Ptx Internals

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Michigan 7 Wk Jrs CHPSPolitics Internal Links

POLITICS INTERNAL LINK FILE

There are three politics files you will need to use:- politics internal links file- politics links file- politics scenarios file

Political Capital Key to the Agenda ......................................................................................................................... 3Political Capital Key to the Agenda ......................................................................................................................... 4Political Capital Key to the Agenda ......................................................................................................................... 5Political Capital Key ................................................................................................................................................ 6Political Capital Key ................................................................................................................................................ 7Political Capital Key Can Switch Votes ................................................................................................................ 8Political Capital Key Can Switch Votes ................................................................................................................ 9Political Capital Spillover ................................................................................................................................... 10Political Capital Key Limited ............................................................................................................................. 11AT: Political Capital Key ...................................................................................................................................... 12AT: Political Capital Key ...................................................................................................................................... 13AT: Political Capital Key It Can Only Help ....................................................................................................... 14AT: Political Capital is Key to Vetos ..................................................................................................................... 15Legislation Key to PC ............................................................................................................................................ 16Legislation Key to PC ............................................................................................................................................ 17Winners-Win .......................................................................................................................................................... 18Winners-Win .......................................................................................................................................................... 19AT: Winners-win ................................................................................................................................................... 20Winners-Lose ......................................................................................................................................................... 21Winners-Lose ......................................................................................................................................................... 22Losers-Lose ............................................................................................................................................................ 23Popularity Key ....................................................................................................................................................... 24Popularity Key ....................................................................................................................................................... 25Popularity Key to Political Capital ........................................................................................................................ 26Popularity Not Key ................................................................................................................................................ 27Popularity Not Key ................................................................................................................................................ 28Popularity Not Key ................................................................................................................................................ 29Popularity Not Key ................................................................................................................................................ 30Popularity Hurts Agenda ........................................................................................................................................ 31Concessions Key .................................................................................................................................................... 32Concessions Key .................................................................................................................................................... 33Concessions Key .................................................................................................................................................... 34

Concessions Key .................................................................................................................................................... 35Concessions Not Key.............................................................................................................................................36Democrats Key......................................................................................................................................................37Democrats Key ...................................................................................................................................................... 38Democrats Key ...................................................................................................................................................... 39Democrats Not Key ............................................................................................................................................... 40Democrats Not Key ............................................................................................................................................... 41Democrats Not Key ............................................................................................................................................... 42GOP Key ................................................................................................................................................................ 43GOP Key ................................................................................................................................................................ 44

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Michigan 7 Wk Jrs CHPSPolitics Internal LinksBase Key to Agenda ............................................................................................................................................... 45Base Key to Agenda ............................................................................................................................................... 46Base Key to PC ...................................................................................................................................................... 47GOP Not Key to Agenda ....................................................................................................................................... 48Moderates Key ....................................................................................................................................................... 49Moderates Not Key ................................................................................................................................................ 50Moderates Not Key ................................................................................................................................................ 511 Party Not Key ..................................................................................................................................................... 52President Gets Blame ............................................................................................................................................. 53President Gets Blame ............................................................................................................................................. 54President Gets Blame ............................................................................................................................................. 55Presidents Get Blame ............................................................................................................................................. 56Congress Avoids Blame ......................................................................................................................................... 57President Doesnt Get Blame ................................................................................................................................. 58Flip-Flopping Kills PC .......................................................................................................................................... 59Flip-Flopping Kills PC .......................................................................................................................................... 60Flip-Flopping Hurts Agenda .................................................................................................................................. 61

AT: Bottom of the Docket (You should obviously make theory args also) ........................................................... 62Interest Groups Key ............................................................................................................................................... 63Oil Lobbies Key ..................................................................................................................................................... 64Oil Lobbies Not Key .............................................................................................................................................. 65Environmental Lobbies Key .................................................................................................................................. 66

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Political Capital Key to the Agenda

Political capital key to agenda

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service[Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p. 25-26]

Cal it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout they all mean the same thing. The most basic and most important of all presidential resources iscapital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, thePresident is severely limited without capital. And capital is directly linked to the congressional parties . While there is little question that

bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success opf the domestic agend a, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents

bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.

Capital is key to the agenda other factors are nowhere near as relevant

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service[Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p. 34]

In chapter 2, I will consider just how capital affects the basic parameters of the domestic agenda. Though the internal resources are important contributors

to timing and size, capital remains the critical factor. That conclusion will become essential in understanding the domestic agenda.Whatever the President's personal expertise, character, or skills, capital is the most important resource. In the past, presidential scholars have focused on individualfactors in discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given low levels in presidential capital, even the most positiveand most active executive could make little impact. A President can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a veritable legislative wizard,

but if he does not have the basic congressional strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted capital affects both thenumber and the content of the President's priorities. Thus it is capital that determines whether the President will have the opportunityto offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes. Capital sets the basic

parameters of the agenda , determining the size of the agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the President's personality, capital is thecentral force behind the domestic agenda.

Political capital is key to settling Congressional disputes over the agenda, ensuring passage

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.16

Presidential priorities also involve more conflict, both inside the administration and out. And the greater the conflict, the more time, information,expertise, and energy necessary to settle the disputes . Youd be surprised how long it takes to iron out the differences, a Johnson legislative assistantargued. Compromise doesnt usually happen overnight. It takes a hefty investment of presidential influence and effort. Once again, welfarereform serves as an example. One highly placed Nixon observer maintained that the {Family Assistance} plan cold have been announced much sooner if there hadnt

been such a struggle. With Bruns and Moynihan at odds, we couldnt move. When one would attack, the other would counterattack. Sure, the issue was intricate, but itcould have been handled much faster without the in-fighting. As it was , there was a stalemate for thee months.

Capital is key to the agenda

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.155]//ZE

Just what is the Presidents must list, and why is it important? From the staff viewpoint, the must list constitutes a shortened version of thelegislative agenda and contains the critical priorities, the items that are considered crucial to the presidential

program . In 1961, for instance, Kennedy offered twenty-five specific requests for legislative action; there was, however, little hope that alltwenty-five would pass. We didnt have enough capital , one aide reflected. There was no way we could get it all . Instead, we feltsome pressure to tell Congress which items were most important , which ones had to pass, which ones the President felt he had to have.Even then, it didnt make much difference we didnt get much anyway. Aid to Education, Medicare, area redevelopment, manpower retraining and youthemployment all became part of Kennedys must life, while agriculture, community-health facilities, saline-water conversion, food-surplus distribution and water-

pollution control were given lesser status.

