PS APPU - Agrarian Structure and Rural Development

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Ag ra r i an Structure and R u r a l Development

P S Appu

India's experience since Independence shows that there is a close inter-relation between agrarian

structure and rural development,

An outmoded agrarian structure is a serious obstacle to the modernisation of agriculture and r a p -

id rural development.

Such a structure is to he squarely blamed for the unequal distribution of the fruits of development

leading to widening of the disparities in income and wealth.

The upper classes who have cornered the bulk of the new prosperity have also succeeded in con-

solidating their political power. Consequently, it has become still more difficult to adopt and implement

far-reaching institutional reforms.

Even so, as the emerging agrarian structure has become a serious constraint to rural development

it will be disastrous to postpone the much-needed institutional reforms.

T H E agrarian structure plays a cruc ial

role in shaping the speed and spread

of rural development A n outmoded,

inegalitarian agrarian structure is not

merely a serious impediment to rapidrural develo pment, it is also the pr in ci -

pal cause of di st ort ing the results of

development. And, rural development

unaccompanied by essential in st it ut io n-

al reform makes it more difficult to

bring about structural changes in the

future. Th e experience of Ind ia duri ng

the years since Independence confirms

this view.

AGRAR IAN ST RUCT URE AT IN DE PEN DE NC E

In a vast coun tr y of such great

div ers ity as Ind ia , exposed as she had

been to different stands of political,

economic, social and cultural influences

in her long and chequered history, it

is, indeed, nat ura l to come across a

bewi lder ing variety o f tenurial condi-

tions. Tho ugh a mul tit ude of tenures

exis ted at the tim e of Independence

and the tenu rial condi tion s varie d a

great deal from region to region, and

even within a compact region, it is

possible to classify the numerous

tenures under tw o bro ad categories

the 'Zam inda ri ' and the 'Rai yatw ari 'systems. The essence of the Zamindari

system was the existence of one or

more layers o f prop rie tar y right s be-

tween the State and the actual holder

of the land. In the Raiyatwari system

no inte rmed iary interests ex isted be-

twe en the State and the lan dho lde r. It

is estimated that Zamindari tenures

covered one-half of the country at the

time of Independence.

Tra dit ion all y al l rulers in India,

Hi nd u as wel l as Mu sl im , appropriated

a share of the produce of the la nd

wh ic h was the pri nc ip al source of

revenue f or the State. In the years of

the decline and disintegration of the

Mu gh al Empi re, fi ndi ng themselves un-

equal to the task of co ll ec ti ng land

revenue, the Pr ov in ci al Governors

resorted to the device of appointing

revenue farmers drawn from the ranks

of vanquis hed potentates, feudal chi ef-tains, marauding free-booters, erstwhile

government functionaries, moneylen-

ders, speculators, etc. They cont racte d

to pay fixed sums to the government but

extorted as much as they could from

the landholders, keeping the difference

as their profit. Though these revenue

farmers were not proprietors, the

British administrators, familiar as they

had been with landlords and tenants

in their own country, recognised such

revenue farmers as landlords and

entered into firm agreements with them

for payment o f la nd revenue. An d theerstwhile landholders who had perma-

nent righ ts in the lan d and had actu-

ally been cultivating it, were reduced

to the status of insecu re tenants. Such

was the ori gin of the 'Za min dar i'

system. As a senior Br it is h adminis-

trat or of the last century put it, "the

prop riet ary rig ht was created by con-

solidating the position of revenue

farmers whom we found managing the

villa ges and payi ng the gover nment

revenue".1 Thus the Zamindar was the

person who m the governme nt recognis-

ed as the proprietor of an estate on

his agreeing to pay a certain sum as

la nd revenue . In cer tai n areas the

amount payable was fixed in perpetuity,

while in other areas the amount could

be revised from time to time. In some

parts of the country the settlement was

made with individuals, while in other

parts w i t h groups of persons. The

Za mi nd ar i estates were of va ry in g sizes.

While some of the big estates covered

hundreds of square miles spread over

more than one district, there were also

ver y smal l ones cove rin g a few acres

in a single village. Ma ny of the Zam in -

dars dive sted themselves of the tr oub le

of directly managing their estates and

col lec tin g rent from cult ivat ors by

leasing out the right to collect rent. In

course of time in some areas several

layers of such inte rmedi ary r ights were

created between the Zamindar and theactual cu lt iv at or. Eve ry one of these

intermediaries including the Zamindar,

appropriated a share of the rent paid

by the cult iva tor s and passed on the

balance to his immediate superior, At

the sum mit was the gove rnmen t to

whom the Zamindar paid land revenue.

Some parts of the cou ntr y, par ti-

cularly in the south and the west, were

free fro m the system o f revenue farm-

ing . In these areas the gov ern men t

entered int o direc t agreement w i t h

numerous landh older s for the pay-

ment of land revenue. This came to be

kn ow n as the 'R aiy atw ari ' system. It

must, however, be pointed out that all

those landholders were not cultivating

the lan d themselves. Ma ny of them had

leased out all their land or part of it

to tenants, mostly sharecroppers. The

dis ting uish ing feature of the Raiy atw ari

system was, ho wever , that the lan d-

holders paid land revenue directly to

the government and there was no in-

term ediar y between the l andh olde rs

and the government.

