WASTED HEROSIM: GHADAR PROPAGANDAAND THE HUMAN COST Of REBELLION

S. Siddiqui

Wanted: Brave soldiers to stir up Ghadar in India.Pay: Death.

Prize: Martyrdom.Pension: Liberty.

Field of Battle: India.’

WITH these words Lala Har Dayal launched the Hindustan Gadar onNovemeber 1, 1913 in San Francisco. for the next five years it

became the primary organ of the Pacific Coast Hindustani Association,also known as the Ghadar Party. from 1913 to 1917, Indian nationalistspromulgated rebellion among the South Asian immigrant community inCalifornia, inspiring eight thousand South Asians across the UnitedStates to return to India to fight for freedom from the British. However,by 1918, the movement disintegrated, and their various adversaries athome and in the West captured, imprisoned and executed those “bravesoldiers.”

The Ghadar Movement was almost entirely ineffectual. The eightthousand Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu revolutionaries that returned to Indiamade little impact on the larger Independence movement. It was a futilefight. The Movement was the poorly planned, quixotic fantasy of a fewradical Nationalists who advanced their cause through propaganda,allowing Ghadar soldiers to sacrifice their lives in vain. A small group ofactivists managed to maneuver the uneducated and irresolute Punjabisinto fighting for a country that didn’t welcome their zeal for aggression.Ghadar failed to bring autonomy to India, but more importantly, itendangered the political status of South Asians in the United States.

The Punjabi story is singular among the various immigration experiences in the U.S. Situated in the lush agrarian land of Northern India,the Punjab faced numerous foreign threats from inner-Asian nations

‘Hindustan Gadar, November i, 1913.

70 S. Siddiqui

seeking the riches of India. Consequently, the Punjabi people developeda ruthless defense against foreigners, giving them bragging rights as oneof India’s best armies. They relied heavily on their land not solely to exertpolitical authority, but also as a mean of financial support, and so theadvent of British imperialism became the Punjabis’ greatest loss. TheBritish struggled to overcome the Punjabi insurgency but prevailed in theend, disgracing the long-proud warriors of the North.2 The shame andmortification associated with this defeat tarnished the Punjabi legacy forgenerations to come.

Impressed by Punjabi military expertise, the British drafted Punjabisoldiers into the Royal Army.3 With British domination slowly encroaching on their freedoms, Punjabis had few financial opportunities beyondagrarian pursuits and joining the British military units. Both occupationsprovided for a modest middle-class life as a second-rate citizen in India.However, fighting for the British oppressor and being forced to fightagainst one’s own brothers was demoralizing. Having few opportunitiesfor economic advancement at home, several middle-class Punjabislooked abroad.

The first vanguard of Indians to immigrate to the United States andCanada were ex-British soldiers from the Punjab. About 90% were Sikhs,and the remainder Muslims and Hindus.4 In British India, most Punjabifamilies occupied a fixed status in the middle-class, but stories of thegreat financial opportunities in America, and fewer promising prospectsin Asia and Africa, lured them westward.5 The immigrant group was amixture of Indian British Army veterans and young men seeking financialadvancement abroad.6 Harrold A. Gould argues that migrant Punjabiswere not wallowing in the depths of poverty, but were merely seekingeconomic advancement.7 This argument refutes the conventional, butlimited, explanation that Punjabis left due to droughts and famines inthe early l900s to prevent the impoverishment of the family and village.8However, the most factual conclusion lies in the Punjabi’s deep need forfinancial advancement and unwillingness to join the British Army.

Barbara 0. Metcalfand Thomas R. Metcalf A Concise History ofModern India, 2nd ed.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 90.

Ibid.L. Gonzales, “Asian Indian Immigration Patterns: The Origins of the Silth Com

munity in California,” International Migration Review 20 (1986): 41.Harold A. Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies: The India Lobby in the United

States, 1900—1946 (New Delhi: Sage Publications tndia, 2006), 8z.6 Karen Leonard, “Punjabi Farmers and California’s Mien Land Law,” AgriculturalHistory

59 (ig8): 549.Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 82.Joan M. Jensen, Passage from India: Asian Indian Immigrants in North America (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 25.

Ix PoSr FAcTo

WASTED HER05IM 71

Migration proves to be the last resort for the insolvent and rebelliousPunjabi.9 Therefore, the Punjabi immigrant sought a definite economicadvantage in America which would supplement the family’s income andallow for eventual prosperity at home, while simultaneously escaping theBritish Raj.

Being laborers with a knack for farming, the Punjabis took advantageof the rapid agriculture, mining, and railroad opportunities in Canadaand the Pacific Coast states. By 1910, 2,742 South Asians had settled inCalifornia.’0 They soon earned themselves a reputation as “hardier thanthe Chinese, the Japanese, or even the so-called Caucasian races.”0 Sometried to become skilled laborers but were effectively barred from expanding their scope of employment, due to the labor unions’ discriminationagainst Asians.’2 They were willing to work for the lowest wages, andsaved almost all their money by living with fellow Sikh laborers in themost meager of conditions. They kept some of their earnings for investment in agricultural and mercantile enterprises, thus setting the foundation for what would fund their political ascent.’3 By investing in Amen-

Nikky-Gunindev Kaur Singh, trans., The Name ofMy Beloved: Verses ofthe Sikh Gurus(San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 20.

Gonzales, “Asian Indian Immigration Patterns,” 42.

“Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 79.‘Jensen, Passage from India, 28.

Gonzales, “Asian Indian Immigration Patterns,” 43.

