Racism and Nationalism in the Creation of Costa Rica's Pacific Coast Banana EnclaveAuthor(s): Ronald N. HarpelleSource: The Americas, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Jan., 2000), pp. 29-51Published by: Academy of American Franciscan HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1007587Accessed: 07/11/2010 00:45

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The Americas 56:3 January 2000, 29-51 Copyright by the Academy of American Franciscan History

RACISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE CREATION OF COSTA RICA'S PACIFIC COAST BANANA ENCLAVE

he creation of the new banana enclave on Costa Rica's Pacific coast in the 1920s marks a significant watershed in the social and political history of race relations in the country. The culminating event in what

was a lengthy battle over the composition of the workforce on the new plan- tations was the signing of the 1934 banana contract between the government of Costa Rica and the United Fruit Company. In addition to allowing for the continued growth of the industry in Costa Rica, the agreement took aim at the West Indian immigrant by prohibiting "people of colour" from working for United Fruit on the Pacific coast. Subsequent to the agreement, the state made a conscious effort to force the integration of the West Indian commu- nity. The government closed English schools, pushed farmers off their land, and deported West Indians in order to purge the province of Lim6n of people who were not citizens, but who belonged to a well-established immigrant community. As a result, resident West Indians were forced to re-examine their relationship with the country and they engaged in a protracted struggle to overcome heightened levels of discrimination.'

The 1934 contract marked a new phase in the relationship between Costa Ricans and the West Indian immigrant community. After independence, Costa Rican nationalism developed around the idea of the homogeneity of the country's population. By the time that the West Indians began to arrive in the country at the end of the nineteenth century, most Costa Ricans saw themselves as a racially pure society who were the direct descendants of poor "white" Spanish immigrants. As a consequence of the development of what Benedict Anderson has called an "imagined community," West Indian immigrants, Asians, and even local aboriginal groups were tolerated, but

1 For a discussion of the choices that people made refer to Ronald Harpelle, "The Social and Polit- ical Integration of West Indians in Costa Rica: 1930-1950," Journal of Latin American History, Vol. 25, Part 1, 1993.

29

30 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

not accepted in Costa Rican society.2 Costa Ricans identified the Central Valley region as "the real Costa Rica."3 In the minds of the majority, authentic Costa Ricans were "white," spoke Spanish, and they were Roman Catholics.

However, Costa Ricans were not alone in their ability to overlook differ- ences in order to forge the notion of a common identity. The West Indians also thought of themselves as a uniform community even though their mem- bers came from all across the Caribbean and along the entire coast of Cen- tral America. Most could be described as English-speaking, Protestant and of African descent, but many did not readily identify with the community despite sharing some of its major attributes. In addition to the divisions of class, gender and religion inherent to any community, there was also a ques- tion of identity with the Caribbean itself. For example, hundreds of people of African descent arrived in Lim6n from Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Most of these people were the descendants of slaves brought to the mainland by the Spanish and they saw themselves as being Central Ameri- can. Also, in the 1927 population census hundreds of people indicated that their nationality was English or British rather than Jamaican or some other Caribbean identity. However, the most significant contradiction that existed in the imagined West Indian community was the presence of thousands of children who had been born in Costa Rica. These Costa Rican-born individ- uals were the natural fallout of half a century of immigration and settlement in Lim6n, and they fell somewhere between the dominant Hispanic com- munity and that of their parents.

The West Indian community originated in the 1870s when labour was imported to build a railroad from the Atlantic coast to San Jos6. After the completion of the railroad in 1890, many of West Indians remained in the country where they were joined by thousands of others who sought opportu- nities on the banana plantations that developed in the region. The Costa Rican government allowed West Indian immigration to continue because the Atlantic coast region was considered too unhealthy for people of European descent. A more realistic view is that the banana industry tended to pay better wages than other agricultural industry and coffee producers in the highlands supported the importation of labour from the Caribbean region so that the existing pool of Costa Rican peasant labourers would remain within their

2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Press, 1983). See Chapter 8, "Patriotism and Racism," for a discussion that is particu- larly relevant to the case of Costa Rican nationalism.

3 John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, in Costa Rican Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 3.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 31

grasp. By 1920, West Indians, numbering perhaps 17,000 individuals, had become the largest visible minority group in the country.

Costa Rican governments encouraged banana production as a means of rapid economic development and as an effort to establish firm control over an isolated part of the country. As a result, a banana enclave developed in the Province of Lim6n where the limit of Costa Rica's political jurisdiction was a issue of contention with both Panama and Nicaragua. The region was opened for effective political control and investment by Minor Cooper Keith, one of the founders of the United Fruit Company and the contractor who fin- ished the railroad to the Atlantic. The entrepreneur arrived in Costa Rica in the 1870s and began developing banana plantations along the completed sec- tions of the railway. Keith's Tropical Trading Company merged with Pre- ston's Boston Fruit company in 1899 to form the United Fruit Company. By the time of the merger, Keith was the owner of the railway, had married into a prominent family and he controlled a massive plantation complex that pro- duced several million stems of bananas for export on an annual basis. As banana exports from Costa Rica and neighbouring countries increased during the first decade of the twentieth century, so did labour requirements.

The same political atmosphere that allowed for the creation of a foreign- controlled banana industry in Costa Rica also generated the conditions that gave rise to a new urban middle class. In 1870, Tomis Guardia rose to power, overthrew the old governing aristocracy, confiscated their property, and promulgated a new constitution. His liberal administration established the power base for a new modernizing coffee bourgeoisie. This group, often referred to as the "generation of 88," was the product of the development of the coffee industry in the nineteenth century. Coffee was a new commodity that generated significant profits and led to the evolution of Liberal political and economic doctrines.4 The emergence of coffee as a lucrative export ori- ented industry also encouraged the growth of a new middle class of business leaders, lawyers and other professionals who eventually came to challenge the modernizing el1ite for power.5

One of the main concerns of the new middle class was the monopoly that United Fruit exercised over banana production in Costa Rica. The company obtained some 800,000 acres of land, or almost the entire province of Lim6n. It controlled labour, communications, commerce and every other aspect of life in the Atlantic region. It was impossible for individual planters

4 Samuel Stone, La Dinastia de los Conquistadores (San Jose: Costa Rica, 1975), pp. 266-269. 5 For a discussion of the formation of the modernizing bourgeoisie see Anthony Winson, Coffee and

Democracy in Modern Costa Rica (Toronto, 1989), pp. 23-27.