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Political Capital key to the agenda

LEE 05 The Rose Institute of State & Local Government Claremont McKenna College Presented at the Georgia Political Science Association 2005Conference

[Andrew, Invest or Spend?:Political capital and Statements of Administration Policy in the Fi rst Term of the George W. Bush Presidency, http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf ]//ZE

How does Congress gauge the credibility of a veto threat? Legislators would gauge the political capital of the president to determine the credibility of the threat.

According to political journalist Tod Lindberg (2004), political capital is a form of persuasive authority stemming from a position of political strength (A21). Political capital can be measured by favorability and job approval polling numbers because they signifysupport for the presidents actions and agenda . For example, President Bushs leadership after the September 11th terroristattacks increased his favorability and job approval polling, and thus his political capital . He subsequently was able to launch a war withAfghanistan and Iraq . In such cases, the presidents high political capital would make a veto more credible . Congress must alsoreckon whether the president will think an issue is worth spending political capital on. As Richard S. Conley and Amie Kreppel (1999) write, Whenever the President .. . act[s] to change the voting behavior of a Member, political capital is expended. It would not be logical to expend that capital in what was known ahead of time to be alosing battle (2).

Bargaining key to success, its the only way to get controversial legislature through Congress.

PIKA & MALTESE 04 (Professor of Political Science & International Relations at U of Delaware & Prof of Political Science at University of Georgia [Joseph A., &John Anthony, The Politics of the Presidency , p. 207]) // THK

The need for presidential-congressional cooperation is cleat, but there are few ways of obtaining it other than throughconsultation involving persuasion and bargaining. Presidents cannot command congressional approval of their propos alsany more than Congress can direct presidents in the exercise of their constitutional powers. The threat of government stalemate is always

present, and more often than not policy is an unsatisfactory compromise of presidential and various congressionalviewpoints . As the United States moves through its third century of operation, the relationship between the president and Congress will becharacterized - as it is today - by a degree of stability provided by the Constitu tion as well as by adaptations to social, economic, and political change.

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http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdfhttp://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdfhttp://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdfhttp://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdfhttp://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf


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Capital empirically determines agenda content

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.56-57]//ZEPolitical Limits. Agenda size and content vary directly with the President's capital. Of the five presidential agendas, Johnson's mustcertainly be regarded as the most extensive, and Ford's as the most limited. According to a former Bureau of the Budget official: Johnson's program was certainly the

broadest of the four that I watched. In the first months of 1965 Johnson presented more than Nixon did during his entire first term. It was a massive amount of legislation which wont be matched for some time. There's no doubt that Johnson's program was the most extensive of the 1956-1974 period. Much of the program hadoriginated in the Kennedy term but had been delayed by Congress. Johnson had considerable leverage in 1965 and made the most of it. Neither Kennedy, Nixon, nor Ford had the same political opportunities. Johnsons legislative agenda was the fullest and the most detailed The main programs were all presented in the first andsecond year; the rest were logical extensions of Johnson's successes. How did Johnson's agenda compare with those of Kennedy, Nixon and Ford? Kennedy, Nixon,and Ford were all frustrated at one point or another. They had to restrict their programs to fit the political situation. Still, Kennedy was far more successful in schedulinghis program than Nixon or Ford. Kennedy hit some serious roadblocks, but he still presented a substantial amount of legislation-not as much as Johnson, but still upthere. Nixon, of course, was stopped by Congress. He was also unsure of what he wanted. Not much needs to be said of Ford. He was just starting up when I left. Eventhen, it was obvious that he wasn't going to be able to charge forward. There wasn't much he could do given the circumstances of his inauguration. The OMB data

support the conclusions. Table 4 gives the total number of requests in each administration, as well as the number of new and "old" proposals. The distinction between new and old is quite valuable for this research, particularly when we turn to the discussion of policy content in chapter 5. Here, it helps usevaluate the impact of capital on agenda size. New proposals involve requests for innovations in federal policy;old focus on the modification and amendment of past programs . Kennedys request for Medicare, Johnson's proposal for Model Cities,

Nixon's revenue sharing, Ford's energy-independence program, and Carter's hospital cost containment are examples of new agenda items. Each involved significantchanges in the government's relationship to society (Campbell 1978). Most social security increases, minimum wage expansions, unemployment extensions and foodstamp extensions are examples of old agenda requests. Each involves simple changes in the existing framework.

Two conclusions emerge from table 4. First, Presidents vary in their agenda activity . Johnson is at the top in both the number of total requests andthe number of new proposals. As one observer noted, "It makes sense that LBJ would look so strong. Thats nothing new. Johnson had all the advantages;had all the momentum. It would be very surprising if he didnt come first among the recent Presidents - if Ford hadsomehow come out first. Second, Ford leads all five Presidents in the average number of old agenda items. In fact, he is the only executive to have more old proposalsthan new. The Ford staff did not dispute the finding. "We were well aware of our position in Congress, and the problems following the resignation," one Ford assistantnoted. That's not to say we didn't want our share of new initiatives. We were working on comprehensive welfare reform and national health insurance. We just read theCongress, looked at the budget, and decided to hold off. We knew that the new programs would have to wait at least until 1977.

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Political Capital Key

The president needs capital to gain support on key issues it is the most vital resource

Bond & Fleisher , professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President inLegislation" p.221 -222)//ZEThe basis of the presidency-centered explanation rests with Neustadts (1960, 33) observation that "what the constitution separates our parties do not combine." Without

a strong party system to fall back on, Neustadt argues the president's success depends on his ability to use available resources to persuade other actors to do what they otherwise might not have done . This explanation emphasizes the president'sreputation among Washingtonians as being skilled at using the vantage points of the office and the president'sability to reach beyond the Washington community and mobilize public support. Success, therefore, is afunction of what the president does or does not do. While the partisan and ideological composition of Congress may set broad limits, askilled and popular minority president can overcome the lack of a partisan majority and persuade Congress tosupport his preferences. Similarly, an unskilled or unpopular majority president can squander the advantages of

party control.

Capital is key to check Congressional battles that would otherwise kill the agenda

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.181]//ZEThere is a clear relationship between presidential capital and staff conflict: as capital declines, conflict increases . As one Nixon aide reported, It is a hell of a lot easier to get along with your enemies when you both can be satisfied. When it turns to a game with winnersand losers, the response is to drag out all the old weapons. There may be a truce at the beginning of theadministration, but it is broken very quickly ." Thus, both domination and the garbage can are tied to conflict. As conflict increases, the staff either engages in attempts at internal domination or collapses into organized anarchy. The rational system demands the greatest amounts of capital in re serve. U nder a comprehensive strategy, there must be enough capital to satisfy the range of potentialalternatives. Though rational choice can produce relatively "cheap" alternatives, the system must have a store of capital in the event that the "best" alternative demands heavy amounts. Presidents obviously determine just what"best" means . It is usually defined by the choice of questions to be asked of potential programs: the President can set a series of screens through which allalternatives must pass. According to a Nixon aide, There is a world of difference between saying you want the program that will work and the program that will pass.

