Punjab Communalised beyond politics (1988)

8/7/2019 Punjab Communalised beyond politics (1988)

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PERSPECTIVESPunjab: Communalised beyondPolit icsDipankar GuptaSumanta BanerjeeDinesh MohanGautam NavlakhaIt is now becoming apparent to many Hindus in Punjab that theSikhs in general have no comm on cause w ith the terrorists. TheSikhs too have made it apparent, through their response toOperation Black Thunder, that the extremists do not speak forthem. If New Delhi is seriously interested in bringing to an endthe sufferings of the people of Punjab then the present popularmood in the state offers it yet anothe r opportunity.INTENSE1), passionate and bloody thoughPunjab has been over the last eight years,it has never been complex. If Chandigarhwas the principal factor till 1984, it is therelease of the Jodhpur detenus and the'punishment of the killers of the Sikhs in the1984 carnag e tha t are the issues today. Boththen and now Sikh opposition to the centrehas condensed aYound incontrovertibletruths. The Ana ndp ur S ahib Resolution gavethe false impression of being a multi pro-nged attack against the'centre; but for allits riverine manoeuvres and territorial en-trenchments, it was only Chandigarh thatwas worth a strategy in the minds of theSikhs. Why' else was Ch andiga rh the un-conditional centre piece of the Rajiv-Longowal accord? Why else would a fadingand besieged Barnala entreat the centre in1986 to at least give Chandigarh and thushelp renew the lease of his government? T hetying in of Chandigarh to Abohar, Fazilka,Kandukhera and other sundry territories wasa post-accord legerdemain1 which only theSikhs saw through as they alone were nothypnotised by the spectre of the secessionistkhalsa. ,

Chandigarh may have fallen back inpublic consciou sness today, bu t it is waitingthere like a recessive gene ready to foil anysuperficial rapprochement on Punjab. Thecentre may weil credit itself for pushingpolitical issues into the b ackground with itsaggressive policies in this province: but atwhat cost! Operation Bluestar, OperationWoodrose 2 and the calm indulgence of Ra-jiv's Congress to the guilty of 1984 haveoutraged the Sikhs right out of their politicalwits. The craving for elementary, incon-trovertible justice su,ffuses the community,so completely that politics and politickingare alien to the mood in Punjab today.

T H E A R G U M E N T SIn the following pages we put forward aview that may not quite resonate with the

national opinion on the subject of Punjab.We too would not have advanced this viewhad we not visited Punjab and assessed mat-ters for ourselves. We believe that the solu-

tion to Punjab is neither intricate norlabyrinthine, with many dark and unlit cor-ridors. The government knows it and theSikhs know it and that is why Sikh pride isheavy with hurt. All that is required of thegovernment is to act constitutionally, to treatextremists as a law and order problem, andto leave the politics of P unjab to the peopleof that region. This would heal the woundand pride would revert back, to being the oldswagger again. But instead the governmentinsists on behaving unconstitutionally, first,by holding the innocent detenus in Jodhpur,and second, by not punishing those respon-sible for the 1984 Sikh massacres. As if allthis were not enough, the centre goes fur-ther. It makes politic deals with terrorists andsuspends the constitutionally legitimatepolitical process in Punjab.3

Tljis paper goes on to argue that thegovernment does not desire a quick solutionto Punjab. Our interviews in Punjab gave usthe unequivocal impression that the govern-ment is aware that the Pun jab problem is notcomplex but is desisting from acting con-stitutionally for political considerations.Time and t im e again we were given to under-stand that the government has a plan whichwill reveal itself within the next two years.The Jodhpur detenus too would be releas-ed one day but the timing of their releaseshould be 'politically right'. Obviously, allthese calculations are being made with aview to capitalising on mass sentiments atthe time of the next general elections. Thetime-frame too is just right: the nation isscheduled to face a general election withintwo years.

Interestingly, we also noted in Punjab thatthere is no fine point of distinction betweenthe Khalistani Commando Force or theBhindranwale Tigers or even the BabbarKhalsa shade off into one another. They alladvocate arm ed m ilitancy, terror tactics, andpreach the formation of Khalistan at anycost. They are supposedly controlled (withthe exception of Babbar Khalsa) by a Pan-thic Com mittee which is believed to be func-tioning from Pakistan. This committeeissues instructions from across the border to

various o rganisations^ that function hereunder its control. This committee has madeclear, on several occasions, th at no religioushead, not scriptural pressure, will dissuadeit from seeking a sovereign Khalistan. Tothem it is not importa nt to be Khalsa (pure,in the religious sense), but to be Sikh. Thisallows the various activists functioningunder the secessionist Panthic Committee totake all kinds of liberty with their religionand it would be a travesty of the term if onestill insists on calling them fundam entalists.Obviously when groups such as these arefreed from all constraints of morality, thenit is not enough, in their eyes, to be just aSikh, but to be their brand of Sikh. This iswhy so many more Sikhs than Hindus havefallen victim to terrorist bullets. Support forKhalistan as an ideal has never been pop ularfor its own sake with the Sikhs. Some havetaken to it on the rebound, but most are op-posed to it. Even so the K halistanis possesanaura of being da re devil oppositionists. Thisimage allowed them to carve a soft niche forthemselves in the minds of most Sikhsalready disenchanted with the wheelings anddealings of politics . But this aura too is fastvanishing. No doubt, months of indis-criminate terrorist killings have taken theirtoll and hardened the attitudes of a largenumber of Sikhs against terrorism. But itwas only after Operation Black Thunderforced the Khalistanis in the temple to sur-render that the erstwhile 'silent majority' ofSikhs began to voice their misgivings aboutthem. This, however, is not the only impor-tant issue to be noted in this connection.Several crucial observations result from ananalysis of why there has not been a majoroutcry against Black Thunder (on the linesof that against Bluestar), and w hat this hasto say about the much overworked notionof the Sikh 'psyche', of 'self image', as wewould rather call it. What needs to be em-phasised is that the Sikhs too want to bedelivered from bearing the incubus of a hurtpride. The anodyne is there and at thedispensation of the centre, but when will itbe applied?B E Y O N D P O L I T I C S

