conflict, then, when it comes, willlikely result in very different end-states. Put simply, terrorists arefew but insurgents, assuming theyhave constructed a viable insurgency, are many. This results in asituation fraught with opportunityfor backsliding and double-dealing

was buffeted by an overt effortby a radical, left-wing group, theCommunist Parly of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN(M) — known simply as“the Maoists” to overthrow theexisting government and remakesociety according to the Party’sunderstanding of the works of Mao

IACSP

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%!!POST- wW1TERRORISMDr. Thomas A. Marks

Comamnist demonstrators shout anri-monanh slo

gans hi Kathrnanth’ May 3, 2004.Today nia,kc one rear of agitation

against the king. Five major political partiesare demanding the ,-eh,stallation a/democracy in

the countn’. REUTERS/Gopal Chitrakar gdflV

ny number 01 works have sought to explore“how terrorism ends.” The challenge, though,is that terrorism comes in two varieties: thatused instrumentally by insurgents, and thatused as an end unto itself by stand-alone terrorists. Insurgents build a new world to challenge the existing world; terrorists build noth

ing save whatever is necessary to make violence againstthe innocent their political Ends-Ways-Means.

H

If insurgency may be compared to an iceberg floatingin the popular sea but always dynamic in its effortto expand, terrorism is acork buoyed by a supportstructure. It floats upon the“sea.” Termination of overt

at both tactical and strategic levels.It is just this that makes the Nepalcase worth examining.

Selling the Scene

For more than a decade, February1996 to November 2006, Nepal

24

Tse-tung. Thereafter, the Maoistswaged a covert struggle to achievethe same end, power.

Though they ostensibly reintegrated into normal politics as a consequence of a ceasefire agreementinApril 2006 and a comprehensivepeace accord that went into effectin November 2006 (With numerousfollow-on agreements also signed).they continued to state that theywere involved in an armed revolutionaiy struggle strategically andwere only proceeding by a different path tactically (i.e., “politicalstruggle”), while maintaining theoption of “returning to the jungle”(by which they meant resumingguerrilla warfare).

This “political struggle,” however,incorporated terrorism, which wasused on a regular and recurringbasis. In fact, it was a debate overjust what form such continuingviolence should take tactically inthe ongoing strategic strugole for“people’s revolution” that causedtile Maoists to split in June 2012into two major parties. The mostradical faction took with it thoseMaoists who remained committedto armed struggle; and they havecontinued in much the same veinas discussed below. Ironically,even as this article went to press,yet a further split occurred in lateNovember-early December 2014,when an ultra-radical faction decided the radicals were not movingaggressively to make good on theirviolent promises.

Period of Overt War

While the Nepali state, in its parliamentary, market economy Lbrm,was identified throughout this1996-2006 overt struggle as theimmediate enemy, the Maoistsregularly claimed that Indian imperialism was the most pressingthreat to the Nepali nation and thatthe United States and capitalismwere the ultimate enemies of mankind. The Maoists were placed onthe State Department’s TerroristExclusion List (TEL), which enumerates terrorist organizations forimmigration purposes, and wereone of the groups designated inExecutive Order 13224, “Rlockingand Prohibiting Transactions WithPersons Who Commit, Threaten to

Commit, or Support Terrorism.”Among the victims of the Maoistswere Nepalis employed in U.S.Embassy security.

Throughout the prosecution oftheir “people’s ‘var,” the Maoistsused a mix of violent and nonviolent actions (e.g.. terrorism mixedwith propaganda); of militaryand political actions; of local andinternational actions: and of directmobilization into their politicalorganization in coordination withmore subtle co-optatinn of civilsociety by front organizations. Political mobilization by democraticgovernment was (and remains)

I tile greatest threat to the violenteffort of insurgents to seize power,because democratic empowermentand its accompanying civil society(particularly social welfare and justice organizations) are the premierchallengers in efforts to mobilizethe populace.

To advance their own control ofareas and population, the NepaliMaoists made their primary tasktile neutralization of all opposingpolitical activity, especially at thelocal level. They did this usingviolence, relying heavily uponattacks which legally and analytically we would label “terrorism.”To fund their effort, the Maoistsrelied upon criminality, primarilyextortion and kidnapping, directedalmost universally at “class” and“political” enemies. Yet for purposes of recruiting, the Maoistssought “conversion testimonials”from those among their foes whocould be compelled to “see thelight” and join “the revolution.”What incensed them was thosewho, approached several times andwarned (invariably, in the end, withviolence), refused to grant the partylegitimacy and obedience.

