Sino-US Relations (1989-1999): from Cooperation to Friction and Competition

11China-US RelationsChina-US Relations

Sino-US Relations (1989-1999): Sino-US Relations (1989-1999): from Cooperation to Friction and Competitionfrom Cooperation to Friction and Competition

Guo XuetangGuo Xuetang

Department of International Studies & Public Department of International Studies & Public AdministrationAdministration

SHUPLSHUPL

China-US RelationsChina-US Relations 22

1, Aftermath of the Soviet Union Collapse 1, Aftermath of the Soviet Union Collapse and the End of the Cold Warand the End of the Cold War

• In 1989 and 1990, the Soviet Union and East European countries declared the end of socialism in these countries. 　

• Ending of the cold war, signified by the fall of the Berlin War, came soon after a domestic political unrest in Tiananmen Square in May and June, 1989.

• The west, led by the United States, waged a campaign of sanctions against China.



2, China-U.S. Diplomatic Conflict2, China-U.S. Diplomatic Conflict• George Bush, “The President’s News Conference”,

June 5, 1989“I am ordering the following actions: suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons, suspension of visits between US and Chinese military leaders, sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students in the US to extend their stay, and the offer of humanitarian and medical assistance through the Red Cross to those injured during the assault, and review of other aspects of our bilateral relationship as events in China continue to unfold.”


• However the president also says:

“I don’t want to see a total break in this relationship, and I will not encourage a total break in the relationship. This relationship is, when you see these kids struggling for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time for the United States to withdraw and pull back and leave them to the devices of a leadership that might decide to crack down further. Some have suggested I take the Ambassador out. In my view, that would be 180 degrees wrong……. ”


33 ，， New New Guiding Principles of China’s Guiding Principles of China’s

Foreign PolicyForeign Policy 　　　　　　 • A correct judgment of the world situation

Peace and development, not revolution and war, would become the tendency of the time. ( 和平与发展是时代的主题 )

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two-polarized world was replaced by a multi-polarized one, and China could be one of the five “poles”. （世界多极化取代两极化）

However, hegemony still exited and the United States, the only remaining super-power, continued to bully the weak nations. （美国强权欺凌弱国）

China and other developing countries should unite to struggle against the unjust world order, whose rules of the game had been designed by the developed nations. （中国与其他发展中国家应该团结起来）　


• Deng Xiaoping put forward the well-known “Guiding Principle of Twenty-four Characters”:– watch the world with a calm mind （冷静观察） ; – stand firmly （稳住阵脚） ; – confidently deal with the difficulties （沉着应付） ; – keep a low profile （韬光养晦） ; – never act as a leader （永不当头） ; – and do something （有所作为） .


• The Missions of Bush’s Envoys– One of most controversial moves made by President

Bush was sending two officials, the National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, to Beijing to privately meet with Chinese leaders twice in 1989, first in July and then in December.

– The second meeting was made public on December 9, only after Scowcroft and Eagleburge arrived in Beijing. The July visit was not revealed to the public until December 19.


The President‘s Daily Brief ( 总统每日简报， PDB), sometimes incorrectly referred to as the President's Daily Briefing or the President's Daily Bulletin, is a top-secret document produced each morning for the President of the United States.


4, The Disputes on MFN Status and Human Rights4, The Disputes on MFN Status and Human Rights

• Soon after June 4, there were calls for wide-sweeping sanctions. Many in Congress latched on to the removal of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status as the most appropriate instrument to demonstrate American outrage and push the Chinese government to improve its human rights practices.

• Congress voted on China’s MFN (later renamed PNTR [permanent normal trade relations] ) status every year between 1990 and 2001.


• MFN: to link or de-link to human rights?• During the 1992 election campaign, Democratic

presidential candidate Bill Clinton made the promotion of democratization an organizing principle of his foreign policy and said that if elected, he would condition extension of China’s MFN status on progress in human rights, market access, and proliferation.

• In his first two years in office, President Clinton implemented and then abandoned this policy, drawing praise and criticism at both junctures


Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for ChinaBy Bill Clinton May 28, 1993

The core of this policy will be a resolute insistence upon significant progress on human right in China. To implement this policy, I am signing today an Executive order that will have the effect of extending most-favored-nation status for China for 12 months. Whether I extend MFN next year, however, will depend upon whether China makes significant progress in improving its human right record.


The President’s News Conference on May 26, 1994

“Extending MFN will avoid isolating China and instead will permit us to engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with cultural, educational, and other contacts and with a continuing aggressive effort in human rights, an approach that I believe will make it more likely that China will play a responsible role, both at home and abroad.

