Review of the Mindanao Peace Processes

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Review of the Mindanao Peace ProcessesCarmen A. Abubakar aa Institute of Islamic Studies, Romulo Hall , U.P. Diliman, Quezon City,Metro-Manila , PhilippinesPublished online: 14 Jun 2012.

To cite this article: Carmen A. Abubakar (2004) Review of the Mindanao Peace Processes, Inter-Asia CulturalStudies, 5:3, 450-464, DOI: 10.1080/1464937042000288732

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Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 5, Number 3, 2004

Review of the Mindanao Peace Processes

Carmen A. ABUBAKAR

ABSTRACT This paper reviews the Mindanaopeace processes starting from the Marcos to theRamos period. It discusses issues and problems,highlighting some of the constant features thathave characterized the peace processes.

KEYWORDS: peace negotiations, stakeholders,regional autonomy

Brief history of the conflict

The Mindanao problem, also known as theMoro problem, has assumed a complexcharacter that is not easy to unravel. It startedwhen the Spaniards issued a policy of subju-gation of the Moros and the colonization oftheir territories, as shown in the instruction ofPhilip II to Miguel Lopez de Legazpi inManila in 1566:

We have been petitioned in your be-half concerning the Moro Islands andhow these men come to trade andcarry commerce, hindering the preach-ing of the holy gospel and disturbingyou. We give you permission to makesuch Moros slaves and to seize theirproperty (Zafra, 1967: 51).

The war that resulted from such a policymet a stiff resistance from the Moros, anddragged on for 300 years. Cesar Adib Majullater described this as the Moro Wars. Con-temporary Muslim historians claim that thiswar is far from over. It did not end with thedeparture of the Spaniards since the Americancolonial regime simply took up where theSpaniards left off. Nor did it end when thePhilippines gained independence and becamea Republic. Rather, the war entered into a

different mode, attaining an international di-mension in the 1970s.

The main reason for Moro resistance tocolonialism was the preservation of their free-dom and way of life. Having a defined terri-tory, a political history and structure of itsown, a cultural and religious identity, theMoro states under the sultanates of Sulu andMaguindanao claimed their own sovereigntyand independence.

Although the Moros valiantly resisted thecolonial onslaught, their territories wereeventually included in the Philippine territorygranted independence by the United States in1947. The Moros, through petitions sent to theUS President and Congress, public rallies anddemonstrations, vigorously protested this in-corporation, all to no avail. A bitter and re-sentful Moro population thus became part ofthe new Republic.

One of the most significant results of thesecolonial wars was the alienation of the Chris-tianized and the Islamized communities; acondition that obtains to a certain degree evenat present.

The peace processes: from Marcos to Ramos

Marcos Period: 1965–1985

When Martial Law was declared in 1972, theMoro National Liberation Front (MNLF) andthe Philippine Army (PA) became engaged ina fierce war in Mindanao.

The MNLF was founded as a result ofseveral events then taking place in the coun-try, especially in Mindanao. Foremost amongthese were the Jabida massacre in 1968 andthe ‘shooting war’ then occurring between

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DOI: 10.1080/1464937042000288732

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Review of the Mindanao peace processes 451

Moro and Christian settlers’ private armies,notably the Ilaga, the Baracudas and the BlackShirts (Abubakar 1989: 112).

The Ilaga were paramilitary groups thatwanted to get rid of Muslims in areas thathave a Christian majority. Reports suggestthat these gangs were supposedly supportedand coordinated by the Philippine Constabu-lary and that additional financing came fromtimber merchants seeking the rich forests ofthe Moros and indigenous groups for logging(Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 15).

The Jabida Massacre refers to the murderof 28 Moro recruits, on 17 March 1968, whowere supposedly part of a military projectcalled ‘Merdika’ conducted on Corregidor is-land. It was not made clear what the objectiveof the project was nor why the recruits weresummarily executed, although many versionshave been reported. One version alludes tothe government training the recruits in orderto infiltrate Sabah (North Borneo) as a preludeto a military invasion. When the recruitsfound out, they rebelled. Government officialssaid that the cause of rebellion was inad-equate pay and vehemently denied the allega-tions (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 15).

The incident and the following cover-upcaused a great deal of protest, culminating inthe decisions of some young Moro students toorganize themselves to protect the Moro com-munities, since the government was obviouslyunwilling to do so. Some of these young Mo-ros believe that ‘only with independence fromthe rest of the country would Muslims be ableto preserve their identity, to realize their aspi-rations and to develop the economic resourcesof their rich lands for the benefit of the futuregenerations’ (Abubakar 1989: 112).

During the height of the 1970s war, the PAwas reportedly spending 1 million pesos aday to finance the war. One of the worstcasualties of this war was the town of Jolo,reportedly burned down by the military whenthe MNLF entered it in February 1974. Thefire burned for four days; rendering thou-sands homeless, dispersing the town’s popu-lation, and destroying the town’s economy.The number of dead was never officiallyconfirmed, nor the value of properties lost inthe fire. Some estimate, however, has been

provided as to the number of people killed,which varies from 200 to 2,000, while 60,000were made homeless (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 16). Jolo has not completely risenfrom the ashes but has gone on a spiral ofviolence, as seen in the hostage incidents andthe all-out military operations that have indis-criminately victimized defenceless civilians.The same can be said today of other Moroareas, like Maguindanao and Lanao.

The overall toll of the conflict is reportedas follows (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1999:16):

The armed conflict was gory, brutaland costly: around 120,000 peoplewere killed (government estimate),more than one million were madehomeless and over 200,000 Muslimrefugees fled to Sabah. During themid-1970s about 80% of the AFP’scombat strength was concentrated inMindanao and Sulu. According to thelate President Marcos, 11,000 Philip-pine soldiers were killed in the firsteight years of the war (1972–80).

In 1975, a ceasefire agreement was de-clared as a step towards a peaceful nego-tiation of the conflict. This is because themilitary solution did not seem to be workingand a decisive military victory was expectedto be costly.

The negotiation was conducted in Libyaunder the auspices of the Organization ofIslamic Conference (OIC). The negotiationsproved to be difficult as the MNLF panelstuck to their original position of Indepen-dence and the establishment of theBangsamoro Republik while the GRP panelinsisted on preserving the territorial integrityof the Republic. However, after a series ofdiplomatic interventions between Marcos andQadaffi, including a visit by First Lady Imeldato Libya, the MNLF was persuaded by theOIC to accept Autonomy. The Tripoli Agree-ment (TA) was finally signed between the RPand the MNLF on 23 December 1976.

