Robert A. McNeil v US Gov & Internal Revenue Service (RAM-071)

8/10/2019 Robert A. McNeil v US Gov & Internal Revenue Service (RAM-071)

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Robert A. McNeil4400 Memorial Dr. #1200

Houston, Texas 77007

713-806-5199

October 5, 2007

Mr. Roger CarisRevenue OfficerEmployee #76-42930Department of the TreasuryInternal Revenue Service8701 S. Gessner, STOP5433HAL

Houston, Texas 77074

Subject: Response to Summons Collection Information StatementTax Year: 2002

Dear Mr. Caris:

I recently received a document entitled Summons Collection Information Statement, datedSeptember 19, 2007. The Summons stated that I am required to appear before you on October 5,2007 to give testimony and to bring for examination certain information for the period August 1,2007 to present, related to tax period 2002. Attached to the Summons was Form 433-A

Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals. (PleaseseeExhibit 1)

The Summons stated that the IRS will use this information to prepare a Collection InformationStatement.

As any prudent person would do, I read the entire document very carefully. I took special noticeof the fact that the Summons was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to me, RobertA. McNeil, under the authority of the Internal Revenue Code, and was signed in the bottom

portion of the page by you, Roger Caris, Revenue Officer. There was no signature of anApproving Officer on the Summons, so, I can only conclude that you are operating without

oversight.

I turned the page over and read the Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on the back,noting that the authority of the Commissioner to issue the Summons apparently comes from:

Section 7602 Examination of books and witnesses

Section 7603 Service of summons

Section 7604 Enforcement of summons

Section 7605 Time and place of examination

Section 7610 Fees and costs of witnesses

Section 7210 Failure to obey summons


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A reasonable person would conclude that, since the Summons references Section 76XX as itssource of authority, you are claiming authority to enforce the Summons under Section 7608

Authority of internal revenue enforcement officers.

Based on my research of the following case law, I am required by the U.S. Supreme Court toknow the authority of the agent who is taking such action.

State ex rel McConnell v. First State Bank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, 124 S.W.2d 726, 733 (1938):Bank insolvency case:

" All persons dealing with public off icers are bound to take notice of the law

prescribi ng th eir authori ty and powers."

Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1940):

" Publi c off icer s are mer ely the agents of the public, wh ose power s and author ity are

defi ned and l imi ted by l aw. Any act without the scope of the authori ty so defi ned does

not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with

knowledge of the extent of their auth ori ty," 113 F .2d, at 286.

Section 1132.55 of the Internal Revenue Manual (entitled Criminal Investigation Division)begins as follows:

Th e Cr iminal I nvestigation Di vision enforces the cri minal statutes appli cable to

income, estate, gift, employment, and excise tax laws i nvolving Uni ted Statescitizens residing in foreign countri es and nonresident aliens subject to F ederal

income tax filing requirements [IRM, Section 1132.55 (1991 Ed.)]

The decision reached in the case of Bothke v. Fluor Engineers and Constructors, Inc. 713 F.2d1405 (9th Cir. 1983) states in part,

" When and if I RS Per sonnel are noti fi ed to ir r egulari ties, pr otests, objections, etc., i t

is up to the offi cer or agent to prove authori ty." I f the I RS officer or agent f ails to

prove authori ty when challenged, s/he may be held li able, with out i mmuni ty, if it later

proves that there were in fact, procedural flaws and authority was imposed without

the force of l aw.

Per Ryder v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136, 515 U.S. 177, I am required toinitiate a direct challenge to authority of anyone representing himself or herself as a governmentofficer or agent prior to the finality of any proceeding in order to avoid implications ofde factoofficer doctrine. When challenged, those posing as government officers and agents arerequired to affirmatively prove whatever authority they claim. (Emphasis added)


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In the absence of proof, they may be held personally accountable for loss, injury and damages.See particularly, the former 26 U.S.C. 7804(b), now published in notes following 7801. Per

26 U.S.C. 7214(a), if and when IRS personnel exceed authority prescribed by law, or failto carry out duties imposed by law, they are criminally liable. (Emphasis added)

Putting my research skills to work, I set out to find the implementing regulations for each of theSections referenced on the back of the Summons.

As you are probably aware, the Parallel Table of Authorities lists rulemaking authority (except 5U.S.C. 301) for regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. During my extensiveresearch, I have learned that each law must have a statute at large AND an implementingregulation. Otherwise, it is not law, and that is as stated by the U.S. Code and the Supreme Courtof the United States.

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Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/parallel/parallel_table.html

[Code of Federal Regulations]

[Parallel Table]

[Revised as of January 1, 2006]

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]

PARALLEL TABLE OF AUTH ORI TIES AND RULES

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following table lists rulemaking authority (except 5 U.S.C. 301) for regulations codified in the Code of FederalRegulations. Also included are statutory citations which are noted as being interpreted or applied by those

regulations.