The Congress is not ready yet with thesoothing touch. It is still intent onpolit icking, and does not l ike to bereminded that the consti tution applies toPun jab as well . Enco uraged by its successin generating opinion around Delhi thatthe general Sikh population, the polit icalmoderates and the Khalistani militants areall equally responsible for the mess inPunjab , the government re len t less lypolit icks in these interstices. This processhas gradually discredited all Sikh forumsand representatives who were mesmerisedby the adder gaze of polit ics and couldnot resist deals and pacts and late-nightaccords. Each such polit ical instanceest ranged the people tha t much morefrom the participants in the acts. Thoughthe Congress government, by vir tue of i tbeing the constant factor at all suchmoments, has the least credibil i ty of all ,

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yet there is virtually no known extantpolit ical organisation in Punjab that hasnot lusted for power, trucked with theCongress, and consequently lost out inpublic esteem.This alienated Sikh consciousness to-day has free-wheeled itself right out ofpolitics. Unless justice is served first theSikhs will persistently reject any politicalunderstanding with the centre. To quotea close associate of the UAD: "There issomething that has happened to the Sikhpsyche in recent times. The Sikhs distrustanything that is not done openly. Thereis a mental block! ' Even the few Jodhpurdetenus that have been released so far havenot been publicly feted and welcomed, noteven by the UAD. There exists a lurking,and quite unjustifiable, suspicion that theforty-odd detenus who come out fromJodhpur belonged to Bhai Jasbir SinghRode's list and had, therefore, come tosome understanding with the government.As Nietzche said, "Everything that isthought about a great deal is finallythought suspicious".4

The latest demonstrable casualty of thisprocess of politicking is, of course, BhaiJasbir Singh Rode himself. As Sant Bhin-dranwale 's nephew and Baba JoginderSingh's grandson Rode erroneously be-lieved that his credentials were impeccableenough for him to be able to ride out adeal with the government. The normallysanguine administrative headquarters atChandigarh is now forced to admit thatRode failed to do what he had promised,and what the government had hoped. 5Even Avtar Singh Brahma, of the KhalistaniLiberation Force, who many thought wouldside with Rode, has so far stayed aloof fromthis government-initiated process.

But Rode has not been the only casualtyin recent weeks. The so-called Khalistanimilitants who surrendered during OperationBlack Thunder severely rocked the image theterrorists had projected of themselves.Though the terrorists were hitherto viewedvariously by the majority of Sikhs , as beingmisguided, irrational demented, and evenblood thirsty, they, nevertheless, camethrough as uncompromising opponents ofthe centre. But their many secret and silentadmirers were shamed when OperationBlack Thunder compelled the militants totamely surrender. Television cameras andcrew men were for days secured, machan likein safe vantage spots ready to shoot as themilitants came out. And come out in a zom-bie like trance they did, w ith their hands overtheir heads. Their meek submission disgrac-ed the entire Sikh community before thesearching eyes of the nation. Most Sikhsvicariously revel in the mar tyrdo m complexand many hoped these terrorists would diehonourable deaths. So when the terroristssurrendered they may have saved their skinsbut the plummage they had donned belonfi-ed to the community. The Sikhs, therefore,felt that they had every right to hope thatthe militants would die to a man. But insteadof gaining vicarious martyrdom the Sikhswere vicariously disgraced. As a staunchanti-Khalistani related his anguish: "I havenever agreed with t he ter rorists. I believe they

are bullies who suffer from all kinds of illu-sions. But they arrogated to themselves theright to speak oil our behalf; and what isworse, the Hindus are convinced that theyrepresent us, and we are thus pushed againstthe wall. Tha t is why. the cowardly surrende rby the terrorists bothers me: I hate to beshamed in the eyes of others".So now in Punjab there are not manytakers for the militants, for the moderates,or for the Congress. Till very recently, i e,till the surrender that climaxed BlackThunder, many considered the debris (malba)of the Akal Takht (demolished in 1984 byBluestar) as sacred and worshipped it too.Today the sam e devotees are outraged whenthey learn that the mound they had so longrevered concealed the bodies of innocentSikhs who fell victims to Khalistanimilitants. Interestingly enough, whilenewspaper reports are routinely dismissed asgovernment propaganda, there has been nopublic suggestion so far that the bodies inthe malba were planted by the government.6This demonstrates not just the fall fromgrace of those few who surrendered but ageneral lack of public credibility for the ter-rorists as a whole.

Today there are no political writings onthe walls of Punjab. Even a city as sensitivesas Amritsar is singularly bereft of anypolitical grafitti. This city which evokeshistory and memories in equal measure isperhaps most indicative of the mood inPunjab. When evening falls armed jawansstraddle the road dividers, and the city silent-ly parts away from them. An air of sullenanger pervades the city but it also breaksspontaneously every time an occasion forhospitality arises. It -is the quintessentialPunjabi city where Punjabi generosity is atits best. It is also a city that doggedly pur-sues business during the day as if to makeup for the early shut down at sunset.1 Amrit-sar by night presents a grim profile of cor-rugated shutters and chained padlocks. Butall its lights are not outnot yet. The liquorstores stay open tiH the late hours as if indefiance of the anti-liquor campaign spon-sored by some Khalistani militants. Quiteparadoxied all this, but, perhaps, quitecharacteristic too.G O V E R N M E N T H A S A P L A N