32 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

or other companies to compete with United Fruit for land, labour and mar- kets. The new middle class was anxious to challenge the existing political el1ite for power and saw United Fruit as an expression of the ineptitude of the "generation of 88." In the eyes of the critics, the fruit company was cheat- ing the national treasury and holding back the country's development. Costa Ricans, they argued, should control their own national resources. The province of Lim6n, existing in the shadow of the United Fruit Company and its West Indian workforce, was a case in point.

The problem for nationalists was that previous governments entered into contractual agreements that limited the action that could be taken against the company. In 1881 Costa Rica signed a contract with Minor Cooper Keith to build a railway line between San Jose and the port of Lim6n. The Soto-Keith agreement gave a vast amount of land to the railway builder and exempted his company from paying export taxes for a period of 99 years. Attempts were made in the 1890s to impose some sort of tax on banana exports, but Keith's special relationship with the ruling 61ite kept his critics at bay.6 In 1899 all existing agreements came into question when Keith's Tropical Trading Company amalgamated with the Boston Fruit Company to form the United Fruit Company. Given the new arrangement the government passed a decree in 1900 that established a timetable for the signing of a new agree- ment. As a result, in 1910, the government and the United Fruit Company signed a contract that imposed a tax of one cent U.S. per stem exported from the country. The contract was in effect for 20 years at which time negotia- tions would take place again.

The ratification of the 1910 contract came just before production levels of bananas peaked and before the industry began a protracted period of decline. By 1900 over three million stems of bananas were exported annually. Exports reached their highest point in 1913 when Costa Rica became the world's leading producer of bananas with a total of 11,117,833 stems. After 1913, exports of bananas from Lim6n declined quickly and by 1917 they had stabilized at about 8,000,000 stems per year. Banana production remained more or less constant between 1918 and 1929 but the onset of the global economic crisis in 1929 lowered export levels again. In 1930, pro- duction began to decline to the levels of the turn of the century and in 1943, because of the combined effects of plant disease and World War Two, no banana ships called at port of Lim6n. Exports from Lim6n did resume after 1943, but they remained at nineteenth-century levels until the 1950s when

6 Keith had married into a powerful Costa Rican family and therefore enjoyed the privileges of the ruling 61ite.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 33

solutions to the problem of plant disease were found.7

During the industry's decline, labour and small private planters found themselves at the mercy of United Fruit. Workers were forced to accept reductions in real wages, higher levels of unemployment and fewer oppor- tunities. Private planters fared no better because United Fruit could arbitrar- ily refuse export quality bananas from independent producers in favour of its own fruit. There were also several problems with the contracts that bound producers to the company and many were dissatisfied with the treatment they received. The result was heightened tension between the company and the people whose labour and efforts produced bananas for export.

By the mid-1920s, as the expiration date of the 1910 contract neared and banana production stagnated, the company's critics began to organize their opposition and a protracted public debate ensued. As usual, the company enjoyed the favour of the presidential administration, but by the late 1920s a powerful coalition of opposition forces had emerged. The most prominent of these was the "Liga Civica de Costa Rica," a group founded in 1927 as a "movement in defence of the nation," which translated into the defence of the economic interests of the new middle class.8

According to U.S. State Department documents, the original founders of the organization were linked to the Cooperativa Bananera Costarricense which was described as a "pseudo-patriotic agency" established to support the Cuyamel Fruit Company in a "banana war against the United."9 Cuyamel was interested in breaking United Fruit's monopoly in Costa Rica and the Honduras-based company approached independent producers with an offer to buy their bananas if they succeeded in pressuring the Costa Rican gov- ernment to open up the business for competition. The Liga Civica surfaced in July 1927 at a time when the integrity of Cooperativa came into question after its links with the Cuyamel Fruit were exposed in the San Jose press.'0 The newspaper reports revealed corporate espionage and the fact that Cuyamel did not really intend to invest in Costa Rica. The Diario de Costa Rica revealed that Cuyamel Fruit Company was really only interested in causing problems for United Fruit in Costa Rica and elsewhere in order to weaken its most significant business rival in Honduras. As a result of the

7 Government of Costa Rica, Anuario Estadistico, corresponding years. 8 The Liga Civica de Costa Rica was a precursor to the Centre for the Study of National Problems

which rose to prominence in the 1940s. 9 United States State Department, Lansing & Woolsey to The Secretary of State, 19 October 1928,

818.43. 10 Diario de Costa Rica, 15 July 1928.

34 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

ensuing scandal over the Cooperativa Bananera, the Liga Civica was founded to give the appearance of a more spontaneous patriotic concern for United Fruit's role in the Costa Rican economy. Under the direction of Luis Melara, a Cuyamel Fruit Company attorney sent to Costa Rica to "make all the trouble he possibly could," the Liga Civica became the new means to fight United Fruit."

Luis Melara allied himself with the existing array of government oppo- nents and framed the struggle in a nationalistic terms. The constitution of the Liga Civica stated that one of the main purposes of the organization was to "preserve and strengthen Costa Rican nationality by all possible means.'"12 The group's most prominent members were considered to be radicals by U.S. authorities because of their attacks on foreign companies, managers and business practices. The Liga Civica was also influenced by the Aprista Movement, an anti-imperialist ideological force that was sweeping across Latin America at the time. Consequently, the Liga Civica adopted much of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americanca's .rhetoric and applied it to United Fruit.' In addition to being anti-American, the Liga Civica was also known as the "Costa Rican Ku Klux Klan."'4 Not surprisingly, the Liga Civica was also adamantly anti-West Indian.

In the Costa Rican Congress, the Liga Civica was linked to the government's political opponents who were known as the "Echandistas" and were the fol- lowers of Don Alberto Echandi who was an unsuccessful candidate for the presidency of the Republic in 1924. Since Echandi was not a member of Con- gress at the time, the Congressional leadership fell to Alejandro Alvarado Quiros, whose family members included Carlos Collado Quiros, Secretary of the Cooperative Bananera and Jos6 Joaquin Quiros, Secretary of the Liga Civica. As a result of these family ties, the Liga Civica had sufficient clout in Congress to cause both the government and the United Fruit Company concern.

