1

The Individual Replacement System:

Good, Bad or Indifferent?

Robert S. Rush

Introduction

This paper traces Army rotation and replacement policies from the Civil

War to the present, and examines the different methods used to keep units

manned and combat effective with emphasis on WWII ETO replacement poli-

cies. What the Army learned through hard experience it has sometimes forgot-

ten -- or replaced by mythology.

Rotation and replacement can be of two types: front-line unit being placed

in a reserve position or disengaged from combat and replaced by another unit,

and that afforded to an individual soldier with a long exposure to combat being

withdrawn from the combat zone as an individual. Categories include units

deployed to reinforce or replace those in theater; augmentation --units and indi-

viduals—to bring larger units up to full strength; and individual replacements

for soldiers killed, wounded, or missing.1

An examination of different replacement systems the Army has used in

the last one and a half centuries demonstrates that the relative merits of each

system depend upon the circumstances. A composite of unit and individual

replacement often works best, with individual replacement being necessary to

keep units up to strength and to accommodate specific personnel issues.

Civil War

During the American Civil War, the best units on both sides (Iron Bri-

gade, Stonewall Brigade) were sustained through individual replacement, with

drafts of men arriving to take the place of those fallen; while units like the Irish

Brigade that had formed, trained and fought together, but did not receive re-

placements grew progressively smaller until they disappeared. Regiments

served from 90 days to 3-years.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in this paper are those of the author. They do not necessarily

reflect official positions or the views of the Department of Defense or any other U.S. Government entity, past or

present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government endorsement of

the paper’s factual statements and interpretations

Robert S. Rush, Ph.D. command sergeant major (ret) USA, during a career spanning thirty years, served in lead-

ership positions from squad leader through continental army sergeant major, and included assignments in regular,

ranger, light (cohort), and mechanized infantry units. Upon retirement, he attended The Ohio State University

and earned a Doctor of Philosophy in military history in 2000. He is the author of seven books to include Hell in

Hürtgen Forest: Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment and GI: The US Infantryman in World

War II. He has also had articles published in Armed Forces and Society, Military Review, Army History, On

Point, Army Trainer and the NCO Journal as well as several articles published on the individual soldier in foreign

military history journals. Dr. Rush is presently a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History where

he has written and spoken extensively on unit rotation and individual replacement policies.

Until the latter stages of the war, Southern regiments were normally larger

than those of the North because the Southern States filled the existing regi-

ments by individual replacements with newly enlisted or drafted men. Alt-

hough there were some exceptions such as regiments of the famed “Iron Bri-

gade” the Union States formed new units rather than fill veteran units no matter

how often Northern commanders stressed the need to fill the older veteran or-

ganizations rather than form new ones.2

War on the Plains

During the period 1866 through 1892, regiments exchanged posts with

one another (Direct Exchange) about every four or five years such as the 22d

Infantry moving from the northwest to garrison posts along Lake Ontario, while

elements of the 1st Infantry, previously assigned to those posts assumed the

22d’s old posts. Regiments received replacement drafts from the infantry re-

placement depot at Jefferson Barracks, MO. When a unit met with disaster,

such as befell the 7th

Cavalry under Brevet MG Custer in 1876, other com-

mands furnished a nucleus of trained men and recruits from the depots reconsti-

tuted the command.3

Spanish American War

The units participating in the Santiago and Puerto Rican campaigns of

1898 sailed without any provision to replace any of their losses. The V Corps

in Cuba became so debilitated through disease that it was withdrawn to the US

and eight regiments sent to replace it, with the corps headquarters returning to

Cuba to join the replacements. The same held true for the Philippine expedi-

tion, so that the more extended operations in those islands soon made it neces-

sary to establish a recruit depot. Thereafter recruit detachments shipped at in-

tervals to join units taking part in the campaign. 4

The First Overseas Deployments

The increase in the strength of the United States Army stationed overseas

following the war with Spain had much to do with the later development of the

replacement system. Initially, the Army followed a policy of replacing units

overseas rather than replacing individuals. This system was so unsatisfactory

that in 1908, regiments preparing for foreign service began transferring only

those persons with fewer than 4 months remaining on their enlistment to other

units. This practice required the replacement of soldiers serving overseas with

drafts arriving from the US. The Army’s experience in furnishing peacetime

replacements to overseas garrisons indicated that the replacement of individuals

was more satisfactory than the rotation of units. As a result, individual re-

placement became common and the practice of rotating units after short periods

abroad was abandoned in 1912.5

World War I

2

A World War I U.S. Infantry Division consisted of two brigades of two

regiments each, with three rifle battalions per regiment. In combat, units rotat-

ed from the front lines to support positions to reserve positions to rest camps.

Standard attrition in an infantry battalion in a quiet sector numbered about 60

per month (battle and nonbattle) with casualties in the active sectors much

higher. Individual replacements arrived to fill understrength units while units

were in rest camps. During periods of offensive action, rather than relieve units

in place reserve regiments passed through the exhausted and depleted front line

regiments to continue the attack.6

Nearly all of the first 500,000 drafted men went into divisions that were

training for combat. For replacements, the Army initially contemplated a terri-

torial system where soldiers from divisional home areas would join the divi-

sions overseas as replacements. This territorial system of replacement was

never adopted because as the Baker Board report concluded it would result in

losses being distributed unequally throughout the country, as had been the case

of the British and French Armies. In its place the Army established a depot

system similar to that then being used by the British and French. 7

The initial plan was for every four combat divisions in a corps there

would be two replacement divisions, one to serve as a depot and the other as a

training division. However combat exigencies soon required the replacement

divisions be used on the front lines, and the policy of timing the flow of re-

placements into France so they might receive short training courses before be-

ing assigned to the front was modified. With no replacements arriving in the

desired numbers, General Pershing opted to break up some of the newly arriv-

ing divisions, sending their soldiers to experienced divisions to maintain the

fighting strength of these veteran formations. In all 11 trained divisions were

broken up to supply replacements that could not be provided by the depots.8

World War II

The US Army fought World War II with a limited number of divisions

dependent upon individual replacements to keep them near full strength instead

of a large number of divisions allowed to fight at reduced strength until pulled

out of the line for rest and refit. This decision not only precluded rotating divi-

sions from combat to inactive theaters, or even allowing them time off the line

once committed to combat, it also meant that front line soldiers had to stay on

the line with relief only through wounds, mental or physical breakdown, or

death itself. Divisions’ remaining continually in the line was most pronounced

in the European Theater of Operations. Here, the American replacement sys-

tem sustained battle worthiness by ensuring units never dropped below the

point where organizational structure suffered and the system possibly facilitated

long-term cohesion, rather than hampered it. Lieutenant General McNair in explaining the intent of keeping units filled

with qualified soldiers as:

“…The individual man, who graduates from the RTC [Replacement

Training Center] in 17 weeks… is ready for battle, if he goes into a

combat unit, particularly if his buddies are experienced soldiers.

That is the system upon which it is based. We train replacements

and supply them with the idea that if a company fights today and

loses 10 men, it gets 10 replacements that night, and the company

never gets down to the point where the men are just a bunch of rook-

ies trying to lick the enemy.” 9

Contrary to the popular assumption that this Army of draftees was some-

how less able, it would do well to remember that in June 1944, most soldiers

had been in the service more than two years, and although inducted, they had

trained hard and were professional in all but name. These well-trained and co-

hesive units in the following months suffered extremely high casualties in the

rifle companies. It was only the constant flow of replacements that kept the

combat units filled, and in heavy combat they were desperately needed. Initial-

ly, the 750-man over strength assigned each assault regiment for D-day 6 June

1944, took care of the replacement needs during the first 10 days. Soon the

corps’ replacement battalion began receiving, processing and assigning re-

placements to regiments both in combat and out, sometimes to the replacements

detriment.10

Regimental adjutants dropped battlefield casualties from company rosters

once they processed through the division clearing station; non-battle casualties

after five days absence from combat units, with replacements usually being

assigned against these losses within 48 hours. The replacements arrived from

two sources: direct from the RTC with 13-17 weeks of training, or from units

conducting unit training prior to shipment overseas. This last set of soldiers

were the perfect replacement—they had received basic and advanced training

plus unit training within a TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) unit,

affording the men the opportunity to practice life in a unit before combat. Alt-

hough unintended, this last group’s experience is similar to the system of of-

ficer replacement enacted after complaints from Northwest Africa caused the

Army Ground Forces to stipulate that newly commissioned officers would

spend a minimum of three months in tactical TO&E units at company, battery

or troop level so that they might obtain seasoning in units before being commit-

ted to combat.11

Many of the soldiers arriving in theater during June and July 1944 were

thankful they had been part of a unit back in the United States, and felt much

better trained than those arriving directly from a replacement training center.

This also held true in Korea, Vietnam, and during the Cold War where soldiers

who had served in like type units were more comfortable with themselves and

their role within the company.

The daily company Morning Reports for the 22d Infantry Regiment, a

3

regiment that I have examined in great detail, show that those previously

wounded, known as casuals, who were physically able went back to their units

when there was a vacancy and a requisition had been submitted, with priority

given to those soldiers who had been in the unit longest. This regardless of

where the unit was or whether the 22d’s parent organization, the 4th Division,

was in the VII, VIII, V, III, XII, and VI Corps; the First, Third, and Seventh

Armies, and the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups.12

After 30 or 40 days of continual combat, sick rates climbed and men be-

came exhausted and careless, with the result that battle casualties mounted.