In it ia ll y the Zaminda rs were givenabsolute freedom to deal w i t h the ir

tenants as they pleased. In course of

time it was found that the Zamindars

were c ausi ng a great deal of harass-

ment to the tenants by res ort ing to

rack -rent ing and summary ejectment.

W i t h a vie w to affor ding a measure o f

pro tec tio n to the tenants, laws were

enacted subsequently for con fer rin g

security of tenure on certai n categories

of tenants who had been in possession

of the land for a lo ng t ime .

The Zamindars usually kept a portion

of their estates under their own dire ct

management. S uch lands consti tut ed

their home farms which they cultivated

thro ugh tena nts- at-w ill or farm ser-

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vants. Th ou gh the Rai ya twa ri system

came to be descri bed as a system of

peasant proprietors, right from its in-

cep tio n a sizeable percentage o f lan d-

owners used to lease out their land to

tenants who would pay fixed rent or

share the produce. Li tt le securi ty o f

tenure was available to the tenants on

the home-farms of the Zaminda rs i n the

Za mi nd ar i areas or to al l categories of

tenants in Raiyatwari areas. There is

li tt le doubt that on the eve of Indepen-

dence a considerable area of land was

under tenancy and that the bu lk of the

tenants enjoyed no security of tenure

or fixity of rent.

The agrarian structure was also

mar ked by great in equ ali ty in the

owner ship of land. Th ou gh data are

not available for that perio d, it is

estimated that a small number of big

landlor ds con tro lle d a substantial por-tion of the agricultural land, while mil -

li on s of sm al l peasants subjected to

numerous abuses and wei ghe d do wn

by perpetual indebtedness, eked out a

precarious existence on ti ny , fragment-

ed holdings employing primitive farm-

ing practices. A n d , at the bott om,

there existed a vast army o f landless

agricultural workers whose social and

econ omic status was even more pi ti -

able, A unique feature of the In dia n

situat ion is the close inter- rel atio n be-

tween the Hindu caste hierarchy and

the agrarian structure. The landownersin va ri ab ly bel onged to the so-called up-

per castes, the cu lti vat ors to the mi d-

dle castes and the agricultural workers

to the lowest castes, a situation that

led to economic dis abi lit ies bei ng ag-

gravated by social disadvantages.

LAND POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Such was the bac kgr oun d against

wh ic h the nati onal land pol icy was

evo lved after Independence. In the Five-

Ye ar Plans the obj ectives of lan d po-

licy have been laid down as, firstly, to

remove such mo tiv at ion al and other

impediments to increase in agricultural

production as arise from the agrarian

structure inherited from the past and,

secondly, to elim inat e, a ll ele-

ments of exploitation and social

injustice w it hi n the agrarian sys-

tem so as to ensure equa lit y of status

and opportunity to all sections of the

rura l popul atio n. Since lan d reform un-

der the Indian Constitution is a state

subject, and tenu rial conditio ns vary

fr om state to state, the Cen tr al gov-

ernment c ou ld only lay do wn the gene-

ral principles which provided the

framework for legislation as well as

administrative action. The principal

measures of land reform adopted for

secur ing the objectives of the la nd po-

licy laid down in the Five-Year Plans

have been the abolition of intermediary

tenures, refo rm of tenancy, i mpo si tio n

of ceilings on agricultural holdings and

re-d ist ribu tio n of land, and the con-sol ida tio n of fragmented agric ultu ral

holdings.

As we have already seen, the in-

termediary tenures covered about one-

ha lf of the count ry, mo stly in the No r-

the rn and Eastern parts. The abuses

of the Zamindari system had attracted

a great deal of att enti on in the lon g

years of the country 's struggle for

freedom. The Zam inda rs were a rather

unpop ular lot not only because of

the oppression practised by them, but

also because they had identified

themselves as the staunch suppor-ters of the Bri ti sh government, In

the circumstances, it was only-

natural that immediately after In-

dependence very hig h p ri or it y was ac-

corded to the abolition of intermediary

tenures so as to bri ng the tenants in to

direct relationship with the State. Ac-

cordingly, every state passed its own

legi sla tion for the abo lit ion of inter-

media ry rights on payment of com-

pensation. The impl eme ntat ion of the

enacted laws has been pra cti cal ly

completed. Only a few min or inter-

medi ary tenures st il l rema in to beabolished and efforts are afoot to do

away w i t h them also. As a result of

the abol iti on o f interme diary tenures

about 20 million erstwhile tenants are

estimated to have become peasant

proprietors owning land directly under

the State. Large areas of pr iv atel y

owned forests and waste land vested

in the State. One serious flaw in the

programme of abo lit ion of intermedi ary

tenures was that no effort was made

to l i m i t the size of the home farms of

the Zami ndar s or to extend prot ect ion

to the tena nts -at -wi ll, mos tly share-croppers on those home farms. The

abo lit ion of interm ediary tenures wo ul d

have led to far more satisfactory re-

sults i f steps had been taken si mu l-

taneously to l i m i t the size o f the home

farms and extend protection to the in-

secure tenants.

