist terrorist attacks, in each case attacks, in each case creating a leadership creating a leadership crisiscrisis

Undermining of democratic Undermining of democratic values and values and democratic institutions. democratic institutions.

ON THE ECONOMY:ON THE ECONOMY: Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on

the the Indian exchequer estimated to be Indian exchequer estimated to be more than more than Rs.45,000 crores Rs.45,000 crores

Increase in budget on agencies Increase in budget on agencies involved in involved in fighting terrorism is 2600 fighting terrorism is 2600 per cent since 1980s per cent since 1980s

Compounded by the loss to property Compounded by the loss to property and impact and impact on business environmenton business environment

ON THE SOCIAL FABRICON THE SOCIAL FABRIC

The assassination of Prime Minister The assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists Indira Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists had terrible reprisal on the Sikh had terrible reprisal on the Sikh communitycommunity

The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered communal onslaught on the Muslim communal onslaught on the Muslim population of the citypopulation of the city

1919 years to bring the insurgency-cum- years to bring the insurgency-cum-terrorism in Nagaland under control, terrorism in Nagaland under control,

2020 years to restore normalcy in years to restore normalcy in Mizoram,Mizoram,

1414 years to put an end to terrorism in years to put an end to terrorism in Punjab. Punjab. 

J&K complicatedJ&K complicated

“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!” [The Queen]

“It was much pleasanter at home, when one wasn’t always growing larger and smaller, and being ordered about by mice and rabbits.” [Alice]

Excerpt from Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll

PREVIEWPREVIEW• SOFT STATESOFT STATE• STRATEGY. DO WE STRATEGY. DO WE

HAVE ANY OR DO WE HAVE ANY OR DO WE NEED ONE?NEED ONE?• STRUCTURES STRUCTURES • ISSUES ISSUES

NATIONAL APPROACHNATIONAL APPROACHOF TOLERANCEOF TOLERANCE

PAN INDIA STRIKES POST 2003PAN INDIA STRIKES POST 2003

Pre 26/11

26/11

Post 26/11

INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM APPROACHAPPROACH

• INADEQUATE INADEQUATE RESPONSE RESPONSE • SYSTEMIC FAILURESYSTEMIC FAILURE• LACK OF COHERENT LACK OF COHERENT

STRATEGYSTRATEGY• SOFT STATESOFT STATE

SYSTEMIC FAILURESYSTEMIC FAILURE• LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUSLACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS• MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

REPORTING TO DIFFERENT AUTHORITY REPORTING TO DIFFERENT AUTHORITY @• MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED AND MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED AND

EQUIPPED FORCES EQUIPPED FORCES &• AMORPHOUS MARITIME & COASTAL AMORPHOUS MARITIME & COASTAL

SECURITY SECURITY • NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE AND TURF NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE AND TURF

BATTLEBATTLE

SYSTEMIC FAILURESYSTEMIC FAILURE• AIR SPACE AND AVIATION AIR SPACE AND AVIATION

SECURITYSECURITY• CYBER SECURITY CYBER SECURITY • NARCO TERRORISM NARCO TERRORISM • MEDIA ANARCHY MEDIA ANARCHY • GLOBALISED TERROR GLOBALISED TERROR

NETWORKS NETWORKS • ANTI TERROR LAWS AND ANTI TERROR LAWS AND

ENFORCEMENTENFORCEMENT

SOFT STATESOFT STATE

SOFT STATESOFT STATE

NATIONAL STRATEGYNATIONAL STRATEGY

NEXT TIME, NEXT TIME, DOUBLE DOUBLE THE THE NUMBER OF NUMBER OF THREATS !THREATS !

DO WE DO WE NEED ONE?NEED ONE?

UN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGYUN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY• ADDRESSING THE CONDITIONS ADDRESSING THE CONDITIONS

CONDUCIVE TO THE SPREAD OF CONDUCIVE TO THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM TERRORISM

• PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS

• DEVELOPING STATE CAPACITY TO DEVELOPING STATE CAPACITY TO COUNTER TERRORISM COUNTER TERRORISM

• DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTSDEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS

UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY (CONTEST)(CONTEST)

THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY IS THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY IS

“ “ TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE UK TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE UK AND ITS INTERESTS OVERSEAS AND ITS INTERESTS OVERSEAS FROM INTERNATIONAL FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, SO THAT PEOPLE TERRORISM, SO THAT PEOPLE CAN GO ABOUT THEIR LIVES CAN GO ABOUT THEIR LIVES FREELY AND WITH CONFIDENCE”FREELY AND WITH CONFIDENCE”

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKSTRATEGIC FRAMEWORK• • PURSUE: TO STOP TERRORIST ATTACKSPURSUE: TO STOP TERRORIST ATTACKS

• • PREVENT: TO STOP PEOPLE PREVENT: TO STOP PEOPLE BECOMING TERRORISTS OR BECOMING TERRORISTS OR SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISMSUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

