Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia · Asian Communist power until the new nations of Southeast Asia could strengthen their own political and economic institutions and

PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN

The British government's announcement in January 1968 that it planned to withdraw its military forces from Southeast Asia by 1971 caused deep regret in Washington, Canberra and Wellington and serious foreboding in the two capitals most directly affected-Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Between July 1967, when Britain first made public its intention to phase out of its military bases "East of Suez" by the mid-1970s, and the decision last January to move up the timetable to 1971, Britain's Common- wealth partners gradually had reconciled themselves to the political reali- ties of London's need to reduce overseas expenditures and defense commitments. They also had recognized that a British withdrawal spread over seven or eight years probably would permit an orderly accommodation to the economic effects of the action and provide them with time to formulate new security arrangements to replace the British military presence in Ma- laysia and Singapore. But the Wilson government's decision to leave by 1971 stunned the Commonwealth nations concerned and raised a serious question in the capitals of many Asian countries: What could be done to prevent a security problem from developing on the southern flank of the Southeast Asian region after the British departed?

One of the striking aspects of the British decision to leave Southeast Asia was the display of genuine regret among the former colonial peoples -Malaysians and Singaporeans. This was in marked contrast to the withdrawal of European power from other parts of Southeast Asia during the past twenty years. The British departure from Burma (1948), the Dutch from Indonesia (1949), and the French from Indo-China (1954) resulted from the armed resistance of their Asian subjects to an attempted reimpo- sition of colonial rule following the Japanese defeat in 1945.1 A major reason why Singapore and Malaysia desired to retain a British military presence was their full appreciation of the fact that they would not have survived the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) nor Indonesian "confrontation" (1963-1966) had it not been for British and Commonwealth forces stationed in their countries. By 1967, however, the British government may have concluded that the security threat to Malaysia and Singapore had been

1A fourth colonial power, the United States, honored a prewar pledge to grant independence to the Philippines.

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greatly reduced following the striking reversal in Indonesian foreign policy after President Sukarno's fall from power in 1966. But this view was not fully shared by the Malaysian and Singapore governments; both nations realized that communal problems could erupt again and be exploited by outside powers if there were no friendly military forces available to help keep the peace.

Of equal significance to its immediate effects on the security of Malaysia and Singapore, the British decision to withdraw brought into sharp focus a trend which had been apparent in the international politics of Southeast Asia since 1950: the emergence of the United States as the principal guarantor of the security of this strategically important but politically weak region. In 1950 the United States had no military bases and little economic interest in Southeast Asia, except in the Philippines where it maintained bases under an agreement with that country. As European power and influence gradually receded, the United States was compelled to reassess its policy of detachment and determine whether its national interest would permit it to stand aside while Communist power, centered in Hanoi and Peking, extended its control over the area. The alternative was for the United States to expand its role in the area and attempt to hold back the thrust of Asian Communist power until the new nations of Southeast Asia could strengthen their own political and economic institutions and then assume a major share of the defense responsibility.

A basic fact of political life in Southeast Asia, and one which strongly influenced American policy from 1950 onward, was that none of the new nations of this area, with the possible exception of Indonesia, had the capability of defending itself against powerful neighbors. Because of their political and economic weakness and the diversity of their religious, cultural and ethnic backgrounds, the nations of Southeast Asia have constituted since World War II a classic case of a power vacuum. Like the Balkans in the pre-World War I period, this area has provided an unstable arena in which the great powers have contended for supremacy. Unlike the Balkans, however, Southeast Asia is a region with which only one great power- Communist China-has a land border; all the others-Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States-are distant powers which sought to maintain their interests or increase their influence.2 This fact has made the task of reestablishing a balance of power there in the past twenty years particularly difficult.

DISINTEGRATION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

In 1940 Thailand was the only independent state in Southeast Asia; all the others were colonies of Great Britain (Burma, Malaysia, Singapore), France (Indo-China), the Netherlands (Indonesia), and the United States (the Philippines, which had commonwealth status). None of the powers except

'Another potential great power, Japan, has thus far chosen not to become involved in security problems in Southeast Asia.