Given the small number of divisions, the only alternative to continuous combat

until men broke down was to rotate units smaller than divisions or to rotate

individuals. Many commanders favored individual rotation over that of units

because they did not believe that relieving units from combat was practical un-

der the existing conditions. Any gain received by replacing weary veterans

with fresh but green troops would be nullified by the loss of the experience

these veterans possessed and a concomitant slowing of momentum and increase

in casualties.13

During the war, the War Department issued several directives to theater

commanders regarding individual rotation that provided them authorization to

rotate soldiers whose morale or health had deteriorated and whose effectiveness

could not be restored by intra-theater rotation. Policies were different within

the different theaters, and in the Southwest Pacific Area, men were first told

that rotation would not be permitted; then that the period would be 18 months,

then 24 months and later 30 months. The differing policy announcements

brought a drop in morale rather than a boost. Leaders found that when men

knew they were going home three months in advance their efficiency tended to

drop while they waited to depart. Individual rotation back to the US had begun

in late 1943 in the Mediterranean and by February 1945 there were few soldiers

remaining in rifle companies who had been in combat in North Africa. Fur-

loughs home for those in the ETO began in early December 1944 but the pro-

gram was put on hold during the Ardennes campaign.14

The 22d Infantry: A Case Study This next section is based in large measure on my research into the 22d

Infantry Regiment during World War II, research in which I was able to exam-

ine the relationship between replacement policy and combat effectiveness in

considerable detail by using morning reports to verify manning data on a day-

by-day basis. Using the data in question, I examined Army replacement policy

in the ETO and compared it with US Army replacement policy in other theaters

as well as with German replacement policy. This is directly relevant to the

subject of this paper since what the Army learned—or thought it learned—

about replacement policy in World War II had an enormous influence on re-

placement policies adopted in the years after.

Although Regular Army in name, the 22d Infantry enlisted complement

comprised only 20 percent regulars in 1941; the majority were draftees who

had arrived in 1941, as it was in other Regular regiments. Regular officers were

even more lacking and by November 1941, most platoon leader positions and

many company commanders were reserve officers called to active duty. After

Pearl Harbor, the 22d dispatched levies of regulars and trained draftees to form

new units, receiving in their place drafts of men from the replacement training

centers, so that by the time the regiment entered combat in 1944 there were

only about ten percent regulars, with the remainder being draftees, Organized

Reserve Corps officers, and officers who had gone through the OCS program.

Although primarily draftees, nearly 90 soldiers remained in each rifle company,

which had an authorized strength of 193, for three years, and draftee NCOs

outnumbering Regular Army squad level NCOs six to one. Although more

than 50 of the officers in the landing on D-day had served with the regiment

since early 1942, only six were Regular Army Officers, only four of whom who

were with the regiment in 1941. The officers moved from position to position

within the different units of the organization, some progressing from second

lieutenant to lieutenant colonel by war’s end.15

This movement within the regiment paid great dividends during combat.

The regiment fought in the maneuvers of 1940 and 1941, trained as a motorized

regiment at Forts Benning and Gordon, de-motorized at Fort Dix, New Jersey

and went through amphibious training at Camp Gordon Johnson, Florida. On 6

June 1944, it, along with the other regiments of the 4th

Infantry Division, as-

saulted Utah Beach. From that period until 2 May 1945, the 22d was in almost

continuous combat, fighting from the beaches to Cherbourg, the hedgerows, the

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

Unk Cadre

Pre D-Day Cadre

Jun-Jul ReplacementsAug-Sep Replacements

Oct-Nov

0

50

100

150

200

250

1-Ju

n

15-J

un

29-J

un

13-J

ul

27-J

ul

10-A

ug

24-A

ug

7-Sep

21-S

ep

5-O

ct

19-O

ct

2-N

ov

16-N

ov

30-N

ov

1944

Able Company 22d Infantry Strength by CohortJun 6-Dec 5 1944

Assigned

Soldiers

Authorized Rifle Company Strength 193

4

St. Lô breakout, Avranches, Paris, the Hürtgen Forest, the Ardennes Campaign,

Prüm, and ending the war in Southern Bavaria-- its only extended respite was

for two weeks in March 1945.16

Although an old regular army regiment oft bloodied fighting in this Na-

tion’s wars, the 22d Infantry’s eleven months of combat in Europe were its

worst. Using the morning reports, I found that battle casualties (killed, wound-

ed and injured in action) numbered about 9,000 for this 3,300-man regiment,

6,200 of them in the 9 rifle companies that numbered 1737 at full strength. Of

the casualties, 1,705 soldiers were killed in action, with 1,395 in the nine rifle

companies, an average of 155 killed in each. Twenty-five percent of the total

killed were leaders: 6.5 percent officers and 18.9 percent NCOs. In rifle com-

panies, officer and NCO leaders comprised 29 percent of those killed. By

war’s end, 92 percent of the soldiers in the 22d’s rifle companies landing on D-

day were either killed, missing or too badly wounded to return to their unit. 17

While the evidence clearly shows that the 22d’s ordeal was unusual, if not

one of the limiting cases of sustained intensity in infantry combat in the Euro-

pean Theater of Operations during 1944; the evidence also demonstrates that

the underlying factors that supported the 22d’s performance were common to

infantry regiments in early arriving divisions. For the months they were in

combat, the median battle casualties for the 15 infantry divisions landing across

the Normandy beaches between 6 June and 7 August amounted to 17,412, or

122 percent of an infantry division’s authorized strength: with the vast majority

of losses within the infantry regiments.18

Thus the 22d’s casualty rates, while

on the high end of the norm, are within the expected range of infantry casualties

in the ETO. Since most of an infantry regiment’s casualties occurred in the rifle com-

panies, let me illustrate using one company as an example. Company A or Able

Company, 22d Infantry, landed on D-day with 229 soldiers and sustained with-

in this cohort 149 casualties in its first month of combat, 35 of them killed. In

its first six months of combat, of the 220 soldiers identified as being with the

company on 6 June 1944, 24 percent were killed, 47 percent seriously wound-

ed, 40 percent lightly wounded and 9 percent missing or captured, for a total of

120 percent, meaning that some soldiers were wounded, returned to duty and

were wounded again. This number includes men evacuated beyond the collec-

tion station as battle casualties but not non-battle casualties such as battle fa-

tigue, or illness, which amounts to approximately 35 percent.

Of the battle casualties, 33 percent were wearing NCO stripes at the time

they became a casualty. Every officer who landed on D-day with the unit was

killed or wounded within the first ten days of combat. Initially, pre-D-day co-

hort officers moved from the battalion headquarters and weapons companies to

fill the empty company commander and executive officer positions while re-

placement lieutenants became the platoon leaders. During its eleven months in

combat Able Company commanders came either from within the company or

from other units in the regiment.19

When the last old timers were killed or

wounded, these replacement now veteran platoon leaders moved up.

By VE day, total battle casualties including replacements numbered 591

with 154 dead, 383 wounded and 54 missing or captured. Twenty-six officers

and 126 NCOs were listed as battle casualties, of which 10 officers and 28

NCOs were killed. Because of the constant influx of replacements, median

strength for Able Company during this eleven-month period was 157, or just 36

below its authorized strength of 193. Obviously, only a very robust replacement

system could keep companies at this strength with such casualties. American

units, because of the constant influx of replacements, were never allowed to

shrink to cadre status and, keeping at more or less a constant strength, remained

organizationally sound. As mentioned earlier, infantrymen returned to their

previous units if able. Fifty-six percent of those wounded, injured, or non bat-

tle-casualties rejoined Able Company, at least until the latter stages of the war,

when the casualty rate was low and those who had served longest in the regi-

ment had priority to return.20

Not all soldiers, however, were physically able to

continue as infantrymen and wound up in units in the rear areas, freeing physi-

cally fit soldiers to be retrained as infantrymen.

In the way of comparison, there were more German losses per division

per day in combat in Poland and the first two months of the Russian Campaign

than at any other time until July 1944 when the proverbial roof caved in.21

If we

are to believe the reams of literature commenting on the extraordinary cohesion

and training of pre-war German units, then the answer to the high casualties

must be that the units had not yet seen combat and leaders did not know how to

react. Nevertheless, during this early period the replacement system worked.

By 1944, the system was grossly overburdened, and only the most favored units

received replacements to keep them near strength.

The German infantry units in the West suffered the same horrendous attri-

tion as the Allies, with one telling difference. The 30-day and later in early

1944 60-day rule of keeping those in hospital on company books greatly exag-

gerated strength, while assigning replacements 30 days after requisitions were

submitted kept the units undermanned even after the requisitions were filled.

Thus, the German replacement policy detracted from rather than enhanced

German combat effectiveness. Once committed to combat, a company never

again reached full daily strength unless pulled from the line for an extended

period. Consequently, amalgamation of combat units and stripping of non-

infantry trained support organizations had to occur for units to continue to exist,

as did happen.

In fall 1944, only select German divisions were pulled out to reconstitute

and most infantry units remained in the line during combat until they were bled

dry; maintaining strength primarily through absorption of smaller units. Com-

manders repeatedly consolidated decimated units, with each consolidation less-

ening units’ organizational coherence, until their ever-dwindling bands of sol-

5

diers disappeared forever: killed, wounded, captured, or surrendered. With

combat power gone, the commanders, staffs and certain specialists returned to

build a new unit, while those few men remaining on the line in subordinate

organizations were absorbed by newly arrived headquarters.

If the U.S. Army had used the German replacement rules of keeping

wounded in hospital on its books for 60 days. U.S. rifle companies would have

required around 247 “actual strength” soldiers to maintain a daily average of

157 soldiers. The American system of dropping soldiers from the rolls of rifle

companies when they were evacuated beyond the division rear areas and their

subsequent re-assignment upon convalescence worked best--keeping units

nominally up to strength while ensuring that veterans returned where they were

most needed and most wanted.