• • PROTECT: TO STRENGTHEN OUR PROTECT: TO STRENGTHEN OUR PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKATTACK

• • PREPARE: WHERE AN ATTACK CANNOT PREPARE: WHERE AN ATTACK CANNOT BE STOPPED, TO MITIGATE ITS IMPACTBE STOPPED, TO MITIGATE ITS IMPACT

US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2008 STRATEGIC PLANSECURITY 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN

• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE DANGEROUS PEOPLE

• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS GOODSDANGEROUS GOODS

• PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S

PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

• STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENTOPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

COMPONENTS OF US STRATEGYCOMPONENTS OF US STRATEGY

• COUNTER TERRORISMCOUNTER TERRORISM• BORDER SECURITYBORDER SECURITY• PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE

AND RECOVERY INCL FORAND RECOVERY INCL FOR NATURAL DISASTERNATURAL DISASTER• IMMIGRATION.IMMIGRATION.• CYBER SECURITYCYBER SECURITY

SALIENT STRUCTURES SALIENT STRUCTURES • NCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND DHSNCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND DHS• UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT 2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT)2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT)• FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA 1978/2008)1978/2008)• JUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASESJUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASES• MIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENSMIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENS• CYBER COMMANDCYBER COMMAND

DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITYDEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER TERRORISM PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGYSTRATEGY

• Prevent Prevent ( EQUALITY; HEARTS AND ( EQUALITY; HEARTS AND MINDS; ROOT CAUSE; IDEA OF INDIA)MINDS; ROOT CAUSE; IDEA OF INDIA)

• Disrupt Disrupt (CAPABILITY TO ANTICIPATE (CAPABILITY TO ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND AT HOME AND ABROAD)AND RESPOND AT HOME AND ABROAD)

• Secure Secure ( TARGET HARDENING)( TARGET HARDENING)• Citizen as Stake Holder Citizen as Stake Holder (PPP)(PPP)• Prepare Prepare ( FOR THE INEVITABLE)( FOR THE INEVITABLE)• Unity of Approach Unity of Approach ( PLURALISM, ( PLURALISM, DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING)DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING)

COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY ( SMART POWER)STRATEGY ( SMART POWER)

• HARD POWER HARD POWER – PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE, STRUCTURES AND TOUGH PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE, STRUCTURES AND TOUGH

DECISIONS)DECISIONS)– SURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITYSURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY– ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN ITABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN IT– ESPIONAGE/COVERT OPSESPIONAGE/COVERT OPS

• SOFT POWERSOFT POWER– PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION, PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION, MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE

OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT)OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT)– INTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATIONINTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATION– KNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICEKNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICE

• TECHNOLOGYTECHNOLOGY– WPNS AND ARMAMENT WPNS AND ARMAMENT – SPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBERSPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBER

STRUCTURESSTRUCTURES

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE • UAPA 2008UAPA 2008• NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA). NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA). • NTRONTRO• NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC) NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC) • THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)• NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID).NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID).• CRIME & CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWKCRIME & CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWK (CCTNS).(CCTNS).• OPERATIONS DIVISIONOPERATIONS DIVISION• STRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITYSTRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITY• OTHER MEASURES OTHER MEASURES

CRITIQUE OF NEW STRUCTURESCRITIQUE OF NEW STRUCTURES• DE – POLITICISE TERRORISM. APPLICABILITY DE – POLITICISE TERRORISM. APPLICABILITY

OF LAWS.OF LAWS.• NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF TALENT. USA NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF TALENT. USA

HAS EST IT UNDER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, HAS EST IT UNDER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) Act (IRTPA)

• COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE WEAKEST COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE WEAKEST LINK AND LARGEST FORCE. LEADERSHIP IS THE LINK AND LARGEST FORCE. LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY.KEY.

• CYBER SECURITYCYBER SECURITY• CBRN CAPABILITY IS SUSPECTCBRN CAPABILITY IS SUSPECT

ISSUESISSUES

RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUESRESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES• MINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITYMINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY• ROLE OF NSA/ CS. REQUIREMENT ROLE OF NSA/ CS. REQUIREMENT

OF DNI. CAN A DIPLOMAT DO OF DNI. CAN A DIPLOMAT DO JUSTICE TO IS OR TWO NSAs?JUSTICE TO IS OR TWO NSAs?

• NIA AND CBI TO BE STAUTORY NIA AND CBI TO BE STAUTORY BODIES LIKE CEC AND CAG ETC. BODIES LIKE CEC AND CAG ETC. NEED FOR YOUNG TALENT AND NOT NEED FOR YOUNG TALENT AND NOT TO BE HEADED BY ‘DUE TO RETIRE TO BE HEADED BY ‘DUE TO RETIRE (SR)’ OFFRS.(SR)’ OFFRS.

• UNIFIED COMMAND IN STATES UNIFIED COMMAND IN STATES WITH MIL ADVISERS.WITH MIL ADVISERS.

RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUESRESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES• COASTAL COMMANDSCOASTAL COMMANDS• CYBER COMMANDCYBER COMMAND• DEDICATED OFFR CADRE FOR DEDICATED OFFR CADRE FOR

CRPF: DELINK FROM IPSCRPF: DELINK FROM IPS• IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE INF IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE INF

UNITS EARMK , TRAINED & UNITS EARMK , TRAINED & EQUIPPED FOR URBAN EQUIPPED FOR URBAN TERRORISM TO SP LOCAL TERRORISM TO SP LOCAL POLICE. POLICE.

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION• BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A LONG BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A LONG

DRAWN CAMPAIGN FOR SUPERMACYDRAWN CAMPAIGN FOR SUPERMACYSUN TZU’S ADVICE, “IN PEACE PREPARE FOR SUN TZU’S ADVICE, “IN PEACE PREPARE FOR

WAR. THE ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO WAR. THE ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE. IT IS MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A THE STATE. IT IS MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A ROAD EITHER TO SAFETY OR TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER ROAD EITHER TO SAFETY OR TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE NEGLECTED.”NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE NEGLECTED.”

• INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT CAN NOT BE WISHED AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT SOURCEDCAN NOT BE WISHED AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT SOURCED

• ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID, ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID,

““FOR GOD’S SAKE, DON’T KEEP RUNNING FOR GOD’S SAKE, DON’T KEEP RUNNING TO MUMMY.” TO MUMMY.”

48

COASTAL SECURITY

Mitigation Efforts taken by Government of India Post 26/11

• Assigning responsibility for coastal security and maritime security. • Designation of Coastal Command.• Strengthening of marine police stations.• Sanctioning of additional assets and manpower for the Coast

Guard. • Creation of Sagar Prahari Bal for the Navy. • Automatic Identification System (AIS) for fishing vessels • Chain of coastal radars. • Joint Operations Centre (JOC).

Responsibilities for Various Maritime Responsibilities for Various Maritime StakeholdersStakeholders

• IN –Overall Maritime Security including Coastal

Security & Offshore Security.

• CG – Coastal Security in Territorial Waters

including areas to be patrolled by Marine police.

• Director General Coast Guard – Cdr Coastal

Command.

• FOC-in-C – C-in-C Coastal Defence.

Responsibilities of Various Agencies Prior 26/11

Territorial Waters(12 NM)

Marine Police

EEZ (200 NM) Security – Coast

GuardOffshore Security – Navy/CG

High Seas - Navy

No specific responsibility assigned to the IN

Responsibilities of Various Agencies Post 26/11

Coastal Security – Territorial Waters

Coast Guard

Overall Maritime Security - Navy

Offshore Security - Navy

Limitations of New Security Apparatus• Overlapping Responsibilities.

• Responsibilities without transfer of authority.

• Coastal Command a misnomer. Responsible for only

co-ordination. No command & control function.

• Replication of responsibility dilutes the accountability.

• Distinction between coastal security & coastal defence.

Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd)

• Undue focus on shallow waters.Undue focus on shallow waters.

• Does not leverage expanse of sea.Does not leverage expanse of sea.

• Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter.Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter.

• IN back to brown water navy!IN back to brown water navy!

Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd)

• Unregulated nature of Indian fishing.

• Absence of legal regulatory mechanism.

• Fishing Community – a political vote bank.

• Compulsions of fisheries being state subject.

Co-ordinationCo-ordination

• Numerous maritime agencies like major & minor

ports, customs, fisheries, DG Shipping, ONGC, IB

and Marine Police under various ministries.

• Each agency has specific charter but bearing on

security.

• Co-ordination between centre & state agencies.

RecommendationsRecommendations

• Clear demarcation of responsiblity, accountability & jurisdiction for various agencies.

Recommendations (Contd)Recommendations (Contd)• Legal regulatory mechanism for Indian fisheries

permitting measures like- Making crossing of IMBL illegal.- No fishing corridor.- Prohibited fishing zones around off shore platforms, VAs/VPs.- All legal provisions with penalties. - AIS/transponders for less than 20 mtrs.- RFID for fishing boats. (Storage of GPS track).

• Centre to exercise powers of regulating fishing beyond 12 nm.

Recommendations (Contd)Recommendations (Contd)• Maritime Domain Awareness.

- Networking of all concerned agencies.- Integration of surveillance data of

LRIT – DG Shipping. PANS – Port authorities. AIS - National AIS network (DGLL) Coastal Radar Chain – ICG Tracking Devices Fishing boats – DG shipping/ Fisheries Data base of registration of fishing boats Data base of other stake holders, Int, marine police, ports etc.

• Maritime Security Advisor.

Question!

ISSUE• The current arrangement for Coastal Security suffers

from shortcomings such as:-– Coast Guard (CG) made responsible to coordinate between

various agencies without authority over them.– Coastal Security responsibility of the CG has been limited to

territorial waters (12NM) while it has the Statutory Charter & capability to operate up to the EEZ (200NM).

– Indian Navy has been made overall responsible with the CG responsible for territorial waters leading to issues of Command and Control.

• How can the issue of Command and Control between various agencies be resolved to bring in better efficiency and accountability?