In response to the rising tide of protest that was focused on United Fruit, President Ricardo Jim6nez initiated a new round of negotiations long before the expiration date of the contract. At the time, Jim6nez was serving his second term in office. During his first term he oversaw the signing of the 1910 contract with United Fruit. On November 2, 1926 the Jim6nez govern-

11 United States State Department, 818.6156/37. 12 United States State Department, R. M. de Lambert to The Secretary of State, 21 August 1928,

818.43. 13 APRA was founded in 1924 by Peruvian Victor Raul Haya de La Torre while in exile in Mexico

in 1924 and was influenced by the Mexican Revolution. 14 United States State Department, R. M. de Lambert to The Secretary of State, 21 August 1928,

818.43.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 35

ment presented Congress with a contract that was typical of his administra- tion. It allowed for the further expansion of banana plantations to new regions of Lim6n in exchange for modest increase in taxation on banana exports.

United Fruit was interested in the early re-negotiation of the 1910 con- tract because production was declining and only access to new land in a remote region could save the industry in Costa Rica. While soil exhaustion limited the life span of a plantation to a maximum of 25 years, the chief cause of concern for the company was the spread of plant disease. By the 1920s, Panama disease was the most important cause of plantation aban- donment in Costa Rica.'5 The Panama disease attacked the plant through the root system and infected the soil, rendering it less productive. The disease was first reported in Panama during the first decade of the twentieth century and soon spread to Costa Rica. As a consequence, the disease caused United Fruit to develop a policy of systematic abandonment of its plantations. By 1926, the early re-negotiation of the banana contract and a slight increase in the level of taxation on exports were acceptable to the multinational in order to guarantee the continued viability of the industry on the Atlantic lowlands of Costa Rica.

In addition to expansion along the Atlantic coast, United Fruit was also interested in establishing new plantations in other regions that were suitable for production and free of Panama disease. Therefore, by the mid-1920s, United Fruit was already planning the development of a new plantation region on the Pacific coast. Panama's Puerto Armuelles was fast becoming an important banana producing enclave and United Fruit was interested in adjacent land in Costa Rica. The prospect of the development of a new banana enclave was well known to influential Costa Ricans and the issue was central to the political discourse of the time.

In response to President Jim6nez's rush to sign a new agreement, Con- gress, which counted several of United Fruit Company fiercest opponents among its members, used its powers to slow the passing of the contract. A congressional commission was formed to examine the contract and assess its impact on the country. One of the most elaborate presentations to the com- mission was made by a group known as the La Sociedad Econ6mica de Amigos del Pais. One of the leaders of the group was Joaquin Garcia Monge, who was also became a prominent figure in the Liga Civica and a man whose vision of Costa Rica was that of a "white settler" society. The

15 Sigatoka was another disease that contributed to the destruction of the industry in Lim6n. It attacked the leaves of the plant hindering the development of large stems of quality bananas. The effects of Sigatoka were first reported in 1938 and the disease devastated the crops in the years that followed.

36 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

Sociedad Econ6mica's charter called for the nationalization of United Fruit's holdings and for the possession of all land by Costa Ricans.16 Though clearly aimed at the corporation, the group also targeted the West Indian

community in its appeal to the public. In one of the Sociedad Econ6mica's first communications, the secretary general, M.A. Zumbado, stated that West Indian immigration was not desirable because of the group's criminal-

ity and because they threatened to "mongrelize" the white race. According to Sociedad Econ6mic, the answer to the problem was to end all West Indian

immigration and to sterilize every person of African descent who was

already living in the country."7 The congressional commission's final report was reflective of the interests of the Amigos del Pais in that it not only attacked United Fruit for monopolizing one of the country's chief exports, but was also critical of the company for introducing "a race" with a "pre- disposition to illnesses such as tuberculosis, syphilis and insanity."'8

The West Indian community in Lim6n was an easy target for the opposi- tion because it was so evidently different in culture, colour, language and religion. Moreover, the tenuous legal position of most members of the com- munity rendered them almost defenceless. By 1927, only 25 out of 20,000 people of West Indian descent in Costa Rica were naturalized citizens.19 The overwhelming majority were either British subjects, or, if born in Costa Rica of West Indian parents, had not exercised their right to citizenship and there- fore, were stateless individuals.20

The activities of the Sociedad Econ6mica and others opposed to the fruit company's monopoly managed to delay the deal, not kill it. The contract negotiations were terminated when United Fruit discovered that the land it had initially coveted was less suitable for plantation development than orig- inally forecast. Consequently, the United Fruit Company pulled out of the negotiations at the last minute and the government was forced to reconsider its position. The issues that brought about the decision for the early renewal of the contract continued to press upon both the government and the com- pany, but a new set of challenges emerged. The Costa Rican government lost any advantage it might have had in 1926 because the negotiations that took place in 1929 to replace the 1930 contract were framed within the context of

16 Government of Costa Rica, Congreso Series, No. 15400, folio 18. 17 Government of Costa Rica, Congreso Series, No. 15400, folio 21. 18 La Gaceta Oficial, 1 February 1927. 19 Government of Costa Rica, Indice Completo de Opciones, Inscipciones y Naturalizaciones: 1824-

1927. 20 There were some Costa-Rican born West Indians with status as British subjects but all indications

are that very few parents registered their children with the local consul.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 37

a global economic crisis. As a result, United Fruit was in a far better bar- gaining position and the government was forced to sweeten the deal in order to please the country's largest employer. United Fruit also happened to be the largest producer of bananas and the only marketing agency for what was Costa Rica's most import export crop.

United Fruit's role in the country's economy became even more impor- tant when the onset of the Depression limited the possibility of export diver- sification. On a per capita basis, the value of banana exports from the province of Lim6n were consistently higher than that of all other exports from the rest of the country. In 1926, for example, they amounted to approx- imately six times the value of coffee and all other export products.2' Between 1920 and 1929, a period of stagnation in the industry, banana exports from Lim6n had an average annual value of 5.5 million U.S. dollars.22 As a result of the company's importance to the economy, the government could not ignore the needs of the banana industry in Costa Rica.