The program that will work best might not pass; the program that will pass might not work as well. If the President wants the very best program, he might not be able toget legislative acceptance. He will have the best program, but nowhere to go." Capital is critical in the emergence of political domination.As capital declines, there is a marked increase in domination . According to one OMB office, The President and staff are going to bemuch happier at the beginning of the term than at the end. There is an spirit de corps at the start that generally disappears by the end. It is simply impossible to maintain

a high level of camaraderie when tough choices have to be made. Capital and the consistency of participants are primary pressures inthe garbage-can system. Once again, as capital declines, conflict increases; as capital declines, the opportunitiesfor accommodation drop. When capital is coupled with low levels of staff consistency, organized anarchies mayevolve.

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Political Capital Key

Capital is crucial in setting agenda priorities

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.161-162]//ZE

Policy windows involve the merging of political interests . Congress, the President, interest groups, and the executive branch may come together at a critical moment . That was the case for national health insurance in 1974. The Democrats had decided to producea bill; organized labor was close to a compromise: Nixon had supported the concept of comprehensive coverage. The window opened briefly in the spring, but it closed

with Nixons resignation and labors willingness to wait for the 1976 election. According to the staffs, the Presidents priorities are a powerful toolin such windows . As one Johnson aide suggested, When the opportunity arises, the President has got to keep the pressureon. Mention the program in a press conference, make a televised address, use the phone. The President has got to make it absolutely clear that the program is a

priority. Policy windows will usually open at the start of the term: with the passage of time, the windows start toclose. As presidential priorities become a primary weapon in the struggle for legislative progress. The decisionto move an item to the top of the must list can speed legislative adoption; it can also open legislative windows.Though Presidents are limited in the timing of the domestic program, the use of priorities remains an area whereexpertise can have a dramatic impact .

High political capital makes agenda passage more likely



No single alternative theory can entirely explain the use of veto threats under President Bushs first term. For example, the president would not be ableto invest political capital without having the opportunity of increased legislation created by the legislative cycle.It is more likely that a combination of these factors produced the data in the first Bush administration. During periods of high legislative activity, the Congress, dividedduring the 107th Congress, anticipated more credible veto threats due to high political capital. Congress constructed legislation that was favorable to the president, and

the president invested his political capital by decreasing his veto threats and opposition to legislation. Congress creates legislation that is morefavorable to the president, and the president supports Congress in order to invest his political capital. Ultimately,this means that Congress and the president are inadvertently working to create agreeable legislation during timesof high political capital. Conversely, when political capital decreases, the president gradually increases hisopposition language.

Political capital is key to the agenda

LINDBERG 04 Editor of Policy Review Magazine, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute

[Tod, Spending political capital, The Washington Times, December 7. Pg. A21]//ZE

No, there is nothing automatic about getting a return on your investment of political capital, if by return you mean more of that selfsame political capital. But youcan indeed buy something by spending your capital: the end of the Saddam regime, or perhaps Social Security

or tax reform. Perhaps you get a return on what you spend in terms of enhancement of your political strength, but perhaps you just end up weakened . Even so, you may think that what you are trying to accomplish is worth the price.

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Political Capital Key Can Switch Votes

The President can use the power of the office to spin unpopular policies in his favor

FITTS 96 Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School [Michael A., THE PARADOX OF POWER IN THE MODERN STATE, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, January, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 827] // DCM

< Finally, and relatedly , the modern presidency has become more centralized and personalized through its public media role - that is, its"rhetorical functions." n40 Given changes in the press and the White House office, the president has become far more effective in setting theagenda for public debate , sometimes even dominating the public dialogue when he chooses. n41 Economists would probably attribute the president's ability to"transmit information" to the centralized organization of the presidency - an "economy of scale" in public debate. n42 At the same time, the president canestablish [*844] a "focal point" around preferred public policies. n43 This proposition can also be stated somewhat differently. As an institutionembodied in a single individual , the president has a unique ability to "tell" a simple story that is quite personal and understandable to the

public . As a number of legal academics have shown, stories can be a powerful mode for capturing the essence of a person's situated perspective,improving public comprehension of particular facts, and synthesizing complex events into accessible language . n44 Complex institutions,such as Congress, have difficulty [*845] assembling and transmitting information as part of a coherent whole; they represent a diversity - some would say a babble -of voices and perspectives. In contrast, presidents have the capacity to project a coherent and empathetic message, especially if it is tied totheir own life stories. In this sense, the skill of the president in telling a story about policy, while sometimes a source of pointedcriticism for its necessary simplicity, n45 may greatly facilitate public understanding and acceptance of policy . n46 >

The president uses his influence to switch votes in Congress

Bond & Fleisher , professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President inLegislation" p.16)//ZE

Using these political resources to aid supporters is more likely. Edwards (1984, 191-92) reports that presidents provide myriad favors for members of Congress. The nature of these favors ranges from flattery and social contact with the president tohelp with constituent problems and campaign aid . And presidential favors and attention go disproportionately tomembers of the president's party (Covington 1987b).' Because most members of Congress can get reelected without the president's help, the effects of this activity are limited. But doing favors for members of Congress at least creates a store house of goodwill that might increase support on somekey issues, and a few members might be influenced by these activities. Thus political parties serve to link members of Congress with oneanother and to the president.

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Political Capital Key Can Switch Votes

Capital is key to switching votes to gain support

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.138-139]//ZE

Congress is the most important factor in the calculation of political costs. Depending on the party compositionand the political mood of Congress, the price of specific alternatives can vary greatly . You spend a great dealof time just counting heads , a Ford liaison office argued. you have to be on guard for shifts in support . On one issue, you might beable to find the right balance of votes; on another issue on the same day, you might not be able to get lunch. For the staffs, congressional supportequaled party seats ; that was your first line for organizing support . As one Nixon aide noted, You turn to your party members first. If we couldnt move out own people, we felt the opportunities were pretty slim. This is not to argue that the staffs considered each party member an automatic vote.

