Quine.the Scope and Language of Science

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The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

The Scope and Language of ScienceAuthor(s): W. V. QuineReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 8, No. 29 (May, 1957), pp. 1-17

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T h e B r i t i s h J o u r n a l f o r t h e

Philosophyo f S c i e n c e

VOLUMEVIII MAY, 1957 No. 29

THE SCOPE AND LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE*

W. V. QuImNE

I

I AMa physicalobjectsittingin a physicalworld. Some of the forces

of this physicalworld impinge on my surface. Light raysstrikemyretinas; molecules bombard my eardrumsand fingertips. I strike

back, emanatingconcentricair-waves. These waves take the form

of a torrent of discourseabout tables,people, molecules, light rays,retinas,air-waves, prime numbers, infinite classes, oy and sorrow,

good and evil.My ability to strike back in this elaborateway consists in my

having assimilateda good partof the culture of my community, and

perhapsmodified and elaborated t a bit on my own account. Allthis training consisted in turn of an impinging of physical forces,

largely other people's utterances,upon my surface,and of gradualchanges n my own constitutionconsequentuponthesephysical orces.All I am or everhope to be is due to irritationsof my surface, ogether

withsuchlatent tendencies o responseasmay havebeenpresent n myoriginalgerm plasm. And all the lore of the ages is due to irritationof the surfacesof a successionof persons, together, again, with theinternal nitialconditions of the several ndividuals.

Now how is it that we know that our knowledge must dependthus solely on surface irritation and internal conditions? Onlybecausewe know in a general way what the world is like, with its

* Received21. x. 55. This paperwas presentedn one of the Bicentennial

ConferencestColumbiaUniversityn OctoberI954. Theversion f it whichwaspublishedn TheUnityofKnowledgeNewYork: Doubleday, 955)waseditoriallymodifiedwithonlythe author's riorgeneralonsent ndwithouthisknowledge ftheactual hanges. Since n theopinionof theauthorhesechanges esultedn theloss of so much of theoriginalmeaning,heoriginalextis produced erewith the

permissionf theTrustees f ColumbiaUniversity,whoholdthecopyright.A I







W. V. QUINE

light rays, molecules, men, retinas,and so on. It is thus our very

understanding f the physicalworld, fragmentary hough that under-

standingbe, that enables us to see how limited the evidence is onwhich that understandings predicated.It is our understanding,suchas it is, of what liesbeyond our surfaces, hat shows our evidence

for that understanding o be limited to our surfaces. But this re-

flection arouses certainlogical misgivings: for is not our very talk

of light rays,molecules,and men then only sound and fury, induced

by irritation of our surfaces and signifying nothing? The world

view which lent plausibility o this modest account of our knowledge

is, according to this very account of our knowledge, a groundlessfabrication.

To reason thus is, however, to fall into fallacy: a peculiarly

philosophicalfallacy, and one whereof philosophersare increasinglyaware. We cannot significantly questionthe reality of the external

world, ordenythat there s evidenceof externalobjects n thetestimonyof our senses; for, to do so is simplyto dissociate he terms'reality'and 'evidence' from the very applicationswhich originally did

most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they mayhave for us.

We imbibe an archaicnaturalphilosophywith our mother'smilk.

In the fullnessof time, what with catching up on currentliterature

andmakingsome supplementary bservations f ourown, we become

cleareron things. But the process is one of growth and gradual

change: we do not breakwith the past,nor do we attainto standards

of evidenceand realitydifferent n kind from the vague standardsof

childrenand laymen. Scienceis not a substitute for commonsense,but an extension of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an

effort simply to broadenand deepen the knowledge which the man

in the streetalreadyenjoys, n moderation, n relationto the common-

placethingsaroundhim. To disavowthevery coreofcommonsense,

to requireevidence for that which both the physicistand the man in

the streetacceptas platitudinous,s no laudableperfectionism; it is a

pompous confusion,a failureto observethe nice distinctionbetween

the baby and the bathwater.Let us thereforeacceptphysicalreality,whether in the mannerof

unspoiledmen in the streetor with one or anotherdegreeof scientific

sophistication. In so doing we constitute ourselves recipientsand

carriersof the evolving lore of the ages. Then, pursuingin detail

our thus accepted theory of physical reality, we draw conclusions







THE SCOPE AND LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE

concerning, n particular, ur own physicalselves,andevenconcerningourselves as lore-bearers. One of these conclusions s that this very

lore which we are engagedin has been induced in us by irritationofour physicalsurfacesand not otherwise. Herewe have a little item of

lore about lore. It doesnot, if rightlyconsidered, end to controvert

thelore it is about. On thecontrary,ourinitiallyuncriticalhypothesisof a physicalworld gainspragmaticsupportfrom whateverit contri-

butes towards a coherent account of lore-bearingor other natural

phenomena.Once we have seen that in our knowledge of the externalworld

we havenothing to go on but surfacerritation, wo questionsobtrudethemselves-a bad one and a good one. The badone, latelydismissed,

is the questionwhetherthere s reallyan externalworld after all. The

good one is this: Whence the strengthof our notion that there is

an externalworld ? Whence our persistencen representingdiscourse

as somehow abouta reality,and a reality beyond the irritation?

