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Short & Long Run Impact of the Financial Crisis on Potential Output. Seminar on Potential Growth & Fiscal Challenges Federal Planning Bureau (Brussels – 27 October 2009). Introductory Remarks. Why is « potential » output so important ? Level of uncertainty needs to be stressed - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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1
Short & Long Run Impact of the Short & Long Run Impact of the Financial Crisis on Potential Financial Crisis on Potential
OutputOutput
Seminar on Potential Growth & Fiscal Challenges
Federal Planning Bureau
(Brussels – 27 October 2009)
.
2
DG ECFIN
Introductory Remarks
Why is « potential » output so important ?
Level of uncertainty needs to be stressed
Presentation tries to answer three basic questions
– I. What does the literature / individual country experiences tell us about past financial crises & their effects on potential output ?
– 2. In terms of quantifying the impact of the present crisis on potential, what can the EU’s agreed Production Function methodology and model simulations tell us about the short, medium & long term effects of the crisis ?
– 3. Given the expectation that the crisis will have negative potential output level, & possibly growth rate, effects -what should be the role of policy in counteracting these effects ?
3
DG ECFIN
1. Short Overview of Literature
Cerra and Saxena – American Economic Review (2008)
Haugh, Ollivaud & Turner – OECD Working Paper (2009)
Furceri & Mourougane (2009) – OECD Working Paper (2009)
Reinhart & Rogoff – American Economic Review (2009 – Forthcoming)
Cecchetti, Kohler & Upper (2009) – (Jackson Hole Symposium)
Question 1 : What does the literature / individual country experiences tell us about past financial crises & their effects
on potential output ?
4
DG ECFIN2. What do individual country experiences tell us about financial crises & growth ?
3 of the 5 « Big » Financial Shocks(Reinhart & Rogoff)
Sweden JapanFinland
Financial Crisis & Potential Output : Three possible cases Case n°1: A "full recovery" scenario
Loss in potential output level entirely recouped after some time Potential output level
Slope = long-term potential growth
No loss in potential output level after some time
Years
Case n°2: Permanent loss in potential output level
No change in potential growth in the long run but permanent shift in potential output level
Same long-term potential growth after the crisis (same slope)
Potential output level
Years
Permanent loss in potential output level
Case n°3: Permanent loss in potential output growth in the long run
Potential output loss in level increases over time compared with the pre-crisis regime
Lower long-term output growth after the crisis (e.g. 1.5%)(lower post-crisis slope)
Potential growth before crisis (e.g. 2%)
Years
Potential output level
Potential output loss increasing overtime
5
DG ECFIN
CapitalStock
Working Age Population
Labour Force
Labour Potential Trend TFP
CHANNELS VIA WHICH POTENTIALOUTPUT WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION
EXTRACTING THESTRUCTURAL COMPONENT
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Labour Supply(Employment * Hours
Worked)
Statistical Trend
MethodHP Filtered
SolowResidual
Potential Employment
Potential Output
Trend Participation
Rate
NAIRU
Trend Hours
Potential Labour Supply
LABOURCHANNELS PRODUCTIVITY CHANNELS
6
DG ECFIN
Finland
-8,00
-6,00
-4,00
-2,00
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
GDP Potential Growth
Annual % Change
-0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Capital Accumulation TFP
% Points Contribution
-2,00
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
16,00
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
NAIRU
% of Labour Force
7
DG ECFINWhat matters for TFP is innovation (ICT Technology Shock) + Restructuring
(EU KLEMS : Structural change in Finland over the 1990's : Industry shares in total value added in 1999/2000 compared with 1989/1990)
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
1989-1990 1999-2000
Manufacturing Private Services Rest of Economy
ICT Producing
Intensive ICT Using
Rest of Manufacturing Intensive ICT Using
ICTProd-ucing
Rest of Private Services
% of Total Value Added
8
DG ECFIN
Case of Finland shows clearly that it is not the amount but the efficiency of investment which counts
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Capital Accumulation TFP
% Points Contribution to Potential Growth
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Software Computing Equipment Communications Equipment
ICT Capital (Software, Computing Equipment &
Communications Equipment)% Share of Total Capital Stock
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Manufacturing (D) Private Services Rest of Economy
ICT Capital in Manufacturing, Private Services & Rest of
Economy Sectors(% Share of Total Capital
Stock)
9
DG ECFIN
Sweden
-3,00
-2,00
-1,00
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
GDP Potential Growth
Annual % Change
-0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Capital Accumulation TFP
% Points Contribution
-0,50
0,50
1,50
2,50
3,50
4,50
5,50
6,50
7,50
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
NAIRU
% of Labour Force
10
DG ECFIN
Japan
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
GDP Potential Growth
% Change
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Capital Accumulation NAIRU TFP
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DG ECFINWhat are the possible lessons from Finland, Sweden & Japan ?