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808 REGIONAL SECURITY PROSPECTS

the United States contemplated independence for its possessions. However, Hitler's occupation of the Netherlands and France and his attacks on Britain in 1940 changed the situation in the Far East dramatically and caused Japan to take advantage of the weakness in the area. By 1942 all of South- east Asia was under the control of Japan; this replacement of Western power by a single Asian power profoundly affected the attitudes of the peoples of Southeast Asia and set the stage for a postwar struggle between the European colonial powers and the new nationalist forces that sprang up during the Japanese occupation. These nationalists were determined to resist the return of their European masters.3

Japan's surrender in August 1945 removed it from the political scene in Southeast Asia so suddenly that a political hiatus ensued before French and Dutch troops were able to move into Indo-China and the East Indies and reestablish colonial rule. The British were never able fully to assert their authority in Burma; in the Philippines, the United States fared bet- ter by trading independence for a defense agreement which provided it with military bases. In Malaya and Singapore, the British maintained colonial administration until 1957 and 1963, respectively, largely because nationalist forces cooperated with, rather than fought against, its rule. Thailand, which was occupied and thereafter cooperated with Japan, was able to have its independence reaffirmed by the Allies after the war only after returning the territories in Indo-China, Burma, and Malaya that it had acquired during the war. By 1946, therefore, three of the four powers that had dominated Southeast Asia before World War II were only in nominal control of their colonies; a fourth, the United States, remained in the Philippines, but on a new political basis. Of the four, only the United States emerged from the war in a stronger position than it had been before.

Four years later, the tenuous postwar balance in Southeast Asia was beginning to crumble. The Dutch were forced by the tenacious Indonesians, and by international opinion, to grant their colony independence; Britain was engaged in a major armed struggle against Communist terrorists in Malaya; the French were fighting a costly war against Viet Minh guerrillas in Indo-China; and in the Philippines, the government was hard-pressed to cope with the HUK rebellion. Furthermore, Communist forces took over control of mainland China late in 1949 and began providing arms to the Viet Minh. By encouraging these Communist uprisings against the colonial powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China greatly increased their influence in the area, even though they had no military forces there. Largely in response to Communist China's hostile policy, the United States in 1950 took the first steps toward involvement in Southeast Asian security problems by providing economic and military assistance to Thailand and by sub- stantially increasing its assistance to the French in Indo-China. The out-

'In Indonesia, for example, the Japanese trained and partially armed the first in- digenous military force and encouraged Sukarno to declare Indonesia's independence in 1945.

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break of war in Korea and China's intervention greatly accelerated U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

France's disastrous military defeat in Indo-China in 1954 and its decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. The United States' decision to join an alliance with other nations to protect this area was dramatic evidence of the breakdown of the postwar balance of power in Southeast Asia and recognition of the strength of Asian nationalism coupled with aggressive Asian Communism. The demise of French power left a glaring power vacuum in the Indo-China peninsula, one which threatened to upset the delicate balance that existed elsewhere in the region.

EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH THE BALANCE OF POWER

In September 1954, the United States took an historic step at Manila: it sought to halt the advance of Asian Communist power by concluding a defense alliance (SEATO) with seven other nations and committing itself for the first time to defend the mainland of Southeast Asia. The treaty provided a legal framework for SEATO action in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, if the security situation required it and these countries requested aid. To a large degree, the U.S. pledge to enforce the lines drawn in the 1954 Geneva Agreements proved successful during the next six years, and an uneasy political equilibrium was maintained. The Diem regime in South Vietnam proved surprisingly successful in bringing a semblance of unity to that country; and although the Laotian political scene continued to boil, there was no serious threat to the security of that kingdom until 1960.

By 1960, however, the security agreements so carefully pieced together at Geneva were disintegrating. A principal reason was Hanoi's decision to abandon its policy of seeking to extend control over South Vietnam by political means and instead to launch armed insurgency against the Diem government. The Kong Le coup d'etat in Laos in August 1960 upset the fragile political balance in that country and led to a series of moves by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China that brought them into a danger- ous confrontation in April 1961. A larger war was averted when President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in Vienna in June 1961 and decided to work toward a negotiated settlement in Laos rather than permit their countries to be drawn into an Asian war. This was a significant first move by the two super-powers to work toward accommodation in Southeast Asia.

