Risk is a Social Thing, Not Just a Mathematical Thing

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Volume 3, Issue 2 2012 Article 4

"Risk Is a Social Thing, Not Just a Mathematical Thing:" A

Model for Stakeholder Engagement in Decision Making

Anneliese Poetz,McMaster University

Poetz, Anneliese (2012) ""Risk Is a Social Thing, Not Just a Mathematical Thing:" A Model for

Stakeholder Engagement in Decision Making,"Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy: Vol. 3: Iss. 2,

Article 4.

DOI: 10.1515/1944-4079.1105

2012 Policy Studies Organization
http://www.psocommons.org/http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpphttp://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp


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"Risk Is a Social Thing, Not Just a

Mathematical Thing:" A Model forStakeholder Engagement in Decision Making

Anneliese Poetz,McMaster University

Abstract

A practical model is needed for stakeholder engagement in decision making that involves

risks to public safety. An effective model should be adaptable to contingencies and meet the needs

of diverse stakeholders in a democratic setting. This paper presents a new model for stakeholder

consultation and knowledge exchange that has been derived through the use of case study and

grounded theory. Data were mainly comprised of 30 one-on-one interviews with stakeholders

involved in the decision making processes for the re-licensing of two nuclear power generation

facilities in Ontario, Canada. The model is centered upon the importance of developing and

maintaining quality relationships among stakeholders before, during, and after consultation, in part

through active communication and conflict management through skilled facilitation. Also important

are stakeholders divergent perceptions about risk, and understanding of the risks associated with

the decision to be made. The paper concludes with recommendations for policy and practice.

Investment in a long-term, relationship-centred approach can enable future projects to remain on-

time and on-budget.

KEYWORDS: knowledge exchange, risk perception, conflict, communication, nuclear power

generation


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Introduction

The concept of safety is a social phenomenon that concerns everyone, sincehazards are present regardless of geographic location. For decision making that

considers risks to public safety, stakeholder consultation is becoming increasingly

common (Daley 2008). Abelson et al. (2003) note that further analysis is needed

in terms of participant views during deliberation. For stakeholders, perceptionsare reality; values, facts, and knowledge are socially constructed through

meanings derived through social interactions (Berger and Luckmann 1966;

McMahon 1997; Crotty 1998). However, there is currently insufficient evidenceconcerning constructivist perspectives on knowledge and deliberation (Chilvers

2008). There is also a need for further investigation of (the often neglected)

aspects of participation such as the impact of stakeholder interactions and theemotions and personal experiences of participants (Harvey 2009).

This research sought to address these gaps by answering the question

how can the current consultation processes for decision making involving risksto public safety be improved? within the context of local level decision making

processes for nuclear power generation in Canada. Research indicates that a

significant portion of the public views the operation of nuclear power generation

facilities as dangerous to public safety, and that many consider themselves under-informed about the risks (Sjoberg 2000). This paper introduces a new approach to

stakeholder1

consultation and argues for a flexible and fluid approach for adapting

to contingencies (a systems2

1 For the purpose of this paper, stakeholder refers to anyone who is affected either directly or

indirectly by the consequences of a decision. For instances in this paper where the term public

consultation is used, it reflects the terminology which has been used in the work which is being

cited. Most existing frameworks separate the public from experts in an us and them manner

(this concept has been explored in more detail elsewhere; see Poetz (2010, 2011a). Thus, the term

stakeholder is used in place of public wherever possible in order to acknowledge the fact thatthe public is a heterogeneous group of individuals comprised of members of industry,

government, non-governmental organizations, academia, etc. who are all affected by the risks

posed by nuclear power generation technology.

approach). An example of such a contingency is anexternal disaster (such as Chernobyl or Fukushima) that could heighten risk

perceptions beyond the impacted community and subsequently increase the

potential for conflict during consultation processes across the globe (see Poetz2010, 2011a). The paper will further argue that heightened risk perceptions,

whatever the origin, are important to acknowledge and address appropriately, in

order to build trust and credibility in institutions that conduct consultation(s) for

decision making purposes.

2 A system is a structured set of objects and/or attributes together with the relationships between

themat the same time [a system is] a subsystem of some wider system and is itself a wider

system to its subsystems (Wilson 1990, 24 and 30).

1

Poetz: A Model for Stakeholder Engagement in Decision Making

Published by De Gruyter, 2012


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Participatory frameworks which are intended to be inclusive anddemocratic have shown mixed results when applied to real-world decision making

situations (see Renn et al. 1993; Abelson et al. 2003; Meisenbach 2006). This may

be due to their rigid design and inability to adapt to individual characteristics andexternal events. Despite recommendations made in research papers and

government-commissioned reports to include opportunities for discussion

between the public and decision making bodies, uptake into practice rarelyoccurs; however, there is no explanation for why this is the case (Meisenbach

2006). Without adequate opportunity for discussion about concerns, processes

which are designed to be democratic remain unsatisfactory and can bedisempowering. Sundqvist and Elam (2010, 1) emphasize the need for a shift

from the mere existence of public involvement towards a more genuine means of

enabling public issues and concerns to reach a higher level of articulation.

This research generated a new theoretical model for approaching

stakeholder consultation which is grounded in the experiences of the participantsin a real-world decision making situation. The paper begins with a critical

review of existing frameworks for stakeholder participation in environmentaldecision-making. This is followed by an overview of the sites and stakeholder

consultation processes which provide the focus of the case study. After a brief

methodology section, the resulting relationship-centered model for approachingstakeholder participation in decision making is presented. The paper concludes

with actionable recommendations for research and practice.

Stakeholder Participation and Empowerment

This study sought to understand how individual perceptions of risk and trust in

decision making institutions3

affected, and were affected by, social interaction.

The quality of such interactions, including trust and the effectiveness of

communication, can determine the potential for misunderstanding and conflict(Grunig 1989; Slovic 1993, 1999). Although organizations communicate

information about risk (e.g., through brochures or TV/radio advertisements) as a

means to reduce or avoid uncertainty concerning environmental impacts (Chess2001), the information is often over-generalized and thus ineffective when it

comes to satisfying individuals wanting to learn more:

citizens do not want more information by way of newslettersand community forums. Rather they have a dread of the nuclear

3 In this document, an institution represents a governmental or non-governmental agency that

operates for a specific purpose; in this case, risk assessment/management in the interest of public

safety.

2

Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, Vol. 3 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 4


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industry and want to know about the risk of a severe accident(Taylor and Spivak 2001, 37).