Indeed, the staffs argued that the party tally could change for each successive issue . Rather, the staffs subscribed to a mild form of partydiscipline. According to one Johnson assistant, We told the party members that they should seriously consider coming along oncertain issues. It was in their best interest, as well as ours. The President has certain tools at his disposal to gain

party support, not the least of which is to cut off the social channel . The battle for congressional support is onereason why Presidents court congressional input on program developmen t. Lyndon Johnson recognized the advantages andattempted to reduce his political costs by including Congress in the drafting of major initiatives: The trick wastocrack the wall of separation enough to give the Congress a feeling of participation in creating my bills without exposing my plans at the same time to advancecongressional opposition before they even saw the light of day. It meant taking risks, but the risks were worth it. My experience in the NYA taught me that when peoplehave a hand in shaping projects, these projects are more likely to be successful than the ones simply handed down from the top. As Majority Leader I learned that the

best guarantee to legislative success was a process by which the wishes and views of the members were obtained ahead of time, and, whenever possible, incorporatedinto the early drafts of the bill. As President I went one step further. I insisted on congressional consultation at every single stage, beginning with the process of decidingwhat problems and issues to consider for my task forces right up to the drafting of the bills (in Kearns 1976, p. 232). Johnson viewed the strategy as a method for cutting political costs. It was much easier to win if we could bring the Congress in early, one Johnson legislative assistant reflected. If we could forge some support

before the programs were drafted, we were halfway there.

Capital is key to persuading vote switches

Bond & Fleisher , professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President inLegislation" p.30-31)//ZE

Third, the president must follow through and use the resources at his disposal to persuade members to support his policy, or at least not to oppose it . President Johnson was fond of saying, "There is only one way for a president to deal with Congress, and that iscontinuously, incessantly, and without interruption" (quoted in Kearns 1976, 226). In his continuous dealings with Congress, the presidentshould use his intimate knowledge of Congress to anticipate reactions and to preempt problems before they

become unmanageable (Edwards 1980. 120 ). At the heart of the concept of follow-through are bargaining and the useof the various carrots and sticks available to enhance the president's bargaining position. The president maytrade favors, supply members with services and personal amenities, and use personal appeals; he may enlist theaid of cabinet members, other members of Congress, or influential individuals in a member's constituency. If softer methods of persuasion fail, he may engage in arm-twisting by making implicit or explicit threats (Edwards1980, 120, 128-73; Christenson 1982, 262-63; Jones 1983, 109). If these activities cannot convert potential opponents or undecidedmembers into supporters, the president may be able to convince them to "take a walk" and not vote against him(Covington 1985). A final interpersonal skill is the ability to compromise. Because members of Congress have power independent of the president, he often must meet

them pan way in return for their support. But he must know when to compromise. If he gives in too soon, it may be seen as a sign of weakness, and he will lose morethan necessary. If he waits too long, he may be viewed as stubborn, and resistance in Congress will harden (Edwards 1980, 166; Christenson 1982, 266: Jones 1983.110).

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Political Capital Spillover

Presidential Leadership spills over capital is key to perception which insures successBond & Fleisher , professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President inLegislation" p.232)//ZE

Perceptions of presidential leadership affect how members of Congress and other participants in the process feel about the president. Unskilled andunpopular presidents are perceived as failures even if their success rate is fairly typical. Such a president mayscore some significant victories, but his style so alienates the other players that even his supporters do not feelgood about the victory. And when such a president suffers the inevitable defeat, the failure tends to beremembered because that is what participants' perceptions led them to expect.

Issues spill over to create more capital

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.58]//ZE

Initial legislative success has an impact on agenda size . If the presidents program is enacted quickly, there is alimited opportunity to replace the enacted requests, to fill the empty space . Once again, Johnson was able to take advantage of theopportunity to a far greater extent than any other recent executive. He was simply more successful in his early months. To a limit, the faster Johnsons

programs were passed, the faster the agenda could be replenished . As congressional calendars reopened, Johnson had theopportunity to move more legislation. This relationship was accentuated by the cycle of increasingeffectiveness. Johnsons staff was more prepared to send a second wave of proposals than were the staffs of most first-term Presidents. The Johnson domestic

process was in full swing at the start of the Eighty-ninth Congress. As programs moved through the legislative process, Johnsons staff was able to supply limitedreplacements.

Political capital spills over 107 th Congress proves

LEE 05 The Rose Institute of State & Local Government Claremont McKenna College Presented at the Georgia Political Science Association 2005

Conference


The idea of investing political capital also supports the notion that the chief executive specializes in foreign and defense policy. The president mayincrease his domestic capital by cooperating on domestic legislation and then spend it implementing foreign

policies. In executing foreign policy, the president will not issue SAPs on his own foreign policy. For example, if the president signs a treaty, Congress may or maynot ratify it, but there is no opportunity for veto. Therefore, the presidents use of foreign policy is a spend maneuver, whereashis domestic policy is an invest maneuver. The 107 th Congress, during which the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

began, supports this theory. President Bush may have spent his political capital towards executing those warsand attempted to invest his capital by cooperating on domestic legislation.

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Political Capital Key Limited

Capital is limited, only so many items can be passed

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p.157]//ZEResources and the Need for Priorities. Priorities are central to the conservation of both internal and external resources . For the liaison staffs, the criticalresource was presidential capital . The President cannot expect Congress to act on every proposa l, one Nixon assistant argued. He must givethem a lead on the top items. Otherwise, he will spread his momentum over too many issues. A second Nixon assistant agreed: When you look at the situationwe faced, the need for priority-setting was even more important . We had a very slim electoral margin; we faced a hostile Democratic Congress; theexecutive branch was not particularly interested in our ideas. Without a firm statement of priorities, we could not focus our energy. That was the primary reason for therepeated reference to the Six Great Goals in 1971. It was an attempt to concentrate our political strength. It is to the Presidents advantage to provide some statement of

priorities. With increased competition for agenda space, the President must focus his scarce political support on the most valuable proposals at least that is what the liaison staffs believe. As on Carter assistant apologized, I dont mean to simplify a very complex process, but Congress nolonger offers that many opportunities for the President to set the agenda. Unless the President gives Congress a firm list of priorities,the Congress will drift to other business . That was a lesson we learned quite early.

Political capital diminishes only by investing fighting and winning can the president get more



The prevalent theory of political capital focuses on its three uses: giving and receiving political capital, investing political capital, and spending political capital. Most presidents constantly engage in one or more of these three uses because unused political capital diminishes (Edwards 2002; Lindberg 2004). In particular, a presidents political capital usually decreases in the second term, usually through the standard measure of favorability and job approval polling numbers.To accrue political capital, the president may support a particular lawmakers legislation by issuing an SAP urging support, thereby givingthat legislator more pull in the Congress and at home. The president may also receive capital from Congress by winning larger legislative majorities . For example, the presidents successful efforts at increasing Republican representation in the Senate and House would constitute an increasein political capital. The president may also receive political capital from increased job favorability numbers, following through with purported policy agendas, anddefeating opposing party leaders (Lindberg 2004). Because political capital diminishes, a president can invest in policy and legislative victories

to maintain or increase it. For example, President George W. Bush invests his political capital in tax cuts which he hopes will yield returnsto the economy and his favorability numbers. By investing political capital, the president assumes a return on investment.