It is not as though the mere occurrenceof speech itself were

conceived somehow asprimaacie evidence of therebeing a realityas

subjectmatter. Much of what we say is recognisedeven by the manin the streetas irreferential ' Hello ',' Thankyou ',' ho hum ', these

make no claimsupon reality. These arephysical responseson a par,

semantically,with the patellar reflex. Whence then the idea of

scientificobjectivity? Whence the idea that languageis occasionally

descriptivein a way that other quiverings of irritableprotoplasmare not ?

This is a question for the natural science of the external world:

in particular, or the psychology of human animals. The questionhas two not quite separableparts: whence the insistenceon a world

of reference,set over against language? and whence the insistence

on a world of external objects, set over against oneself? Actuallywe can proceed to answer this two-fold question plausibly enough,in a generalsort of way, without any very elaboratepsychologising.

Let us supposethatone of the earlywordsacquiredby a particularchild is 'red'. How does he learn it ? He is treatedto utterancesof

the word simultaneouslywith red presentations; further,his own

babblingis applaudedwhen it approximates to 'red' in the presenceof red. At length he acquiresthe art of applying the word neither

3







W. V. QUINE

too narrowlynor too broadlyfor his mother's tastes. This learning

process s familiar o us undermanynames: association, onditioning,

training, habit formation, reinforcement and extinction, induction.Whatever our colleaguesin the laboratorymay discover of the

inner mechanismof that process,we may be sure of this much: the

very possibilityof it dependson a prior tendencyon the child'spartto weight qualitativedifferencesunequally. Logically, as long as a,

b, and c are three and not one, there is exactly as much difference

between a and b as between a and c; just as many classes,anyway,divide a from b (i.e. contain one and not the other) as a from c. For

the child, on the other had, some differencesmust count for morethan others f the describedprocessof learning' red ' is to go forward

at all. Whetherinnatelyor as a result of pre-linguistic earning,the

child must have more tendencyto associatea red ball with a red ball

than with a yellow one; more tendencyto associatea red ballwith a

red ribbon than with a blue one; and more tendencyto dissociate

the ball from its surroundings han to dissociate ts partsfrom one

another. Otherwise no training could mould the child'susage of

the word 'red', since no future occasion would be more stronglyfavouredby pastapplications f the word thananyother. A working

appreciationof something like 'natural kinds', a tendency anywayto respond n differentdegreesto differentdifferences,has to be therebefore the word 'red' can be learned.

At the very beginning of one's learningof language,thus, words

are learnedin relation to such likenessesand contrastsas are already

appreciatedwithout benefit of words. No wonder we attribute

those likenessesand contrasts o real stuff,and think of languageas asuperimposedapparatusor talkingabout he real.

The likenessesand contrastswhich underlie one's first learningof

language must not only be pre-verballyappreciable; they must,in addition, be intersubjective. Sensitivityto redness will avail the

child nothing, in learning'red' from the mother, except in so far as

the mother is in a position to appreciate hat the child is confronted

with something red. Hence, perhaps,our first glimmerings of an

externalworld. The mostprimitive

sense ofexternalitymay

well bea senseof the mother's reinforcementof likenessesand contrastsn the

firstphasesofword-learning. The real s thusfelt, first andforemost,

aspriorto languageand external o oneself. It is the stuffthatmother

vouchesfor and callsby name.

This priority of the non-linguisticto the linguisticdiminishesas

4








learningproceeds. Scholarshipetsin; i.e. the kind of learningwhich

dependson prior earningof words. We learn' mauve' at anadvanced

age, througha verbalformulaof the form' the colourof' or' a colourmidway between'. And the scholarly principle takes hold early;the child will not have acquiredmany words before his vocabularycomes to figure as a major agency in its own increase. By the time

the child is able to sustainrudimentaryconversation n his narrow

community, his knowledge of language and his knowledge of the

world are a unitarymass.