The strategic vision implementedinitially by the Nepali Maoists (forperhaps five to eight years after1996) was modeled upon that ofShining Path (Sendero Luminoso)in Peru specifically and other Maoist groups (such as those in thePhilippines and India) generally.Thereafter, the Maoists acted ontheir own initiative. It is significantthat the models that shaped theirapproach were among the moreruthless and “bloody” to appear

in the Cold War era and immediate period thereafter, especiallyShining Path. Consequently, theMaoist effort was propelled by theuse of violence to eliminate, first,individual or group resistance ofthose active in local politics andcivil society, second, governmentpresence so that the population inMaoist-controlled areas could beorganized as a rival to the state ina contest for political power.

All those who resisted at the local level were neutralized. police response was ambushed bythe guerrillas, local police stations eliminated, and entire areasstripped of government presence— to include the government buildings in many cases. Ultimately,even regular army units foundthemselves attacked, and isolatedunits ;vere always in danger of being ovenvhelmed. This “strategicoffensive” (i,e., military) phase ofthe war was initiated by the Maoistsin November 2001 with an assaultupon the koyal Nepal Army (RNA,now Nepal Army or NA) cantonment in Dang city.

Government forces were caughtin a conundrum: only disperseddeployment of small units couldgenerate the presence requiredto secure and protect the population, yet such a posture increasedthe dangers of annihilation as theMaoists could mass large units ofmultiple battalion strength (approximately 600 individuals perbattalion). Even district capitalswere at risk. In such circumstances,the level of brutality and bloodshedincreased almost exponentially,because no protection could beafforded to any of the populationsave partially in district capitalsand major cities.

In January 2003, the Maoistsoffered the ceasefire in order toconduct peace negotiations withthe government. Their approachfollowed the most startling evidence up to that point of Maoistpenetration of urban areas: on26 January 2003, a Maoist urbanpartisan group in Kathmandu. thenation’s capital, ambushed andkilled the commanding officer ofNepal’s paramilitary .4n,ed PoliceForce (APF). Inspector GeneralKrishna Mohan Shrestha. At the

could masslarge unitsof multiplebattalionstrength(approximately600 individualsper hattahon).Even districtcapitals wereat risk. In suchcircumstances,the level ofbrutality andbloodshedincreasedalmostexponentially....

..the Maoists

time, APF was play-— ing a leading role in

the effort against theinsurgents. Shresthawas the highest ranking officer to die inthe entire conflici,

and the Maoists used the shock ofhis death as their stepping stone tothe ceasefire.

The negotiations, though, were butcover fbr regroupment, resupply,and repositioning ofcombatants. On27 August 2003, the Maoists endedthe ceaseuire. Simultaneously withtheir proclamation, they attackeda number of government positionsusing forces they had moved duplicitously during the talks. Further,their urban partisans began an accelerating campaign oftargeted killingagainst important counterinsurgentfigures stationed in Kathmandu.Incapable of protecting even a topcounterinsurgency general, it goeswithout saying that in police eyes,even had they been completelymotivated, protecting the generalpopulace became a distant priority.

In the sequence at hand, the accelerating Maoist effort was supportedby the mobilization of a counter-state within the very boundaries ofthe legal Nepali state, Ultiinawly,some 70-80% of the population,located primarily in the rural areasoutside the 75 district capitals andthe several major urban centers,was controlled by the Maoists.This control, in turn, was built uponterrorism, which was used in a ruthless campaign of intimidation andassassination.

Flight oftargeted individuals — especially from rural areas to the urbancenters (with Katltmandu the mostcommon haven) — did not result insafety. Numerous cases testi’ to analmost pathological obsession of theMaoists in following their victimswherever they were in the smallcountry that is Nepal and, if thevictims had fled abroad, in harassingtheir relatives. demanding that thevictims retum (“to face the music”might be the appropriate refèrence).Even officials — as discussed above— were afforded relatively minimal(and often ineffectual) protection.Ordinary’ people simply could notescape ifihey remained in Nepal, aswas quickly realized and exploitedby the Maoists.

