ROMEL G TORRESLLB 4C

DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL

BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO VS PALANCA Judicial Due Process Requisites

FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned till he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it.

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.

3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao HoEqual Protection – Delegation of Powers – Administrative Bodies

FACTS: Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power.

Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

ASPECT OF PROCEEDING

Espleta v Avelino (1975)

Facts: Shell’s counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espleta’s witness Montano for cross-examination and the conclusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her an audit for a job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony and cross-examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeleta’s testimony. The judge granted this request to the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeleta’s counsel’s letter for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones from Montano’s testimony due to her being stricken from the records.

In essence, there was partiality on the part of the judge.

Issue: Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge?

Held: No. Petition for certiorari granted

Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the form of 14,000 from Shell’s proposed amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage due to gasoline leakages.

Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. The trial didn’t satisfy the standard for a judicious inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the litigants should be given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.

People vs. Teehankee jr. 249 SCRA 54-125

FACTS: On July 10, 1991 Maureen Hultman, Jussi Leino and Roland Chapman while walking along the corner of Caballero & Mahogany streets, was approached by the accused Teehankee jr. And after seriesof events, the accused fired his gun killing Chapman and mortally wounding Hultman and Leino, then left. Leino, though mortally wounded mustered all his strength and called for help and noticed at least 3 people looking on from outside their house namely Vicente Mangubat, Domingo Florece and Agripino Cadenas. Mangubat, after the gunman sped away, ran outside his house, helped the victims and reported the incident to the proper authorities. During their Investigation the NBI and the Makati police asked Jussi Leino twice regarding the person who shot them; The first instance was On July 15, 1991 while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown (3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified Claudio Teehankee Jr. as the gunman from the pictures. In order to confirm the identification made by Leino and other witnesses Cadenas and Mangubat who also pointed the accused as the gunman thru a separate out –of court identification procedures. The Assistant director of NBI Epimaco Velasco, the Chief of NBI-Special operations group Salvador Ranin and 2 othe ragents brought the accused to Forbes park for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino.Leino has just been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since his parents were worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the investigation of the gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also live. The NBI agreed. So, the security agents from US embassy fetched Leino at his house and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park. After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the laws and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about 5 meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino was his Father, NBI-SOG chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at men who will be coming out of the house and identify the gunman from the line up. A group of five to six men (including the accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the street. From the group, Leino identified the accused as the gunman for the second time.3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER. The trial court convicted the accused Claudio Teehankee jr. because the strength of the testimonies of 3eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, in his appeal, he vigorously assailed the validity of the out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses especially the identification of Jussi Leino.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the out-of-court identification in this case is a valid and licit way in the identification of the accused?

HELD:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots

where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. Based on this statement given by the high court regarding the issue, we can say that out-of the court identification of the accused is valid and licit when it is in line with the rules that the Supreme court.

RURAL BANK OF BUHI VS. CAprocedural due process

FACTS: Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks division of the Central Bank. However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial assistance was suspended Later, a general examination of the bank’s affairs and operations were again conducted. The rural bank’s division found out massive irregularities in the operations, giving out loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, and sums amounting to millions past due to the Central Bank. There were also promissory notes rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result, the Buhi Bank became insolvent. The division chief, Odra, recommended that Buhi be placed under receivership. Thus, the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583, placing the bank under receivership. Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver. Odra thus implemented the resolution, authorizing deputies to take control and possession of Buhi’s assets and liabilities. Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing that the resolution violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank claims that there was a violation of due process. They claim that the bank was not given the chance to deny and disprove the claim of insolvency or the other grounds and that it was hastily put under receivership. Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board ordered the liquidation of the Bank. The judge ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of execution. The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution, citing that the Judge did not follow the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB.

ISSUE: Was due process observed?

SC: YES. CLOSURE VALID.

Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO REQUIREMENT that a hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed under receivership. The law explicitly provides that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY forbid a banking institution from doing business and IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver when: 1) there has been an examination by CB, b) a report to the CB, and c) prima facie showing that the bank is insolvent.

As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law could not have intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process when it conferred power to place rural banks under receivership.

The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER. It maybe subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, etc. The appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board, WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING, but subject to the JUDICIAL INQUIRY, to insure protection of the banking institution.

Due process does NOT necessarily require a PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD may be made SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in panic and hysteria. In that way, fortunes will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking industry.

There is no question that the action of the MB may be subject to judicial review. Courts may interfere with the MB’s exercise of discretion. Here, the RTC has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether the MB acted in bad faith when it directed the dissolution of Buhi Bank.