The table is divided into four segments: United States Code citations, United States Statutes at Large citations,

public law citations, and Presidential document citations. Within each segment, the citations are arranged in

numerical order:

For the United States Code, by title and section;

For the United States Statutes at Large, by volume and page number;

For public laws, by number; and

For Presidential documents (Proclamations, Executive orders, and Reorganization plans), by document number.

Entries in the table are taken directly from the rulemaking authority citation provided by Federal agencies in their

regulations. Federal agencies are responsible for keeping these citations current and accurate. Because Federal

agencies sometimes present these citations in an inconsistent manner, the table cannot be considered all-inclusive.

The portion of the table listing the United States Code citations is the most comprehensive, as these citations are

entered into the table whenever they are given in the authority citations provided by the agencies. United States

Statutes at Large and public law citations are carried in the table only when there are no corresponding United

States

Code citations given.

This table is revised as of January 1, 2006.

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Just a few minutes of research revealed that the Sections of Title 26, referenced on the Summons,provide rulemaking authority for the relevant Parts of Title 27, as shown below:

26 U.S.C. (1986 I.R.C.)

7601-760627 Part 70

7602.27 Parts 29, 46, 296

7608.27 Part 70, 2967610..27 Part 70

Please note that there are no CFR parts for which 26 USC 7210 provides authority, as shownbelow.

You can imagine my surprise and confusion when I searched the internet for Title 27 and foundthe following:

Source:

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div6&view=text&node=27:2.0.1.4.7.1&idno=27

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~TI TL E 27--Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Fi rearms

CHAPTER I--ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, DEPARTM ENT OF TH E

TREASURY

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I decided to read further, in the hopes that I could see the connection between a Summons for analleged tax liability under 26 USC Subtitles A and C Internal Revenue Code, and your claim of

authority to summon me along with my books and records, under 26 USC Section 7608, whichprovides rulemaking authority for 27 CFR Part 70 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms.

So, I started at the beginning and clicked on the link to Subpart A Scope, taking note of theparagraphs related to the issuance of summonses, examination of books and records, entry ofpremises, and preparation of returns.

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Title 27: Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

PART 70PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Subpart AScope 70.1 General.

(a) The regulations in Subparts C, D, and E of this part set forth the procedural and

administrative rules of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau for:

(1) The issuance and enforcement of summonses, examination of books of account and witnesses,administration of oaths, entry of premises for examination of taxable objects, granting of

rewards for information, canvass of regions for taxable objects and persons, and authority of

TTB officers.

(3) The preparing or executing of returns; deposits; payment on notice and demand;assessment; abatements, credits and refunds; limitations on assessment; limitations on credit or

refund; periods of limitation in judicial proceedings; interest; additions to tax, additional

amounts, and assessable penalties; enforced collection activities; authority for establishment,alteration, and distribution of stamps, marks, or labels; jeopardy assessment of alcohol, tobacco,

and firearms taxes, and registration of persons paying a special tax.

[T.D. ATF376, 61 FR 31031, June 19, 1996, as amended by T.D. TTB44, 71 FR 16958, Apr.

4, 2006]

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As you can see, Subpart A talks solely about matters related to alcohol, tobacco products, andfirearms, therefore, I could find no legal basis for your claim of authority, under 26 USC Section7608, which provides rulemaking authority for 27 CFR Part 70 Alcohol, Tobacco Products andFirearms.

In addition, 27 CFR 29 pertains to regulations related to stills, as shown below:

TITLE 27--Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms

CHAPTER I--ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU,

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SUBCHAPTER A--LIQUORS

PART 29--STILLS AND MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS


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Further research revealed that 27 CFR 46 provides regulations for the following activity:

TITLE 27--Alcohol, Tobacco Products and FirearmsCHAPTER I--ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU,

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SUBCHAPTER B--TOBACCO

PART 46--MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS RELATING TO TOBACCO

PRODUCTS AND CIGARETTE PAPERS AND TUBES

Finally, to add to the confusion, Section 7602 entitled Examination of books and records,Paragraph (a) entitled Authority to Summon, talks about determining the liability of any

person for any internal revenue tax. The phrase any internal revenue tax suggests that there

might be more than one.

In fact, on the bottom left of the Summons, it statesAuthority to examine books and witnessesis also provided under sec. 6420(e)(2)-Gasoline used on farms; sec 6421(g)(2) Gasoline used forcertain nonhighway purposes by local transit systems, or sold for certain exempt purposes; andsec. 6427(j)(2)-Fuels not used for taxable purposes.

So, in my mind, the Summons fails to clearly state either a) the internal revenue tax that the IRSclaims I am liable for, or; b) the section of the U.S. Code for which you claim authority to issuethe Summons.

