Sendero Luminoso: Re-Lighting the Path of Peruvian Terrorism - Jeff Randall

8/6/2019 Sendero Luminoso: Re-Lighting the Path of Peruvian Terrorism - Jeff Randall

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/sendero-luminoso-re-lighting-the-path-of-peruvian-terrorism-jeff-randall 1/3

Sendero LuminosoRe-Lighting the Path of Peruvian TerrorismBy Jeff Randall

On May 17, 1980, a small band of rogue warriors calling themselves“Sendero Luminoso” attacked the Peruvian town of Chuschi, in thesouthern province of Ayacucho. Unknown to anyone at the time, thisattack would mark the beginning of one of the most brutal guerillawars in South American history. Founded in the remote department

of Ayacucho by Abimáel Guzmán Reynoso, a philosophy professorat the University of Huamanga, Sendero Luminoso blendedMarxism, Leninism and Maoism into a killing machine that wouldreign for 12 years and create a wake of bodies numbering in thetens of thousands. In 1992, Guzman, also known as “Comrade

Gonzalo,” was arrested and the Sendero Luminoso seemed to dwindle away. For the next 10 years Peru

enjoyed relative safety with the exception being an occasional violent act committed by organized drug

traffickers. However, the last five years has seen authorities once again turning their attention to thoseSpanish words “Sendero Luminoso” (Shining Path) as a resurgence of this terrorist group appears to beforming.

Between August and September of 2007 more than 40 members of Sendero Luminoso (SL) have beencaptured, revealing a new strength and organizational structure that’s worrying law enforcement officials.

In an internal intelligence report released in 2004, Peruvian officials listed a guerilla fighter simply named“Artemio” as the current head of SL. According to more recent reports, Artemio is currently operating inPeru’s central jungle with an insurgency force of 200-300 men known as Proseguir (meaning “to carry on

or continue”). These fighters make their living serving as bodyguards to drug traffickers and smugglers,as well as cultivating their own plots of illicitcoca and processing labs. Intelligence reports

and witnesses also indicate that inSeptember of 2007, a “summit” of SL leaderswas held in Huanuco, Peru, where it isbelieved that at least two high-level leaders,

Comrade Lee and Comrade Maradona,attended this meeting with as many as 25guerilla fighters serving as a security detail.SL groups have also come out of theshadows in Ayacucho (birth place of ShiningPath), committing random acts of terrorism

and violence. It is believed that this “SouthernCompany” of SL has about 80 men, movingin units of 10-20 rebels each in the regionssurrounding Ayacucho.

This leaner version of Shining Path has managed to create havoc and inflict some damage on military

and police forces through hit and run tactics. In December 2006, SL killed 5 police officers and 2 workersof the National Coca Company (the only authorized dealer in coca leaves and rival to illegal cocaplantations). In January ’07, SL ambushed two National Police officers in Churcampa resulting in thedeath of one officer and the serious injury of the other. Later in the year, SL used sniper rifles taken frompreviously attacked police and military personnel to snipe at army bases in Junin and Ayacucho. InNovember, a police station was attacked in Peru’s southern highlands, resulting in one officer death andtwo wounded. Another attack in the same month left four officers dead and two wounded in Huancavelica

when as many as 30 terrorists ambushed a group of 10 police officers by throwing dynamite andgrenades into their vehicles, and then opening fire on the convoy. Peru’s official response to theseattacks is to write them off as revenge attacks due to tougher law enforcement measures taking away

profits from the narco-terrorists. And while this may be true to some extent, the one thing we know for



sure is SL is once again becoming an offensive force and taking the fight to their enemy, instead ofmerely serving in a defensive role, protecting smugglers and traffickers.

The new Shining Path has also changed its political war tactics. In the past they would come into town torob, rape and pillage what they wanted, then murder the whole village if they didn’t join the insurgency.

Nowadays they merge with the local populace making it extremely difficult for police to identify who they

are. Some SL members are nomadic and move from town to town, tasked with identifying future allies aswell as enemies. When SL does come to town for recruiting purposes, they enter peacefully; paying forthe goods and services they take (instead of paying by gunpoint) and quietly leave after distributingpamphlets that encourage the local populace to join the fight against “government corruption.” This tacticseems to be working, especially with locals who are upset about the Peruvian government’s crackdown

on private coca cultivation. For most farmers, coca is nothing more than another agricultural product.Simply put, it’s just a higher paying form of corn, rice or yuca. For years, many families have dependedon the profits of growing and selling coca to illegal processors to make their living. Even with thegovernment introducing and paying for alternative crop production, the coca growers are finding it veryhard to make the change, and in many cases warring with their neighbors and other farmers who haveaccepted the alternative crop plan. Some of the largest protests, roadblocks and violence have resulted

from the war between the cocaleros and the agri-growers. Shining Path has recognized this “resistance”

to government policy and seems to be successfully utilizing it to grow their insurgency.

