Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

8/8/2019 Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

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Understanding confict. Building peace.

InclusIve Peace In

MuslIM MIndanao:RevIsItIng the dynaMIcso conlIct and exclusIonFrancisco J. Lara Jr. and Phil Champain


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ab Iri arInternational Alert is an independent peacebuilding organisation that has worked or over 20 years tolay the oundations or lasting peace and security in communities aected by violent conict. Our mul-tiaceted approach ocuses both in and across various regions; aiming to shape policies and practicesthat aect peacebuilding; and helping build skills and capacity through training.

Our feld work is based in Arica, South Asia, the South Caucasus, Latin America, Lebanon and the Phil-

ippines. Our thematic projects work at local, regional and international levels, ocusing on cross-cuttingissues critical to building sustainable peace. These include business and economy, gender, governance,aid, security and justice. We are one o the worlds leading peacebuilding NGOs with more than 120 stabased in London and our 11 feld ofces.

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International Alert 2009All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any orm orby any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without ull attribution.

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Front cover image: Girl with toy airplane rom the houses-on-stilts village o Tubig Indangan in Simunul Island, Tawi-Tawi. Farley Baricuatro, 2006.


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Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao:Revisiting the Dynamics o Conictand Exclusion

Francisco J. Lara Jr. and Phil Champain1


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2 International Alert

akwm

The authors would like to thank all those interviewed in the process o researching this paper ortheir willingness to share, or their courage, and or their dierent perspectives. Thanks also goto the Crisis States Research Centre o the London School o Economics and Political Science ortheir generous support. In particular we would like to thank Proessor James Putzel o the LondonSchool o Economics; Dr. Steven Rood o The Asia Foundation, Philippines; Muslahuddin Daud,Post-Conict Project Ofce/Aceh o the World Bank; Pro. Abhoud Syed Lingga o the Instituteo Bangsamoro Studies; and the participants o the Waging Peace Conerence, Manila, December2008 or their insights and advice. Canan Gndz, Ed Garcia and Heidi Ober o InternationalAlert provided important critiques o and input to the content. Chandani Thapa o InternationalAlert provided copy editing and coordinated the design and printing processes. This report isthe responsibility o International Alert and does not necessarily reect the views o any o ourdonors.

International Alert, June 2009


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3Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao

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1. Iri 6

2. Iji i Mi ci 7

3. t i mi i Mim Mi 8

4. uri i ri i Mim Mi 10

5. c i i Mim Mi 15

6. c i rr i 2008 17

7. a ri prpi: t a 19

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The people o Mindanao in the Southern Philippines have been suering the eects o violentconict or over 30 years, at a cost o at least 120,000 dead, and the displacement o an estimatedtwo million people. There have been peace agreements, in particular the agreement between theGovernment o the Republic o the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front(MNLF) in 1996, but these agreements have ailed to secure a lasting peace. Indeed, the evidencepoints to an increase in violence ollowing the 1996 settlement.

This paper sets out a case that explains why there is so much conict in the post-conict moment.It argues that at the core o the problem is the exclusionary political economy that is developed andsustained through a complex system o contest and violence. Rebellion-related violence relating tothe vertical armed challenges against the inrastructure o the state combines with inter- or intra-clan and group violence relating to horizontal armed challenges between and among amilies,clans, and tribes. These two types o conict interact in ways that are poorly understood andwhich sustain conditions serving the interests o those with access to economic and politicalpower and exclude the majority o those in Mindanao rom opportunities to improve their lives.The authors argue that the regions underdevelopment can no longer be ascribed solely to thecolonial and post-colonial exploitation o the region and discrimination towards Muslims andindigenous people, but must also be connected to the shiting balance o economic and politicalpower within Bangsamoro society itsel.

A number o key research fndings support this argument:

Incidences of local clan-based, or group violence (rido) have increased markedly ollowingthe 1996 peace agreement;

The weaknesses of the Misuari government post-1996, and its inability to control the violencethat intensifed ollowing the increase in rido and the war between the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) and the GRP in 2000, opened up opportunities or rival groups to step up to theplate and (re)acquire economic and political power;

Conict has enabled the continued growth of an underground economy marked by theprolieration o illegal drugs, unlicensed frearms, and control over small-scale and unlicensedmining activity and smuggling, providing revenue or local clans; and

Muslim Mindanao continues to be excluded from the fruits of national growth, and theminimal growth in the region itsel is unsustainable, and mainly dependent on election andreconstruction-related consumption spending.

Given this, international and local eorts to end armed rebellion and that call or immediateceasefres, elections, autonomy, and decentralisation as the key instruments or lasting peace anddevelopment are let wanting. They are inadequate not because these are the wrong aspirations,but because they do not engage strategically with the less visible yet vital dynamics o inter- andintra-clan conict.


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1. Iri

Musheera lugs most o her personal belongings wherever she goes. She is used to evacuating herchildren and her valuables at a moments notice, and like other Muslim women caught in thelong conict in Mindanao, she has witnessed the mindless violence and depredation caused by aconict where there are no bystanders, only perpetrators and victims. She went through the sameordeal when she evacuated her amily rom Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte to Iligan City ollowinga deadly attack on civilians by Muslim rebels in August 2008. Four years o working or peacehas not diminished her ear o reprisals. Musheera provides psycho-social counseling to Muslimsand Christians who have experienced the trauma o conict. Sometimes the Christian victimscould not bring themselves to trust a Muslim woman to help them recover rom the trauma oviolence. We had been talking about peace in this municipality or more than ten years, engagingin countless rituals to promote solidarity and peace, but it only took a single day o cruelty andviolence to bring back all the ear, anger, and suspicion that we thought we had let behind.

Makin used to join in rido (violent inter- and intra-clan euds), believing that revenge was theonly way his amily could restore its honour and protect its interests when threatened by otherclans or tribes. In his village, the rido are oten due to land issues, but they can easily erupt out ojealousy, humiliation, and disrespect or the amily. Its dangerous because you can get killed eveni the problem involves a distant relative, so everyone in the clan is cautious and always preparedto fght. Makin conesses that his amily was involved in a rido that led to several deaths. Theviolence prevented children rom going to school and men rom working in the felds. He nearlylet school, but his ather helped to settle the eud, enabling him to fnish his studies. Thanks beto Allah i I had not fnished school I would have no uture. That would have led me to the path

o the rebels, since my ather was a rebel commander himsel. Worse, it could have steered me tothe criminal gangs here, Makin says.

The stories o Musheera and Makin2 underscore the recurring violence that accompaniessuccessul political settlements in the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia. Musheeraand Makin reside in communities where violence was expected to subside ater a peace agreementwas signed between rebels and the government in 1996. However, a ew years ater the agreementwas signed, a new war broke out and inter-clan conicts intensifed, exposing the ragility o theagreement and provoking a re-examination o strategies designed to ensure a lasting peace.