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

Abel Company 22d Infantry Composition6 Jun-6 Dec 44

using German personnel accounting techniques

Unk Cadre

Pre D-day Cadre

Rep Jun-Jul 44

Rep Aug-Sep 44

Rep Oct Nov 44

Casualties in Hospital

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

6/1/

44

6/15

/44

6/29

/44

7/13

/44

7/27

/44

8/10

/44

8/24

/44

9/7/

44

9/21

/44

10/5

/44

10/1

9/44

11/2

/44

11/1

6/44

11/3

0/44

Ass

ign

ed

So

ldie

rs

Authorized Strength of Rifle Company 193

“Actual Strength”

“Daily Strength”

The Hürtgen Forest

The Hürtgen Forest illustrates the worst-case scenario for attritional com-

bat. The following does not describe what the 22d Regiment or its battalions

did. The relevant statistics are that it entered the Hürtgen at 96 percent of its

authorized strength of 3,316, sustained 2,806 total casualties, while receiving

2005 replacements for the 6,000 yards of terrain gained during its18-day ordeal.

The 22d lost every original battalion commander, and had at least 31 com-

manders for its nine rifle companies-with the “next man up” usually assuming

command.

By November 1944, those members of the 22d who had survived the

Normandy campaign were experienced, battle-hardened leaders at platoon,

company, battalion and regimental level. Because many had served with one

another during the several years of training in the United States and the previ-

ous five months of combat, this ‘Band of Brothers’ was the cohesive force that

kept the regiment healthy. This layering of experience over the difficult to

attain but easily lost cohesion at the squad level gave the few veteran primary

group survivors a continuing link to the organization. Situational cohesion im-

posed by the dynamics of battle tied arriving replacements to this hardened

cadre, as well as to a lesser extent the commitment to the common purpose of

the group. S.L.A. Marshall and Shils and Janowitz sharply de-emphasized the

importance to cohesion of commitment to a common cause, patriotism, the de-

sire to defeat a hated enemy, or other motives, instead emphasizing that cohe-

sion in combat was based on the individual's loyalty to the primary group. While a necessary corrective to earlier views that over-emphasized the im-

portance of ideology and patriotic fervor, this thesis has in my view been

pressed too far. Just ask the soldiers currently in Afghanistan and Iraq if the

events of September 11, 2001 affected the way they viewed themselves and

those they are fighting.

If one looks only at the regiment’s overall strength, one does not see the

massive inroads made on rifle company strengths. There were more casualties

in rifle companies that there were members who began on 16 November. Five

days after entering the battle, the regiment’s rifle companies had lost more than

40 percent of their strength and by the end of this eighteen-day battle, casualties

6

in these units had reached a staggering average of 134 percent, with 92 percent

of those beginning the battle in rifle companies killed, wounded, injured or

evacuated as non battle casualties. It was only through the massive infusion of

replacements that the companies remained viable although tremendously de-

graded by loss of its seasoned veterans 22 The great majority of soldiers killed or wounded were not the newly arrived

replacements, but veterans. The veteran riflemen, scouts, and BAR (Browning

Automatic Rifle) men were privates first class (PFC). On 16 November, there

were more PFCs in the regiment than any other rank. Many arrived in the regi-

ment between June and early November 1944, and some of them were pre D-

day. Most of the PFCs had experienced combat at least once. More than 50

percent of the total combat casualties during the first week of fighting in the

Hürtgen Forest were these veteran PFCs. When the PFCs fell, officers and

NCOs took their place as scouts because the replacements lacked experience in

front line patrolling. Unfortunately, more leaders were lost by this

out-front style of leadership. Twenty-five percent of the leaders

fell, on par with the TO&E strength of a rifle company; however,

most fell during the first days and by 30 November, there principally only

replacements left to continue the fight. During the battle, some of the lower

ranking veterans became cautious and resistant to change; not pushing so hard

as to embarrass other veterans who were even more cautious. Although cohe-

sion is normally desired, these primary groups may have become “muscle

bound” with cohesion in the form of peer pressure after two months of relative

inactivity prior to the Hürtgenwald.23 The 22d received 2005 replacements over the 18-day period of which 320

were casuals returning to duty after being earlier wounded or injured. Most of

the replacements coming from the states were in the ranks of private and se-

cond lieutenant. Many of the NCO and PFC replacements new to the regiment

had been wounded while in other units and had been diverted to the 22d during

this crisis.24

Even with such bloodletting, the 22d moved forward as long as there was

a veteran cadre around which the new replacements could coalesce, even

though the veterans too had human faults. This chart shows the members pre-

sent by cohort in Company A in the Hürtgen Forest along with casualties and

replacements of each. It was only through the massive infusion of replace-

ments that the company remained viable although tremendously degraded by

loss of its seasoned veterans. The great majority of soldiers killed or wounded

were not the newly arrived replacements, but veterans.

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

Devolution of a Company

Able Company Hurtgen Casualties

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Oct-Nov

Aug-Sep

Jun-Jul

Cadre

Repl Oct Nov

Repl Aug-Sep

Repl Jun-Jul

Gain Cadre

Loss Oct Nov

Loss Aug-Sep

Loss Jun-Jul

Loss Cadre

Total Co Str

Daily Company Strength

(includes Replacement arriving

during Hürtgen Campaign)

Repl Aug-Sept

Pre D-Day Cadre

Repl Jun-Jul

Losses

Replacements /Casuals

Repl Oct-Nov

Gains

Love Company, one of the rifle companies in the 3d Battalion, began the

battle at 100 percent strength. During the course of the Hürtgen Forest, 152 of

the Love Company soldiers standing in formation on 16 November fell.

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

0%

2 0%

4 0%

6 0%

8 0%

10 0%

16-

Nov

17-

Nov

18-N

ov

19-N

ov

20-N

ov

21-N

ov

22-N

ov

23-N

ov

s4nov44

25-N

ov

26-N

ov

27-N

ov

28-N

ov

29-N

ov

30-

No

v

1-D

ec

2-D

ec

3-D

ec

4-D

ec

D a te

Pe

rce

nt

LT C

MAJ

C P T

1s t LT

2d L T

1S G

Te c h S G T

P lt N C O s

Te c h G d s

P F C

P V T

Battle Losses by Grade by Day 22d Infantry Regiment

Hürtgen Forest (100 Percent)

7

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

0

50

100

150

200

250

Day

1

Day

2

Day

3

Day

4

Day

5

Day

6

Day

7

Day

8

Day

9

Day

10

Day

11

Day

12

Day

13

Day

14

Day

15

Day

16

Day

17

Day

18

Assigned Strength

Losses cadre

Losses Replacements

Returning Casuals

New Replacements

Authorized strength 6/187

Cadre losses

8 officers (Auth 6)

33 NCOs (Auth 37)

111 Other Ranks

Cadre Beginning

8 officers

37 NCOs

148 enlisted

Replacement Gains

3 officers

17 NCOs (3 cadre)

115 Other Ranks (8 cadre)

90 percent P1 (173)

80 percent P2 (154)

70 percent P3 (135)

60 percent P4 (116)

Avg

Str

143

Day

1-18

Avg

Str

147

Day

1-14

Love Company, 18 days in Combat with Replacements

However, with replacements the company remained viable though de-

graded by veteran casualties, and maintained an average strength of 143 sol-

diers during the 18-day period. It was only at the end of the battle, when the

veterans were all killed, wounded, or too worn out to be effective, that the

company could do no more. Forty-one of those beginning the battle, most of

whom were in the company admin section, answered the company muster on 4

December when they loaded trucks for a quiet sector in Luxembourg, where

they began reconstituting; to be interrupted by the Battle of the Bulge twelve

days later. 25

Without replacements, the company would have essentially disappeared

after 15 days in combat, and what is most critical to sustained combat perfor-

mance, leaving no veterans remaining for those replacements arriving after the

battle to coalesce around when it reconstituted. Those veterans who carried

within them a priceless repository of battlefield knowledge that passed from

them to new replacements by demonstrating how to fight and survive by the

method of “do as I do” which no amount of stateside or other training could

replicate.

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

0

50

100

150

200

250

Day

1

Day

2

Day

3

Day

4

Day

5

Day

6

Day

7

Day

8

Day

9

Day

10

Day

11

Day

12

Day

13

Day

14

Day

15

Day

16

Day

17

Day

18

Assigned Strength

Losses cadre

Returning Casuals

Authorized strength 6/187

Cadre Beginning

8 officers

37 NCOs

148 enlisted

50 percent strength

90 percent P1 (173)

80 percent P2 (154)

70 percent P3 (135)

60 percent P4 (116)

Avg

Str

114

Day

1-14

Cadre losses

8 officers (Auth 6)

36 NCOs (Auth 37)

140 Other Ranks

Love Company, 18 days in Combat without Replacements

Avg

Str

98

Day

1-18

The German Perspective

During its battle in the woods, the 22d Infantry fought elements of thirteen

German regiments. Only the regiments of the 275th Infanterie Division had any

success against the Americans in the Hürtgen forest, principally because they

had been in the Grosshau area since early October and their commanders knew

the ground. The 275th entered heavy combat against the U.S. 28th Infantry

Division in October 1944 and the 4th Division in mid-November. This German

Division was bled dry after just four days of intense fighting against the 4th,

and the 275th relinquished battle control to the newly arriving 344th

Volksgrenadier Division, which absorbed the combat elements of the 275th.

Quickly decimated, the 344th controlled the battle for just five days of

fighting before transferring command of the battle around Grosshau to the ar-

riving 353d Volksgrenandier Division.

Four days later, the 353d was an amalgam of disparate units holding a

tenuous line of small towns that prevented movement into the Rur River plain.

When the 22d seized Grosshau on 29 November, the German units were so

such a mixed bag that the 133 Germans captured near Grosshau were from 15

different companies, 6 different regiments, and 4 different divisions. Later reg-

iments from yet another division acted as a counterattack force in attempts to

throw the Americans back.