Although the crisis favoured United Fruit in its dealings with the govern- ment, the economic turmoil also served to unite the company's middle class opponents with the Hispanic working-class. As part of the strategy of attack on United Fruit, the company's critics built upon the existing ethnic tensions in Lim6n to enlist Hispanic plantation workers in their battle with the cor- porate giant. The middle class brought nationalism to bear on the traditional struggle for better wages and working conditions on the plantations. Rising levels of unemployment in the banana industry made Hispanic workers more attentive and the company's opponents encouraged the ethnic tensions within the work force. Whereas previous discussions of the problems posed by United Fruit in Costa Rica tended to ignore the West Indian presence, in the late 1920s the threat of "Africanization" became part of the standard list of complaints against the company.

When the new contract was brought before Congress in 1930 it caused a predictable uproar among the company's detractors. In exchange for a com- mitment to buy more fruit from private producers and expand employment opportunities in Lim6n, the government proposed to give United Fruit per- mission to begin new operations on the Pacific coast. The company's critics,

21 Jeffery Casey Gaspar, Lim6n 1880-1940: Un estudio de la industria bananera en Costa Rica (San Jos6, Costa Rica, 1979), pp. 197-198.

22 Government of Costa Rica, Anuario Estadistico, 1934. And even during the Depression years of 1930-39 they averaged more than 2,300,000 U.S. dollars per year or 46% of the total value of Costa Rica's annual exports. (Calculations are based on data collected at the Banco Central de Costa Rica and the Direcci6n General de Estadistica y Censos).

38 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

unable to defeat the legislation in Congress and fearing further domination by foreign capital interests, called for strict controls on United Fruit's new venture. Congressional opponents were once again vigorous in their argu- ments against the new agreement, and they used the spectre of the West Indian presence to attempt to derail the negotiations.

The most significant move by the opposition was the publication of an article in a leading newspaper on the eve of the Congressional vote on the contract. The article, entitled "Como quiere que sea Costa Rica, blanca or negra?," was written by Dr. Jos6 Guerrero, director of the National Census Office, a former member of the Liga Civica and a member of the Sociedad Econ6mica. It was published in La Tribuna, one of future President Otilio Ulate's newspapers, and was later reprinted in the Reportorio Americano, whose editor was Joaquin Garcia Monge who was also of the Sociedad Econ6mica and the Liga Civica. Guerrero's criticisms were based on the findings of the 1927 census. Using unreleased data from the census, Guer- rero concentrated on the racial threat posed by United Fruit Company.

Jose Guerrero attempted to bring Costa Ricans face to face with the dimensions of the West Indian presence by shocking them with the fact that people of African descent formed the majority of the population in Lim6n. Moreover, according to Guerrero, "negritos" had already invaded the Cen- tral Valley and 431 of them were living in San Jos.23 Guerrero's article opposed the contract on nationalist grounds but he chose to draw particular attention to the fact that where United Fruit went, West Indians always fol- lowed. Guerrero depicted the situation as a challenge to the survival of the "white" race and a problem in which "sentimentalism had no part, because it was biological in character or more concretely, eugenic." As a result of the article and other pressures, the West Indian presence in Costa Rican became a central issue in the final debate on the 1930.

By late 1929, the world economy was in obvious trouble and countries that depended on export markets for a few agricultural products, like Costa Rica, were in no position to dictate terms of investment. Therefore, despite strong opposition the contract was pushed through Congress. The company's critics were not able to stop the signing of the agreement but they remained con- cerned about the fact that United Fruit had already begun purchasing land on the country's Pacific coast. The politicians understood that United Fruit's development of operations on the Pacific coast offered some relief for mount-

23 "Negrito" was and is a derogatory term for people who are apparently of African descent. Also, many of the people living in San Jos6 were the descendants of Central American slaves and not West Indians from Lim6n.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 39

ing unemployment in the highland region, but some worried openly that West Indian labourers would migrate to the new plantations. Their concerns were reflected in a published statement by several Congressional deputies in Otilio Ulate's La Tribuna. Although the statement was primarily an attack on the economics of the contract, the authors stated that United Fruit had succeeded in obtaining permission to "Africanize" another region of Costa Rica.24

Although the deputies who published the statement in La Tribuna demanded that sixty percent of the workforce be Costa Rican, they did not get their wish. A provision was included in the contract requiring United Fruit to hire Costa Ricans whenever they were equal in aptitude and suit- ability. However, the wording of the hiring clause allowed the company to continue using its existing labour force on the grounds that it was the most suitable. Nonetheless, an initial step was taken to guarantee positions for Costa Ricans within the company and it was soon followed by calls for other restrictions on the West Indians.

In Lim6n, the deal received quite a different reception. The community's leading newspaper, The Searchlight, ran extensive articles on the banana industry and the impending contract. The editor of the newspaper, Samuel Nation, was representative of those in the West Indian community who relied on the United Fruit Company for their prosperity. The Searchlight, which was the only English language newspaper in the country, encouraged even greater solidarity between his community and the United Fruit Com- pany. The newspaper's editorials appealed to the government to give the fruit company a "chance to develop the banana industry.""25 Nation's com- ments made it clear that he considered the fate of West Indians in Costa Rica linked to that of the United Fruit Company. The editor argued that the people who were critical of the banana contract only envied the care and attention that the company had taken of the West Indian community. By portraying the fruit company as the protector of the "coloured labourer" he echoed what the critics had been saying all along. Samuel Nation's efforts helped further widen the gap between West Indians and their Hispanic counterparts.

As might be expected, the opposition to the 1930 contract did not disap- pear with its implementation. Several Congressional deputies were furious at the concessions granted to the United Fruit Company and they continued to

24 La Tribuna, 30 August 1930, signed by Rafael Calder6n Mufioz, Otilio Ulate Blanco, Adriano Urbina, Carlos Manuel Echandi, Ram6n Bedoya, Jos6 Rafael Cascante Vargas, Juan Guido Matamoros, Manuel Antonio Cordero, Francisco Mayorga Rivas, Victor Manuel Villalobos B., Marcial Rodriguez Conejo and J. Manuel Peralta.

25 The Searchlight, 28 June 1930.

40 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

attack the government for its acquiescence. Consequently, in August 1932, Congress created a special commission to look into the United Fruit Com- pany's compliance with the 1930 contract.26 Otilio Ulate, Adriano Urbina and Jorge Ortiz E., deputies who had opposed the contract in the first place, were selected to conduct the enquiry. As part of its investigation, the Commission travelled to Lim6n where they met peasant producers, large-scale farmers, workers and businessmen who complained about the United Fruit Company and its operations.