“I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual extension of MFN trading status for China.”

----------Bill Clinton


5, China’s Bid for the 2000 Olympics5, China’s Bid for the 2000 Olympics

• In 1993, Beijing was one of the finalists competing for the right to host the 2000 summer Olympics (the other cities were Sydney, Manchester, Istanbul, and Berlin).

• The U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution in July urging the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to deny Beijing’s bid when the IOC met to vote in late September.

• Although the congressional resolution was nonbinding and only one of IOC’s 88 members was from the U.S., many in China blamed Washington for Beijing’s loss.


6, The Debate on How to Dealing with a 6, The Debate on How to Dealing with a Stronger China in the U.S.Stronger China in the U.S.

• In the 1990s, American experts and officials started to more seriously consider the ramification of a stronger China for U.S. interests.

• In 1992 and 1993, several sources, among them the IMF, estimated that China had the world’s second or third largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. In addition, China’s economy in 1992 resumed its fast rate of growth, leaving some to project that the size of China’s economy would surpass that of the U.S. early in the first decade of 21st century.

• Coupled with relatively slower growth in the U.S. and a recession in Japan, such estimates were welcomed by the business community, while those who considered the potential security implications were more concerned.


(The) economic growth and changed strategic circumstances have already made China’s increasing power a potential threat to U.S. interests. It is time Americans began to adjust their policies, and more importantly their perspectives, to prepare for the possibility of a China stronger than any they have seen before.

-----------------------------Thomas McNaugher, “A Strong China: Is the United States Ready?” Brookings

Review, Fall 1994. Brookings Institution.


Containment aims to prevent war. But a change in regime to a tolerant, democratic China is the better guarantee of peace. Time to apply the pressure and keep it on.

-----------------------Charles Krauthammer, “Why We Must Contain China,” Time,

Vol.146, No.5, July 31, 1995


• In May 1995, President Clinton decided to grant Taiwan “president” Lee Tenghui a visa so that he could visit his alma mater, Cornell University.

• In response, P.R.C. recalled its ambassador from Washington and in July 1995 conducted military exercises in waters near Taiwan.

In Feb and Mar. 1996, China conducted even larger exercises and test fired missile that flew close to the island. The U.S. first warned the PRC of “grave consequences”, then sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity, further signaling its opposition to the PRC’s actions.

7, Conflict in the Taiwan Strait7, Conflict in the Taiwan Strait


the military targetPLA’s military exercises in waters near Taiwan in 1995 and 1996


8, To be Back on Track8, To be Back on Track

• As a consequence, the Chinese leadership and the Clinton administration intensified efforts to stabilize and broaden the official relationship. The key symbols of these efforts were the summit meetings held between Clinton and Jiang Zemin in Washington in Oct. 1997 and in Beijing in June 1998.

• The two countries issued a joint statement in Washington on October 29, 1997.


Jiang Zemin delivered his speech at Harvard University on Nov.2, 1997.


President Clinton paid a state visit to Beijing in June 1998.

In Shanghai during his visit, Clinton reaffirmed U.S. adherence to the "Three No's" principles on Taiwan (the United States does not support independence for Taiwan, or "one China, one Taiwan," or "two Chinas," or its membership in any international bodies whose members are sovereign states)


In short, treat China with a view toward how you want it to behave. It is in our interest that China becomes rich and interdependent with us all, but only if it plays by the rules and is constrained from using force.

Gerald Segal, “Speak Plainly to the Paper Tiger”, New Statesman, April, 1998.


• April 6-13, 1999: Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji paid an eight-day official visit to the United States at the invitation of US President Bill Clinton.

• May 8th, 1999: the bombing of Chinese embassy by the US-led NATO in the former Yugoslavia.

9, The Crisis Again and Coming of 21st Century9, The Crisis Again and Coming of 21st Century


Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, post bombing. You can see the path the shell took before exploding.


Anti-American protests in Beijing, China (1999) over the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.


Chinese policemen surround the U.S. embassy in Beijing on May 10 to prevent demonstrators from storming the compound, following the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Tens of thousands besieged the U.S. embassy for three days, attacking it with chunks of concrete and glasses.


Suggested Readings:Suggested Readings:

• Sino-US Joint Statement (1997)

• The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (Feb. 21, 2000)


• According to your opinions, what will be the prospect of Sino-US relations?

A) Partnership

B) Adversary

C) Competitive and cooperative

D) Other

Documents

Sino-US Relations (1989-1999): from Cooperation to Friction and Competition