The TA granted autonomy to 13 provincesand nine cities identified by the MNLF as the

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452 Carmen A. Abubakar

Bangsamoro Homeland. These provinces are:Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur,Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato,Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao delNorte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, SouthCotabato and Palawan.

Autonomy in southern Philippines wasdeclared on 25 March 1977 via ProclamationNo. 1628. A Ceasefire Agreement was signedearlier on 20 January 1977. In addition, Presi-dential Decree (PD) No. 497 on Amnesty wasalso issued to enable MNLF members to re-turn to civilian life. Presidential Memoran-dum Orders Nos. 516 and 541 were alsoissued to hasten the return of displaced civil-ians.

For autonomy to be implemented, aplebiscite would be held, a decision stronglyopposed by the MNLF as not being part of theagreement. However, Marcos had asked forthe insertion of the provision (no. 16) whichstates that ‘the government of the Philippinesshall take all necessary constitutional pro-cesses for the implementation of the entireAgreement’. He then interpreted these pro-cesses as the conduct of a plebiscite. The inter-esting part of this situation was that Marcoswas governing via Presidential Decrees (PDs)since the country was under Martial Law.Thus, it was rather ironic to use the consti-tution, which he had suspended, to achievehis purpose.

In spite of the MNLF’s protest and itsdecision not to participate in the process, theplebiscite proceeded on 17 April 1977. Theresult was that, out of 13 provinces, only tenprovinces were included and three were not,namely, Davao, Palawan and southern Cota-bato. Marcos then set up two autonomousregions (instead of one) through PD.1618 enti-tled: Implementing the Organization of Sangguni-ang Pampook and the Lupong TagapagpaganapNg Pook in Region IX and XII.

The PD was issued on 25 July 1979.Among its objectives were the following:

(a) The establishment of autonomous regionsto enhance the attainment of peace andorder;

(b) The acceleration of socio-economic devel-opment;

(c) The resettlement of displaced families inRegions IX and XII.

PD 1618 created the two autonomous re-gions of Region IX and XII. Region IX com-prised the provinces of Basilan, Sulu,Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, includingthe cities of Dipolog and Dapitan, and Zam-boanga del Sur including the cities of Paga-dian and Zamboanga. Region XII comprisedthe provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao delSur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sul-tan Kudarat and the cities of Iligan, Marawiand Cotabato.

On 9 May 1979 elections for the 21 repre-sentatives to the Sanguniang Pampook wereconducted. Region IX representations weredistributed as follows: Basilan–1, Sulu–3,Tawi-Tawi–1, Zamboanga del Norte–4, Zam-boanga del Sur–8. For Region XII, the follow-ing distribution was made: Lanao delNorte–3, Lanao del Sur–4, Maguindanao –including Cotabato City–4, North Cotabato–4,Sultan Kudarat–2. Sectoral representationswere also mandated: youth–1, Agriculturalworkers–1, non-agricultural workers–1, pro-fessionals–1.

Together with the establishment of the twoautonomous regions was an active campaignconducted by the government to co-opt asmany of the MNLF commanders as possibleby giving them economic concessions, govern-ment positions and other privileges. They be-came widely knows as ‘Balikbayans’ orReturnees, rather than Surrenderees sincethey believed that they did not surrender tothe government forces but voluntarily joinedor returned to the government’s fold. Theautonomous regions became a source of em-ployment for some of these MNLF forces andtheir dependants.

The MNLF Central Committee however,refused to take part in the establishment ofthe autonomous regions, calling this a unilat-eral decision of Marcos and a violation of theTripoli Agreement.

Ruben Canoy, then head of the MindanaoIndependence Movement, used to describethe regional autonomous government as ‘pa-per autonomy’. Some others called the regionin jest as ‘monotonous’ rather than auton-

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omous (Abubakar 1989: 118). Former senator,Santanina Rasul was reported to have re-marked, ‘regional but not autonomous’ (Mus-lim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 17).

Aquino Period: 1986–1992

Marcos was ousted in 1986 through what hasnow become popularly known as PeoplePower (or EDSA One).1 The new administra-tion of Corazon Aquino called for nationalreconciliation. Towards this end, a resump-tion of talks with the MNLF became one of itsagendas.

To enable the MNLF to respond positivelyto its invitation for peace talks, the govern-ment allowed a series of confidence buildingactivities to be conducted. Among these arethe following:

(a) The holding of the Second BangsamoroNational Congress held at Maimbungfrom 1–5 September to provide for consul-tation amongst the Moro people.

(b) The return of Misuari and his wife Desde-mona to the Philippine to attend the con-sultation.

(c) The historic meeting between Misuari andAquino in Jolo on 5 September 1986.

In 1–3 January 1987, a three-memberPhilippine delegation composed of AquilinoPimentel, Agapito ‘Butz’ Aquino, and Nor-berto Gonzales went on a special mission toJedda to discuss the possibility of formalnegotiation with the MNLF.

This meeting produced the Jedda Accord.Some of the major components of this Accordwere:

(a) An agreement to continue the discussionof the proposal to the grant of autonomyto Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawiand Palawan;

(b) An MNLF proposal for the issuance of anExecutive Order suspending pertinentprovisions of the draft constitution on thegrant of autonomy for Muslim Mindanaoto allow the MNLF to undertake demo-cratic consultations with the people ofMindanao;

(c) The inclusion of the phrase ‘subject todemocratic processes’ in the document.

Peace Talks were opened in Manila on 5February 1987. Other venues for talks in-cluded Zamboanga, Jolo, and Cotabato. Butthe talks met many snags. Some of these wereheated discussion on:

(a) whether the Tripoli Agreement was to bethe basis of the talks or merely a referencepoint;

(b) whether the government actually agreedto grant autonomy to Mindanao as agreedin the Jedda Accord or merely to discussit; and finally;

(c) whether to reject or accept the 24-pointproposal submitted by the MNLF.

The Jedda Accord became a controversialdocument during the negotiation, due to oneitem which reads: ‘Create a Joint Commissionwhich will discuss and draft the mechanismand details of the proposal for the granting offull autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu,Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan, subject to demo-cratic processes.’