The Congressional deputies found United Fruit to be in violation of vir- tually every clause in the contract and recommended stem action on the part of the government. They found that the company had not met its commit- ment to plant more land or to grant additional contracts to private planters. The industry continued to stagnate in Lim6n and, it was argued, Costa Ricans were being short changed by the company. A few of the submissions to the commission made mention of the perceived favouritism on the part of United Fruit toward West Indians, but most of the people who came forward focused on problem of the company's monopoly position. Despite a lack of evidence, in the introduction to the final report, Otilio Ulate and his col- leagues remarked on "the problem of the predomination of workers from the coloured race which prejudices the creole worker." Even though West Indi- ans suffered as much as anyone during the industry's decline in Lim6n, they were identified as a part of the problem.

In light of the need for foreign investment and within a context of con- tinued congressional hostility, President Jim6nez, upon re-election for a third term in 1932, sought to negotiate yet another contract with United Fruit. The new contract was designed to supersede that of 1930 and its objective was twofold. It was both an effort to try to appease some of the government's opponents and also an attempt to increase investment in Costa Rica at a time when the world's economic outlook was grim. The negotia- tions focused on United Fruit's need for disease-free land and the opening up of the industry to more private producers. In public, the government did not mention the West Indian issue and the community itself remained silent.

One of the most important aspects of the negotiations for the 1934 con- tract was that they presented an opportunity for Costa Rican producers to play a larger role in the future production of bananas. A number of influen- tial Costa Ricans had purchased land alongside the United Fruit Company's holdings on the Pacific coast and they were ready to take advantage of the

26 Government of Costa Rica, Congreso Series, No. 16358.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 41

development of a new banana industry. These land speculators purchased large tracts of land that were to be either converted into plantations or sold for a profit. They were not peasant farmers who were looking for an oppor- tunity to sell a few hundred stems of bananas to United Fruit. Bananas were big business even in the 1930s and a small number of influential people were poised to take advantage of the expansion of the industry.

In addition to land, one of the most important pre-requisites of the suc- cessful development of banana plantations on the Pacific coast was a size- able labour force. Two problems existed with respect to meeting the labour needs of the new industry. For one thing, the Pacific coast region near Panama was an isolated and sparsely populated region and labour would have to be enticed to the plantations. Fortunately, for the banana industry, the economic crisis created a large pool of surplus labour in Costa Rica. A far more serious problem for the company was that by the early 1930s the working class in the banana regions had been radicalized by the economic crisis. The Communist Party of Costa Rica was founded in 1932 and soon attracted the attention of workers and peasants in many areas of the country. One of the regions where the Communist Party enjoyed its strongest support was among banana plantation workers in Lim6n. In Costa Rica, as else- where in the world, the working-class was becoming more vocal and des- perate, and their interests threatened those of the 61ite. Therefore, the prob- lems of labour supply and control were important considerations for the everyone who was interested in benefiting from the new banana contract.

The labour problems of the future plantations on the Pacific coast had as a backdrop the mounting tensions between Hispanics and West Indians in Lim6n. The ethnic hostilities in Lim6n were underlined in 1933 in a petition which was sent to Congress with the names of more than 500 people who referred to themselves as residents of Lim6n.27 The petition attacked the United Fruit Company, its West Indian labourers, and it requested the prohi- bition of "negro" immigration.28 The document stated that the "negro race" had a privileged position in Lim6n because of United Fruit Company hiring preferences and, as a result, the "white race" was left out on the street. Along with the usual statements about racial inferiority, promiscuity and the threat posed by the "negro" invasion of the highlands, the petition made reference to the tense relations between the two groups. The document also served to

27 Of note is the signature of one Jose Guerrero. This may be coincidence, but the name is the same as that of the man mentioned earlier who was Director of the Census Bureau, member of La Sociedad Econ6mica de Amigos del Pais and the Liga Civica and was also the author of articles attacking the West Indian presence in Costa Rica.

28 Government of Costa Rica, Congreso Series, No. 16753.

42 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

introduce the threat of West Indian violence against Hispanics. West Indians, it was said, harassed the Costa Ricans continuously and made no secret of their access to arms.29

It was possible for many workers to blame West Indians for their plight because the fruit company consciously divided its labour force in order to prevent unified action. Segregation was a fact of life in Lim6n and over the years there had been many confrontations based on ethnic divisions. Upon arrival in Lim6n, Hispanics discovered that West Indians had the best jobs with United Fruit because they had been there longer and spoke English. It was not unheard of for West Indians and Hispanics to cross one another's picket lines. For example, in April 1911 the United Fruit Company brought two hundred men in from the highlands to replace striking West Indian dock workers.30 Similarly, a story about labour unrest in Lim6n in the Diario de Costa Rica on 8 February 1920 told how "white" workers had taken the jobs of "blacks" in a recent strike and that the opposite could happen in future.3' The divisions between Hispanic and West Indian workers existed long before 1934, but the economic crisis and middle-class efforts to heighten resentment towards people of African descent served to add to the tension.

The only effort to bridge the gap between West Indians and their Hispanic counterparts came with Communist Party efforts to unite all workers in a struggle against the fruit company. The communists benefited from the increased despair of labouring Costa Ricans and it enjoyed particularly strong support on the banana plantations where the struggle to survive was com- pounded by the nature of employment with the United Fruit Company. The Communist Party recruited a few members of the West Indian community but the majority shied away. Part of the reason for the West Indian aversion to radical politics was that community leaders used their influence to undermine the communist efforts at recruitment. Nevertheless, significant inroads were made despite strenuous efforts by United Fruit and the Costa Rican authori- ties to curtail organization on the plantations. The success of the Communist Party at organizing workers was first evidenced on 8 August 1934 when the largest strike action in the country's history took place in Lim6n.