Financial crises have the capacity to result in either temporary (Fin, SW) or more longer lasting declines in potential growth (Japan)
Finland & Sweden : recovery was shaped by the TFP enhancing restructuring & innovation policies pursued by both governments
Japan : highlights the dangers of allowing banking problems to persist & of avoiding essential restructuring
Efficient allocation of capital impaired Weak pattern of tangible & intangible investments
12
DG ECFIN
1. PF Method : Short to Medium Term Effects(Overview of Labour, Capital & TFP contributions to Euro Area Potential
Growth)
Question 2 : How can we quantify the impact of the crisis on potential (PF Method + Model Simulations)
-0,40
0,10
0,60
1,10
1,60
2,10
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Annual % Change
-0,40
-0,20
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Labour
Capital
TFP
% Points Contribution to Euro Area Potential Growth Rate
13
DG ECFIN
PF Method : Results for Belgium
-0,40
0,10
0,60
1,10
1,60
2,10
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Annual % Change
-0,20
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Labour
Capital
TFP
% Points Contribution to Belgian Potential Growth Rate
14
DG ECFINFinancial crisis makes trend TFP estimates
particularly uncertain (CU; Obsolescence; R&D;Sector & level shifts)
Euro Area : Actual + Trend TFP
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Actual TFP Trend TFP
15
DG ECFIN
Short to Medium Term Effects on Euro Area Potential Growth RatesComparison of PF results with IMF / OECD
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
IMF Commission (PF Method) OECD
% Change
16
DG ECFIN
2. Medium to Long Run Model Simulations
Overall Objective : To assess the likelihood & extent of permanent level & growth rate effects from the crisis
Method adopted– Disruptions in financial markets– Shifts in attitudes towards risk– « Risk Premium » shock
17
DG ECFINQUEST III Simulations : Risk Premium Shock(Based on actual Interest Rate Spreads + A realistic monetary policy response setting)
18
DG ECFIN
QUEST III Simulations : Risk Premium Shock
0
50
100
150
200
250
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027
% D
ev
iati
on
fro
m B
as
elin
e L
ev
el
Risk Premium (Optimistic) Risk Premium (Pessimistic)
19
DG ECFIN
QUEST III Simulations : Potential Output & Investment Effects
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027
Potential Output (Optimistic) Potential Output (Pessimistic)
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027Investment (Optimistic) Investment (Pessimistic)
20
DG ECFINPart 2 of Presentation : What conclusions should we draw from quantifying the effects ?
Short Run (2009 / 2010) : Consensus that the crisis will have a large negative impact on potential (PF / OECD / IMF)
Medium run : Since PF method is simply based on an extrapolation of past trends, the slow recovery process highlighted by the OECD & IMF seems more plausible
Medium to Long Run Model Simulation Results
Optimistic scenario (Long run level & growth rate effects are small but both negative)
Pessimistic scenario (Long run effects are substantial)
Balanced “no policy change” view : “Permanent level loss” + strong risk of a small negative effect on potential growth rates
21
DG ECFIN
Question 3 : Is there a case for policy action? (TFP already on a pre-crisis downward trend + Financial
Crisis + Ageing)
22
DG ECFIN
A Large Agenda
Key Issues (EU 2020)
1.Sort out the problems in financial
markets
2. Support essential restructuring & adaptation of
business models(« Rescue » / « Mitigation »
policies ?)
3. Labour market policies
(Focus on easing labour market transitions &
reducing structural
unemployment)
4. Sustaining investments in
physical & intangible capital +
promoting innovation
(Environmental technology shock ?)
5. Avoiding the policy mistakes of past crises
23
DG ECFIN
Overall Conclusions Past Crises : Literature review / country experiences
– Financial Crises lead to prolonged, even permanent reductions in the level of potential output – more uncertainty surrounding potential growth rate effects
– Cases of Finland & Sweden highlight the importance of TFP enhancing restructuring & innovation policies as part of an effective crisis recovery strategy
Quantitative estimates of the long run (no policy change) impact of the present crisis– Significant risk of a permanent loss in potential output levels as a result of the
crisis – Long run potential growth rates are also likely to be negatively effected but
the effect is likely to be small Uncertainty - close monitoring of potential output developments
– Financial market conditions (availability / cost of capital)– Labour market – TFP
Policy response– 5 broad strands of action – « EU 2020)