While the improvised nature ofbodyguard procedures meant thatsome of Nepal’s key military andpolice counterinsurgency officialswere eliminated in well-plannedand executed assassinations, normal people were truly on their own.As individuals sought safety. theystreamed to the urban centers andabroad. Though not measured officially, large numbers of individualsfled to India. with which Nepal hasan open border. India. though, oftenproved a poor choice for sartctuary,because it had a powerful, growing Maoist insurgency — whichpresently affects 182 districts (ofa national 640 total) in 20 states.

What ensured that the conflictin Nepal would become savagestemmed from the complex humangeography of the country, whereinmore than a hundred ethnic andcaste groups sought to survivein a society which economicallywas one of the poorest on earthand socially was dominated by therealities of the Hindu caste system(i.e., stratification is the norm),Given the resulting inefficiency andcorruption of Nepali polities, theMaoists were able to aggressivelyexploit the issues of community.caste, and class: and thus sought toenflame every group against others.

Children were a particular target,with widespread recruitment andimpressment occurring myriadtimes. A demand for one “member’of each family, normally a youngson or daughter, to enter Maoist service was normal in all areas wherethe Maoists were able to establishdominance, The Maoist movementoverall thus was characterized byolder, radicalized adults leadingyounger manpower mobilized bya variety of local concerns butinspired by a warped constructionof ‘the other” and a promise ofmaterial gain as the ultimate rewardfor their efforts, The Party surfedthe resulting wave of violence anddestruction.

It was this ugly underside, drivenby the zero-sum game which isthe Nepali psyche (a consequenceof scarcity as a way of life), thatcaused the U.S. Embassy to warnregularly of a Khmer Rouge mind-set upon the part of the insurgents— referring to the tragedy whichengulfed Cambodia when radical

Maoists took over there in 1975and ultimately killed an estimatedone-fourth to one-third of the entire population. The reality of theNepali Maoists’ purported “newsociety,” in other words, was anything but utopia.

Making the sitoation worse wasthat the dynamic of the insurgencyunleashed countless free-lanceactors who engaged in criminalactivity even as they pursued theirtasks as Maoists. This introduced ahopeless situation for victims. Onthe one hand, the Maoists were conducting an orchestrated campainnof terror; on the other hand, much ofthe execution was decentralized tolocal organs over whom the centralinsurgent authorities did not eventry to exercise authority. Familymembers were watched, as well asoften threatened and subjected toviolence, as a way to put pressureon the targeted victim.

Throughout the events discussedabove.Nepal’s response ‘vas clumsy and often chaotic. Though themilitary (NA) improved, the frontline of defense was necessarily thepolice. Under peacetime circuit-stances, the quality of the policewas uneven: during the period ofovert conflict, the situation grewmuch worse. The caving in of thepolice force upon itself, as it wassavaged and forced back to thedistrict capitals and urban centers,often eliminated those pockets ofprofessionalism that existed andleft citizens with nowhere to turn.

Further, transitioning the police toa counterinsurgency posture provedproblematic, sincc they had in thepre-war years been mainly a “presence” force with minimal trainingin either Western-style policing orthe direct action associated withSWAT teams. Corruption was a major problem, and intra-force rivalryand disagreements caused promising efforts at enhancing intelligencecapabilities to be still-born. Takentogether, it does not surprise that thepolice were often ineffective andpreoccupied overwhelmingly withsurvival, which again thrust thevictim back on higher own devices.

At the time of the April 2006ceasefire noted above, statisticswere shocking. In addition tonearly 17.000 deaths in the con-

Children werea particulartarget, withwidespreadrecruitmentandimpressmentoccurringmyriad times.A demandfor one“member” ofeach family,normally ayoung son ordaughter, toenter Maoistservice wasnormal in allareas wherethe Maoistswere ableto establishdominance.

26 Journal oiCounteflerrorism & Homeland Security International Vol. 21. No.1

flict, the numbersmaimed, kidnapped,and displaced ran toan order of magnitude higher, in termsof the structure of thestate, one-third of the

3,913 county (VDC) offices hadbeen physically destroyed withinone year after the November 2001attack on the army, which the Maoists saw as initiating their final pushfor victory. A number of the 75district offices had likewise beenattacked. Various efforts at necotiation had come to naught, and evensigned agreements had little effectupon Maoist behavior

indeed, even prior to the declarationof the 2006 ceasefire, a “12-PointAgreement” between the Maoistsand its seven legal (but alienatedfrom the government) party partners committed all “to carry outthe political activities without anyhindrance.” A more comprehensiveand explicit Code of Conduct” followed the next month and committed the signatories “not to make anyhindrance and give any mental andphysical pressure from either sideto the workers of political partiesand members of social organizations or individuals to disseminatetheir opinion, to conduct meetingsand assembles, to conduct the act

of extending organizations throughmovemeni around any part of thecountry.” None of these provisionswere observed.