The MNLF claimed that a verbal commit-ment has been made by the government panelto grant autonomy to Mindanao. This meantthe inclusion of the 23 islands of Mindanaoinstead of just the 13 provinces named in theTripoli Agreement. This disclosure caused apublic furore and Aquilino Pimentel had toissue a press statement to the effect that thegovernment panel agreed only ‘to discuss’ theMNLF proposal. Opposition leaders accusedthe government of ‘bad faith’ in dealing withthe MNLF, and one leader went to the extentof predicting the collapse of the peace talksbecause the government panel ‘made a lot ofcommitments they cannot fulfill’ (Abubakar1989: 124).

Related to the Jeddah Accord controversy,was the debate on the territorial boundary ofthe area of autonomy. The MNLF’s final pro-posal was autonomy for the 13 provinces al-ready specified in the Tripoli Agreement withno plebiscite, while the remaining 10provinces would be subjected to a plebisciteafter a transitional period. As stated earlier,this means that the autonomous area would

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include all 23 provinces of Mindanao. TheGRP counterproposal was to maintain theoriginal autonomous area of ten provinces,and to have a plebiscite for the additionalthree provinces. This was rejected by theMNLF, which insisted on the 13 provinceswithout any plebiscite. In hindsight, thegovernment’s proposal would have been abetter alternative had the MNLF been morerealistic. It would have retained the regionalautonomous area granted by the Marcosregime with the possibility of three more aftera transition period. But whether this proposalwould have been pushed through is anothermatter.

Unable to come to any agreement, thetalks collapsed on 9 May 1987 after threemonths of fruitless discussions.

Later, the GRP panel began to rely on theconstitutional provision as spelled out in Arti-cle X of the 1987 Constitution, calling for aplebiscite and majority approval before anautonomous region could be created. Onlythose cities and geographical areas voting fa-vourably for autonomy will be included(Abubakar 1989: 119).

The difficulty of this provision is that thereare pockets of Moro areas (located in cities,municipalities, barangays) in largely Christiandominated provinces that are expected to votefor inclusion in the autonomous area butwould make the autonomous region un-wieldy. In the end, even this provisioncould not be implemented and inclusion wasmade on the provincial basis. After theplebiscite, only four provinces were includedin the new autonomous region known asARMM.

According to Kamlian (2002: 4) the MNLFcited two important reasons why the talksfailed. One is that the Philippine governmentwas merely biding time, for the constitutionalplebiscite and for the congressional election totake place; the other is that when the Philip-pine delegations came to Jeddah to negotiatefor the opening of talks, they promised themoon and stars, not out of sincerity but forthe sake of political expediency. During thisperiod, the Aquino government was beingthreatened by various political groups, as evi-dent in the coup attempts by some sectors of

the Philippine military, and so needed to havepeace in Mindanao.

Meanwhile, the new constitution contain-ing a special provision (Article X, Section 15)granting autonomy to Muslim Mindanao andthe Cordilleras, and the creation of a RegionalConsultative Commission (RCC) to help Con-gress with the formulation of the Organic Actwas passed. The same Section called for aplebiscite.

The RCC was created on 24 July 1987 byExecutive Order and became a law on 11March 1968 as RA 6649. The membership ofthe RCC came from the Muslim, Christian,and Lumad (Tribal Indigenous Groups) com-munities. Forty-four members were ap-pointed, 16 members were Muslims and therest were Christians.

The RCC was a contentious body, unableto agree on major issues. For example, thename of autonomous area was hotly debatedon whether it was going to be called theAutonomous Region of Southern Philippinesor the Autonomous Region of (or in) MuslimMindanao.

A Muslim Commissioner summed up thiscontroversy:

The question of what to call the pro-posed autonomous region is taking onthe aspect of a major controversy withstrong arguments for and against theterm ‘Muslim Mindanao,’ a termwhich is already used in the 1987 Con-stitution, RA 6649 and in the text ofthe Commissioners’ oath oraffirmation upon their being formallysworn in as Members of the Com-mission. In some areas, the discussionon the term has been so emotionally-charged as to elicit the rather extremeresponse from the Christian sector rep-resentatives that even the most well-made Organic Act on autonomy maybe rejected in the plebiscite by Chris-tians if the term ‘Muslim’ is notdeleted from the name of the auton-omous region (Basman et al. 1989: 55).

The RCC submitted a draft Organic Act toCongress in January 1989 but, as claimed by

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some RCC members, the final version passedon 8 June 1989 (RA 6734) was a substantiallydifferent version from the RCC’s.

With the passage of the Organic Act forthe Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM), a plebiscite was held on 19 Novem-ber 1989. Four provinces joined the area ofautonomy namely: Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguin-danao and Lanao del Sur. Elections werecalled for on 17 February 1990. Winners forthe governor and vice-governor positionswere proclaimed on 4 July 1990; while thoseof the Regional Assembly were proclaimed ona staggered basis until the final proclamationwas made on 10 July 1990.

The MNLF did not participate in the elec-tion, having rejected the Organic Act and re-turned to its stand on independence. Nopeace talks were again held during the re-maining period of the Aquino Administration.

Ramos Period: 1992–1998

The Ramos presidency can be said to be themost successful in the peace processes since itwas able to obtain the Final Peace Agreementwith the MNLF in 1996 after four years ofnegotiations.

The Ramos peace initiatives were an-chored on the proposition that the generalwelfare of the country, particularly its econ-omic development, would not improve if in-surgency continues and the population isfragmented. Ramos therefore called for rec-onciliation and national unification.

The first step made by the Ramos adminis-tration was the announcement of an amnestyprogram under Proclamation Nos. 347 and348 signed on 15 March 1994. Ramos createdthe National Programme for Unification andDevelopment (NPUD) through Executive Or-der No. 152 on January 1994, under which aNational Programme for Unification and De-velopment Council (NPUDC) was organizedas the secretariat. The NPUDC was also au-thorized to establish councils at the regional,provincial, city and municipal levels to delivereffectively the financial support and local ser-vices being offered to rebel returnees.

The National Unification Commission(NUC) was organized on 28 July 1992 through

Executive Order No. 19 dated 1 September1992.