To this end, participatory frameworks for stakeholder consultation may also beconsidered a means for exchanging information about risks which may be a more

effective and satisfying means of communication.

Stakeholder participation and empowerment4

Full control over decision making is not always necessary for

empowerment if goals such as increased understanding or partnership in decisionmaking are made possible (Zimmerman 1995). It is, however, reasonable to

expect public consultation with regard to risky technologies to move from public

consultation to partnership with stakeholders. Certainly, a degree of direct and

reasonable involvement of citizens in the implementation of technologiesinvolving risk, such as the use of nuclear energy should be expected in

democratic decision making processes (Strohl 1999, 40). When stakeholdersbelieve themselves to be excluded, the result can be disempowering, andestablished systems for managing risks through institutional action may not be

viewed as effective (Edelstein 1988; Reich 1991).

are inextricably linked; theexperience can be either empowering or disempowering depending upon the

quality of the interaction (Rich et al. 1995; Wandersman and Florin 1990;

Zimmerman and Rappaport 1988; Edelstein and Wandersman 1987). Arnsteins(1969) ladder of stakeholder participation is a fundamental model which describes

eight levels of citizen involvement in decision making. While Arnstein argues for

high levels of citizen control over decision making and discourages tokenism and

non-participation, others argue that information and power sharing is not

necessarily in the best interest of the public for highly technical decisions (such asthe focus of this investigation). As Beierle (2004, 337) states, rather than

supporting communities right-to-know the fiduciary duty of agencies [is] toprotect citizens from risks.

Dorcey, Doney, and Rueggeberg (1994) developed a model based uponArnsteins (1969) ladder that describes a continuum of public engagement and

increasing levels of interaction and influence over outcomes. The lowest (least

favorable) levels are inform and educate. The highest levels (most favorable) are

seek consensus and ongoing involvement. The model stresses adaptability for the

level of public engagement based upon the decision making context in which it is

applied (Dorcey, Doney, and Rueggeberg 1994). It has been suggested by Doelle

and Sinclair (2006, 185) that it is time to consider a different approach tolegislating public participationone that starts with the ultimate objective of co-

operation. Rich et al. (1995) recommend a collaborative approach to community

4 Empowerment is the process of gaining influence over events and outcomes of importance

(Fawcett et al. 1994; Rappaport 1981).

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decision making concerning local environmental hazards, as it provides a processwhich facilitates empowerment. Collaborative partnerships can begin to transform

relationships among stakeholders, and greater empowerment can be achieved

through an emphasis on relationship-building (Wheatley 1992; Fawcett et al. 1994Maton and Salem 1995). To reiterate a previous point, what can be

disempowering is a scenario where the reasons for decisions are neither explained

nor understood (Otway 1992; Wandersman and Hallman 1993; Edelstein 1988;Reich 1991). Attention to improving processes for public engagement is

worthwhile, since individuals and the community can feel either empowered or

disempowered depending upon the experience, regardless of whether the risk isremoved or mitigated:

If governments fail to respond to citizens concerns or use

technical experts to discredit those concerns, citizens may feel

abandoned by the one institution that was supposed to be undertheir control and protecting their interests. If governments

encourage citizens to invest energy in elaborate processes thathave no real (chance) of influencing the outcome, they can

heighten frustration levels (Rich et al. 1995, 664).

The quality of interaction is also important because of its possible effects

on individual knowledge, from which perceptions are formed. Healy (2009, 1644)

argues that effective participation mustaccount for how knowledge is

constructed by and through processes, including those ofparticipation/deliberation. Essentially, Rich et al. (1995) illustrate the role of

individual knowledge and, more importantly, the ability to exchange and acquireknowledge in participant satisfaction and better-quality decisions.

Models for Stakeholder Consultation

Thus, effective environmental management requires the adoption of a

collaborative approach for issues involving high uncertainty (Funtowicz andRavetz, 1993; Cardinall and Day 1998; Chilvers 2008). Currently legislated

processes for public consultation in Canada have been criticized for being too

formal and rigid due to the limited opportunities for discussion between non-

industry stakeholders and government and industry decision makers (seeGovernment of Canada 1992). By adopting a fluid, collaborative approach,

experts can empower citizens by communicating technical information in anunderstandable manner (Gaventa 1988). However, despite recommendations for

discussion forums with diverse participants, discussion has often been avoided

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(Meisenbach 2006; Renn et al. 1993). Holmes and Scoones (2001) suggest that inhighly controversial situations, conflicts must not be ignored and instead should

be addressed directly. Habermas (1993) views conflict as both inevitable and

necessary during deliberation in order to validate the facts which are underdiscussion.

Several academic frameworks have been developed based on Habermas

principles of fairness and competence. While arguably well-intentioned, Renn etal.s (1993) framework can be viewed as disempowering. It limits citizen

involvement to a mere ranking of items that have been predetermined by

experts (Renn et al. 1993). This can be offensive to some citizens who may feelthey have more to contribute. Weblers and Tulers framework (2000), also

grounded in Habermas principles, cites the importance of managing conflict and

building better relationships among all stakeholders. However, neither Renn et al.

(1993) nor Webler and Tuler (2000) acknowledge how a pre-existing good or bad

relationship can influence individual perceptions about risk, and that thisrelationship may also relate to the potential for conflict, misunderstandings, and

ineffective communication.The civics model (Nelson and Serafin 1995) places understanding at the

center in order to suggest its paramount importance during stakeholder

consultation. The model also emphasizes conflict management, but focuses onconflict resolution concerningfacts. While understanding is important, this paper

argues that it is conflict concerning the facts about nuclear power generation

between nuclear and non-nuclear individuals and organizations that often

leaves those in the middle of the debate confused thus failing to increaseunderstanding. In order for a model to be practical and applicable, other types and

sources of conflict must be considered and managed (such as long-standingconflict based on a history of poor relationships) while recognizing that conflictresolution is unlikely. As Moote, McClaran, and Chickering (1997, 877) state,

social deliberation in itself does not ensure successful collaboration and

establishing rules of operation and decision-making within the group is critical conflicts need further consideration.