Period of Coven War(“Peace”)

Despite overt commitment topeaceful politics, the Maoists continued such actions.

The insurgents enteredinto the April 2006ceasefire talks, becausea shift to subversion under the cover of “peace”was the least costly,most logical way tocomplete the neutralization of governmentpower and to push therevolutionary strugglethrough to completion.The state in effect hadsued for peace, and theMaoists adroitly movedto exploit the opening. When a formalcessation of hostilitiescommenced in November 2006, the Nepalesemilitary was confinedto its barracks, supposedly along with theMaoist “army,” whichwas sent to “regroupment camps.”

In reality, a large portion of theMaoist forces in the camps werepoorly trained local militia (andnew recruits). Key combatantsmoved into an alleged “youth organization” — the Young CommunistLeague (YCL) — which expandeddramatically and functioned asthe storm troopers for the Maoistpolitical arm.

This process was repeated throughout the country. The activitiesof YCL, as well as student andother front organizations, allowedthe Maoists to continue theircampaign of terrorism within thevery structure and prolections ofdemocracy, often with the supportof misguided international actors(both state and non-state). In April2007, the Maoists became partof the government in Nepal. ByAugust 2008 they headed it.

Considerable irony was at work.On the one hand, surface developments could be seen as a steadyprocess, whereby a “better tomorrow” appeared to loom comparedto the ugly realities of the day. Onthe other hand, each step towards“peace,” whether a ceasefire or asigned agreement to move towardsconflict resolution, invariably resulted in dashed hopes.

Nothing illustrated this more thanthe years which rolled by following

the formal declaration of “peace” inNovember 2006. To gain power,the Maoists had entered into anarrangement with anti-governmentbut legal political parties, whichultimately placed Maoist representatives in the legislature (still car-fling their weapons) and Maoistsin control of various governmentagencies. Part of the power-sharing agreement stated that elections would be held for a combined“constituent” (i.e., constitutional)assembly and parliament. Twice(in June 2007 and November 2007),they were postponed, both timesdue to Maoist subversion — and aMaoist need (as they perceived thesituation) to continue eliminatinglocal resistance prior to participating in any “open” vote. A finalattempt to hold a vote, April 2008,was successful.

Not surprisingly given their destmcdon of rivals in the 70-80% of thepopuladon they continued to terrorize and thus dominate, the Maoistsemerged as the largest parliamentaryparty. They had less than 40% of theseats (with a lower percentage of theactual popular vote), though, and sowere unable to form a govemmentuntilAugust 2008, when they broughtMarxist-but-non-Maoist politiciansinto a coalition.

Significantly, the Maoist majority,though gained in a “rough” but marginally legal manner in urban centers,was gained in rural areas (where mostof the population lives) by systematically excluding, through mcnace andviolence, rival panics. The processincluded kidnapping, illegal detention,and torture, as well as extensive otherforms of covert violence.

This happened to all rival politicalparty activists who attempted tocrack the physical cordon the Maoists put in place around their captivevote-bank, as well as to various civilsociety actors who challenged (simplyby their social welfare actions) theMaoist monopoly of power. in previously government-held areas, suchas Kathmandu, the Maoists not onlybrutalized opposing political activistsbut continued to seek the completeneutralization ofold foes (to theirwayof thinking).

With their assumption of actualpower in August 2008, and with thearmy still confined to barracks, the

Not surprisingly,given theirdestruction of rivalsin the 70-80% 01the population theycontinued to terrorizeand thus dominate,the Maoists emergedas the largestparliamentary party.

28 Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International Vol. 21, No.1—- aa-. -

Maoists could use the state itselfas the cover fortheircontinued tenor, which was aimed at decimating theopposition to the extent no further resistance wouldbe possible. Far from moderating their behaviorwhen faced with the task of actually ruling, theMaoists continued in much the same vein as theyalways had. Shakti Khor camp, for example, southof Kathmandu and the major Maoist regroupmentcenter, became a nerve center for criminality anddeath squad activity. Best evidence suggests,however, that it was but a “first among equals” insuch a profile.

