Russian Consuls and the Greek Revolution (1821-31)

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Russian consuls and the Greek war ofindependence (182131)Lucien J. Frary

a

aDepartment of History , Rider University , Lawrenceville , New

Jersey

To cite this article:Lucien J. Frary (2013): Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence(182131), Mediterranean Historical Review, 28:1, 46-65

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Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (182131)

Lucien J. Frary*

Rider University, Department of History, Lawrenceville, New Jersey

Russian consular dispatches contain vivid descriptions of life in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Balkans. Besides war and diplomacy, Russian archivalmaterials provide historians with insight on nationalism, religion, and society.The long-lasting struggle for Greek independence (1821 31) createdunprecedented challenges for Russian officials in Ottoman domains. Tsaristenvoys played a mediating role in issues over territories, prisoners of war,religious conversions, and refugee relief. In the context of RussianOttomannineteenth-century relations, this article shows that Russian agents worked to

protect the rights of Orthodox Christians and promote commercial, cultural, andpolitical connections. It reveals the sometimes contradictory nature of tsaristpolicy, based on legitimism and reactionary conservatism, yet supportive ofmovements for independence among Orthodox Christians.

Keywords: Eastern Question; Greece; Ottoman Empire; Russia; Balkans

Manuscripts and archives from Russian consulates in the Ottoman Balkans broaden our

perspective on the history of the Eastern Question (the dilemmaof what to do with the resilient

Ottoman Empire) in the first half of the nineteenth century. Largely untapped sources from

consular posts such as Thessaloniki (Angelo Mustoxidi), the Aegean archipelago (Ioannis

Vlassopoulos), northern Greece (Ioannis Paparrigopoulos), and Patras (Ioannis Kallogerakis)

present abundant firsthand testimony on the Greek revolt, the problems inherent in Ottomansociety, and the rivalries among European powers in the Near East.1 The testimonies of

Russian consuls providerichsnapshots of theturmoil of the times.Communications, registers,

personal letters, pamphlets, newspaper clippings, and other official and private documents (in

a variety of languages) provide multi-faceted reflections on a diverse range of ethnic and

religious issues, adding depth to what is often portrayed as a military and diplomatic affair. By

relating anecdotes, travel impressions and personal encounters, the copious correspondence

of Russian consuls casts fitful beams of light upon conditions within the Ottoman Empire, and

provides historians with a treasure-trove for the study of the Eastern Question.

Russian diplomatic activity in the Balkans and Near East was first established during

the reign of Peter the Great (16961725). By the early decades of the nineteenth century,Saint Petersburg had created many contacts in the main commercial and political centres

of the Ottoman Empire. The responsibilities of Russian consular agents were wide-

ranging. Daily duties included the inspection of passports and regulation of commerce, the

maintenance of naval registers, and the collection of data on military affairs. Less

frequently, consuls were expected to intervene when Orthodox Christians, Russian

proteges, and merchants were treated unfairly. Consular files contain unique records on

judicial procedures and social practices in cases involving Muslims and Christians.

Perhaps the most vexing (but also advantageous) consular task concerned the

functioning of the capitulation and berats (deeds of protection) systems. The notorious

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

*Email: [email protected]

Mediterranean Historical Review, 2013

Vol. 28, No. 1, 4665, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518967.2013.782671


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capitulation system granted European powers special commercial, judicial, and political

privileges.2 The right to hire talented Ottoman subjects as proteges (holders of berats)

enhanced Russian contacts with the local elite and provided information from remote

locations.

By the nineteenth century, the employment of Greeks at consular posts in the Balkans

and eastern Mediterranean had become a special Russian tradition.3 Talented individuals

were invited to Saint Petersburg, where they received an education and government salary

before returning to Levantine posts as accredited Russian officials. Greek Russian agents

witnessed dramatic events, interacted with eminent personalities, and left vibrant

communiques reporting their encounters. Their writings illuminate the hopes and dreams,

hazards and hardships of transitional regions along the Ottoman periphery. They exhibit

the nuanced sympathies of the native, and offer intimate insights into lifestyles and

practices that often escaped the purview of Western envoys.4 Russian subjects of Greek

ancestry constructed a proud sense of identity based on allegiance to the tsar, their Greek

homeland, and the greater Orthodox world. Promoting Russian interests and ambitions

proved satisfying to these Greeks, who spoke in the name of the tsar.As prominent representatives of Orthodox Christianity, Russian consuls detailed the

confused religious realities that constituted the core of the Greek-Ottoman confrontation.

The religious connection between Russia and the Orthodox people of the Balkans served

as a strong binding element. Russias Orthodox sentiments were extremely important in a

society where religion had traditionally defined divisions in the state and dictated the

culture of each division. Common Orthodoxy meant common culture, and Saint

Petersburgs practice of employing Greeks reinforced the image of Russia as the ultimate

liberator and the great benefactor.5

Deep-seated sympathy for Orthodoxy meant that the extensive coverage of the

sectarian violence by Russian envoys tended to portray the Greeks in a positive light.Witnesses of numerous attacks by the non-Orthodox, the Russian agents could be very

hostile to Turks and Albanians. Yet they were not biased against all Muslims; they even

showed sympathy to Muslim leaders. Consular narratives are also excellent sources on

Russian Orientalism, a subject of recent interest among historians.6

This article focuses on Russia and the last phase of the Greek revolution based on

hitherto neglected Russian consular documents.7 It demonstrates that Russia aimed to

maintain commerce and friendship with the Ottoman Empire, safeguard the rights of

Orthodox Christians, and develop contacts in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.

Whereas the Russian Foreign Ministry professed an attitude of neutrality towards the

Greek revolt, on many occasions Saint Petersburg was willing to intervene. An

examination of Russian entanglements in near-eastern affairs illuminates the dual

character of tsarist policy, which aimed to secure a special position among the Orthodox

Christians, while categorically condemning revolutionary disorders and nationalist

insurrections against legitimate sovereigns.

The Greek revolution broke out in a variety of different places in February as well as

March 1821. In February, along the Danube, the dashing Russian general Alexander

Ypsilantis and a small force of volunteers marched into Moldavia and proclaimed

independence from Ottoman rule. In March, the raising of a Greek flag and the swearing-in

of armed men took place in important towns and villages throughout the Peloponnese.

In April, according to the traditional account, Archbishop Germanos called for

insurrection in Patras and other leaders soon assembled. The numerous movements werenot coordinated, and the offensive launched by Ypsilantis was soon crushed. In the

Peloponnesus and the mainland, however, concerted attacks by Turks on Greeks or by

Mediterranean Historical Review 47


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Greeks on Turks lasted for the next decade. There were many victories and defeats of the

revolutionaries at sea as well. The Greeks, disorganized and prone to infighting, often

came near to complete defeat.

The intervention of the European great powers proved crucial in resolving the Ottoman-

Greek encounter. The decisive moment came at the Battle of Navarino in October 1827,

when a coalition of European warships annihilated the Ottoman fleet and stranded

thousands of the sultans troops in hostile territory.8 The period from Navarino to the

assassination of President Ioannis Kapodistrias in 1831 underscores the violence that

characterized the GreekOttoman clash and illuminates the process of transition from

empire to nation state. Among the studies of this period, the emphasis is on British and Greek

sources, although Russian consuls reported directly and regularly about a wide range of

issues.9 Subjects of concern included piracy, banditry, boundary disputes, and instances of

sectarian violence. The storming of fortresses, mountain ambushes, naval barrages, and

hand-to-hand skirmishes is vividly described. The Russian envoys possessed high

responsibilities, and their interventions affected the lives of thousands.