The aforementioned frameworks appear to be abstracted from the

individual behavior(s) that can cause (mis)understanding, increased potential forconflict, and the (in)effectiveness of communication. Indeed, Johnson (2008, 110)

states that the ultimate success of deliberative democratic processes is

determined by actors themselves. An additional challenge is that existing

frameworks for participation have been designed with the mindset that allmembers of the public wantto participate. Mitchell (2002) distinguishes between

active and inactive publics. Active publics include industries, environmental

NGOs, and other interest groups. Inactive publics are individuals or groups whodo not generally become involved in consultation for decision making on local

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issues (Mitchell 2002). It is important for risk managers to find ways to engageinactive publics in decision making in order to prevent the reduction of the

general publics interests to the narrow viewpoints presented to decision makers

by a small number of individuals from special interest groups (Diduck 2004;Parson 2000). Frustrated scientists and industry experts judge the public for

behaviors which they believe are based upon irrationality or ignorance, while

active publics reciprocate this frustration in the form of antagonism towardgovernment and industry (Slovic 1993).

Planning a roadmap for why, where, and how stakeholder input will be

sought is especially important in situations where many stakeholders may distrustthe consulting institution (Cheng and Mattor 2006; Rosenstrom and Kyllonen

2007). Successful planning of a participatory process lies first within clearly

communicating the institutions goal for including stakeholder input into decision

making (Glicken 2000). Indeed, Glicken (2000, 308) states that the participatory

process must be as carefully managed as the technical side of the risk assessmentif the process is to succeed. A well planned and executed approach may not only

improve information exchange and trust in institutions, but in the long-term cantranslate into a more cost- and time-efficient process (Diduck 2004; Glicken

2000; Cheng and Mattor 2006). A more cost-effective approach can benefit

industry directly, and the public indirectly, especially in situations where theindustry is publicly funded.

The constantly evolving technology and social conditions within which

institutions must manage risk present ever-changing challenges to gaining public

trust (Flueler 2001). Approaches to stakeholder engagement must evolveaccordingly. The following section describes the decision making processes for

the re-licensing of nuclear power generation facilities in Canada, which includeopportunities for stakeholder input throughout. It also details the specific situationunder study the controversial re-licensing (for refurbishment and restart) of two

nuclear power generation facilities in Ontario.

The Case Study

Two nuclear power generation facilities comprise the focus of this case study:

Pickering A (located in the city of Pickering, within sight of local residents) and

Bruce Power (located near Kincardine, at a distance from the surrounding

community). Local public support is not as strong in Pickering (population~80,000) as it is in Kincardine (population ~10,000) (see The Kincardine News

2008; Mehta 2005). This could be due to Pickerings larger population andsmaller proportion of residents who are employed at the facility (OPG 2009; City

of Pickering 2008). Bruce Power Inc. operates through a public-private

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partnership with the Province of Ontario (Bruce Power Inc. 2003; Swift andStewart 2004), while Pickering is owned by the Province and is operated as the

crown corporation Ontario Power Generation (OPG), whose sole shareholder is

the Province of Ontario.In 1997, as part of Ontarios Nuclear Assets Optimization Plan (NAOP),

the provincial government shut down seven of Ontarios 19 nuclear reactors,

including four at the Pickering A and four at the Bruce A power stations(Mehta 2005). Also in 1997, new legislation (the Nuclear Safety and Control Act)

was introduced in Canada which dissolved the previous Atomic Energy Control

Board and the Atomic Energy Control Act, and enacted the Canadian NuclearSafety Commission (CNSC) as the new organization which would oversee the

safety of Canadas nuclear technologies (Morrison 1998; Government of Canada

1997). The basis for this new legislation related to the need for greater avenues

for public input concerning environmental issues (Morrison 1998). This was

viewed as a more democratic approach to decision making, especially consideringthe loss of public trust in the Canadian government organizations responsible for

nuclear technologies (see Morrison 1998).The re-licensing processes for Pickering A and Bruce A represented

the first time in Canada that a series of reactors was to be re-started after a major

and extended shut-down. The re-licensing process for a nuclear power generationfacility involves the following steps (OPG 2009):

1. Nuclear organization submits Letter of Intent and ProjectDescription to CNSC.

2. CNSC issues Draft Environmental Assessment (EA)Guidelines.

3. EA Guidelines subject to public review.4. CNSC commission hearing on EA Guidelines.5. CNSC issues Final EA Guidelines.6. Nuclear organization submits Draft EA Study to CNSC.7. Nuclear organization submits Final EA Study Report to CNSC.8. CNSC issues Draft Screening Report for public review.9. CNSC commission hearing on Screening Report.10.CNSC commission decision on EA.

The new legislation (Government of Canada 1997) triggers the Canadian

Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) (Government of Canada 1992) andrequires an environmental assessment specific to nuclear technologies as directed

by the CNSC. Within this process, there are several opportunities for public

participation ranging from informal open houses to formal CNSC hearings. Whilethe CEAA requires an environmental assessment to be conducted at the federal

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level, an additional EA at the provincial level is optional. This is one example of asource of contention during the processes which are the focus of this study; since

the province of Ontario decided not to duplicate the EA that was conducted at the

federal level, many stakeholders who were unaware that a Federal EA had beenconducted believed that there had been no EA at all.

The direction and scope of this research developed in reaction to the

personal frustration experienced by individuals and affiliated institutions andstakeholders engaged in the ensuing decision making processes. Many found their

perceived inability to impact the outcome disappointing. Most research

concerning stakeholder consultation has been conducted from the perspective ofthe public, with considerably less research on this issue from the decision makers

perspectives (Renn et al. 1993; Meisenbach 2006; Chilvers 2008; Webler and

Tuler 2000). Therefore, in order to fully understand the situation, this study

examined the problem from a variety of perspectives, including those of

institutional decision makers, scientists, interest groups, government, and the laypublic. The chosen strategy and conceptual approach required qualitative

methodologies in order to interpret the associated underlying social,organizational, and political processes.

Methodology

From a social constructivist perspective, stakeholder knowledge, perceptionsabout risk, and responses to scientific facts can be influenced by the quality of

personal interactions (Martin and Richards 1995; Stehr 1994; Aronson 1984).

This study employed an inductive approach from a social constructivistperspective, using a combination of case study and grounded theory (Stake 2001;

Strauss and Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2000; Glaser 1978). A case study approach

was utilized in order to allow the researcher to study the situation in depth, while

the combination with grounded theory allowed for the abstraction of a theorygeneralizable to other contexts (see Creswell 1998).