Nevertheless,we are so overwhelmingly impressedby the initial

phaseof our education hat we continue to think of languagegenerallyas a secondaryor superimposed pparatusor talkingabout realthings.We tend not to appreciate hat most of the things, and most of the

supposedtraits of the so-calledworld, are learnedthrough languageand believed in by a projection from language. Some uncritical

personsarrive thus at a copy theory of language: they look uponthe elements of language as names of elements of reality, and true

discourse as a map of reality. They project vagariesof language

indiscriminatelyupon the world, stuffingthe universe with ands andors, singularsand plurals,definites and indefinites,facts and states of

affairs,simply on the ground that there are parallel elements and

distinctionson the linguisticside.

The generaltask which sciencesets itself is that of specifyinghow

reality 'really' is : the task of delineatingthe structureof realityas

distinct from the structure of one or another traditionallanguage

(except, of course,when the sciencehappensto be grammar tself).

The notion of realityindependentof languageis carriedover by thescientistfrom his earliest impressions,but the facile reification of

linguisticfeatures s avoided or minimised.

But how is it possiblefor scientists o be thus criticalanddiscrimin-

ating about their reifications? If all discourse is mere responseto

surface rritation, hen by what evidencemay one man'sprojectionof

a world be said to be sounder than another's? If, as suggestedearlier,the terms'reality' and 'evidence' owe their intelligibilityto

theirapplications

n archaiccommonsense,why may

we not then

brushaside the presumptionsof science?

The reason we may not is that scienceis itself a continuation of

commonsense. The scientist is indistinguishablerom the common

man in his senseof evidence,except that the scientist s more careful.

This increasedcareis not a revision of evidentialstandards,but only

S







W. V. QUINE

the more patient and systematiccollection and use of what anyonewould deem to be evidence. If the scientist sometimes overrules

something which a superstitious ayman might have called evidence,this may simply be because the scientist has other and contraryevidencewhich, f patientlypresented o thelaymanbitby bit, wouldbe

concededsuperior. Or it may be that the laymansuffers rom some

carelesschain of reasoningof his own whereby, long since, he came

wrongly to reckon certain ypesof connection as evidential: wronglyin that a careful survey of his own ill-observed and long-for-

gotten stepswould suffice to disabusehim. (A likely exampleis the

'gambler's fallacy'-the notion that the oftener black pays thelikelier red becomes.)

Not that the layman has an explicit standardof evidence-nor

the scientisteither. The scientistbegins with the primitive sense of

evidence which he possessed as layman, and uses it carefully and

systematically. He stilldoes not reduce it to rule, though he elaborates

and uses sundry statisticalmethods in an effort to prevent it from

getting out of hand in complex cases. By puttingnature to the most

embarrassingests he can devise, the scientist makes the most of hislay flair for evidence; and at the same time he amplifiesthe flair

itself, affixing an artificialproboscis of punch-cardsand quadrille

paper.Our latest question was, in brief, how science gets ahead of

commonsense and theanswer, n a word, is ' system '. The scientist

introducessystem into his quest and scrutinyof evidence. System,moreover, dictates the scientist'shypotheses themselves: those are

most welcome which are seen to conduce most to simplicityin theover-all theory. Predictions, once they have been deduced from

hypotheses,are subjectto the disciplineof evidence in turn; but the

hypotheseshave, at the time of hypothesis,only the considerations f

systematicsimplicity o recommend hem. Inso far,simplicity tself-in some senseof this difficult erm-counts as a kind of evidence; and

scientistshave indeedlong tended to look upon the simplerof the two

hypothesesas not merely the more likable,but the more likely. Let

it not besupposed,

however, that we have found at last atype

of

evidence that is acceptableto science and foreign to commonsense.

On the contrary, he favouringof theseemingly simplerhypothesis s a

lay habit carriedover by science. The questof systematicsimplicityseems peculiarlyscientific in spirit only because science is what itissues n.

6








3

The notion of a reality independentof languageis derived fromearliestimpressions,if the speculations n the foregoing pages are

right, and is then carriedover into science as a matter of course.

The stress on externalityis likewise carried over into science, and

with a vengeance. For the sense of externalityhas its roots, if our

speculationsare right, in the intersubjectivitywhich is so essential

to the learningof language; andintersubjectivitys vital not only to

languagebut equally to the furtherenterprise, ikewise a social one,

of science. All men areto qualifyas witnessesto the dataof science,and the truthsof scienceare to be trueno matterwho pronounces hem.

Thus it is that sciencehas got on rather with masses and velocitiesthan with likes and dislikes. And thus it is that when science does

confront likes and dislikes it confronts them as behaviour, inter-

subjectivelyobservable. Languagein general is robustly extravert,but science s more so.

