RADCON TECHNICIAN TRAINING

1

RADCON

TECHNICIAN TRAINING

Welcome-You may click the left mouse button or use the Enter key to advance.

HPT001.113 2

Foreign

Material

Exclusion

Computer Based Training

HPT001.113 3

About This Course

You may use the “P” key to go to the previous screen.

HPT001.113 4

This Computer Based learning activity has been developed from the material in the lesson plan on Foreign Material Exclusion (HPT001.113).

About This Course

Revision Prepared by: Brian Fike 02/13/2004

Plant Concurrence BFN Brad Mitchell

Plant Concurrence BFN

Plant Concurrence BFN

TVAN Corporate Concurrence

HPT001.113 5

Foreign Material Exclusion OBJECTIVES

Terminal Objective:– Upon completion of this lesson the student will

demonstrate satisfactory knowledge of the TVAN Foreign Material Control Program by scoring at least 80% on an examination. SPP-6.5 is allowed as reference material for the exam.

HPT001.113 6

Foreign Material Exclusion OBJECTIVES

The examination for this CBT will be provided on the computer.

A proctor must allow you access to the examination.

The software will score each question as you answer it.

HPT001.113 7

Foreign Material Exclusion

OBJECTIVES Enabling Objectives

1. Define terms outlined in the FME procedure and this course.2. State the purpose of Foreign Material Exclusion.3. Identify responsibilities of various personnel for work preparation

through job closure to include recovery from loss of FME controls.4. Identify the most common causes of Foreign Material Intrusion

(FMI).5. Identify potential radiological hazards and other concerns resulting from FMI or loss of FME controls6. Identify FME requirements for special activities and specific areas.7. Identify points from industry events concerning FME, including

SOER 95-1.8. Correlate error prevention tools used to prevent foreign material

intrusion.

HPT001.113 8

Foreign Material Exclusion REFERENCES

A. SPP-6.5, Foreign Material Control, Revision 7, effective date 07/11/2003.

B. HPT001.113, Foreign Material Exclusion, RADCON Technician Training Program, Revision 0.

C. INPO SOER 95-1, Reducing Events Resulting from Foreign Material Intrusion.

D. BFN PERs

E. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-390/97-11

HPT001.113 9

Foreign Material Exclusion Training Materials and Aids

Access and/or print the following documents you will need for the course by clicking on the icon:

SPP 6.5, “Foreign Material Control, latest revision.

Student NotebookMicrosoft Word

Document

Microsoft Word

Document

HPT001.113 10


Introduction

Foreign material introduced into plant systems can cause equipment degradation, inoperability of components, or even fuel damage which may lead to higher radiation and contamination levels.

HPT001.113 11


Introduction

Intrusion of foreign material into primary systems can also create activated products which cause more radiation dose to personnel.

TVAN has had its share of FME events. Just a few are included

here.

HPT001.113 13


Introduction - BFN Events

– 1998 - A hose was floating in the Unit 3 spent fuel storage pool. The hose broke and part fell to the bottom of the pool.

– 1998 - Foreign material was found in steam trap 2-TRP-073-005 at BFN and appeared to be welding slag and grinding dust. The trap had been replaced during U2C9 outage.

HPT001.113 14


Introduction - BFN Events

– 1997 - Clear cellophane wrap was used to support RADCON activities on the refuel floor. This is contrary to FME control requirements.

– 1995 - Plastic type material was wrapped around the lower suction portion of the BFN 3A core spray pump impeller.

HPT001.113 15


Introduction

Significant industry events continue to occur due to inadequate control of Foreign Material.

INPO SOER 95-1 provides insights into the most prevalent causes of foreign material intrusion events and identifies some effective industry practices for preventing foreign material intrusion.

HPT001.113 16


Introduction

Several other events and SOER 95-1 concerning foreign material intrusion will be reviewed later in this course.

HPT001.113 17


Introduction

For these reasons, nuclear plants have a Foreign Material Control program in place.

FME Control Program

HPT001.113 18


Introduction

SPP 6.5, Foreign Material Controls, provides requirements for maintaining nuclear plant cleanliness by preventing the uncontrolled introduction of foreign material such as maintenance residue, dirt, debris, or tools into open systems or components, and recovery from intrusion of foreign material.