Right from the First Five-Year Plan

emphasis was also la i d on tenancy re-

form. Three important guidelines were

laid down in the Five-Year Plans for

the refo rm of tenancy. Fir st, rent

sho uld not exceed one- fif th to one-

fo ur th of the gross produce; secondly,

the tenants sho uld be acco rded per-

manent right s in the la nd they cul -

tivate subject to a li mi te d right of

resu mpti on to be granted to land -

owners; and thirdly, in respect of non-

resumable l and, the land lord -te nant re-

lati onsh ip sho uld be ended by con-

ferring ownership rights on tenants.

A l l states have enacted le gi sl at io n fo r

regul ating the rent payable by cu lt iv at -ing tenants. Yet ma xi mu m rates of

rent permis sible under the law con-

tinue to be above the lev el suggested

in the plans in a few states. Several

states have also enacted laws fo r con -

ferring security of tenure on tenants.

However, under the existing law the

position of tenants continues to be in-

secure in some areas. On ly a few

states have as yet enacted legislation

to enable tenants to acqu ire owner-

ship rights. Thus, in several states, the

enacted leg is lat ion falls short of the

accepted pol icy , and impl eme nta tio nhas been weak and ine ffe cti ve. The

Planning Commission's Task Force on

Agrar ian Re la ti on s (1973) has summed

up the po si ti on thus :

"The imp lem ent ati on of the enact-ed laws has been half-h earted, halt-ing and unsatisfactory in large partsof the coun try. The legal prot ect iongrant ed to tenants has often beenineff ecti ve. In accordance w it h thepolicy laid down in the Second Five-Year Plan the laws enacted by seve-ra l States pro vi ded for the resump-tion within certain limits of tenantedlands by landowner s for personal cul-

tiv ati on. The term 'personal cul ti-vation' was wide enough to cover allcases of cul ti va ti on under the land -owner's own super visi on or the su-pervis ion of a member of his fam ily .The prov isi on for resum ption oftenanted land by la ndowners result-ed in the ejectment of many tenants.Th en there were large scale eject-ments throug h the device of Vo lu n-tary surrender s'. In many cases,tenancies have been pushed under-ground and converted into wo rk-contracts. Even where the law pro-vides for security of tenure, tenantshave, in practice, found it extremelydifficult to claim successfully tenancyrights because mos t of the leases,parti cula rly crop-sharing arrange-ments, are oral and informal. Wheretenancy is insecure, legal provisionsregarding fair rent are useless and notenant dares to in it ia te ac ti on fo r get-tin g fair rent fix ed. Th is is so be-cause the tenant who has the auda-city to pray for fixation of fair rentfaces the ris k o f inst ant ejectment.Thus the objective of ensuring fairrent and security of tenure st il l re-mains unattained in large parts ofthe counlry."2

W i t h a vie w to reduci ng disparities

in the owne rshi p of lan d and make

some land available for distribution to

the landless labourers and s mall ho ld -

ers, the Second Fi ve -Ye ar Plan recom-

mended the imposition of ceilings on

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E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L W E E K L Y Review of Ag ri cu lt ure September 1974

agri cul tur al holdi ngs. In accordance

wi th that pol icy , ce ilin g laws were en-

acted by the diff erent states by 1961.

There were wide variations between the

ce il in g laws o f diff erent states in the

matter of the lev el of cei ling , un it of

application, exemptions, etc. At one

end, the ceil ing law of Kera la prov idedfor a cei li ng of 4 to 8 hectares for a

family, while at the other extreme, the

law of An dh ra Pradesh fix ed the ceil -

in g area in the range o f 11 to 130 hec-

tares dependi ng upo n the class of

land . In some laws fa mi ly was the

unit of appli cati on, wh ile in some

others cei lin g was fixe d for i nd iv id ua l

landholders. A l l the laws pro vid ed for

a large number of exempti ons. The

enactment of the ceiling laws had been

preceded by a na ti onal dehate attend-

ed wi th a great deal of pu bl ic it y. Na-

turally, all prudent landowners tooksteps in good tim e to dis tri but e the

surplus land among their relatives,

friends and dependants, and in some

cases they arranged paper transactions

to show dis tr ib utio n among ficti t ious

persons. Subsequent efforts to nu l li f y

such transfers have not been very suc-

cessful. As the Planning Commission's

Task Force has put it ". .. as a result

of the high leve l o f ceil ing, large num-

ber of exemptions from the law, mala-

fide transfers and partitions, and poor

imple menta tion , the results achieved

have been meagre".3

The poor resultsare demonstrated by the fact that on

the imp lem ent ati on of the ceiling laws

only about one million hectares of land

could be declared surplus. That works

out to be less than one per cent of the

tota l arable lan d in the coun try . On

fi ndi ng that the results were unsatis-

factory, the Governmen t of India issued

revise d guideli nes in Au gu st 1972 in

order to reduce the lev el of ce il in g

and bri ng about a measure of uni fo r-

mi ty i n the laws of the diffe rent states.

Accord ing to the new po li cy , the fa mi ly

is the unit for the determination ofce il in g area and most of the exemp-

tions have been wi th dr aw n. The state

governments have amended their ceil -

ing laws in accordance with the new

guideli nes and they have ind ic at ed

that on the implementation of the new

laws about 1.5 m i l l i o n hectares of sur-

plus land is likely to become available.