Indian Immigrants at Angel Island, 1910. Photo courtesy ofEchoes offreedom Exhibit, University ofCalifornia Berkeley.

VOLUME XIX 2010

72 S. Siddiqui

can ventures, the Punjabis made a definitive shift from their promise toreturn home to their waiting families.

When leaving India, the son was made to swear that he would behave himself and would eventually return to India and resume hisfamilial duties. However, finding life in America more monetarilyrewarding, several Punjabi men settled down. California decidedly lackedPunjabi-Indian women, so some Punjabi men married Mexicans orwhites, but these exogamous marriages were not the norm as most menchose bachelorhood.14 While inter-marriage provided for an assimilationof sorts, Punjabi men and their multicultural families knew they wereunlike any other society in California and often felt the sting of racism.Due to their stubborn adherence to traditional values, Punjabis werereluctant to adapt to American society. White supremacists promotedthe idea that Punjabis were “somewhat less than human” and incapableof assimilation or civilized society.’5 History witnessed the fact that everyperiod has victims, and the hairy, rather unkempt “Hindus” wereundesirables in a segregated white America.’6 The media popularizedphrases like the Hindu Invasion and the Tide of Turbans. SomeIndians had difficulty finding jobs in urban areas, and claimed to beBlack or Mexican to escape the greater prejudice against South Asians.’8For the most part, Punjabis were impervious to racism and exclusionarysentiment on the social level, but as the twentieth century wore on thepricks of political racism against Asians became more prevalent.

Until 1908, immigration was not a significant issue for SouthAsians.’9 As indicated in the table below, there is a dramatic fluctuationof South Asian immigrants to the U.S. between 1908 and 1909. Before1908, only io% of applicants to enter the U.S. were rejected. Looselyregulated immigration laws, because of the need for labor, soon resultedin a visibly flourishing Punjabi community in California, as the aforementioned Punjabi laborers were willing to work for the lowest wages,creating too much competition for union workers.

4lbid.,47.“Ibid.,44.‘ The term “Hindu” is a misnomer used by Anglos in the twentieth century. Early South

Asian immigrants were actually comprised of Sikhs and Muslims, as well as Hindus. TheSouth Asians were perceived as hairy and unkempt by a dominant white society unused tothis breed of brown person.

‘7Jensen, Passagefrom India,‘8lbid.,4i.“The significant increase in 1910 is thus far unaccounted for.

Ex PosT FACTO

WASmD HEROSIM 73

Asian Indian Immigration to the United States: 1900-1914

Year Number Year Number

1900 9 1908 1,710

1901 20 1909 337

1902 84 1910 1,782

1903 83 1911 517

1904 258 1912 165

1905 145 1913 188

1906 271 1914 172

1907 1,072 1915 82U.S. Census, 1975: 1O7—1O8.

Organizations like the Asiatic Exclusion League (AEL) were indefatigable in their efforts to prevent the further immigrations of Asians.They were mostly concerned with the exclusion ofChinese and Japaneseworkers, but soon turned their attention towards the Punjabi “darkskinned, alien intruders.”2’ According to the AEL, ten thousand Punjabisoccupied the Pacific States in 1910, and they entered the U.S. to “theprejudice of the unemployed white citizen.”22 Actually, there were fewerthan six thousand South Asians living in the U.S. in 1910.23 In a letter tothe U.S. Secretary of Commerce and Labor the AEL wrote: “The AsiaticExclusion League respectfully protests against the wholesale landing ofHindus who are now being admitted ... [theseJ Hindus are no morewanted or needed here.”24 The AEL also wrote to various politiciansurging them to pass austere immigration laws against Asians, but theyalso directly harassed the Asian workers.

Though they claimed to be a peaceful exclusion movement, the AELquite adeptly organized groups of hostile workers to act upon theirresentment towards the Asian laborers.25 Exclusionary sentiment,promulgated by the AEL and other white supremacist groups, contributed to one particularly bloody event in Bellingham, Washington. OnLabor Day’s eve in 1907, at least three hundred rioters beat severalIndians in the town, while the sleepy Bellingham police department

° Source: Data from Gonzales, “Asian Indian Immigration Patterns.”Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 100.

Joseph Cellini, ed., Proceedings oftheAsiatic Exclusion League:19o7—1913 (New York:Ama Press, 1977), 6.

n Gonzales, “Asian Indian Immigration Patterns,” 44.Cellini, Proceedings, 6.

5Jensen, Passage from India, .

VOLUME XIX 2010

74 S. Siddiqui

chose to ignore the attacb.26 Eventually, Bellingham’s mayor stoppedthe atrocities, but white supremacy was a widespread ideal throughoutBellingham’s Caucasian community. The editor of the Bellingham Heraldsaid “the Hindu is not a good citizen . . . it would require centuries toassimilate him.”17 four days after the riots began, Indar Singh, thespokesman of the Bellingham Indian community, announced that allIndians would leave Bellingham by the week’s end.28 The Bellinghamriots began a trend in rural and urban American societies.

ANewProblemfor Uncle Sa]

trt’.1 r,..H ZW7( W X%.ST W4T 2!

:‘—..

i•’.• IdC2

)cc •‘

Racist cartoon targeting South Asiansfrom theSan Francisco Call, August13, 1910.