Outside Punjab, newspaper editorials andpopular opinion concur that Rajiv's Con-gress is adrift a nd w ithout a plan on Punjab.Rajiv, on the other hand, insists that he hasa plan and, ironically, the Sikhs in Punjabthink so too! It is popular knowledge inPunjab that Rajiv is going to hold on to theJodh pur detenus as his 'trum p card' till elec-tion time.7A participant at a much publicis-ed breakfast meeting with Rajiv on April25th this year admitted that Rajiv was in nomood to unconditionally release the inno-cent citizens still detained in Jodhpur. Wealso have it from the highest administrativequarters in Punjab that Rajiv's 'scientificmind' has evolved a strategy that is goingto unfold over the next two years. TheJodhpur detenus figure somewhere in thispolitical scheduling, most likely towards itsclimax. So Rajiv's plan is no secret in Punjab^nd this is why Pu nj ab has no use for

politics or clever plots.Now in retrospect it appears that theLongowal-Rajiv accord was never meant towork. Longowal's assassination soon afte,rthe agreement was arrived at made it easierfor the centre to renege on the accord. It wasfrom then on that the mindless militancy andterrorism of the kind we see today began togrow in Punjab. Bluestar, the 1984 mass-acres, Operation Woodrose and now the fail-ed pact buoyed the terrorists' morale andfreed them from moral compunctions. Asa serving Sikh police officer confessed: "Itis very hard for me tof find a proper responsewhen the young terrorists we apprehend tellme that while you beat us and even kill us,no punishment has been given yet to thekillers Of Sikhs in D elhi!' The mod erate Sikhoption could offer no alternative from themoment it was clear that the elected Akaliministry was powerless in wresting Chan-digarh from the centre, as per the accord.Barnala, as the chief minister, in exhaustedslow motion, replayed the old Akali failingof trying to dea l with D elhi and with the 'militants at the same time. While Barnalawas thus frittering away his opportunities,'the lines of vision of the other moderateleaders criss-crossed as they focused on thechief minister's chair. In their haste to grabpower the Akali Dal splintered into squab-bling factions so gross and petty that it wasonly their eponymous mast-heads thatdistinguished one warfing band fromanother. All this while the militants slowlygained some credibility, primarily by default,feeding on the cynicism of the people whohad just voted in the Akali ministry in 1985with a record turn-out.

The centre's aggressive posturing in.Punjab which was largely meant for thegallery outside the province, also stoked thefire of terrorist militancy. OperatioaWoodrose which systematically terrorisedthe youth between the ages 16 to 20 drovemany youngsters to militancy or to Pakistan.From the CPI to the CRPF to^the Punjabsecretariat in Chandigarh, there is completeunanimity today that Woodrose brutallyforced large numbers of young men to jointrje ranks of the militants. Only recently hasthe Woodrose method been given up for aless rigorous one. As an officer in uniformsaid: "We no longer harass people if theywere forced to give food or shelter to ter-rorists. Instead we encourage them to talkto us and we try to win them over to ou r side.This change in our policy has helped us alot. Now people are beginning to inform usabout the whereabouts of these terrorists!'In other words, this official confirmed, thatdemocratic methods are not only morehumane and just but that they also work.It may be recalled in this context th^at fromthe closing weeks of 1987 the Punjab govern-ment repeatedly announced that the ter-rorists were on the run and that the securityforces were getting the better of them. 8

From our discussions with various respon-dents in Punjab we too were given the im-pression that this indeed was the case. Thisis what makes the next stage of governm ent'smanoeuvres mysterious and diabolic.The government in December 1987 is saidto have suddenly ordered the CRPF and

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other security personnel active in Punjab togo easy on the terrorists. In the words ofsenior official: "We were given unwrittenorders not to kill terrorists but to catch themif we could". This was a signal to the CR PFand the police to stay clear of the terrorists. and not engage in any action against them .9Terrorists, after all, are not caught withbare hands. Th is policy upset many in thesecurity forces to the extent that a muchaward ed seni or police, officer w rote a D Opointedly criticising it . The question,therefore, is : why did the governm ent notrealise its advantage? This m ay again leadman y observers to believe tha t the govern-ment as usual was prone to drifting andwas again with out a plan. -Some of the mwill perhaps think differently today withthe advantage of hindsight.The government even then.had a plan.With the softening of the government'spolicy -towards the m ilitants the num berof terrorist killings escalated. It was alsoin these early mo nths of 1988 that theCongress began pushing the 59th constitu-tional amendment in parliament. Further,according to a senior police official, as a

part of the general policy of relaxationagainst terrorists , secur-ity checkingaround the Golden Temple was more orless given up, and guns began to go intothe holy complex in large numbers. ByFebruary new spapers were already repor-ting that a parallel government operatesfrom the Golden Temple.10 When all thesefactors are put together it certainly does notinvoke the image of a goofy Doon Schoolmonitor but that of an amoral politicalmanipulator.T H E P L A N

One is not very sure to what extent O pera-tion Woodrose was given up because of apolitical decision or because of reasons ofsoldiering in the field. The ready endorse-ment that the~security and CRPF personnelgave to the jettisoning of W oodrose also in-dicates that it was becoming difficult for thesecurity forces to carry on with the policyof terror and intimidation because of its ob-vious counter-productivity. After all, it wasmen from the services who were facing ter-rorist bullets and risking their lives.Be that as it may the change in field tacticshelped. During the months of November-Decem ber 1987 the villagers were less hostile,though far from friendly, to the ( armedforces, which also meant that the cycle ofterrorist recruitment was beginning to taperoff. At this junc ture the government decidedto go soft on the terrorists. This not onlyrevived the flagging mora le of the extremistsbut it also led from January 1988 onwardsto a spate of killings, extortions, abd uctions,rapes, tortures and pillage by the terroristsin Punjab. Doubtlessly, a large number ofajiti-social elements joined the so-calledranks of the Khalistanis sensing a clear andopen field." But the earlier hard coremilitants regrouped too, either in theGolden Temple or in the Mand area, orunder the political penumbra of the homem in is t ry .1 2 This again set of f themoderates in UAD to coq uette afresh with