Data were collected as part of a larger project that focused on the

experiences of stakeholders that participated in the decision making processes forthe re-licensing of the Pickering A and Bruce A nuclear power generation

facilities in Ontario. One-on-one, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were

conducted with 30 stakeholders (see Table 1) for the purpose of eliciting insight

into a diverse range of experiences. Emphasis was placed on stakeholderengagement and utilization of different forms and sources of knowledge. One

focus group was conducted in Pickering, Ontario with 3 members of the laypublic. Interview questions covered topics such as transparency of processes and

information, democracy and inclusiveness, how different types of information are

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used for decision-making, type of involvement in the Pickering A and/or BruceA decision-making processes, and the role of past and present conflicts (see

Poetz 2010 for complete interview checklist).

Table 1. Diversity of Respondents Participating in the Study, According to Position During the DecisionMaking Processes for Re-Licensing of Pickering A and Bruce A Nuclear Power Generation Facilities

Actor

TypeResearch Industry NGO

CNSC

(Regulator)Govt Public

Scientific

Expert4 - - 1 - 2

Decision-

Maker- - - - 3 -

Both - 7 - 5 1 -

Neither - - 4 - - 3

Total= 30

Data collection occurred between February and August, 2007. Interviewsand the focus group were transcribed and then coded using N-Vivo 2.0 software.

Key documents identified by stakeholders were triangulated with interview data

and strengthened the theory. The researcher provided another source of data, sincethe researchers own experiences having lived in a host community became

central to the research as an instrument for reflection during construction of the

grounded theory (Milliken and Schreiber 2001). Open coding and axial codingwere used to fracture the data using constant comparison before higher level

inductive analysis enabled the abstraction of a generalizable theory. Initial coding

in N-Vivo yielded 337 codes, while additional higher level analysis provided for aconvergence of these open codes into themes including (but not limited to)knowledge, communication, decision making basis, technical risk, environmental

risk, risk perception, trust, and conflict. These themes formed the basis of further

higher level analysis, which resulted in the final model presented in this paper.The conditional matrix (see Figure 1) was utilized in conjunction with

situational analysis in order to elaborate on causes, conditions, and consequences

of the situation of concern. The framework provides a way to describe andorganize the findings about human interaction at the interpersonal, institutional,community, and global levels (Strauss and Corbin 1998).

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Figure 1. Strauss and Corbins (1998) Conditional Matrix Showing Direction and Hierarchy of Causes andConsequences

Within the conditional matrix, the phenomenon under study (e.g., any substantive

topic such as decision making, conflict and consensus, information flow, or moraldilemmas) is examined with reference to potential conditions for consideration

during analysis, such as time, history, biography, economics, power, and politics.

Due to the controversial nature of the situation of concern, situational analysiswas chosen since it provides the necessary structures for elaborating more fully on

the variability of positions and interactions among stakeholders (see Clarke 2005).

Trustworthiness of the findings and recommendations was established through aprocess called member-validation, in which a summary of the findings is

presented to respondents for comment before the theory is finalized.

Results and Discussion

Analysis identified four key elements of stakeholder participation in decisionmaking: (potential for) conflict; (mis)understanding; risk perception; and

communication (see Figure 2). However, these elements are interdependent and

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also affect (and can be affected by) the quality of relationships among individual,group, organizational, national, and international stakeholders. Accordingly, the

relationship-based model presented in this paper applies to all levels of the

system within which the decision-making processes occurred, from global tolocal. Details of this system were articulated through the use of situational

analysis; these details are beyond the scope of this paper and are illustrated

elsewhere as an adjunct to the model presented here (see Poetz 2011b).

Figure 2. Relationship Model for Effective Knowledge Exchange Before, During, and After Stakeholder

Consultation for Making Decisions that Relate to Public Safety (See Poetz 2010 for Full Analysis andDescription).

The relationship among stakeholders is placed at the center of the model in

order to denote its central importance for mitigating conflict, for achieving

effective communication and understanding, and for reducing risk perceptions(see Poetz 2010, 2011a, 2011b for full discussion of these systems). The four

elements surrounding the core relationship promotes a cause-effect relationship

in either direction; these elements expand or contract the model according topositive or negative effects. For example, the current situation, which is

characterized by a poor relationship among stakeholders, has affected the four

surrounding elements in a negative way. Communication efforts among

stakeholders remain ineffective. Conflict persists. Risk perceptions remain high

Relationship

Conflict

Communication

Understanding

Perception

of Risk

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(among certain stakeholders). Understanding has become impossible to achieveeven with the most well-intentioned communication strategies. The model (Figure

2) illustrates an iterative and dynamic framework which is adaptable to

contingencies because of its basis in relationships and trust; communication aboutrisks relating to external events (e.g. Fukushima) is most effective when the

audience trusts the source. Indeed, relationships are by their nature dynamic and

iterative phenomena. As such, care must be taken during every interaction to buildand not damage trust through self-governance, especially by individuals

representing decision-making organizations/institutions.

Core Relationships and Consultation Processes

Time is an important consideration in conducting public consultations, since

projects depend on timely movement through the processes (e.g., to keep costs at

a minimum). However, it is important that processes are not conducted in amanner which negatively impacts relationships among stakeholders. If public

consultations are rushed, that sense can be conveyed to participants and can comeacross as insincerity with regards to the duty to protect public safety. The effect

will be poor communication, misunderstandings, increased perceptions of risk by

non-decision makers, and conflict stemming from their unaddressed concerns.The existing formal quasi-judicial process can unduly silence or exclude

those wishing to participate, either because of the intimidating nature of the

process or the disallowance of discussion, or both. This, of course, challenges the

intended democratic process. Intervenors participating in the decision makingprocess for the licensing of the nuclear power generation facilities felt that they

were not treated fairly or respectfully due to this formal nature of the hearing:

see my library here and there, and theres some more

heretheres all kind of like environmental assessment studies

there, and theres some more down on the floor over there...thatjust shows you how much time I have put into it and its sometimes

very frustrating that you dont get listened to properly. NGO

The more informal open houses, also part of the legislated consultation

process, may represent a more inviting approach. These are open to anyone in the

general public to drop in and discuss any concerns (e.g., technical, environmental,

or others). Members from the regulator and/or industry are present and available;however, these open houses are reportedly ill-attended. This remains a source of

frustration for the industry and the regulator since open houses are viewed as the

fairest venue for public consultation because there are no limitations on who canattend, how long a person can speak to someone, or what can be discussed.

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In order to achieve a level of personal interaction with greater publicinclusion, there needs to be a forum which balances the informal nature of open

houses with the structure of the formal hearing process (see Poetz 2011a). An

opportunity for informal discussion with a moderator present for the purpose ofmediation would be one such compromise. In order to be well-attended,

participants would still need to believe that they may somehow impact the

outcome through their efforts:

youve got tointegrate your processwith the bigger decision

making structure. So having all thatnice touchy feely, lets get

together and talk and stuff, well what for?...people [will feel]used and abused and kind of wasting their timeits a nice idea to

get people just sort of talking in a less stressful setting, but the

other side of thatI find that people want their views recorded.

