Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) Prof. Dr. A.C.
Hemerijck director
Slide 2
Role of the WRR Policy making (Heclo) = puzzling + powering
WRR: puzzling Mandate to advise government Government obliged to
respond
Slide 3
Characteristics of the WRR Scientific/academic
Multidisciplinary Policy oriented Intersectoral Long term
perspective Independent
Slide 4
Scientific/academic + mulitdisciplinary Members of Council are
professors Member of Staff have PhDs They also teach at university
Law, economics, socioligy, political science etc.
Slide 5
Policy oriented + Intersectoral Council for government policy
Good contacts with policy makers Complex societal problems Not
restricted to single sectors or policy silos
Slide 6
Long term perspective 25 years ago: predicting the future 25
years later: formulating future adequate policy directions
Slide 7
Independent We dont have to listen to the prime minister the
prime minister has to listen to us. Special law on WRR Own working
program
Slide 8
WRR = council + staff
Slide 9
Council Legal mandate 1976 Chairman Wim van de Donk Other
members (8) Nominated by the cabinet Working council (3 days a
week)
Slide 10
Staff Academic staff (25-30) Support staff (10) Organisation
under Ministry of General Affairs (Prime Ministers Office) Budget
for external studies
Slide 11
Council AND staff Project teams Staff and Council meetings The
primacy of argument
Slide 12
Various projects Dynamism in Islamitc activism Climate strategy
Welfare state Labour market, flexibility & security National
identity Infrastructure Security Innovation Religion Europe
Slide 13
Recalibrating Work and Welfare in the Wider Europe Anton
Hemerijck (WRR, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Antwerp
University)
Slide 14
Outline 1.European orientations and welfare regimes 2.Goodness
of fit and the imperative of welfare recalibration 3.Welfare
performance at a glance 4.Sequential (self-)transformation and the
politics of recalibration 5.Why we need a new welfare state
6.Conclusions (role of EU)
Slide 15
Paul Pierson (2001) In an atmosphere of austerity a fundamental
rethinking of social policy seems a remote possibility.
Slide 16
1. European orientations and welfare regimes
Slide 17
European orientations Normative: nobody left behind
(significant redistribution) Cognitive: social policy (potentially)
as a productive factor Institutional: democratically endorsed
negotiated reformism (gradual transformative rather than punctuated
change) Mutiple equilibria effective, legitimate and coherent
Slide 18
Four (or five) welfare clusters Scandinavian
(generous/universal/tax) Anglo-Saxon (targeted on need/tax)
Continental (encompassing breadwinner insurance contributions)
Mediterranean (insider protection, no safety net, familialism) New
member states (mixed Beveridgean and Bismarckian catch-up far less
coherence)
Slide 19
2. Goodness of fit and the imperative of welfare
recalibration
Slide 20
Goodness of fit Welfare state institutions (policy legacies,
administration, financing and spending levels) Compatible with:
Structure of (international) economy (technology) Social (family
and demographic) structure and value orientations EU (and
international) political economy
Slide 21
Postwar goodness of fit Sovereign industrial economies based on
exploiting existing (US) technologies Nuclear male breadwinner
family social structure, young population (PAYGO) Limited
international competition (foreign investment highly regulated) EU
limited goals the expansion of heavy industry, the liberalization
of trade, CAP, the deregulation of product markets (much later) All
four original regimes equally viable to the 1980s
Slide 22
Goodness of fit in question Accelerating economic
internationalization and techological change Post-industrial
differentiation (shift to services, feminization labour market,
adverse demography, family destabilization) Relative austerity
(standing commitments/low growth) EU not mandated to push through
socially invasive and politically salient reforms (semi-sovereign
welfare state)
Slide 23
Diverse systems no longer (equally) viable Scandinavian (public
finance/flexibility problem largely resolved) Anglo-Saxon ([child]
poverty/inequality problem improved under New Labour) Continental
(inactivity/employment/pension problems catching up dualization)
Mediterranean (segmentation/perverse familialism with declining
fertility - divergence) More intense social problems in NMS, but
also high growth
Slide 24
The imperative of recalibration Functional evolution of
socio-economic risks Distributive social groups and generations
Normative social justice considerations Institutional roles and
responsibilities (organization of social policy)
Slide 25
3. Welfare performance at a glance
Slide 26
Total social expenditure in % of GDP, 1980-2003
Slide 27
Employment/population ratios, 1980 2006
Slide 28
Female employment and share of womens part-time work, 2006
Slide 29