The Indian community in Marysville, California also dealt with extreme racism in 1908. Local newspapers accused Indians of indecentlyexposing themselves to women and children, and claimed that they were

26 Ibid., 46.Bellingham Herald, quoted in Jensen, Passage from India, 48.Jensen, Passagefrom India, 48.

Ex Posr FAcTo

WASrEDHER0SIM 75

unable to observe the normal laws of decency.29 A vigilante group inMarysville eagerly ran the indians out of town.3° The Indians claimed themob had stolen $2000 from them. When the Indians tried to have thetwo men prosecuted, the judge released the accused with a mild warning.3’ The Sacramento Bee summed up the Marysville incident as follows:“All is quiet today and there will be no more trouble if the Hindus keepaway.”32 Exclusionary fervor reached a crescendo and Indians, themedia’s sacrificial lambs, were barred from both rural and urban communities. Cartoons like the one in the August , 1910 issue of The SanFrancisco Call were a realistic interpretation of popular feelings towardsAsian Indians. By 1910, politicians were whole-heartedly working towardsturning troublesome Indian workers away ftom North American shores.33The Anglo desire for a white West Coast inspired the need for a politicization of South Asian immigrants.

from 1908 onwards, South Asian political organizations tried to advance the immigrant community’s rights of naturalization and socialequality. Groups like the Khalsa Diwan Society and the United IndiaLeague in Vancouver, Canada and the Pacific Coast Hindustani Association in Astoria, Washington all began the path to political and culturalassimilation within the dominant Anglo society.’ Many of these earlyorganizations were founded in gurdwaras, or Sikh temples, and were ledby members of the uneducated labor-class community. Because Punjabiswere effectively barred from meeting in public places, the gurdwarabecame the birthplace of political mobilization.35 As early as 1908, anAnglo counter-insurgency was in the works to quickly but quietly disruptthe political awakening of the Indian community.6 The Alien Land Lawof1913 was an especially devastating setback to the Asian community, asit disallowed aliens, or non-citizens, from owning or leasing land.37Despite a lack of political experience, the Punjabi immigrant populationbanded together to find a gap in the great white wall of exclusion.

9Ibid., 54.° New York Times, January 28, 1908.

3’Jensen, Passagefrom India,“ Sacramento Bee, quoted in Jensen, Passagefrom India,a Jensen, Passage from India, 56.a Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 133.

Ibid.36 Ibid., 135.

Gonzales, “Asian Indian Immigration Patterns,” 44.

VOLUME XIX zoro

76 S. Siddiqui

Punjabis tried to rebut the waves of anti-Asian sentiment throughthe courts, but had little positive impact on immigrants’ rights. Punjabiworkers were social outcasts, and were paid dramatically lower wagesthan the white worker. By 1913, Punjabis trying to migrate from Indiagrew increasingly frustrated with the blockaded North American shores.America was meant to be the land of opportunity and political asylum,and the whole world expected this opportunity to be offered openly tothem. A wealthy Indian entrepreneur, Gurdit Singh, decided to challengethe immigration laws of Canada by sending a load of Punjabis to Vancouver aboard the Komagata Maru. One theory states that the passengers’ motives were not to present a political challenge to Canadianexclusion and authority.8 Yet evidence proves Ghadar songs andspeeches, and politically charged material, were delivered on board, evenat this early stage to incite rebellious fervor among the new immigrantsto Canada, however Singh claimed no part in the revolutionary activky.39Singh and his associates in this plot consulted a leading English firm andwere assured there was no bar to Indian admission into Canada. They

Harish K. Pun, Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Orgonisation and Strategy (Amritsar,india: Guru Nanak Dev University Press, 2003), 76.

39Jensen, Passagefrom India, 137.

Passengers aboard the Komagata Maru, including Gurdit Singh inlight suit with binoculars, 1914. Courtesy ofEchoes ofFreedom Exhibit,

University ofCalfornia Berkeley.

Ex POST FACTo

WASTED HER0sIM 77

were told Singh had met all Canadian immigration provisos as stated inthe 1906 and 1907 Canadian immigration acts.4°

Upon reaching Vancouver, officials told the weary Punjabi passengers that they failed to meet all immigration stipulations. They could notdisembark. for forty-five days, the Komagata Maru lay in wait, thepassengers being cared for by the Punjabi community in Vancouver. InJuly 1914 Canadian authorities forced the Komagata Maru to leave theVancouver port, unsuccessful in its challenge against Canadian exclusion. The Komagata Maru episode clearly displayed Canadian animositytowards the South Asian worker, and elevated the political consciousnessof the migrant Punjabi community in the U.S. and Canada. There was aperceived need for a political platform in the South Asian communitynow and this incident in particular brought the already establishedGhadar Party to the forefront of South Asian politics.

The word ghadar means rebellion, mutiny, and revolt in Punjabi, themain language spoken in Punjab, India. The earliest Ghadar activists toarrive on the scene of Indian politicization were educated, upper-classIndians studying at American universities, In the early twentieth century,America was truly regarded as the land of opportunity, where a youngmind from India could attain knowledge of modern technology, advanced education, and even Western political stratagems. The youngscholar was expected to return home with newfound knowledge andcontribute to the arduous process ofmodernizing India.4’ Several of theyoung students did indeed return to India and joined the Indian NationalCongress. However, those young activists with ulterior motives andradical inclinations, once let loose, managed to wreak havoc during theirshort time in America. These young radicals created the Ghadar Movement, and were keen on using the raw material they found in the Punjabicommunity of California to foment rebellion in India.42 The Ghadaractivists politicized the Punjabi community by establishing the GhadarParty.

40 Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 120.‘ Ibid., 139.