Otherwise, whats the point? Scientist

The building of relationships among stakeholders during and forconsultation purposes must be approached with a long-term view. It was

suggested that by revisiting communities post-decision, the CNSC could further

facilitate information exchange and build trust. The short-lived interactions thatoccur during decision making processes are not enough to sustain positive

relations:

the process includes the community, the decision makingexcludes the community and its back to a Taj Mahal, away from

the community never to be seen again until the next time they comeinto your community and say, By the way, we want your input. Government

The people who make the decision should go back and de-brief.You never ever see the regulator who holds the hearings and talks

to the publicgo back to the community to explain the

decisionand try to address some of the fears from the decision.

You dont see them again or hear from them again until the nextapplication is made. Government

The need for the regulator to revisit the local community and explain thedecisions in an active way, rather than by passively placing it on a website, is very

important for conveying genuine concern for public safety. For the public, it

would inform them that the CNSC is always there looking out for their safety, andcould also encourage participation in the decision making processes in the future:

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the contact with people is disappearing, a lot. So the only

contact they get today, people, is through hearing processes, and

parliamentary hearings and stuff, but its not everybody that goesthere, and everybody claims to speak for everybody. So how do

you access everybody, thats a problem. CNSC

The current situation, characterized by inadequate communication,

misunderstandings, and heightened fears, continues to exacerbate conflict and sets

the stage for future interaction (increased potential for conflict). The lessons fromthe deliberative process employed by the NWMO demonstrate the importance of

these social factors, including individual attitudes and self-governance:

Participants with a history of activism or with direct stakes in any

given policymay require more time to deliberatecollectivelyways of addressing these [include]mediation by

specialists in public deliberation and citizenengagementhoweverdemocratic decision-making is ultimately

contingent on the will of actors from both coalitionstherefore,

the ultimate success of deliberative democratic processes isdetermined by actors themselves, and especially actors in positions

of institutional and financial dominance (Johnson 2008, 110).

Negative effects from unsatisfactory interactions often persist beyond thelicensing processes, including negative influences on credibility, trust, and the

overall quality of future interactions. To improve relationship-building, the mostprevalent suggestion was the provision of opportunities for informal discussionand information exchange among decision makers and interested members of the

public. While this suggestion was referring to scheduled opportunities for

informal discussion, individuals representing decision making institutions canmaximize their potential for building positive relationships by also recognizing

opportunities in unexpected circumstances:

I remember in Newfoundland, I wanted to meet people at thescoping level of an EA and they were not available. So I set up a

meeting and I showed upand the secretary of the fishermans

association said, Oh, theyre out there hauling a boat, so I wentdown to the beach, and I hauled the boat with them, and we sat on

a rock and we spoke. CNSC

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The following sections explain how specific circumstances can producepositive or negative results for relationship management based on the approaches

taken toward the four elements.

Communication

Dominant themes for communication include balance of information about risksand benefits, active versus passive provision of information, and the importance

of trust in the individual(s) or institution(s) from which the information originates.

The potential for conflict can be increased if communication between institutionsand stakeholders, including those uninvolved in the decision making process, is

inadequate:

If that right [ones democratic right to express opposition to the

way risks are managed] is being expressed because ofmisinformation, then it means that the bodies involved need to do a

better job of communicating. I dont blame the public not by anystretch of the imagination. I blame the communicators of that

information. Government

Communication can often be biased, including only positive information

about the benefits of nuclear power generation, such as information provided by

the industry to the public. This constitutes a form of conflict management by

means of avoidance; it is just too risky to provide negative information viabrochures. However, if balanced information were to be provided in a discussion

forum, it could have several positive outcomes, the most important beingincreased trust and credibility in the industry. It also would empower the public topersonally assess the risks based on greater understanding:

Id be more confident in the nuclear industry if they came to meand said, Okaywe evaluated the risks, and objectively, we think

the positives outweigh the risks, and therefore were going to do

this. So I like to seethe plusses and minuses, and understand

the decision. I dont think they do that, because I think there aremembers of the public that would react in a different waysome

people will see that if there are any health risks, well, thats it,

were either moving out of here or close the place down, its a kindof black and white view. Scientist

Things change once you get that objectivityyou know yourenever going to change 5% of the peoples minds, doesnt matter

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what you tell thembutmost people if they see the good in it,and they see that theres a very transparent process, then it

becomes something that theyre able to make their own mind up

for the most part. Scientist

Direct personal interaction with ongoing opportunities for discussion with

experts and decision makers (not public relations personnel) would allowinterested citizens to obtain information that addresses their specific concerns.

This is something that traditional communications via brochures and other media

cannot do due to its generalized nature. However, it is paramount that this be doneby the right individual(s) with the right knowledge, adequate social skills, and the

ability to communicate effectively. Data indicate that if the receiver of

information does not trust the source of information, then the communication

strategy, no matter how clever or costly, will be ineffective. Consequently, the

desired change in public understanding, public trust, and public image will also beunlikely.

Conflict

The role of history is fundamental to the current state of conflict concerningnuclear power generation (see Poetz 2010). There have been both pro- and anti-

nuclear positions of varying degrees since the inception of nuclear power

generation in the 1940s. This section highlights the need for all stakeholders to be

conscious of the importance of their individual approaches to knowledgeexchange, especially decision makers during personal interaction with other

stakeholders. Conflict over the perceived or real safety of nuclear power facilitiesis firmly rooted in the history of such aspects of the relationship between decisionmakers and the public. In light of this conflict, communication within the

context of stakeholder consultation can be ineffective if, when faced with conflict,

communication becomes defensive.While technically outside of stakeholder consultation processes, having

the facts presented by pro- and anti- nuclear representatives and debated via the

news media as a platform affects behavior during consultation. It is likely thatindividuals following this type of debate in order to assess their own personal risk

will become even more confused, heightening emotional response during

consultation:

the opponents to nuclear power alarm people about it. They say

Well these guys dont know what theyre doing, and this stuff is

some kind of green ooze that will stick to your shoes and kill allyour children in the future. Theres no facts on it, but its because

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the public dont (sic) know enough about it, then they have adilemma: do I believe this guy whos in the industry, or do I

believe these other guys, and you know, confusion reigns.