Ypsilantiss ill-fated revolt in the Danubian principalities created one of the mostintense diplomatic exchanges in the history of the Eastern Question. After months of

negotiations in 1821, the Ottoman Divan refused to accept a Russian ultimatum regarding

the treatment of Orthodox Christians. Reprisals against rebel fugitives and the prolonged

occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia by Ottoman troops led to the departure of the

Russian envoy to the Sublime Porte, Grigorii Stroganov, an act formalizing the break in

Russian Ottoman relations.10 In the following years, Matvei Minchaki (Minciaky) served

as the chargedaffaires of the Russian embassy. In 1825, the Foreign Ministry sent Alexandr

Riboper (Ribeaupierre) as the primary plenipotentiary (he became ambassador in 1826) to

the Sublime Porte. Riboper and Minchaki wrote copious memoranda on the Greek

revolution based on intelligence from agents throughout the Aegean, the Morea, and theIonian Islands.11 In 1828, the London Conference sanctioned Greek independence, and

Saint Petersburg revived consular stations in Ottoman lands and sent a variety of missions to

Greece.

Eyewitness reports from the bustling city port of Thessaloniki provide vivid snapshots

of the embattled lands of the Ottoman East during the final years of the Greek revolution.12

Political independence and confessional status became fluid in this area of unrest.

Thessaloniki files present first-hand evidence of the flexible communal identities,

ambiguous confessional ties, and shifting political loyalties characteristic of borderland

communities in transition.

An educated polyglot native of the Ionian Islands, Angelo Mustoxidi enjoyed a fruitful

career as a Russian envoy in the Ottoman Empire for more than 40 years.13 While serving as

the Russian vice consul at the Dardanelles during the diplomatic showdown in the summer

of 1821, Mustoxidi and his family departed in perilous circumstances. During the following

years, he visited Trieste, Venice, Naples, and Malta as the attacheto the Russian mission in

Turin.14 In September 1827, he resumed his functions as the vice consul at the Dardanelles.

When the Russian-Ottoman War (1828 29) began, Mustoxidi joined the Russian flotilla in

the Mediterranean under the command of Vice-Admiral Login Heyden.15

The Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) that ended the war confirmed Russian privileges in

the Danubian principalities and opened the Dardanelles to commercial vessels.16 The

peace settlement facilitated trade and created opportunities for determined individuals

with knowledge of languages and commerce. Mustodixis experience qualified him wellfor a busy trading hub like Thessaloniki. He arrived in August 1830 aboard the Russian

brig Telemakh, with instructions to supervise various matters in RussianOttoman and

L.J. Frary48


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Ottoman Greek relations. His tasks included overseeing Russian commerce with the

Ottoman Empire, safeguarding the rights of Orthodox and Muslim refugees, and

adjudicating in disputes that might cause violence between Ottoman Turkey and the Greek

state. Mustoxidis gift for languages and his native familiarity enabled him to establish

contacts with informants throughout Rumelia (the southern Ottoman region of the

Balkans) and develop close relations with the Turkish elite.

The Russian vice consuls first forays into the messy realities of the Ottoman East

brought unforeseen challenges. A specific duty concerned the whereabouts of soldiers

missing from the recent RussianOttoman war. Late in 1830, he learned through his

informers that the Turkish authorities were holding four Russian soldiers, including two

officers, as prisoners in Trikala, a Thessalian town about 100 miles south-east of thesancak

(sub-province) capital of Ioannina in central Epirus. Mustoxidi ordered his dragoman

(interpreter) Sergei Bogdanov to travel to Ioannina and meet with the Turkish Pasha

Mehmed Resid.17 After a physically demanding journey through brigand-infested, war-torn

terrain, Bogdanov was to obtain buyurldi(invitations) from the pasha, make reclamations

for Russian merchants, arrange for the deliverance of Christian slaves, and find a suitableagent among the local elite. In a letter to Nikita Panin, the Russian plenipotentiary in Aegina,

Mustoxidi indicated that he had informed the grand vizier of the mission.18

In December 1830, a few hours outside Thessaloniki, Bogdanov witnessed dozens of

human heads on pikes along the roadside. His first dispatch describes a theatre of war and

horrors replete with tortured and imprisoned Christians (reaya), villages reduced to

cinders, and the complete absence of commerce and agricultural activity due to the

massacres committed by Ottoman troops.19 Bogdanov (a graduate of the School of

Oriental Languages in Saint Petersburg and competent in Turkish, French, and Italian) was

relieved that his travelling companion (a Greek named Georgios) had found them shelter

in Katerini, a town in central Macedonia.

20

Reaching Ioannina in early January, Bogdanov held a short meeting with the pashas

representative, who gave him letters guaranteeing safe travel and the right to obtain the

release of the four prisoners. Days later in Trikala, Bogdanov learned that six Russian

soldiers had at one time resided in the town. One of them had died months ago, threehad fled,

and the other two had become members of the community and enjoyed life in Trikala. These

six men were not war captives but in fact deserters from the Russian army, and none was an

officer. According to Bogdanov, these bad subjects (named Pavel, Andrei, Grigorii, Ivan,

Garasim Grigoriev, and Iakov Nikolaev) had embraced Islam. The two who remained in

Trikala (Garasim and Iakov) now insist on being called Hussein and Mustafa. They had

married local women and had no desire to return to Russia. Bogdanov wrote:

In vain I employed all methods of persuasion to convince them to abandon this foreign soil. Invain I tried to reassure them than they had nothing to fear from their Turkish governors. Yet allmy efforts failed before a firm conviction that they would not repent as Muslims.21

The Ottoman authorities were willing to enforce the Russian request and secure the safe

passage of the supposed captives. In the end, however, the perplexed dragoman decided

not to force the matter, and left the men to their fate.

The acceptance of Islam by Hussein and Mustafa reflects the fluctuating situation on

the margins of the Ottoman Empire during the turbulent 1820s. The consulate in

Thessaloniki was among several points in the central battle zones where tsarist agents

reported on the complexities of the Greek-Ottoman encounter. In Patras, Russian vice

consul Ivan Kallogerakis was among the first authorized by the Foreign Ministry to

communicate directly with the independent Greek state. A prosperous, educated merchant



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with roots in Odessa, Kallogerakis had the task of promoting Russian interests in the

Ionian Islands, Epirus, the Gulf of Corinth, and the Morea.22 In November 1828, Mark

Bulgari, the Russian plenipotentiary in Aegina, ordered him to employ your zeal to

protect the commercial interests of Russian subjects, and by this you will acquire new titles

of the benevolence of the Foreign Ministry.23 Kallogerakis reported from Patras on

shipping, health conditions, and the status of Russian subjects. Of interest to historians on

a wide range of issues, his dispatches (filed several times a month in French, Russian,

Greek, and Italian) include exchanges with Ivan Vlassopoulos, a sort of wandering

Russian agent in the Archipelago.24

Arriving in October 1828, Kallogerakis and his large family adjusted well to the people of

Patras and their new conditions.25 His first communiques describe the regions topography,

demography, industry, and commerce and commented on its history and antiquities.