It would be unwarranted ationalism o supposethat we can stake

out the businessof sciencen

advanceof pursuingscience andarrivingat a certainbody of scientifictheory. Thus consider,for the sake of

analogy, the smaller task of staking out the business of chemistry.

Having got on with chemistry,we can describe t ex post actoas the

studyof the combiningof atoms in molecules. But no such clean-cut

delimitation of the business of chemistry was possible until that

business was alreadyin large measuredone. Now the situationis

similarwith sciencegenerally. To describescience as the domain of

cognitive judgmentavails us

nothing,for the definiens here is in as

urgentneed of clarification s the defminiendum.Takingadvantageof

existing scientificwork, however, and not scruplingto identify our-

selveswith a substantive cientificposition,we can then delineatethe

scientificobjective,or the cognitive domain, to some degree. It is a

commonplace predicamentto be unable to formulate a task untilhalf done with it.

Thought, if of any considerablecomplexity, is inseparable rom

language-in practicesurelyand in principlequite probably. Science,

though it seeks traits of realityindependentof language,can neither

get on without languagenor aspireto linguisticneutrality. To some

degree, nevertheless, he scientistcan enhanceobjectivityand dimin-

ish the interferenceof language,by hisvery choice of language. And

we, concerned o barethe essenceof scientificdiscourse, anprofitably

7







W. V. QUINE

rework the language of science beyond what might reasonablybe

urged uponthepractising cientist. To suchanoperationwe now turn.

In a spirit hus not of practical anguagereformbut of philosophicalschematism,we may begin by banishingwhat are known as indicator

words (Goodman) or egocentricarticulars Russell): 'I', 'you',' this', 'that', 'here', 'there', 'now', 'then', and the like. This

we clearly must do if the truths of science are literally to be true

independentlyof author and occasion of utterance. It is only thus,

indeed, that we come to be able to speak of sentences,i.e. certain

linguisticforms,as true and false. As long as the indicatorwords are

retained, t is not the sentencebut only the severalevents of its utter-ancethatcan be said to be trueor false.

Besides indicatorwords, a frequentsourceof fluctuation n pointof truth andfalsity s ordinaryambiguity. One and the samesentence,

qua inguisticform, may be true in one occurrenceand false n another

because the ambiguity of a word in it is differently resolved byattendant circumstances on the two occasions. The ambiguous

sentence'Yourmothersboreyou' is likelyto be construedn one way

when it follows on the heelsof a sentenceof the form ' x bore y ', andin another when it follows on the heels of a sentence of the form

'x boresy'In Indo-Europeananguagesthere is also yet a third conspicuous

source of fluctuation in point of truth and falsity; viz. tense.

Actuallytense isjust a variantof thephenomenonof indicatorwords;the tensescan be paraphrasedn terms of tenselessverbsgoverned bythe indicatorword 'now', or by 'before now ', etc.

How can we avoid indicator words? We can resort to personalnames or descriptionsn placeof' I' and 'you', to datesor equivalent

descriptionsin place of 'now', and to place-namesor equivalent

descriptionsin place of'here'. It may indeed be protested that

something tantamount to the use of indicator words is finallyunavoidable, at least in the teaching of the terms which are to be

made to supplant the indicatorwords, But this is no objection;all that matters is the subsequentvoidability of indicator words.

All that matters is that it bepossible

inprinciple

to couch sciencein a notation such that none of its sentencesfluctuatesbetween truth

and falsity from utteranceto utterance. Terms which are primitiveor irreducible,from the point of view of that scientificnotation,

may still be intelligibleto us only through explanationsn an ordinary

language rife with indicatorwords, tense, and ambiguity. Scientific

8








language is in any event a splinter of ordinary language, not asubstitute.

Grantedthen that we can rid science of indicatorwords, whatwould be the purpose? A kind of objectivity, to begin with, con-

genialto the scientific emper: truthbecomes nvariantwith respect o

speakerand occasion. At the same time a more urgent purposeis

served: that of simplifying and facilitatinga basic departmentof

science,viz. deductivelogic. For, considere.g. the very elementarycanonsof deductionwhich leadfrom 'p and q' to 'p ', andfrom ' p '

to 'p or q', and from 'p and ifp then q' to 'q'. The letter 'p ',

standingfor any sentence,turnsup twice in eachof theserules; andclearlythe rules are unsoundif the sentence which we put for 'p' is

capableof being true in one of its occurrencesand false in the other.

But to formulatelogical laws in such a way as not to depend thus

upon the assumptionof fixed truth and falsity would be decidedlyawkward andcomplicated,andwholly unrewarding.