The situation in Muslim Mindanao begs an important question: Why is there so much conict inthe post-conict moment? 3

This paper examines the roots o persistent conict by going beyond the original narrative oresistance and rebellion to shed light on the shiting political and economic conditions that explaintheir longevity. It distinguishes between the original causes o conict (onset) and the emergingpolitico-economic conditions that underlie their persistence (duration).4 The paper argues that agap exists in current analysis o persistent conict in Mindanao, which is based upon a traditionaldiscourse o exclusion that ails to capture the regions shiting economic and political conditionsand the emergence o new orces that shape the possibilities and limits or a lasting peace.

This study oers a political economy and institutional approach to analysing conict that canhelp various stakeholders, namely: civil society groups (including those rom the business sector);local and national government executives; and, local and international development agenciesengaged in creating conditions or a lasting peace in Mindanao. The paper is also relevant to otherplaces that have witnessed enduring conict in Southeast Asia and includes a brie review o theMindanao conict in relation to the dynamics o conict and exclusion in Aceh, Indonesia.


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2. Iji i Mi i

Most studies o the Mindanao conict highlight the injustices and grievances against the colonialand post-colonial Philippine state, tracing the roots o violence to the historical resistance o theBangsamoro (Moro Nation)5 people to oreign colonizers who ruled Mindanao bringing withthem the Christian settlers and businessmen rom the northern and central part o the Philippines,and the transnational companies that grabbed the lands armed and occupied by the Muslims andindigenous people.6 The thet o the Moros land was acilitated and reinorced by an externally(Spanish and American) imposed set o property rights institutions based on the colonial systemo titling, transer, and sale o land over the Moros traditional system o communal ownershipand stewardship o property.

The colonization o land was made worse by the ofcial neglect o poor rural communitiesby the central state and local governments in Mindanao, accompanied by political repression,militarisation and discrimination towards Muslims and indigenous people in the countryside.7 Incomparison to the ethnic and identity-based struggles that mostly defned the nature o conictin parts o Arica and South Asia, the scholarship on Mindanao paid little attention to ethno-religious dierences as the basis o conict.8 Scholars pointed out how ethno-religious identitieswere poor mobilising symbols or the secessionist movement, even though the rebels used themto instrumentally project their legitimacy to the international community, particularly the Islamicstates. In act, ethno-religious discourse was oten used to blur the ailures o governance,especially at a time when local governments were falling under the control of Moro strong menor the rebels themselves.

The current rationale or resistance and rebellion remains anchored to this historical discourseo injustice and discrimination, despite the shit in the economic balance o power, the changesin local political authority, and the dierent set o actors that play a role in governance. Theyresonate in the proposition that a solution to the historical injustice o land grabbing andeconomic exclusion perpetrated against the Bangsamoro is to be ound in autonomous sel-rule, which is critical to achieving peace and development, and is best addressed through therecognition o their ancestral homeland.9 However, as we shall discuss later, the sourceso unrest and the triggers o violence and conict in the region have markedly changed.

The Mindanao conict is estimated to have resulted in at least 120,000 dead, and the displacemento an estimated two million people since it started in the early seventies.10 In 1996, a peace accordbetween the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government o the Republic o the

Philippines (GRP) paved the way or the ormer to govern an autonomous regional governmentcalled the Autonomous Region o Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) a devolved political authorityestablished in 1991 that provided or autonomous rule by the Moro people.11 Autonomy wasaimed at the development o the economy and improvement o the welare o Muslim Mindanao,which includes the population residing in the fve provinces and one city that elected to join theautonomous region.12 Establishing a separate region dominated by Muslims was also expected toimprove the targeting o programmes and services that would improve standards o living, andencourage the entry o domestic and oreign investors in the conict-torn areas o the region.

However, more than ten years ater the 1996 agreement, economic growth, or the lack o it, hasopened up new patterns o exclusion.


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3. t i mi i Mim Mi

There are at least two aspects in the current pattern o economic growth in Muslim Mindanaothat create hostile conditions or a lasting peace.

a. Exclusion rom benefts o national economic growthThe lives o the poor and disadvantaged in Muslim Mindanao have not improved during theperiods o economic growth that the country as a whole has enjoyed over the past decade. As thePhilippines recovered rom the 1997 Asian crisis and its GDP grew at an average o 4 percent,most o the Mindanao regions recovered except or our o fve provinces within the ARMM,which remain at the bottom o the ten low-growth provinces in the country in terms o real percapita income.13

This had a palpable eect on the human development indicators o Muslim Mindanao. Theeconomic and social conditions in Muslim Mindanao lag behind other provinces and regions,evidenced by its poor record in terms o employment, poverty, and health (Table 1). Absolutepoverty in Muslim Mindanao is 45 percent, compared to the national average o 36 percent.Unemployment is fve times higher than the national average. Meanwhile, expected lie at birth(ELB) in Muslim Mindanao is only 52 years, in comparison to the national average o 71 yearsor the Philippines. In addition, inant mortality is higher in Muslim Mindanao, where 55 inantsdie per thousand compared to 49 or the rest o the country.

Muslim Mindanao displays a similar trend in terms o education. Twenty-six percent o children oschool age participate in primary school compared to 43 percent in Mindanao and 45 percent or the

rest o the country. O those that are able to enter school, cohort survival rates are the lowest in theARMM, with only 37 percent o students entering the elementary grade (Grade 1) making it to thesixth grade, versus 53 percent or Mindanao and 66 percent or the rest o the country.

tb 1. hm dpm Iir: Mim Mi

Pri/cr

elB Pr I Mri(pr 1000 i bir)

Pr ump

ARMM 52 years 45% 55 inants 56%

Philippines 71 years 36% 49 inants 10%

Sources: The study was done by the UNDPs PHDNetwork. Philippine Human Development Report (2005). Peace, humansecurity, and human development in the Philippines. Makati City: Philippine Human Development Network, UNDP, NZAID;

National Statistics Ofce (2008). Total population and annual population growth rates by region: Population censuses 1995,

2000, and 2007. Quezon City: NSO.

The divergence between provincial or regional fgures and national indices expose the geographicalexclusion o Muslim Mindanao rom the gains o national economic growth and povertyreduction, despite the onset o a ormal peace.

b. Unsustainable growth patternsDuring the ew instances when economic growth in Muslim Mindanao was comparable to, orexceeded the national pattern o growth, that growth has been unsustainable because it was basedon reconstruction and election-driven consumption spending.