Kallogerakis praised the advantages of the city port and its resources, and emphasized the

potential for economic and cultural development. Patras and its environs would be among the

best and strongest in free Greece, averred Kallogerakis: The public places, columns, and

straight roads all well aligned gave the external appearance of a European city.26

The Russianconsul visited farms, orchards, and artisan establishments throughout the Peloponnesus and

the Gulf of Corinth and established contacts with local Greeks, including doctors, merchants,

lawyers, and politicians. He intervened in the affairs of Russian merchants, while highlighting

the loyalty of the Greeks to the tsar. Although his enthusiasm later mellowed, Kallogerakis

boasted that les Patreens were the best Greeks around.27

When the Greek state was created, the location of the capital remained undecided.

Rather than Nafplion, the de facto centre of authority, Kallogerakis favoured Patras for its

suitability for regulating trade between Malta, France, the Ionian Islands, the Adriatic

Gulf, and the Levant.28 The regions main cash crop, the Corinthian currant (popular

among the British who use the little berries in scones, Christmas cake, mincemeat, andmuch else) promised to benefit merchants, sailors, and skippers,29 although Kallogerakis

lamented that the long and destructive conflict had dealt devastating blows to the orchards

and farms:

A mournful and majestic silence reigns all around. The depopulation, the solitude, and thevivid memories of recent times cannot but cause shivers. The absence of agriculture andlabour in these beautiful lands that in the past were the roof of so many people! Pray thevineyards, which produce the beautiful fruit of Corinth, have been miraculously spared thedestruction of the barbarians and the sorrows of numerous campaigns.30

Patras, observed Kallogerakis, must rival in beauty the most attractive city in Italy, if

only due to its happy and charming physical situation.31 The city itself consisted of two

parts: an elevated old town with a fortress, and a lower new town with squares, wide

streets, a government building, hospital, prison, and slaughterhouse. Yet these days are

fraught with troubles, Kallogerakis warned, entangled by so many foreign adventurers,

speculators, and men without faith.32 In order to present a positive message to the people,

Kallogerakis wrote, I display myself in all affairs as a zealous co-religionist who sincerely

admires the government for its virtuous and humane principles.33

Violence and uncertainty characterized life in the Morea, as the Greek government

struggled to survive. A vexing problem concerned the large contingent of Arab and

Egyptian troops (at one time as many as 50,000) under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha of

Egypt (the son of Muhammad Ali), that had been terrorizing the Morea and trouncing the

divided Greek forces since 1824.34

Kallogerakis claimed that, as long as these soldiersremained in the Morea, any Greek action north of Corinth was impossible. He urged the

Russian Foreign Ministry to pressure the Ottoman authorities to recall the Arab-Egyptian

L.J. Frary50


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expedition and send a squadron to Navarino Bay as a show of strength. To hasten their

departure, Kallogerakis facilitated the efforts of the French forces in the region to occupy

the Morea. He also encouraged the government to create roads and hospitals and he

opened the consulate (his home) to French generals.35

The final battles for fortresses in western Greece in 182829 underscore the tenacity

which years of bloodshed had inspired the adversaries. Claiming to be a faithful son of the

fatherland, Kallogerakis compared the Greek campaign to the valiant experience of

Russia in 1812.36 In January 1829, he received word from his agent in Mytika (the

headquarters of the Greek army under the British General Sir Richard Church) that the

Turkish-held city of Vonitsa, across the Gulf of Corinth, was under blockade, and the

Ottoman leader was bound to capitulate at any moment.37 One week later Kallogerakis

learned that the Albanian portion of the garrison was ready to evacuate for the sum of

6,000 Turkishtallaris, and that another 30,000 would suffice to open the doors of nearby

Preveza.38 Greek troops occupied the spot in December, but Ottoman forces held firm in

the castle. Kallogerakis was exasperated that the Greek captains ordered the burning of the

town, despite its probable future importance.39

In March, Kallogerakis claimed that the Turks inside the fortress were eating their

horses; he hoped that neither side would suffer longer.40 When the citadel finally fell, his

emotional report gushes with Greek heroism and celebrates the triumph over tyranny:

prayers are being chanted in all the churches and the people of Patras rejoice in the

streets.41

The Greek armies next turned their attention to the acropolis at Nafpaktos (Lepanto),

which they besieged by land and bombarded by sea. The Ottoman garrison suffered a fate

similar to the one in Vonitsa. The Albanian irregulars departed, and the Turkish

commander refused to surrender without orders from the capital. There is no other nation

like the Turks, wrote Kallogerakis, who are able to endure with greater steadfastness allthe horrors of a siege. It is tenacious.42 Although firmly committed to the Greek cause,

Kallogerakis condemned the blockaders mutinous spirit and vindictiveness. Meanwhile,

he wrote moving descriptions of the flight of Muslim families and the assault on refugees

by brigands.43

In early 1829, President Kapodistrias was beginning his second year in power.44

The final battles in western Greece underscore the challenges facing the government.

Uncertain about the loyalty of the generals and the discipline of the army, Kapodistrias

sent his brother, Agostino, as lieutenant plenipotentiary to oversee operations in the north,

with far-reaching authority to control pay, rations, and supplies.45 According to

Kallogerakis, Agostino inspired confidence among the Greek palikaria (brave young

men). In March, Agostino took direction of the Nafpaktos siege, ignoring the authority of

generals Church and Demetrios Ypsilantis. By overstepping these two popular generals,

Agostino opened the door to criticism, but Kallogerakis supported the centralizing

tendencies and pro-Russian sympathies of the presidents brother: The troops under the

orders of the lieutenant plenipotentiary steadfastly and faithfully occupy the important

parts of Thermopoly and Boundounitsa. Boeotia and Livadia are free from the presence of

Ottomans, thanks to the actions of Count Kapodistrias.46 The formal demonstration of the

presence of the Greek government in western Greece, Kallogerakis declared, created

auspicious circumstances: never before since the outbreak of the revolution had there

been an epoch more favourable to the Hellenes to advance their armies into Epirus and

push their conquests all the way to Ioannina.47

Whereas Western observers generallycondemned Agostino, the Russian vice consul praised his energetic and authoritative

manner.48



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During the Russian Ottoman war, Ottoman governor Mehmed Resid Pasha was

forced to leave mainland Greece and Epirus without troops. The power vacuum provided

the Greeks with an excellent opportunity for expansion into Boeotia and Phocis, and then

into Thessaly. The liberation of lands by the Greeks, extolled Kallogerakis, would mean

an imminent end to the suffering of thousands of Orthodox Christians. Critical of the

Turkish-Albanian soldiers level of courage, Kallogerakis claimed the Greeks owed their

success to their religious fervour, ardent patriotism, and determined leadership.49

Unfortunately, according to the Scottish historian George Finlay, the anarchy that still

prevailed among the Greek chiefs prevented the numerical superiority of the Greek forces

from being available.50

Ivan Paparrigopoulos, one of the great Greek veterans in Russian service (the

dragoman of the vice consulate in Patras before the outbreak of the Greek revolt), was

another important tsarist envoy in newly independent Greece. He became a key mediator

in deciding the fate of the fortresses still under Ottoman command, although historians

have under-appreciated his accomplishments.51 A practised diplomat with an intimate

knowledge of local society and politics, Paparrigopoulos engaged in direct discussionswith joint TurkishGreek committees. His verbal skills (he spoke Turkish, as well as

Greek, French, Russian, and Italian) and experience made him a particularly suitable

emissary. He nearly singlehandedly negotiated a peaceful solution to several crises,

although his talent engendered the jealousy of the other European consuls.52

Since the garrison majority at Nafpaktos consisted of Turks from Constantinople and

Anatolia, the struggle for the citadel continued for weeks. Kallogerakis reported that the

besieged Turks refused to give up without orders from the military leadership in

Istanbul.53

Fortunately, Paparrigopouloss judicious intervention and the desperation of the

garrison persuaded the Turks to cooperate. The pasha suggested an immediate end tohostilities and insisted upon the right to send a courier to Ioannina to ask for further orders.