Political capital diminishes with time - Only investing political capital in popular issues can prevent its decay



Now, in the usual metaphor of political capital, presidents who have it often make the mistake of trying to "hoard" it. They put their political capital in a safe place in order to bolster their personal popularity. They do not "risk it" in pursuit of political victories,whether on their policy agenda or for controversial judicial appointments, etc. And therein, in the conventional application of the metaphor, lies

peril. For political capital, when hoarded, does not remain intact but rather diminishes over time through disuse. It "wastes away" - and

with it, a president's popularity and reputation.Therefore, again in the conventional use of the metaphor, it is mere prudence for a president to "invest" his political capital. Only by seeking political victories and winning them by such judicious investment can a president maintain and even increase his political capital. Whodares wins.This is, of course, a most mellifluous metaphor for the activists in the president's camp. It promises reward for ambitious action and warns against thehigh price of a lack of ambition . In fact, it almost sounds like a sure thing: The president takes his political capital, invests it and reaps a mightyreturn .

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Presidential capital isnt significant party support and divisions are key


Neustadt is correct that weak political parties in American politics do not bridge the gap created by the constitutional separation of powers . Wewould add: neither does skilled presidential leadership or popularity with the public. In fact , the forces that Neustadt stressed as the antidote for weak

parties are even less successful in linking the president and Congress than are weak parties. Our findings indicate that members of Congress provide levels of support for the President that are generally consistent with their partisan and ideological predispositions. Because party and ideologyare relatively stable, facing a Congress made up of more members predisposed to support the president does increase the likelihood of success on the floo r. There is, however, considerable variation in the behavior of the party factions. As expected, cross-pressured members are typically divided,and when they unify, they unify against about as often as they unify for the president. Even members of the party bases who have reinforcing partisanand ideological predispositions frequently fail to unify for or against the president's position. Our analysis of party and committeeleaders in Congress reveals that support from congressional leaders is associated with unity of the party factions . The party bases are likelyto unify only if the party and committee leader of a party take the same position. But party and committee leaders within each party take opposing stands on asignificant proportion of presidential roll calls. Because members of the party factions and their leaders frequently fail to unify around a party

position, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the outcome of presidential roll calls.

Political Capital is irrelevant case studies proveBond & Fleisher , professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President inLegislation)

In sum, the evidence presented in this chapter provides little support for the theory that the president's perceived leadership, skills areassociated with success on roll call votes in Congress. Presidents reputed as highly skilled do not win consistently more often thanshould be expected. Even the effects of the partisan balanced Congress, the president's popularity, and, the cycle of decreasinginfluence over the course of his term. Presidents reputed as unskilled do not win consistently less often relative to. More over, skilled

presidents do not win significantly more often than unskilled presidents on either important votes or close votes, in which skills havethe greatest potential to affect the outcome. Because of the difficulty of establishing a definitive test of the skills theory, some may argue that it is

premature to reject this explanation of presidential success based on the tests reported in this chapter. It might be argued that these findings by themselves do not denythat leadership skill is an important component of presidential-congressional relations. Failure to find systematic effects in general does not necessarily refute theanecdotes and case studies demonstrating the importance of skills.

Political capital is not key to the agenda



Striking it is, then, that Mr. Bush came in for only half of the metaphor: He believes he possesses political capital, but rather than investit, he proposes to spend it.I think this innovation may be an improvement. It removes the implicit expectation of an automatic returnon the use of political capital. Because in reality, one may spend one's political capital and lose it - specifically, if things don't turn outthe way you hope, namely, in glorious victory.

Little to no evidence supporting an effect of poli tical capital


The evidence presented in this book provides little support for the theory that the presidents leadership skills and his popularity withthe public are strongly associated with success on roll call votes in Congress. These findings do not deny that presidential leadershipand popularity are important components of presidential-congressional relations. Failure to find systematic effects in general does notnecessarily refute the anecdotes and case studies demonstrating the importance of the president. Although we have raised questionsabout the evidence in some of the literature, certainly there are occasions when the presidents standing with the public and what hedoes (or fails to do) changes the outcome of a vote. Our analysis does suggest, however, that such cases are not representative of

presidential-congressional relations: in general, presidential variables have a very limited influence on the probability of success onthe floor of Congress.

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Capital can be borrowed Bush proves

National Journal 07 (National Journals Congress Daily, 1-26-07, lexis)

So Tuesday night, he did the only thing an unpopular yet still ambitious lame duck president without political capital could do:He asked if he could borrow some . Bush began by complimenting the chief of the new hoarders of political riches, Speaker Pelosi ,congratulating her and noting how proud her dad would have been. Then, he acknowledged openly that the Democrats had stolen what was left of his booty: "Some inthis chamber are new to the House and the Senate, and I congratulate the Democrat majority," he said. And then, he asked them to share it. "Congress has changed, butnot our responsibilities," he said. "Our citizens don't much care which side of the aisle we sit on -- as long as we're willing to cross that aisle when there is work to bedone." After imploring his opponents to "cross that aisle" and drop off some political capital, Bush launched into a series of proposals that might put them in a sharing mood, using comfortingly Democratic-sounding rhetoric that might lull them intoemptying their pockets . "A future of hope and opportunity requires that all our citizens have affordable and available health care," said Bush, describing his

plan to make health insurance more affordable for the poor and middle class through tax credits. On immigration: "We need to uphold the great tradition of the melting pot that welcomes and assimilates new arrivals," he said, asking Congress to "resolve the status" of illegal immigrants. On energy: "Extending hope and opportunitydepends on a stable supply of energy that keeps America's economy running and America's environment clean," he said, seeking greater reliance on alternative fuels andsearching in vain across the House floor for a tree to hug. He even asked Democrats to support his Iraq policy -- though they had already demurred -- saying theyshould join the decision-making process by consulting with him more and bringing their capital to a special advisory council on the war on terror. While askingthe Democrats to share capital -- presumably betting they thought they would get it back with interest on Election Day 2008 if they passed some bills -- the president also pleaded for a loan from the viewers at home. All he was saying, to alter a line from John

Lennon, was give war a chance. "Our country is pursuing a new strategy in Iraq, and I ask you to give it a chance to work," he said. Though his capital had beensquandered previously as Iraq deteriorated and he specifically declined to send more soldiers, now he was asking for a little collateral so he could send 20,000additional U.S. troops into the country. The president might , indeed, get some of capital he wants to borrow . Some might find it difficult to beginabandoning Iraq, and Democrats might not want to be on the receiving end of the "do nothing" label they tagged on the Republican Congress. And whyshouldn't the president try for a little loan? He'll be out in two years. He won't have to pay i t back.