the separatis ts without putting forwardany proposals of their own. This wasreadily apparent in the UAD conventionheld on December 27, 1987 whenAmarinder Singh left the meeting in ahuff because the resolution put togetherby the militants was being forwardedunopposed by senior members of the.UAD.13The pot was thus kept boiling for it wastoo early yet to arrive at a s olution. T he elec-tions were still far away and the wellcultivated national mood could still bedepended upon for a rich red harvest of anti-Sikhism. The government, therefore, decid-ed to continue with its policy of sideliningthe moderates and reviving internecinerivalry am ong the Sikhs. To this end it quitedramatically introduced Bhai Jasbir SinghRode into the scene. Rode who had earlierbeen arrested by the government as adangerous terrorist after a much publicisedinternational man-hunt now suddenly be-came virtuous enough for Delhi and forChandigarh to be appointed as jathedar ofthe Akal Takht. The moderates' again outof sheer fright, clambered over each otherto own Rode, but for the people of Punjabthis indeed was the dizzy limit. No wonderthere is no credibility left in the eyes of thepeople of Punja b for anyone whose businessis politics. One hears very often in Punjabthe rumour that even Manochahal, thedreaded leader of the Panthic Committee,is really Buta Singh's man, and that theAISSF leader Gurjit Singh is a covertBalram Jakhar pawn.14While all this was going on in the com-bat zone, so to say, the government was alsomoving in with the 59th constitutionalamendment in parliament. In the h,ack-ground of growing terrorist violence it was

good timing on the part of th^governmentto inviegle in emergency resolutions.Whether the amendment was meant fromthe very beginning to be enacted only withrespect to Punjab or not is not important.The crucial issue is that with this amend-ment emergency has been made respectableagain and it can now be talked about in theopen . It is no longer tab oo, no longer a for-bidden topic, in haute political circles. Thisby itself is a great feat and if does not reallymatter whether it is applied immediately ornot, in Punjab or not, with respect to theKhalistanis or not. What this amendmenthas also done, as a by produc t, is that it hassurreptiously taken away the right of parlia-ment and the election commission to act aswatch-dogs, even in theory, during the periodunder emergency.15 This amendment mayappear at first flush to be a somewhat in-nocuous isolated act, but it is part of a com-plex of devious ploys and stratagems involv-ing the Golden Temple, the soft-pedalling ofterrorists, and the revival of Bhai JasbirSingh Rode. Only when it is seen as suchdoes one realise that the government allalong had a plan and is still acting accor-ding to it.

Like all political plans this plan too,isopen ended. Whether the government willuntangle issues of justice and human rightsfrom matters political will depend upon the

government's political reading of the situa-tion at election tim e. But in these 18 mon thsor so, if this government's current form per-sists, then no amo unt of pressuring, exerting,or exhorting is going to bring about anysolution in Pun jab. However, it is also verylikely that if justice is delayed too long thenthe scenario may change again, The moralwhipping whjch the militan ts have receivedin recent weeks may be forgotten in a freshwave of K halistani credibility. As the govern-ment's plan is still open-end ed, it might welltry to recreate the national panic of 1984once more for the next elections, in whichcase the resurgence of terrorism would notbe such a bad thing for the Congress(I).Wha t is more, a troubled Punjab might evenlegitimise the implementation of the 59thamendment. Or, and this is a fond hopewhich is still not quite U topian, the govern-ment will condescend to uphold fundamen-tal rights and pursu e elementary justice, andleave the politics of Punjab to a free and fairelection. Whethe r o ne optio n is exercised orthe other it will all depend eventually onwhat the centre thinks will work out in itsfavour. So, even the option fora just solu-tion is still going to be intrinsically soiledas its delivery will be politically tim ed, anddealt out, to use Rajiv's artless phrase, likea 'trump card'.T H E T E R R O R I S T F A C T O R

It is ironic that the government of Indiawhich is so exercised about the continued in-carceration of Nelson Mandela in SouthAfrica should keep hundreds of innocentSikh citizens as hostages in Jod hp ur for overthree years. Even the government acknow-ledges that of the 365 original detenus ofJod hpu r only 13 can be listed as offenders.The rest are innocent pilgrims picked upfrom the Golden Temple in the dragnetfollowing Bluestar in 1984. It has been fouryears now and about 50 of the detenus have"gone mad".16 Yet, argued one of thehighest officials in the Punjab government,the timing of their release must be politicallyright. " The Sikh leaders and masse.s are notyet ready for them," confided this high-ranking official. The hollowness of this,moral oxymoron has not escaped the Sikhs.But strangely this has not arousedwidespread anger in the rest of the country.

For the hardened terrorist too it does notmatter what happens to the Jodhpur detenusor whether the killers of 1984 are punishedor not. There can thus be no sense in thetheory of the 'trump card' if it is meant toslow down and rein in terrorism. As aKhalistani apologist said: "the momentRode said that he would like to have PooranAzadi whether it be within In dia or outsideit, he lost the supp ort of the m ilitants. Therec'an be no compromise on a sovereign andindependent Khalistan".It is quite clear th at there exists no roomfor a political dialogue with the advocatesof K halistan. It just does not matter to theseterrorists whether Chandigarh is given toPunjab or not, whether Punjab gets keepAbohar, or whether the killers of 1984 aredangled from lamp-posts, or whether Sikhsoutside Punjab are threatened or not. In

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their scheme of things Khalistan has to bewon through terror and intimidation. ThatRajiv released Rode, and not his 'trumcard'in Jodhpur, is obviously becau sehe felt thatRode was the joker in his pack , who woulddo his bidding and fulfill m ultiple purposes.To this extent the government has beeneminent ly successful . The SGPC issplintered, the UAD is divided 17 and theterrorists are unmoved.Though Punjab has been beaten blue andblack, wh at with Bluestar, Woodrose, Tint-ed Glass, and Black Thunder, yet the ma-jority of the Sikhs are still highly recon-ciliatory. The government must deal withthese Sikhs because, in the u ltimate analysis,neither the militants nor the m oderates cando without them. Khalistan is still not acherished goal for an overwhelming majorityof Sikhs, thoug h th ere exists a feeling today,more so than it did in 1984-85, that if thingsdeteriorate any further then Khalistan can-not be much w orse. The terrorists and theirapologists might argue that Khalistan is aviable reality, for sm all states are known toexist, but the idea has simply not caught onwith the mass of Sikhs, Today, as m entioned

earlier, neither the militants nor themoderates control the complete allegianceof the Sikhs. This realisation was broughtto full public view with Operation BlackThunderO P E R A T I O N B L A C K T H U N D E R