Agostino (backed by a force of 3000 troops of the line) rejected this proposition, but

negotiations under the guidance of Paparrigopoulos continued.54

Despite days of cannon bombardment and a desperate lack of supplies, the Ottoman

commander remained resolute. Finally, in April, Paparrigopoulos negotiated the surrender

in exchange for amnesty and guaranteed safe passage to Ottoman territory. The city had

not been in Greek hands since Byzantine times, and the shores of the Gulf of Corinth were

now firmly under Greek control. For his efforts in finalizing the negotiations, the pasha

awarded Paparrigopoulos two splendid stallions.55 Thus a Russian agent of Greek

extraction was the crucial link ending a long and bitter struggle. Not without considerable

effort, he persuaded the Turkish commanders to depart peacefully, while reining in the

ambitions of Greek captains. He owed at least some of his success to Agostino, whom he

singled out as a balanced and intelligent individual. By the summer of 1829, the successful

campaigns in Rumelia enabled the Greek government to incorporate valuable territory into

the Greek state.56

How far the Greeks aimed to push their territorial claims into Ottoman lands was a

matter of some perplexity to Russian agents. Messolonghi was among the last major

outposts of Turkish power in the western mainland. The site of the legendary yet tragic

Greek resistance (and the death of Lord Byron), the town was an irresistible target for

independence, as rumours circulated of potential horrors against Christians if it was left

under Ottoman control. Led by the British Captain Frank Hastings, Greek forces laid siegeto the fortress by the end of April. The Turkish-Albanian population inside began to show

signs of despair as the Greek ship Karteriamade a prolonged assault on the coastline and

L.J. Frary52


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the nearby fortress at Anatoliko.57 Once again, Paparrigopoulos offered his services to

resolve the encounter, and the commandant of the citadel invited the Russian agent to his

headquarters to discuss an armistice.58 After numerous meetings, Paparrigopouloss

efforts resulted in a peace treaty signed on 2 May 1829.59 According to the agreement,

Turkish civilians inside the fort were free to leave with their movable property at the

expense of the Greek government. Once the noncombatants evacuated, the treaty promised

Ottoman troops safe passage overland with their animals. Such a peaceful resolution

contrasts with the violent exchanges along the GreekOttoman border in later years.

Overall, an incalculable number of Turks undertook an exodus from the land where

they had lived and prospered for centuries. Predictably, the religious factor was never far

from the minds of the adversaries: clause six of the peace agreement negotiated by

Paparrigopoulos stipulated that the Turks were to hand over to Greek families all children

under the age of four, even if they were Muslim. The Greek leaders warned that any future

remonstrance on this or other matters would indicate breech of the agreement.60

As conditions appeared to become calmer, the Greek governments inability to collect

revenue and command allegiance rekindled the fires of protest. In the wake of nearly 10years of constant warfare, many of the Greek irregulars grew restive as their government

failed to live up to its promises. President Kapodistriass centralizing tendencies generated

resentment among the military chieftains, and his choice of personnel remained

consistently unlucky. A good example of the presidents unpopular behaviour was his

decision to visit the disgruntled Greek camps, where, instead of making concessions, he

criticized the captains for incompetence.61

Clamours for back pay and allowances for food inspired mutinies among the Greek

troops in Nafpaktos and Messolonghi. In June 1829, Kallogerakis wrote to Panin, the

Russian representative in Argos, that the irregular Hellenic troops stationed at Nafpaktos

began by chasing all troops of the line and artillery from their posts. They have seized allthe batteries of the fortress, where they post their black and red banners. The insurgents

demand their outstanding pay.62 In response, the Greek government asked for 20 days to

raise the funds, and this prevented bloodshed. At this point, Kallogerakis expressed

sympathy for the rebels, who elected representatives, composed lists of grievances, and

displayed general prudence. Yet he feared the tide of rebellion would swell and

recommended paying the troops (national heroes).63

Weeks passed and the mutinous garrisons began to suffer from a lack of supplies. Once

again, Paparrigopoulos led the negotiations, which centred on payment, retention of ranks

and munitions, and a subsidy for food. The government tried to foment dissension between

the various insurgent captains, although by November the movement had died down and

the irregular troops surrendered.64

By the end of 1829, the Greeks had overwhelmed their enemies and conquered the last

fortresses of the mainland. Further north, hostilities continued as Albanians revolted

against their Turkish commanders. Unrest in Epirus raged as Russian agents took hasty

measures to ensure the livelihood of Christians. Consular reports contain vivid, gruesome

tales of massacres of Christians by renegade Albanians. Kallogerakis wrote:

My pen falls from my hands from trying to expose all of the horrors and cruelties that theAlbanians commit in the district of Zaghori (near Ioannina) that is composed of forty villagesof only Christians. Havoc, pillage, the violation of virgins as young as twelve, mutilations andtortures in boiling water are inflicted on the bodies of the unfortunates who are forced to give

up their gold and jewels. Other horrible acts are committed with impunity.65

Kallogerakis lamented of the need to rely on intelligence from unofficial sources and

called for the posting of Russian agents in Preveza and Ioannina. In Thessaloniki,



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Mustoxidi seconded the appeal for a Russian agent in Epirus and Albania. He warned of

the weakness of the Portes authority, and described the plight of numerous deserters,

refugees, women and children slaves who have escaped massacre and wish to become

naturalized citizens in Greece.66

A common theme in the Russian consular reports is the unrest in Albanian territories, an

understudied subject that illuminates the development of Balkan nationalisms and the

destabilization of Ottoman society. While a vital component of the sultans striking force,

the Albanians could be fickle if left unpaid or exposed to undue risks. The degree to which

Albanians were friends or foes of the Sublime Porte was never clear, and captains and their

troops frequently changed sides in the middle of a campaign. Russian reports indicate that

the Albanians retained their own unique esprit de corps, which separated them from the

Turkish commanders. At Nafpaktos, for example, the Albanian portion of the garrison was

the first to surrender (in exchange for an indemnity), underscoring the precariousness and

unpredictability of the sultans multi-ethnic armies. Albanian unrest deserves emphasis, for

it weakened Ottoman fighting power and divided local authorities.67

When the GreekOttoman war came to an end, the boundaries of the new state and theextent of its sovereignty remained unsettled. The debate was outside the control of the

Kapodistrian government. Rather, the London Conference (which consisted of the French

and Russian ambassadors as well as the British foreign secretary) determined these issues,

while the fate of the Ottoman Empire hung in the balance.68 A turning point occurred in

March 1829, when the Allied Powers agreed to assign to Greece northern borders

extending on a line from Volos to Arta, plus the island of Evvia, which had a Greek

majority. The Peloponnesus, naturally, was assured, since Ibrahim Pasha and his army had

withdrawn. Russian diplomacy aimed towards a viable frontier that would induce peaceful

relations, whereas the British leadership favoured a truncated state consisting of the

Peloponnesus and Cyclades Islands. Although not entirely successful, Russian pressurehelped the Greek state retain hard-won territories. Once the sultan submitted to the

negotiations, the Russian chargedaffaires to Greece, Mark Bulgari, was convinced that it

was Russias special ability to convince the Ottoman Porte that had led to the

establishment of strong Greek borders. Fortunately, the positions that the Greeks occupy

in the north of the continent dont call for new efforts or new conquests to maintain. 69

The boundary settlement did not satisfy everybody. President Kapodistrias was bitterly

disappointed about the decision to keep the islands of Crete and Samos under Ottoman

rule.70 He repeatedly lobbied Saint Petersburg, and sent vivid letters regarding the

potential dangers to Christians.71 Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode did his best to

guarantee the livelihood of Christians. Saint Petersburg contributed 50,000 pounds sterling

to the Greek government in 1829, and made plans to educate hundreds of young Greeks in

Russian military academies.72 Unfortunately for Greek patriots, later diplomatic

negotiations reduced the northern frontier to a line running from Aspropotamos to

Volos, thus leaving predominantly Greek-speaking regions within the sultans territory.