Industry

Thus, there appears to be a direct relationship between conflict,

communication, and risk perception, and an indirect effect on understanding aboutrisk (see Figure 2).

Perceived (or actual) risks to public safety can have great potential to

adversely affect relationships, based on how conflict is handled. This is especiallytrue in terms of the way in which stakeholders view individuals or organizations

responsible for protecting public safety:

I came to the conclusion years ago that the industry wrecked the

technology, because they went about it so badly when they weregearing up in the 60s and they just pushed everything through

without environmental assessments, and people dont forget that and thats why I think its important for them, [to] get a sense of

okay, what exactly IS the objection because maybe we can fix the

process and not trash the technology. So thats another angle ofit because people are just seething and nobody stops to figure out

why. Scientist

Accordingly, the potential for conflict is based upon stakeholdersperceptions of each other, especially on the perceived value that institutions

managing risk place upon concern about public safety. The quality ofrelationships is dependent upon several factors: communication, approach toconflict management (or avoidance), and attitudes and non-verbal cues during

personal interaction. The level of understanding about risk and other factors such

as institutional mandates and processes is dependent upon the effectiveness ofcommunication. In addition, past and present levels of understanding and conflict

interact to determine the quality of the relationship, and set the stage for future

communication and consultation. The aforementioned issues encompass thesocial dimension of risk, as well as the consequences of ignoring it (see Figure 2).

The longer destructive conflict, and its sources (including relationship aspects),

are ignored, the more polarized the issue becomes. This greatly reduces the

possibility of reaching consensus: When it comes to nuclear power, theresalmost no consensus on any issue. (Government).

But conflict need not always be seen as negative. If a forum for discussion

or debate about scientific or other issues affecting public safety could be providedduring decision making processes and made open to the public, the debate could

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have several positive effects. For example, it would allow industry and non-industry scientists to informally talk about the issues of concern, and learn from

each other:

a strength of deliberative democratic processes is their tendency

to reveal the magnitude of risk, extent of uncertainty, and nature of

complexities characterizing a range ofissueshighlight areas ofagreement and disagreement, identify issues in need of more

dialogue, andthe importance of a more discursive approach to

decision-makinglets go of the ideal of consensus. A deliberativeoutcome is successful in so far as participants have sufficiently

contributed to it and are willing to abide by it even when they

disagree with it (Johnson 2008, 109).

However, strongly held beliefs can overshadow this type of deliberativeprocess and cause frustration among institutions in their attempt to establish

meaningful dialogue. The general content of the arguments opposing thetechnology are often repetitious. In other words, when decision-makers

consistently hear the same messages from the same individuals or organizations, it

desensitizes them, decreasing the effectiveness of communication. This does notmean that these participants should be excluded from the discussion; rather, it

means that stakeholders need to modify their mode of communication. Inclusive,

informal dialogues over time can facilitate building more gratifying relationships

among stakeholders despite the contentious nature of the issue up for discussion:

The [NWMO] process demonstrates how to involvea rangeofindividuals broadly reflective of different interest areas andperspectivesall organized in an iterative process extended over a

period of timeit is the combination of the range of sequential

dialoguesthat creates conditions of inclusion. Topics persistingover a long history of a given policy area should be up for

deliberation. The contentious nature of topics is not a reason to

exclude them (Johnson 2008, 108).

The rewards of a more direct conflict management approach through in-

person, open discussions are multiple. Short-term benefits for industry and non-

industry stakeholders include more effective transfer of information; longer-termgains include increased trust and improved relationships.

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Understanding

The data revealed two topics that are important in terms of establishing

understanding: 1) understanding about processes and institutional mandates,and 2) understanding about risks to public safety. The processes for public

participation are largely not understood or well known:

you can inform the public better about what that process isI

think the public might not know whats being done or when their

input is required, or if they want to speak up that there are these

certain key points where its encouraged...the process is there, thepublic just doesnt know about it, or doesnt choose to act upon it.

Scientist

When individuals do not fully understand the processes for publicparticipation and/or the mandate of the institutions, they are likely to become

frustrated. This is because they are likely to, unknowingly, intervene in alicensing decision in the wrong way:

they tend toask the commission to do things that thecommission doesnt have any authority or power to deal with

like decisions about whether were going to have nuclear power in

Ontariothats an energy policy decision made by the

provincethe Ontario Power Authority is probably the best placefor them to express their views about whether nuclear should be

part of our energy mix. Once that decision is made, the CNSC thenreally is only there to say Look were neither pro- nor anti-nuclear; were there that if the province decides its going to have

nuclear, that were going to make sure that its safe. CNSC

This kind of misunderstanding about institutional roles can cause

frustration with all stakeholders, including the commission (the CNSC). Usually,

the response to this type of presentation at the hearings is that the person will notbe permitted to continue. The commission will redirect them to take their

concerns to the appropriate institution. The frustration that results from this

interaction can perpetuate the ongoing conflict between industry-related

institutions and nuclear opponents. More importantly, it can give the impressionthat these institutions do not care about safety, or that the commission is in the

back pocket of the industry.

Misunderstandings about the actual risk posed by nuclear powergeneration are probably the most oft-cited reason for non-industry persons to fear

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nuclear power generation technology. The data have revealed four main types ofrisk which are considered by the proponent and the regulator with regards to

nuclear refurbishment projects: technological, environmental, financial, and

political (see Poetz 2010, 2011a). Of these, the risks of technological failure,environmental impacts, and cost-overruns have historically provided the basis for

conflict between pro- and anti-nuclear stakeholders.

Institutions that manage risk can improve understanding by firstrefocusing attention on their relationship with the non-industry public. For

example, the current relationship between the CNSC and the public is weak. This

is due to several factors: few avenues for face-to-face communication, poorquality stakeholder interaction characterized by formalness and/or poor

interpersonal skills, distancing of oppositional parties by conflict through the

media, and lack of trust in the industry and associated institutions. Providing a

more informal opportunity for interaction could go a long way to foster improved

relationships:

when youre sitting there with all those other suits andexpertsto make a plea to the commission about your concern;

perhaps we need to find another way thats less intimidatingto

engage the public and to get the views of the public on theseprojects. Somehow to reach out, better outreach and fair access to

the commission members in perhaps a little more informal way

CNSC

Pickering and Kincardine are very different communities in terms of the

understanding held by its individual citizens. For example, a large proportion ofthe population (approximately 3,500) in Kincardine region (amalgamatedpopulation of approximately 12,000) are employed at Bruce Power, and therefore

have intimate knowledge of the nuclear facility (personal communication, Bruce

Power 2010). The proportion of the local population employed at OPGs nuclearfacility is considerably lower by comparison, at 3,026 employees (plus ~1,500

support staff) in a region where Pickering alone contributes a population of

approximately 93,000 (City of Pickering 2008). This can have very differentconsequences in terms of the relationship with the local community, as well as for

overall understanding of risks and community support:

that would be the case up at Bruce, where the public tend tobemore educated in nuclear because the community is smaller

and theres more interaction, mostly you know withimmediate

neighbors work with Bruceso as opposed to Pickering, it might

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be your tenth neighbor working at Pickering [nuclear], the othernine are either working [elsewhere] in Pickering. Scientist