Once Operation Black Thu nder was suc-cessfully accomplished everyone wanted totake credit for it. But in all probability thedecisions made a nd taken during this opera-tion were local in provenance. It must,however, be tru e th at some bro ad guidelines,viz, not to da mag e the G olden Temple, musthave been formulated at higher levels, yetquite unlike Operation Bluestar, opera tionaldecisions were left in the charg e of tho se onthe spo t. Again u nlike Bluestar, even the tint"ing of Black Thun der was not pre-planned.It was only after D IG Virk ^a s shot at andinjured by boastful militants that the policeand the commandos swung into action. Themilitants hardly expected this as they had,in recent months, been pampered by thegovernment to the point that many believedthey were too powerful for the Indian Stateto take onAccording to a prominent politician inAmritsar, if the shooting of Virk had gone

unchallenged there would have been a revoltin the ranks of th e CRP F. This is probablyan overstatement, but it nevertheless ac-curately pinpoints the seething frustrationamong the officers and men of the PunjabPolice and the C RPF and m any of them mayhave been just waiting for a chance. Asalready mentioned, the police in Punjabthoroughly disapproved of the go-soft policyon the terrorists.In any, event, Operation Black Thunderrelied heavily on local initiative and com-mand. It is quite likely that the governmentmay also have been dragged into the opera-tion because it was caught in a situationfrom which it could not retract without in-curring the wrath of the security forces inPunjab. In fact the government at Delhi kept

quiet all through the operation in case itshould misfire. It was only after BlackThund er w as successfully accomplished thatRajiv Gandhi bluntly declared that his poljcof aggression had worked yet once again inPunjab.18But Black Th under was not just blunt ag-gression. The Director General of PoliceK P S Gill, conducted the ope ration with asure touch as if he were sitting on the ex-posed nerve ends of the terrorists; When theterrorists came out, they appeared to hav$been morally outmanoeuvred and totallyfrustrated. Th ere was no anger, defiance, andhatred in their faces. They looked rather likeexhausted marathon runners compelled togo the distance despite a flagging morale. Itwas Gill again, as an observer of BlackThunder related, who ordered round-the-clock media coverage the instant the 46 ter-rorists took refuge in the Harmandir Sahib,It was almost as if the DG P ha d right thensensed the eventual outcome and saw the op -portunity to call the bluff of the terroristsand capture their humiliation through theT V; lenses. Th e terrorists in recent m onth shad done enough damage to their reputa-tion by their wanton killings, but all thatcould be explained away by placing theresponsibility on anonymous gadflies of theKhalistani cause. It was, however an alto^gether different matte r to see the likes ofAjnala, Penta, Nirwair Singh first meekly. surrender a nd then hun grily swallow ba na-nas, in police custody. Nothing could haveseared through the terrorists' a ura the waythe television cam eras did du ring th e climac-tic stages of Op eration Black T hunder. T heimages the terrorists had broadcast ofthemselves through cocky pho tos w ith AK47s and apocryphal stories of derring-do justdid not square with what came through onthousands of T V screens.

F R O M B L U E ST A R T O B L A C K T H U N D E R :T H R E E L E S S O N S, There are three important observationstjtatiriust be empha sised he re While the im-ages ate Still fresh. T hese po ints were ma deMiree years ago an d they sta nd reaffirmedtpctay.?0 First, the blunderbuss method us- \ed in Operation Bluestar was totally uncalledfor. If Operation Bluestar had been con-ducted like Operation Black Thunder then

the story of Punjab would have read quitedifferently. Its many long passages wouldnot have been italicised in anger. IndiraGandhi would still have been alive, Rajiv's'trump card' would not be holed up inJodhpur, ' and neither would thousands ofSikhs have lost .their lives in th e massacresof 1984. It is now quite clear tha t the G oldenTemple is not defensible over a protractedlength of time, and there is not now, northere ever was, a network of secret passageslinking the temple to unknown pointsoutside.Secondly, Bhindranwale gained in staturebecause he die d, ostensibly, fighting. He also,died with numerous other pilgrims wh o hadcome to the Temple to celebrate Guru ArjunDev's martyrdom day. It was not B hindrah-wale's initial charisma that the Sikhs foundappealing as much as his 'martyrdom'. T hevery people who earlier in conversationspoured scorn on Bhindranwale now reverehim after his 'shaheedi'. They now contentthat Bhindranwale was a great religiousleader, who read the Guru Bani every day,and whose anger against Delhi was onlyretaliatory. Many of these latter-day ad-mirers can be found in the ranks of 'triemoderates whose very existence Bhindran-wale had scorned. This list of admirers in-cluded Sant Longowal who, in a post-Blue-star interview in 1985, insisted on referringto Bhindranwale as a 'sant' and a martyr. 2 'Bhindranwale too went against tradition bytaking refuge in the Akal Takht with his menfor three days. But the Akal Takht was notdefiled as a consequence because B hindran-wale died a martyr's deathin fact the rub-ble of this demolished Akal Takht was, tillrecently, even worshipped by spme. If Penta,Ajnala and Nirwair SinglThad died duringBlack Thunder then the fact that they haddefiled the Golden Temple and left it "fullof stink" (to quote Barnala) would in all pro-bability not have surfaced either. 22Thirdly, the Sikh objection to Bluestar wasnot because they could not tolerate anypolice or army action in the temple butbecause the army needlessly destroyed theAkal Takht and.damaged the Golden Tem-ple. Three years ago, when this propositionwas first made, many may have found it hardto believe. But it .stands authenticated todayin the light of the reception that Black

JUST PUBLISHEDTHE INDIAN NATION IN 1942

EditedbyGyancndra Pandey

(Sponsored by Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta)1988 pp. 268 Rs. 130.00The essays in this volume bring together a substantial set of new historical materialwhich throws light on the diverse organised an d popular forces making up thejocalrevolts against.British rule in different regions of India in 1942-43. Hitesranjan Sanyal,David Hardiman, Gyanendra Pandey, Chandan Mitra, Biswamoy Pati, David Arnold andGail Omvedt axamine in detail th e course of the Quit India Movement in Medinipur,Gujarat, Eastern U.R, Bihar, Malkangiri, Madras and Satara, while Gyanendra Pandeywrites an introductory essay, offering a new interpretation of the movement as a w hole.