8

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

I

II

985

985

II

IIII 985

II

/275 xx

II

II

984

1057

II

IIII 1057

II

/344 VG xx

Various small

Kampfgruppes 344

Bn Köhler (about 100)

344 VG xx

II

Battalions renamed for their commanders after

Battalion numbers withdrawn for reconstitution

Bn Ramrad

344 VG xx

Various small

Kampfgruppes 344KG

II

353 VG

II

German Consolidation

in the Hürtgenwald

In contrast to the American Army in the Hürtgen Forest, the German Ar-

my allowed units in contact to wither, and instead of reinforcing these veteran

organizations, consolidated them when they grew too small; while committing

newly rebuilt units of relatively fresh but untried and untrained men—to little

avail. German companies suffered the same fate as the 22d’s, but lacked the

ability to regenerate and disappeared as organizations in the Hürtgen.26

When

the final phase of the battle for the Hürtgen Forest ended in early December

1944, it was the Americans who had gained the ground and the Germans who

had had to surrender it—in a battle where much-mentioned American superiori-

ty in air support and logistics went for naught, and artillery was equally availa-

ble.

Twelve days after its relief from the Hürtgen Forest, an exhausted and de-

bilitated 22d Infantry was reconstituting in the quiet sector just north of Lux-

embourg City, with companies of 50-60 soldiers holding 5,000 yards of front.

There, they were struck by elements of the 212th

Volksgrenadier Division dur-

ing the opening phases of the German Ardennes Counteroffensive. The 212th

was experienced through hard service in Russia and had been reconstituting

since late September 1944 for its role in the Ardennes Campaign. In January

1945, the Ia (Chief of Staff) wrote about the first seven days of the battle.

Company leaders were not experienced to fight in the West and lacked

terrain appreciation as well as underestimated the fighting abilities of

the Americans.

The biggest problem was the 20km front—this tactic only works if the

enemy is flank sensitive and surrenders strong points when bypassed,

but in reality the American strongpoints offered grim resistance even

when the situation appeared hopeless.

The enemy was tenacious and showed strong resistance. The key to the

success of all American attacks was, besides the material superiority,

the outstanding training of the individual soldier and, in particular,

the fire discipline that was evident everywhere.

Infantry wise, through the steady flow of replacements of fresh, rested

forces the Americans slowly achieved the upper hand against our own

troops, which were severely weakened by deprivations and exhaustion

for days, so that even instantaneously launched counter attacks did not

succeed from the 7th day of battle onward.

The main weakness of our own leadership lies in the insufficient expe-

rience of company leaders for such an extensive battle. They were not

capable of leading their companies in this environment. … This was

the division’s [212th

] first experience against the enemy in the West.27

Lessons

As demonstrated above, infantry in combat always suffer casualties. If

lucky there are not many; however, if at the wrong place and at the wrong

time—they can be devastating. Companies three hundred yards apart may have

a tremendous disparity in losses. Once entered into sustained heavy combat,

organizations remained viable either through receiving replacements to bolster

units on the line or by consolidating units as they grew ever smaller, with each

consolidation causing the unit to lose more organizational structure and coher-

ence. Success results NOT from rotating organizations in and out of combat

but from sustaining those organizations while in combat. Battalions fighting at

near battalion strength can accomplish missions what battalions fighting at

company strength cannot, even when it is a company of grizzled warriors. It is

only when the veteran cadre is sustained by a continual influx of new soldiers

who in turn coalesce around this battle-hardened core that a unit’s combat pow-

er increases. It also demonstrates that “battles are won by remnants,” because

manpower wastage runs so high so quickly, and if it were not for an efficient

replacement system, regiments would be ground down to its backbone in rela-

tively short order.

Organizations operate smoothly as long as there is an abundance of every-

thing and the mission is being accomplished at a reasonable price. Similar to

sports teams, all of whom appear cohesive as long as they are winning; military

organizations moving forward rarely have cohesion problems. With the appear-

ance of stress and setback; however, a never ceasing friction begins that only

organizations with a strong identity and a capability to change survive. Ameri-

can infantry organizations remained effective because of organizational cohe-

sion, while the German units they faced collapsed. Contrary to some conven-

9

tional wisdom, it was the American system of keeping units in the line and pro-

gressively integrating replacements in the middle of combat that sustained

combat-effective infantry units at the battalion level and below, because the

units stayed large enough to function as designed. The Germans, constantly

whittled by attrition, became a jumbled group of individuals with much less

organizational endurance.

The small unit cohesion seen as crucial to success by many theorists did

not exist in most infantry organizations because the casualties were too high.

Traditional small unit cohesion takes years to build, but only moments to de-

stroy, and then the reliance must be on other factors. Infantry casualties in the

divisions landing on the Normandy coast in June through August 1944 reached

better than 100 percent before the war terminated in Europe, with some regi-

ments reaching more than 300 percent and many rifle companies more than 500

percent.

Based on personal experience as well as my research, I believe that there

was cohesion, just not the kind to which Ardant du Picq, Marshall, and Shils

and Janowitz refer. Rather than the long-term acquaintanceship of a “band of

brothers”, I found that the more typical type of wartime cohesion resulted from

conditions more situational in nature and imposed by circumstances and sur-

roundings. The 22d in the Hürtgen had a combination of the types, the ever-

shrinking "band of brothers" around which situational cohesion coalesced until

the veteran replacements became members of the band.

Replacements Fitting In

Before the Second World War, men destined for the infantry entered their

units direct from recruiting and reception stations, and received their basic

training in specially organized recruit companies within the regiment. Once

basically trained, soldiers joined their companies as “basics” within the head-

quarters platoon of their company, and joined their squad when a position

opened. However, with the high attrition associated with infantry combat,

many times the infantry basics went into squads. Beginning in 1942, those men

not directly assigned to newly forming divisions received their training at re-

ception training centers (RTC); in 1943, all infantrymen entering divisions were

RTC trained.

The replacements in the veteran divisions approximated the attitudes of

the veterans when asked about their willingness to enter combat. They were

more proud of their company than the veterans, and both were prouder than

green men in units which had not seen combat. They knew that until they

fought well in combat and “learned the ropes,” they would not be completely

accepted by the combat veterans and the established primary group. The re-

placements did not resent their inferiority to the veterans; and sought to “prove”

themselves by taking over the veterans’ attitudes, such as their conviction about

the war.28

Edward Shils found in his “Primary Groups in the American Army”

that while replacements to some extent hampered the functioning of small units

under fire; he also believed that it was not of paramount importance principally

because the primary group was not the only factor in military effectiveness and

partly because the assimilation of newcomers into the group was accelerated by

combat.29

The Commanding General of the 96th

Division on Okinawa requested that

his units receive replacements in small packets rather than in large groups so

that they might better assimilate into units. His request was borne out in the

Stouffer Studies that found that “the larger the proportion of newcomers, the

greater the resistance of the established primary group to their assimilation.”30

That was unless there were severe casualties, as there were in the ETO.

General Fox Connor wrote in 1940 about World War I combat, “With replace-

ments promptly assigned to fill the blank files and with casualties not crushing,

odds are the veterans talked up their unit and its exploits. However, when re-

placements did not arrive and the veterans watched their group grow smaller

and smaller, every man’s thoughts turn to the hardship suffered and the buddy

killed alongside him. Morale crumbles.”31

Replacements rapidly assimilated into their squads when everyone was

faced with an external threat such as combat. Situational cohesion imposed by

the dynamics of battle tied replacements to the hardened veterans, as well as to

a lesser extent the commitment to the common purpose of the group. To the

members of the armed forces, this meant going home victorious after defeating

Germany and Japan. It did not really matter how long a replacement was in his

unit—there were no significant differences in his morale whether he entered

combat shortly after being assigned (within a week) or had joined his unit and

remained out of combat for a longer period.32

With the end of the war in Europe, the Army announced a point system

whereby soldiers would redeploy to the United States. Those with 85 points

were subject to discharge on their return home. With the end of the war against

Japan, the clamor to bring the boys home negated Army plans to bring individ-

uals home in the organizations they had fought in. Instead, divisions became

carrier units that shipped home with soldiers from different units but within the

announced points.

During 1946 and 1947, the Army conducted studies on casualties and ro-

tation policy. Both arrived at the same conclusion that a rotation policy was

necessary for the frontline soldier. They also considered individual rotation

practical only if unit rotation was practiced. Unit rotation seemed to promise

longer life for the frontline soldier, to assure a reserve, and to provide units

with an opportunity to reequip, to assimilate replacements, to review the les-

sons of battle, and to carry out such reorganization as might be needed.33

Whatever the individual rotation system devised, the committees recom-

mended that it be simple and warned that once such a system was set up it must

10

be rigorously carried out, otherwise more harm than good would result such as

had happened in the Southwest Pacific Area. One study recommended that

individual rotation be based on time in combat rather than on time overseas and

implied relief from frontline service after 250 days, and noted that individual

rotation was better than unit rotation. The proposed individual rotation system

did not guarantee a soldier a trip home or even out of the theater or that he

would not return to combat, but did guarantee him relief from frontline combat

for a definite and uninterrupted period.34

Korea When the war began in Korea, most infantry regiments in the Army con-

tained two instead of three battalions, and were augmented by a third battalion

as well as by individual fillers during the first months of the war. Additional

replacements arrived to take the place of those killed or wounded. Dependent

upon the tactical situation, soldiers spent time first in the divisional replacement

company where they received additional training and indoctrination specific to

the organization before moving forward to join their regiment, whereas in

WWII, they processed through the service company, to battalion and finally to

their assigned unit. Of those wounded, approximately 60 percent returned to

duty. Whenever possible hospital returnees went back to their parent unit, or if

classified limited service, sent to a unit in Japan or elsewhere.35

World War II experience indicated that after long periods of sustained

combat, soldiers sometimes became careless, sometimes overly cautious, and at

others, even indifferent to their own personal safety; in any event, an infantry-

man’s chances of still being in the unit after six months in combat were consid-

erably lessened. An infantryman’s chance of survival on a day-by-day basis

after six months in combat was about 30 percent. In other words, only three of

ten soldiers beginning in a rifle company were present after six months. The

other seven were killed, missing, or evacuated as a battle or nonbattle casual-

ty.36

As a result of the studies and analysis of the WWII replacement system

for the first time the Army set a time limit on length in a combat zone during

the Korean War. Soldiers were awarded points for being in the combat zone,

with more points granted those on fighting on the front lines that those in head-

quarters and service units. Appearances are that front line soldiers thought the

program fair, while those in the rear echelons did not.37

Although there were calls for unit rotation during the Korean War, man-

power and shortage of units precluded any type of unit rotation during the early

years. Additionally, the Secretary of the Army believed unit rotation would

nullify the Army’s effort to maintain combat efficiency in Korea by the gradual

rotation of individuals from battle wise units.38

General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief Far East, and former

commander of the 82d Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps in the