Ironically, you might say thatthe resurgence of Shining Pathcan be attributed in part to thesuccess of Plan Colombia and

the Andean Initiative. As moresuccesses are gained bymilitary and police in Colombia

against the FARC guerillamovement and more cocafields eradicated, the cocaleros

and terrorists are simplymoving their operations tocountries that are easier tooperate in. Police and military

reports that FARC patrolsconstantly cross over thePutumayo River borderbetween Peru and Colombia towork with Peruvian cocagrowers and narco-terrorists.

While the Peruvian government has made no official statement indicating that FARC and Shining Pathare working in unison, the officers on the ground will tell you that it’s so. Couple this with Interior MinisterLuis Alva revelation that drug gangs and Mexican cartels, including the violent Sinaloa gang, are startingto operate in Peru and you have all the ingredients for a substantial increase in violence, as well as illicitdrug production.

While all of this may sound bad, the Peruvian government has had its share of successes. In October2007 an army patrol killed seven Shining Path guerillas. Earlier in the year in the now infamous drugsmuggling town of Tingo Maria, National Police arrested Jimmy Rodriguez, a top SL leader and closeconfidant of Artemio. In addition to this arrest, Comrade Alex, Comrade Huaman and Comrade Shego,all member of SL’s “death squad” have been captured. Even with these successes, Artemio is still atlarge and still recruiting. And from the latest intel reports it appears that SL’s numbers may be larger thanoriginally estimated – only time will tell.

In an attempt to curb the violence and halt an organized resurgence of SL, the Peruvian government isdispatching more police officers into conflict regions and looking to other countries for increased funding,

technology and training. The government is also ramping up intelligence operations and becoming more



public on the current state of Shining Path. In November 2007 Peruvian President Alan Garcia made acontroversial decision to release the names of some 2,000 people who had been previously imprisonedon terrorism charges, “so everyone knows exactly who their neighbors are." Garcia hopes to preventthese former prisoners from creating new terrorist cells or from being recruited into existing cells byshining a public light on them.

Whether anyone agrees with former President Alberto Fujimori’s tactics, it should be noted that hisadministration did manage to take down the old, and very strong, Shining Path guerilla movement. As ofthis writing, Fujimori is on trial in Peru for murder, corruption and other charges related to his method ofdoling out justice during his administration. Off the record, some police and military still support Fujimoriwith a few calling for the current President to “up the anty” in Fujimori style on the current acts of

terrorism. Another issue that has contributed heavily to Shining Path’s ability to make a comeback is thesheer remoteness of most of Peru. It’s very hard to develop or improve many of these areas and a lot ofpeople feel their government has forgotten about them. Couple this with SL’s new “friendly” approach atwinning the hearts and minds of the locals, and it’s easy to see how SL is re-gaining a foothold.

I guess the best question at this point is why we (Americans) should even be concerned about a small

guerilla insurgency in a far-away Republic named Peru? The answer is this encompasses much more

than the country of Peru. With Peru surrounded by increasingly anti-American and socialist leaningcountries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela who often turn a blind eye to narco-terrorism, and withthe increasing spill-over of narcotics and terrorism from these countries into Peru, the insurgency knownas Shining Path is definitely a group to watch. It is a known fact that SL is beginning to merge with otherterrorist groups and cartels and it’s only a matter of time before the whole region is in jeopardy. A larger,more organized Shining Path could upset the balance of power in surrounding countries, such as

Colombia, and bring about further escalation from other extremist groups in countries such as Bolivia andEcuador. Even the successes we’ve made in Colombia have the potential of being toppled by a large SLinsurgency due to the government not controlling much of its own territory outside of the capital city. So,

in a nutshell, any new organized insurgency in the NW region of South America should be considered athreat to US national security interests.

Fixing this problem is not out ofbounds by any stretch. Having spent aconsiderable amount of time with thePeruvian populace and police of the

coca growing regions of Tingo Maria,Huanuco and other central jungletowns, it’s obvious the National Policeare under-staffed, under-equipped andin many cases under-trained to dealwith a terrorist attack of any size. Even

the special units such as DIRANDRO(the Peruvian DEA equivalent) arehungry for increased funding andtraining to make them more successfulover the long haul. Now may be thetime for United States to invest more

money and resources in Peru,especially with Ecuadorian President

Rafael Correa’s insistence on terminating an agreement that allows the US military to use one of their airforce bases for anti-drug operations in the Andes, and Bolivian President Evo Morales stating he will notcooperate with the USG on any anti-narcotics operations.

Documents

Sendero Luminoso: Re-Lighting the Path of Peruvian Terrorism - Jeff Randall