It remains to be seen whether this ex-

pectation will be fulfilled,

In In dia most of the agri cult ural

holdings are not only small but they

are also fragmented. Hence emphasis

was laid on consolidation of holdings

in the Fiv e-Y ear Plans. By the end of

1972, about 33 m i l l i o n hectares of

land was consolidated, mostly in the

states of Punjab, Hary ana and Ut ta r

Pradesh. A major weakness of the

programme was that consolidation was

done without taking effective steps to

ensure security of tenure to tenants,

par tic ula rly sharecroppers. In the re-

sult, cons olid atio n of holdings hasoften led to large-scale ejectment of

insecure tenants. Th is happened be-

cause the sharecropping tenancies sub-

sisted in respect of part icu lar plots of

land and after cons olid atio n the iden-

ti ty of those plots was lost. Thus con-

solidation often helped the landowner

in getting ri d of his tenants. No t wi t h-

standing this serious drawback, conso-

li da ti on of holdings has played a sig-

nificant role in the modernisation of

agri cul ture in Punjab, Hary ana and

western Uttar Pradesh.

A f t e r reviewing a l l the measures o f

la nd refo rm adopted since Inde pen-

dence, the Planning Commission's

Task Force concluded:

"A broad assessment of the pro-grammes of la nd ref orm adoptedsince Independence is that the lawsfor the abol it io n of interme diarytenures have been impl eme nte d fai r-ly efficiently, while in the fields oftenancy reform and cei lin g on hol d-ings, leg isl ati on has fal len short ofproclai med poli cy and implementa-ti on of the enacted laws has beentardy and inefficien t. W i t h the abo-

l i ti o n of inter mediar y interests theowne rshi p of la nd became morebroad-based and the erstwhile supe-rior tenants acquired a higher socialstatus. It sho uld not, howe ver, beoverlooked that as a result of thetenancy laws enacted in the decadespr io r to Independence the superio rtenants had already been enj oyi ngsecurity of tenure and fixity of rent.It is a moot p oi nt whether the abo-li t io n of interm ediary interests con-ferred any new economic benefits onthe tenants. The programmes wh ic hco ul d have led to a rad ic al changein the agrar ian stru ctur e and theelimination of some of the elementsof exploitation in the agrarian systemand ushered in a measure o f di st ri -butive justice were those of tenancyreform, c ei l ing on agricu ltural hold-ings and distribution of land to thelandless and sma ll holders . As al-ready pointed out these programmescanno t be said to have succeeded.Hi gh ly explo itat ive tenancy in theform of crop-sharing still prevails inlarge parts of the coun try . Suchtenancy arrangements have not onlyresulted in the perpetuation of socialand economi c inju sti ce but havealso become insurmountable hurdlesin the path of the spread of moderntechnology and improved agricultu-ral practices. Thus the overa ll as-

sessment has to be that programmesof la nd re for m adopted since Inde-pendence had failed to bring about

the required changes in the agrarianstructure."4

RURAL DEVE LOPM ENT AND AGRARIAN

STRUCTURE

The last tw o decades o f pla nned eco-

nomic development have witnessed the

fo rm ul at io n and the execution of seve-ral programmes aimed at rural deve-

lopment. The most impo rtant among

these are the Co mmu nit y Devel opmen t

Programmes, a massive effo rt in ex-

panding irrigation facilities and a

comprehens ive programm e aimed at

achieving rapid increase in agricultural

pro duc ti on in certa in selected areas.

India's Second Five-Year Plan viewed

the Co mm uni ty Developme nt Program-

me as the chie f instrument for imp ro-

vi ng a ll aspects of ru ra l li fe . It was

expected that the relat ive ly smal l allo-

cations made by governmen t for financ-ing projects l ike i rrigati on work s, vi l-

lage roads, schools and hospitals wo ul d

be substant ially augmented by con tri -

butions from the public, and that the

village community itself would assume

respo nsibi lity for the executio n and

future maintenance of those proje cts.

A large army of gove rnment fu nc ti o-

naries was app oin ted to help in the

execution of the projects and provide

extension services in agr icul ture , ani-

ma l husbandry, co-ope ration , educa-

ti on , health, etc. It was hoped that

the programme would promote self-help, lead to concerted c omm una l en-

deavour for a better lif e for i ndi vid ual s

as we ll as for the communi ty as a

whose, and would ultimately pave the

way for self-sustained rur al develop-

ment. Community Development blocks

were opened to cover the whole

country.

The achievements of the Co mm un it y

Development Programme have been

rather uneven. In a few areas some

progress was achieved, particularly in

the adoption of mo dern agri cul tura l

practices. A number of min or irr iga -

tion wo rks, rural roads, school bui ld-

ings, community halls, etc, were also

constructed. Public contr ibution in

these efforts was, however, far below

the expected level. Not wit hst andi ng

these small gains, it Is gene rall y ac-

cepted that the Community Develop-

ment Programme failed to achieve its

objectives. Th e bu lk of the benefits o f

the programme accrued to substantial

landowners. The landless agri cul tur al

workers, sharecroppers and sma ll pea-

sants derive d very lit tl e benefit from

the program me. N or has the Co mm u-

nity Development Programme resulted

in an urge for co-operative endeavour

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for rura l development or prom oted

self-help.

The root cause for the failure of the

Community Development Programme

is that the inhabitants of an Indian v i l -

lage do not constitute a community.