ETO during WWII, also rejected unit rotation, considering it wasteful, as he felt

units on the line could not be replaced by other units until the latter had re-

ceived training; thus requiring two units to accomplish one job. He further be-

lieved that unit rotation would damage combat effectiveness, as new men on

the line would not be able to benefit from the experience and guidance of veter-

an soldiers.39

Lieutenant General James van Fleet, Eighth Army commander and witness

high casualties while a regimental commander in the ETO, and who probably

understood better than most the need to rotate soldiers out of combat, believed

that the “high enlisted rotational turnover has had a highly beneficial effect on

the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Army” and further felt that a turnover of

30,000 per month in theater would improve morale and have little effect on

combat effectiveness as long as replacements were of high quality.40

General Mark Clark followed General Ridgway in May 1952 as Command-

er in Chief Far East. As the former commander of Fifth Army in Italy, he had

relied on relieving units on the line so they might retrain and receive replace-

ments. In December 1952, Clark recommended that the Army rotate battalions

in and out of the Far East. This plan envisioned cadres of officers and NCOs

joining with newly inducted recruits, taking them through basic and advanced

infantry training and then overseas to Korea. The Army G1 estimated that this

method would require 57 battalions be built per year, and an additional 20,000

men added to the personnel pipeline, at the time the Army barely had enough

men qualified to fill overseas requirements. Consequently, the plan was not

adopted.41

As demonstrated above, every senior commander in Korea had a predilec-

tion toward the type of replacement system prevalent in the theater in which he

operated during World War II. In the PTO and MTO, although combat was

fierce at times, there were enough units so that units could rotate out of combat

during quiet periods. This did not, and could not happen in the ETO where the

intensity of combat was continual.

Unit rotation did occur in Korea. Two National Guard divisions arrived in

Japan during 1951 however did not remain there long. Anxious to demonstrate

the effectiveness of its mobilization plan the Army directed that both divisions

deploy to Korea to replace divisions currently serving there. The divisions

moved to Korea in increments with only their individual weapons and equip-

ment. The advance parties signed for all vehicles, crew served weapons, and

other equipment of the Regular divisions—which were in reserve off the front

lines—while advance parties from those divisions signed for the Guard divi-

sions’ equipment in Japan. As the Guardsmen arrived in Korea, most of the

divisions being relieved personnel boarded the same transport to move to Ja-

pan. During the exchange, several thousand officers and enlisted men from the

1st Cavalry and the 24

th Infantry Divisions were transferred into the Guard divi-

sions because they had less than the minimum number of points required for

11

rotation from Korea. The exchanges occurred without significant problems and

the two Regular divisions began training programs within a few days of arriv-

ing in Japan.42

In 1954, three Regular divisions returned to the US from Korea, among

them the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions who moved with only their colors and

1,025 officers and enlisted men eligible for rotation. The divisions’ equipment,

facilities, and soldiers not eligible for rotation were transferred to other units in

Korea.43

4 Man Teams and Carrier Company

In late 1952 the Army returned to a simple and proven system that had

worked well during the latter stages of the European theater during World War

II: groups of four men who had been together during basic training were inte-

grated into carrier companies for ship movement overseas and assigned to the

same platoon upon arrival at their oversea station. Field commanders regarded

the method as highly effective since it solved many problems of transportation,

administration, and morale.44

Replacement in the Chinese and North Korean Armies

Rather than reconstitute units severely attrited, the Chinese and North Ko-

rean Armies disbanded them, with their personnel assigned to other units. This

practice was intended to prevent defeated units from becoming demoralized.45

Attempts at Unit Rotation during the 1950s and 1960s

Rather than unit rotation, for fifty years, USAREUR and EUSA relied on

individual rotations of one, two, three, or four years to keep its units filled plus

planned augmentations of units arriving from the Continental United States to

maintain security in Europe and Korea. Nevertheless, unit rotation was at-

tempted.

With the Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on atomic weapons and the

resultant Army restructuring, as well as poor enlisted retention rates, the Army

reexamined the individual replacement system that required a large manpower

overhead because large numbers of soldiers were always in transit. Some with-

in the Army believed that a unit replacement system would be more economi-

cal, and be more effective while improving esprit de corps. Beginning in 1956,

the Army experimented with several different methods of unit replacement;

most involving rotating with units in Germany.

Platoon Replacement

Platoon replacement called for training soldiers together in the United

States, then processing and shipping them overseas as part of well-trained in-

fantry platoons. USAREUR considered the platoon experiment effective, how-

ever found that assigning intact platoons to established companies created prob-

lems when the companies compressed its three original platoons into two so

that the new “third” platoon could remain together, causing resentment and

morale problems among those previously assigned soldiers moving from one

platoon to another.46

Operation GYROSCOPE.

In 1954, the Army developed Operation GYROSCOPE, which in-

volved pairing like units of separate battalion, RCT, and division size. The

paired units would rotate between the US and an overseas station, the unit in

the US relieving a like-type unit overseas on a three-year cycle. Leaving all

12

heavy equipment in place, the thought was that after the initial rotation troops

would take only their individual weapons and equipment.47

This pairing also

theoretically provided a “home base” for soldiers during most of their career.

GYROSCOPE proved to be a plan that could not sustained and DA ended it

in 1959. Between 1955 and 1959, the major combat units that participated in

Gyroscope were twelve divisions in six rotations between the US and Germany;

two divisions in a rotation between the continental US and Alaska; four ar-

mored cavalry regiments in two rotations between the US and Germany; and

two airborne regimental combat teams in a rotation between the US and Japan.

Theater commanders complained that GYROSCOPE resulted in unacceptable

periods of reduced readiness. Although GYROSCOPE helped to sustain sol-

diers’ morale, the experiment also demonstrated that the Army was not large

enough to support division-size unit rotation without grave risk to operational

readiness, while the cost of rotating combat, combat support, and service units

with dependents, was prohibitive. After units arrived overseas, they needed

time to familiarize themselves with the operational area and contingency plans,

and near the end of a rotation attention was focused on preparations for return-

ing to the US. In addition to these factors, GYROSCOPE created particular

problems for divisions. Since they rotated in increments, it was several months

before an exchange was completed and the entire division ready for combat. 48

After several rotations, Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army

commander, and former commander of Combat Command B 7th Armored Di-

vision and St Vith fame, recommended limiting GYROSCOPE to units smaller

than divisions after he found that combat efficiency declined before and after

rotation. In 1958, the last divisional exchange took place thereafter the program

involved only smaller-size units. In 1959, the Army ended GYROSCOPE be-

cause other replacement systems worked better with less disruption. Although

GYROSCOPE helped to sustain soldiers’ morale, the experiment also demon-

strated that the Army was not large enough to support division-size unit rota-

tion without grave risk to operational readiness, while the cost of rotating com-

bat, combat support, and service units with dependents, was prohibitive.49

ROTAPLAN.

The principal purpose of the unaccompanied unit rotation plan know as

ROTAPLAN was to provide units capable of rapidly responding to world-wide

requirements, with the additional hope that it would reduce the gold outflow

from the United States to Europe. ROTAPLAN deployed organizations over-

seas for 179-day periods without dependents. Reluctant from the beginning,

General Clark believed that the Army’s then force structure ratios between

troops overseas and those in the United States (40 percent versus 60 percent),

plus theater deviations in organization and equipment, precluded world-wide

adoption of a unit rotation plan. He also thought applying the program only to

selected units was inequitable and therefore should apply equally to combat and

support organizations. General Paul L. Freeman, at that time USAREUR

Commander and former commander of the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry

Division, who had deployed with his unit to Korea during 1950 and command-

ed at Chipyong-ni, wrote, “My position on any form of unit rotation has not

changed. I am strongly opposed to ROTAPLAN because of the degradation of

readiness stature and operational capability.”50

One would think that Generals

Clark and Freeman, both former commanders of organizations that had gloried

themselves in combat, would have had thought better of unit rotation. In July,

1963 the Army discontinued ROTAPLAN because “it generated considerable

personnel turbulence and did not produce the hoped for reduction of the spend-

ing of dollars abroad.”51

LONG THRUST

Beginning in 1961, equipment for two U.S. based divisions was preposi-

tioned in Europe, which drastically reduced the reaction time necessary to pro-

vide combat-ready reinforcements. The LONG THRUST exercises, involving

infantry battle groups, demonstrated the capability of the United States to move

trained forces from America to Europe that would be capable of sustained

combat in a matter of days. Although conceived as a strategic mobility exercise

on the battle-group level, it became an instrument of augmentation and unit

rotation when it deployed a battle group to Berlin on short notice. 52

In its tests conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, USAREUR revali-

dated the individual replacement system as the most effective method of sus-

taining units, as long as the flow of trained replacements continued. Generally,

commanders deemed the battle group and battalion-size rotations successful,

although the 1- to 2-month period of lowered operational readiness was a high

price to pay for such a short time overseas. There was the concern that, “if too

high a percentage of the overall Army strength is in constant rotation turmoil,

the “fire brigade” in the United States and the guardians of peace along the

Iron Curtain become equally ineffectual.” Participating units in the United

States had to be stripped of any soldier who did not have at least eight more

months of service and who had recently returned from overseas, especially

from a hardship tour area. These shifts destroyed the teamwork that had been

developed in training. Some units of the 2d Infantry Division units had to be

broken up to fill deploying battalions.53

USAREUR finally recommended in

1963 that battalion sized rotations continue only as a training device to exercise

troops, airlift procedures and prepositioned equipment; preferring the individual

replacement system and rapid deployment of CONUS units as the standard

method of reinforcement.54

OVUREP

The Overseas Unit Replacement (OVUREP) began in 1960. After spending

eight months training together in the United States, (basic through unit training)

13

the infantry battalion shipped to Korea for a one-year rotation beginning in

March 1961. The OVUREP battalion disbanded in the spring of 1962, with its

remaining members being assigned to other units throughout Korea.55

Vietnam, the Yearly Rotation System

Units who had served and trained together in the United States fought the

first battles in Vietnam. However, instead of utilizing unit replacement Army

leader decided, for many of the same reasons as in Korea to retain units in thea-

ter and rely on individual replacements to keep them filled. In the eight years

infantry units were in Vietnam, approximately 15 percent of those soldiers

serving as infantrymen arrived as part of a unit, the remainder as replace-

ments.56

During that period, individual replacements arrived to take the place

of men made casualties and of those rotated home under the one-year rotation

policy that affected all soldiers in country, regardless of duty position or loca-

tion.