HPT001.113 19


SPP-6.5, Foreign Material Control, emphasizes an attitude of

“focus on prevention” .

HPT001.113 20


Introduction In addition to programs and

procedural direction, our work practices and habits have a great impact on the end result of all that we do.

The success of TVAN’s FMI Program depends on YOU!

HPT001.113 21


Procedure

SPP 6.5 requirements apply to all maintenance, modification, operations and testing activities which involve open systems or components.

HPT001.113 22


Procedure The methods used to

control foreign materials within areas will depend on the configuration and safety significance of the system, the activity being performed, and the probability of foreign material intrusion.

FMEControls

Procedure Adherence is an error prevention tool!!!

HPT001.113 23


Procedure

Several activities such as valve packing and pump repacking are NOT considered as opening of a component or system.

Also, some activities are exempt from the FME requirements under certain conditions.

Review SPP 6.5, Section 2.0 for more examples of the above.

HPT001.113 24

Foreign Material Exclusion TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The following definitions from SPP 6.5 are important and are found in Section 5.0

HPT001.113 25


Foreign Material Exclusion - Preventing the inadvertent introduction of foreign material, such as dirt, debris, maintenance residue, tools and equipment into open plant systems or components.

HPT001.113 26


FME Area - A work area where specific controls are implemented to prevent the introduction of foreign material into systems or components during the performance of maintenance, modifications, test or inspection activities.

HPT001.113 27


Maintenance Residue - Any by-product of a maintenance activity, such as chemical deposits from solvents, particles and filings from cutting, grinding or lapping dust, wood chips from scaffolding, tape adhesive, and welding or soldering residue.

HPT001.113 28


Source Term - The quantity of radioactive materials (corrosion products and fission products) contained in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

HPT001.113 29


Fail-Safe - Describes an item which is too large to fit through the sensitive openings in systems, components, or equipment.

HPT001.113 30


Fail Safe (cont.) - Component parts of the item must be secured to prevent loss and the item must be easily retrieved from the system or component.

HPT001.113 31


Fail Safe (cont.) - During refueling activities, in the area of open pools of water, an item may be considered fail-safe if the configuration of the item makes it readily retrievable, even though it is small enough to fit through available system openings.

HPT001.113 32


Qualified FME Monitor (FMEM) - A person who has had training concerning FME procedures and controls, duties of FMEM, and actions to be taken should loss or suspected loss of FME control occur.

HPT001.113 33


The FMEM must be knowledgeable of

– FME requirements,

– use of accountability logs,

– their responsibility to remain at or near the entrance to FME control area,

– the logging in and out of items and/or personnel,

– and verification (accountability) for all items before closure or removal of boundaries/barriers.

HPT001.113 34


FME Accountability Log - A chronological listing used to account for items and personnel that enter and exit FMEAs.

HPT001.113 35


Temporary Cover - A method to cover and protect a system or component from the introduction of foreign material when the system or component is left unattended.

SPP 6.5 has several specific requirements for temporary covers.

HPT001.113 36


Lanyard - A line, rope or cord used to secure or restrict an object from movement or loss. Lanyards should be made of nylon or corrosion resistant steel wire. The shortest length should be such that it minimizes dropping distance and limits the object from hitting and damaging surrounding equipment.

In no case shall a personnel hazard be caused to exist by the use of lanyards!

HPT001.113 37


Non-fail-Safe - Describes an item which could be introduced into sensitive openings of systems or components.

HPT001.113 38


Non-fail-Safe (cont.)- This introduction could occur by the item itself falling into or part of the item falling into the openings.

Can you think of a Non-fail-safe item where part of the item could fall into openings???

HPT001.113 39


For example: a lens holder comes off a flashlight, allowing batteries, lens and holder to fall into an open system or component.

This type of item is considered nonfail-safe, and shall require additional methods, such as lanyards, taping, and bagging to prevent loss.

HPT001.113 40

Foreign Material ExclusionWork Steps

Work Planning Work Preparation Work Performance

HPT001.113 41

Work Planning

HPT001.113 42

Foreign Material Exclusion Work Planning

A FME evaluation for controls should be performed whenever a system or component is to be opened. This evaluation is typically performed by the work planner.