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Economic growth in Muslim Mindanao is much lower than the national average, even though itollowed the pattern o national growth except in 2000 and 2002 (Figure 1). The all in economicgrowth in 2000 is traced to the all-out war between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)and the GRP.14 The spike in 2002 and the increase in 2004 can be traced to the inusion oreconstruction aid ater the 20002001 war, and the growth in consumption during and ater

the regional and national elections during those years (1998 national elections, 2002 regionalelections, 2004 national elections).

ir 1. Pr Ir i R gdP: Mim Mi Piippi,19972007

Source: NEDA, 2008

Thus, except or the palpable increase in consumption spending in Muslim Mindanao ollowingmajor political exercises and the onset of post-conict aid and reconstruction, there is littleimprovement in terms o value-added production and sectoral productivity. Statistics (MindanaoEconomic Development Council, 2006) demonstrate that productivity gains rom 20002005were limited to fsheries and a ew agricultural crops such as rice and corn.

The unsustainable nature o ARMMs economic growth, coupled with the regions exclusion romthe benefts o national growth, make a durable peace more difcult to achieve.15 Studies have

shown how the type o economic growth that is directly caused by the massive inusion o aid andreconstruction expenditures, or by the exploitation o both lootable (e.g., valuable gems, drugs,timber, agricultural products) or non-lootable (e.g., oil and gas) resources in post-conict areasopens up new arenas o competition and conict, and a rise in separatist or non-separatist violence.16

20

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-10

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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007


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4. uri i ri i Mim Mi

This paper dierentiates between two types o violence in Muslim Mindanao: the frst type isreerred to in the conict literature as separatist, political, rebellion-related, top-down, or conict-related violence which pertains to the vertical armed challenges against the inrastructure o thestate and the insurgent and rebel groups; the second is oten called non-separatist, bottom-up,inter- or intra-ethnic, clan, or group violence which pertains to horizontal armed challengesbetween and among amilies, clans, and tribes.17 For this paper, we shall use the terms rebellion-related violence and inter- or intra-clan or group violence, respectively, in distinguishing betweenthese two types o conict.

Rebellion-related conict in Mindanao is sub-national and separatist, while inter- or intra-clan orgroup conict is community-based and non-separatist. Both can be products o resource disputesand politico-economic contestation at various levels. Rebellion-related violence is the outcome oarmed conrontation between the GRP and the MILF and MNLF.18 On the other hand, inter- andintra-clan or group violence can take various orms, o which rido is the most widespread.19The twotypes intersect in terms o politico-economic oundations and the orms they take. Their persistenceis tied to the capacity o protagonists to engage in armed, organised, and protracted violence.

The two may also be distinguished in terms o their benefciaries. Rebellion-related violencebenefts the national or sub-national states or the insurgent and rebel inrastructure. Inter- andintra-clan or group violence benefts the amilies, clans, and tribes that emerge victorious aterviolence and conict subsides or ends.20 Other benefciaries include business interests and specifcethnic or religious identity groups that alternately support the state, the rebels, or both.

Beore the 1996 peace agreement, the previous administrations o the ARMM had been ledby Muslim political elites backed by traditional clans with strong connections to the centralgovernment.21 The entry o MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari to the ARMM governorship canthereore be viewed as a ormal turn-over o power and resources rom the traditional Muslim clansto the rebel leadership o the MNLF.22 The transition o power was aided by Misuaris popularityas a symbol o the Bangsamoro resistance. Misuari had strong access to the central governmentunder Ramos and he enjoyed international support and recognition rom the Organization o theIslamic Conerence (OIC).

Four years later in 2000, war was reignited between the GRP and another rebel group called theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), ater the then President Joseph Estrada implemented a

more bellicose policy towards insurgents and ordered an attack against MILF camps across andbeyond the ARMM. Armed conict erupted again in 2003 and 2008 under the administration oPresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

The outbreak o hostilities in Muslim Mindanao during the second hal o 2008 alone led tohundreds o atalities and the displacement o an estimated 250,000 people.23 These clashes wereprovoked by an aborted deal that was to provide or the recognition o the ancestral domainclaims o the Moro people and the establishment o a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). TheMemorandum o Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was hammered out ater yearso negotiations between the MILF and GRP peace panels. But ater the proposed agreement wasdeclared unconstitutional by the Philippines Supreme Court ater the deal was announced, thegovernment panel was disbanded and peace negotiations were suspended. Negotiations have sinceresumed, though ew expect any signifcant breakthrough until ater President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos term ends in 2010.


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The persistence o rebellion-related violence in Muslim Mindanao can be principally traced tothe ailure to reach an eective political settlement between the dierent rebel groups and theGRP. However, this sort o violence can also escalate when both the rebels and the militarytake sides among euding clans and tribes engaged in fghts over land, resources, or politicalofce. This in turn leads to a vicious cycle where continued armed challenges to the national and

local government cause militarization and human rights violations that poison the ormal peaceprocess.24

Studies have shown how the weaknesses in governance under Nur Misuaris administrationcreated conditions or the persistence o rebellion-related violence.25 The regional autonomousgovernment was neither autonomous nor capable o governing rom the start. The ARMM wasweak and unable to deliver basic programmes and services in key areas such as health care andeducation. Tax and revenue-generating power was inadequate, and the ARMM was beset bynumerous and increasing cases o grat and corruption. These problems partly explain why localand international aid and development agencies were directly involved in the provision o publicgoods and other developmental programmes and services.

In addition, the ARMM did not wield eective command over the local police and armed orces.The ailure to monopolize the states coercive power meant that the regional government had verylittle inuence over the provision o security and the direction o internal security reorms. TheARMM could not even play an active part in preventing rido and other community-level conicts.

Part o the reason behind the ailure o the post-1996 ARMM government was the absenceo genuine powers required by the regional executive ofce and the regional assembly in suchimportant areas as fscal autonomy which remained under central control. 26 These had beenpart o the original agreement, but their implementation was blocked by Congress. At the sametime, the new rebel-governors lacked the required skill and capacity to deal with the multipleevolving conditions in the feld: where a new rebel challenger (MILF) was getting stronger,

community-level conicts were erupting, and criminality was increasing. And not unlike theclan-based governors that preceded him, Misuari was aced with charges o mismanagementand corruption.

In reality, the Misuari-led regional government presided over the autonomous region underpeace terms aimed at securing the short-term economic goals o the Ramos administration(19921998). The Ramos government created the political space necessary to undertakefscal and economic reorms aimed at controlling growth in expenditures and a reocusing oresources towards economic priorities such as inrastructure building and energy generation.27The strategy was successul and violence declined signifcantly in the period prior to and shortlyater the conclusion o peace talks with the MNLF (Figure 2). The Ramos administration canalso be credited with stemming rebellion-related violence by simultaneously entering into peace

negotiations with the MILF, the Communist Party o the Philippines New Peoples Army(CPP-NPA), and military rebels associated with the Reorm Armed Forces Movement and theYoung Ofcers Union (RAM-YOU).


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ir 2. Ii Rbi-r vi

Source: Philippine Human Development Report (2005). Peace, human security, and human development in the Philippines.

Makati City: Philippine Human Development Network, UNDP, NZAID. Compiled by P. Abinales and E. Ramos.