Ibid., 150.

VOLUME XIX• 2010

78 S. Siddiqui

Ghadar Party founder, Lala Har Dayal. Courtesy ofDr. T. S. SibiaUniversity ofCalifornia Davis and the Sikh Pioneers Organization.

One of the infamous founding members of the Ghadar Party wasLala Har Dayal. Considered the high priest of early Ghadar activity, hearrived in San Francisco in 19;;, a self-proclaimed “propagandist,” andwas excited to begin working with the unorganized Indian masses hefound there.43 As a young and energetic Punjabi activist, Dayal was ableto consolidate the various South Asian political movements. He pooledtheir resources, combined their memberships, and focused their ideologyunder one umbrella organization: the Ghadar Party. Unlike the peasantpopulation he worked with, Har Dayal hailed from a well-to-do Delhifamily, and had achieved high levels of Eastern and Western education.Like his contemporaries, Har Dayal was an idealist, a gifted speaker,vastly knowledgeable, and dedicated to freeing India from its colonialstatus by any means possible. He can be considered the father of theGhadar Movement because at a meeting of the Indian Association rn;izHar Dayal first hatched the plan of a violent revolution against Britishimperialism.

Ibid., 151.

Lala’Harddyal

Ex PosT FAcro

WASTED HER0sIM 79

In 1913, Har Dayal and his associates launched the Ghadar Party using the Pacific Coast Hindustani Association as a staging base. At first, itwas an uncomfortable coalition between Punjabi workers and Indianintellectuals who had little in common besides their ethnicity. Theunsteady relationship would last only until 1918, when the Ghadar Party’sdynamics would change significantly. For the time being, Sohan SinghBhakna, a prominent Punjabi farmer, was elected President of the Party,while Dayal became the secretary.45 Placing the “commoner” at theforefront was a bold but brilliant political move on Dayal’s part. WhileBhalcna was more like a puppet in Dayal’s hands, he physically epitomized the Punjabi farming life. Dayal declared that the fight for freedombegins with the pen and printing press; he concentrated on the publica

1bid., 174.

Ibid.

S. Sohnr, Sincj SPix;J elI Ghadoe P,erty

ee r,ee, T SIt tcl Iddpanjab

Sohan Singh Bhakna, first President ofthe Ghadar Party.Courtesy ofDr. T. S. Sibia, University ofCalfornia Davis, and the Sikh

Pioneers Organization.

VOLUME XIX• 2010

8o S. Siddiqui

tion ofthe Party’s official mouthpiece, the Hindustan Gadar, a propagandist newspaper informing the naïve and ignorant Punjabi community oftheir duty to India.6 The first issue of Gadar was printed from an ancientprinting press at the Party’s San Francisco headquarters on November i,1913, and quite clearly explained the movement’s goal: it intended tofollow a violent path to revolution against the British Raj in India.

Dayal can be considered a nomadic revolutionary; he never stayedvery long in one place due to arrests, deportation, or boredom. Early in1914, Dayal was arrested by immigration officials in San Francisco as anundesirable alien, and instead of facing trial he quietly left the countryfor Switzerland.47 The Hindustan Gadar printed Dayal’s reaction as calmand aloof. He brushed off the authorities and stated he would simplyinstigate rebellion in “another country.”8 He left a young Indian namedRam Chandra as the paper’s editor, but Chandra quickly assumed partyleadership.49 A shrewd politician and wily businessman, Chandraencouraged the German bankrolling of the party and united the fissipar

46 Pun, Ghadar Movement, 127.Gites T. Brown, “The Hindu Conspiracy, 1914—1917,” The PofIc Historical Review 17

(1948): 300.

Hindustan Gadar, March 31, 1914.Brown, “The Hindu Conspiracy,” 300.

Gadar Hall at 436 Hitt St. San Francisco, c. 1913. Courtesy ofEchoes offreedom Exhibit, University ofCalifornia Berkeley.

Ex Pos’r FACTO

WASTED HER05IM 8i

ous Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus in the group.5° Under Ram Chandra’stutelage, Ghadar reached its heights in both popularity and infamy.5’

Another notorious founding member, Taraknath Das, laid the foundation in America for a violent political movement. A radical Bengalisent to the U.S. to study, Das enrolled at Norwich University, a militaryacademy in Vermont, where he became well-versed in military trainingtechniques.52 While attending Norwich, he travelled around the EastCoast delivering lectures on his favorite subject: free Hindustan. Hispersistence in printing radical newspapers in India and the U.S. placedhim under political surveillance. The conspicuous attitudes of Ghadaractivists made them popular, but also caught the attention of Britishspies.

° Ibid.Brown, The Hindu Conspiracy,” 305. Chandra led the Ghadar Party until February

1916, when Dr. c. K. Chakravarty arrived on the scene and gradually transferred the Party’sleadership to himself.

‘ Tapan K. Mukherjee, Taraknath Das: Lfe and Letters of a Revolutionary in Exile(Calcutta: Jadavpur University Press, 2003), i8.

Ghadar Party leader and Hindustan Gadar editor, Ram Chandra.Courtesy ofDr. T S. Sibia, University ofCalfornia Davis and the Sikh

Pioneers Organization.