WEBB VS. PEOPLE

Due process – Right To Be Heard – Fair And Impartial Judge

FACTS: Webb sought the disqualification of judge Amelita Tolentino on the ground that the judge allegedly told allegedly told the media that "failure of the accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of arrest is an indication of guilt." Respondent judge denied the motion. Later, Webb filed a second motion to disqualify respondent judge as the latter allegedly told the media that the accused "should not expect the comforts of home," pending the resolution of his motion to be committed to Bicutan, Paranaque. Respondent judge again denied the motion to inhibit. Again, Biong filed another motion to disqualify respondent judge on the ground of bias and partiality. This was likewise denied by respondent judge.After arraignment, Webb filed an Urgent Motion for Hospitalization. He alleged that he was sick of dermatitis or asthma of the skin which aggravated due to his continuous commitment at the Paranaque Municipal Jail. The motion was denied by respondent judge.During trial, there were other incidents when during cross examination (regarding Jessica Alfaro’s affidavit, and another regarding departure for the US), whenever the prosecution objects, Judge Tolentino sustains the objection. Webb thus filed another motion to inhibit on ground of bias and prejudice of Judge. As usual, Judge Tolentino denied it. Also, Judge denied the taking of deposition of Webb’s witness who was in the US. Later, during formal offer of evidence, Judge admitted only 10 out of 142 exhibits offered by Webb. According to Webb, all these sets irreversibly, the eventual conviction of the accused.

ISSUE: Should Judge Tolentino inhibit herself on the ground of bias and prejudice?

HELD: NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees that "(n)o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law."19 A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. We have ingrained the jurisprudence that every litigant is entitled to nothing: less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge for all the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.

Hence, the Rules of Court allows a judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case for "just or valid reasons" other than those referring to his pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or decisions.

A party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof. He alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they do not sufficieritly prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.

The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad, faith or malice.

ANG TIBAY VS. CIRadministrative due process

Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIRFACTS: TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 

ADMU vs Judge CapulongConstitutional Law – Power of School to Dismiss Erring Students

FACTS: On February 8, 9 and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aguila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found a certain student guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Consequently, he was dismissed together with other students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Capulong, upon student’s appeal, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.

HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. Therefore, the order of Judge Capulong is hereby reversed.

Diosdado Guzman vs. National University

Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for

malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”

Held: Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees within hearing distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why they should not be held liable for holding an assembly.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?

HELD: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an

assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELANFACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and non issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a guilty verdict on Nadal’s alleged willfull withholding of the following information in his application for scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of his mother in the USA in support of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.

HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.

PHILCOMSAT vs. AlcuazPolitical Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies

FACTS: By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted “a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications.” Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals.” Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent

NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and reasonable.

ESTRADA VS. SANDIGAN BAYANSubstantive due process

FACTS: Erap assails the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (RA 7080 / RA 7659), on 3 grounds: (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under RPC, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Plunder Law provides, Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Erap, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

ISSUE: WON the contention of the respondent is valid?HELD: VALID. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its

description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

US vs Toribio

FACTS: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty32 Phil. 580 (1915)

Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual question one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax in question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases’ latter aspect as correlated to the police power of the State.

Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “ in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.”

Issue: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?

Held: The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.

People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the constructionunder the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

x x x x x x x x x

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

MARANAW HOTEL VS NLRCLabor Standards – Working Conditions and Rest Periods – Illegal Dismissal

FACTS: Damalerio was a roomboy for Maranaw Hotels. One day, he was cleaning the room of one of the guests when he saw the private stuff of the guest scattered all over the floor. So he took it upon him to pick those up and put in the guest’s bag but then when he was doing so the guest (Jamie Glaser) entered the room and saw Damalerio’s hand inside Glaser’s bag. Glaser filed a complaint against Damalerio. Damalerio was dismissed subsequently.

ISSUE: Whether or not Damalerio was illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes. Although it was not completely proper for Damalerio to be touching the things of a hotel guest while cleaning the hotel rooms, personal belongings of hotel guests being off-limits to roomboys, under the attendant facts and circumstances, that the dismissal of Damalerio was unwarranted. To be sure, the investigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth enough evidence of culpability. It bears repeating that Glaser lost nothing. Albeit Maranaw Hotels may have reasons to doubt the honesty and trustworthiness of Damalerio, as a result of what happened, absent sufficient proof of guilt, Damalerio, who is a rank-and-file employee, cannot be legally dismissed.As for the service charges received by Maranaw Hotels during the period where he was not able to work he’s entitled to the shares therefrom. But if he chooses not to be reinstated by reason of the estranged

relations with the hotel, he’s entitled to separation pay but without the shares from the service charges anymore.

MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP., INCGR # 111097 July 20, 1994 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Ordinance, Delegated Legislative Power)

FACTS: Petitioners opposed the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to establishment for the operation of casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that both violated P.D. 1869, permitting the operation of casinos centralized and regulated by PAGCOR.Petitioners contend that pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No. The ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. Ordinances should not contravene a statute because local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred to them by Congress.Petition is denied.

ERMITA-MALATE vs City of ManilaPolice Power – Due Process Clause

FACTS: On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police

power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.

JMM Promotion and Management vs CA

FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. 

YNOT VS IACPolice Power – Not Validly Exercised

FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovincial but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to out rightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

AGUSTIN VS EDUGenerally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power

FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an

emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

J. Balacuit v. CFI (1988)

Facts: The Municipal Board of Butuan City issued Ordinance 640 to address the complaint of parents that it is too financially burdensome for them to pay the full admission price for their children. The Ordinance provided that admission tickets for movies, public exhibitions, games, contests, and other performances, should be sold at half the price for children between 7 and 12 years of age. Violators would be penalized with imprisonment and/or a fine. Petitioners are managers of theaters which were affected by ordinance 640.They claim that it violates the due process clause of the constitution since it is: Oppressive, unfair, unjust Undue restraint on trade Violates the right of persons to enter into contracts

Issue: W/N Ordinance 640 violates the due process clause of the constitution

Held: The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children. A reduction in the price of admissionwould mean corresponding savings for the parents ; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Further, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.

L. Bennis v. Michigan (Marc 4, 1996)

FACTS: Petitioner co-owns a car which was used, without her knowledge, by her husband for an illegal sexual activity with a prostitute. He was caught and the vehicle was then forfeited as a public nuisance. Petitioner contends that the forfeiture is unfair because it relieves prosecutors of the burden of separating a co-owner guilty of an illegal act from the co-owner who happens to be innocent.

ISSUE:W/N the petitioner’s right to due process under the 14th amendment as well as her right to be compensated for a property taken provided for in the 5th amendment were violated.

HELD: The court ruled in favor of the respondent. The 14th and 5th amendments of the United States Constitution were notviolated.

HELD: Jurisprudence in this case has reinforced the right of the state to confiscate a public nuisance even though the owner or co-owner of the property was innocent. (See. Palmyra; Ship. Dobbin’s Distillery; Alcohol. Van Oster; Car. Calero-Toledo; Yacht. Kokkonen; Yacht.) Forfeiture by the government serves as a deterrent against criminal acts since it makes it an unprofitable venture. There is no violation of the14th and 5th amendment in this case.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980

FACTS: In issuing administrative order no. 04-92 (ppa-ao no. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation on august 12, 1992, respondents united harbour pilots association and the manila pilots association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-ao no. 04-92 on December 23, 1992, the op issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of ppa-ao no. 04-92 onmarch 17, 1993, the op, through then assistant executive secretary for legal affairs Renato c. corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before branch 6 of the Regional trial court

ISSUE: Won Ppa-Ao-04-92 Is Constitutional

HELD: The court is convinced that ppa-ao no. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The supreme court said that in order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is readily apparent that ppa-ao no. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.

National Development Company and New Agrix vs. Philippine Veterans Bank (192 SCRA 257)

FACTS: Agrix Marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land. Agrix later on went bankrupt. In order to rehabilitate the company, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1717 which mandated, among others, the extinguishing of all the mortgages and liens attaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to processclaims against the company to be administered mainly by NDC.

Respondent thereon filed a claim against the company before the Committee. Petitionershowever filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. Respondent took measures to extrajudicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing another case in the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC held in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree; mainly violation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and violation of the equal protection clause. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: is the respondent estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the law since they first abided by it by filing a claim with the Committee? Is PD 1717 unconstitutional?

HELD :On the issue of estoppel, the Court held that it could not apply in the present case since when the respondent filed his claim, President Marcos was the supreme ruler of the country and they could not question his acts even before the courts because of his absolute power over all government institutions when he was the President. The creation of New Agrix as mandated by the decree was also ruled as unconstitutional since it violated the prohibition thatthe Batasang Pambansa(Congress) shall not provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the government.