For those with experience within the industry (and therefore greaterunderstanding), community acceptance was more a function of familiarity:

attitudes and acceptance toward nuclear is always highincommunities that have nuclear installations because so many

people in the community work there and relay to their family and

friends the reality that these facilities are safe. Industry

However, for opponents of the technology, community acceptance and

risk tolerance was viewed as being dependent upon economic gain. One

scientists opinion was that employees at the plant valued their income over

safety: well-paid workers will normally ignore risks to health andenvironmentwhile populations not connected to those workers will assess risks

more objectively. Risk and attitudes toward nuclear power are discussed in thefollowing section.

Perception of Risk

Risk perceptions are dependent upon understanding, conflict, and the level of trust

within the relationship between the individual and the institution managing risk.

In order to build trust and good relationships, it is imperative that a persondeemed to be an expert is mindful not to minimize an individuals fears about the

technology merely because they do not share the same understanding. Doing sonot only injures the relationship, but this missed opportunity for facilitatingunderstanding can increase potential for conflict by giving the impression that the

institution does not care about public safety (see Poetz 2011a). Personal

interaction, done in the right way, can lead to effective communication:

you have to actually make the effort and get out and physically

go and meet people, one on onewe tend not to do it in the

industry, we tend to put something down on a nice glossy brochureand send it off and say, here is public informationand it doesnt

go too far, because surprise surprisethey dont read it, they

dont understand it, it doesnt answer the question that theywantpeople have issues that concern them, and its not that it

concerns 10,000 others, but it concerns me. Scientist

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This paper advocates an approach that would provide regular opportunitiesfor facilitated discussion among stakeholders. Experts from within the industry

and regulatory agency would ideally make themselves available periodically to

interact personally with individuals who choose to attend.The industry has typically believed that they do provide adequate

information about nuclear power generation, and remain puzzled and frustrated as

to why this information does not reduce perceptions of risk with regard to thetechnology:

I dont think either government or industry or regulators, or

NGOs, for that matter, do an adequate job of informing the peopleabout what real risks are and whats being done about them.

CNSC

In order to mitigate the emotional consequence of perhaps poorlyinformed perceptions through better understanding, more effective

communication is critical. Effectiveness relies upon 1) trusting relationships, and2) the right information. The right information will be tailored to individual

needs, be balanced in terms of benefits and risks, and include information about

what institutions are doing to manage risks on behalf of public safety. Balancedinformation provided to the public (e.g., including honest information about the

risks to public safety) can reduce conflict because of increased understanding:

I dont think its appropriate to scare the public about nuclearpower, I think its important to inform them realistically, about the

negatives and the positives about nuclear power. And I think theyshould clearly understand the risks, and they do NOT understandthat at all. Nobodys told them. Scientist

Addressing the social dimension of risk, specifically effectivecommunication and conflict management, can have overall positive effects for

non-industry stakeholders:

when you pull all the bits and pieces together, you come to anoverall understanding that its a very complex emotional issue and

perhaps if the general person living in the area were to sit down

and really understand it, there wouldnt be so much exaggerationsand mis-truthsthe more you know, the more mellow you are in

your decision making, and you sort of can see the whole picture

rather than just a small portion of it. Scientist

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The basic social process identified in this research was relationship-building. The most important component of effective stakeholder consultation

processes for decision making is relationship building and relationship

management as it relates to communication, understanding, potential for conflict,and perception of risk. According to the model generated as a result of this study,

by establishing positive personal connections

with stakeholders and the

community (e.g., one-on-one personalized communication through opportunitiesfor informal discussion), effectiveness of communication can be increased,

thereby facilitating understanding. With increased understanding, there will be a

greater likelihood that perceptions about risks will become more realistic and areduction (but not elimination) of conflict that can have negative consequences.

Over the long-term, if industry invests in building trusting relationships with non-

industry stakeholders, it can provide a more effective basis for listening and

responding to risk related concerns with appropriate information for addressing

heightened risk perceptions following an incident. In this way, many of themisunderstandings and sources of heightened risk perceptions that can lengthen

legislated public consultation processes and leave many dissatisfied with theoutcome can be addressed long beforehand. The following section summarizes

the findings of the study and outlines specific recommendations for applying the

model in practice.

Conclusions

The core finding of this investigation is the importance of the social dimension of

risk in relation to the effectiveness of institutional decision making processes(Figure 2). Relationship quality is central. Although all relationships are

considered important, perhaps the relationship between decision makers and their

stakeholders is the most salient. These stakeholders must bear the consequences

of decisions made on their behalf, and may not trust measured risk information(such as technical, environmental, financial) to the same degree as decision

makers. Although decision makers must also bear the consequences, they

arguably have more control over the outcome than their counterparts. Thisrelationship aspect which is defined in part by trust, represents the social

dimension of risk. The four major categories identified in the findings

(communication, understanding, conflict, and risk perception) are influenced by

and, in turn, influence the quality of relationships among all stakeholders,including institutions and the public (see Figures 1 and 2). This grounded

theory reflects the intersection of multi-directional relationships and processes atindividual, group, organizational, community, institutional, national, and global

levels (see Poetz 2011b for a detailed description of the multiple levels of

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stakeholders in the system within which these decision making processes tookplace), and represents a systems approach to stakeholder consultation.