If I have erred in my research and you claim authority under a different Section of the U. S.Code, or Commissioners Delegation Order (CDO), or Treasury Delegation Order (TDO), youwill have the opportunity to clarify that point in your response to the Affidavit of Authority,attached to this letter as Exhibit 2.

Until I receive the completed Affidavit from you, I offer this response to the Summons:

I, Robert A. McNeil, state, unequivocally, that I have not now, nor have I ever been,

engaged in any activity related to alcohol, tobacco products, or firearms ; or gasoline usedon farms; or gasoline used for certain nonhighway purposes by local transit systems, or

sold for certain exempt purposes; or fuels not used for taxable purposes.. Therefore, Ihave no documents responsive to the Summons.

In fact, I have no income subject to any income tax law, and the IRS knows it. I say this withcertainty because I have served notice to the IRS, on numerous occasions, of the following courtcases supporting my position:

Butcher's Union vs. Cresent City, 111 US 746, 756 (1884)

Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 629 (1895)

Flint vs. Stone Tracy, 220 US 107, 151 - 152 (1911)

U.S. vs. Whitridge, 231 US 144, 147 (1913)


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Stratton's Independence, 231 US 399, 417 (1913)

Merchants Loan & Trust Co. vs. Smietanka, 255 US 509, 518 - 519 (1921)

Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916) Stanton vs. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103, 112 -114 (1916)

Doyle vs. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918)

Peck vs. Lowe, 247 US 165, 173 (1918)

Southern Pacific vs. Lowe, 247 US 330, 335 (1918)

Evans vs. Gore, 253 US 245, 263 (1920)

Eisner vs. Macomber, 252 US 189, 205 - 206 (1920)

Bowers vs. Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 US 170, 174 (1926)

Jerome H. Sheip Co. vs. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699, 705 (1930)

Redfield vs. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (Ore. 1930)

Helvering vs. Edison Brothers, 8th Cir. 133 F2d 575 (1943) U.S. vs. Ballard, 535 F2d 400 (1976)

Further information regarding these cases can be found in Exhibit 3attached.

It should be noted that the IRS consistent response to legal arguments based on these cases is torefer to them as frivolous and to contend that they have no basis in law. When challenged incourt, however, the U.S. Attorneys consistently cite U.S. Tax Court cases and unpublished lowercourt decisions to refute the U.S. Supreme Court cases, in clear violation of stare decisis, thedoctrine of precedence under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same

points arise again in litigation.

Which leads me to the subject of Constructive Notice:

Constru ctive Notice: Notice ari sin g by presumption of law fr om th e existence of facts

and cir cumstances that a par ty h ad a duty to take notice of... noti ce pr esumed by l aw

to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that person. (Black's Law

Di ctionary, Seventh Editi on)

Constructive Notice serves to inform a party of the existence of facts and circumstances that aparty had duty to take notice of. It also serves to deny the informed party the defense that he/she

had no knowledge of the facts and circumstances relevant to the issues at hand.

Which leads me to the subject offraud:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICEDof the definition of the word fraud:

A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to

induce another to act to his or her detrim ent. Blacks Law Dictionary ~ Third

Pocket Edition ~ 2006, page 300.


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Further,

F raud: Deceit, deception, artifi ce, or trickery operating prejudicially on the r ights of

another, and so i ntended, by i nducin g h im to part with property or surr ender some legal

right. 23 Am J2d Fraud 2. Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice andaccomplishin g th e purpose, wh ether it be an act, a word, silence, t he suppression of the tr uth,

or other device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. 23 Am J2d Fraud 2. An

affirmation of a fact rather than a promise or statement of intent to do something in the

fu ture. M cInn es v Sutli ff , 241 111 521, 89 NE 651.

Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 480(1983). Fraud and deceit mayarise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an

untruth.

McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372, Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307:

F raud in its elementary common law sense of deceit includes the deli berate

concealment of materi al inf ormation in a setting of fi duciary obligation. A public

official is a fiduciary toward the public, and if he deliberately conceals material

information f rom them he is guilty of fr aud.

It is well established in American jurisprudence that:

Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters, Nudd v. Burrows, 91

U.S 426; F raud vitiates everything, Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; Fraud vitiates

the most solemn contracts, documents and even judgments, U.S. v. Throckmorton,98 U.S. 61.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that, without proper authority, the Summons issued by theCommissioner, through you, is fraudulent and, therefore, null and void.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that it is fraud for an IRS agent to impersonate a criminalinvestigator of the Intelligence Division, and fraud vitiates everything that it enters into,including this summons. In your response to theAffidavit of Authority, you will be required to

provide evidence of your authority to act as a criminal investigator in the Intelligence Division.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICEDof the following case law related to the search and seizure ofprivate books and papers:

BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886): " Th e search for and seizure of stolen or

forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof,

are totall y dif ferent thi ngs fr om a search for and seizure of a man' s pri vate books and

papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them

as evidence against him. The two things diff er toto coelo. I n the one case, the

govern ment is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not."

" Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are so

far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the

eye cannot by the laws of Engl and be guil ty of a tr espass, yet where pri vate papers are


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removed and erried away the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of

the tr espass, and demand more considerable damages i n that r espect. Where is t he

wri tten law that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there i snone; and therefore it is too much for us, without such authority, to pronounce a

practice legal whi ch woul d be subver sive of all the comf orts of society." , at 628.

It appears, therefore, that there is no written law giving you the power to search for and

seize my personal books and records.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICEDof the following U.S. Supreme Court case, setting forth theessential elements of tax evasion and willful failure to file, which the Government is required to

prove:

CHEEK v. UNITED STATES, 498 U.S. 192 (1991): Willfulness, as construed by ourprior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the (1)

law imposed a duty on the defendant, (2) that the defendant knew of this duty, and (3)

that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." Ther e are three essential

elements to the cri me of tax evasion, namely (1) wil lf ul ness; (2) existence of a tax

deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of

the tax. Sansone v. Un it ed States, 380 U.S. 343, at 351, 85 S.Ct. 1004, at 1010 (1965);

United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dack, 747 F.2d

1172, at 1174 (7th Ci r . 1984); and U ni ted States v. M al, 942 F .2d 682, at 687 (9th Ci r.

1991); Uni ted States v. Sil kman, 156 F .3d 833 (8th Cir . 1998). See also L awn v.

United States, 355 U.S. 339, at 361, 78 S.Ct. 311 (1958.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED of the recent case against Tommy K. Cryer (Case #06-50164-01), involving tax evasion and willful failure to file. After two years of investigation and

preparation, the Department of Justice attorneys withdrew the felony tax evasion charges at thestart of the trial. In addition, the attorneys could not provide the law that made the defendantliable for the Federal Income Tax. As a result, Mr. Cryer was acquitted by the jury of thecharges of willful failure to file. This case was decided on July 13, 2007. (Please seeExhibit 4)

United States v. Tommy K. Cryer

No. 06-50164-01

Wester n D istrict of L ouisiana

Shreveport Division

Apparently, Mr. Cryer did a good job of explaining to the jury what he read in the Brushaber,Stanton, and Eisner Supreme Court cases about the legal meaning of the word "income" andwhat he read in the Internal Revenue Code - everything but the law that required him to file. Hehad asked the IRS to show him the law that made him liable, but the IRS did not respond.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICEDof the numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases prohibiting adirect tax on the citizens of the United States without apportionment according to the census, asset forth in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 4. (Please seeExhibit3)


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In the Tommy Cryer case, as well as others, the Department of Justice attorneys committed fraudby claiming that these Supreme Court cases had been overturned by Tax Court cases and by

unpublished decisions.

In truth, these Supreme Court cases have never been overturned and support the fact that ArticleI, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution remain in full effecttoday.

These clauses are stated below:

Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3: Representati ves and dir ect T axes shall be apporti oned among

the several states which may be included in this Union, according to their respective

Numbers..

Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4: N o Capitation, or other dir ect, Tax shall be laid, unless inProportion to the Census or enumeration h erein befor e dir ected to be taken.

The conclusion to be reached by this discussion is thatthere is no law requiring me or any

other U.S. citizen to file a tax return or pay Federal Income Taxes.

If you have knowledge of such a law, you will have the opportunity to state it in the Affidavit ofAuthority.

Which brings me to the following:

My first contact from the IRS for an alleged tax liability occurred when I received a ProposedIndividual Income Tax Assessment for the tax year 2002. That document was dated July 25,2005. Over the next 18 months, I repeatedly provided the IRS with evidence that I did not havea tax liability for 2002, or any other year.

My first contact with you was your letter to me on February 9, 2007, informing me that you werein the process of gathering information from various third parties related to unfiled returns.Since that time, you have taken the following actions:

Refused to acknowledge the U. S. Supreme Court cases cited;

Refused twice to fill out and return the Affidavit of Authority (even going so far as todetach the Affidavit from my original letter and mailing it back to me, staple holes andall);

Refused to provide me with a list of all persons contacted by any employee, contractor,agent, officer, or other representative of the Internal Revenue Service, along with thename(s) and employee number(s) of any employee(s), contractor(s), agent(s), officer(s)or other representative(s) of the Internal Revenue Service who contacted them, as Irequested in my letter dated March 16, 2007;

Placed Federal Tax Liens on my assets;

Confiscated $1,358.76 from my bank accounts;

Caused me to incur $136.00 in insufficient funds charges, as a result of the confiscation

of my funds;


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Threatened and intimidated my clients, causing them to remit $18,937.71 to theDepartment of Treasury for a tax liability that I do not owe;

As a direct result of your threats, at least one client has refused to engage me for anyfuture projects, thereby depriving me of my most basic right.. the right to contract andwork where and for whom I choose.