However, a latent unrest continued to grow behind the peace bargains secured by the Ramosgovernment. Indigenous groups, Christian settlers and politicians, and some o the traditionalMuslim clans that were excluded rom the GRP-MNLF peace processes saw their intereststhreatened and their needs unmet by the post-1996 rebel-led government which styled itsel asa representative of the entire Bangsamoro people. This unrest was accompanied by a spike in

hostilities between the GRP and the MILF and CPP-NPA ater the end o Ramos term in 1998.As a result, business groups and investors continued to evade Muslim Mindanao, preerring toinvest instead in the prosperous metropolitan centres o Davao, Cagayan de Oro, and GeneralSantos, and the East Asian Growth Area (EAGA) business initiatives being promoted by theRamos government.28

Without a doubt, the intensifcation o rebellion-related violence ater 1996 reinorced the causalrelationship between social exclusion and conict, but with a new twist. Whereas the originaldiscourse o social exclusion was synonymous with the anti-statist political line advanced by theMoro separatists in the struggle or an independent state, the current discourse o exclusion is beingwielded by indigenous peoples, including local businessmen, Christian settlers and politicians, andthe powerul Muslim clans against the rebel-separatists themselves. Their grievance economic

and political exclusion rom the outcome and benefts o the GRP-MNLF and the GFP-MILFpeace processes. Their target the Misuari-led ARMM, the current ARMM administration, andthe MOA-AD.

This reverse antagonism holds the key to understanding the connections between politicalauthority and the evolving shits in the regions political economy. The regions underdevelopmentcan no longer be ascribed solely to the colonial and post-colonial exploitation o the regionand discrimination towards Muslims and indigenous people, but must also be connected to theshiting balance o economic and political power within Bangsamoro society itsel betweenthose who prospered from the war and the ensuing peace, versus those who did not benet, inparticular the many who remain impoverished and vulnerable within the region. In reality, thisrepresents a tug o war between the Muslim rebels and their advocates and ollowers on the onehand, and the Muslim aristocracy and the Christian settler-elites on the other. In the middle standthe mass o poor and vulnerable communities that were, and continue to be, excluded rom thesupposed benefts o the peace process.

350

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150

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50

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n MIl

n Mnl

n nPa

2 7

97

133

20

4 8 23

288

114

315


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The traditional dichotomies underlying the Mindanao conict have changed. In tandem with thecentral state, the powerul Muslim and Christian clans and the leaders o the MNLF must sharepart o the blame or the lingering violence, and the perpetual ailure to generate wealth andprosperity within the region. The MILF will be acing the same challenges i a peace agreement isachieved, as inclusionary demands have started to rise among indigenous people, settlers, women,

and local business groups in light o the aborted MOA-AD.

The authenticity and urgency o local demands cannot be discounted as crucial socio-economicissues have not been addressed. Access and secure rights to land, a just share in the regionsnatural resources, the availability o employment and credit or livelihoods are undamentaldemands which the dierent ARMM administrations ailed to address, resulting in the steadydeterioration o peoples standards o living. The growing economic and political diaspora romMuslim Mindanao is recorded each year in the increased density o Muslim ghettoes in Metro-Manila, Cebu, Davao, Baguio, and other secondary urban centres. These ghettos oer a poignantreminder that the change in the regions leadership has not produced the desired development.

Unequal access to key resources such as land continues to provoke unrest and violence. Largetracts o land continue to evade agrarian reorm in the ARMM, which ranks second in termso working scope (321,869 hectares) under the Philippines Comprehensive Agrarian ReormProgramme (CARP) as o 2003, yet has the lowest accomplishment report (60%) in the transero private agricultural land (PAL) across Mindanao ater more than a decade o agrarian reormimplementation. Worse, almost all o the PAL areas that have been transerred were acquiredthrough voluntary oers o sale or voluntary land transer (VOS-VLT), a system o land transerrie with raud and corruption.29

The persistence o land-based conict and the inability to undertake an eective land reormprogramme creates a critical intersection between rebellion-related violence and inter- or intra-clan or group violence. The outbreak o hostilities between the MILF and the GRP in 2000, or

example, was prompted by both parties taking sides in a local Muslim-Christian conict overcontrol o a parcel o land in Lanao del Norte.30 The conuence is maniested in inter- and intra-clan euds which have escalated as a orm o dispute settlement between competing clan and tribalinterests during the post-1996 peace settlement period (Figure 3).

ir 3. cm cr Rido Ii, 19902004

Source: Kamlian, 2007

90

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70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

n1990-1994n1995-1999n2000-2004

coabao

laao

su

aKudara

suu

Baia

tawi-tawi

Zamboagasur

Zamboaganore

Zamboagasibugay


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The persistence o inter- and intra-clan or group violence in Muslim Mindanao is distinctlyrelated to resource conicts at the community level particularly on the issue o land.31 Numerousstudies have also pointed to the strong links between rido and the awed institutional make-up oagrarian reorm in the region. Indeed, the imposition o a conventional, top-down agrarian reormprogramme in a region where specifc cultural institutions o communal and clan ownership over

land prevail is partly to blame or the violence.32 An analysis o sources orido confrms numerouscases where the survey and land titling processes undertaken under the CARP led to intra-amilyviolence when individual titles encroached on land owned (through inheritance or pusaka) byanother amily member.33

Apart rom land issues, election-related conict constitutes a secondary but signifcant sourceo community-level violence, as it leads to control over political ofce that increases access tofrepower, or determines entry into businesses that are part o the underground economy. Thisrepresents another convergence point between sub-national and community-level violence, namelyelectoral disputes and conicts over the illegal economy, such as in the lucrative drug trade inMuslim Mindanao. It reveals the onset o a new dynamic o exclusion that is distinct rom itsearlier representations, and the emergence o new and powerul clans with access to new sourceso economic power.