For standard, recurrent activities in which FME is required, a mandatory FME list and standing instructions concerning FME controls (requirements) should be developed.

An example is SPP 6.5, Appendix F, BFN Spent Fuel Pool, Vessel Cavity, and Equipment Pit - Level 3

Appendices B - G contain other BFN requirements.

HPT001.113 43

More stringent FME requirements may be mandated for any work activity than is listed in the Appendices of the SPP.– Especially important for work on valves which

have stellite hard-facings and where particles could come in contact with reactor coolant.


HPT001.113 44

Less stringent controls must be approved by the FME Program Coordinator or designee.


HPT001.113 45

Work Preparation

HPT001.113 46

Foreign Material Exclusion Work Preparation

Work Supervisor Responsibilities:– Brief the work crew(s)

– Assign qualified FME monitor

– Define FME area boundaries to be established

Worker Responsibilities:– Establish boundaries and markers

– Remove nonessential material from the FMEA/adjacent areas

– Clean the FMEA (including overhead and components) of dirt and debris

– Erect a clean enclosure or barrier around the FMEA

– Make all items fail-safe

– Remove unsecured personal items (jewelry, wallet, coins, etc.)

HPT001.113 47


FME areas must be bounded and marked.

STOPDO NOT REMOVE

WITHOUT AUTHORIZATIONOF

Work Supervisor

Phone #

HPT001.113 48


The STOP sign and these FMEA boundary postings (or similar ones) are used.

FOREIGN MATERIALEXCLUSION AREA

AUTHORIZED PERSONNELONLY

FOREIGN MATERIALEXCLUSION AREA

AUTHORIZED PERSONNELONLY

FME MONITOR APPROVALREQUIRED

BEFORE ENTRY

HPT001.113 49


FME Monitor Responsibilities

– Perform and document an initial inventory of all non-permanent items that are not fail-safe within the FMEA using an approved FME Accountability Log.

– Concurrence must be obtained from the job supervisor.

FMEMonitor

HPT001.113 50

Work Performance

HPT001.113 51

Foreign Material Exclusion Work Performance

Work Supervisor Responsibilities– Ensure work preparation steps are complete

– Authorize system or component opening

– Monitor work area

– Ensure logs are reconciled and approved

– Ensure FMEA cleanliness

– Designate an individual to witness closure of the system

HPT001.113 52


FME Monitor Responsibilities– Maintain required access controls to FMEA

and records for material accountability

– Ensure personnel understand requirements and comply with FME controls

SPP 6.5, Sections 3.3.5, and 3.3.6, contain many more specific requirements for both the above responsibilities.

HPT001.113 53


Some examples are:– Log all missing items or parts from tools and

equipment entering the FMEA. Video taping or photographing items is an option.

– Log all tools, equipment, and material that enter and exit the FMEA

– Inspect tools, etc., exiting the FMEA for missing parts that might have been lost in the FMEA.

HPT001.113 54


Control of Materials Entering FMEAs– Tape shall be placed over all pocket openings

containing items/material.– Pens and pencils shall be attached to a lanyard.

HPT001.113 55

Foreign Material Exclusion Work Performance Control of Materials Entering FMEAs

(cont.)– Loose objects such as badges and dosimetry

shall be worn under protective clothing or placed in a pocket and taped, even if attached to a lanyard.

– Electronic dosimeters are considered secured if placed inside the pocket with the retaining clip over the pocket and taped.

HPT001.113 56

Foreign Material Exclusion Work Performance Control of Materials Entering FMEAs (cont.)

– Items of jewelry, such as earrings, wrist watches, rings and necklaces shall be removed or placed in taped pockets. However, rings which cannot be removed, and rings and watches covered by gloves shall be considered fail-safe.

– Eyeglasses shall be fastened to the wearer with tape, nylon cord, or eyeglass retainer straps

HPT001.113 57


Worker Responsibilities– Examine all items before entry and before

removal to identify and correct any loose or missing parts

– Use good work practices to minimize maintenance residue generated during the activity.

– Ensure parts/particles, especially valve stellite hard-facing, are removed before closure.

HPT001.113 58

Foreign Material Exclusion Work Performance Examples of Good Work Practices

– Ensure that the external surface of the component to be worked is free of foreign material that could enter the system when opened.