VoLuME XIX• 2010

82 S. Siddiqui

Das, at first quite sincerely tried to help the South Asian communityin California. He established the Indian Independence league in 1906,and through this organization set up a free evening school in Oakland,California. At the Oakland school he taught English, American History,and other subjects that would help the workers improve their chances atattaining American citizenship. He understood naturalization was apriority.53 In 1907, Das founded the Hindustani Association, with thedeclared purpose to defend and fight for Indian rights. He also begandisseminating a radical bi-monthly magazine called free Hindustan.Cadaverous photographs of women and children killed by Britishexploitation printed in free Hindustan successfully persuaded the Indianand leftist American public that India was a country oppressed.54 In thisway, Taraknath Das went from a political non-entity to playing a majorrole in the immigration struggle for South Asians in America. All thewhile, Das maintained a penchant for aggressive politics and publicizedhis ulterior motive: the Indian independence movement. The Gliadaractivist possessed a perverse ingenuity, his brilliance deterred only by anall-consuming need for revolution.

The simplest, but rather inadequate, explanation about the formation and popularity of the Ghadar Movement can be summated in theactivists’ success in brainwashing an entire immigrant community.Another substandard answer is that the Ghadar Movement was bornamong a few uneducated Sikh peasants who were unable to further themovement on their own and needed the activist’s help.55 A more satisfactory argument is that socio-political frustration had spread throughoutthe agrarian Punjabi society, leading to a need for positive politicalaction. The Punjabi community was ready to challenge U.S. immigrationlaws, and this awakened desire for equanimity with the dominant societyprovided “an impetus for broadening the spectrum of political awareness.”6 Political ferment coupled with incidents of anti-Indian violenceand discrimination, such as the Bellingham riots and the demoralizingKomagata Maru confrontation, culminated in a burning, lingeringfrustration towards the Anglo Americans. And thusly, the activists’appeal grew.57

The combination of impassioned, but calculated, speeches, songs,and conniving newsletters convinced the Punjabi public that Ghadar wastheir only viable option. The Hindustan Gadar created a desire for

Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, i86.Mukherjee, Taraknath Dos, 20.Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 151.56 Ibid., 138.Mukherjee, Taraknath Das, 46.

Ex Pos’r FAcTo

WASTED HEROSIM 83

rebellion, as guilt inspired several Punjabis to become freedom fighters.Mother India’s call to “preserve the honor of [your] forefathers, [and to]prove yourselves to be worthy sons,” was difficult for Punjabis to ignore.They felt they had abandoned their motherland during a time ofdesperate need.8 Unaware of independence movements already established inIndia, Punjabis made easy targets of manipulation. The Punjabis weremade to believe that Ghadar was the dominant political party in India,when the reality was that political supremacy still belonged to theBritish.59

A wave of politicization overtook the agrarian population. GobindBehari Lal, a cousin of Har Dayal and fellow Ghadar activist, recalls thepopularity of the movement as a phenomenon. After working for theirAmerican employers all day, Punjabis would “get together in their simplecamps ... and sing and dance about the Revolution.”6° Hero-worshipthrough geet, or songs, is an old and revered tradition in the Punjab.6’Songs describing the heroism of Ghadar soldiers and the glories ofmartyrdom were especially popular. This combination of culturalendearment and politics was irresistible for the Punjabi.62 The GhadarParty ideology had truly infiltrated the minds of Punjabi immigrants.

Another reason for Ghadar’s fame is due to Punjabi aggravation withthe limited life of the Asian worker in America. The inability to gainimmigration or naturalization rights, and strict exclusion in Canada ledSouth Asians to the supposition that Indians would remain second-classhumans while living under the shadow of British imperialism. By 1913,

the Punjabi community was almost unanimously Anglophobic. Theactivists stepped in at the opportune moment to sympathize with theconcerns of the immigrants by presenting a political plan throughpropaganda speeches. Later, in 1913, Ghadar gained vast popularity. TheGhadarites’ Punjabi audience was angry and amenable to both legal andviolent political action.

The activists now held the attention of the South Asian public, butpopularity does not necessarily equal success. Within two weeks of thedeparture of the Komagata Maru, Ghadar troops began their departurefor India.6 The activists fashioned the Ghadar Movement after the 1857

Hindustan Gadar, November i, 1913.

The British Raj did dole out a measure of political influence for the Indian NationalCongress. The Indian led Congress was still in its formative years, and was, theoretically,loyal to the Raj.

6o Gould, Sikhs, Sworn is, Students, and Spies, 217.

Pettigrew, “Songs of the Sikh Resistance Movement,” Asion Music 23 (1991—1992):

86.6 Ibid., 91.63 Mukherjee, Taraknath Dos, 63.

VOLUME XIX 2010

84 S. Siddiqui

Mutiny in India, an early Nationalist attempt at rebellion that ended inthe massacre of Indian soldiers and civilians. The first issue of theHindustan Gadar proclaimed that the 1857 Revolution “created such aunion, determination and enthusiasm that the whole world is astonishedand is praising it.”6 Though the 1857 Mutiny was unsuccessful, theGhadarites attempted to recreate just such a rebellion against the Britishby using the California Punjabis as guinea pigs. With World War I ragingon, the Ghadarites believed that they possessed an advantage against theBritish, who would be too distracted to defend India from a Ghadaronslaught. It was through imagined optimism and a decided underestimation of the British that the Ghadarites built an unstable foundationfor spreading propaganda and persuading a number of uneducatedfarmers to long for martyrdom.