Capital does not guarantee agenda passage



Political capital is not equal in all policy areas. Commenting on President Clintons term , President George W. Bush said,I felt like he tried to spend capital on issues that he didn't have any capital on at first, like health care (quoted inSuellentrop 2004). In spending political capital, the president diminishes his political strength by initiating or pushing a

policy proposal with no intent on return. A president can spend capital for noble goals such as a balanced budget, the end of Saddam Husseinsregime, or to veto legislation. The theory of political capital as it relates to SAPs is that presidents are more likely to spend political capital through a presidential veto

because they have the power to do so. In times of increased political capital, the relative strength of SAP wording will also increase because the president has greater flexibility to take stands on particular issues. This analysis is a case study of the first Bush terms adherence to this hypothesis.

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AT: Political Capital Key It Can Only Help

Capital can only help the agenda



Congressional Anticipation. The last alternative explanation proposes that Congress drafts favorable legislation in response to the presidents increase in political capital . In contrast to the investment explanation, where the president uses veto threats differently depending on hiscapital and the legislation stays constant, this theory suggests that Congress changes its actions. The presidents use of the veto is constant, but Congresschanges its legislation depending on the presidents approval rating. In recent years, the majority leadership in the House hasaggressively used its power to control the agenda. If a measure seems likely to divide the majority party or face a presidentialveto, then it will probably not reach a House floor vote in the first place (Simendinger 2003). When the presidentsapproval ratings increase, the Congress anticipates a stronger veto threat. This anticipation creates favorablelegislation rather than unfavorable legislation that will trigger a veto. Therefore, when the presidents politicalcapital is at its highest, the presidential veto will be least likely . In the current 109 th Congress, however, there were signs of strain

between the White House and the House Republican Leadership, possibly caused by the presidents decrease in political capital (Bush Vows Stem Cell Veto 2005).

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AT: Political Capital is Key to VetosPolitical capital does not influence veto threats



These alternative explanations change the traditional perception of political capital as a simple receive and spend concept. Presidents do not just receive political capital and spend it during periods of high approval. Presidents may invest it in preparation of the opportunity to use it. Indeed,the evidence of the 107th Congress shows that the president was likely investing his political capital for the ensuing war in Iraq or in preparation for stronger legislative

battles. Additionally, Congress did not give enough opportunity for the president to exercise his veto threat. In this respect,the assumption that increased political capital leads to more veto threats fundamentally misses the decisionmaking of the administration. The Bush administration did not have the opportunity to issue veto threats, andgiven the chance might not have done so. Future presidencies can learn from the first Bush administrations use of SAPs. In times of high politicalcapital, future presidents should invest political capital to promote administration agendas, as President Bush did after September 11th and the Iraq War. By workingwith Congress during periods of high political capital, presidents will be able to use all their available power.

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Legislation Key to PC

Legislative success increase a presidents political capital

FITTS 96 Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School [Michael A., THE PARADOX OF POWER IN THE MODERN STATE, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, January, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 827] // DCM

Three different scholars of the presidency, writing in different traditions, have reached similar conclusions regarding the significance andadvantages of stronger presidential power, especially as compared to legislative influence . Presidential scholar Terry Moe has described theinfluence of the modern president as follows: When it comes to building structures of control ... the battle between president and Congress is lopsided. The president is aunitary decision maker, he can take unilateral action in imposing his own structures, his individual interests are largely congruent with the institutional interests of the

presidency, and he is dedicated to gaining control over government. Congress is hobbled by collective action problems, vulnerable to agenda manipulation by the president, and populated by individuals whose interests diverge substantially from those of the institution. The result is an asymmetry in the dynamic of institutionalchange, yielding an uneven but steady shift toward a more presidential system. n70 >>

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Legislation Key to PC

Legislative success is key to a presidents momentum and political capital

Eshbaugh-Soha , 5 -- Ph.D., Texas A&M University; assistant professor of political science, UNT (Political Research Quarterly, The Politics of PresidentialAgendas ; 58: 257-268) // DCM

Past research holds that if presidents are to increase their success in Congress, they must set the policy agenda in their favor. But whatdetermines the propensity of presidents to propose or support different policies? Because presidents influence the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, presidentsdevelop their yearly domestic policy agendas in anticipation of each policy's success or failure in Congress. After all, presidents want to emphasize their strengths to achieve their goal of policy enactment in Congress. From this assumption, I devise a typology of long-term and important presidential

policies, and argue that political limitations and fiscal constraints influence the president's yearly domestic policy agenda . I show that presidentsoffer different types of policies as part of their yearly domestic agendas given Congressional makeup and the federal budget deficit. The president's agenda is of immense importance to American politics. Several argue that presidents have substantial influence over the agenda-setting stage of the policy process(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 1995; Schattsneider 1960). Others maintain that the way presidents package their agendaexplains much of their eventual success or failure in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; Jones 1994; Light 1999; Neustadt 1990). Theimplication of these works is that presidents anticipate the contextual environment and, when it is favorable, will be successful in Congress.Edwards (1989: 146) argues that the president may be successful given a strategically packaged agenda and a favorable contextual environment, while the "the

president's greatest influence over policy comes from the agenda he pursues and the way it is packaged " (Bond and Fleisher 1990: 230).Despite scholarly consensus that agenda setting is important to American politics and presidential-Congressional relations, previous research relies on the assertion thatagenda setting is important to presidential relations with Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989), without providing empirical support for if and how presidents strategically package their domestic policy agendas. Indeed, these works do not answer one important question: what determines the president's

propensity to propose or support different types of policies?Two scholars have explored the determinants of the president's policy agenda. Light (1999) notes that information, expertise, and political capital are a

premium in the presidents agenda decisions, and that presidents have the most potential to shape the legislative agenda early in their tenure . He shows how these factors influence the types of policies on the presidents agenda, without confirming his inferences through hypothesis testing (see King1993). Peterson (1990) also studies the president's agenda. He analyzes the contextual environment and its impact on whether presidents prefer large or small, and newor old policies. Although he finds that the Congressional environment is important in the presidents agenda decisions, seemingly relevant variables such as the federal

budget deficit are statistically insignificant.The underlying premise of agenda-setting research is that the president should be able to package policy priorities so as to increase the likelihood of their adoption.Doing so may require presidents to assess the probability that a proposal will be successful depending on contextual circumstances, such as Congressional makeup.