In practice certainly one does not explicitly rid one's scientific

work of indicatorwords, tense, and ambiguity, nor does one limit

one's use of logic to sentences hus purified. In practiceone merelysupposes ll suchpointsof variationfixed for the spaceof one's logical

argument; one does not needto resort o explicit paraphrase,xceptat

points where local shifts of context withinthe logical argumentitself

threatenequivocation.This practicalprocedureis often rationalisedby positing abstract

entities,'propositions', endowed with all the requisiteprecisionand

fixity which is wanting in the sentences hemselves; and then sayingthat it is with

propositions,and not their

coarsesentential embodi-

ments,thatthe laws of logic reallyhave to do. But thispositachieves

only obscurity. There s lessmystery n imagininganidealised orm of

scientificlanguage in which sentences are so fashioned as never to

vacillate between truth and falsity. It is significant that scientific

discourseactually does tend toward this ideal, in proportion to the

degree of development of the science. Ambiguities and local and

epochal biases diminish. Tense, in particular,gives way to a four-

dimensional reatmentofspace-time.

4

A basic form for sentencesof sciencemay then be representedas' Fa ', where ' a ' stands n place of a singularterm referring o some

object, from among those which exist according to the scientific

9







W. V. QUINE

theory in question, and ' F ' stands in place of a general term or pre-dicate. The sentence' Fa' is true if and only if the objectfulfils the

predicate. No tense is to be read into the predication ' Fa' ; anyrelevant dating is to be integral rather to the terms represented by ' F'

and 'a '

Compound sentences are built up of such predications with help of

familiar logical connectives and operators: 'and', 'not', the uni-

versal quantifier' (x)' (' each object x is such that '), and the existen-

tial quantifier ' (3x)' ('at least one object x is such that'). An

example is' (x) not (Fx and not Gx) ', which says that no object x is

such that Fx and not Gx ; briefly, every F is a G.A given singular term and a given general term or predicate will

be said to correspondf the general term is true of just one object, viz.

the object to which the singular term refers. A general term which

thus corresponds to a singular term will of course be 'of singular

extension ', i.e. true of exactly one object; but it belongs nevertheless

to the grammatical category of general terms, represented by the' F'

rather than the 'a' of' Fa'. Now the whole category of singular

terms can, in the interests of economy, be swept away in favour ofgeneral terms, viz. the general terms which correspond to those

singular terms. For, let 'a' represent any singular term, 'F' any

corresponding general term, and '... a . . .' any sentence we may

have cared to affirm containing 'a'. Then we may instead dispense

with' a ' and affirm' (ax)(Fx and . .. x.. .) '. Clearly this will be

true if and only if' . . . a . . .' was true. If we want to go on

explicitly to remark that the object fulfilling 'F' is unique, we can

easily do that too, thus :

(x)(y) not [Fx and Fy and not (x = y)]

provided that the identity sign' = ' is in our vocabulary.

How, it may be asked, can we be sure there will be a general term

corresponding to a given singular term ? The matter can be viewed

thus: we merely re-parsewhat had been singular terms as general

terms of singular extension, and what had been reference-to astruth-of, and what had been '.. a .' as' (3x)(Fx and .. x. .

If the old singular term was a proper name learned by ostension, then

it is re-parsed as a general term similarly earned.

The recent reference to '=' comes as a reminder that relative

general terms, or polyadic predicates, must be allowed for along with

the monadic ones; i.e. the atomic sentences of our regimented

IO








scientificlanguage will comprisenot only 'Fx ', 'Fy ', 'Gx ', etc.,

but also

'H-xy',

Hzx', 'Jyz', 'Kxyz ', and the like, for appro-

priately nterpretedpredicates'F', 'G ',' H', 'J',' K', etc. (whereof'H' might in particularbe interpretedas '= '). The rest of the

sentences are built from these atomic ones by 'and', 'not', ' (x)',' (y) ', etc. Singular erms' a ', ' b', etc. can,we haveseen,be left out

of account. So can the existential quantifiers' (ax)',' (ny)', etc.,

since' (ax) ' can be paraphrasednot (x) not '.

Besidessimplesingularterms there are operatorsto reckon with,such as '+ ', which yield complex singular terms such as 'x + y'.

But it is not difficultto see how these can be got rid of in favour ofcorresponding polyadic predicates-e.g. a predicate ' ' such that'Zzxy' means thatz is x + y.

This pattern or a scientific anguage s evidently ratherconfining.There are no names of objects. Further,no sentences occur within

sentencessave in contexts of conjunction, negation, and quantifica-tion. Yet it sufficesvery generallyas a medium for scientifictheory.Most or all of what is likely to be wanted in a science can be fitted

into this form, by dint of constructionsof varying ingenuity whichare familiar to logic students. To take only the most trivial and

familiarexample,consider he' if-then ' idiom; it can be managedby

rendering ifp then q' as 'not (p and not q) '.