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5. c i i Mim Mi

Studies have shown how the power o the clans that were a fxture o traditional Muslim societywere held in check by the rebel orces o the MNLF and MILF in the long years o conictrom 1970 to 2001. Several Muslim amilies and clans were directly or indirectly involved inthe conict, oering material support and sending their young men and women to join andsupport the rebel armies. Other clans collaborated with the central state, strengthening theiraccess to national resources in exchange or providing a security apparatus or the central statein the region. However, even the clans that colluded with the Marcos regime saw the need orpeaceul coexistence with rebel orces in a bid to neutralize, and sometimes draw upon the lattersfrepower.34

However, with the weaknesses o the Misuari government and its inability to control the violencethat intensifed ollowing the increase in rido and the war between the MILF and the GRP, awindow was opened or rival groups to step up to the plate and (re)acquire economic and politicalpower. Misuaris demand or the national state to deliver on its commitments and his stab atanother revolt was a belated attempt at maintaining power. Misuari was arrested and imprisoned,paving the way or the restoration o clan politics and the resurgence o clan institutions suchas rido, and the emergence o warlord clans that exercise power based upon their control overdevolved political authority and a vast underground economy.35

Clan control over the ARMM government and the inormal economy in the region inducesmuch o the same violent competition associated with the traditional clan control over land.Fund transers between the central government to the ARMM in the orm o internal revenue

allotments (IRA) constitutes the bulk o unds placed under the control o the clans, amountingto an estimated 2.23 billion pesos in 2006 alone.36 This underscores the violent, winner-takes-all nature o electoral competition. With government consumption expenditures in the ARMMgrowing at a aster rate than the rest o Mindanao combined, it was clear that whoever controlledthe state would corner these sums.37

It also explains why every election year is alternately seen as a source o opportunity and danger bypoor communities in Muslim Mindanao. Elections oer the chance to sell votes and inuence inexchange or money and other resources such as frearms, but they also present countless dangersassociated with the potential rido that can erupt i a amily or clan relative runs or politicalofce. The mode o electoral competition in Mindanao also creates a powerul link betweenrebellion-related violence and inter-clan violence, particularly when violent euds between rival

clans escalate when rebel groups and the police and military support rival candidates.38

Apart rom government-to-government transers, a growing underground economy marked bythe prolieration o illegal drugs, unlicensed frearms, control over small-scale and unlicensedmining activity and smuggling provides additional sources o revenue or local clans (Table 2).Earnings rom illicit activities are deposited and laundered in commercial banks in the key citieso Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Iligan, and Zamboanga City.39 A key aspect o thebooming underground economy is the existence o an inormal market or arable agriculturalland. This study uncovered several instances o land transerring ownership without any state lawregulating the sale or generating the required taxes.

The violent mix between a spreading underground economy and electoral corruption also reectsthe orces and relationships that bind the central Philippine state with Muslim Mindanao. Sub-national state building is ostensibly sacrifced or the central objective o sustaining the powerul


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6. c i rr i 2008

The resurgent violence in the second hal o 2008 demonstrates the aorementioned role o claninstitutions as an endogenous actor that plays a decisive role in the outbreak o violence. Whenthe government scuttled a drat memorandum o agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD),some base commands o the MILF went on a rampage, leading to the indiscriminate killing andinjury o hundreds o civilians in some coastal towns o Lanao del Norte.40 These attacks providedthe justifcation or the reversal o the GRPs original position to support the MOA-AD, and thelaunch o major oensive operations against the MILF in Northern and Central Mindanao.

The conrontation between the GRP and the MILF did not exist in a vacuum, but was aided byorces outside the main protagonists in the conict. As war began to rear its head, preparationsor the scheduled elections or the regional leadership o the autonomous region were underway.The MILF publicly called or a suspension o the ARMM elections. On the other hand, the clanswanted the elections to proceed, hoping that it would provide a barrier to the eventual creationo a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), as called or in the agreement.

The current ARMM governor comes rom a strong clan in Central Mindanao, known or itsfrepower and political inuence that stretches beyond central Mindanao.41 The same clan retainsstrong ties with the central government, and is alleged to have played a key role in the electoralraud and violence associated with the 2004 and 2007 elections.42 The ormation o a BJE posed agenuine threat to the traditional clans at a time when both the political leadership o the ARMMregional government and several key provinces within the region were under their control. Thecollusion between regional power-brokers and specifc national agencies in spurious land deals

would also be aected by a successul MOA-AD.43

A conjuncture was reached when the interests o the ARMM-based clans and the local governmentofcials near the region converged, with the latter engaging in armed actions against MILF feldcommands in the provinces adjacent to the ARMM.44 The MOA-AD cast some uncertainty overthe uture o investments in Mindanao and was ostensibly a threat to the economic and politicalbase o the Christian political elites who stood to lose part o their territory to an expandedBJE. The inammatory rhetoric coming rom several local government ofcials went unabatedprecisely because they enjoyed the support o local big business and the landed elite in Mindanao.45

Their actions during the tense ew days ollowing the announcement, combined with a reciprocalvehemence against the MOA-AD rom among the national political elite, has been repeatedlycited as a major cause or the rush to arms, and was subsequently used by several base commands

o the MILF to justiy their attacks.46

Accounts o the recent turmoil in Mindanao provide evidence that validates the analysis o thelinks between emerging economic sources o power and intensifed social exclusion in MuslimMindanao, namely:

The interests of the powerful Muslim clans and Christian politicians converged in a manner thatmade it easy to scuttle the drat agreement on ancestral domain, aided by the national governmentwhich withdrew rom the agreement ater encountering widespread opposition. While there isno evidence o direct collusion between the Christian and Muslim clans, their responses to thethreat o a BJE coincided to undermine the agreement. The scholarship on Muslim Mindanaohas pointed to the role of local strong men who can either facilitate or delay peace processes.A similar situation occurred in the events leading to the signing o the MOA-AD, except that thistime the Muslim clans had a stronger inuence over the central state. Their enhanced leveragederives rom the strategic role that they have played in shaping national electoral outcomes.


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Apprehension over the loss of control over territory and the revenue streams from businessand investments, coupled with the huge income rom the illegal economy played a centralpart in the parallel moves of the traditional Christian and Muslim aristocracy to scuttlethe agreement and in omenting violence in the events leading to the explosion o ull-blownconict. As aorementioned, the importance o controlling political ofce is intertwined with

the economic oundations o power in Muslim Mindanao, i.e., successul electoral strugglesenable the control o ormal political authority that is required to corner the proceeds rom boththe expansion in local and oreign investments, government-to-government transers, and theexpanding underground economy.47

The peace process actually excluded several groups that could have rallied behind the agreement,including the local business and church leaders sympathetic to the cause o a lasting peace inMindanao. In addition to the social exclusion experienced by poor Muslims, there exists anequally deep experience o exclusion amongst women and the indigenous people o Mindanao,whose constituencies contain widespread support or lasting peace.

Indeed, women take on additional burdens in securing the household and the amily in the courseo conict-related violence, oten taking the lead during times o orced displacement, and seeingto the needs o the amily in evacuation camps. They have not been eectively drawn into peaceprocesses, despite the act that they play a key role in negotiating an end to community-levelviolence, and oten conront the risks and dangers associated with inter- and intra-clan violence(rido). Not only does this ail to harness womens potential contribution, it contravenes UNSecurity Council Resolution 1325 which stresses, amongst other things, supporting womenspolitical, economic and social participation in peacebuilding at all levels.