With the onset of large-scale involvement in Vietnam, the Army expanded

rapidly and formed units for deployment to satisfy ground force requirements.

Because the one-year tour policy remained in effect throughout war, the Army

resorted to the use of an “infusion” technique that distributed soldiers with var-

ying rotation dates into newly arriving units to preclude the organization’s in-

stantaneous disestablishment after one year in country. Infantry battalions re-

mained in theater long after the soldiers who had arrived with it in Vietnam had

rotated, with the units being filled by a constant influx of replacements.

In Vietnam, when Delta companies arrived in country as a battalion’s fourth

rifle company, most senior commanders broke the companies up, spreading the

soldiers throughout the battalion and assigning soldiers from those companies

to the Delta Company so that there was a leavening of old veteran hands in

each company. Senior commanders thought it better to have veterans in an or-

ganization instead of one that had trained together but had no combat experi-

ence.57

Soldiers arriving in Vietnam, similar to Korea, also went through unit spe-

cific schools before joining their companies. Due to individual replacement,

the units always had veterans of varying degree around which the replacements

could coalesce. Although most soldiers were in country a year or less, there

was a cross leveling so that there were veterans in each newly arriving unit af-

ter 1966, both to ensure that not all soldiers went home at one time, and more

importantly so that the veterans could impart their battle-learned knowledge;

without which units would have had to learn the techniques of this specialized

combat environment the hard way, resulting in higher than normal casualties

that a unit new to combat absorbs.58

When platoons were overrun in the field, it was more likely to be more

because they were under strength than because they lacked cohesion. In the Ia

Drang LZ X-Ray fight, the B Company 1-7 CAV platoon that was cut off and

almost annihilated began with 27 well-trained and led soldiers.59

Had there

been fewer, it is very possible, like many other short-handed platoons, their unit

would have been destroyed.

For the North Vietnamese Army up until 1968, many of the main force reg-

iments of the NVA would fight one major battle during the spring and then

withdraw to a safe haven for 6-8 months to refit and train the groups of re-

placements arriving from the north and then move into position for the next

attack. After 1968 TET, NVA/VC effectiveness declined after the “US learned

to step up its operations and fight much more efficiently when the NVA/VC

stepped up its attacks.” “A second reason … is that loss of trained VC/NVA

cadre and personnel, apparently lowered the fighting effectiveness of the

Communist forces in South Vietnam.”60

Could it be that those American sol-

diers returning for subsequent tours as well as those members of organizations

that had been fighting in the same area for years now understood how to fight

this type war?

The Volunteer Army

In 1973, the All-Volunteer force replaced the 25-year long draft. Much like

the 50s and early 60s, leaders became concerned about turbulence caused by

continual movement of individuals, preventing small units from attaining max-

imum training effectiveness and combat readiness. Consequently, the Army

conducted various studies to more clearly define the problem and identify solu-

tions.

Brigade 75/Brigade 76

Under this plan the headquarters and a support battalion for each brigade

were stationed in Germany while the infantry, armor, and field artillery battal-

ions, engineer companies, and cavalry troops from the United States rotated

every six months. No provisions were made for dependents to accompany the

soldiers since they were to be away from home on temporary duty for only 179

days. As units rotated, the Army monitored the effect on the budget, readiness,

and morale. Evidence soon suggested that the rotation of the brigades im-

proved neither cost effectiveness nor readiness, and the brigades were perma-

nently assigned to Germany.61

Cohort

In the 1980s the Army experimented with the COHORT (Cohesion, Opera-

tional Readiness, and Training) Unit Replacement System, an effort to foster

unit cohesion by keeping soldiers together in companies for a life cycle of three

years, after studies conducted during the late 1970s and early 1980s found that

turbulence and lack of cohesion might be reduced through development of a

unit rotation system.62

The cohort battalions of the 1980s began at full strength filled with newly

graduated classes of One Station Unit Training (OSUT) soldiers and cadres of

14

officers and NCOs drawn from throughout the Army. However, because of

personnel policies of sending new packages of soldiers once a year to replace

those soldiers dropped from the rolls for medical, compassionate or other rea-

sons, the battalion’s companies soon realized a steady decrease in strength even

with the yearly additions; with some squads beginning at nine reduced to six or

seven by their third year. In 1989, an infantry battalion in its last year and

trained to peak efficiency went to JRTC at 76 percent strength, counting short-

ages and non-deployables, only seven percent from where many consider a unit

unable to accomplish its mission. However, JRTC induced casualties rapidly

decreased combat numbers to the point of one company with an attached pla-

toon making the battalion main attack with only 63 soldiers!63

And companies

fighting at such reduced strength, no matter how well trained or veteran, could

not accomplish missions expected of full-strength units, and possibly suffered

higher casualties than they would have if operating at full strength.

Rush

Replacement and Rotation

Coh ort Com pan y 1-22

198 6-198 9

0

2 0

4 0

6 0

8 0

10 0

12 0

14 0

May-8

6

Jul-8

6

Sep-

86

Nov -8

6

Jan-87

Mar-87

May -8

7

Jul-8

7

Sep-

87

Nov-

87

Jan-88

Mar-88

May -8

8

Jul-8

8

Sep-

88

Nov-

88

Jan-89

Mar-89

May -8

9

Jul-8

9

To ta l

C ad re

OSU T

19 86

19 87

19 88

19 89

J

R

T

C

Authorized strength 5/125

80 percent P2 (104)

70 percent P3 (91)

90 percent P1 (117)

60 percent P4 (78)

50 percent strength

Many of the officers, NCOs and specialists from this “old” cohort remained

in place when this battalion received its “new” cohort of over 300 soldiers from

OSUT. Because of the heavy leavening of leaders and squad members who had

been together for an extended period, instead of three NCOs and six OSUT

infantrymen there were three NCOs one to three seasoned soldiers and three to

five newly assigned soldiers. With such a mix, the training of squads and pla-

toons progressed rapidly to the point that after eight weeks the squads were

better than the ones they had replaced.64

One of the problems was that company and battalion level training lagged

because of the emphasis on squad training. Although Cohort was going strong

at the end of the Cold War, there were problem indicators. Units were not mis-

sion capable during their train up period. Secondly, because of the cohort na-

ture, soldiers arrived in bulk once a year to fill the spaces of those departed,

though never bringing the unit up to its authorized strength.

At its largest, COHORT comprised ten percent of the Active Component's

companies. The Army’s downsizing and the numerous unpredictable deploy-

ments of the Army in the early 1990s that required ad hoc tailoring of forces

created major problems for COHORT. Perhaps more importantly, the fixed

composition of unit personnel, geographical areas of stationing, and life cycle

of COHORT units restricted the control that commanders could exercise over

them.

After the Cold War

Desert Shield/Desert Storm

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 the United States Army was without a

doubt the most proficient and professional military force the United States had

ever fielded at the beginning of a foreign war. Since the early 1980s units had

been training at the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center,

and the combat training centers in Europe. Units and their slices arrived by air,

drew equipment from pre-positioned stocks, fought a world-class foe, and prac-

ticed all of the requirements necessary for success on the modern battlefield.

These realistic exercises acquainted soldiers with the stress of battle as well as

peacetime training could hope to manage. Additionally, tactical units routinely

deployed on exercises such as REFORGER to Germany, BRIGHT STAR in the

Middle East and TEAM SPIRIT in Korea. 65

Although 296,965 soldiers participated in Operation Desert Storm, casual-

ties were minimal—principally due to detailed planning and excellent unit and

individual training. Part of the planning entailed preparing for the expected

high casualties. Rather than use individual replacements as was done in past

wars, the replacement plan entailed using complete pre-positioned platoons,

squads, and crews drawn from non-deploying units. The 22d Support Com-

mand had responsibility for the Weapon System Replacement Operations

(WSRO) and Squad/Crew/Team (SCT) programs. These small units complete

with their equipment would go to the forward combat elements as replacements

for battle casualties. As a result of the small number of casualties, some of

these organizations were assigned at the Corps and Army level, while others

were assigned directly to divisions. The US VII Corps formed Task Force

Jayhawk, and used the WRSO units for rear area security operations; while the

XVIII Airborne Corps assigned the WRSO units below Corps level.66

Redeployment

Units left the theater with their personnel and equipment, not just their col-

ors, with the XVIII Airborne Corps returning first to resume the contingency

corps mission, followed by the return of VII Corps to Europe. Once the cease-

15

fire appeared to be holding, Central Command had commanders identify sol-

diers to send home as representatives of those to follow. This initial redeploy-

ment of 1000 found themselves celebrated at home with their families just two

weeks after the war had ended. Bringing the remaining soldiers home from

Kuwait and Iraq would take months. 67

Operations other than War and Small Scale Contingencies

The overseas deployments Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia and other

locations during the 1990s besides Desert Shield and Desert Storm required

consideration, if not determination, of tailored rotation policies and the Army

adopted unit rotations. However, it was not without cost.