K P BAGCHI & COMPANY286, B B Ganguli Street, Calcutta . 700 0121-1698 Chittaranjan Park, New Delh i : 110 019

1680 Eco nom ic and Politica l Weekly Aug ust 13, 1988


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Thunder has received from SficîiSt Both inPunjab andoutside. Badal andCompanywho initially went ou t toshow'their solidari-ty with the terrorists in the mistaken assum p-tion that Sikh sentiments would be offend-ed byBlack Thunder soon looked patheticand dismal. Barnala toopitched into thefray, though separately from Badal, butlooked equally ridiculous at the end of it.He tried to make up for it by releasing astrongly worded criticism of the terroristsfrom jail soon after Black Thund er conclud-ed.23 The SGPC too was quite bewildered.It initially defied the government a nd refus-ed to bepressured bythe administration togive inwriting that it would guarantee thatno arms would enter the Golden Temple.The SGPC officials argued, quite correctly,tha t it was the job of the police and thesecurity personnel tosee tosuch matters per-taining to law andorder. But the commit-tee members were taken aback by the positiveresponse to Black Thunder and quiteneedlessly buckled under and yielded toth egovernment's demands. Yet once again Sikhrepresentatives of all hues were out of step -with majority Sikh sentiment.S I K H S E L F - I M A G E

The above three points demonstrate thatthe Sikhs, like the other communities, areho t governed by blind religiosity. Like othercommunities the Sikhs too are proud of theirculture and tradition s. But unlike most othercommunities theSikh self-image has neverha d toreadjust, however secretively, totheircollective illusions. A s the Sikhs believe thattheir history begins only with their Gurusthey are able toconstruct a tradition that isstrident with pride. This has been furtherconfirmed by their success in contemporarytimes. Their achievements in business, inagriculture, inthe army, infact inevery walkof life led them tosee themselves as the realand true Indians w ho could hold their ownagainst the best inthe world. The fact thatPunjab easily outdistances the other pro-vinces in India in producing the mostmarketable surplus infoodgrains has spon -sored the misconception that the Sikhs feedthe hungry Indians nation-wide. TheSikhvalour inthe arme d forces too iswell know nand they areproud of the fact that a largenumber of gallantry awards in the Indianarmy has been won by Sikhs. In Sikhpopular perception the Hindu is conceivedin the stereotypical 'bania' m ould. H e ispor-trayed as a fat, unctious, cowardly, vege-tarian, who w ears dhotis andeats rice withhis fingers. Interestingly, on e of the victimsof the Sikh m assacres inDelhi confessed inan interview that he found it difficult to. understand how the 'bania' Hindu couldsuddenly turn so murderously violent.24

Quite clearly, the Sikhs have not theremotest desire to be known as Hindustanithough there are close cultural ties betweenth e twocommunities. But the Sikh self-imag^ is not anexpansive one. It is contentto conserve its own tradit ions andculturean d itdoes not seek tousurp, orsubjugate,Hinduism, norfashion Hindu rituals andmores inits own image. This iswhat Hindu- communalists from Shraddhanand onwards

have found it hard tounderstand. It mustalso be added that the cultural markersseparating the Hindus from Sikhs were self-consciously anddeliberately developed bythe Sikhs from around the end of the 19thcentury. They vigorously said hum Hindunahin25 to Arya Samaj Hindu expan-sionism and, at the same time, overhauledall their rites ofpassage, such as birth, mar-riage, and death ceremonies, so that the ywould not resemble Hindu ones at all. Toa large extent all this was inresponse toAryaSamaji intolerance and cultural pretensions,but one must a lso acknowledge the hand ofthe British ineffecting this cultural separa-tion. The British not only patronisedorganisations, like the Chief Khalsa Diwan,which were assiduously evolving specificallySikh cultural traditions, but they wentonecritical step further. The Sikh regiments inthe British Indian Army were deliberatelyencultured into this new traditio n, th us giv-ing this freshly formed identity furtherlegitimacy. The ruling Jatprincely families!of Punjab also lent their prestige to thiscareful crafting of Sikh identity and, beforelong, Sikhs from every walk of life univer-sally accepted their cultural uniqueness.Perhaps the Sikh pride intheir martial pastand present also dates back to this period.This new self-awareness am ong the Sikhsdeepened their ' emotional attachm ent withtheir history, with their Gurus, and with theirtemples. The Sikhs, inother words, under-went a thoroughgoing cultural and religiousrenaissance in the first twodecades of thetwentieth century. The sufferings of theirreligious preceptors and Gurus, the ex-emplary courage and dedication of thefaithful panj piaras, and even the gloryof M aharaja Ranjit Singh were revived andreappropfiated, by way of a distinct culturalgenealogy, as their very own. Like everythingelse with the Sikhs, this cultural heritage to owas imbued w ith pride, as befits a new-bornidentity. Anyone who has visited the G oldenTemple will easily appreciate the completechange a Sikh undergoes when he is withinthe holy precincts.26 The atmosphere withinthe temple is solemn forthe worshippers areremembering, as they are praying, the tribu -lations and martyrdom of their Gurus andcultural heroes. Consequently the Gurud-