It may be instructiveto dwell on this example for a moment.

Notoriously, 'not (p and not q) ' is no translationof'ifp then q';and it need not pretendto be. The point is merely that in the placeswhere, at least in mathematicsand other typical scientificwork, we

would ordinarilyusethe' if-then' construction,we findwe canget onperfectlywell with the substituteorm' not (p and not q) ', sometimes

eked out with a universalquantifier. We do not ask whether our

reformed diom constitutesa genuinesemanticalanalysis, omehow, of

the old idiom; we simplyfind ourselvesceasingto dependon the oldidiom in our technicalwork. Here we see, in paradigm,the contrastbetweenlinguisticanalysisand theory construction.

5

The variables x ', 'y ', etc., adjuncts o the notation of quantifi-cation, bring about a wideningof the notion of sentence. A sentence

which containsavariablewithoutitsquantifier e.g.' Fx' or' (y)Fxy',

lacking '(x)') is not a sentence in the ordinarytrue-or-falsesense;II







W. V. QUINE

it is truefor some values of its free variables,perhaps,and false for

others. Called an open sentence, it is akin rather to a predicate:

instead of having a truth value (truth or falsity) it may be said to havean extension, this being conceived as the class of those evaluations of

its free variables or which it is true. For convenienceone speaksalso

of the extension of a closed sentence, but what is then meant is simplythe truth value.

A compound sentence which contains a sentence as a component

clause is called an extensionalcontext of that component sentence if,

whenever you supplant the component by any sentence with the same

extension, the compound remains unchanged in point of its ownextension. In the special case where the sentences concerned are

closed sentences, then, contexts are extensional if all substitutions of

truths for true components and falsehoods for false components leave

true contexts true and false ones false. In the case of closed sentences,

in short, extensional contexts are what are commonly known as truth

functions.

It is well known, and easily seen, that the conspicuously limited

means which we have lately allowed ourselves for compoundingsentences-viz., ' and ', 'not ', and quantifiers-are capable of gener-

ating only extensional contexts. It turns out, on the other hand, that

they confine us no more than that; the only ways of imbeddingsentences within sentences which ever obtrude themselves, and resist

analysis by 'and', 'not', and quantifiers, prove to be contexts of

other than extensionalkind. It will be instructiveto survey them.

Clearly quotations, by our standards,non-extensional; we cannot

freely put truths for truths and falsehoods for falsehoods withinquotation, without affecting the truth value of a broader sentence

whereof the quotation forms a part. Quotation, however, is always

dispensable in favour of spelling. Instead e.g. of:

Heraclitus said' irvra "'' i wvra ^E contains three syllables,

we can say (following Tarski) :

Heraclitus said pi-alpha-nu-tau-alpha-space-rho-epsilon-iota,

and correspondingly for the other example, thus availing ourselves of

names of letters together with a hyphen by way of concatenation sign.

Now, whereas the quotational version showed a sentence (the Greek

one) imbedded within a sentence, the version based on spelling does

12








not; here, therefore, the question of extensionality no longerarises.

Under either version, we are talking about a certain object-alinguisticform-with help, as usual, of a singularterm which refers

to thatobject. Quotationproducesone singular erm for thepurpose;spellinganother. Quotation is a kind of picture-writing,convenient

in practice; but it is rather spelling that provides the proper analysisfor purposesof the logical theory of signs.

We saw lately that singularterms are never fminallyeeded. The

singular erms nvolved in spelling, n particular,an of course inallybe

eliminated in favour of a notation of the sort envisaged in recentpages,in which thereare ust predicates,quantifiers, ariables, and ',and 'not'. The hyphen of concatenationthen gives way to a

triadicpredicateanalogousto the 'Z' of 5 4, and the singularterms

'pi ', 'alpha', etc. give way to generalterms which 'correspond' to

them in the senseof 5 4.A more seriouslynon-extensionalcontext is indirect discourse:

'Heraclitussaidthatall is flux '. This isnot, like the caseof quotation,

a sentence about a specific and namable linguistic form. Perhaps,contraryto the line pursued n the case of quotation,we must acceptindirect discourse as involving an irreducibly non-extensionaloccurrenceof one sentence in another. If so, then indirectdiscourse

resists he schematism ately put forwardfor scientific anguage.It is the more interesting,then, to reflect that indirect discourse

is in any event at variancewith the characteristicbjectivityof science.