The NUC was given the following man-date:

1. To formulate and recommend, after con-sulting with concerned sectors of society, tothe President, a viable general amnestyprogramme, and peace process that willlead to a just, comprehensive and lastingpeace in the country;

2. To review and evaluate the existing Na-tional Reconciliation and DevelopmentProgramme … with the view to integratingthe programme into the general amnestyand peace process;

3. To call upon any official, agent, employee,agency or instrumentality of the national orlocal government for any assistance thatmay be necessary to carry out the purposeof Executive Order No. 19.(Werble 1996:76–77)

After broad consultations at the national,regional and local levels lasting from October1992 to July 1993, the NUC submitted itsrecommendations to the President. Among itsproposals are the Six Paths to Peace, whichwas submitted as a means of attaining a just,comprehensive and lasting peace inMindanao. These are:

1. The pursuit of social, economic and politi-cal reforms that address the root causes ofthe armed conflicts;

2. Building consensus and empowerment forpeace;

3. Pursuit of a peaceful, negotiated settlementwith the different armed rebel groups;

4. Establishment of programmes for hon-ourable reconciliation and integration ofRebel groups into the mainstream society;

5. Addressing concerns that arise out of thecontinuing armed hostilities; and

6. Nurturing a positive climate forpeace.(Werble 1996: 77–78)

The Office of the Presidential Adviser onthe Peace Process (OPAP) later took over thefunctions of the NUC. On 22 September 1992,the President signed RA 7637, thereby repeal-ing the anti-subversion law (RA 1700), therebyremoving the legal obstacle in the peace nego-

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tiations and allowing the Philippine govern-ment to make contact with the MNLF (Werble1996: 78).

The Ramos administration conducted tworounds of exploratory talks with the MNLF,first on 3–5 October 1992 in Tripoli, Libya,then on 14–16 April 1993 at Cipanas, Indone-sia. These led to the Formal Talks between theGRP and the MNLF panels in Jakarta, Indone-sia from 25 October to 7 November 1993. Thisfirst formal talk produced the following:

(a) An interim Ceasefire Agreement;(b) The reactivation of Mixed Committees (as

stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement);(c) The Support Committees generally com-

posed of experts from both sides to dis-cuss issues relevant to the talks and thosearising from the Tripoli Agreement;

(d) An Ad Hoc Working Groups on the Tran-sitional Implementing Structures andMechanisms;

(e) The decision to hold the meetings of thesecommittees in the Philippines was alsomade (Werble 1996: 78–83).

The Second Round of Formal Talks alsoheld in Jakarta, on 1–5 September 1994 re-sulted in:

(a) The signing of the 1994 Interim Agree-ment on education.

(b) The recommendation of the ad-hoc com-mittees on the following issues: economicand financial system, mines and minerals,administrative system, representation inTHE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, LEGISLATIVE AS-

SEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, INCLUDING

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1993 INTERIM

CEASEfiRE AGREEMENT (WERBLE 1996: 85–84).

The Third Round of Talks took place inJakarta from 27 November to 1 December1995. This reaffirmed the points reached in thefirst and second talks, including the formationof an Ad Hoc working Group on the settingup of the Transitional Implementing Structureand Mechanism of the Provisional Govern-ment, called for in the Tripoli Agreement(Werble, 1996: 84).

The Fourth Round of Talks ended in theinitialling of the Peace Agreement on 29 Au-gust 1996, also in Jakarta. The formal signing

of the Peace Agreement was held in thePhilippines on 2 September 1996 (Werble1996: 85).

The salient points of the agreement are asfollows.

• The establishment of the Special Zone ofPeace and Development (SZOPAD), theSouthern Philippines Council for Peace andDevelopment (SPCPD) and the Consulta-tive Assembly;

• The expansion of the Autonomous Regionof Muslim Mindanao (ARMM);

• The integration of the MNLF forces into theArmed Forces of the Philippines and thePhilippines National Police;

• The establishment of a Special Regional Se-curity Force for the autonomous region;

• The establishment of a Regional Assembly;• The Right of Representation and partici-

pation of the citizens of the AutonomousRegion in the National Government and inall organs of the state.

• The establishment of a Regional Economicand Development Planning Board;

• The establishment of the Shariah Courts(Kamlian 2002: 4).

The Final Peace Agreement called for atwo-phase implementing process.

Phase I covers three years of transitiontowards the implementation of the TripoliAgreement. During this period, the SouthernPhilippines Council for Peace and Develop-ment (SPCPD) and the Consultative Assemblywould be established. At the same time, thePhilippine Armed Forces will absorb somemembers of the MNLF forces.

SZOPAD (Special Zone of Peace and De-velopment) was proclaimed through Execu-tive Order (EO) No. 371. This EO alsoprovided for the implementing guidelines forthe creation of SPCPD and the ConsultativeAssembly.

The integration of 7500 MNLF men intothe AFP and the PNP is almost completed. Asof March 2000, a total of 5250 had alreadybeen integrated into the AFP and 1250 in thePNP (Kamlian 2002: 5).

Phase 2 called for an amendment or repealof the Organic Act (RA 6734), a plebiscite to

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determine the new area of autonomy and thenelections for the new officials.

The referendum was conducted on 14 Au-gust 2001. While this was intended to expandthe area of autonomy, the result was disap-pointing since only the province of Basilanand the city of Marawi were added to ARMM.

There were high expectations that thisPeace Agreement would finally end theconflict in Mindanao. That it has not done sowill be discussed in the next section of thispaper in terms of making observations onhow the peace processes have been conductedand implemented.

Some observations on the peace process

Ceasefire Agreements

An important feature of the peace processeswas the Ceasefire Agreements. These wereintended to enable the parties, especially therebel groups, to move about freely to consulttheir members on the pending peace talks andto come up with their own positions.

However, Ceasefire Agreements on thewhole did not always hold the peace. Al-though mechanisms were put in place tomonitor the violations of the Ceasefire Agree-ment, these mechanisms were not effective.Cases of violations were reported on bothsides. According to the OIC Monitoring TeamCommander, Zainal Abidin, Brigadier Gen-eral TNI (Report: 26 August 1998), in theperiod between 1 June and 15 July 1998, fourencounters took place between the govern-ment forces and rebels.

Accusations of using the Ceasefire Agree-ment to consolidate positions or to do morerecruitment and training were levelled againstthe MNLF. Similarly, the AFP was also ac-cused of undertaking military operationsagainst rebel forces. Both parties have usedCeasefire Agreements to be able to negotiatefrom a position of strength.