The same is true or indigenous groups such as the Higaonon, Teduray, Iranun, and Subanentribes who are oten displaced when conict-related violence erupts in areas which they occupy.They possess deep-seated animosities towards rebel leaders who make instrumental claims that

a consensus exists among the Bangsamoro people over the uture o the ARMM, despite theirexclusion rom the negotiations. They have repeatedly warned o a new ront opening in theMindanao conict i the MOA-AD were approved. While some tribes have been Islamised, theinuence o tribal traditions and the distinct tribal claims over land and areas which they claimas part o their ancestral domain prevent them rom complying with the outcomes o any peaceagreement between the central state and Muslim rebels unless they are directly involved.

The poor and vulnerable peasant communities (mostly Muslim), women, and indigenous peopleare the new aces o social exclusion in Muslim Mindanao, and their continued marginalisationrom the peace processes and the benefts o economic growth present ormidable barriers to thecause o a lasting peace.


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7. a ri prpi: t a

Persistent violence aicts other places in Southeast Asia where political settlements have beenachieved between rebel orces and the central state that led to devolved political authority. The2005 Peace Accords that ended the civil war between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) andthe Government o the Republic o Indonesia (RI) have produced a ragile peace punctuated byviolence between ex-combatants o GAM and between dierent ethnic and political groups.48

Evidence has also emerged that some elements o the Indonesian armed orces (TNI) are unwillingto recognise the legitimacy o GAM and its leaders, which adds to the distrust and growing unrestunder Acehs new leaders.

What was a tentative peace began to unravel soon ater the agreement was reached. Conicterupted even beore the holding o the frst democratic elections in the autonomous province in2005. Tensions arose within the rebel orces over who should run as Aceh governor, originatingrom a actional split within GAM beore the peace agreement was signed. An ofcial break-upthen emerged ater Yusu Irwandi was elected governor.49

The split within the GAM led to the exclusion o a signifcant number o ex-combatants romthe fnancial benefts o the reintegration programme, with several ex-GAM commanders beinglet out rom the reinsertion and reintegration assistance that was cornered by the dominantaction within GAM. The struggles within the rebels ranks spilled over to the allocation o choicepolitical posts within the province. Meanwhile, some ex-combatants who were excluded tried toget their share by bullying local government ofcials into giving them contracts during the post-tsunami reconstruction.

The unequal access to land and post-conict reintegration benefts by ex-combatants, including thethousands o Acehnese victimised by conict, partly explains the persistence o violence. However,there are other drivers o violence, including the continued exclusion o poor communities romrevenues derived rom Acehs natural resources, the weakness o devolved governance institutions,and the marginalisation o certain ethnic groups especially those residing in the central highlands.

Aceh demonstrates a paradigm o democratisation that has turned violent, as political and inter-ethnic rivalries erupted soon ater the Helsinki agreement was signed in 2005. These shouldhave been anticipated, as previous studies50 have called attention to the likely consequences o ahastily-imposed western-type democracy on ethnically diverse communities.

Aceh saw western-style democracy and devolution imposed on a cauldron o inter-ethnic andinter-political animosities, resulting in the hardening o ethnic and political divisions. As a result,poor rural and urban communities remained vulnerable to sudden outbursts o ethno-politicalviolence especially during the period beore and ater the 2009 national legislative elections.51

Indeed, Indonesia aces several ethno-political conicts within its borders, including in placessuch as West Java, North Maluku, Central and Southern Sulawesi, where lingering problemswith the system o democratic and electoral competition are bound to worsen. In a similar wayto the Philippines, constitutional reorms to address economic and political issues that aect localconict have arrived slowly due to competing agendas or charter change in both countries.52

As with Muslim Mindanao, Aceh has been excluded rom growth during the past decade (inthis case Indonesias). Human development indicators expose the lagging state o health andemployment in the province (See Table 3).


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tb 3: hm dpm Iir: a Ii

Pri/cr

elB Pr IMri(pr 1000 i bir)

umpmr

Aceh 55 years 35% 42 inants 29%

Indonesia 67 years 27% 35 inants 12.5%

Source: World Bank, 2008

However, unlike Muslim Mindanao, Acehs source o domestic economic growth is showingsome signs o value-added production in agriculture. This has been the product o the massivepost-tsunami inrastructure reconstruction work that helped to acilitate the ow o agriculturalgoods. Data on Aceh is limited to the period 20012007, but the fgures demonstrate positivegrowth arising rom arm productivity (See Figure 4).

ir 4: cmpri R gdP grw i a Ii 20012007(Pr Ir)

Source: World Bank, 2008

However, a marked depletion in oil and gas reserves threatens to impact negatively on this patterno growth. I the overall decline in the value o these resources were included, Acehs economy

would actually register a contraction o 2%. Moreover, while the increase in Acehs share in therevenues accruing rom oil and gas reserves owed into the provincial government in the periodprior to and ollowing the armed conict, ew benefts trickled down to the grassroots level, asevidenced by the wide gap that remains between standards o living in Aceh compared to otherprovinces in the North Sumatra region.

As in the case o Muslim Mindanao, research has also unveiled the spread o an undergroundeconomy in Aceh, maniested in the spread o loose frearms, bribery, and extortion activities,particularly in the transport sector. This has had a substantial eect on the costs o the post-tsunami and post-conict reconstruction process.53

Nevertheless, the economic sources o conict in Aceh are eclipsed by the problems odemocratisation that accompanied the creation o a devolved authority within the province. This

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Ii

a


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is underscored by two actors in particular. First, the worsening division amongst the Acehnese isdepicted in the ormation o six local political parties, which joined 34 other national parties invying or electoral posts in the recent elections. Second, the actions o the central Indonesian statethat tried to avour one group within GAM to the detriment o the others.

As in the case of Muslim Mindanao, democratisation and devolution was marked by a winnertakes all process o political competition, as control over political ofce carried with it control overgovernment-to-government transers, revenues rom the oil and gas reserves, and reconstructionbenefts.

The GAM-afliated Partai Aceh has attained a signifcant victory in the 2009 elections, but thepolitical crevices that led to outbreaks o violence in the provincial capital remain as wide as ever.These ashpoints intertwine with the unsettled issues and claims o ex-combatants dissatisfedwith the post-conict reintegration process and the demands o indigenous people in the centralhighlands and the southeastern part o the province, where armed groups continue to organiseadherents and oment secessionist demands. The unrest is urther stoked by a rise in unemploymentas the post-tsunami reconstruction phase begins to wind down, and as oil and gas productiondeclines with resources drying up along Acehs east coast. Placing the entire post-tsunami andpost-conict reconstruction process under the control o a provincial government controlled by adominant action within GAM has been a source o continuing tensions.

In conclusion, a conuence o events occurring at the same time as the peace process provides thecore o a crisis that threatens to engul the province.


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8. ci: ri ii p

This study has pointed to newly emerging sources o violence and conict in Muslim Mindanaoand ocuses on the resurgence o clan politics, the recurrent property rights issues that uel rido,and the expansion o an inormal economy that provokes both rebellion-related and inter-clan orgroup conict. The study emphasises the decisive role played by electoral politics in determiningaccess to and control over government-to-government budget transers and the vast inormaleconomy. The paper highlights the persistent social exclusion that is being nurtured by the rapidchanges in the regions political economy. And to enable an initial analysis o conict rom theSoutheast Asian regional perspective, a brie comparison has been undertaken between MuslimMindanao and Aceh.