Nevertheless, Peterson (1990: 207-08) finds little impact of the contextual environment on presidential policies, bringing into question the conventional wisdom that presidents can package their agendas strategically to increase their success in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). With this in mind, I rely on agenda-setting and anticipative reactions theories to argue that fiscal and political factors should affect the content of the president's yearly domestic policy agenda from 1949-2000. Lacking any readily available data source to test this argument, I also advance a new policy typology that categorizes domestic policies across both time andimportance dimensions. I use the number of yearly policies for each policy type (major, minor, incremental, and meteoric) as dependent variables in four separate

analyses. To account for the yearly changes in the political environment, I offer a timeseries analysis of several hypotheses. I argue that presidents seek tooptimize their domestic policy preferences, and because their success depends on broad legislative cooperation, presidents anticipatethe reaction of Congress and support or propose different policies accordingly in their yearly domestic policy agendas .1THEORYThree areas of theory-presidential goals, agenda setting, and anticipative reactions-provide a useful framework for discussing the determinants of the presidentsdomestic policy agenda,2 including a justification for why a time-importance policy typology is useful for assessing the presidents strategy in determining his yearlydomestic policy agenda.Presidential GoalsThe guiding force behind the presidents actions while in office is goal achievement . Presidents essentially have three goals-policy enactment,reelection, and historical recognition (Light 1999)-that they hope to achieve while in office. Of primary concern to presidents when they submit their domestic policy agenda is the enactment of that agenda. Although reelection and historical recognition may influence the policies

presidents propose or support, presidents need a policy record on which to run and be reelected, and by which they may beremembered historically3 Reelection and historical recognition are also term-specific goalspresidents pursue reelection during their first term and strive for alegacy in their second. Policy enactment pervades the presidents entire tenure and helps presidents in the achievement of their other goals. >

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Winners-Win

Winners win and losers lose winning creates a perception of powerOrnstein 01 (Norman, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, High Stakes and an Overloaded Agenda, Roll Call, September 10, lexis)

The compromise accomplished two ends. First, it changed the agenda base of the issue . Patients' rights went from an issue where the onlyviable proposal was from Democrats (with GOP co-sponsors), which the President vowed to veto - to one where both Democrats and Bush are for patients'

rights and merely differ on the details. Two, it gave the President a victory on the House floor when all the pundits predicted defeat - amajor momentum builder. In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success - the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory - isthe most valuable resource a chief executive can have . Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is onthe defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculatewho will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not.

Winners win and losers lose losing makes Bush look weak Barnes 03 (Fred, Executive Editor of the Weekly Standard, The Path of More Resistance, The Weekly Standard, March 24, lexis)

That Bush has persisted on Iraq in the face of sinking polls, diplomatic setbacks, and rising criticism argues against the cynicalview. Thomas DeFrank of the New York Daily News reported last week that Bush told friends nearly a year ago that he'd concluded Saddam Hussein must bedeposed. Since then, the president hasn't flinched. "He's using his political capital to take a reluctant nation to war," says a WhiteHouse official. It's not the other way around--Bush taking the country to war to build political capital.

Let's not exaggerate. Bush has lost some ground politically, but he's not in freefall . The latest Gallup Poll showed approval of his performancedipped from 63 percent to 57 percent over the past two months. This brings Bush roughly back to where he was prior to September 11. The rally-around-the-president phenomenon usually vanishes in seven or eight months. With Bush, it took 18 months to disappear, and it's likelyto return when war with Iraq begins.The long road to war has created uncertainty about the future, and this is partly responsible for the weak economic recovery. Federal Reserve chairman AlanGreenspan, among others, says so. The vote by Turkey not to join the war, the opposition of France, Russia, and Germany, the troubles at the U.N.--all haveshown the president as less than dominant. And not only have Bush's political opponents been emboldened, an antiwar movement has had time to mobilize,though less effectively in America than in Europe.

Norm Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute has a theory that winners win. That sounds tautological, but it means thatwinners create confidence in their ability to keep winning and thus improve their chances of doing just that. But lose or hit aroadblock, and the opposite occurs. "If you're not winning, you look vulnerable ," Ornstein says. Rebuffs by allies and the U.N."make Bush look less formidable. He looks not impotent but weaker."There's something to this. Certainly Daschle and House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi and Democratic presidentialcandidates act as though they believe it. Their criticism of Bush has become frequent and harsh.

Presidents that look like winners are more likely to secure agenda success


Finally, the presidents professional reputation affects the leeway he has to pursue his policy goals. Presidents whoare viewed as unskilled are continually on the defensive . Their explanations of problems tend to becomeexcuses; compromises become waffling. Skilled presidents have more room to maneuver. When they suffer aloss, as every president does, they still have leeway to pursue other items on their agenda or to try again to turnthe defeat into a victory . Reagans efforts to secure aid for the Contras in Nicaragua during the 99 th Congress (1985-86) illustrate the point. After losingseveral important votes by close margins on the House floor, the President eventually got a bill through the House giving him most of what he wanted, again by a thinmargin. It is hard to believe that Carter would have been able to prevail after so many setbacks. However, even Reagan was swamped by the political context. Reagansrequest in the 100 th Congress (1987-99) for additional aid for the Contras was defeated in the House by a narrow margin despite intense lobbying and appeals to the

public.

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Political capital will drop - every legislation decreases influence.LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p. 36 -37

The impact of resources on opportunities can be best described as a problem of policy cycles . Certain resourcesdecline over the term, while others grow . The more we seemed to learn about the domestic system, one Nixon aide complained, the less wecould do. We had out best shot at the start oaf the term but didnt have the organization to cash in. By the time we had the organization, the opportunity was closed.This ebb and flow of presidential resources creates two basic cycles within the domestic policy process.

The first pattern might be called the cycle of decreasing influence. It is based on declines in presidential capitaltime, and energy. Presidents can usually anticipate a midterm loss of party seats in Congress and a streaky erosion of public approval. At least for the past fifty years,all Presidents, whether Democratic or Republican, have faced a drop in House party seats at the midterm election. Johnson lost forty-seven Democrats in the House in

1966; Nizon lost twelve Republicans in 1970. And at least since George Gallup first began measuring public approval, all President have experiencedsome decline in their public support over the term . In the last twenty years, however the declines have been more severe. Today the Presidentcan expect a near-linear drop in his approval rating in the first three years of office, with a slight rebound at the end of the term As one Ford aide remarked, Eachdecision is bound to hurt somebody; each appointment is going to cut into support. Theres really now way that the President can win. If he doesnt make choices, hewill be attacked for being indecisive. If he does, he will satisfy one group but anger three others.

Declines in capital eventually bring the domestic process to a halt. Toward the end of each term, thePresident must spend increasing capital just trying to unclog the legislative calendar. Unless the President

is highly successful with early requests, the agenda becomes dominated by the old business . Of the five mostrecent Presidents, excluding Reagan, only Lyndon Johnson was able to sustain a consistently high level of agenda activity into the second an third years. Theother four President were force to begin repeating their domestic requests by the end of the first year in office. Even Johnson recognized the problem. As oneaide remarked, You have to start backtracking almost from the first day. Unless the programs move off the agenda, you have to start investing your timetrying to bump them off. You have to devote your energies to the old items before replacing them with your new ideas.