By 1830, much remained undecided on the mainland. One troublesome question

concerned the Turks demand for an indemnity. The legal rights of Muslim Turks, who were

forced to abandon territories that had been in their possession for centuries, consumed the

attention of the Russian consular staff. They who worked diligently to disentangle this

thorny problem, which encompassed family inheritance, religious foundations (waqfs),

mosques, convents, and Christian slaves. Since the Greek government had no funds with

which to meet their demands, Ottoman troops rode roughshod over regions along thedemarcation line in the summer of 1830.

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Meanwhile, Muslim Turks were still in control of the Acropolis in Athens, and

continued to resist resettlement.73 Paparrigopoulos (who established residence as the Russian

consul in Attica and Evvia in 1831) proved himself an astute observer, and composed

extensive reports on the internal affairs of the Ottoman borderlands. One of his primary tasks

was to determine the indemnities due to Turks for evacuated properties. Frustrated from the

beginning, he openly criticized the Ottoman governor of Attica, Hadji-Ismail Bey, for

corruption and avarice, and accused him of appropriating a large portion (up to ten per cent)

of the profits when selling waqfs, mosques, and territories owned by Turkish families.74

The Russian consul also blamed Hadji-Ismail for sanctioning a host of disorders in Attica:

The fraudulent and deceptive system that he continuously follows makes him appear odious

among Greeks and Turks alike.75 The Greek commission petitioned for Russian protection,

as Hadji-Ismail continued to ignore the law. Paparrigopoulos complained bitterly:

The Turks continue to put their horses and other livestock in the few churches which remain.Religion and Politics equally impose upon me the need to interfere in this affair, especiallysince the Christian inhabitants of the city are profoundly affected by this act done on their

places of prayer. As the Russian consul, I have demanded that the serasker[commander-in-chief] immediately evacuate all the churches.76

Paparrigopoulos went so far as to write directly to the Greek president to garner support for

the protection of Christians and their churches. After meeting with Hadji-Ismail, he was

able to ensure their evacuation.77 He informed Panin:

I give good people money to help encourage them to get busy restoring the desolatedchurches. The cost is only twenty tallaris, but the effect it produces on the hearts ofinhabitants, as a sign of the benevolent interest of our August Master [Nicholas I], isconsiderable.78

Sectarian clashes characterize these tense months of transition in the marginal regions.

Receiving alarming news that the lives of Christians were in peril in Elefsina (Eleusis),which was still under Ottoman control, Paparrigopoulos facilitated the evacuation of Greek

families. Thanks to his intervention, troops on both sides of the border returned to their

positions after several tense days. He recommended that the Greek government issue strict

orders to captains of irregular forces to prevent a conflict.79 By the spring of 1831,

Paparrigopoulos claimed to have protected the lives of more than 6000 Christians still under

Ottoman authority in Attica. He intervened personally when Turks and Albanians

physically beat Christian locals at midday in the middle of the market.80 He sent agents to

Nafpaktos, Amfissa, and Galaxidi, corresponded regularly with Kapodistrias, and employed

Alexander Vlassopoulos (the son of the veteran Russian agent) as his dragoman.81

Meanwhile, he repeatedly complained to Apolonarii Butenev, the Russian ambassador in

Constantinople, about his substantial property losses since the outbreak of the revolt.82

In the summer of 1831, attention turned to the north, where Paparrigopoulos reported

that the Turks were committing outrageous acts against the Christian inhabitants of Evvia.

He petitioned Omer Pasha (the commander of the island), claiming he was using all

measures in my power to put an end to the trouble.83 While sanctioning Paparrigopouloss

efforts and encouraging him to continue, the Russian Foreign Ministry feared that a general

uprising would place the destiny of the country in jeopardy and expose its frontiers to an

Ottoman invasion.84 As the Russian delegation in Constantinople pressured the grand

vizier, Paparrigopouloss hard-nosed persistence prompted Omer Pasha to do his duty and

respect Christians.

In the autumn of 1831, Paparrigopoulos wrote from Athens: The Turkish authoritiesand the Turks in general are taken by the idea, due to the present circumstances, that Attica



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and Evvia will be divvied up in their favour.85 Ties to the land were strongly emotional,

especially since ten years of successive devastation had left many areas barren. A sense of

nostalgia exudes from an anecdote about a Turk, who, starting on his sad departure from

Attica, turns a last time to gaze on the Piraeus: Overcome with emotion, he prostrated

himself, and kissed the ground from which he and his fathers had drawn their life.

Sweetest fatherland! he cried, I am leaving you, and shall never see you again!86

Both sides suffered from religious and ethnic persecution and forced resettlement.87

Instances of the maltreatment of Christians appear in the dispatches of Mustoxidi in

Thessaloniki. He complained that the military exercises in Rumelia resulted in bloodshed,

including the massacre of Greek captains and their families. Hundreds of Greeks fled to the

mountains, where they were chased by Turks who caused huge disorders, pillaging and

killing without any regard. The [Turkish] commanders themselves permitted insults and

acts of violence against innocent Christians.88 In response to Greek petitions, Mustoxidi

sent letters of protest to the Ottoman government. His negotiations with Mehmed Resid

permitted several hundred families to settle in the Greek kingdom.89 Mustoxidi provided

his own funds to cover the exodus.90

An important portion of RussianOttoman relations during the 1820s concerns the

lives of Christians taken as slaves by Ottoman soldiers.91 Kallogerakis, Vlassopoulos,

Paparrigopoulos, Rikman, Riboper, and Mustoxidi received scores of letters from the

Greek government and common people asking for intervention. As the only independent

Orthodox nation in the world, the Russian state and society reacted with determination.

The various echelons of the Russian empire engaged in a nationwide relief effort. Russian

consuls compiled detailed lists of captives names, location at the time of capture, and

status inside Ottoman territory.92 During the revolt, whole families had been relocated

from the mainland and islands to places as far as eastern Anatolia and Bulgaria. In the

interests of humanity and religion, Russian Ambassador Riboper protested to thehighest Ottoman authorities. The response was that the slaves were the legal private

property of their owners. After a long correspondence, the upshot was unfavourable for the

captives and their families, who remained slaves of the sultan.93

An incident involving a young Turkish girl during Paparrigopouloss tenure in Athens

provides an interesting image of the times. According to the Russian consular record,

during the opening days of hostilities in 1821, a Greek priest in Athens took possession of

a two-year-old Turkish girl. Ten years later, when conditions had stabilized, the priest

returned to Athens with the youngster. The girls father, who still resided in the town,

learned of her presence and petitioned Mehmed Resid, asking to take custody of her. When

a body of Greek representatives complained, the Ottoman authorities decided to ask the

girl where she wished to live. Paparrigopoulos, a participant in the negotiations, helped

organize a mixed Greek-Turkish commission to decide her fate. After some debate, the

commission resolved to allow her to live with her father for a term of eight days, after

which she could make up her own mind.