Butcher's Union vs. Crescent City, 111 US 746, 756 (1884) " It has been well

said that the property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the

original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and

inviolable.";

Murdock vs. Com. of Penn., 319 US 105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at1298 (1943): A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right

granted by the F ederal Constituti on.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that your actions have damaged my standing in the businesscommunity, are in violation of the U. S. Constitution, and show a total disregard for the SupremeCourt rulings cited. As a result, you have subjected yourself to prosecution for multiple countsof provable fraud.

Sadly, your refusal to provide evidence of your authority, or to respond to the issues raised in myletters, is consistent with the actions of other IRS employees, as well, as shown below:

Jan Sinclair, Operations Manager, Automatic Substitute For Return (ASFR),

Holtsville, New York, who refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to theissues raised in my letters dated August 25, 2005 and January 21, 2006.

Scott Prentky, Field Director, Compliance Services, Ogden, Utah, who, in effect,referred to the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court rulings as frivolous andrefused to respond to the issues raised in my letter dated August 25, 2005.

Larry Leder, Operations Manager, Automated Collection System (ACS), Bensalem,Pennsylvania, who refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the issuesraised in my letter dated September 13, 2006.

Mary Hannah, Operations Manager, Automated Collection System (ACS), Bensalem,Pennsylvania, who refused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the issuesraised in my letter dated February 12, 2007.

Theresa Harley, Operations Manager, Collection, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, whorefused to provide evidence of authority or respond to the issues raised in my letterdated February 12, 2007.

The silence and evasion exhibited by you and the above-referenced IRS employees clearlydemonstrates a pattern of bad faith dealing, and occurred in spite of the fact that I served noticeto all parties of relevant case law which requires me to know the authority of the agent who istaking such action:

Based on your actions over the past several months, including the issuance of this Summons, Ican only conclude that you are contemplating further unlawful acts against me.


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Proceed as you will, Mr. Caris, but, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTICED that I intend tovigorously defend myself as a Pro Se litigant and will exercise all of my rights under the First,

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the numerous SupremeCourt cases I have cited, as well as Miranda (MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 1966).

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of

the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on

a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or

naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;

nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life

or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,

nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shallprivate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and publictrial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to

have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment VIIIExcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.

Finally, I hereby demand that you fill out and return the attached Affidavit of Authority(Exhibit 2) to me by Certified Mail within 10 calendar days of the date of this letter. ThisAffidavit will serve as proof of your authority under the laws of this country to take any actionagainst me.


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Exhibit 1

Summons Collection Information Statement


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Exhibit 2

Affidavit of Authority

Please fill out the following Affidavit and return by certified mail to Robert A. McNeil

within 10 days. You may fill out only those items that you are prepared to swear to or

affirm. You may refuse certain items by drawing a line through the items and initialing

those items in the margin.

Please be notified that if you refuse to swear to or affirm any of the listed items, relying on

your 5th

amendment rights of not being compelled to testify against yourself, that such

refusal shall be the equivalent of standing mute and the court will be forced to make its

determinations based on the sworn testimony and evidence provided by Robert A. McNeil.


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Affidavit of Authority

I am an authorized representative of the Internal Revenue Service.

1) I understand that Robert A. McNeil is a citizen of Texas and the United States and

is not engaged in a corporate activity and is not liable for the income tax under the

corporate income (excise) tax and does not have earnings from foreign sources.

2) Robert A. McNeil is liable for the individual income tax, that is a direct tax on his

property, levied without the Apportionment provision of the U.S. Constitution.

3) IRC section 7608 or section _________ authorizes agents with my title to perform

collection actions under subtitle A and C.

4) I certify that I am duly delegated to issue Notices of Lien and Levy by Delegation

Order number ____________ from the Secretary.

5) My delegation orders from the Secretary to perform collection actions under IRC

Section 6331 are listed in delegation order number(s) ________________.

6) I am authorized to take collection actions against Robert A. McNeil, under the

authority of the 16th

Amendment without the constitutional requirements of

Apportionment. I understand that Robert A. McNeil is not operating as a corporate

entity and has not received taxable income under the definition of income in the

16th

Amendment, as stated by U.S. Supreme Court rulings.

7) The Internal Revenue Service has the lawful authority under subtitle A to require

Robert A. McNeil to file 1040s and require him to include his sources of income as if

those sources were income defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.

8) The Internal Revenue Service has the lawful authority to require Robert A. McNeil

to file form 1040s under penalty of perjury for any and all years in question and this

would not violate Robert A. McNeils Constitutional protections.


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9) Our lawful authority to impose an individual direct tax without Apportionment,

that makes Robert A. McNeil liable for the individual income tax, is the Internal

Revenue Code, section _______, paragraph(s) ________, and regulation number

___________, paragraph ________ of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26.

10) I further certify that the IRS is acting under all lawful and correct collection

procedures.