Existing processes for obtaining public input that were scrutinized during

the course of this investigation did not consider public consultation from either asystems view or social constructivist perspective. In other words, the institutions

involved in interactions with the public did not appear to consider that the quality

of their relationship with stakeholders (including individual behavior) couldteach trust or distrust, or that this could increase the potential for conflict in

subsequent consultations. A major finding was that trust in institutions was judged

or determined by the quality of the relationship and/or interaction amongstakeholders (before, during, and after consultation, and including how conflict is

managed). This was also found to be the key factor in perceptions about risk and

the management of risks to public safety. Not only do risk perceptions affect

behavior, but behavior and the interpretation of that behavior can influence

perceptions of risk and institutions that manage risk. Many academics have notedthat this social construction can refer to 1) the way in which individuals respond

to scientific facts, or 2) the way individuals perceive the institutions that providethe information (Martin and Richards 1995; Stehr 1994). The findings of this

research thus reflect the tenets of social constructivism described by Berger and

Luckmann (1966): that reality is based upon perceptions, and furthermore, thatfacts, values, and knowledge are socially constructed through the meaning derived

from social interactions (McMahon 1997; Crotty 1998). An individual

representing a decision making institution has great influence in the establishment

of their individual (and by extension their institutions) trustworthiness throughtheir conveyance of credibility, sincerity, and respect for stakeholders.

If representatives of institutions must be accountable for personal conduct,it is also reasonable to require non-industry stakeholders with strong emotions toconduct themselves accordingly. As stated by Johnson (2008, 110), the

ultimate success of deliberative democratic processes is determined by actors

themselves. That is, in order for a democratic process to have the greatest chanceof being applicable in practice, a flexible and adaptable approach that focuses on

individual and collective behavioral aspects of relationships is necessary.

Perceptions about the quality of institutional decision making may also beimpacted by poor communication. Information which is not understood as

intended, or which is biased in favor of the organization or individual who is

providing it, only serves to alter risk perceptions based upon myth rather than

truth. Grunig (1989) has stated the importance of communication for achievingunderstanding. Without this understanding, the result can be misperceptions and

hard feelings [which can form] the seed and nucleus of subsequent conflicts

(Pondy 1992, 257). The effectiveness of communication is influenced in largepart by relationship factors such as (dis)trust in the communicator, the nature of

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the information (e.g., technical, environmental), and the type of information (e.g.,risk assessment, institutional mandates and processes) (Poetz 2010). As Slovic

states if trust is lacking, no form or process of communication will be

satisfactory (1993, 677).The way in which information is provided by institutions can also

influence its effectiveness. Previous research has indicated that citizens want to

know about the risk of a severe accident, and find over-generalized information(such as brochures and other mass produced information) that avoids

communicating this risk to be ineffective (Chess 2001; Taylor and Spivak 2001).

The most effective approach for communicating negative (e.g., risk) informationis through an active communication strategy, whereby personalized dialogue and

discussion provides a forum for addressing individual concerns and fears. As

Merrifield (1989) has noted, it is through personal interaction that information is

more likely to be suited to the needs of the recipient.

It is acknowledged, however, that it may be difficult to engage citizens (acircumstance reflected in the difficulties encountered by the researcher in

obtaining public participation in focus groups). Engagement is complicated byactivist dominance, and/or limited by non-participation due to apathy or to

acceptance of the technology in local communities. The success of the process

would depend on the social and political values of the community, the level andtype of involvement of community members (especially those in more dedicated

positions of nuclear opposition), and the interest and knowledge level of the

community. Nonetheless, such opportunities should be provided for those who

wish to attend, and, it is believed by the researcher, that if such facilitateddiscussions are conducted appropriately (as recommended in this paper), word-of-

mouth among residents could increase future participation.The literature often endorses the achievement, or at least the seeking of,

consensus (see Meisenbach 2006; Habermas 1984, 1987). However, consensus

regarding highly contentious and polarized issues, such as nuclear power

generation, may never be reached (Holmes and Scoones 2001). Consensus islikely impossible, but conflict need not be viewed as entirely negative.

Empowering stakeholders through discussions can promote understanding of the

technology as well as stakeholder concerns through healthy conflict. This canlead to a reduction in the potential for present and future bad conflict, which is

often based on misunderstandings.

Current opportunities for interaction are viewed as mostly limited to

public consultation phases for licensing decisions. In addition, these are viewed asone of two extremes: either too formal or too informal (see Poetz 2011b). The

quasi-judicial formal hearing process is perceived as exclusionary, intimidating

and unfair (in part) because statements cannot be challenged by other participants.Open houses are seen as inadequate because they are perceived as too informal

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and are ill-attended; individuals who do participate may feel their input is notreally valued.

The model presented as a result of this research and the conclusions which

can be drawn from this grounded theory study are theoretical, not confirmatory.The findings stand as a suggestion for seeing the situation of public participation

in decision making concerning issues involving risks to public safety in a different

way.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are directed at institutions responsible for

ensuring public safety through consideration of various factors related to riskperceptions and public involvement in decision making processes. First, in any

situation where institutions consult the public, institutions have a responsibility to

clearly explain their organization/institutions mandates, processes, and roles priorto any open houses or other opportunities for providing input or engaging in

discussion. Doing so would serve to minimize the potential for frustration and

conflict based on procedural misunderstandings, and may increase the perceived

credibility of the institutions and processes in place.Second, opportunities throughout (and beyond) the decision making

processes should be made available for semi-formal ongoing discussions among

representatives from institutions and anyone who wishes to participate.Institutions responsible for managing risk (the regulator and the licensee), after

consulting the public (and with relationship building in mind), should aim to

revisit the community after the decision is made to explain the reasons for thedecision (even though, in this case, decisions and their rationales are posted on the

CNSC website). By engaging in constant and meaningful dialogue on an on-going

basis, relationships can be built that facilitate improved communication and

empowerment through understanding. These conditions can contribute to moremeaningful interaction during the next consultation phase, thus reducing the

potential for conflict.

Finally, investment in a well-trained and skilled facilitator rather thanpublic relations personnel could more effectively support ongoing face-to-face

communication efforts, enabling the industry and/or regulator to adopt a more

fluid, relationship-centered approach to stakeholder consultation with greater

emphasis on effective communication and conflict resolution. This may be crucialfor long-term success within and outside of legislated consultation processes. A

facilitator can assist in the mutual establishment of parameters for respectfuldialogue at the outset, and can keep the dialogue within those parameters. For

example, with the assistance of the facilitator, the expectations of discussion

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participants can be shifted away from achieving consensus, since it is unlikelythat consensus can be reached.

By investing time and money in long term relationship-building, the

quality of current and future interactions during processes for public engagementin licensing decisions can be improved. With a trusting relationship among

stakeholders, consultation phases for licensing and other decision making

processes can be shortened due to a reduction in conflict and misunderstandings.This can help ensure projects remain on-time and on-budget, which will benefit

organizations and, in the long-run, the consumer.

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