Nevertheless, ceasefires were necessary tostop hostilities and allow peace initiatives.

Foreign venue of negotiation

One of the constant features of the peace

processes is that negotiations were usuallyconducted in a foreign country. The peacenegotiation during the Marcos period washeld in Libya, the Ramos’ peace negotiationswere held in Indonesia. Only the Aquinopeace negotiation was held in the Philippinesbut this did not produce any agreement.

The rationale for these foreign venues wasto make sure that the negotiating panels havea free hand and are not subject to pressuresfrom outside forces. The practice of holdingnegotiations elsewhere in a third country is aninternational practice.

This practice has worked well with thePhilippines’ case and has been further utilizedin the negotiations with the MILF (Moro Is-lamic Liberation Front) in Malaysia, and theNDF (National Democratic Front) in theNetherlands.

Participation of a third party

Another constant feature of the peace processwas the participation of a third party. Usuallythis has been held by the OIC, a demand thatwas made by the MNLF way back in the1970s.

The OIC has been responsible for bringingthe MNLF to the negotiating table and even inconvincing the MNLF to accept autonomy.One of the principles that the OIC held in thenegotiations was the preservation of the in-tegrity and sovereignty of the Philippine terri-tory. This principle has always been declaredas non-negotiable by the Philippine govern-ment.

The OIC has used a variety of means suchas good office, mediation, threat of sanctions(at the height of the oil crisis in the 1970s) andregional arrangement to help solve theconflict. Its rationale in participating in thepeace process was based on the principle ofIslamic solidarity. It is for this purpose thatthe MNLF was recognized as the ‘sole rep-resentative of the Bangsamoro People’,granted an observer status and participationin the Islamic Summits and Islamic CountriesForeign Ministers (ICFM) meetings. In ad-dition, the MNLF also achieved a quasi-diplo-matic status and privileges, political asylum,

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and ‘every form of assistance or support in allways and means’ (Santos 1999: 23).

Many Islamic Countries Foreign Ministers(ICFM) resolutions issued in its annual meet-ing reflect the concern of the OIC vis-a-vis theproblems in southern Mindanao. These reso-lutions were accompanied by the organizationof OIC bodies such as the Quadripartite Min-isterial Commission and later the inclusion ofAsian member states like Indonesia andBangladesh (in 1993) to focus primarily on theMindanao conflict. The election of Indonesiaas chair of the Ministerial Committee of Sixgreatly facilitated the peace negotiations un-der the Ramos administration (Santos 1999:23).

Indonesia described its role on behalf ofthe OIC as facilitator rather than mediator asper instruction of the Foreign Minister AliAlatas. In addition, Indonesia also served asInterim Ceasefire Monitor-Observer. Thiscalled for the deployment of Indonesian armyofficers (with OIC patches) in Mindanao, ad-ditional diplomats at its embassy in Manila aswell as at the foreign ministry in Jakartawhere the peace talks were held (Santos 1999:26).

It goes without saying that OIC partici-pation had more to do with persuading theMNLF to accommodate some of the Philip-pine government’s conditions than vice-versa.Nevertheless, the Philippine government rec-ognizes the help of the OIC and recently evencontemplated becoming a member of thisbody. President Arroyo attended the OICmeeting held in Malaysia as a special guest ofPrime Minister Mahathir, implying that mem-bership application in the body is being seri-ously considered by the administration.

In fact, this is not a new idea. Speaker ofthe House of Representative, the late RamonMitra made this suggestion in 1988 to counterthe MNLF’s announcement of its membershipapplication to the OIC. Mitra’s suggestion re-ceived a lot of negative response ranging frombeing called ‘Mitra’s joke’, a ‘harebrainedidea’, ‘a desperate move’ and a ‘cheap attemptto upstage the MNLF’. The government re-sponse was to assign the Department of For-eign Affairs to study the idea (Abubakar 1989:121). From the Aquino to the Arroyo adminis-

tration, the change of attitude is quite remark-able.

In the peace talks with the MILF, two newcountries have become involved as third par-ties. These are Malaysia and the United States.Malaysia was the venue for the initial talksand will continue to host the next round oftalks. The US, on the other hand, has dele-gated its participation to the Institute of Peace.

Participation of the OIC was not alwaysappreciated. For instance, the Aquino admin-istration was loathe to accept or recognize therole of the OIC, declaring that the Mindanaoconflict was an internal and domestic issueand should be solved without any third partyinterference (Abubakar 1989: 121). For thisreason, the government insisted that negotia-tions be conducted in the country. Without athird party to prod one side or either side tomake compromises on set positions, the talksdid not last long.

Third parties’ participations – in this casethe OIC, and more recently the US in the caseof the MILF – are usually made upon theinvitation of the parties involved in the nego-tiations. Not only does it ensure that the twoparties stay on the negotiation table, thirdparties also guarantee the availability ofneeded financial support for the implemen-tation of the agreement.

Composition of the negotiating panels

There have officially been just two panelsrepresenting the Philippine government andthe MNLF. Each group however had its ownsupport staff.

The major criticism in this composition isthat other groups, who identify themselves asstakeholders in the Mindanao problem,wanted to be represented in the peace negoti-ations. These are the Lumads (the tribalgroups in Mindanao) and the Christian set-tlers who migrated to Mindanao and haveestablished themselves in the area. Theyclaimed that their interests are not protectedor even addressed in the peace negotiations.

An interview with Ramon Maambing,Executive Director of the Lumad Develop-ment Center, a non-government organization

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based in Cotabato City had this to say on thismatter:

The Lumads were left out of the peaceagreements. They had no representa-tives at the talks. The negotiation wasjust at the top between the govern-ment and the MNLF. The grassrootswere left out (Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 65).

Trying to avoid a similar situation in thecoming peace talks between the Philippinegovernment and the MILF (Moro Islamic Lib-eration Front), a letter sent by representativesof the Church, and two NGOs, dated 15 Octo-ber 2001) was sent to President Arroyo ad-dressing among other things the followingissues:2

1. Representation of the Lumads in the nego-tiating panel by appointing an IP (Indige-nous People) leader endorsed andrecognized by IP organizations and TribalCouncils in Mindanao

2. The Lumads want to contribute to the dis-cussion on Ancestral domain because thisis the core expression of the IP’s strugglefor self-determination.