Central to Maoist activity was the generation,through illegal activity, of resources necessary formaintenance of their political party. Such actionsreached substantial proportions and were alwaysaccompanied by actual or threat of violence. On thesurface, democratic noons were observed — at least10 a point — while beneath the surface, intimidationand altacks were routine. Myriad incidents thatoccurred during this period, Ausrust 2008 to May2009, bearwimess to the extent Maoist depredationsnot only increased dramatically but so did policecomplicity, to include the release of apprehendedSuspects in torture and murder cases after the policehad received orders from Maoist officials.

Only when the Maoists completely overplayedtheir hand did they stumble. In May 2009. asensationat videotape surfaced of Maoist leaderMr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal : Prachanda (“Fierce

One”), then the prime minister, openly boastingto a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathering atShakti Khor camp of his use of the peace processto subvert parliamentary democracy and of hisfuture plans for eliminating all rivals to the Maoist“people’s republic.”

The outrage was such that the highly fragmented opposition, supported by India and anumber of other key external players, mustereda parliamentary majority and became the government. The shield behind which this occurredwas the much-maligned but considerablyimproved military (NA) that used its period ofconfinement to enhance its professionalism,especially doctrine and promotion procedures.Further in the background, was India, actingthrough its CIA’equivalent, RAW (Researchand Analysis Wing).

The result was a Maoist tactical retreat to therole of”opposition party,” which allowed grealeropportunities for continued covert violence andextortion, free from the scrutiny and irksomeoversight that came when they were forcedto operate in the open. Indeed, they promptlyretaliated by using their substantial numbers toblock all normal business and filled the streetswith YCL and rural thugs. bused in to man ictions designed to bring normal governance to ahalt. Anyone attempting to cross their lines setup in demonstrations was met with violence.

Those of the press who energetically pursuedstories on continued Maoist crimes were menacedand at times murdered. Among the most prominent cases was that of Ms. Uma Singh, a correspondent for Republica (a nationally distributedKathmandu daily which appears in both Englishand Nepal). Ms. Singh was murdered by beinghacked to death in March 2009 after her detailedstories exposed the continued Maoist criminaland terroristic activity.

Nepali media, after very pointed warnings fromthe Maoists, largely retreated to self-censorship,which has made gathering comprehensive datadifficult. The human rights organizations fromwhich one might expect such an effort were tainted, early in the struggle, by “activism” which attimes amounted to complicity with the insurgents.Rivals who might have provided a more balancedpicture ‘vere neutralized by terror. Nevertheless.some acts have been so astonishingly brutal thatthey have been impossible to keep under wraps.

The case of Ms. Urna Singh is mentioned inthe preceding paragraph. Shortly thereafter, inDecember 2009, Ms Tika Bisla. journalist forRajdhani daily. was savagely beaten in Dangand left for dead after a column she wrote fora local weekly, Jantidhara, criticized the YCL.Among the weapons used 10 assault her were razor blades. In contrasi, the fatal assault on UmaRhatri was carried out using kukris, the Bowie

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knife-like weaponmade legendary by

— the Gurkhas. Mediafigures in Nepal remain at considerablerisk for reportingperceived as hostile

by the Maoists. Events went frombad to worse. In a dramatic turn.a longstanding political gridlock,in which no party could form amajority government (in Nepal’ssemi-restored parliamentary system), was broken in February 2011,when a secret deal was cut by thelegal Marxist candidate, Mr. ThalaNath Klianal, with the Maoists togive them control of the InteriorMinistry in return for their support.When the deal became known, itwas repudiated by the then-PrimeMinister’s own party, since it is theInterior Ministry that controls internal law and order, most especiallythe police. To place the Maoists incontrol of this ministry thus wouldhave provided the ultimate cloakof legality for their illegal activity.

Nevertheless, on 28 August 2011,a further back-door deal, this timewith political parties from Nepal’slowlands, or tarai, brought theMaoists to power and the Maoist“number two,” Dr. Babaram Rhattarai, to the prime ministership.The practice of Leninist democraticcentralism dictated that Dr. Rhattarai answer to the MaoistPolitburo, which continuedto hold closed door meetingsto plot its next steps. Theimplications for the safety ofnon-Maoist political activistscould hardly be overstated.Making the situation stillmore fraught with peril,throughout these events, theMaoists were locked in an escalating intra-Party strategicdebate with at least one faction, the so-called “radicals,”advocating immediate overtuse of widespread violenceto the extent necessary tooverturn the system. The opposing ‘moderates” in suchdebate (i.e., the Maoist government at that time) claimedthat the Party’s ongoingcourse of action — covertlyusing terror to neutralizeall opposition while openlyparticipating in politicswas the preferred and leastcostly approach. This faction

could point to dramatic progress inadvancing to a position of absolutepower. Placing “party unity” above“party discipline,” the “moderates”allowed the “radicals” to continueto prepare forces for “urban revolt.”