The data col lec ted d ur in g the seven-

teenth ro un d of the Na ti on al Sample

Survey in 1961 showed that 12 per

cent of the rural households owned no

land at all and 32 per cent owned less

than 0.4 hectare per househo ld. Af t er

a decade of la nd re fo rm the size-class

dis tri but ion of land holdings c ontinued

to be extremely skewed, with 72 per

cent of the agr icu ltu ral hol dings being

bel ow 2 hectares in area and account -

ing for only 20 per cent of the total

agricultural land. At the other end of

the scale, ho ld ings above 8 hectares i n

area accounted for 5 per cent of the

total number of holdings and 36 percent of the to ta l la nd . A t the 1961

census it was es timated that one quar-

ter of the agric ult ura l land was under

tenancy and that over 80 per cent of

the tenanci es were insecu re. The po-

pula tion of a typ ica l Indian village

consists of big , me di um and smal l

landowners, tenants, the bulk of whom

are insecure share-croppers, village

artisans and agr icu ltu ral workers. The

economic interests of these classes are

often in conf lict . The landowners and

tenants arc interested i n keep ing agri-

cu lt ur al wages as lo w as possible, a lllandowners are anxious to raise their

share of the produce of the land and

also to eject their tenants, and the big

landowners who are also invariably the

vil lag e moneyl enders , oppress al l the

other classes in the village.

The eco nomic i nequali ties and clea-

vages are aggravated by social disabi-

lities and conflicts rooted in the caste

system. A ty pic al Ind ian villag e has

over three dozen castes and sub-castes

which can broadly be divided into the

so-called upper, mid dle and lowercastes. In spite of all the changes that

have taken place du ri ng the last quar-

ter of a century since Independence,

the ownership of la nd is st il l generally

con fin ed to the members of the up-

per and the middle castes, tenants are

mostly drawn from the middle castes,

and those who belon g to the bot to m

rungs of the caste hi er ar chy are, by

and large, agric ult ura l labourers.

Suc h be ing the state of affair s, the

inhabitants of an Indian village have

no soci al cohesion or comm on econo-

mic interests. The extremely inegahta-ri an character of the agrar ian struc-

ture i s cle ar ly one of the ro ot causes

for the failure of the Community De-

velo pmen t Programme. The poor per-

formance of the co-operative societies

and the village panchayats (organs of

local self-government) should also be

at tr ib ut ed to the same cause. The

co-operative societies, con tro ll ed as

they are in most parts of the country

by rich farmers, seldom cater to the

needs of the weaker sections of the

populat ion. Si mil ar ly the vil lage pan-

chayats arc also domi nat ed by the

rur al elite, and the und er-pr ivil eged

classes usually take no interest in their

fu nct ion in g. Ha d steps been taken to

lev el do wn inequali ties, all these ins ti-

tutions would have fared better.5

Gi ve n the character of the Ind ian

ru ra l struct ure, the fail ure of the

Com mu ni ty Development Programme

is not in the least surprising. But even

development programmes wh ic h pro-

vi de d for massive publ ic investmentand di d not cal l for any concer ted

communal action, did not fare as well

as expected because of the fa il ure to

effect necessary ins ti tu tio na l reform.

To this category belong the prog ram-

me for development of ir ri ga ti on and

the intensive efforts for agr icu ltu ral

development in certain selected areas.

A n in ve stment of Rs 2,650 cro res made

in major irrigation schemes up to 1973

is estimated to have resulted in an ad-

ditional ir rigati on potential of 10 mi l-

lion hectares.0 Act ual ut i l isa t ion for

the country as a whole is estimated to

be of the order of 80 per cent of the

potential created. Ut il isa ti on is, how-

ever, par ti cu la rl y poor in c erta in sche-

mes like the Kosi Project.

Kos i is a multi purp ose project exe-

cuted at an expenditure of about Rs

100 crores providing flood control and

irrigat ion in the Kosi Div isi on of Bi-

har. The writer had occasion to study

different aspects of this project.7 The

irr iga tio n potential created is 0.32 mi l-

lion hectares for autumn crops, 0.1

million hectares for spring crops and0.15 m i l l i o n hectares for summer crops.

Th ou gh the canals have been i n ope-

ration for about a decade, the highest

utilisation so far has been only 40 per

cent of the potentia l duri ng autumn,

15 per cent in spring and 10 per cent

in summer. The main features of the

agrarian structure of the Ko si Are a

are extreme concentration in the

ownersh ip of land , absentee la nd lor d-

ism, widespread sharecropping and a

preponderance of landless a gri cul tur al

labourers. It has now been established

that the mai n reasons for the l ow ut i-l isa tion of the irr iga tio n potential, par-

ti cu la rl y in the spring and summer

seasons, are concentration in the

ownership of la nd and widesprea d

share croppi ng on terms unfa ir to the

sharecroppers. In the K os i area the

main crop is paddy harvested towards

the end of November or early in De-

cember. Imme dia tel y after har vest ing

the paddy crop, the farmers get only

two to three weeks to prepare thelan d and sow wheat. Un der cond i-

tions of trad ition al agriculture using

scrub bullocks for draught power, the

farmers find it difficult to plant wheat

on more tha n 6 to 8 hectares. Frag-

mented hol din gs, and the fact that

many of the big la ndowners are ab-

sentee la nd lo rds, have added to the

diff icul ties. Large holdi ngs have been

found to be one of the main reasons

for the low util isat ion of the irri ga-

ti on potenti al. Sharecropping has been

found to be an equally important ob-

stacle to a fuller utilisation of the ir-rigat ion potential. Ac cor di ng to the