3. The IPs are marginalized but importantstakeholders in the peace process.

Another group that has sought representa-tion in the negotiating body is women’s orga-nizations. During the Ramos peace processes,women were included in the committees butnot as direct participants in the negotiations.In the Arroyo administration’s peace negotia-tions, two women were included in thegovernment peace panels, namely: Irene San-tiago (a Christian) and Emily Marhombsar (aMuslim).

It goes without saying that the focus of thepeace negotiations has been rebel forces withlegitimate political agenda such as the Moros’struggle for self-determination. It is felt thatadding other groups’ demands would unnec-essarily burden the agenda of the negotiationand render it unwieldy; beside which, moretime would be needed to satisfy all the de-mands. This kind of thinking has led to adifferent negotiation with each rebel group.Transparency/Information dissemination on thepeace negotiations

Information dissemination regarding the 1996peace process and the result had been con-sidered inadequate. For this reason, when theratification of the vehicles for implementa-tions like the SPCPD was undertaken, therewere vociferous oppositions from many sec-tors. Christian provinces did not want to beincluded in what was perceived to be largelyan MNLF–led organization. It is not a coinci-dence therefore that an OMI priest in theperson of Fr. Eliseo (Jun) Mercado, then presi-dent of the Notre Dame University systemwas appointed as the Floor Leader of SPCPDto allay fears that Christians’ interests havebeen forgotten.

Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Director of the Re-search and Development Center at the MSUGeneral Santos campus, described the reac-tions of some sectors of the population in thatCity as well as in other places in Mindanao,regarding the 1996 peace agreement:

Some sections of civil society stagedvociferous protests after the promul-gation of EO371. In General SantosCity, broad-based coalitions of (Cath-olic) church workers, lay people, pro-fessionals and youths staged rallies inthe city plaza to denounce PresidentRamos and the SPCPD. In other citiesand towns in Mindanao, irate crowdsthrew tomatoes at speakers in govern-ment-organized public meetings aboutthe Peace Agreement. In CotabatoCity, designated seat of the SPCPD,opponents of the Agreement dis-played banners and pasted posters onwalls. One poster said: Give peace achance – oppose the SPCPD! (Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 60).

Obviously, many resented the exclusive-ness of the peace process and its outcome.According to Guiam (Cagoco-Guiam 1999:61), ‘the lack of grassroots consultation beforethe SPCPD was proclaimed stoked resentmentamong Mindanao’s Christian and Lumadpopulations’ who felt excluded from the peaceprocess. President Ramos had to assure Chris-

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460 C. A. Abubakar

tian settlers that ‘there were no hidden mo-tives, no secret agenda, no backroom deals’.He maintained that ‘every decision redressesvalid grievances in a manner consistent withour Constitution and our laws’ (Muslim andCagoco-Guiam 1999: 19)

More than resentment, however, was thefeeling of distrust and prejudice that the warsfomented, especially amongst Christians wholooked at the Muslims as ‘troublesome’ (Mus-lim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 61). This is notconfined to the grassroots. Msgr. OrlandoQuevedo, president of the CBCP (CatholicBishop Conference of the Philippines) noted‘there are some highly educated newspapercolumnists who openly express their negativeopinion of Muslims based on actual or allegedwrongdoings committed through the years’.He went on to make this observation: ‘Inparishes and schools, I have met priests, sis-ters and lay people, expressing their supportfor total war and eschewing peace until theMoro rebels are decisively defeated’. TheBishop referred to this attitude as ‘religiousprejudice’ (The Philippine Post 15 September2000: A5).

While the Bishop was talking aboutEstrada’s Total War policy in 2000, it is simplya repeat of Cagoco-Guiam’s observation ofwhat took place in 1996: ‘Old prejudicesagainst Muslims surfaced, even among sectorsin civil society which were thought to havedeveloped tolerance and broad understandingof inter-ethnic relations. Many journalists andacademics were among the most vociferouscritics of SPCPD and the Peace Agreement’(Cagoco-Guiam 1999: 60).

Length of negotiation

The Ramos peace negotiation took four yearsand is called the Final Peace Agreement, as-suming that as far as the MNLF is concerned,no other negotiation will be held. This agree-ment also claims that it is the implementationof the Tripoli Agreement signed by Marcosand the MNLF.

The TA was an incomplete document sincemany of its provisions ended with the phrase‘to be discussed later’. This never happenedbecause, after 1976, the MNLF splintered into

many factions. Marcos then took advantage ofthe situation claiming that it was impossibleto determine which of these factions now rep-resented the Moro people. In addition, Marcosclaimed to have implemented the agreementby creating the two autonomous regions insouthern Philippines.

While it is true that the Ramos negotiationwas more successful in attaining a final agree-ment, the length of time spent in crafting theagreement also worked against it. By the timethe agreement was signed, the Ramos admin-istration was preparing for the presidentialelections. Unfortunately, Ramos’ LAKASparty was defeated and the new administra-tion of Joseph Ejercito Estrada took over.Estrada’s programme of government centredon food security and poverty alleviations andthe implementation of the Peace Agreementsigned by the previous administration wasnot given a high priority (Abubakar 1999: 55).

Changes in the administration also putinto power oppositions to the peace process.In Mindanao, the opposition was led by threewomen collectively known as the ‘Tres Mar-ias’ composed of Representatives Lualhati An-tonino, Daisy Avance Fuentes, and MariaClara ‘Caling’ Lobregat (Gutierez 1999: 67–70).

They accused the Ramos administra-tion of selling out to the MNLF andwhipped up anti-Moro sentiment intovirulent opposition to the Agreementamong Christian settlers in Mindanao.Only ‘over their dead bodies’ wouldthe MNLF rule Mindanao, they said.In the end, the Tres Marias, throughthe House Appropriation Committee,were able to block funding for thetransition structures (Gutierez 1999:67–68).

More to the point, in this case, is the pecu-liar nature of the country’s political culturethat prevents continuity in government’s pro-grammes. Every time a new administrationtakes over, whether on the local or nationallevels, the likelihood of setting a new direc-tion is almost 100%. This means that the pro-grammes of the past administration will, in all

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probability, be discontinued or redirected sothat the new administration can take credit forits implementations. Political appointees run-ning the programmes are inevitably changed.The local term for this phenomenon is can-didly called ‘panapanahon lang (or weather,weather lang)’ translated as, ‘this is our time,so we will do what we want’. This has createda great deal of unfinished projects started byprevious administrations. What happened tothe peace agreement during the Estrada pe-riod was to fall into this cultural trap.