It is a subjective diom. Whereasquotationreportsan externalevent

of speech or writing by an objective descriptionof the observablewritten shapeor spoken sound, on the other hand indirectdiscourse

reportsthe event in terms rather of a subjectiveprojectionof oneself

into the imaginedstate of mind of the speakeror writer in question.Indirectdiscourse s quotation minus objectivity and precision. To

marshall he evidence for indirect discourse s to revert to quotation.It is significant hat the latitude of paraphrase llowable in indirect

discoursehas neverbeenfixed; andit is moresignificanthattheneed

offixing

it is sorarely

felt. To fix it would be a scientificmove,

and

a scientificallyunmotivated one in that indirect discourse endsawayfrom the very objectivitywhich science seeks.

Indirectdiscourse, n the standard orm' saysthat', is thehead of a

familywhich includesalso' believesthat',' doubts that',' is surprisedthat', 'wishes that', 'strives that', and the like. The subjectivity

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W. V. QUINE

noted in the case of'says that' is shared by these other idioms twice

over; for what these describe in terms of a subjective projection of

oneself is not even the protagonist's speech behaviour, but his sub-jective state in turn.

Further cases of non-extensional idiom, outside the immediate

family enumerated above, are' because' and the closely related pheno-

menon of the contrary-to-fact conditional. Now it is an ironical but

familiar fact that though the business of science is describable n

unscientific anguage as the discovery of causes,the notion of cause

itself has no firm place in science. The disappearanceof causal

terminologyfrom thejargon of onebranchof science and anotherhasseemed to mark the progress in understandingof the branchesconcerned.

Apart from actual quotation, therefore, which we have seen how to

deal with, the various familiar non-extensional idioms tend away from

what best typifies the scientific spirit. Not that they should or could

be generally avoided in everyday discourse, or even in science broadly

so-called; but their use dwindles in proportion as the statements

of science are made more explicit and objective. We begin to seehow it is that the language form schematised in ?4 might well, despite

its narrow limitations, suffice for science at its purest.

6

Insofar as we adhere to that idealised schematism, we think of a

science as comprising those truths which are expressible in terms of' and', 'not', quantifiers, variables, and certain predicates appropriate

to the science inquestion.

In this enumeration of materials wemayseem to have an approximation to a possible standard of what counts

as 'purely cognitive '. But the standard, for all its seeming strictness,

is still far too flexible. To specify a science, within the described

mould, we still have to saywhat the predicates re to be, andwhat the

domain of objects is to be over which the variables of quantification

range. Not all ways of settling these details will be congenial to

scientific ideals.

Looking at actual science as a going concern, we can fix in a

general way on the domain of objects. Physical objects, to begin with

-denizens of space-time--clearly belong. This category embraces

indiscriminately what would anciently have been distinguished as sub-

stances and as modes or states of substances. A man is a four-dimen-

sional object, extending say eighty-three years in the time dimension.

'4








Each spatio-temporalpart of the man counts as anotherand smaller

four-dimensional object. A president-electis one such, say two

months long. A fit of ague is another,if for ontological clarityweidentifyt,asweconvenientlymay,withitsvictimfor the duration fthe seizure.

Contraryto popularbelief, such a physicalontology has a placealso for statesof mind. An inspirationor a hallucinationcan, like

the fit of ague, be identifiedwith its host for the duration. The

feasibilityof this artificial dentification f any mentalseizure, x,with the correspondingime-slice ' of its physical ost,maybe seen

by reflecting n the followingsimplemanoeuvre. WhereP is anypredicatewhichwe mightwant to apply o x, let usexplainP' astrueof x' if and only if P is true of x. Whatevermay have been looked

upon as evidence, cause,or consequenceof P, as appliedto x, counts

now for P' as applied to x'. This parallelism, aken together with

the extensionalityof scientificlanguage, enables us to drop the old

P and x from ourtheory and get on with just P' andx', rechristenedas P and x. Such, in effect, is the identification. It leaves our

mentalistic dioms fairly intact, but reconcilesthem with a physicalontology.

This facile physicalisationof statesof mind rests in no way on

a theory of parallelismbetween nerve impulses,say, or chemicalcon-

centrations,and the recurrenceof predeterminedspecies of mental

state. Itmightwell be,now andforever,thattheonly way of guessingwhethera man is inspired,or depressed,or deluded,or in pain, is by

askinghim or by observinghisgrossbehaviour; not by examininghis

nervousworkings, albeit with instrumentsof undreamed-ofsubtlety.Discovery of the suggestedparallelismwould be a splendidscientific

achievement, but the physicalisationhere talked of does not re-

quire t.