The girl, elegantly clad in gold jewellery and sumptuous attire, appeared in front of

the mixed commission and a large crowd eight days later. The commission asked her a

series of questions (some of which Paparrigopoulos posed personally). In sum, the girl

declared that she only wanted to live with the Christians. Paparrigopoulos concluded: the

Turks did not dare complain, and the girl was shipped off to an orphanage on Aegina.94

The case of the Turkish girl and the Russian converts to Islam are just two of the many

fascinating stories contained in consular reports during the Greek revolution. Russianconsuls helped set the groundwork for political and economic development, and their

writings detail the growth of parties and clientele networks, financial issues and health

L.J. Frary56


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standards. The assassination of President Kapodistrias in October 1831 provided a further

need for strong avenues of influence. The first ambassador to Greece, Gabriel Katakazi (a

Greek from Constantinople), arrived late in 1832.95

Russian consular writings enhance our understanding of the historical development of

Russian ties to the Christian East. They offer insight into the functioning of Ottoman

politics, the dynamics of great power diplomacy, the construction of identities, and the

formation of nation states. Beset with conflicting tensions, Russian policy-makers aimed

for the pacification of the region, yet were willing to resort to aggressive measures when

their demands went unmet. Greek-Russian commentators might have made harsh

judgements about Ottoman rule, but they addressed certain realities that were undeniable

to other observers, and they could pronounce harsh indictments of their coreligionists.

While working to protect Christian lives and properties, Russian agents encountered

unexpected challenges based on the religious and legal status of Christians in regions on

the margins of empire and independence. As intermediaries, Greek-Russian agents played

moderating roles by counselling caution and conciliation. They worked to reconcile messy

quarrels about personal property, family relations, and confessional status. Both Greeksand Turks urged Russian officials to rectify their grievances, although the tsarist officials

resisted claims that went beyond legal contracts.

Often working in concert with their British and French counterparts, Russian consuls

proved persuasive thanks to their unique talents. They played pivotal roles in the greater

scheme of nineteenth-century international relations. Thanks to cordial relations with the

local population and effective interaction with Greek and Turkish officials (according to

particular assumptions and customs), Greeks in Russian service perpetuated the image of

Russia as the supreme guardian of the Christian East.

Notes1. All the documents referred to in this essay come from the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiskoi

Imperii (Archive of Foreign Policy of Imperial Russia, hereafter AVPRI), specificallycollections 133 (Kantseliariia MID), 159 (Formuliarnye spiski), 165/2 (Afiny-missiia), 180(Posolstvo v Konstantinopole). For each source, I cite the exact archival reference, includingcollection (f.), index (op.), file (d.), and page (l.). The documents place of composition anddate (the Julian calendar used by Russia followed 12 days behind the Gregorian calendar in thenineteenth century), is followed by the archival reference. Selected Russian archival reportsduring these years are published in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii,Vneshniaia Politika Rossii(hereafterVPR); Lisovoi,Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. AVPRI holdingsare listed in Budnik,Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii. Recent monographs based onAVPRI materials include Gerd, Konstantinopol i Peterburg; Lisovoi, Russkoe dukhovnoe i

politicheskoe prisutstvie; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia.2. On the capitulations, see van den Boogert,The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System;

van den Boogert and Fleet, The Ottoman Capitulations; Eldem, Capitulations and WesternTrade; Prousis, British Consular Reports; Homsy, Les capitulations; Essad, Du regime descapitulations ottomans; Genton, De la juridiction. On the social and economic setting, seeQuataert, The Age of Reforms; Puryear, International Relations and the Levant; McGrew,

Land and Revolution. On the proteges, see also Kontogiannis,Oi prostatevomenoi.3. The Russian practice of employing Greeks became a family affair, as fathers found openings in

Russian service for their sons and grandsons, widows gained pensions, and daughters becameeducated. On Greeks in Russian service, see Batalden, Catherine IIs Greek Prelate; Bruess,

Religion, Identity and Empire; Arsh,Eteristskoe dvizhenie; idem.,Albaniia i Epir; idem,IoannKapodistriia; Pappas,Greeks in Russian Military Service; Prousis,Russian Society; Petrunina,

Grecheskaia natsiia; idem, 50 let na sluzhbe Rossii; Priakhin, Greki v istorii Rossii; idem.,Lambros Katsonis; Muratidi,Greki-admiraly i generaly; Nikolopoulos,Greki v Rossiia; idem,From Agathangelos; Papoulidis, A propos de luvre des employes grecs; idem, Kvoprosu o deiatelnosti grekov; Katsiardi-Hering, Mythos kai Istoria.



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4. Accounts of British officials are reproduced in Prousis,British Consular Reports; idem,LordStrangford; Dakin, British Intelligence; Fleming, John Capodistrias. Foreign Office archivesare described in Prevelakis and Kalliataki, Epirus, Ali Pasha, and the Greek Revolution;Prevelakis and Gardikas-Katsiadakis, Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the

British Embassy. Driault and Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece introduce Frenchforeign ministry files.

5. Petropulos,Politics and Statecraft, 102.6. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye,Russian Orientalism; Tolz, European, National and (Anti-)

Imperial; Taki, Orientalism on the Margins; Brower and Lazzerini, Russias Orient; Frye,Oriental Studies.

7. General accounts of the period include Finlay,History, 2: 195289; Brewer,The Greek War ofIndependence, 32551; Petrunina,Grecheskaia natsiia, 147222; Dakin,The Greek Struggle,238312.

8. Antonio Sandrini, Russian commercial agent in Zakynthos (Zante), described the elation of theGreek population at the arrival of the Russian frigate Elena after the battle: the crowds ofislanders who welcomed the Russian frigate incurred the indignation and the jealousy of theBritish authorities (who maintained a protectorate of the Ionian Islands): Sandrini toNesselrode, Zante, 9.10.1827, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12441 (1827), ll. 2701. Sandrini left

a fresh description of the battle: Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zante, 12.10.1827, ll. 2723 (VPR, 15:2712). His two sons served for the Russian Foreign Ministry (see AVPRI, f. 159, op. 664, d.2962 4). On Russian participation at Navarino, see Andrienko, Do i posle Navarina;Bronevskii, Navarinskaia bitva; Bogdanovich, Navarin; Rykachev, God navarinskoikampanii; Daly, Russian Seapower, 9 21; Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i flot, 203 26;Anderson,Naval Wars, 52333. On the Greek revolt and the Ionian Islands, see Wrigley, The

Diplomatic Significanceand The Ionian Islands.9. Vakalopoulos, Istoria, vol. 8; Photiadis, I epanastasi tou eikosiena, vol. 4; Papadopoulou, I

epanastasi stin dytiki sterea Ellada; Vakalopoulos, I periodos tis anarhias, draw on Greekarchives. British records are featured in Dontas, The Last Phase; Dakin,British and AmericanPhilhellenes. Driault and Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece, 1: 398465, utilizeFrench reports. On the Kapodistrian period, see Woodhouse,Capodistria; Petropoulos,Politics

and Statecraft, 10752; Kaldis, John Capodistrias.10. On the Greek revolt and the Russian-Ottoman encounter, seeVPR, 13: 113 9, 132 3, 154 9,1628, 1768, 20310, 2247, 63748; Prousis, Russian Society, 378; idem, RussianOttoman Relations, 27; idem,Lord Strangford.