– Inspect and clean the work area if required before starting work including the area above the work area and ensure no loose items exist which could fall in the system while open. Remove or secure items that could fall in the system.

– Clean any new components or parts of protective coating or dirt before installation.

– Use only approved chemicals.

– Ensure all tools or components entering the FMEA that have loose or missing parts are identified on the accountability log.

HPT001.113 59


Examples of Good Work Practices (cont.)– Visually inspect system internals for foreign material immediately

after opening. If foreign material is found, notify job supervisor and FMEM if applicable.

– As work progresses, inspect system internals that will be inaccessible after further assembly.

– Ensure system cleanliness before final closure.

– Be responsible for items taken into FME areas, ensuring items being carried in are logged in and out on exit when required.

– Clean up as work progresses, rather than rely on large clean-up when the work is completed.

HPT001.113 60


FME areas are classified as:Level 1 - FME General Housekeeping

Level 2 - Systems/Components in which the opening is small, or all areas can be visually inspected and foreign material removed.

Level 3 - Systems/Components in which all areas cannot be visually inspected and foreign material removed.

HPT001.113 61


SPP 6.5, Appendices contain requirements for specific activities for Levels 1, 2, and 3 and are listed by system for BFN and PWRs.

Appendix G gives guidance for BFN Refuel Floor FME controls.

Appendix H gives requirements for BFN Torus and Drywell activities.

HPT001.113 62


Appendix I gives guidance at PWRs, Reactor Equipment Pit with Head in Place.

Appendix J gives guidance at PWRs, around Spent Fuel Pit, Cask Loading Area, Transfer Canal and Refueling Cavities when flooded.

Appendix K gives guidance at PWRs, Control of Loose Debris in Ice Condenser, Modes 5, 6 and No Mode.

HPT001.113 63

Foreign Material Exclusion Suspension of the Job

Often plant conditions change which requires work within a FMEA to be suspended. If work in a FMEA is stopped during a shift, between shifts, or for a period of time certain actions are required.

HPT001.113 64


If work on a job will be interrupted for normal breaks, meals, shift turnovers, or work related activities, the Lead Work Performer or Job Supervisor shall ensure the following conditions are met:– Work location must be secured with appropriate

temporary covers, plugs, or other barriers.

– To extent practical, unneeded tools, equipment, supplies, material, and debris are removed and general housekeeping requirements are met.

HPT001.113 65


The Job Supervisor may relax the FME requirements when work is interrupted for longer than one shift, provided the following conditions are met:

HPT001.113 66


Ensure all personnel are out of the area. A “Stop” sign should be posted at the entrance to require

all individuals who enter the area to contact the job supervisor before entering the area. FME boundaries may be removed if “Stop” signs are placed on the temporary covers.

When FME boundaries remain ensure temporary signs are maintained to clearly identify the FME area and the responsible supervisor to be contacted for entry into the area.

HPT001.113 67


Temporary plugs, covers or seals should be substantial and compatible with the application. Examples:

metal or plastic disks. pipe plugs, blind flanges, heavy gasket material herculite

Covers should be fire resistant or fire retardant to the extent possible.

HPT001.113 68


Paper products or rags inserted into openings are unacceptable for use as temporary plugs or covers.

HPT001.113 69


Recovering from Loss of FME Controls - Worker Responsibilities:

If a known or suspected instance of entry of foreign material into an open system or component should occur, the worker(s) shall immediately take action.

HPT001.113 70



work

Notify:

FME monitor Job supervisorShift Manager or RFF

Senior Reactor Operator as appropriate.

HPT001.113 71



If an item can not be accounted for on the inventory log, the worker shall notify his job supervisor.

HPT001.113 72



If the material can be easily retrieved (without further disassembly of the system or component) then the retrieval may be performed and documented on existing work initiating document.

CautionRadioactive

Material

HPT001.113 73


Recovering from Loss of FME Controls

Caution Radioactive Material!

Do not remove foreign material without first having the material surveyed by RADCON!

Unplanned radiation dose events have occurred because workers handled foreign material that was highly radioactive.