The Ghadar approach was almost childlike in its naïveté. Perhaps theGhadarites’ greatest shortcoming was their unwillingness to cloak themovement in secrecy. Ghadar activists were proud and loud, and spoketo anyone willing to listen. Because they broadcast their plans to Indiansand Americans alike, Ghadarites exposed themselves to far too manyenemies. The Ghadarites’ main strategy consisted oforganizing a mass ofpeople under the Ghadar banner, and shipping them off to India with ahandftil ofweapons to battle the continental power that had dominatedtheir country for centuries.6 The activists exaggerated the success of themovement in India through the organization’s newspaper.

In the first issue of the Hindustan Gadar, Har Dayal blatantly said thegoals of Ghadar were to free India from the British through a violentmutiny. As early as 19%, from the Ghadar headquarters in San FrancisCo at 436 Hill Street, the Gadar achieved a weekly circulation of aroundfive hundred and reached a wide audience throughout the U.S. andCanada.6 The Punjabi community was led to believe that the stage wasset for rebeffion in India, that England was significantly weakened due toWorld War I, and that all Indians were in support ofGhadar. In 1917, ayear of turmoil for Ghadarites, the Gudar reported that “all efforts of theEnglish Government to stop the revolutionary movement have been invain.”6 These false, but sensational, statements stirred up the crowds.Although activists like Das and Dayal were at first attempting to help the

Hindustan Gadar, November i, 1913.

Gould, Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies, 204.66 Hindustan Gadar, November i, 1913.

6Jensen Passage from India, 185.68 L. P. Mathur, Indian Revolutionary Movement in the United States ofAmerica (New

Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 19-10), 52.

Hindustan Gada, January 17,1917. Just five months later, the Hindu-German Conspiracytrial would begin, proving the movement was in deep legal trouble.

Ex PosT FACTO

WASTED HEROSIM 85

situation of South Asians in California, they quickly shifted gears to thepolitics of revolution in the motherland. Of course, the movement was atotal failure.

Tb. kb.nft .re nsnotO tb. 100100.

Just some of the 400 Ghadar soldiers executed, 1915—1916, except GurditSingh. Courtesy ofDr. T. S. Sibia, University ofCal!fornia Davis and

the Sikh Pioneers Organization.

According to the most credible estimation, eight thousand Ghadarvolunteers returned to the motherland between 1913 and 1916, and assoon as they set foot on Indian soil, the Ghadar soldiers were captured,imprisoned, and often executed.7° The 1915 Lahore Conspiracy Trials inPunjab, India are indicative of the virtual collapse of Ghadar in India.Forty-two Ghadar soldiers were sentenced to death and about twohundred were imprisoned in this one case alone.7’ Both the IndianNational Congress and British Imperialists were not eager to let a smallgroup of rebels disrupt the steady flow ofpower. For three years, Ghadarites left the relative comforts they enjoyed abroad and returned to takeIndia back, but they were stuck in a perpetual rut. The Movement

70Arun C. Bose, Indian RevolutionariesAbroad, 1905—1922: In the Background ofinternational Developments (Patna, India: Bharati Bhawan, 1971), 122.

71Mathur, Indian Revolutionary Movement, 121.

VOLUME XIX 2010

86 S. Siddiqui

produced only negative results: numerous deaths and a depressingimpact on the struggling South Asian community in the U.S. By 1916, itwas apparent that Ghadar was a failure. But the activists’ troubles wereonly just beginning.

In 1914, Germany opened a third front in World War I, by declaringits support of the Indians in their anti-Imperialist struggles. Germanspublished and distributed a pamphlet entitled Germany—India ‘s Hope,thus claiming the status as India’s big brother.72 During the War’s earlyyears, Germany realized that India was a crucial piece of the BritishEmpire, and so Germans were only too happy to provide India with themeans to fight England. Not surprisingly, the Ghadar Party welcomedGerman financing due to a shortage of funds.n The only other majorsource of income for the Ghadar Party was member contribution, mostlyfrom farmers eager to help the cause. This collaboration with Germanyinstigated Ghadar’s political downfall.

Ghadarites correctly believed “the German nation. . . [would] assuredly help the movement for the liberty of India.”74 A Berlin-IndiaCommittee was established in 1913 and Franz Bopp, the German consulin San Francisco, attended a Ghadar meeting in December that yearwhere preliminary plans were made to send a troop of armed Indians tofoment rebellion in India.75 A July 1914 issue of the Hindustan Gadaradvised Ghadarites to “establish friendly connection with the Germannewspapers and political leaders, and inform them of the progress ofourown movement.”6 Later in 1914, the Gadar praised Germany as “theleader of Persia, Turkey, India and all the weak and subject nations!”Though Ghadarites readily accepted pecuniary assistance, the connection to Germany would lead to the Party’s eventual ruination.

The alliance of these two seditious groups within the U.S. drew surveillance from British spies and the FBI. At the forefront of surveillancewas the British official W. C. Hopkinson. He, and his team of Indianspies, conducted surveillance on Ghadar leaders and the Punjabi community. Indians in Canada felt that the most efficient way of eliminatingBritish spies was assassination. In August 1914, two of Hopkinson’sinformers were found dead in a Sikh temple. When Hopkinson appearedin court to testify against the alleged murderers, a Sikh man named

7Jensen, Passagefrom India, 194.

There is no consensus among historians at present as to how much assistance wasgiven to the Indian Independence movement, but the Hindu-German Conspiracy Trialsuggests Germans in California were in close contact with Ghadar activists.

Hindustan Gada, July 21, 1914.

Jensen, Passagefrom india, 196.Hindustan Gadar, July 21, 1914.Hindustan Gadar, September i, 1914.