The result was that terrorism continued both as a consequence ofParty policy and as per individualdirection of dissident leadershipfigures (i.e., those who did notagree with Party strategy). In effect,terrorism was accepted as the priceof party unity.

Moving to me PresentThis arrangement-of-conveniencecame apart in mid-2012. First, theturmoil surrounding the ConstituentAssembly (CA), within which theMaoists controlled the largest blockas a consequence of violent votemanipulation (discussed above),was discharged by the president on27 May 2012 after failing to meet itsmandate to produce a new constitution. Dr. Bhattarai announced thathe would continue to lead an interimgovernment and that elections for anew CAll would be held.

“moderate” approach aiid formallysplit in late June 2012 to form theirown party committed to strategicuse of violence — i.e., committed toa position which argues that overtversus covert violent action constitutes the only viable approachto seizing all power and pushingthrough revolutionary reorderingof the state,

Both factions maneuvered vigorously to bring party elements andmanpower to their respective sides,with the radicals in particular seeking to incorporate alienated combatants of the People’s LiberationArmy (PLA) and Young Communist League (YCL). Though violentclashes between the two factionsincreased throughout the latter halfof2012 and earlypan of2Ol3, both‘Mere constrained by their need tomove carefully lest they give opponents in the legal political spectrum, who themselves were quitedivided, grounds to unite.

Such a posture was particularly diflicuk for the radical faction of Mr.Mohan Raidya, because it had topresent a public face which did notexcite alarm even as it led its membership in “appropriate” violentaction, such as land seizures andviolent labor actions (especiallyfavored were the ubiquitous bandas— i.e., general strikes suddenly de

clared by an organization andwhich, in the Nepali context,are always enforced throughmenace and violence). Ultimately, the “radical” designwas to provoke repressionwhich would facilitate anurban uprising.

It was in this context, inorder to buttress the “moderates” — who, to he clear,continued to hold powerregardless of legal provisions— that a U.S. decision wasmade in September 2012 todrop the Maoist TFL designation, in much the mannerthat the Provisional IrishRepublican Army (PIRA)was suspended from the FTOlist when it appeared that itwas willing to work towardsan end to conflict, In Nepal,the U.S. (and the West ingeneral) has a considerablyweaker hand to play than inNorthern Ireland.

In any case, dropping the “moderate” faction from the TEL designation in no way changed the situationof individuals still on the wrongside of the Maoists, because themost radical and violent elementsof “the Maoists” had moved intothe breakaway “radical” factionthat controlled (and controls) someone-third of the former politicalcadre and, best evidence demonstrates. a much greater percentageof the martial manpower(i.e., thosewho were members of the PLAand YCL).

On 14 March 2013, continued resistance to the status quo from civilsociety and non-Maoist politicalparties resulted ina”dear wherebythe four largest parties brokeredan arrangement which placed thecountry’s Supreme Court ChiefJustice, Mr. Kiul Raj Regmi, as interimprime minister and charged himwith holding 19 November 2013elections for a new CAll, electionsthe radical Maoists immediatelydeclared openly they would hoycoftand use violence to thwart.

There followed an astonishingperiod which ultimately saw theentire security forces (to includethe long-sequestered army) deployed, in conjunction with tens ofthousands of volunteers, domesticand foreign, to provide the securitynecessary to hold the elections.This kept casualties and damagerelatively low — 3 dead and 26wounded; 109 vehicles torched!damaged — despite the fact that54 Bombs/fEDs exploded andanother 430 were defused, with 34instances of small arms firing.

As had happened previously, Dahalwas again been caught on tape (inthe final days before votine), thistime urging the members of theinner circle to use whatever meanswere necessary’, legal or illegal, toensure victory. When early returnsindicated the scale of the security-enabled debacle in the making,the “moderates” pulled all election observers, demanded that thevote-counting be stopped, said theywould boycott CA H, and claimedthat a national and international plothad been engineered.