Statistically, a win has no effect on further success

Bond & Fleisher , professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President inLegislation" p.223)//ZEPresidency-centered variables, however, provide an even weaker explanation of presidential success. We found little support for the thesis that the weakness of

legislative parties increases the importance of presidential skill or popularity for determining presidential success on roll call votes. Our analysis reveals that presidents reputed to be highly skilled do not win consistently more often than should be expected given theconditions they faced. Similarly, presidents reputed to be unskilled do not win significantly less often than

expected. The analysis of presidential popularity reveals that the president's standing in the polls has only a marginal impact on the probability of success or failure.

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Winners-LoseWinners lose policies Bush wins dont cause increased political capitalLone Star Times 07 (President George W. Bush: Failure?, May 3, http://lonestartimes.com/2007/05/03/president-george-w-bush-failure/ )

Honest assessment in public of President Bushs efforts as chief executive can be difficult because of the rather strident nature of his opponents. It isimpossible, after all, to balance a ledger with those who will give no credit for anything to a man they hate. But what will Bushs legacy actually be? It is a

valid question, and examining the record could be instructive. Let us try to take a level-headed look.EconomyThe economy is probably one of the Presidents strongest suits. Despite terrorist attacks on the nation and a resulting recession, the American economy hasrebounded and remains strong years later. Mainstream liberal media may attempt to say otherwise, but very low unemployment and strong stock marketsindicate a generally healthy economic picture. There have been stumbles along the way, but Bushs tax reductions remain a shining conservativeaccomplishment. Compassionate Conservatism This initiative of the President must be regarded as a failure. Whatever the initialreasons for the attempt, Bushs plan to sell conservatism as mean and needing his brand of fiscal compassion largelyflopped. His efforts such as No child left behind and extensive reaching out to Congressional Democrats only resulted inmore and more spending and no political capital gained with his opponents. Some Republicans, and the President must benumbered among them, continue under the delusion that hard-left Democrats like Ted Kennedy and Nancy Pelosi can be gottenalong with, despite mountains of evidence to the contrary.

Winners lose pushing legislation hurts public supportBRACE & HINCKLEY 92 Professors of Political Science, Government, and Public Affairs at U. of Illinois [Paul & Barbara, Follow the Leader , p. 174-175]

Further, activity often works against popular support. In idealized portraits, presidents use their popular mandate in vigorous support of programs,winning Congress and the public to their point of view. In reality, the choices are more complex and limited. In the first place, the size and success of thelegislative objectives are heavily controlled by factors the president cannot control. And when president do try to rally the nation for legislativeobjectives, they risk a drop in the polls and a corresponding loss of success for their programs in Congress . Active positiontaking on votes in Congress and domestic travel (rallying the congressional members own constituencies) hurt public support.Tradeoffs are necessary. When presidents take positions, helping support their success in Congress, they lower their public approval.But approval helps congressional success. Every 10 percentage point gain in public approval yields a 7 percentage point gain incongressional success. Presidents thus face a delicate situation: in order to increase congressional success by bolsteringapproval they must decrease the number of positions they take. As their positions decrease, their congressional success rate falls. Popular

presidents thus find built in limits, while their less popular peers confront the dilemma in which efforts to make headway with congress set them further behindin the polls. The dilemma has no obvious solution, as presidents facing serious economic conditions know. With their polls at a low ebb they can least afford

bold new proposals; they can be criticized as ineffective and even less able to do their job. Since the polls fall with worsening economic conditions and withdramatic international events, presidents are most able to provide legislative leadership when the country needs it least and are least

able to supply that leadership when domestic conditions demand it.

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http://lonestartimes.com/2007/05/03/president-george-w-bush-failure/http://lonestartimes.com/2007/05/03/president-george-w-bush-failure/


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Winners Win doesnt assume the plan adding new initiatives can only hurt political capital

Pastor 91 (Robert, professor of political science at Emory University , Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy: Comparative Advantage or Disadvantage, The WashingtonQuarterly, Autumn, lexis)

The third dysfunction in interbranch relations is the length of time and the amount of presidential capital needed to gainapproval of a major foreign policy law or treaty. When the president makes a compelling case that the national security of the UnitedStates demands the approval of a particular bill or treaty, Congress rarely rejects him . This was true for the Panama Canal treaties and thewar in the Persian Gulf. But if the policy is unpopular, the president will almost certainly have to devote a much larger proportion of his time and political capital to gaining approval for it, and he will have less time for and influence on other foreign policyissues. Also, if he needs to ask Congress repeatedly to approve an unpopular policy -- such as contra aid -- he will deplete his

political capital and is likely eventually to lose the votes , as Reagan did. The increasing complexity of the world and its growing interdependencewith the United States means that the agenda will grow, the trade-offs between domestic and international interests will become more delicate, and the role of Congress will increase proportionately. A few difficult issues -- like the canal treaties or contra aid -- can delay consideration of the entireforeign policy agenda for prolonged periods. Given a fixed amount of time and a limited number of decision makers, thissystemic delay might be among the most important problems that stem from interbranch politics . The president must be veryconscious of his agenda and very selective in his approach. Carter filled his agenda with a host of controversial issues at the

beginning of his administration. Although he succeeded in gaining approval of the new Panama Canal treaties and new energy

legislation, both issues were costly, and ironically, his victories left him weaker politically. Reagan learned from Carter'sexperience and selected a smaller, more manageable agenda. His victories -- the tax cut and the defense budget -- came moreeasily in Congress, and he looked stronger as a result. To a certain extent, one's judgment of congressional involvement is colored by one'sassessment of the administration's policy. If one believes that an administration's policy on South Africa or the Middle East is correct, then congressionalintrusions are viewed more negatively than if one views the administration's approach as flawed. The congressional style of foreign policy making isadmittedly messy, public, and sometimes contradictory. But as Francis O. Wilcox, whose career spanned both branches, observed: "If Congress has frequentlyseemed to be going in one direction and then in another, that is partly because it is a collection of poorly coordinated, strong-minded individuals. But moreimportantly, it is because that is the way the White House and the Kremlin have moved as well." n27

Winners lose next vote is against the President regardless of ideology or party supportMANN 93 Director, Governmental Studies program, Brookings Institution. Co-Director, AEI-Brookings Renewing Congress Project. Former Aid to Reagan[Thomas, Beyond Gridlock: Prospects for Governance in the Clinton Years and After. Editor James L. Sundquist, pg. 19]

Most representatives and senators do not feel beholden to any president, let alone one who ran behind them in the last election.

I am reminded of advice I received from former senator Jacob Javits of New York in his last year of life, when I was perplexed and trying to figure out a votethat had just taken place in the senate

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