Ex PosT FAcTo

WAsTED HER0sIM 87

Mewa Singh shot and killed Hopldnson.8 However, the assassinationmethod was entirely ineffective as British spies continued to followGhadar activities for the next three years and to spread anti-Asianpropaganda in the U.S. The British also urged the U.S., their ally, toconduct heavy surveillance on the Ghadar Party. The mounting tensionbetween spies and Ghadarites culminated in the Hindu-German Conspiracy trial in San Francisco in 1917.

During a time of war, it is difficult to differentiate between anti-colonialism and “conspiracy.” The Hindu-German Conspiracy trial isconsidered a “wild goose chase” amongst historians, and certainlyweakened Ghadar activism in San Francisco.79 It began in November 1917,

lasted more than six months, and cost $3,000,000. It was one of thelongest and most costly trials America had seen.8° Ghadar involvement inconspiracy plots against England broke the U.S. Neutrality Laws, andGhadar activists were finally brought to trial. U.S. Attorney John W.Preston arrested sixteen Ghadarites and seventy German activists in SanFrancisco in April 1917 on charges ofconspiracy against England and theU.S. Ram Chandra, Taraknath Das, Dr. C. K. Chakravarty, the GhadarParty’s leader at the time, and German consul Franz Bopp were amongthe convicted.8’ They were indicted for inciting South Asians to “mutinyand rebel against the established government and authority of the saidKing” in India.82 Both Germans and Ghadar activists were charged withsending men and arms to India in an attempt to usurp the British Raj.

Despite considerable evidence that proved the defendants guilty, alack of cooperation from the witnesses and the accused made it difficultto establish who should be convicted.8 At long last Chakravarty, his hairslicked back with Vaseline, became the ideal witness, confessing theactivities of the Ghadar Party and its members, much to the chagrin ofGerman consul Bopp.8 Dozens of indictments followed and almost all ofthe defendants were found guilty and given lengthy prison sentences, orin some cases deportation. Nevertheless, prison and deportation sentences from Ghadar conspiracy cases in India tended to be more severe

Jensen, Passagefrom India, 191.

79Brown, The Hindu Conspiracy,” 310.8 Karl Hoover, ‘The Hindu Conspiracy in California, 1913—1918,” German Studies Review 8

(1985): 246.8, United States vs. Franz Bopp, Ram Chandra, et at. 6133 F. (NARA—Pacific Region—San

Francisco, no. Cal. 1917), box8 Franz Bapp, 6133 F., box8Brown, ‘The Hindu Conspiracy,” 308. See also Joan M. Jensen, ‘The ‘Hindu Conspiracy:’

A Reassessment,” The Pacfic Historical Review 48 (1979).

8Hoover, “The Hindu Conspiracy in California,” 257. Chakravarty’s confession was mostlikely a self-preservation tactic. He was still found guilty, but served the light sentence ofjust thirty days in prison and a $5,000 fine.

VOLUME XIX 2010

8$ S. Siddiqui

than those in San Francisco.8 The Hindu-German Trial effectivelynipped the growing weed of anti-British sentiment in California.

The trial created divisiveness within the Party and changed the dynamics of the group forever. The group’s leader, Chakravarty, had coldlybetrayed the entire community in his court confessions. During the trial,Ram Chandra was shot dead by Ram Singh, a fellow Ghadarite, as he wasabout to testify against those involved in the Ghadar Party.86 SeveralGhadar veterans arrested in India readily gave their testimony againsttheir Ghadar leaders in the San Francisco courts.8 The trial demoralizedthe Indian community as they realized they mistakenly trusted theMovement’s leaders. It became increasingly difficult to ascertain whowas trustworthy within the community. After the Conspiracy Trial,Ghadar was, in essence, disbanded as most ofthe leaders were in jail. Thenumber of Ghadar soldiers sent overseas after 1917 steadily decreased.After the trials Ghadar transformed into a quiet and subdued underground operation.

The year 1917 had a profound impact on the history of South Asiansin America, as evidenced in the Hindu-German Conspiracy trials. Duringthe Trials, The New York Times and The San Francisco Chronicle sensationalized the story and to some extent vilified the Indians as Germanpuppets and anti-American plotters. The Chronicle portrayed the SouthAsians as a dirty, disorganized, and unruly group, who constantlyattempted to thwart the trial and caused riots in the courtroom.88 Whilethis is partially true, the Chronicle took advantage of the riveted American public, and shamelessly promoted anti-Asian sentiment in its newsreporting. America’s public and legal disapproval ofthe Indian Nationalists’ movement labeled it less a land of liberty, as a war-induced paranoiaencouraged the social and political exclusion of aliens.

In effect, the significantly decreased traffic ofSouth Asian immigration to the U.S. through the Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924 can betraced back to Ghadar. The first major legal stricture specifically againstSouth Asians was established in early 1917, while Ghadar was at itsheights of political influence. The Immigration Act of i9i7 implementedan English literacy test, and an Asian barred zone.8 The Act filtered outundesirable, low class immigrants, specifically immigrants from SouthAsia, believing the uneducated laborer made a negative impact on the

S. N. Aggarwal, The Heroes ofCeflularJail (Patiala, India: Publication Bureau PunjabiUniversity, 1995), 137—139.

86jensen Passagefrom India, 224.

Franz Bopp, 6133 F., box88 San Francisco Chronicle, December 13, 1917.89 The Asian barred zone consisted mostly of the South Asian states India and Burma.