For his part, rival Baidya — whoseattempt to implement a nationwide10-day banda before the voting

t..

vt;I ‘t Initially, only the first of these came

to pass, so Dr. Bhattarai continuedto rule by mandate, The “radicals”saw this chain of events as finalvalidation of the bankruptcy of the

30 Journal of Counlerterrorism & Homeland Security Inlernalional Vol. 21, No.1

Now, “the revolution” — weakened by popular backlashand internal shortcomings, notably unbridled corruption— finds that its most hardened bullyboys have deserted toloin those who claim to he the true torchhearers of radicalsocietal restructuring, the “radicals.” Yet the radicals,too, are unsure how to proceed, since the population hasso firmly demonstrated its rejection of terrorism.

collapsed — sought to take creditfor the Dahal faction’s precipitousdefeat and vowed to continuewith the radical strategy of ruralterrorism and engineering “urbanrevolt.” Baidya’s radicals, in fact,had demonstrated, in Thawangcounty (VDC) of Rolpa, their stillconsiderable ability to use terrorism to thwart democratic process.For decades, Thawang had beena Maoist stronghold and had remained under radical control. Inthe election, not a single local ballotwas cast (of 1,878 registered voters) once the radicals announcedthey would attack any individualswho sought to vote.

In the event, the massive securityand international presence enabledsuccessful ballotirm. The resultswere heartening, as the mixed ‘firstpast the post” and “proportional”seats, selected through 78% turnout, gave the traditional politicalparty powers, the Nepali Congressand Communist Party of Nepal(Unified Marxist-Leninist), 61.7%of the total 601 seats (196 and 175seats, respectively). The ‘moderate” Maoists were distant third withbut 80 seats (only 26 ofwhich wereobtained in direct “first past thepost” competition).

Lift in the U•Turn Lane

In the year that has followed, ithas become clear that Nepal hasreturned to its normal chaoticstate. To be sure, life in a republicrather than a monarchy has broughtsignificant change, with unleashed

social forces demanding a politicalvoice, and a tremendous proportionof the youthffil work force seekingsustenance through employmentabroad. Nearly 50% of the 28 million population is 19 or under in acountry with a GOP of but SI 9.3 bn,Remittances are now the mainstayof’ the economy (28.8% of GOP).

If one sense, it was business asusual, the momentary insurgent victory swept away by Nepali reality,in another a grim legacy remained.A large portion of the Maoist manpower has over the past severaldecades taken its key leaders attheir words, to the extent that themost radical one-third has no’v splitso as not to be bound by what it seesas the “betrayal” of revolutionaryideals by the “moderates.” It ‘lascontinued to use violence pursuantto the radical pronouncements ofits leaders.

“Irony” is again the appropriateterm. Even before the surprisingturnabout just described, the “moderate” Maoists. though claimingto be finally in the process at lastof integrating their “regroupmentcamp” military occupants into theestablished security forces, hadnot actually done so. Neither hadthey completely disbanded YCL(much less various other violentfront organizations, especiallystudent groups) nor clamped downon the violent actions of their localfollowers. Menace, extortion, andterror continued. Despite theirsigned agreements to participatein peaceful politics, they openlyand frequently asserted that they

regarded all political arrangementsas but a transition to their goal ofa “people’s republic.” Violence.therefore, remained the method forpolitical communication.

Now. “the revolution” — weakenedby popular backlash and internalshortcomings, notably unbridledcorruption — finds that its mosthardened bullyboys have desertedto join those who claim to be thetrue torchbearers of radical societalrestructuring, the “radicals.” Yetthe radicals, too, are unsure how toproceed, since the population has sofirmly demonstrated its rejection ofterrorism.

Indeed, unable to deliver a new“people’s war” strategy, the radicalson 1 December 2014 received ahard slap from their most violentone-third, who bolted the rump toform an “ultra” party. Denouncing the radicals as too cautiousand as producing no results inreturning the country to a stateof war as planned at the time ofthe original mid-2012 breakawayfrom the “moderates,” a new Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), orCPN(M), declared itself — expropriating the original acronym of theMaoist mainstream.

Under the leadership of ftrebrand(Mr.) Netra Bikram Chand, a seriesof clandestine meetings was held inthe old Maoist stronghold ofRolpato prepare the way forward. Chandobserved that the form of violencethe ultra-radicals would adoptwould depend upon circumstances,but he called for a “people’s re

taliation” against those who hadbetrayed the cause of people’s war.The “principal enemy” — the targetagainst which direct action shouldbe taken — was stipulated as NepaliCongress (NC), the standard-bearerofNepati parliamenmsy democracyand the largest democratic pan.