terms on wh ic h sharecropping is prac-

tised in the Kosi Area, all the inputs

have to be pr ov id ed by the share-

emppor; yet be must give ha lf the

produce i n each season to the la nd -

lord. Unde r the Bihar Tenancy Ac t

the landlord is entitled to only 25

per cent of the gross produce, but

sharecroppers w ho insist upon thei r

legal rights face ejectment. Therefore,

in practice, half the produce is given

to the landowners. Experience shows

that in this region an average crop of

paddy yie ld in g about 10 to 12 quin -

tals per hectare can be grown with-

out app lyin g chemic al fertilisers or

using improved seeds. Growing wheat

is, however , more costly . The addi-

ti onal cash expendi ture is at least

Rs 250 per hecta re. As he has to par t

w i th one ha lf of the produce, the

sharecropper docs not fi nd it wo r th

his while to grow wheat by incurring

add iti ona l expenditure to meet wh ic h

he has. anyway, to borrow money on

usurious terms. The likely return from

the second crop wi l l not ju st if y the

add iti ona l investment and the atten-

dant risk. This is another reason why

the land under sharecropping usually

remains unc ult iva ted dur ing spring.

The same exp lan ati on holds goo d for

the summer crops as well.

The ineg alit aria n agrarian structure

is to be blamed squarely for the un-

equal dist ri bu ti on of the benefits of

the scheme. The project has, no doubt,

led to considerable ag ric ult ura l pros-

perit y. La nd values have apprec iated

phenomenally. Persons ow ni ng large

areas of land have benefited greatly.

Sma ll landowner s have also recei ved

some benefits. They have not, however,

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Revi ew o f Agri cu lt ure , September 1974 E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L W E E K L Y

been able to make fu l l use of the

irrigation in the absence of access to

necessary inpu ts. Furt herm ore , thei r

dependence on bi g land owne rs for

credit has rendered the position of the

smal l holders rather vulnerable. The

enhanced la nd values have whe tte d

the appetite of the big landowners to

acquire more land and expand the size

of their holdings . Ma ny a small holder

has been obliged to mortgage or sell

his lan d to big landowner s. The

position of the sharecroppers has

considerably deteriorated. The rise in

agr icu l tura l product iv i ty and land

values has pro mpt ed the land owne rs

to get rid of their sharecroppers lest

the latter succeed in esta blis hing a

cl ai m to the land. Several sharecrop-

pers have been evicted from the land

they had been cu lt iv at in g for years.

The iro ny of the situati on is that evenafter the ol d sharecroppers are evic -

ted the lan down ers seldom bother to

cultivate the land personally. In most

cases they get the la nd cu lt iv at ed

through new sharecroppers who are

not l i ke ly to cla im tenancy r ights. As

the prevailing agrarian structure is not

conducive to the development of in-

tensive agri cul tur e, there has been

only marginal improvement in the in-

tensity of cropping. Hence, there has

been no sign ific ant expansion of em-

ployment opportunities with the result

that the dail y wages of agr icu ltu ralfabourers con tin ue to be among the

lowes t in the coun try. Thus, the be-

nefits of the project have been shared

in this manner: substantial lan dow n-

ers have benefited subst antia lly, smal l

landowners have made small gains but

their posi tio n has become vulnerable,

the sharecroppers have suffered great-

ly and the landless agricultural labour-

ers survive i n the same condi tio ns of

abject poverty in which they have al-

ways l ived.

In the clo si ng years of the Second

Fiv e-Y ear Plan it became fa ir ly clear

that the Co mm un it y Devel opment Pro-

gramme was not likely to succeed and

that the pol ic y o f spreading the availa-

ble resources th in ly alt over the coun-

try would not lead to the required in-

crease in agri cul tur al prod uct ion . This

was the background against which a

new agri cul tur al strategy was e volved

The essence of the new strategy was

to concentrate all development effort;

in areas with assured irrigation. The

introduction of the Intensive Agricul-tural District Programme in three dis

tricts in 1960-61 marked the first stage

of the new strategy. Late r the pro

gramme was extended to another

thi rte en dis tri cts . I n 1964-65 and sub-

sequent years, a modified version of

the scheme, style d as Intensive A g r i -

cul tur al Ar ea Programme, was exten-

ded to more districts. The appearance

of high-yielding varieties of wheat and

rice seeds from 1964 onwards turned

out to be the harbinger of a break-

thr ough on the agricu ltu ral front. Ef-

forts continued to be concentrated in

areas w i t h potent ial for rap id agric ul-

tur al gro wt h, but the strategy was

further mo dif ied emphasising the pi vo -

tal roles on the high-yielding varieties

of seeds and mul tip le- cro ppi ng. The

great spurt in food pro duc ti on that

fo ll ow ed was rather inacc uratel y and

hasti ly hail ed as the 'Green Rev olu -

tion'. The increase recorded in food

production was no doubt impressive

by any standard. The output of food-

grains shot up from 89 million tonnes

in 1964-65 w hi c h was the best year

before the so-called revolution, to 100

m i l l i o n tonnes i n 1969-70. In 1973-74

the output is estimated to have been

about 107 mi l l io n tonnes. St i l lm or ei m-

pressive was the increase in the out-

put of whea t, the cereal that respo n-

ded most to the new package of prac-

tices. Du ri ng the six years fro m 1964-

65 to 1970-71 wheat pro du ct io n in-

creased at a compound rate of about

14 per cent per annum.8

When the new strategy was evolved,

it was con fid ent ly hope d that the ap-

pl ica ti on of science and techno logy

backe d by investment w ou ld take

Ind ian agricult ure out of the woods.