This physicalisationdoes not, indeed, suffice to make 'inspira-tion', 'hallucination', 'pain', and other mentalistic ermsacceptableto science. Though these become concretegeneral ermsapplicable o

physical objects,viz. time-slicesof persons,still they may, some or

others of them, remain toovague

for scientificutility. Dispositionterms,and otherpredicateswhich do not lend themselves o immediate

verification, are by no means unallowable as such; but there are

better and worse among them. When a time-sliceof aperson s to be

classifiedunder the headofinspirationor hallucination,andwhen not,

may have been left too unsettledfor any useful purpose. But what is

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W. V. QUINE

then at stake is the acceptabilityof certainpredicates,and not the

acceptabilityof certainobjects,values of variablesof quantification.

Let us not leave the latter topic quite yet: ontology, or thevalues available to variables. As seen, we can go far with physical

objects. They arenot, however, known to suffice. Certainly,asjustnow argued,we do not need to add mentalobjects. But we doneed to

add abstract bjects, if we are to accommodate science as currentlyconstituted. Certain hingswe wantto say n sciencemaycompelus to

admit into the range of values of the variablesof quantificationnot

only physical objects but also classes and relations of them; also

numbers, functions, and other objects of pure mathematics. For,mathematics-not uninterpretedmathematics,but genuineset theory,

logic, numbertheory, algebraof realand complex numbers,differen-

tial andintegralcalculus,and so on-is bestlooked upon as an integral

part of science,on a par with the physics, economics, etc. in which

mathematicss said o receivetsapplications.Researches n the foundationsof mathematicshave made it clear

that allof mathematics n the above sensecan be got down to logic and

set theory, and that the objectsneeded for mathematics n this sensecan be got down to a single category, that of classes-includingclassesof classes,classesof classesof classes,and so on. Our tentative

ontology for science,our tentativerangeof values for the variablesof

quantification,comes therefore to this: physical objects, classesof

them, classes n turn of the elementsof this combineddomain,and so

on up.We have reachedthe present stage in our characterisation f the

scientific framework not by reasoning a priorifrom the nature ofscience quascience, but ratherby seizing upon traits of the science

of our day. Special raits husexploitedincludethe notion of physical

object,the four-dimensional onceptof space-time, he classicalmouldof modern classicalmathematics, he true-falseorientationof standard

logic, and indeedextensionality tself. One or another of thesetraits

might well changeas scienceadvances. Alreadythe notion of aphysi-cal object, as an intrinsicallydeterminateportion of the space-time

continuum,squaresdubiouslywith

modem developmentsn

quantummechanics. Savants thereare who even suggest that the findingsof

quantummechanicsmight best be accommodatedby a revision of the

true-falsedichotomyitself.

To the question, finally, of admissiblepredicates. In generalwe

may be sure that a predicatewill lend itself to the scientific enter-

i6








prise only if it is relatively free from vagueness in certain crucial

respects. If the predicate is one which is mainly to be used in ap-

plicationto the macroscopicobjects

of common sense,then thereis

obvious utility in therebeing ageneral endencyto agreement,amongobservers,concerning ts application o those objects; for it is in such

applications hat the intersubjective erifiabilityof the data of science

resides. In thecaseofa predicatewhichsmainly applicableo scientific

objectsremote from observationor common sense,on the otherhand,what is required s thatit be freemerelyfrom suchvaguenessasmightblur its theoretical unction. But to say thesethingsis merely to saythat the predicatesappropriateo science arethosewhich expeditethe

purposesof intersubjectiveconfirmationand theoreticalclarity and

simplicity. These samepurposesgovern alsothe ontologicaldecision

-the determinationof the range of quantification; for, clearly the

presenttentativeontology of physical objectsand classeswill be aban-doned forthwith when we find an alternative which serves those

purposesbetter.

In science all is tentative, all admits of revision-right down,as we havenoted, to the law of the excludedmiddle. But ontology is,

pending revision, more clearly in hand than what may be called

ideology-the question of admissiblepredicates. We have found a

tentativeontology in physical objectsand classes,but the lexicon of

predicatesremains decidedly open. That the ontology should be

relativelydefinite,pending revision,is requiredby the mere presence

ofquantifiersin the languageof science; for, quantifiersmay be said

to have beeninterpretedandunderstoodonly insofaras we havesettledthe range of their variables. And that the fund of predicates hould

be foreversubject o supplementations implicitin a theoremofmathematics; for it is known that for any theory,however rich,there

areclasseswhich arenot the extensions(cf.?5) of any of its sentences.

The Universityof Harvard

B 17

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Quine.the Scope and Language of Science