The strike was organized by the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Atlintico which was a union dominated by Hispanics and affiliated with the Communist

29 There is no other evidence of threats made by West Indians against Hispanics in this period. 30 The Times, 28 April 1911. 31 Diario de Costa Rica, 8 February 1920, p.4. See also Victor Hugo Acufia Ortega, Los origenes de

la clase obrera en Costa Rica: las huelgas de 1920 por la jornada de ocho horas (San Jose: CENAP- CEPAS, 1986), for the context of the strike action.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 43

Party.32 Although some authors have portrayed the West Indians as active par- ticipants, the evidence suggests otherwise.33 The lack of West Indian participa- tion in the strike served to annoy organizers. Trabajo, the Communist Party's weekly newspaper, made a couple of appeals for members of the West Indian community to join the strike, but there was little success because the divisions that existed between the workers in Lim6n were profound. Manuel Mora, the leader of the Communist Party of Costa Rica, went so far as to refer to the West Indians as the "damned Negroes" and he stressed their reluctance to join the strike despite the Party's best efforts to garner their support.34 Oral accounts back newspaper reports that describe West Indian reticence. One informant who remembered the strike stated that it "was not a black man's fight" and that the West Indians "stayed home because they didn't want trouble."

The growing animosity between the different ethnic groups accounted for a large part of the West Indian community's reluctance to join the strike action, but there were other important reasons for West Indian absence. One serious concern among West Indians was the effect that participation in the strike would have on their residency in Costa Rica. By 1934, petitions, newspaper articles and attacks in Congress had made the entire West Indian community aware of the tenuous nature of their residency in the country. Several thousand children of West Indian immigrants had been born in Costa Rica, but the vast majority were not citizens. At most, Costa Rican citizen- ship protected only a few hundred members of the West Indian community in 1934.

Local West Indian leaders who were vocal about their anti-communism also played upon the fears of their community. West Indians had good reason to worry about retribution by the Costa Rican authorities and community leaders made sure that everyone understood that participation in the strike would have consequences for those involved. Along with intimidating reports in the local West Indian newspaper, The Atlantic Voice, there appeared public warnings from a shadowy group that called itself "The Sojourners Committee." The Committee told West Indians not to participate in the strike because the government and company would punish individu- als, and it warned them that the British government would not protect them from ill treatment for "taking part in the strike, or aiding and abetting the

32 See The Atlantic Voice for coverage of the strike. 33 See Charles W. Koch, "Ethnicity and Livelihoods, a social geography of Costa Rica's Atlantic

Zone." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1974, pp. 284-289; and Philippe I Bourgois, Ethnicity at Work: Divided Labor on a Central America Banana Plantation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 106-109.

34 Diario de Costa Rica, 23 September 1934, and The Atlantic Voice, 13 October 1934.

44 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

strikers."35 According to this clandestine group, West Indians required the continued benevolence of the United Fruit Company in order to be protected from the Costa Ricans.

A closer examination of the membership of the Committee offers insights into the way West Indian community leaders exercised their influence. It was comprised of the executive of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the most influential secular organization in the history of the West Indian community in Costa Rica.36 The West Indians in Costa Rica had a lengthy relationship with Garveyism that preceded the founding of the UNIA. During 1910-11, Marcus Garvey spend a few turbulent months in Costa Rica fighting for the rights of labouring West Indians and challenging local leaders. Garvey was run out of town, but his brain-child, the UNIA, returned later in the decade to become the most influential community organ- ization in Lim6n. Branches, divisions and chapters of the UNIA sprung up throughout the Caribbean basin. In Central America the organization spread from British Honduras to the Panama Canal. By the mid-1920s, there were reported to be twenty-three branches in Costa Rica and forty-seven in neigh- bouring Panama.37 At one time the UNIA was so popular among West Indi- ans in Lim6n that at a meeting it collected "two scrap baskets and one suit case full of United States gold notes," and at another, "Garvey stood beside a pile of gold notes which reached above his knees."38 The United States Consul also reported that even during the 1920s, after the UNIA began its rapid demise, United Fruit Company employees in Costa Rica sent about $2,000 a month to Garvey's organization.39 The Caribbean coast of Central America became one of the most important regions of UNIA activity outside the United States and was a powerful force in the local West Indian commu- nity even after the organization's demise elsewhere.

The arrival of the UNIA initially disturbed the Costa Rican government and the United Fruit Company, but they soon came to realize that Garvey- ism could be coopted. In 1921, when Marcus Garvey visited Costa Rica again, the President of the republic and the manager of the United Fruit Company met with the man who was called the "Provisional President of

35 The Voice of the Atlantic, 25 August 1934. 36 Among them was Samuel Nation who became the editor of The Atlantic Voice in 1936. 37 Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the

Universal Negro Improvement Association (Westport, 1976), p. 16. 38 Robert Hill, ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, III

(Los Angeles, 1985), p. 536. 39 Cited in Edmund D. Cronon, Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro

Improvement Association (Madison, 1969), p.88.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 45

Africa." Both decided that Garvey did not represent a serious threat. The company's manager in Costa Rica asserted that Garvey was also an employer of labour, that he "understands our position, is against labor unions, and is using his best endeavour to get the Negro race to work."40

After Garvey's departure, United Fruit kept tabs on the UNIA, and a func- tional relationship existed between the two entities. By 1927 the local divi- sion of the UNIA was led by Samuel Nation, the editor of a local newspaper and one of the West Indian community's most outspoken anti-communists. Nation and his associates commanded the respect of the community in Lim6n because they headed the only organization that specifically repre- sented the interests of people of African descent. During the 1934 strike this same group of men used their position to keep West Indian workers out of the labour dispute. With Samuel Nation at the helm, the UNIA wrote the United Fruit Company's managers to inform them that they were at the com- pany's "service always for all reasonable matters" of "mutual understanding and general welfare" and that their organization would call a meeting to dis- courage the participation of West Indians in the strike.4' The note was signed by "THE COMMITTEE" who were the same "SOJOURNERS COMMIT- TEE" who had published warnings in Samuel Nation's The Atlantic Voice. As a result of the meeting, The Atlantic Voice was able to report that the West Indian labourers had declined to associate themselves with the strike movement, but it added too that those who stayed away from work also did so because they were intimidated by the Hispanics.42 Propaganda and threats by community leaders combined with fear and lack of alternatives to keep the West Indians out of the strike and worked to perpetuate ethnic divisions.