I declare under the penalty of perjury and under the laws of the United States that the foregoingis true and correct, except for items that I have crossed out and initialed.

Signed _______________________________ Date: ___________________

Printed Name of Agent __________________________________________

Agents Employee Number ______________________

Agents Title ________________________

Agents IRS Division Name _______________________________

Witness Signature and Printed Name _________________________________

The State of Texas

County of _________________________

Before me, a Notary Public, on this day personally appeared_____________________________, known to me (orproved to me on the oath of__________________________) to be the person whose name is subscribed to theforgoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purpose and consideration thereinexpressed.

Given under my hand and seal of office this _______day of _________________ A.D. 20_______

________________________________________

Notary Public, State of Texas

________________________________________

(Print name of Notary Public here)

My commission expires the______ day of____________________20______


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Notice of Non-Compliance

Notice is hereby given that if you fail to produce this affidavit, signed by an authorized

agent, your failure to do so shall be construed as prima facie evidence that there is no agent

in your department or agency who is authorized to take collection actions under IRC

section 6331, or subtitle A or C, or under Title 26 and shall create the legal presumption or

conclusion that you have been taking illegal collection actions against Robert A. McNeil,

while acting under color of law and are engaged in an extortion and fraud scheme

against Robert A. McNeil.

Important footnotes follow;

InFederal Cr op I nsur ance v. M err il l, 332 U.S. 380, the Supreme Court ruled:

Whatever the form in which the government functions, anyone entering into an

arrangement with the government takes a risk of having accurately ascertained that he

who purports to act for the government stays within the bounds of his authority, even

though the agent himself may be unaware of the limitations upon his authority. Alsosee Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389; United States v. Stewart,311 U.S. 60; and generally, in re Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666.

Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931):

"Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of

the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress. They

cannot be merely assumed by administrative officers; nor can they be created by the

courts in the proper exercise of their judicial functions," 283 U.S., at 649.

State ex r el M cConnell v. Fi rst State Bank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, 124 S.W.2d 726, 733 (1938):

"All persons dealing with public officers are bound to take notice of the law prescribingtheir authority and powers."

Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1940):

"Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose powers and authority are

defined and limited by law. Any act without the scope of the authority so defined does

not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with

knowledge of the extent of their authority," 113 F.2d, at 286.


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Exhibit 3

The U.S. Constitution and the 16th

Amendment

The Constitution of the United States prohibits a direct un-apportioned tax in two places: Ar ticle1, Section 2, Clause 3and Ar ticle 1, Section 9, Clause 4.

Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3: Representati ve and dir ect Taxes shal l be apporti oned among

the several states which may be included in this Union, according to their respective

Numbers..

Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4: N o Capitation, or other dir ect, Tax shall be laid, unless inProportion to the Census or enumeration h erein befor e dir ected to be taken.

This prohibition against a direct un-apportioned tax remains in full force and effect today.

16th Amendment (Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratified February 3, 1913): The Congressshall have power to l ay and coll ect taxes on in comes, f rom whatever source deri ved, without

apportionm ent among the sever al States, and without r egard to any census or enumer ation.

The Internal Revenue Service falsely states that the Constitution and the 16th Amendment

authorize a tax on every individual. The following cases show that such claim is false and

fraudulent.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. COM. OF MASSACHUSETTS, 37 U.S. 657 (1838): " The

gover nment of the Un ited States may, therefor e, exercise all , but no m ore than all the judi cialpower provided for it by the constituti on." 37 US 657, 672.(Underline emphasis)

Murdock vs. Com. of Penn., 319 US 105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at 1298 (1943): Astate may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the F ederal

Constitution.

Nothing can be clearer than that what the constitution intended to guard against was the

exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons and property within

any state through a majority made up from the other states. Pollock vs. Farmers Loan andTrust Co. onoriginal intent, 157 US 429, 582 (1895).

Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916), on original intent, " ... the all embracingcharacter of the two gr eat classif ications, i ncludi ng, on the one hand, D ir ect Taxes subject to

apportionment, and on the other, excises, duties, and imposts subject to uniformity, held the

law to be unconstitutional in substance for these reasons: concluding that the classification of

Dir ect was adopted for the purpose of rendering it impossible to burden by taxation

accumulations of property, real or personal, except subject to the regulation of apportionment,

..." (Underline emphasis)

10th Amendment to the Constitution states: "The powers not delegated to the United Statesby the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the People."


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Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 629 (1895): " Excise' is defined to be aninland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, and sometimes upon

the r etail sale; sometimes upon the manuf actur er, and sometimes upon th e vendor.

Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 US 41, 47 (1900): " Direct Taxes bear upon persons, upon possessionand the enjoyment of rights";

FLINT v STONE TRACY, 220 US 107, 151 - 152 (1911): Duties and imposts are terms

commonly applied to levies made by govern ments on the importation or exportation of

commodities. Excises are 'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of

commodities within the country, upon li censes to pursue certain occupations, and upon

corporate pri vil eges.' Cooley, Const. L im . 7th ed. 680.(Underline emphasis)Thus, in the matter of taxation, the constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and

indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely,

the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts,and excises.Pollock, 157 US 429, 556 (1895);

The Code of Federal Regulations cites direct and indirect taxes in 19 CFR 351.102 Definitions.

Direct tax. ``Direct tax'' means a tax on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other

for ms of i ncome, a tax on the ownership of r eal pr operty, or a social welf are charge.

I ndir ect t ax. ``I ndir ect tax' ' means a sales, excise, tur nover , value added, f ranchi se, stamp,

transfer, inventory, or equipment tax, a border tax, or any other tax other than a direct tax or

an i mport charge.

See above Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916), onoriginal i ntent.

U.S. vs. Whitridge, 231 US 144, 147 (1913): " As repeatedly pointed out by this court, the

corporation tax law of 1909... imposed an excise or privilege tax, and not in any sense a tax

upon property or upon i ncome mer ely as in come." ;

MERCHANTS LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509, 518 - 519 (1921): TheCorporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, was not an income tax law, but a definition of

the word income was so necessary i n its administration I t is obvious that these

decisions in principle ru le the case at bar if the word income has the same meaning i n the

Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it hasthe same scope of meaning was in eff ect decided i n Souther n Pacif ic v L owe , where i t was

assumed for the purpose of decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the

act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the word must be

given the same meaning and content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in

the act of 1913. When we add to this, Eisner v M acomber th e defi ni tion of in come which

was applied was adopted from Strattons Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the

Corporation Excise Tax A ct of 1909 ther e woul d seem to be no room to doubt that the wor d

must be given t he same meani ng i n al l the I ncome Tax A cts of Congress that was given t o it in

the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely

settl ed by decisions of th i s Cour t.(Underline emphasis)


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EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189, 205 - 206 (1920): The 16th Amendment must be

construed i n connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the eff ect

attr ibuted to them befor e the amendment was adopted.

A s repeatedly h eld, th is did not extend t he taxing power to new subjects

it becomes essenti al to distingui sh between what i s and i s not in come , as the term i s ther eused..

we find little to add to the succinct defini tion adopted in two cases arising under the

Corporation Tax Act of 1909(Str atton s and Doyle)

SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. v. LOWE, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918): " We must reject in this case,as we have r ejected in cases ari sin g under the Corporati on Excise Tax A ct of 1909, the br oad

contention submitted on behalf of the government that all receipts, everything that comes in,

are income within the proper defini tion of the term 'gross income'. Certainly the term

' in come' has no broader meaning i n th e I ncome Tax A ct of 1913 than i n th at of 1909, and for

the present purpose we assume there is no difference in its meaning as used in the two acts."

FLINT v. STONE TRACY CO., 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911): I n the case at bar we have alreadydiscussed the limitations which the Constitution imposes upon the right to levy excise taxes,

and it could not be said, even if the principles of the 14th Amendment were applicable to the

present case, that there is no substantial difference between the carrying on of business by the

corporations taxed, and the same business when conducted by a private firm or individual.

The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise, in which the actual transactions may

be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the

privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the

corpor ate capacity of those taxed, and wh ich are not enjoyed by pr ivate fir ms or indi viduals.

(Underline emphasis)

Stratton's Independence, 231 US 399, 417 (1913): Evidently Congress adopted the income asthe measure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in corporate form

because it desired that the excise should be imposed, approximately at least, with regard to the

amount of benefit presumably der ived by such corporations fr om the cur rent operati ons of the

government. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 165, 55 S. L. ed. 107, 419, 31 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising the right to tax a

legiti mate subject of taxation as a fr anchise[231 U.S. 399, 417]or privilege, was not debarred

by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although derived in part

from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable.(Underline emphasis);

Sims v. Ahrens et al., 271 SW Reporter at 730: Income is necessarily the product of the jointefforts of the state and the r ecipient of the income, the state fur nishing the protection

necessary to enable the recipient to produce, receive, and enjoy it, and a tax thereon in the last

analysis i s simply a porti on cut f rom the i ncome and appropriated by the state as its share


Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (Ore. 1930): " The individual, unlike thecorpor ation, cannot be taxed f or the mer e pr ivil ege of existing. T he corporation is an ar tif icial

entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individual's rights to

live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot beimposed." (Underline emphasis)


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Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918): " An examination of these and other

provisions of the Act (Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909) make it plain that the

legislative purpose was not to tax property as such, or the mere conversion of property, but to

tax the conduct of the business of corporations organized for profit upon the gainful returns

fr om their busin ess oper ations." (Underline emphasis)

STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103, 112 -114 (1916): Not being within the

authority of the 16th

Amendment, the tax i s therefore, withi n the rul ing of Poll ack a dir ect

tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment.; (Underline

emphasis)

STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103, 112 -114 (1916): it was settled inStratton s I ndependence that such tax is not a tax upon pr operty but a tr ue excise levied

on the result of the business...(Underline emphasis);

Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699, 705 (1930): " A man is free to layhand upon h is own property. T o acquir e and possess property is a r ight, not a pri vilege ... T he

right to acquire and possess property cannot alone be made the subject of an excise .... nor,

generally speaking, can an excise be laid upon the mere right to possess the fruits thereof, as

that ri ght is the chief attr ibute of ownership." (Underline emphasis);

U.S. v. BALLARD, 535 F2d 400 (1976): Gr oss income and not gross receipts is thefoundation of income tax li abil ityAt 404,The general term income is not defined in theI nter nal Revenue Code. At 404, gross in come means the total sales, less the cost of

goods sold, plu s any i ncome fr om investments and fr om incidental or outside operati ons or

sources.

Doyle vs. Mitchell, 247 US 179, at 183, at 185 (1918): " Wh atever diff icul ty there may be abouta precise and scientif ic defi niti on of ' income" ; it imports, as used here, somethin g entir ely

distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax;

conveying r ather the idea of gain or in crease ari sing fr om corporate activiti es." (Underline

emphasis);

Evans vs. Gore, 253 US 245, 263 (1920); " ... It manifestly disregards the fact that by the

previous r uli ng it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new

power of taxation." (Underline emphasis);

Brushaber vs. Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 12 (1916), " ... the whole purpose of the Amendmentwas to r eli eve all income taxes when imposed f r om apporti onment fr om a consider ation of the

source..." and on the contrary shows that i t was drawn with the object of maintaining theli mitations of th e Constituti on and harm onizin g their oper ation.(Underline emphasis);

Peck vs. Lowe, 247 US 165, 173 (1918); " The Sixteenth Amendment, although referred to inargument, has no r eal beari ng and m ay be put out of view. A s poin ted out in r ecent decisions,

it does not extend th e taxi ng power to new or excepted subj ects(Underline emphasis)

Bowers vs. Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 US 170, 174 (1926)," I t was not the purpose or eff ect of thatAmendment to bri ng any n ew subject with in the taxing power ." (Underline emphasis);


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Helvering vs. Edison Brothers, 8th Cir. 133 F2d 575 (1943); " The Treasury cannot by

interpretive regulation make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the

revenue acts of Congress, n or can Congress, without apportionment, tax that which is not

income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.";

Also see Southern Pacific vs. Lowe, 247 US 330, 335 (1918); Butcher's Union vs. Cresent City,111 US 746, 756 (1884) " It has been well said that the property which every man has in his

own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and

inviolable.";

Pollack, 157 US 429, 556, 573, 582, and 436-441 (1895), No capitation, or other direct, taxshall be laid, unless in proportion to the census. And, As to the states and theirmunicipalities, this (contributions to expense of government) is reached largely through the

imposition of direct taxes. As to the federal government, it is attained in part through excises

and indirect taxes upon luxuries and consumption generally, to which direct taxation may be

added to the extent the r ule of appor tionment all ows.;

Flint vs. Stone Tracy, 220 US 107, 161, 165 (1911); Coppage vs. State of Kansas, 236 US 1, 23-24 (1915),The court held it unconstitutional, saying: 'The right to follow any lawful vocationand to make contracts is as completely withi n the protection of the Constituti on as the ri ght to

hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will.

One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot

be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every

citizen i s pr otected in hi s right to work wher e and f or wh om he will . H e may select not onl y his

empl oyer, but al so hi s associates.(Underline emphasis);

Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 US 312, 348 (1921); That the right to conduct a lawful business, andther eby acquir e pecuniar y prof its, is proper ty, is indi sputable.

Meyer vs. State of Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923); Without doubt, it denotes not merely

freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any

of the common occupations of lif e..."

Sims vs. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557; 271 S.W. 720, 730-733 (1925), " T he l egislatur e has no power

to declare as a privilege and tax for revenue purposes, occupations that are of common

right..." (Underline emphasis);

Taft vs. Bowers, 278 US 470, 481 (1929); Un der for mer decisions here the settled doctri ne i sthat the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income

without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as

income.;

Jack Cole vs. MacFarland, 337 S.W. 2d 453, 455-56 (Tenn. 1960), " Realizing and receiving

income or earni ngs is not a pri vilege that can be taxed." ... " Since the ri ght to receive income

or earnings is a right belonging to every person. This right cannot be taxed as a privilege."



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Exhibit 4

Shreveport TimesJuly 13, 2007

Tommy Cryer

Case #06-50164-01


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Documents

Robert A. McNeil v US Gov & Internal Revenue Service (RAM-071)