Perhaps, it was even believed that the

unpleasant question of ins tit uti ona l

ref orm co ul d be by-passed. The eupho-

ria of the in it ia l years of the so-ca lled

'Green Revolution' did not, however,

last long, Soon it became evident that

the bul k of the gains were bei ng cor-

nered by the big farmers, Several stu-

dies, mos tly em piri cal, show that the

disparities in income and wealth have

increased. Soci al ten sion has also been

on the increase. The new tec hno log y

is, no doubt, scale-neutral in the sense

that it can be applied with equal ef-

fectiveness on big and small farms,

provided water and the other inputs

are available in right quantities at the

right time. Considerable investment is

cal led for in irr i gati on, la nd improve -

ment, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.

W i t h the higher investments, the risks

are also highe r. La ck of access to cre-

dit and other inputs and their in ab il it y

to undertake risk s, make it rather di f -

fi cu lt for the sma ll farmers to adopt

the fu ll package of mode rn farming

practices. Hence the dispa ritie s bet-

ween the bi g and the sma ll farmers

are incre asing. The tenants, par tic ula r-

l y insecure sharecroppers, have fared

even worse. In the context of rising

income and la nd values, landowners

have been trying hard to eject their

tenants and bring the land under their

direct cultivat ion. W ol f Ladejinsky9

and Francine Frankel10 have reported

the ejectment of tenants i n c erta in dis-

trict s where the new agr icu ltu ral stra-

tegy was adopted. A n d Pranab Bar-

dhan's studies11 indicate that there

has been no impro vem ent in the real

wages of agricultural labourers except

in Ke ra la where they are somewhat

better organised. There is plenty of

evidence to show that the new pros-

pe rit y has been shared ve ry un equ all y,

the bulk of the gains accruing to the

big farmers.

Whe n it was fou nd that the la ck of

access to credi t was rend erin g it

very difficult for the small farmers to

moderni se the ir far min g, a scheme

kn ow n as the Small Farmers Deve lop-

ment Agency was sanctioned in the

Fou rth Fiv e-Ye ar Plan to help sm all

farmers who own less than 2 hectares

of land . A few distri cts were cover-

ed under the scheme on an experi -

mental basis in the Fourth Plan and

it is proposed to cover about one-

half of the country in the Fifth Plan.

The main thrust of the scheme is in

providing credit and subsidies for land

improvement and irriga tion. The draw-

back of thi s scheme is that unless a

person owns a minimum area of land,

say at least 0.4 hectare, he wi ll not

fi nd it ec onomi c to inves t even in a

masonry we ll . A m i no sharecropper

will, for obvious reasons, make any

investment in irr iga tio n works. A s al-

ready pointed out, 44 per cent of the

rural households own no land or less

than 0.4 hectare. Hence even th is

scheme, which is specially designed to

help the weaker sections of the ru ral

society, wi l l prac ticall y leave out in

the cold the bottom half of the rural

popul atio n. It wo ul d, of course, be

possib le, to ensure that part of the

benefits accrue t o that class i f the exe-

cution of the scheme is accompanied

by a red is tri but ion of la nd and the

conferm ent of permanent righ ts on

renants-at-will.

There is evidence to show that the

outmo ded agrarian structure is alsostanding in the way of the spread of

the so-called 'Green Re vo lu ti on ' to

many areas where considerable poten-

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8/8

t ia i ex is ts for rap i d agr i cu l tu ra l

gro wth . In the Indo -Gang etic pla in

and the deltas o f the great ri ve rs ,

In di a has some of the wo rl d' s most

r ich ly endowed agr icu l tura l t racts with

un ri va l l ed gro und water resources.

S igni f ic ant increase in agr i cu l tu ra l

pro duc ti on has taken place only in

the western po rt io n of the Ind o-Ga n-

getic plai n. In this area the bu lk of

the lan d is cult iva ted by own er far-

mers and sha rec rop pin g tenanc y is

very rare indee d. The new f ou nd agri-

cu lt ur al prosp erity of this area is ba-

sed on the exploitation of ground wa-

ter. Cur re nt ly 80 per cent of the avai-

lable ground water is tapped in this

region to support mu lt ip le crop ping .

But in the eastern portion of the Gan-

getic pl ai n and the deltas the exp lo i-

tati on of gro und water continues to

be poor. In some of these areas the in-

cidence of share croppi ng and absen-

tee Ian dow ner shi p contin ues to be

hig h. A n outmodoel agraria n struc-

ture is one of the mai n l i mi t i ng fac-

tors in the spread of the 'Gre en Re-

volution' to these areas.

CONCLUSIONS

The fo l l ow in g conclusion s emerge.

India's experience since Independence

shows that there is a close inter-rela-

t i on between agrarian structure and

ru ra l development. A n ou tmode d agra-

ri an str uct ure is a serious obstacle to

the mode rni sati on of agri cult ure and

rap id rur al development. Such a struc-

ture is to be squarely blamed for the

unequal d is t r i but ion of the fru i ts of

develo pment leadin g to wi de ni ng of

the dispar ities in inc ome and wea lth.