Despite the absence of massive West Indian participation, "foreigners" were identified by the government and in the mainstream press as the agita- tors in the strike. Threats were made by the government in both the English and Spanish press to revoke naturalisations or deport foreign participants in the strike.43 But it was not West Indians who were participating in or leading the strike. Most foreign agitators were Nicaraguan labourers who had come to Costa Rica from the hyper-politicized atmosphere of a country that had recently experienced a lengthy U.S. occupation." In fact, Nicaraguans and

40 Hill, The Garvey Papers, III, p. 536. 41 Northern Railway Archives, Memorandum for heads of division and departments of the United

Fruit Company, 17 August 1934, 42 The Voice of the Atlantic, 18 August 1934. 43 The Voice of the Atlantic, 25 August 1934. 44 Emel Sibaja Barrantes, "Ideologia y protesta popular la huelga bananera de 1934 en Costa Rica,"

unpublished M.A. thesis, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, 1983. p. 60-71. See also Arnaldo Ferreto, La Huelga Bananera 1934, pamphlet, nd.

46 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

not West Indians were ultimately expelled by the Costa Rican authorities after the strike.

A closer look at the immigrant communities of Lim6n reveals that although intimidation was a factor in keeping West Indian workers from participating in the strike, there was also another important reason for the general lack of support within the community. West Indians had much less reason to support the strike because a large portion of the community did not work for the com- pany. Instead, by 1934 the West Indian community was diversified in its eco- nomic interests and concerns about the working conditions on the banana plantations were a thing of the past for many. The differences between West Indians and others in Lim6n are revealed in the 1927 population census. An analysis of data on two communities of comparable size offers insights into the place of West Indians in Lim6n during the period leading up to the strike.

The 1927 census sample indicates that West Indians and Nicaraguans were the two largest immigrant groups and that each occupied a different position in the local economy."45 The reason for these differences was that the West Indians arrived earlier and, in 1927, were less dependent than the Nicaraguans on the banana industry for direct employment. The peak of West Indian immigration to Costa Rica was between 1905 and 1915, whereas the majority of Nicaraguans in the census sample had arrived between 1920 and 1927. According to the data, 75.6 percent of the West Indian immigrants arrived in Costa Rica before 1915, while 72.9 percent of the Nicaraguans arrived within two years of census day on 22 May 1927. Therefore, almost one-third of the Nicaraguans were exiles from the war against Augusto Sandino that was raging in their home country.

The period in which the immigrants arrived in Costa Rica is reflected in the data on employment. The 1927 census shows that West Indians were more likely to be self-employed or the owners of farms or business than were the Nicaraguans. In the samples taken of Cahuita and Siquirres, forty-seven percent of all West Indian males were either self-employed or employers, as compared with thirteen percent for the Nicaraguans. Therefore, the place of West Indians in the economy of Lim6n had changed considerably since they first began to arrive in the late nineteenth century. By 1934 the West Indian community was less reliant on the banana industry for employment and more dependent on political and economic stability in the province of Lim6n.

45 The data for this section is taken from the original forms of the 1927 census. The two communi- ties were Cahuita on the Atlantic coast and Siquirres which is located inland from Lim6n. The two com- munities contained a total of 748 individuals and with approximately half residing in each town. Cahuita had a larger West Indian population while Siquirres was more Hispanic.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 47

The census data also shows that West Indians were less likely to be com- pany employees. Almost seventy-seven percent of the Nicaraguans in the sampling were employed in the banana industry whereas only thirty-four percent of West Indians worked on the banana plantations. Nicaraguans were also much less likely to have secure jobs because the majority of them were day labourers who were not entitled to company benefits like family housing, access to land and bonuses. Similarly, 77 percent of the Nica- raguans in the sample were day labourers as compared to only 32 percent of the West Indians. At the time of the strike the participation of both groups in United Fruit's labour force would have remained similar to that of 1927 because between the taking of the census and 1934 the industry stagnated and so did the fortunes of individuals in the province.

Moreover, the percentage of West Indians in Lim6n who were farmers was also much higher than the national average. Whereas a mere 4.5 percent of all Costa Ricans were farmers, the census sample showed that 29 percent of West Indians farmed for a living.46 They relied on sales of bananas and other food stuffs to United Fruit and could not afford any retribution by the company. West Indians, remained loyal, or at best silent throughout the strike because of both the intimidation by the community 61ite and out of self-interest.

Although the West Indian absence from the strike favored the company, United Fruit did not hesitate to ignore the community's interests in favor of profits. While the strike raged in Lim6n, the fruit company was in the final stages of negotiating yet another banana contract with the government. By the time of the strike the new contract was in the hands of congressional members and they submitted a set of reforms that the fruit company was quick to accept. Along with a commitment to favour private planters, pay higher prices and expand production on the Pacific coast, Costa Ricans were to be given the majority of jobs on the new plantations. In addition to the contract itself, Congress also tacked on a companion law that prohibited United Fruit from introducing "negroes, or Jamaicans" to the new banana zone.47 United Fruit acquiesced because the plantations in Lim6n were not producing as well as they once did and the company was faced with the pos- sibility of abandoning Costa Rica if disease-free land was not found.

Consequently, the exclusion of West Indians from jobs on the Pacific coast at a time when their Spanish speaking counterparts were on strike can

46 Government of Costa Rica, Censo de Poblaci6n de Costa Rica (11 de mayo de 1927), San Jose: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, 1928.

47 La Tribuna, 25 August 1934.

48 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

only be seen as having a dual intent: Jos6 Guerrero, Otilio Ulate and their ilk could rest assured that the Pacific coast would not be "Africanized," and workers on the Atlantic coast would be further divided in their conflict with United Fruit. The contract essentially guaranteed employment on the Pacific coast to any and all Hispanic workers who were not jailed or fired for par- ticipation in the Atlantic coast strike. West Indians, though experienced and loyal to the corporation, would be left in Lim6n to contemplate their future as a community and as individuals in Costa Rica.

Just three days after United Fruit accepted the contract reforms proposed by Congress, an agreement was reached in the office of the Secretary of Labour between representatives of the banana planters and the workers. United Fruit representatives did not take part in the strike negotiations because they did not recognize the work stoppage as a strike. The agreement was, however, submitted to United Fruit for its approval, but the company refused to accept the terms and there was a brief but unsuccessful resump- tion of the strike two weeks later. The second strike was more violent and resulted in the incarceration of its leaders, but support dwindled because no one could afford to be black listed by the company in the 1930s.