At this point, it is good to point out thatone of the outstanding facts of the peace pro-cesses is that they have largely been a presi-dential initiative. As such, it is subject notonly to the vagaries of politics, but more ofteneither to presidential resourcefulness, vacilla-tions or at its worst, indifference.

Problematical implementation of agreements

After each agreement was signed, the im-plementation proper had always run intotrouble. The Tripoli Agreement (1976) wasnever fully discussed so many of its provi-sions were not realized. At the same time,Marcos unilaterally implemented the agree-ment according to his own interpretations.

According to one writer, one problem inthe 1996 peace agreement was that Govern-ment did not speak with one voice. In 1995,when substantial discussions were beingmade, Congress initially distanced itself, de-claring the talks to be exclusively the domainof the executive. This allows congress to freeitself from any commitment and to enableitself to question the administration regardingthe agreement it entered into (Gutierez 1999:67). The Senate also conducted public hear-ings to review the commitments made andthereby forced the administration to acceptnine amendments such as the following:

The withdrawal of any political pow-ers of governance from the SPCPDand the CA, the independence of localgovernment units, the enumeration ofthe national agencies to the controlledand supervised by the SPCPD to avoidblanket coverage (Gutierez 1999: 67).

That six of the 24 senators, including theSenate President, voted against a resolutionexpressing support for the peace talks speakfor itself (Gutierez 1999: 67).

There were other voices and forces againstthe Agreement. Six senators, nine con-gressional representatives and a provincialgovernor also filed a petition with the Su-preme Court to invalidate the Agreement ar-guing that (Gutierez 1999: 68):

1. The transition violated constitutionalstatutes;

2. The executive usurped legislative powers;3. The document could not have the force of

law;4. The peace treaty would pave way for Moro

authoritarianism in the south.

This petition effectively watered down thesubstantive provisions in the Executive Order(EO) that was to provide the implementingguidelines for the peace agreement (Gutierez1999: 68).

When EO 371 was finally issued on 2October 1996, many provisions containedtherein were not supportive of the Agree-ment, as can be seen in the following(Gutierez 1999: 68):

The EO provisions on funding did notspecifically allocate funds for the tran-sition structure – neither was the De-partment of Budget and Managementinstructed to draft a supplementarybudget for recommendations to Con-gress, as stated in Point 15 of theAgreement;

The EO did not make explicit that 44(out of 81) members of the Consulta-tive Assembly would come from theMNLF, as stated in the Agreement;

The EO created a complicated bureau-cratic maze – in its provisions on therole of the SPCPD were merely decla-rations of policy, too general to be ofany use for ground level executive ac-tion. The Agreement itself was morespecific: it named seven governmentagencies whose operations in the SZO-

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PAD region would be ‘placed underthe control and supervision of theSPCPD’.

These voices and forces represent power-ful vested interests in Mindanao who arethreatened by the political ascendance of theMoros for fear that this would lead to a rever-sal of fortune.

Gap between Moro aspiration and negotiatedagreement

From the foregoing discussions, it can easilybe seen that the negotiated agreements havefallen short of the Moros’ aspirations for self-determination. The quest for a genuine auton-omy in exchange for MNLF’s demand forindependence and a separated homeland hasnot prospered. As many have observed, theARMM functions mainly as an adjunct toMalacanang. It has no real capability for self-rule since its revenue component is inad-equate to sustain itself. Thus, even thedevolved agencies identified in the OrganicAct, could not function properly for the samereason.

Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam (1999: 19) onthe new autonomy law:

The new autonomy law did not givethe Moros the means to redress thesuffering and insecurities arising fromrelative and absolute poverty and pol-itical subordination. The governmentof the area of autonomy had very littlefinancial independence, and there wasno provision to enable Muslims toovercome the effects of past depri-vation.

Like the Marcos-inspired autonomousstructures, the ARMM failed as a pol-icy response. Autonomy came to meanconcession for rebellious Muslims, notprocesses for democratic participationfor the benefit of all. The ARMM be-came another bureaucratic layer pro-viding little except position andprivilege for self-interested Muslimpoliticians.

In the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, bud-

getary constraints also dogged the implemen-tation and delayed the ‘intensive’development efforts promised by the govern-ment. In addition, the implementing mechan-ism and structure spelled out in EO 371 leftmuch to be desired (Abubakar 1999: 55). Inshort, while the intent of peace negotiationswas to redress historical injustices and grantMoros their aspiration for self-rule, the resultshave been disappointing.

Moros’ aspiration for self rule and a separ-ate homeland has to do with being able toexpress a distinct political and religious ident-ity, which bring with it the development ofparticular socio-cultural, legal, educational,economic, and religio-political institutionsthat would make Moros’ society adhere moreclosely to Islamic law. They feel that thiscannot be achieved under a Philippine secularstate that nevertheless describes itself as theonly Christian nation in Southeast Asia.

Conclusions: approaches to peace

Disappointments in the peace process and itsresults may stem from the fact that the under-lying sentiments on the grant of self-rule havebeen mitigated and circumscribed by a rigidconceptual framework based mainly on thedefinition of territoriality and constitutional-ity. The MNLF, for instance, would not settlefor less than the 13 provinces that wouldconstitute the Bangsamoro homeland, whichhad been annexed by the US Colonial admin-istration to the Philippine territory withouttheir consent. In spite of the reality that mostof these areas have become Christian majorityprovinces, the MNLF is of the opinion thatthere must be restorative justice for the Morosin terms of giving back their lands. Thus, thearea of autonomy should be granted withouta plebiscite. The Philippine government’s pos-ition is that the national territory could not benegotiated (that no president would like to beremembered as the one who dismembered thecountry) and that the constitutional processes(plebiscite) should be followed. This frame-work prevents other creative formulationsfrom being introduced or adopted.

The creation of an autonomous area as acompromised solution fails because not only

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is the enabling act flawed with many limita-tions but also the provinces in the ARMM areadministratively difficult since they are notcontiguous to each other. Of the fourprovinces (with Basilan and Marawi Cityadded after the plebiscite in 2001) whichvoted to join the autonomous area, two arelocated in Western Mindanao (Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) and the other two located in CentralMindanao. What compounded the difficulty isthat these provinces were amongst the poorestprovinces in the country in spite of its richnatural resources.