The upper classes who have cornered

the bu lk of the new pro spe rit y have

also succeeded in con sol ida ti ng thei r

polit ical power. Consequently, it has

become st i l l more dif f i cu lt to adopt

and implem ent far-reaching inst i tu-

ti on al refor ms. Eve n so, as the emer-

gin g agrarian struc ture has become

a serious const rain t to ru ra l deve-

lopm ent it w i l l be disastrous to

postpone the much-needed institutional

reforms.

Notes

[The views expressed in this paper

are the write r's ow n and not neces-

sarily those of the Gove rnm ent ofIndia.]

1 B H Bade n-Po wel l, "La nd Systems

of Br it is h India", Vo l II , p 464.2 P la nning Commi ss ion , New D el h i

(1973), "Report of the Task Forceon Ag ra ri an Rel atio ns", pp 3-4.

:3 Ibid, p 4.

i Ibid, pp 6-7.5 For a frank and lu ci d revi ew of

the Comm uni ty Developmen t Pro-

gramme, the Co-oper ative Socie-ties an d Panchay ats see Gu nn arMyr da l , "As i an D rama" , V o l I I ,Chap ter s 18, 22 and 26.

6 Govern ment of Ind ia, M i n i st ry ofIrr igat ion and Power, Annual Re-port (1972-73), pp 48-49.

7 P S Ap pu , "Un equ al Benefitsfrom Kosi Project", Economic andPolitical Weekly, June 16, 1973.

8 Wo l f Ladej in sky, "Ho w Green IsThe Green R evol utio n ?" Economicand Political Weekly, December29, 1973.

9 Wo l f Ladejinsky, "Ironies ofIndia's Green Revolution", Foreign

Affairs, July 1970.

10 Francin e R Fran kel, "India'sGreen Revo lu t ion" .

11 Pranab Bardha n, "Gree n Rev olu -t ion and Ag r i cu l tu r a l Labourers ",Economic and Political Weekly,Speci al Nu mb er , July 1970.

Uti lisation of Ground Water Resources

Public versus Private Tubewells

B D Dhawan

This paper is basically a review article. The author has picked a few studies on tubewells and

attempted to probe some of the major economic claims being advanced in favour of private tubewells.

The economic underpinnings of the thesis that private tubewells are superior to public tubewells

appear to be weak on closer scrutiny.

Also examined is the problem of 'mismanagement' of state tubewells, which is the root cause of

disenchantment with them in several quarters.

IN contrast to the dis mal shortfalls wi t-

nessed i n most targets set by the Pla n-

ning Comm issi on, the F our th Plan

achievement i n grou nd water explo ita-

tion is comme ndable . Thi s remarkable

achievement has come about due to a

veritable tube well "explosion'. It is

estimated that about one hundred

thousand tube wells are bein g inst all ed

in the country every year.1

There were about 3,000 pu bl ic and

21,000 pri vat e tubewel ls i n the country

at the beginning of the planning era.

By the end of the Fo ur th Pl an perio d,

about 20,000 public tubewells are said

to have been ins tal led . On the other

hand, the corr espon ding numbe r of

priva te tubewell s may be pla ced in the

range 0.6-1.0 mil l ion. 2 Wh i l e one wel-

comes the emergence of this dy na mi c

enterprise in the countryside, one ought

to keep in mind the support rendered

by the State in the dev elo pme nt o f

pri vat e tub ewe lls . The State has not

only p rov ide d Substantial indi rect

finance for pri vat e tubew ell s but has also

undertaken massive programmes of rural

e lectr i f icat ion.3 Ru ral electrif icat ion is

probably the more important of these

tw o factors e spec iall y since 1967 wh en

the programme of rural electr if icat ion

was sharply reoriented, where by the

pr im ar y c oncern o f the progr amme be-

came the energisation of agr icu ltu ral

pumpsets instead of ele ctr ifi cat ion of

vi ll age habitati ons. It is this extension

of the pow er system to the In di an

coun trys ide that has no w made the agr i-

cul tur e sector a major contender f or

available power supplies in many

states.4

When one looks at the comparative

rates of growth of state and private

tube well s, one notices the rel ati vel y

slower growth in the number of state

tubewel ls. Since priv ate tubewel ls are

a feasible pro pos iti on lo r farmers wi t h

rel ati vely large lan dhol ding s, a faster

incre ase in th eir numbers w ou l d accen-

tuate the prob lem of ine qui ty in the

rura l sector as small and margi nal farm-

ers' water needs are not taken care of

through pub li c ir rig at ion works. In this

perspective, the choice between private

and pu bl ic tubewells appears to bo il

down to the famil iar problem of growth

versus equ ity . The ref ore , it is not

sur pri sin g that one conies across mis -

givings bein g aired both wi th regard

to the developmen t of priv ate as w el l

as pub li c tubewells.5

Th is paper is basic ally a rev iew

article . But the rev iew is far fr om com-

prehen sive. The author has ju st pi ck ed

up a few studies on tub ewe lls . Th e

effort here is to probe i nto some majo r

A-75

Documents

PS APPU - Agrarian Structure and Rural Development