Ex PosT FAcTo

WASTED HER0sIM 89

American economy and social structure. Those who supported the Actbelieved an illiterate person to be “either very stupid or has grown upunder poor social and political conditions, with a low standard of living,and is less desirable than the literate man.”9° This bill was heavilydebated for ten years before it passed, as Presidents Taft and Wilsonvetoed the Act four times. President Wilson declared that the bill “seeksto all but close entirely the gates of asylum which have always been opento ... [those] whom the opportunities of elementary education havebeen denied, without regard to their character, their purposes, or theirnatural capacity.”9’ Due to the alarming majority in favor of the bill, theImmigration Act was passed on February;, 1917. The anti-South Asiancontent of the Act, and fact that the Act was passed during the Conspiracy Trial and at a time of intense Ghadar activity is evidence that the billtargeted South Asians in particular, and made American citizenship animpossibility for them.

The impact of Ghadar is a point of contention amongst students ofthe South Asian diaspora in the U.S. The notion that the Ghadar Party’sactions were preliminary steps to Gandhi’s Independence movement isparticularly erroneous, because Gandhi’s movement was the opposite ofGhadar, and Gandhi was already building his own movement, separatefrom Ghadar, by ;9;792 There has also been some serious suggestion thatGhadar enabled the rise of nationalism and politically awakened thePunjabi community in California.93 This theory does not account for themany deaths or the invalidated socio-political presence of the SouthAsian population in America.94 After Ghadar, the Punjabi immigrants inCalifornia felt more defeated than before the activists “helped out.”Racist sentiment left them on the outskirts of Canadian and Americansocieties. Ghadar veterans, and even those immigrants uninvolved withGhadar activities, were blacklisted as German spies, communists, andradical Anglophobes.95 Aside from social issues, the remaining immigrantpopulation was also left to struggle within the political strictures placedon them. Some groups, born out of the subdued Ghadar movement,attempted to work towards political equality for South Asians in California throughout the ;92os and 19305, but they made no significant impact.Instead of having an easier time achieving citizenship, Indians were not

90Congressional Record, Appendix and Index to Parts 1-5 of the 2nd session of the 64thCongress of the United States ofAmerica, Volume LIV (February i, 1917), 290.

‘ Ibid., 345. January 29, 1917.

Purl, Ghadar Movement, 178. See also Bose, Indian Revolutionaries Abroad.Jensen, Passagefrom India, 213.

It is difficult to surmise the actual number of Ghadar soldiers dead, as these recordsare in India.

Jensen, Passagefrom India, 271.

VOLUME XIX 2o;o

90 S. Siddiqui

granted naturalization and an immigration quota until 1946.96 Ghadarwas a bloody stain on the early history of the South Asian diaspora in theU.S. and left a detrimental impact on the Punjabi community, as theywere left to live with the mess created by Ghadar’s radical fervor.

Though Ghadar was an appalling failure, the movement and its leaders introduced a new approach towards the exclusion issue. In the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino,and other Asians were troubled by American exclusion. These groups allpresented various attempts at battling exclusion and political racismwithin the U.S. But Ghadar’s significance lies in its unique strategy: aviolent rebellion overseas that was, indirectly, meant to liberate Indiansthroughout the world, by raising their status as natives of a free country,not a British colony. No other ethnic group in this period employedviolent rebellion against the wall of exclusion. Despite Ghadar’s manyflaws, it was an inimitable stratagem for acquiring immigration andnaturalization rights.

The immigration and assimilation patterns of South Asians in California could have been drastically different without the interference ofGhadarites. Before the involvement ofGhadar activists in California, thePunjabi farmers were quietly going about their business, living a hardworking life to help their families at home. The early Punjabi farmersalso organized themselves to combat the initial tides ofpolitical racism.The interference of Ghadar activism impressed a negative stereotype thatsurpassed the kinds of social and political discrimination Punjabis werefacing in the ;92os. Anti-Asian immigration laws slowed the migration ofSouth Asians to America to a trickle, as opposed to the steady flow ofimmigration earlier that century. Ghadar created a rebellion that was anunparalleled disaster in India and left a gaping hole in the history of theSouth Asian diaspora.

The idea that violent rebellion can bring about political autonomy isnot a novel one, nor is it always entirely ineffectual. Violent, anti-colonialist rebellions are prevalent in the twentieth century, and sometimes succeed in toppling the imperial power and replacing it with ashaky regime. It isa universally established truth that Ghadar failed, butwith a more intelligent organizational structure and plan of attack,Ghadar activists and soldiers may actually have succeeded in deposingthe British Raj. Nevertheless, the Ghadar movement was a distinctive

Jensen, Passagefrom India, 279. President Roosevelt, in collaboration with the National Committee for India’s Freedom, was an advocate ofgranting Indians naturalization, andsped up the processing of the bill in the House and Senate. Roosevelt, quoted in Jensen,said the statutory discrimination of Indians ‘now serves no usehit purposes, and lisiincongruous and inconsistent with the dignity of both our peoples.”

Ex PosT FACTO

WASTED HER0sIM 91

event, unseen in any other immigrant group of early twentieth centuryCalifornia. Despite the party’s severe defects, Ghadar created a significant, if unconstructive, early political history for South Asians in California. Eight thousand men answered Har Dayal’s call for brave soldiers, buttheir battle was lost and their heroism wasted.

Miss Siddiqui wrote this piecefor an undergraduate seminar class. She isa confusedfirst-year graduate student turned social activist, but tells herprofessors that she is working on intellectual Islamic History andMuslims in colonial South Asia.

VOLUME XIX. 2010