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Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

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Page 1: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System

Michael AielloHanning GaoMartin GoldbergMichael SosonkinJason Woloz

Page 2: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Agenda Introduction High level requirements Risk Analysis System Architecture Security Architecture Security Policies Security Compliance Matrix and Traceback Security Requirements Security Trade Study

Page 3: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System The aim of the system is to securely collect and

report sensitive metrics. Currently, there are several ad-hoc processes that exist in the environment designed collect metrics of varying sensitivities. The oversight, organization, calculation, grouping and reporting on these metrics is currently accomplished through a tedious manual process. The goal of the collection and reporting system is to standardize, automate and allow privilege management for the different aspects of the collection, calculation and reporting processes.

Page 4: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

High Level Requirements

Repository Handle metric storage and archival Redundant off-site backup depository

Metric-collection Subsystem Automated metric collection Manual metric collection

Collection Job Configuration Specified data point selection Scheduled collection

Page 5: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

High Level Requirements

Statistical Application Task and execution manager Result Viewing Automated monitoring and execution

Reporting Centrally managed administrative interface Multi-level third-party reporting capabilities

Page 6: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Risk Analysis

Assets Firm Reputation – The metrics information, if used, can

damage the company’s reputation. Customer Information – The system can be used to discover

vulnerabilities, if abused then other information stored in company’s information systems is also vulnerable.

Availability of Metric repository Contents of the Metrics Database – The database contains

information about the company’s vulnerabilities and information system setup. The information may be used to cause further damage.

Knowledge of Firm vulnerabilities – This system provides a way of managing this, so if known then the company is exposed.

Availability of Metric collection system

Page 7: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Risk Analysis

Threats1. Insider – People that control the system and use the system

but do not have administrative control over it.a. Motivation: Manipulate metrics to look better to management.

Get money for selling information to others.b. Capabilities:

i. Intellectual: Mediumii. Computing Resources: Limited to what’s in the company the user.iii. Access to system: All system’s user interfaces, many areas of the

database.iv. Budget: Low

c. Probability of Attack: Lowd. Probability of Success: Highe. Risk: Low

Page 8: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Vulnerable and likelihood areas Automated Collection Component

Reception of manipulated information from in house developed systems- Medium

Reception of manipulated vendor feeds - Medium Reception of manipulated emails with fraudulent metrics -

High Vulnerabilities in collecting software – Medium Vulnerabilities on vendor interfaces- Low Denial of Service attacks on collection system – Low

Page 9: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

System Architecture

Page 10: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Security Architecture

Page 11: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Security Policies

1. System Level All communications must be secure between repository

and its associated modules

2. Automated Collection Component Will only connect to authorized information gathering

agents

3. Statistical Packages The statistical providers must not have write access to

the database.

Page 12: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Security Policies

4. Reporting System Should only have read access to the repository

5. Configuration System Only administrator authorized modules can be imported

into the collection system.

6. Metric Repository Metric database information should securely and

redundantly in compliance with the mission critical information storage policy.

Page 13: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Security Requirements

Statistical Package The providers may not be allowed to write to the database.

For any statistical computation, only reading of data is required. A provider must be allowed to have some place where it can write temporary or swap

data. Communication between the provider and the database must be confidential.

Either through an encrypted or a dedicated channel. The calculation must encapsulate the provider so that provider is locked with its

environment. Any function for computation must run in its own environment so that it does not

interfere with the rest of the system Any computation must not be allowed to profile and collect information about the other

parts of the system. Secure Communication – in case there is distribution of processing then there

should be secure communication between parallel processes. Channels of communications between the computing processing must be either

encrypted or dedicated to ensure no information leak. Temporary data security

Data written by the providers for temporary purposes must be in a secure location.

Page 14: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Security Matrix

Security Requirement Process/Hardware Justification

Depository system will be distributed to provide fail over

Database will be setup to run in a cluster environment

To ensure metric data collection is not interrupted or backlogged.

Encrypted communication between repository and subsystems

Use industry standard encryption protocol such as SSL or VPN

To protect metric data’s integrity and confidentiality

The repository network is segmented from rest of corporate network

Use firewall to restrict access to repository network

To protect repository from unauthorized access and also to protect data confidentiality

Communications between the offsite backup system and the primary system should be encrypted

Use VPN to connect onsite and off site depository system

To protect metric data’s integrity and confidentiality

Direct access to the repository will be restricted to system administrators

Enclose depository system in locked down physical area and issue access only to sys admins

To protect repository from unauthorized access and also to protect data confidentiality

Page 15: Sensitive Metric Collection and Reporting System Michael Aiello Hanning Gao Martin Goldberg Michael Sosonkin Jason Woloz

Trade Study

A Security Metrics Collection and Storage system poses to be very useful in large enterprise networks. This is by no means a bleeding-edge concept, for organizations required to perform site-wide security audits. In such cases there is now a federally mandated need to collect, store and correlate security metrics. With a natural progression of business thinking this system will eventually be in a commercial solution. However, after doing a trade study, it was found that currently there is no commercial off the shelf software solution available. This is most likely due to the fact that most organizations use several vendor solutions, each of which have their own proprietary format. Up until now, home-grown solutions have been built to satisfy an organizations particular requirements. Until some kind of standard or vendor solution is developed that reads multiple proprietary formats, this will most likely remain the case.