PD 1717 was held as unconstitutional on the other grounds that it was an invalid exercise of police power, It had no lawful subject and no lawful method. It violated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection clause bylumping together all secured and unsecured creditors. It also impaired theobligation of contracts, even though it only involved purely private interests.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZConstitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the

said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

PEOPLE vs CAYATFACTS: Cayat, who was a native of Baguio and a non-Christian, was imprisoned for violation of Act 1639, being a member of a non-Christian tribe, illegally had in his possession one (1) bottle of A1 gin, an intoxicating liquor. Under Act 1639, It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

o (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;o (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution; ando (3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

ISSUE: Is the law in accordance with equal protection?HELD: YES. VALID. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

DUMLAO vs COMELEC“Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65

FACTS: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be

followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3 rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Goesaert v. Cleary, (1948)

Facts: A Michigan state law provided that no women could obtain a bartender’s license unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner.

Procedural Posture: Challenged under equal protection.

Issue: Whether the law violates equal protection; i.e. whether women have a constitutionally protected right to choose to be a bartender.

HELD: No.

Reasoning: [Frankfurter] Michigan could ban all women from being bartenders if it wished. The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards. Since there may be a reasonable and valid desire in the legislature to protect female

bartenders, the court can not second-guess the legislature and decide that the real purpose here was for male bartenders to monopolize the industry.

VILLEGAS VS. HUI CHIONG TSAI PAO HOEqual protection

FACTS: There was an Ordinance in Manila, enacted making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within manila without first securing an employment permit from the mayor’s office. 1. Pao, an employee in Manila, sought an injunction to restrain the enforcement of Ordinance 6537.

He argues that:a. As a revenue measure, the measure imposed on aliens is discriminatory and violative of the

rule on uniformity of taxation. b. As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful

occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide or limit the action of the Mayor

c. It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens, thereby violative of equal protection clause.

ISSUE: does it violate equal protection clause?HELD: YES.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.

ORMOC SUGAR VS. TREASUREREqual protection

FACTS: The municipal Board of Ormoc City, enacted an Ordinance #4, imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Is the ordinance valid? Does it comply with equal protection?

HELD: NO. We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

HIMAGAN vs PEOPLEEqual Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of

preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337

G.R. No. 132922April 21, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without

legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in thePhilippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising

radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZG.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995

Petitioners: Nerio Rogado, Chief Accountant; Elisa Rivera, Chief of the Records; Jose T. Almonte, EIIB Commissioner; Villamor Perez, Budget and Fiscal Management Division Chief; Respondent: Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez

FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

HELD: Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

TUI vs CA

FACTS: Petitioners assail the CA decision and resolution that upheld the constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 (“An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”) were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ).

Respondent Court held that “there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the ‘Secured Area’ is precise and well-defined as ‘. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .’” The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.

The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the “secured area” and not to include the “entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law.”

The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its “avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest.” It ruled that “EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227].”Disagreeing, petitioners now seek before us a review of the aforecited Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.

ISSUE: W/N EO 37-A is constitutional

HELD: YES. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. There are real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) begermane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from itsstatus quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. The classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law.Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present business operators outside

the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new, jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local.It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws.As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channelling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the “secured area.” The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. Petition DENIED.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOSFeb. 3, 2000

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

HELD: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appelleevs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,

accused-appellantG.R. No. 121777(350 SCRA 163)

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the “recruiter” who was then talking about thebreakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was “recruiting” nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call froman unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitmentconducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, acertain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken.Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, afraid was executed.Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.(2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated

HELD:(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court “criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.” The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at areasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute“recruitment and placement” suffer from over breadth since by merely “referring” a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as “labor or employment referral”(“referring” an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to aprospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of over breadth. A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit theexercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by theConstitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generallyworded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that itfails to give adequate warning of the boundary between theconstitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

(2)Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equalprotection clause in her defense.She points out that although theevidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out applicationforms and even received Lourdes Modesto’s payment, appellant was the onlyone criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free.From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is

not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.”In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF MANILA vs QUISUMBING

FACTS: The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.

The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) limited tenure.

The compensation scheme is simply the School’s adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the School’s system of compensation is violative of the principle of “equal pay for equal work”

HELD: Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to female employees as against a male employee for work of equal value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in an labor organization.

Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer has discriminated against an employee, it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Central Bank Employees Association Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (GR148208, 15 December 2004)Central Bank Employees Association Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas[GR 148208, 15

December 2004]En Banc, Puno (J):

Facts: On 3 July 1993, RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On 8 June 2001, almost 8 years after the effectivity of RA 7653, the Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II,Section 15(c) of RA 7653 (Exercise of Authority) provides that "In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall ... (c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board·s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral·s human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758." The Association alleges that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is ´a classic case of class legislation,µ allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s position.

Issue: Whether the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated upon by exempting BSP officers (SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law.

Held: Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by