The units deploying to meet Small Scale Contingency (SSC) or Operation

other than War during the 1990s depended upon individual rotation and fillers

to reach deployment strength, deployed as units and then relied upon replace-

ments to keep it filled while deployed. During the 1990s, peacetime

nondeployable soldiers in deploying units comprised between 35 to 40 percent

due to PCS, ETS, schools, and recent return from overseas or other reasons.

These deploying units were “fenced” to assist in stabilizing the organization

while the command identified who would deploy and who would not during the

manifesting process. The deploying and deployed units received two types of

soldiers to fill identified vacancies: individual replacements on permanent

change of station, and as a result of MOS cross-leveling actions, fillers, soldiers

temporary transferred from one unit to another unit to enhance the personnel

strength and mission capabilities of the deploying force, and who returned to

their home units upon redeployment. Non deployable soldiers temporarily

transferred to other units while those eligible to deploy arrived, which compli-

cated any deployment immediately following the first since the non deploying

units now had additional nondeployables. This created extensive personnel

turbulence and had larger ripple effects across the entire force.68

In 1999, the Army announced its plan for the Stabilization Force in Bosnia

and Herzegovina (SFOR) that would rotate, for six to twelve month periods,

active and reserve component forces from CONUS, with the active and reserve

forces alternating the command responsibility of SFOR under a single integrat-

ed command structure. Later, in March 2001 the Army announced plans to

limit deployments to 179 days, although not effective during wartime or mili-

tary exercises. In its wartime deployment to Afghanistan, the Army again

chose to rotate units, announcing the planned replacement of elements of the

101st Air Assault Division with elements of the 82d Airborne Division. In

Iraq, the Army is also planning to rotate units on one-year cycles into and out

of Iraq, augmented by individual replacements to fill those slots of individuals

unable to complete the entire tour 69

Conclusion

The Army’s first extended overseas theater was the Philippine Insurrection,

and it experienced such difficulties keeping units up to strength or sending new

ones to replace them that it shifted from a unit rotation system to an individual

replacement system. The individual replacement system -- wedded to point

systems and other initiatives -- by and large served the Army well through

WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. The system proved necessary since hard

experience demonstrated front line soldiers could not be asked to serve indefi-

nite periods without declining effectiveness and increased casualties. Addi-

tionally, since US Army units in peacetime traditionally use individual re-

placements as soldiers move in and out of the Army (through the draft

or voluntary enlistment), using individual replacements in wartime has had the

additional advantage of training in peace for what one does in war.

The US Army unsuccessfully attempted unit rotation with battle groups,

battalions, brigades, and divisions from the 1950s through the 1980s. In all

cases, senior commanders preferred individual rotation to unit rotation because

unit rotation proved more costly in terms of manpower, money and reduced

readiness. Historically, whenever the Army entered into combat, all attempts at

unit rotation halted, with commanders again relying on individual replacement

to keep units filled while in the combat theater. There were never enough units

to do otherwise and, probably more important, replacing veteran formations

with those still green to combat or unfamiliar with local circumstances resulted

in higher casualties in the near term, as new units learned combat lessons the

hard way.

Infantry in combat always suffer casualties. If lucky there are not many;

however, if not—they can be devastating. It appears that during World War II,

Korea and Vietnam, infantry organizations had few, if any, effective primary

groups—that is squads—during extended periods of heavy combat. The casu-

alties were too heavy. Reading about an infantry division of 18,000 suffering

10 percent casualties seems of minor importance until the casualties are broken

out to find that this equates to more than 33 percent casualties in each of the

division’s 27 rifle companies. However, casualties never fall evenly—so while

some companies may have lost 10 percent or fewer of their number, other com-

panies may have suffered 70-80 percent; with primary groups disappeared. The

root question is how do you sustain a unit that has taken such casualties.

Since the end of World War II, many have vilified the individual replace-

ment system for reducing combat effectiveness. However, in my analysis of

the primary records, I found that this thesis at its heart is inaccurate. Success

resulted not so much from rotating organizations in and out of combat but in-

stead from sustaining those organizations while in combat. Battalions fighting

at near battalion strength can accomplish missions that battalions fighting at

16

company strength cannot, even when it is a company of grizzled veterans, and

mission accomplishment is still a first priority. It is only when the veteran ca-

dre who have trained together as a unit, is sustained by a continual influx of

new soldiers who in turn coalesce around this battle-hardened core—and those

who survive themselves evolve into veterans, that a unit’s combat power is

sustained and grows. What this means is that “battles are won by remnants,”

because manpower wastage runs so high so quickly that units would be ground

down to their backbone in relatively short order if it were not for an efficient

replacement system. Missions don’t change because small units are short manpower—and

squads short-manned at five or six pull the same load as one of nine, which

leads in peacetime lower morale, more injuries and absenteeism; and in war to

higher casualties. I found from experience that squads lose two to three sol-

diers on initial contact—regardless of the strength of the squad.70

If you begin

with nine soldiers, you have a manageable six, but if you start with only six,

only three are left and the advantage of years of training together are lost. Sam-

uel Stouffer’s American Soldier studies found some evidence that casualties

occurring among the primary group under conditions of extreme deprivation

were more prone to cause fear than those which occurred to members of the

group with whom an individual was less close bound.71

Consider a rifle company under wartime conditions that has sustained 30

percent casualties and receives as replacements (as occurred during the platoon

rotation test to Germany in the 1950s) a complete, highly trained but inexperi-

enced to combat platoon from the States. Would you as commander consolidate

your three veteran platoons to two, keeping the new platoon intact—or do you

break up the new platoon to fill the old one? At the platoon level do you keep

the untried squad intact or is the squad broken up to fill the others, allowing the

immediate passing on of lessons learned from veteran to replacement?

This paper in no way denigrates the value of small unit cohesion. I have

been in enough small units to know that soldiers work better with someone they

know. Nevertheless, I also believe that long-term association is no panacea, as

soldiers do not need to live together over long periods to develop cohesion.

Without good leadership, dynamic training, and dedication to the task at hand,

the cohesion we seek can go bad—with defining moments frequently undesira-

ble things done after duty hours, or assaults against the system, as occurred in

Vietnam. My point is that good, stressful training, as well as a near full

strength squad, is of more importance than entire groups of soldiers remaining

together for long periods. Moreover, the individual replacement system en-

sures that units always remain viable, especially in heavy combat.

Soldiers do not need to live together over long periods to develop cohesion.

What builds cohesion fastest is good, stressful training. General Frederick J.

Kroesen wrote in a review of the book Reading Athena’s Dance Card: Combat

Performance in the Vietnam War “I believe training to be more important than

any other single factor, except testosterone levels at the moment.”72

In a January, 1994 Military Review article General Gordon Sullivan, former

Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote, “Football has six basics—run, pass, catch,

block, tackle, and think. We must look to the same type of basics. Without ex-

cellence in the basics, versatility is impossible.”73

No football team, either pro

or collegiate, wins a championship just with players who have been together for

years. The college championship team is composed of a mix of all four classes

senior to freshman; and the team that is loaded with seniors one year will do

without the next. That is why coaches attempt to bring even numbers into their

program, and hope for 10-20 “veteran” seniors out of their one hundred or so

players. Company A, 22d Infantry comprised the same type dynamics between

1940 and 1944.

With individual replacement, not every man will necessarily have per-

formed a given task; however, there is always someone around who has done it,

either in this unit or another. Soldiers who have never rail-loaded vehicles

learn from those in the unit who have. Or, a light battalion with no TOE re-

quirement for tracked vehicle drivers, which suddenly finds it needs them, lo-

cates soldiers within its ranks who have learned this skill in previous assign-

ments. Such versatility is not possible if the soldiers had remained with one

organization.

Findings

Units fail most often when not maintained at strength, not because the sol-

diers lack long-term bonds with one another.

Unit replacement cannot keep units filled because there is no guarantee that

it can keep pace with high levels of daily losses.

Units are more combat-efficient when there are combat-wise veterans with-

in the unit.

Junior soldiers learn faster when there are seasoned soldiers, not yet ser-

geants to assist them. There are 33 officers and NCOs within the three ri-

fle platoons of a company and 66 other ranks, giving a leader to led ratio of

1 to 2. That said, team leaders have direct control over three soldiers, 1 to

3 in training and the addition of a seasoned soldier assists immeasurably

both in training and establishing the organizational ethos “we don’t do that

in this organization.”

Units are more effective when soldiers have gone through hard training

together.

The individual replacement system regenerates organizations through con-

tinual change. Newly arrived replacements continually change the group’s

dynamics. The best replacements are those who have previously served in

other like type TO&E units.

17

Officers and senior NCOs are the heart of an organization, setting its tone

and climate, while the junior sergeants and seasoned soldiers are its arteries

in transmitting information and knowledge.

More emphasis should be placed on building a “band of brothers” of of-

ficer and NCO leaders, rather than focus enormous energy on building hard

attained but easily lost squad cohesion. Officers and NCOs, more so than

any others should remain within the same brigade-sized organization as

long as possible, with officers moving between organizations as they be-

come more senior. In the Hürtgen Forest Major Henley, 1st Battalion 22d

Infantry Executive Officer, when he learned of the 2d Battalion being hard

hit, informed the 2d Battalion Executive Officer to give him all of his

cooks and KPs and he’d ensure that supplies got forward. In times past,

Henley had served as the 2d Battalion Operations Officer.