Previous studies have pointed to the exclusion that Muslims in Mindanao and Aceh experienceas the cause o the long wars between rebel challengers and the nation-state in the Philippinesand Indonesia. These studies have also shown how the secessionist cause oten ails to gain strongadherents at the local level. While the language o secession has been replaced by a discourse onautonomy, the original claims o social exclusion continue to resonate at the local level as thegains rom growth and autonomy ail to lead to a signifcant change in peoples standards oliving.

Exclusion then remains an oten-used term at the heart o explanations o violent conict inMindanao and elsewhere. But exclusion is not a straightorward concept, and cannot beunderstood solely in terms o Muslim identity. For identity at the local level in Mindanao is morecomplex than this. Exclusion is also determined by other aspects o identity such as gender, clan

and age, and by relationships and networks which either enable access to political and economicpower or not.

As the sources and expressions o exclusion have changed and become more complex since theonset o the struggle or a Bangsamoro homeland (see Table 2 above or example), so has itbecome more urgent to dig deeper into questions o who the excluded are, what they are excludedrom, by whom, and why? These are difcult questions to answer given a multitude o dierentactors and agendas. They can also be dangerous questions to ask given that they lead switly toan exploration o who holds power and the nature o this power.

This paper posits the presence o a blocked transition towards a lasting peace in Mindanao andAceh. The literature describes a blocked transition as a situation where the government directly

or indirectly condones the use o violence against independent political actions undertaken by thepoor majority.54 In the particular case o Muslim Mindanao, we reer to a blocked transition asa situation where traditional local elites and the central state collude and condone the continuedspread o violence as a hedge against the political actions o opposition groups and armed rebels,and is most pronounced during electoral struggles. In the case o Aceh, the continued use oviolence against other "claimants" in the post-conict process is inextricably linked to the processo shoring up one rebel action to the exclusion o others. In both cases, the continuation oviolence intimidates political opposition and cripples the ability o devolved and autonomouspolitical authority to end widespread violent conict.

Part o the limitation o current approaches to peacebuilding is that these approaches oten rameviolent conict predominantly as armed, rebellion-related conict. However, as this paper hassought to illustrate, the armed conict between the MILF/MNLF and the GRP armed orcesboth eeds and draws on inter- and intra-clan conict (rido). This conict cocktail, with its roots


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in exclusionary politics and economics, creates new opportunities or those benefting romexclusion. It underlines the lingering plight o people like Musheera and Makin, who live underthe terms o a ormal peace that exists only on paper.

International and local eorts to end armed rebellion and that call or immediate ceasefres,

elections, autonomy, and decentralisation as the key instruments or lasting peace anddevelopment are let wanting. They are inadequate not because these are the wrong aspirations,but because they do not engage strategically with the less visible yet vital dynamics o inter-and intra-clan conict and do not enable understanding o how these dynamics are inextricablylinked to key issues such as the unsettled property rights ramework that governs access to land,the mode o democratic electoral competition, the expansion o an underground economy, andthe relationships between this economy and local clan politics. Without the ull picture, a ullsolution is not possible. Certainly, the inormal economy may provide livelihoods or the poorand vulnerable in conditions o uncertainty and insecurity, but it also brings with it risk o localconict, and ultimately weakens the administrative capacity o the state.

Peacebuilding strategies must, thereore, include consideration o local community conictdynamics and the ways in which armed rebellion interacts with them. This consideration willinevitably lead to a closer exploration o the inormal economy and the contestation or politicalinuence that brings control o this economy. Such a process requires dialogue with particularcharacteristics. Dialogue that operates at the nexus between armed rebellion and local communityconict; that engages those towards both ends o the excluded/included spectrum in order toconront and unpack current patterns o power and control; that can draw in the private sector since this sector is key to the delivery o jobs and incomes; that develops practical and strategicreorms since dialogue in and o itsel is only a means to an end; that operates at multiple levels since managing conict is the responsibility o many; and that can sustain momentum over anextended time period since societal change takes time.

I this peacebuilding approach can be strengthened and successully complement others then itis more likely that the resources or equitable and sustainable development in Mindanao can beused eectively, to bring about the transition rom persistent violence and underdevelopment topeace and prosperity or all.

Like a stone dropped into a pond, dialogue between dierent stakeholders, i characterised asabove, can create changes in attitudes and behaviours that, like ripples, spread out to inuenceinstitutions and policies, gradually creating a new environment in which inclusion can eventuallytrump exclusion (Figure 5). Such an inclusive state would depend upon an open and air processo political competition, and a political and economic inrastructure based upon the absolutecontrol by local states o the means o coercion.

The challenges are many. Such a situation may not be avourable or national elites who seek toutilise weak electoral systems or their beneft. A representative state may also be vulnerable to thelegitimate claims and grievances o a dominant group that may see ew benefts rom a discoursethat is representative o all sectors and a practice accountable to all citizens. Furthermore, identity-based regimes in the post-conict period such as the GAM-led provincial government, or theMNLF-led ARMM and MILF-proposed BJE would have to deny themselves the armed strengththat is necessary or their armed groups to survive. This truism remains at the core o the problemo continued violence, i.e., an identity-based and instrumentalist regime possesses the seeds o itsown instability and insecurity.


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ir 5: t Pbii Ripp

Source: International Alert.

In the ace o these challenges, new and innovative interventions are required to stem continuingviolence. These interventions must be owned by those with a stake in the required transitionrom conict to peace, and inormed by an honest dialogue exploring the current expressionso exclusionary political and economic practices. They must build on the learning o past andpresent dialogue initiatives, drawing on experience already gained.

International agencies must support such a dialogue process which promises to develop a newtemplate or development assistance based on an understanding o the links between armedrebellion and local community conict. Such a template will result in interventions that willenable vulnerable groups to adapt to conditions o conict and provide the building blocks or thesettlement o undamental issues such as land ownership, ancestral domain, and natural resource

distribution.

Only then will Musheera be able to live without the constant ear o displacement, and Makinbring up his children without the need to protect them rom rido, as his ather had to do or him.Only then will the principle o inclusion, the key to lasting peace, become a reality.

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Rr

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e

1 ri lr Jr. i Rr ai crii s Rr cr l s emi Pii si. Pi cmpi i dirr Prrmm r ai eri ri Iri ar.