United Fruit and the Costa Rican government both capitalized on the lack of labour solidarity in Lim6n to get what they wanted out of the 1934 agree- ment. The company was able to ignore the union and isolate the agitators because the leaders, many of whom were Nicaraguan, were either exiled or jailed. The Costa Rican government got a commitment to new investment, employment for Costa Ricans, and, as a part of the fallout in Lim6n, gained increased control over the Atlantic coast region and its inhabitants.

The West Indian community lost the most despite having refrained from participation in the strike. In the months that followed, Congress entered the formal debate on the contract which was ratified on 7 December 1934. The final version of the contract contained few surprises but its intent was clear. In exchange for investment, the United Fruit company was given control over the banana industry on the Pacific coast. In terms of the workforce, Article 5 of a "companion law" regulating conditions of work required a preference for Costa Ricans in the banana industry and the prohibition of "people of colour" from employment on the Pacific Coast. The ratification of the contract by the government provided bleak testimony of United Fruit Company's attitude toward the most faithful segment of its labour force.

The Communist Party was openly opposed to the contract from the start and its newspaper, Trabajo became the only publication to defend the rights of the West Indians. Among the several news items that made reference to

RONALD N. HARPELLE 49

West Indians was an appeal for solidarity with Costa Rican workers to fight the contract that was being debated in Congress.48 The tone of the appeal placed the onus on West Indians to join the Communist Party and, therefore, fell on deaf ears. The appeal was penned by Harold Nichols, a young West Indian who was living in San Jos6 at the time. Nichols however, represented only a tiny minority of his community because he was one of a few hundred West Indians that had left Lim6n for the highlands. He had moved to San Jose where he was obliged to make the kind of commitment to Costa Rica that the majority of the community was reluctant to make. He moved away from his community and its West Indian identity to become an Afro-Costa Rican. Nichols may have been known in Lim6n but his affiliation with the Communists and his apparent desire to become Costa Rican meant that his appeal was limited.

Surprisingly, the people of Lim6n did very little to express their displeas- ure with the clause in the contract that restricted their mobility and impacted so heavily on their future in Costa Rica. Other than one letter to the editor, the local West Indian newspaper did not respond to the restrictions while the contract was being negotiated.49 Samuel Nation, United Fruit's biggest booster, remained silent on an issue that was the most significant to confront the West Indian community in its 50-year history in Costa Rica. A petition from some Costa-Rican-born West Indians was sent to the two deputies from Lim6n, but their concern was with the impact that the companion law had on the rights of Costa Rican citizens. The desire to appease United Fruit pre- vented West Indian leaders from defending their community.

Manuel Mora, the Communist Party deputy, who had been frustrated by the lack of West Indian participation in the strike, was the only voice raised against the companion law in Congress.50 Although Mora was not alone in his opposition to the entire agreement, it is important to note that both deputies from Lim6n, Juan E. Romagosa and Virgilio Chaverri, supported the contract despite its overt discrimination against their own constituents and the impact that it would have on the economy of the province they rep- resented. In early December 1934 the Cort6s-Chittenden contract became law with a vote of twenty-nine deputies for and only 12 against. Article 5 was buried in the contract and became part of the new reality for West Indi- ans in Costa Rica.

Initially, the community relied on the benevolence of the United Fruit

48 Trabajo, 4 November 1934. 49 The Voice of the Atlantic, 3 November 1934. 50 Government of Costa Rica, Congreso Series, No. 17004, folios 83-84 and folios 126-134.

50 RACISM AND NATIONALISM

Company to press for its rights in the country. A handful of voices in the community kept members on guard against attacks from discrimination, but it was the omnipresent company that sheltered West Indians until 1934. What people failed to realize was that West Indian interests were only pro- tected as long as United Fruit required their services. When it became obvi- ous that disease was resulting in a gradual reduction in the Atlantic coast crop, the only solution was for the company to move to the Pacific coast. In an effort to maintain corporate interests in Costa Rica, United Fruit was quite willing to turn its back on the people who had made the sacrifices that maintained a profitable enterprise. The West Indian community was aban- doned by United Fruit without any consideration for the sacrifices they had made to make the banana business in Costa Rica an overwhelming success.

Moreover, in addition to signing a contract excluding West Indians from working for the company on the Pacific coast, United Fruit also destroyed the local economy. To make matters worse, under the terms of the agreement land owners on the Pacific coast were paid more for the bananas they pro- duced than did private producers on the Atlantic side. The destruction of the economy continued in Lim6n when, on its way out, United Fruit ripped up tracks, bridges and other infrastructural supports. Similarly, company com- missaries and local services were downgraded or eliminated because United Fruit no longer had an interest in the welfare of the people of Lim6n. When the fruit company left so did the market for bananas and many of the staple agricultural products that were previously sold to consumers in the region. As the economy shrunk the need for services within the community also diminished and many shops and stores closed their doors. Economically, Lim6n never recovered fully from the decline of the banana industry.

The provisions of the 1934 contract also marked a new stage in the attempts by nationalists to restrict the "African" presence in Costa Rica. Overt discrimination against West Indians in Costa Rica continued to grow throughout the 1930s and 1940s. In addition to the denial of job opportuni- ties on the Pacific coast, West Indian immigrants had to deal with a series of laws designed to force them to either assimilate or emigrate. For example, the laws concerning foreign residents became more stringent throughout the 1930s and in 1942 the immigration of all visible minorities was banned.52

United Fruit's move to the Pacific coast sparked the emigration of thou- sands of people of African descent who were forced to look elsewhere to ful- fill their ambitions. Whereas the country's population increased between

52 See R. Harpelle, "The Social and Political Integration of West Indians in Costa Rica," for a com- plete discussion of the period.

RONALD N. HARPELLE 51

1927 and 1950 by 68.4 percent, the number of people in Costa Rica who were considered "black" or "mulatto" declined from 21,257 to 15,118 or by 29 percent. Those who remained behind had to confront Costa Rican efforts to assimilate the West Indian community. By 1950 almost five thousand West Indians had become Costa Rican citizens through naturalization or by virtue of being Costa Rican-born and, therefore, entitled to opt for citizen- ship. The impact on the community was severe because the creation of a banana enclave on the Pacific coast institutionalized racism in Costa Rica and West Indian contributions to the country's history were all but forgotten.

Department of History RONALD N. HARPELLE Lakehead University