HPT001.113 74


Recovering from Loss of FME Controls - Work Supervisor Responsibilities

If the missing items cannot be accounted for, the job supervisor shall determine if work should be stopped and the item retrieved or if the search and retrieval will be performed just before closure.

HPT001.113 75


Recovering from Loss of FME Controls - Supervisor Responsibilities

A PER will be initiated for items which cannot be retrieved immediately.

Safety and technical evaluations will be performed as appropriate.

10 CFR 50.59

Problem Evaluation Report(PER)

HPT001.113 76


Completing Job Closeout

Before a system opening is closed:– All PERs identifying FME must be evaluated– The system determined acceptable for closure– Closeout inspection performed and documented– Any FME concerns resolved, documented on PER– Workers remove all materials, debris, tools, and

equipment.– Initiate corrective actions for inadequate FME controls– Provide feedback to work planner on problems or good

practices

HPT001.113 77


Training Requirements

General and specific training shall be conducted for:– All personnel with access to plant work areas for a

general knowledge of FME.

– Engineers, supervisors, technicians, operators, planners.

– FME monitors, foremen, craftsmen, contractors.

– A list of qualified FME monitors will be maintained by Site Training.

HPT001.113 78


Periodic Assessment The Site FME

Coordinator should periodically perform an assessment of how well the FME program is working. This would involve review

of such items as work documents and PERs concerning loss of/or suspected loss of FME controls.

HPT001.113 79


Periodic Assessment

1stQtr

2ndQtr

3rdQtr

4thQtr

0

20

40

60

80

100

1stQtr

2ndQtr

3rdQtr

4thQtr

Trends will be reviewed and any corrective measures should be implemented.

HPT001.113 80


Common Causes of FMI ****Identified by INPO****

Insufficiently established and communicated management expectations for the implementation of FME controls.

Limited supervisory emphasis on FME considerations and practices during pre-job briefings and monitoring of work.

Insufficient training for workers in basic FME practices and a lack of specific training for work activities involving specialized activities of key plant systems.

HPT001.113 81


INPO Recommendations

Provide clearly established management expectations for foreign material exclusion controls and practices.

Verify the work control process reinforces FME controls.

Ensure initial, continuing and job-specific training programs provide the knowledge and skills needed to implement effective FME practices.

HPT001.113 82


SOER 95-01

On August 29, 1994, at Pilgrim, a main generator fault caused a load rejection that resulted in a reactor scram from 100 % power. The fault resulted from overheating of stator bar insulation. The overheating has been attributed to foreign material restricting flow of the stator cooling water outlet header. Imprints in one piece of the gasket material indicate that the material may have covered as much as 80 % of the outlet flow area from the most severely damaged stator bar.

The unit was shutdown for 14 weeks.

HPT001.113 83


SOER 95-01

At Biblis A, 1994, during preparations for plant restart following a refueling outage, a fire occurred in the motor of a reactor coolant pump as a result of a short circuit in the motor windings. When the motor was inspected, a chisel, left in the motor during a previous motor inspection, was found to have caused the short circuit.

Plant restart was delayed for approximately one month.

HPT001.113 84


SOER 95-01 Robinson 2

– On October 10, 1992, parts from a refueling tool came loose and lodged in the control rod guide tube of a fuel bundle. The next day, contractors who performed the work noticed parts were missing, but they did not report this to their supervisor or to station personnel. 18 hours later, the contract personnel informed their supervisor that the missing parts were at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. Their supervisor thought this was of limited significance and did not report it to station personnel. One hour later, a control rod would not fully insert into a fuel bundle, station personnel were informed that missing tool parts might be the cause. Visual inspection of the control rod revealed one of the missing parts stuck to the end of the control rod. The other parts remained in the guide tube of the affected fuel bundle.

HPT001.113 85


SOER 95-01

Milhama 1, 1993 - A turbine overspeed trip test was performed on the main turbine. During this test which followed a refueling outage, bearing lube oil pressure was 14 psig instead of the normal 24 psig at rated turbine speed. The reactor was shut down and investigation revealed that the bearing oil pump ejector nozzle was found clogged with paper towels that had been used to wipe the main oil pump flanges.

The plant was off-line for an additional 6 days.