2 n ir r m.3 ti pzz i k rm Mm (2007) pri i timr-l, wi i r i b

p-i mm i ai b c. crmr J. g (2002).4 Wrii i i a, cir smbi (2005, p.53) pi i rr rib

duration, rr onset i.5 t rm bangsa i M rm wi skri r rr i, , r, i ,

(Bi, 2005). t Mr ni libri r (Mnl) Mr Imi libri r (MIl)ppriz rm bangsamoro prm ir r ip Mr i. s nb (1976),Jbir (1999), Mim (1994), li (2007).

6 t.J.s. gr, 1980; am, 1999; Mim, 1994; Jbir, 1999.7 Mr, 1984; am, 1999.8 abi, 2000; Bi, 2005; M K, 1998.

9 t Mmrm arm ar dmi r: I i i i Bangsamorohomeland i rr r Bmr pp miri mi w ir piipiri. (n. 2, cp Priip, Mmrm arm ar dmi ap gRP-MIl tripi arm P 2001.)

10 si-omp J, 2005.11 t fr ri ii i i tripi arm 1976, wi Mnl rp

ir im r ip r m. ar Mr irip, p k wrri b Pri crz aqi i 1986. t ri m ri w p wi 1987 m t ori a r Mim Mi r Rpbi a 6734 1987, i 1989 pbii w rmi ii pri w ji m ri. s c-gim (2006) Iribi(2006).

12 t aRMM r 27,500 qr kimr ppi 2.7 mii. I i ri, w bbri am Ri Mim Mi (aRMM) Mim Mi, ri r Wr, cr, nrr Mi mprii pri l sr, Mi, Bi, s, twi-twi, Imi ci Mrwi.

13 t pri r Mi, s, twi-wi, Bi. tir im m r 11,668p (166.00), r ir r pr pi im nrr lz pri n vi (2005hm dpm Rpr, p.101).

14 t MIl i brkw i rm Mnl w bi i 1984 b him sm, Mimr w w pr Mnl rip. sm i i 2003. t MIl w pr p rmi bw Mnl Piippi rm (gRP) i 1996.

15 t r mi rw pri b Mim Mi rr mrii pr mmii i rri riri , r pi rm r . si w mp-i irmm, mbiizi, riri (ddR) pii prrmm r rpr r m r i iii (s Brm, 1998; sr, 2000).

16 o rrr rr r, m r pi i bw b rr -pri i, bw -b rr pri i (R, 2003, pp.4767).

17 R, 2000; ti, 2003; K, 2008.18 Iriw r i i pr cmmi Pr Piippi nw Pp

arm (cPP-nPa) rr pri i i j r wii aRMM, wi rq rpr ipri m MIl nPa f mmr i p. Mwi, r rm rp pri ri i i ab s, wi im r ii pii prm, i rm i -ki r rm, iimii ri. I i mr pprpri rib r i rimi i. s girrz (1999, p.349).

19 tr r wri r i rido pr wm ir rm bi bj i. hwr,r rido ppr mi r (s dr ., 2007; unyPad, 2007).

20 Ir- ir- rib i r mim r, i m iip r mjrri i wi i i. Wi m rii i, i p i ri.

21 t fr aRMM rr w Zri c (19911993), w m rm pwr i Mi wi i aqi rm. t rr w liii Pmm (19931996), w mrm prmi i l sr wi pii i Rm rm.

22 di-vi gri (2000) pr rm nr Miri, mr 30 mmbr Mnl irrip ji aRMM ri rm i 1996. or Mnl r mmi mmbr cb

Mr Mimi sm r f.


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23 c bw rm rp MIl rb i a 2008 rr wi r r-r pi iirimi kii b b i. Rw fi rp wi r iji pr ii mmrm rm r mi (Iri crii grp, 23robr 2008, Policy Briefng, Jkr Br).

24 a riw ri miirizi ir q iii ppi i Mim Mi iib i 2005 undP rpr (P, hm sri, hm dpm i Piippi).

25 girrz di-vi, 1999; gim, 2006.

26 R, 2007.27 Rm m pri i mi f rii brkw bi ri wr

rii. s di-vi gri (2000).28 Wi ib prmi pbii i Mi, Rm rm w ii wii eaga

r im i- r wii aRMM, prrri prm i mjr rbr Mi.

29 d R abr, 2003.30 cmmi- i bw Mim crii p r ri 30-r rm

i lim, l nr bm fr pi i 2000 wr, aP i wi crii wi MIl Mim. Iriw wi M si, ei dirr Pkii I. (2007).

31 a i rido w ip wr priip r mmi- i, w b r mpii.

32 dr ., 2007.33 M, 2007.34 Iriw rp ii r i r ik bw pwr

rb r. t l (a-lm) ii ai dimpr, wr i b i wi m r Mnl i 70. t rp r m pwr i Mi l pri iif fi mri ppr MIl, prir ri rip MIl r him sm.

35 Miri w pp rm aRMM rip i 2001 b - grp 13 b dr. Prk hi,w bm aRMM rr. t grp 13 i mp k r Mnl w wr iifwi Miri rip. t hi- aRMM w bri pr k-r aRMM b pwr amp Mi.

36 nwbrk undP (2007) IRa diribi b Pri 2006, i dmr gr i PiippiPrj. Iriw wi sr amb, aRMM Jii Rrm aii Mr, usaId.

37 ni sii crii Br, gRP, 2008.38 trr, 2007, t ai i.39 Iriw wi ir bk fr (m) r mmri bk i Piippi i r

prii ri rr r Mi.40 t MIl ii p, Mr Iqb, iirimi kii iii i

Kmb, lim, Kw, pbi iii w b ir b MIl rmi rpibii b mm r MIl mmr umbr K Br.

41 am rp wr amp. t amp mi i impr pii r i MimMi. a amp i rmr rr Mi, wi i Z amp w r i2008 rr aRMM. s Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 a 2008 14 Mr 2007.

42 See Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 M 2007.43 Iriw wi rki fi dprm arri Rrm (daR) (m) i Mi r

r pwr i Mi wr ir i m r r (vos) ri--w ri. t irrrii, im, r r w l Bk Piippi(lBP) ifi p pm vos im.

44 cri ri r a 2008 k rpr ir i rm r bw prmiirmiii MIl m prir m Moa-ad.

45 l fi w wr ri pp Moa-ad i vi-grr M Pi (cb) Mrc lbr (Zmb ci).

46 rp ii ii pi ir m rir Mim wr i piii pri k i bki Moa-ad.47 lr, 2007.48 gaM r r a Rri a (KPa) m ir (Jakarta Post, 6 Mr 2009).49 rmr gaM Irwi w i 2005 rr a.50 sr, 2000; Brm, 1998.51 Iri miri rp rpr r i i i ppr i i i 2009.

sr Pri a i b w, wi i rm r i pri i a b r iimi. The Associated Press, 13 brr 2009; Wr Bk, J-a 2008.

52 lr, 2008, 2009.53 si r i pm mi r bw B a M bi ir

bi i a (Wr Bk, 2006).54 lr Mr, 1990.


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