wara has a mournful ambience whichthickens to near viscosity the spiritualismWithin. As a serving army officer put it:"When we are inthe Gurudwara we cannothelp but beoverwhelmed. But as soon as wecome out we become Rambos again!'It is not as if the solemnity of the wor-,shippers within the temple is being or-chestrated by the religious specialists.Thelaity and the specialists act quite .in in-dependently oêach other: in fact there isvery little that the specialists dowhich isarcane and mysterious to the mass offollowers. Because the Sikh religionis young,zealous, andparticipatory, it is possible toarrive at complete unanimity among theSikhs when their holy shrines are desecra-tedwhether it be by Ahm ad Shah Abdali,or by the Indian Army in 1984, or by the ''terrorists in 1988.As the Sikhs are both proud of theirreligion and, at thesame tim e, very practi-cal, indeed earthy, intheir secular lives, theyconfuse most scholars working onPunjab.What is usually overlooked is that Sikhismis also a medium through which commu-nities like the Jats asserted their economicprosperity.27 A nd as theJats constitute thedominant community inPun jab there existsan inbuilt resistance to thedevelopment ofSikh fundamentalism inPunjab. The Sikhsare such successful pragmatists, innovators,and adventurers that a fundamentalist strait-jacket would illsuit their very vitalistic elan.Many scholars on contemporary Punjabdon't quite see this aspect of Sikhism andmistakenly believe that the Sikhs are in-herently fundamentalist and hence seces-sionist. Very often Master Tara Singh's pur-ported pleas for a Khalistan to the BritishCabinet Mission in 1946 is mentioned tosubstantiate the claim that the Sikhs havealways resented being united with India. Butwhat is conveniently forgotten is that evenTara Singh's plea for a Khalistan (orSikhistan) was conditional upon MuslimLeague getting Pakistan. Tara Singh arguedthat if, and only if, Pakistan were carved outof India the Sikhs would demand a separatesovereign state. In a theocratic Islamic stateof Pakistan, Tara Singh feared, most Sikhswould be forced to lead a' precarious ex-istence. Even so this dema nd never took wjng

T A B L E : P ERCEN TA G E VARIATION INN U M B E R O F H O L D I N G S IN 1980-81 OVER 1970-71BY F I V E M A J O R S I Z E ^ G R O U P S

DistrictAmritsarBhatindaFerozepurGurdaspurôshiarpurJalandharFaridkotKapurthalaLudhianaPatialaRoparSangrurTotal

Marginal- 7 3 . 0- 5 5 . 0- 6 8 . 4- 4 6 . 4- 6 8 . 4- 6 7 . 7- 5 4 . 9- 8 1 . 6- 5 8 . 5- 3 2 . 3- 5 1 . 7- 5 1 . 9- 6 1 . 9

Small'-40.7- 3 1 . 0- 2 8 . 9- 1 . 8- 2 1 . 9- 4 5 . 83.6- 3 3 . 3- 2 8 . 5- 1 4 . 14.8- 2 5 . 0- 2 3 . 3

Medium .10.0- 0 . 51.715.024.1- 2 . 1- 3 5 . 013.3- 2 . 414.57.20.5'2.3

Large7.7515.20

-10.603.4017.807.5021.8038.9012.209.20- 4 . 4 01.108.60 '

Extra-Large36.50- 3 . 5 08.902.30

-10.0024.2033.4065.402.100.05- 2 5 . 212.607.30

Total-38.60-14.80-29.70-18.50-36.70-35.60-15.96-33.30-19.50- 5 . 0 0-24.10-16.70-25.30

Source: Agricultural Census of Punjab, 1970-71 and 1980-81. We are grateful to Sucha S Gillof Punjab University, Patiala, for making this information available to us.

.Economic and Poli tical Weekly August 13, 1988 1681


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among the Sikhs. The late H S Malik, thelast prime minister of the princely Patiatastate, once vivdly described how the optionof joining with Pakistan, or even seeking aKhalistan, was shot down by the Sikh prince-ly states of Punjab.28The Sikhs in general are not particularlyprone to fundamentalism but they are never-theless very proud of the many diacriticalmarks that specify their culture and investit with aesthetic dimensions that areremarkable in their unanimity. That theirculture is bounded by firm lineaments doesnot imply that their secular life should begoverned by a rigid religious format. Suchdepictions of cultural inflexibility ariseprimarily out of unfamiliarity and dis-tance.29 As with all such matters, it is im-.portant to look and see how the Sikhs in factconduct themselves, rather than to seekahistorical explanations by extrapolatingstylised interpretations of Sikh scriptural in-junctions. While discussions on contem-porary Punjab centre, quite justifiably, onthe Akali Dal, the Khalistanis and so forth,the following should also be remembered.In the last decade alone the Sikhs had firstvoted in the Akalis, then voted them out in1 9 8 0 , and then voted in the moderates in1985 (to endorse the Longowal ac cord), andare now, by all indic ations, q uite fed up withall political formations, both moderate andextremist. Surely the raj karega khalsa com-plex, as interpreted by many non-Sikhobservers, should have imposed a moreuniform political protocol on the Sikhs.J E - T H N I C I T Y A S A B O U N D A R Y C O N D I T I O N

If ethnicity had caused the P unjab prob-lem then the scriptural inton ation raj karegakhalsa should have summoned the Sikhmind to quest for Khalistan. Instead, it in-vokes in the majority of Sikhs the moral andspiritual injunction that truth shall prevail.Sikh identity and consciousness may nothave caused the Punjab problem but theycertainly constitute its boundary condi-

tion.3 0 One should appreciate the sharpoutlines of the Sikh self-image, as also itstelescoped temporal perspective, if any head-way is to be made in resolving the crisis inthis region. The Sikhs today believe that theyhave been slighted as a community, and theirself-conscious prikle, stiffened by economicprosperity, will leave them unbending tilltheir collective ego is salved. It hurt themthat C handig arh was first given then takenaway from them arid is now kept danglinglike a carrot. It hurt them again when thearmy needlessly devastated their Akal Takht.If l.he massacre of thousands of Sikhs andthe Jodhpur detenus hurt the most today itis because they are the latest in a long listof inflictions.