Employment rates of older workers (55-64), 2006 (1997)
Slide 30
Standardized unemployment rates (2007/1997)
Slide 31
Life course employment rate in Sweden 1995 and 2005
Slide 32
Life course employment rate in Spain 1995 and 2005
Slide 33
Fertility (1970-2003)
Slide 34
Correlation between total fertility rates and female employment
rates in 2003
Slide 35
Correlation between total fertility and female unemployment in
2003
Slide 36
Childcare use and costs (2001)
Slide 37
Public social expenditure and education in per cent of GDP,
2004
Slide 38
Contingent convergence Clear shift away from early exit (supply
reduction) to raising participation (also women, young and elderly)
Convergence towards higher participation better educated younger
cohorts Fiscal cost-containment but no retrenchment Equity and
efficiency (Scandinavian success) Social services and human capital
lagging behind Long incubation periods
Slide 39
4. Sequential (self-)transformation and the politics of
recalibration
Slide 40
Sequential transformative change From Keynesian synthesis to
pragmatic monetarism Cost competitive wage bargaining
(de-indexation) Broaden base taxation Activating social security
Active labour market policy Minimum income protection innovation
Pension restructuring (contribution/benefits in line with increased
life expectancy) toward a cappuccino three-tiered model
Dual-earner-family-friendly services Human capital impulse
Financial hybridization provisions (family services and health
care) Process: from corporatist class-based bargaining towards
(soft) concertative multi-level problem-solving With temporal
joint-decision traps
Slide 41
The politics of recalibration Exposing drawbacks of welfare
status quo (cognitive) Legitimize new policies (effective) and
principles (normative) Framing reform resistance as problematic
Efforts at political consensus-building Phasing in (two-tiered)
reform Rethinking roles and responsibilities Dual importance of
EMU/Single Market and Employment Strategy (closing and opening
reform pathways)
Slide 42
5. Why we need a new welfare state
Slide 43
Ageing societies Social security is strongly redistributive
over the life cycle: the ageing of societies puts tough fiscal
pressures on public spending The debate on ageing has been overly
focussed on pension reforms and savings Of vital concerns is how
social policy interact with fertility, education and labour supply
(the future tax base) Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck,
Myles
Slide 44
The gender dimension Women an important resource/capability
Pool of underutilised labour supply Provider of future labour
supply Complicated relation with social security system Main
providers of child and elderly care
Slide 45
Family policy, female economic activity, child poverty and
fertility Family policy Female labour force participation Child
poverty Fertility ++/-- - - +
Slide 46
Human capital and family policy Knowledge intensive economies
push up skills premiums: youth with poor cognitive skills or
inadequate schooling today will become tomorrows precarious worker.
Sustaining the welfare of a large aged population necessitates
high-productive labour force: strong social inheritance not
affordable. Cognitive inequalities are substantially lower in
Scandinavia and the trend towards declining social inheritance
coincides with expansion of universal day care. Sharing the costs
of raising children to avoid population decline (and meet child
rearing preferences) and its consequences for growth and
intergenerational equity
Slide 47
Ten priorities 1.Mobilizing active popupation 2.Child-centered
investment strategy (fertility) 3.Raising and broadening human
capital base 4.Flexicure labour markets 5.Dual earner family
support coherence 6.Gender equality 7.Later and flexible retirement
(quality work) 8.Migration and integration through employment
participation 9.Strong anti-poverty strategies (minimum income
protection) 10.Fiscal prudence (but no orthodoxy) in the face of
ageing
Slide 48
Normative recalibration Serving citizens to reach their full
potential across life course Connected to dynamic (international)
economy and social change Dynamic equality from freedom from want
(protection/redistribution) to responsibility sensitive freedom to
act (resources/capabilities) Policy redirection to address family
contingencies
Slide 49
6. Conclusions Welfare states as evolutionary systems with
temporary (dis-) equilibria and windows of opportunity for gradual
transformative change Focus on connection and interplay between
challenges and welfare regimes (goodness of fit) More coherence
through a life course perspective Seek positive feedback fertility,
(flexible) labour market participation, human capital formation,
less poverty More tailored combinations of income policy and social
services and governance structures for managing transition to the
post-industrial economy Hard to imagine welfare recalibration
without EU (EMU/EES)