Although individual replacement remained the dominant form of manning

units since 1912, it was not because unit replacement was not attempted. Unit

rotation overall cost more in terms of manpower, money and reduced readiness

than the Army was willing to pay. Army commanders who made the decisions

regarding unit rotation and individual replacement buttress my findings. The

officers who led the Army during the 50s, 60s, and 70s were products of the

WWII Army. Senior leaders in Korea had been, with the exception of the vast-

ly senior MacArthur, army, corps, and division commanders during WWII,

primarily in the ETO; those during the Vietnam era, battalion, regiment and

brigade commanders in WWII and Korea. They therefore, understood the dy-

namics of unit cohesion when making decisions for or against unit rotation and

individual replacement. Except for General Mark Clark, all were adamant

against instituting a unit rotation system over a more effective and flexible in-

dividual replacement system. They understood that units in WWII were built

through individual replacement; with those soldiers not able to keep up, or

transferred elsewhere, being replaced in turn. During Korea and Vietnam,

those aspects of the individual replacement system that militated against a sol-

dier’s success were revamped, with divisional training centers established to

teach the new replacements those skills most necessary for survival.

The Army enjoyed far greater success with unit rotation during the 1990’s

due to improvements in air transportation that enabled troops to move quickly

and efficiently, extensive experience with POMCUS and NTC that ingrained

habits of separating troops from one set of equipment and marrying them up

with another efficiently, digitized information management with respect to per-

sonnel and logistical issues, the smaller scale of most operations, and the fact

that casualties from all causes remained low, in part due to quality training, thus

obviating the need for sudden mass infusions of replacements.

US Army history suggests that unit rotation works best when casualties are

low and combat is episodic, or when ample reserves exist and the situation is

static. Unit replacement cannot keep pace with high levels of daily losses. In-

dividual replacement works better than unit replacement when combat is sus-

tained and fluid, and casualties are high or unpredictable. Today’s circum-

stances may argue for a hybrid, with units rotating as units but supplemented by

sufficient individual replacements to keep them viable through the duration of

their tours.

18

1 Elva Stillwaugh, “Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict,” Ch 3 “Rotation” (Np, Nd, Office of the Chief of Military History), 2;

(hereafter Stillwaugh, Personnel Policies, ch. #)2. Np, Nd, Office of the Chief of Military History 2 Leonard Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military

History, 1954), 87 (Hereafter, Lerwill Personnel Replacement); William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1875) II: 387.

3 Army Station Lists, 1866-1910; Lerwill, Personnel Replacement, 473 4 Ibid., 150-151. 5 Ibid., 154-55; 328-29. 6 Edward J. Drea “Unit Reconstitution – A Historical Perspective” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, 1983), 3. 7 Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces in US Army in the World WAR, 1917-1919, I (Washington, DC: 1948) 88-89. 8 Lerwill, Personnel Replacement, 201; 211; 473; 328-29. 9 Ibid., 358 10 Robert S. Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment, (Lawrence, KS: University

Press of Kansas, 2001), 32-33; see also chapter 5 Induction, Training and Leadership; Lerwill, Personnel Replacement, 445 11 R.R. Palmer et al, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops: The Army Ground Forces, US Army in World War II

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 367; 467. 12 Robert S. Rush, “22d Infantry Morning Report Database,” Np, 2000-2001 13 Lerwill, Personnel Replacement, 475; Robert S. Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest 289; 291; 300; 337. 14 Lerwill, Personnel Replacement 331, 332; Robert S. Rush, The US Infantryman in World War II (2) Mediterranean Theater of

Operations (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 55; First United States Army, Report of Operations 1 August 1944-22 February

1945, Annex 1, “G1 Section Report” (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office 1945), 27-28. 15 Robert S. Rush, “22d Infantry Morning Report Database,” Np, 2000-2001 16 Headquarters, 22d Infantry Regiment “22d Regiment History” NARA RG407.304-INF (22)-.01; 17 Lerwill, Personnel Replacement, 330; Robert S. Rush paper presented at the National Archives 5 April 2002. 18 U.S. Department of the Army, Adjutant General’s Office, “Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final

Report (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1953), 80-82. 19 Robert S. Rush, “Company A 22d Infantry Morning Report Data Jun-May1944-1945” (Np, 1999-2002) 20 Robert S. Rush, “22d Infantry Morning Report Database,” Np, 2000-2001.

21 Foreign Military Studies P-011 Statistics Systems: II, 123 “Average Daily Figures on Dead And Missing in Various Campaigns

(Division)” 22 22d Infantry Regiment Morning Report November-December 1944 23 22d Infantry Regiment Morning Report November-December 1944; Combat interview with Morris Sussmann, E/2/22, MHI

22dHurtCI, Reel 2178; Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest, 321; see also Edward E. Hampton Jr. “Lost Potential: Frozen Groups and

Tank Gunnery Performance, “ Armor (May/June 1994): 19. 24 First United States Army Report of Operations, G1 Section Report, 15. On 20 November 1944, First Army diverted 699 hospital

returnees from the 83d Division and 87 from the 2d Division to regiments desperately in need of infantry soldiers. This was one

of only two major diversions within the First Army of soldiers from their parent units. 25 22d Infantry Regiment Morning Report November-December 1944. 26 Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest, 306 and elsewhere. 27 212th Volksgrenadier Division Report of Operations Ardennes Campaign, National Archives II RG 242 Captured German Records,

Records of German Field Commands, Divisions, 212th Infantry Division, January 1945), 6. 28 Edward A. Shils, “Primary Groups in the American Army” in Robert K Merton, and Paul F. Lazarfeld, eds. Studies in the Scope and

Method of the American Soldier (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1950), 30-31. 29 Edward A. Shils “Primary Groups in the American Army” Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier” Continuities

in Social Research, ed Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazerfeld (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1950), 37.

30 Headquarters 96th Infantry Division, “Action Report Ryukyu Campaign, 96th Infantry Division “Commanding General’s Com-

ments” (NARA RG407.396.03), 2; Shils, Primary Groups, 31. 31 Fox Connor, “Replacements, Lifeblood of a Fighting Army” Infantry Journal 21 (May 1941), 8. 32 Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest, 335; Shils, Primary Groups, 37 33 Lerwill, Personnel Replacement, 337 34 Ibid., 336 35 Charles G Cleaver, “History of the Korean War, Vol III, Part 2, Personnel Problems June 1950-July 1953” (Np, Nd, Military History

Section, Army Forces Far East, 1953), 2-4; 65, 82-90, 77. (Hereafter Cleaver, Personnel Problems). 36 Stillwaugh, Personnel Policies, ch. #) Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest, 319-20 and elsewhere; Cleaver, “Personnel Problems”, 94. 37 Ibid., 99 38 Stillwaugh, Personnel Policies Ch 3 “Rotation,” 30 39 Ibid., 31. 40 Ibid., 23.

19

41 Ibid., 34-35. 42 Donnelly, Movements and Retrogrades, 2 43 Ibid., 2 44 Bradford, Edward M. “The Replacement and Augmentation Systems in Europe (1945-1963)”. Unpublished monograph, Historical

Section, United States Army, Europe, 1964, 37 (hereafter, Bradford, Replacement Europe) 45 David Rees, The Korean War: History and Tactics, New York: Crescent Books, 1984, 91. 46 Bradford, Replacement and Augmentation, Europe. 36 47 Donnelly, Movements and Retrogrades, 3 48 Historical Division, Headquarters, US Army, Europe, “Operation GYROSCOPE in the United States Army, Europe” 1947

(Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) 8-3.1 CN 1), 44-48; Donnelly, Movements and Retrogrades 5 49 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/gyroscope.htm 50 Bradford, Replacement and Augmentation, Europe, 72, 73, 76, 87. 51 Ibid., 87. 52 Ibid., 90, 91. 53 Ibid., 92 54 Ibid., 93 55 http://ranger95.crosswinds.net/divisions/history_of_the_2nd_infantry_divi.htm 56 From charts derived from John B Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army

Lineage Series (Washington DC: GPO, 1998), 333, 336, 345. 57 George L. MacGarrigle. Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to October 1967, Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1998,

348. 58 Battelle Columbus Laboratories, Journal of Defense Research: Series B (Tactical Warfare),Vol. 7B, No. 3 (Fall 1975): Tactical

Warfare Analysis of Vietnam Data, 855 (henceforth, Battelle, Tactical Warfare Analysis. 59 George L. MacGarrigle. Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to October 1967, Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1998,

89; Headquarters, 1st Bn 7th Cavalry, “After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley Operation 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry 14-16 Novem-

ber 1965,” 8. 60 Battelle, Tactical Warfare Analysis, 837. 61 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 366. 62 AR 600–83, New Unit Manning System (Government Printing Office, 1986), 3 63 Personal recollections. The writer’s personal experience over a thirty year period; nine at squad and platoon level, six at company

level, and twelve at battalion and above. 64 Ibid. 65 Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, ed. The Whirlwind War: the United States Army in operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995), 45; 41. 66 Msg, ARCENT to SupCom, 17 Feb 91, sub: WSRO Operations. 67 Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk!: the VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History,

2002), 441; 439 68 Ronald E. Sortor, J. Michael Polich, “Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo” (Rand Arroyo MR-1417-A , 2001), 8, 7; 1st

Personnel Command “Personnel Policy Guidance for Contingency Operations” 8 September 2001. 69 William J. Webb “U.S. Army Rotation Policies: a Bibliographic Essay (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, NP,

17 Dec 2002), 2; Bill Putnam, “Keane Announces Overseas Unit Rotation Schedule” Washington, Army News Service July 23,

2003. 70 This based on the author having walked hundreds of squad and platoon light infantry lanes with very experienced rifle squads, 71 Ibid., 38. 72 Glenn, Russell W. Reading Athena's Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

published in Army Magazine, May 2001, http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/(reviews)/20015?OpenDocument 73 Gordon R. Sullivan, “Ulysses S. Grant and America’s Power-Projection Army” Military Review (January 1994), 12.