While it is true tha t the Akalis had work-ed out a long-winded resolution at Anan d-pur, it was the emotional gratification ofwinning Chandigarh that threw the bulk oft h e . Sikhs behind the Akali Dal. WithBluestar and Woodrose this oppositionist at-titude towards the government hardened giv-ing rise to the misconception that the Sikhsconstitute an undifferentiated politicalphalanx subservient to the Akali Dal. Infact, if Chandigarh had been given to Pun-j a b , then the normal Sikh divisions wouldhave surfaced leading to internal politicaldifferentiation.31 There would have beendifferent degrees of commitment among theSikhs to water and territorial issues (men-tioned in the Rajiv-Longowal accord) depen-ding on their class positions. The centre,rather than playing its expected role of dif-ferentiating the Sikhs on secular grounds, in-stead heightened their emotional pitch bytying in water, and principa lly territory, withChandigarh. The cultural boundary condi-tions we just alluded to gelled together againresulting in yet another impasse. The broadconsensus among the political cognoscentiin Punjab is that if Barnala had resigned aschief minister1 the moment it was clear thatChandigarh would not come to Punjab 32then he-would still be an im porta nt politicalleader today.

If the Akalis won credibility for accretingother demands to Chandigarh, they lost it.the moment Baroala's Akali ministry clungto state power in spite of being denied Chan-digarh. Today, however, Chandigarh is notas emotive as are the Jodhpu r detenus andthe guilty of 1984. The credit for h ighlightingthese latter issues does not go to the Akalis.These issues have captured th e popu lar Sikhmind almost in spite of the Akalis. TheAnandpur Sahib Resolution is a dead letterin Punjab. One rarely hears of any Sikhleader today referring to it. Even Badal afterhis release from prison in late 1987 talkedprimarily of the Jbdhpur detenus, thoughaccording to a n associate, he would have lik-ed to talk about a special status for Punjabas well. But Article 370 of the Con stitutionwhich provided for Kashmir's unique posi-tion is not upperm ost in mainline Sikh con-sciousness today. Unless issues of justice areresolved clever constitutional ploys aroundArticle 370 will fail to im press. But if justiceis delayed any longer then this mood ofsullen resentment may well sour into one ofrage which m ilitants might profitably stir tothicken the plot again.

C O N C L U S I O NQuite magically, a new spontaneousgrassroots rapprochement between Hindusand Sikhs is toiling its way up from the scor-ched earth. According to a literary-cum-political a ctivist it was heartening to see hun-dred of Hindus and Sikhs, in mid-June (hisyear, sit late into the night w atching p oliticalplays which related their common tragedy.Though this fledgeling communal amity isstill very fragile it holds out a promise forthe future. One indication of it is also thefact that even the Hindus in Punjab are voic-ing the opinion today that arms could not

have gone into the Golden Temple withoutthe knowledge of the police. No politicalorganisation can, however, claim credit forthis outcome though there are manyunrepentant secularists in Punjab whotirelessly batted away for inter-communal


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believe, is largely the effect of distance.Look more Closely and you Will seeperpetual m odif ication in process" Q uotedby Adam Kuper , Anthropology and An-thropologists: The British School, 1922-72,H ar m onds w or t h , Pengu i n , 1973, p 31.30 F G Bailey does much the sam e kind of ex-ercise when he examines the role of castein a village conflict in Orissa . See his, 'TwoVillages in Orissa, in MaxG l uckm a i n (ed)'Closed Systems and Open Minds, Chicago,Aldine, 1964, pp 57-60. C ul tura l ly too theSikhs of the southern dis t r ic ts of Punjab( the M alva region) are qu ite different fromtheir co-reg ionist in the northern dis t r ic ts( the Majha region).1 The Sikhs in Pat iala ,Nabha , etc, are quite laxabout keeping theirbeard and turban, quite unlike Sikhs fromsay A m ritsar. In fact Ranjit Singh's empiredid not include the southern dis t r ic ts .31 Sikhs are internally differentiated by caste,occupation and region as well. For instance,Amri t sa r and H os h i a r pu r (the M aj ha dis-tricts) are highest in the alienation1 of smallpeasant lands (see the table) . Some arguethis is the reason for ter ror ism beingstrongest in these regions. While the JatSikhs are the rura l dominant cas tes , the' tarkhans ' (carpenters) and the commercia lAroras are bet ter off in the urban areas .Landholdings are the largest in the southernMalwa region. It is also here that left ac-tivity is bes t known. The Mazhab i S ikhs ,who labour on land, have many points ofconflict with the Jat l andowners . For astudy of the way Jat Sikhs hold other Sikfi>castes in con t em p t see, Joyce Pettigrew,Robber Nobleman: A Study of the PoliticalSystem of Sikh Jats, L o n d o n , RKP, 1975,pp 41-42.

32 Punjab was to get C h a n d i g a r h on J anua r y26, 1986 as per the Rajiv-Longowal accord.33 Some of these organisat ions include theAFDR, Khet Mazdoor union (pr imari l ly inA m ritsar) , A gricul tural W orkers' U nion ofth e CPI (active in M o g a and Far idkot) andT he K irt i K isan U nio n (active in Amri tsar ,Nawasehar ; Kapur thala) .34 A keyfigure in the Punjab secretar iat con-f irmed: "The num ber of m ur de r s per yearhas not really gone up by much accordingto our records . T ha t is why I keep insistingthat a distinction ought to be m ade betweenterrorist killings and killings by terrorists! 'Unfor tunate ly such opinions are onlyprivately expressed and never find im-plementat ion in government policy. Thevarious news agen cies toocompete agains tone another in selling the most gruesomeheadlines to the dailies. As a Delhi basedemployee in a reputed nat ional news agen-cy said, 'If there is a report that says 10 peo-ple were m urdered inPunjab, and if anotherreport should also corne in, saying that thereare, in addi t ion , 18 terrorist kil l ings inPunjab, then the sub-edi tor combines thetw o and sells the news item as '28killed inPunjab' . This is certainly catchier than say-ing '18 killed by terrorists in Punjab ' . Onone ocass ion our rival new agency's itemwas preferred to ours because their captionwas m ore b loo dy than the one we put out.My Sub was really angry w ith me for letting,this happen".

Documents

Punjab Communalised beyond politics (1988)