Apart from territoriality and constitution-ality, other factors have influenced the frame-work of the peace process. This has to do withthe mode of negotiations. Thus far, con-cession, accommodation and threats havebeen used in the search for peace.

Marcos, for instance, used the stick (mili-tary operations) and carrot (concessions/ac-commodations) mode and succeeded inco-opting many MNLF commanders to for-sake the struggle and become governmentagents. This has been followed by succeedingadministrations as well.

Part of the government’s concession werethe creation of offices and agencies to lookafter the welfare of the Moros. Notable amongthese is the establishment of the Commissionof National Integration (CNI), which along theyears has changed with each new administra-tion. It transmuted into the Ministry of Mus-lim Affairs (Marcos period) then to the Officeof Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities(Aquino period), then to the Office of MuslimAffairs (Ramos period). There is now a bill inCongress that will further transform thisoffice into a Commission, like the NationalCommission for Indigenous People (NCIP),which has been established for the tribal com-munities.

Other offices created specifically to ad-dress Moros’ needs were the Southern Philip-pines Development Agency (SPDA, recentlyclosed down by the GMA administration), theIslamic Investment Bank, the Shariah Courts.Unfortunately, these offices/agencies havebeen constrained by budgetary limitations,weak implementing guidelines and misman-agement. The Islamic Investment Bank, for

example, does not operate as an Islamic bankbut as a regular commercial bank, essentiallybecause of banking laws and thus has notbeen as well patronized by Muslims who aresupposed to be the major beneficiaries. It isalso capitalized at only 50 million pesos sinceits opening, thus has failed as a vehicle forMuslim communities’ economic growth.Moves to privatize the bank have not beensuccessful so far.

Of course, the biggest concession has beenthe establishment of autonomy. But, as al-ready discussed, the Organic Act finallypassed by Congress has been so watereddown that the issue of government sincerityin addressing the Moro problem has beenraised. Many Moros are of the opinion thatautonomy was programmed to fail.

Because ARMM is also conceived as a con-cession to the MNLF, the discussion going onis the question of what to concede to the MILFin the forthcoming negotiations. ARMM hasbeen reduced to a piece of property to bedivided amongst Moro groups negotiatingwith the government. Now it is the turn of theMILF to be the real estate holder. Where doesthe general Moro population figure in thisscheme?

Since autonomy has not producedsignificant changes in the lives of the Moros, itis obvious that some other arrangement mustbe considered. Along this line, moves towardsFederalism to satisfy the clamour for moredecentralization of governmental powers arebeing made.

The idea of federalism has been aroundsince the 1973 Constitutional Convention. In1986, former Chief Justice of the Court ofAppeals, Jainal D. Rasul Sr. submitted a pro-posal for a federal form of government to themembers of the Constitutional Commissionpointing out that this form of government ‘isa constitutional solution to the age-old Moroproblem’ (Rasul 2002: 136).

According to proponents of Federalism,the ARMM area would be converted to aMoro state. However, the geographical loca-tions of the Moro provinces would create thesame administrative difficulty. Another issueis whether or not political powers devolved toStates will satisfy Moro quests for self-rule

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that autonomy has not. This remains to beseen since the move for Federalism is stalledin Congress.

In the meantime, peace negotiations re-main the sole means of solving the Mindanaoconflict. But obviously if the same frameworkand orientation of the peace process continuesalong the same old lines, the results will con-tinue to be unsatisfactory.

Notes

1. Another People Power known as EDSA Dos in2001 ousted Estrada from the presidency andinstalled Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

2. WWW.Moroinfo.com, posted 9 December 2003.

References

Abubakar, Carmen A. (1989) ‘Moro Ethno-National-ist Movement’. In Kumar David and SantasilanKadirgamar (eds.) Ethnicity, Identity, Conflict andCrisis, Hong Kong: Arena Press, 108–125.

Abubakar, Carmen A. (1999) ‘SPCPD and economicdevelopment: high expectations, low output’,UP-CIDS Chronicle 4(1–2): 53–55.

Basman, Taha M. Mama S. Lalanto, and NagasuraT. Madale (1989) The RCC Untold Story (Auton-omy for Muslim Mindanao), Manila: B-lal Pub-lishers.

Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa (1999a) ‘A critical partnership,civil society & the peace process’, AccordMindanao, MSU-GSC Research Journal 3(1, 2):56–63.

Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa (1999b) ‘Lumads and thepeace process: interview with Ramon Maamb-

ing’, Accord Mindanao, MSU-GSC Research Jour-nal 3(1) January–June: 65.

Gutierrez, Eric (1999) ‘The politics of transition’,Accord Mindanao, MSU-GSC Research Journal 3(1,2): 66–73.

Kamlian, Jamail A. (2002) ‘The Mindanao peaceprocess in the Philippines: an update’, Lectern,MSU-Iligan 8(9): 4–5.

Muslim, Macapado A. and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam(1999) ‘Mindanao, land of promise’, AccordMindanao, MSU-GSC Research Journal 3(1, 2):10–19.

Rasul, Al-Gazel (ed.) (2002) Still Chasing the Rain-bow, Quezon City: FedPil Publishing.

Santos, Soliman M. (1999) ‘Islamic diplomacy, con-sultation & consensus’, Accord Mindanao, MSU-GSC Research Journal 3(1, 2): 20–27.

Werble, Magsaysay (1996) ‘The Mindanao peaceprocess: chronology of events from Tripoli toJakarta 1976:1996’, MA Thesis, Institute of Is-lamic Studies, U.P. Diliman.

Zafra, Nicolas (1967) Philippine History through Se-lected Sources, Quezon City: Alemars-PhoenixPublishing House.

Author’s biography

Dr Carmen A. Abubakar is a professor and thecurrent Dean of the Institute of Islamic Studies inthe University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman,where she has been a member of the faculty since1981. Dr Abubakar has published several articles onthe society and culture of the Muslims in the Philip-pines.

Contact address: Institute of Islamic Studies, Ro-mulo Hall, U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, Metro-Manila, Philippines.

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Documents

Review of the Mindanao Peace Processes