11. Selected material from the writings of Minchaki and Riboper are published inVPR, vols 1316. Russian agents reported from Aegina (Ivan Vlassopoulos), Zakynthos (Anton Sandrini),Corfu (S.P. Popandopoulo), Mytilini and Syros (S.L. Svilarch), Santorini (B. Marchesini),Naxos (K. Raftopoulos), Samos (G. Svoronos), Mykonos (Pietro Kordia), Tinos (Ivan Dzhani),Navarino (P. Robert), Cyprus (Mario Santi), and elsewhere. See, Delo ob uchrezhdeniikonsulstv, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 78 (1829); AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831);Teplov,Russkie predstaviteli.

12. Russian relations with Thessaloniki began in the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century,the sancak (sub-province) of Thessaloniki was a valuable centre of Russian commercial,

religious, and military enterprise. See, Frary, Russian Interests; Mazower, Salonika;Svoronos,Le commerce de Salonique; Papazoglou, I Thessaloniki.

13. Mustoksitsi, Anzhelo Arsenevich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2343; Frary, RussianInterests; Toussimis, Angelos Moustoxydis.

14. Mustoxidi to Kapodistrias, Corfu, 8.09.1821, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 7185 (1821), l. 1;Mustoxidi to Emperor Nikolai, Venice, 10.05.1827, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 7429 (1827), l.1. Mustoxidis well-known brother Andreas (a historian and later Greek minister of education)also served at the Russian post in Turin.

15. Mustoxidi to Nesselrode, Padua, 14.07.1828, ibid., l. 3.16. Bitis,Russia and the Eastern Question, 274425, covers the war using records in the Rossiiskii

gosudarstvennyi voeno-istoricheskii arvhiv (RGVIA); Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i flot, 20326, describes naval operations; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 34363, provides the Ottoman view;

Sheremet,Turtsiia i Adrianopolskii mirexamines the peace treaty.17. Mustoxidi to Rikman, Thessaloniki, 15.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 513/1, d. 1295 (1831), ll.

345.

L.J. Frary58


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18. Mustoxidi to Panin, Thessaloniki, 13.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), l. 146.19. Bogdanov to Mustoxidi, 30.12.1830, Katarina, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1295 (1831), l. 9.20. The dragomans service record is contained in Bogdanov, Sergei Ivanovich, AVPRI, f. 159,

op. 464, d. 386.21. Bogdanov to Mustodixi, 12.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1296 (1832), ll. 36 7.

A copy of the letter is contained in AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), ll. 1479.

22. Kallogerakiss service file is contained in AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 1592.23. Bulgari to Kallogerakis, Poros, 17.11.1828, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1228 (1830), l. 29.

Bulgari was of Greek heritage and served as the Russian plenipotentiary to Greece from 1828to 1829. See Bulgari, Mark Nikolaevich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 497.

24. Bulgari to Kallogerakis, Aegina, 9.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 83 (1829), ll. 1 2;Kallogerakis to Vlassopoulos, Patras, 28.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 190, ll. 1116.On Vlassopoulos, see Vlasopulo, I.N., AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 693; Stanislavskaia,Rossiiai Gretsiia, 276, 281, 2857, 310, 3212, 3323; Arsh, Albaniia i Epir, 221 7; Melnitskii,Tri glavy, 348 9.

25. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 1.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 1. OnPatras during this period, see Lazares, Kapodistriaki Patra; idem,Politiki istoria tis Patras, 1:1353.

26. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 18.27. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 17. Later he complained of an insufficient

salary, the climate, and sanitary conditions and begged for transfer to Crete, Chios, andSmyrna. See Kallogerakis to Riboper, Patras, 8.10.1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1228(1830), ll. 212; Kallogerakis to Rikman, Nafplion, 28.12.1830, ibid., ll. 267; Kallogerakisto Rikman, Patras, 15.05.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), l. 50.

28. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 12.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 57, d. 72 (1829), ll. 22 3.29. The name currant derives from a hybrid Anglo-French expression, raisin de Courantz.30. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 12.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 22.31. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 18.32. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 18.33. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 18.04.1829, ibid., l. 237.

34. On the activities of the Egyptian navy, Ibrahim and his army, see Aksan,Ottoman Wars, 2939; Douin,Les premieres fregates; Finlay,History, 2: 47 83, 112 59; Brewer,The Greek Warof Independence, 23446; Driault and Lheritier,Histoire diplomatique, 1: 40919.

35. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 1.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 1.Accounts of the French forces include Driault, Lexpedition de Crete et de la Moree; Mangeart,Souvenirs de la Moree; Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics, 1222; Kremmydas, Ogallikos stratos stin Peloponniso.

36. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 4.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 12.37. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 10.01.1829, ibid., l. 21. On the Vonitsa campaigns and

the activities of Church, see Vakalopoulos, Istoria tou neou ellenismou, 8: 109 115; Dontas,The Last Phase, 126 35; Dakin,The Greek Struggle, 2305, 24757. For fortress details, seeAndrews,Castles of the Morea.

38. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 16.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 30.

39. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 6.02.1829, ibid., l. 48.40. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 2.03.1829, ibid., l. 66.41. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 9.03.1829, ibid., l. 69.42. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 9.04.1829, ibid., l. 213.43. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 17.04.1829, ibid., l. 223; Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras,

26.04.1829, ibid., l. 240; Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 28.05.1830, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507,d. 135 (1830), ll. 656.

44. Woodhouse,Capodistria, 43559.45. Finlay, History, 2: 207; Vakalopoulos, Istoria, 8: 10915; Dontas, The Last Phase, 1359;

Woodhouse,Capodistrias, 439.46. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 25.03.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 97 8.47. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 26.03.1829, ibid., l. 97.

48. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 3.04.1829, ibid., l. 210. Woodhouse, The Greek War ofIndependence, 135, claims Agostinos assertive folly led to the resignation of Sir RichardChurch, the one man capable of ensuring that the Greeks enjoyed at least de factooccupation of



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the disputed areas. Philips, The War of Greek Independence, 2945, describes Agostino inhighly negative terms and accuses President Kapodistrias of alienating the people by hisproclivity for compatriots of the same semi-Venetian Corfiot aristocracy; Finlay,History, 2:207, labels Agostino as really little better than a fool and a miserable creature; Lane-Poole,Sir Richard Church, 71, writes, Agostino can only be described as a contemptible fool . . . thepuny nonentity who happened to be the brother of John Capodistrias.

49. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 10.05.1830, AVPRI, f. 165/2, d. 507, d. 135 (1830), l. 58. Thisattitude coincides neatly with the tsarist policy of Official Nationality. See Riasanovsky,

Nicholas I; Whittaker, The Origins of Russian Education.50. Finlay,History, 2: 206.51. See Paparrigopouloss service file, Paparigopulo, I.K., AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2565;

Nikopoulos,Greki v Rossii, 12048; Goudas,Vioi paralliloi, 5: 20348; Arsh,Albaniia i Epir,3156; Skiotis, The Greek Revolution, 1002; Kandiloros, I Philiki Etaireia, 229, 233 5,3158, 353; Sphyroeras, O Philikos Ioannis Paparrigopoulos; Pappas, Greeks in Russian

Military Service, 301 3. Philips, The War of Greek Independence, 325, describesPaparrigopoulos as a wily Greek . . . who had studied a rude diplomacy in the school ofAli Pasha. Woodhouse, Capodistria, 474, refers to him as only a Russian Commissioner.Greek historians have been more generous. The contemporary Phrantzi, Epitomi tis istorias, 3:

85 90, ascribed the relatively harmonious peace-making process to Paparrigopoulos;Papadopoulou,I epanastasi, 12830, notes that Paparrigopoulos, well known among Turkisheducated men in the area, enjoyed the confidence and respect of the Ottoman authorities;Vakalopoulos,Istoria, 8: 120, 347, underscores his pivotal role and longstanding relationshipwith the Turkish leaders.

52. An exception is William Meyer, the British consul at Preveza, with whom Paparrigopoulosworked closely. In the summer of 1831, the two men made an excursion deep into Ottomanterritory in order to persuade Grand Vizier Mehmed Resid Pasha to protect hundreds of Greekfamilies and captives taken during the rebellion. An extensive correspondence betweenPaparrigopoulos, Rikman, Meyer, and Mehmed Res id Pasha is contained in AVPRI, f. 165/2,op. 507, d. 163 (1831), ll. 3273. On Meyer, see Prousis, British Consular Reports, 51 98.

53. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 29.03.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 204 5.

54. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 9.04.1829, ibid., ll. 212 3.55. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 17.04.1829, ibid., l. 223.56. Vakalopoulos, Istoria, 8: 11522; Dontas, The Last Phase, 12642. With the conclusion of

hostilities, Mehmed Resid Pasha left Ioannina and was awarded the rank of grand vizier.Finlay,History, 2: 207; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 265.

57. Dontas, The Last Phase, 65 85.58. Paparrigopoulos to Kallogerakis, Patras, 2.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829),

l. 263.59. The treaty is available in Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 13.05.1829, ibid., ll. 276 7. See also,

Finlay,History, 2: 207; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 267.60. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 13.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 276.61. On the rising opposition, see Woodhouse,Capodistria, 43587.62. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 12.06.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 299. Panin

replaced Bulgari in June 1829. See Bulgari to Riboper, Argos, 17.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 180,op. 517/1, d. 1794, ll. 634.

63. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 15.06.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 303 6.64. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 2.11.1829, ibid., l. 351.65. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 12.04.1829, ibid., ll. 220 1.66. Mustoxidi to Riboper, Thessaloniki, 3.10.1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1294 (1830), ll.

812.67. Arsh, Albaniia i Epir, introduces the wealth of Russian archival material on Albania. See

also, Anscombe, Albanians and Mountain Bandits; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1889, 23741; Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 20 7; Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte;Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire; Skiotis, The Greek Revolution; Skiotis, MountainWarriors.

68. The main literature includes Peppa,Ioannis Kapodistrias; Petridis,I diplomatiki drasis; idem,Neoelliniki politiki istoria, 1: 1029; Tounta-Phergadi, O Ioannis Kapodistrias; Woodhouse,Capodistrias; Fleming, John Capodistrias; Crawley, The Questions of Greek Independence;

L.J. Frary60


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Dontas,The Last Phase. For material on the Russian negotiations (more than 6000 manuscriptpages), see AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 129607; Vinogradov, Les discussions sur la Gre ce aLondres; Vacalopoulos, Lattitude de la Russie face ala question de lindependance grecque.

69. Bulgari to Nesselrode, Argos, 17.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1794 (1829), ll. 8 9,16.

70. Panin to Nesselrode, Aegina, 29.08.1829, ibid., ll. 167 71.

71. Perepiska s grafom Kapodistria (1829), AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2623; AVPRI, f. 133,op. 469, d. 45.

72. Kapodistrias to Nesselrode, Nafplion, 6.03.1830, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 45, l. 47.73. Brewer, The Greek War, 30615; Woodhouse, Capodiastria, 4734.74. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, n.d., AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1799 (1830), ll. 21 3.75. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, February/March 1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154

(1831), l. 14.76. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 5.02.1831, ibid., l. 11.77. Paparrigopoulos to Kapodistrias, Evvia, 23.02.1831, ibid., l. 21. Although impressed by his

zeal and sagacity, Panin reprimanded Paparrigopoulos for engaging in formal correspondenceand sharing personal opinions with President Kapodistrias. Panin to Paparrigopoulos,Nafplion, 23.04.1831, ibid., l. 69.

78. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 5.02.1831, ibid., l. 11.79. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 18.04.1831, ibid., l. 32.80. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, February/March 1831, ibid., ll. 14 5.81. Paparrigopoulos to Kapodistrias, Evvia, 23.02.1831, ibid., ll. 21 6; Paparrigopoulos to Panin,

Athens, 24.03.1831, ibid., ll. 289.82. Paparrigopoulos to Butenev, Athens, 18.04.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1799 (1831), ll.

756.83. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 7.05.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), l. 48.84. Panin to Paparrigopoulos, Nafplion, 9.03.1831, ibid., ll. 58 9.85. Paparrigopoulos to Rikman, Athens, 29.10.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), ll.

612.86. Philips,The War of Greek Independence, 342.

87. On the question of refugees, see Vakalopoulos, Prosphyges kai prosphygikon zitima. On theMuslim population, see McCarthy, Death and Exile.88. Mustoxidi to Rikman, Thessaloniki, 7.01.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1295 (1831), ll. 4 5.89. Mustoxidi to Panin, Thessaloniki, 12.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), ll.

1402; for a petition from Greek captains addressed to Mustoxidi, see ibid., ll. 1434.90. The Russian state reimbursed him 25,000 Turkishpiastersfor his work to save Greek families.

See Mustoksitsi, Anzhelo Arsenevich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2343.91. For an assortment of supplications from families and the Russian response, see AVPRI, f. 180,

op. 517/1, d. 2614 (18247); AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll. 4052. Studies ofOttoman slavery include Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade; Toledano, Slavery and

Abolition; Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War, 348 59; Erdem, Slavery in the OttomanEmpire; David and Fodor, Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders; Fisher, Between

Russians, Ottomans and Turks.

92. For Greek supplications and lists of captives, see Divers papiers concernant la Grece, AVPRI,f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2627, which contains 500 pages of statistics, inventories, tables, variousmemoranda and aperc us.

93. Ribeaupierre to Panin, Buyukdere, 24.02.1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll.3436.

94. For the copious communication on this affair, see AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831).95. Russian minister Rikman was among many witnesses of the assassination. See, Rikman to

Nesselrode, Nafplion, 6.10.1831, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 234 (1831), ll. 503 10; Woodhouse,Capodistia, 5007; idem., The Greek War of Independence, 1456; Finlay, History, 2: 245-6;Brewer,The Greek Revolution, 3468; Crawley,The Question of Greek Independence, 1978.

Notes on contributor

Lucien J. Frary received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, and is now Associate Professorof History at Rider University. He is the author of articles and reviews in Russian Review, Russian



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History, Mediterranean Historical Review, Slovo, Ab Imperio, Kritika,and Modern Greek StudiesYearbook,and he is currently completing a book on Russia and the making of Modern Greece.

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Documents

Russian Consuls and the Greek Revolution (1821-31)