Lacking firm guidance, confusedand frustrated, “radical” manpowercontinues to act upon fiery summons to the barricades, carrying outacts of menace and violence in thelarge portions of the country wherepolice presence is minimal andcommunications difficult (much ofthe country can still not be reachedbyroad). These often involve criminal action, especially extortion,and make life dangerous for thoselabelled as enemies of the cause.Hundreds have thus fled abroad.

Nonetheless, Nepal lurches forward, leaving the Maoists behind.The result is a situation that is a farcry from the revolutionary worldthat seemed in the offing whenthe state collapsed in 2006. In theend, the Maoists have discoveredthey have lost the key elementthat briefly gave their instrumental

• terrorism a veneer of rectitude: legitimacy that was able to mobilizedissatisfaction ‘vith the flawed old-

• order behind a message of hope.

About the Author

• Dr Thomas A. Marks is the Journal qf’Counienermrksm & Home/arid Seeurin’ lot ‘l• andIACSP& Southeast AsiaCorrespondent.

•—

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i’IiOTO CREDITS:

I ‘CS I’ D irec er,, f Opc ran,, OSStes-:n I Fa:en,

As-soc talc Pri NI slierPhil Friedman

Senior EditorNancy Perry

CoolriIruling EttlionPeel Da’,;s

Ilattr.as 3 I tearerJosl,L,,t Sinai

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Snout America AdvisorEdwards. Maggio

I loncland Sccttrlty eta ‘or(‘iil David (,;nLu’:::

renona I Sent rit A,I ‘or‘fl:omaa

Enrergency Managerureot At!’ ‘Jr(lark I Slate,,

Direclttr of Enuergency i”Don 1.- R,,i,,lcan

Tactical Att.isora beat Ta abe n

llazmat Ad’ stirDot, jafitat

Securily Driver Att’isorA inliony Rice,. ADS!

Cyt,cns arlare AdvisorDavid (less in;

(cli ‘‘‘tone Forensic.s A Is NorDr Eat,,,,;: i’),:iscr.

‘,\(5’e Atteist,r ItJohn NI. ‘cia FSLiL1 ID

John Daisflomaa I’i ‘re

Cl erie Cealelhaoo. MA, (SW. I PURohen £ Their,,

Southeast Asia C.ura’npondcnlDr T t,,,r.,as A Marks

European CornripondentEtteaheti, Pontei

?tlid,lIe East CorrespondentAll Koknar

Nalionat SaIn Reprc’,entatkcPhil F nndr.att. Ad santa t3:rm tar

Tel: :ot.r4_u5ys.Ita: 2l)2.3I5_Ia5LJat’.

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Page 14 HWolves Amongst The Sheep:

Assessing The Threat To Academic “t’ 1Institutions in the U.S., -EE

by Di: Thomas B. Hunteri_. - .

Vol. 21, No. 1 Spring 2015

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Page 24 T“Post-Conflict” •4,

- •JnLam - --Terrorism In Nepal, —: —-by Di: Thomas A. Marks,...- :

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Page 6 SITREP

Page 8 Cyberdefense Guidelines For Agencies And Departments, kv David Geiiirt

Page 12 Simple (Cyber) Sabotage, by Tha C. Williams, Esq.. GJSSP PAW

Page 14 Wolves Amongst The Sheep: Assessing The Threat To Academic Institutions in theL’.S., by Di: Thomas B. Hunter

Page 20 Assessing The Terrorism Threats Against Indonesia And Its Counter-TerrorismResponse Measures, by Dr Joshua Sinai

Page 24 “Post-Conflict” Terrorism In Nepal. by Dr Thomas A. Markc

Page 32 An IACSP Q&A With John R Lehman, Jr., by Paul Davis

Page 36 Secure Driver: Is Perception And Reaction Time Overlooked’? by Anthony Ricci

Page 38 Urban Shield. by Bob 0 ‘Thien, Jim Weiss. and Mickey Davis

Page 42 A Look Back At The liistoiy Of The U.S. NAVY SEALS, by Paul Davis

Page 48 Book Review: Global Security Consulting: How To Build AThriving InternationalPractice, by Luke Bencie (Review bi’ Di: Joshua Sinai,)

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