HPT001.113 86


SOER 95-01

Perry 1, 1992/93 - During a refueling outage debris was found on the suppression pool floor and on the suction strainers for 2 RHR pumps. The strainers were replaced in a future outage due to deformation from excessive differential pressure caused by debris on the strainers.

Additionally, filter media for 3 large air filters in the drywell air coolers, used to provide filtered air in the drywell during plant outages, was determined to be the source of fibrous material found coating the suction strainer during another outage.

HPT001.113 87


SOER 95-01 Dresden 3, 1993 - A reactor scram occurred due to flow

restriction in the high-pressure section of the main turbine. A bolt, slugging wrench, and key stack that fit together to form a tool had been left in the main steam piping during a previous outage.

These parts caused extensive damage to the first-stage turbine rotor and stationary diaphragm blades. The blading deformation partially blocked the steam flow.

A two-month forced outage was required to repair the HP turbine.

HPT001.113 88


SOER 95-01

Hatch 2, 1992 - Fuel sipping identified failed fuel bundles. Inspection revealed debris in 102 of the bundles. Some of the bundles were damaged from ferrous metal chips from machining activities performed on primary system piping during the previous refueling outage.

HPT001.113 89


SOER 95-01

Point Beach 2, 1992 - A foam rubber plug was found blocking a containment spray pump. The plug had been installed in the piping for cleanliness control during modification work that installed full flow test lines in the containment spray, RHR, and safety injection systems during a previous outage.

HPT001.113 90


SOER 95-1

Many of these events caused delays in restart of a unit, or forced outages to repair damage to the plant.

HPT001.113 91


WBN Event NRC Inspection Report No. 50-390/97-11 On September 20-21, 1997, with the reactor defueled, a

rad-worker noted four, small foreign objects lying on the reactor vessel flange. Because of his concern for FME (Error Precursor – “Can-do” attitude), the rad-worker placed three pieces of the material in a plastic bag without having the appropriate radiation survey conducted and subsequently removed the bag from the reactor vessel cavity area.

HPT001.113 92


WBN Event NRC Inspection Report No. 50-390/97-11 (cont’d)

One piece of foreign material was later determined to have a contact reading of 56 Rem/hour.

Calculations indicate that the worker received 3.645 Rem to his hand or about 7% of the NRC annual extremity limit of 50 Rem.

HPT001.113 93


OE 9543 While preparing to install a new Low Pressure Stop Valve

on the 2B Reactor Feed Pump, workers disassembled a NEW valve to inspect for foreign material and found a handfull of metal shavings and grease inside the valve near the plug and seat area.

This foreign material was not visible prior to disassembly of the valve. The workers removed all foreign material from the valve and then installed the valve successfully.

If the workers had not removed this foreign material, it could have been introduced into primary plant systems resulting in possible fuel and component damage.

HPT001.113 94


OE 9543

The root cause of this incident is:– Less than adequate foreign material intrusion

controls by the equipment supplier. – The equipment supplier has since instituted

final inspection requirements to prevent a future incident of this type.

HPT001.113 95

SUMMARY During past years, foreign material intrusion events have

occurred with an increasing frequency resulting in the following:– nuclear fuel cladding damage

– major equipment damage

– heat transfer capability degradation

– increased radiation levels

– increased presence of discrete radioactive particles

– increased radwaste generation

– system flow characteristics degradation

– unscheduled plant outages and outage extensions

HPT001.113 96

Summary

All employees must maintain an awareness

of Foreign Material Exclusion during maintenance activities and especially during an outage.

TVAN

HPT001.113 97

Examination Instructions-

Your examination must be proctored. You may review the course as much as you

wish before taking the test.

HPT001.113 98

Exam Ground Rules

No communication, except between student and proctor. No reference material other than SPP-6.5 is permitted during testing.

All answers given are to be your own, and you are not to receive assistance on the exam, nor are you to provide assistance to another student on the exam.

Violations of exam integrity will result in disciplinary action. By entering the exam and requesting a proctor code, you are

attesting that you understand and will comply with the exam rules.

HPT001.113 99

FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION

We need your feedback on this course. Please obtain a feedback form, complete, and mail it to Brian Fike, BFT 2A, BFN.

Thank you!

HPT001.113 100

FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION

You may press escape to go back to the main menu to take the test.

Documents

RADCON TECHNICIAN TRAINING