The 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos sought to reestablish a balance of power in Indo-China. By putting its troops into Thailand in May 1962, the United States succeeded in stabilizing the political situation in Laos despite strong Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese pressure; but the military gains already made by the Pathet Lao resulted in a de facto partition between Communist and non-Communist forces, which left the Pathet Lao in control of nearly two-thirds of the country and especially of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The settlement left unsolved the problem of South Vietnam, which was sub-

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ejected to increasing guerrilla warfare supported from North Vietnam. At the Geneva Conference in 1961-1962, the Soviet Union and the United States assumed leadership of the Communist and non-Communist nations respectively, but beneath the surface there was a perceptible shift in the attitudes of these super-powers. In 1954, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had been cool, if not hostile; by 1962 there was a thaw in the "cold war" and the two powers groped toward an understanding on South- east Asia that would preclude a confrontation between them in this part of Asia. Furthermore, both nations were concerned over the expansionist tend- encies of China, and both were aware that in 1961 they had narrowly averted a mraj or confrontation over Laos, for which neither seemed prepared to go to war.

RENEWAL OF COMMUNIST PRESSURE AND U.S. RESPONSE

The year 1962 was a crucial one for the future security of Southeast Asia. Many Asian countries interpreted the Geneva Accords on Laos as a defeat for the United States, because while the U.S. had threatened in March 1961 to intervene in Laos, it had thereafter acquiesced in the Pathet Lao takeover of two-thirds of that country before the fighting stopped. Although the United States had valid reasons for deciding against intervention in Laos, its decision had the effect of causing two of its SEATO allies-Thai- land and the Philippines-to question its steadfastness in the face of pressure from the Communist powers.4 U.S. unwillingness to intervene in Laos probably reinforced Hanoi's and Peking's view that further gains could be made if unconventional warfare were employed against South Vietnam instead of an overt attack, as in Korea, which would bring the SEATO Alliance into operation. Therefore, the "war of national liberation" against South Vietnam was intensified, and the Pathet Lao soon withdrew from Souvanna Phouma's coalition government in Vientiane and prevented it from exercising control over the Communist invasion route from North to South Vietnam. Despite the introduction of large numbers of American advisers and modern equipment into South Vietnam in 1962 and 1963, the security situation there continued to deteriorate under the growing military pressure of the Viet Cong, aided by North Vietnam.

The year 1962 also saw the beginning of another threat to the security of Southeast Asia in the growing belligerency of Indonesia, which had been armed with Soviet weapons. In 1962 Sukarno decided to seize West Irian from the Dutch, who had refused to accede to Indonesia's demands since 1949 to turn over the New Guinea territory. Emboldened by the acquisition of jet aircraft and warships from the U.S.S.R. and by his calculation that the United States would not support the Dutch in a showdown, Sukarno pressured the Netherlands to give up West Irian in 1962, proclaiming it a

'For the reaction in Thailand to these events, see Donald Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), chapters 5-7.

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great victory over the colonialists. Encouraged by this easy success and by the Indonesian Communist Party's (PKI) insistence that he assert Indo- nesia's role in the Southwest Pacific, Sukarno next turned his attention to the proposed state of Malaysia, which Britain had fostered in order to bring Singapore and the colonies of North Borneo into a federation with the states of Malaya.5 Sukarno may have had some justification for feeling that Britain had organized Malaysia without any consideration for the views of Indonesia; but it was for other, more ambitious, reasons that he decided to resist the formation of Malaysia and to launch his armed "confrontation" against it after the new state was proclaimed in September 1963.6

By January 1965 the security situation in Vietnam was disintegrating at an alarming rate as a result of the stunning military victories by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units against the forces of South Vietnam. The United States faced a political disaster as great as that suffered by France in 1954, because the North Vietnamese seemed determined to force a humi- liating withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia. Peking joined the effort by signalling the start of a "war of national liberation" against Thailand in 1965. Cambodia's foreign policy began to shift markedly toward friendship with Hanoi and Peking, while, to the south, Sukarno talked ex- pectantly of a Djakarta/Hanoi/Peking Axis that he hoped would eliminate Western power and influence from Southeast Asia and establish Indonesian hegemony over the Southwest Pacific region. Even France, a SEATO ally, began to adopt a strongly anti-U.S. policy on the Vietnam war.

By the end of 1965, however, the security situation throughout Southeast Asia had once again shifted sharply, this time in favor of the United States and its allies. Probably the major factor in this remarkable change in so short a time was the United States' decision to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam after sustained aerial bombardment of North Vietnam had failed to force Hanoi to stop its intervention in the South. The introduction of American ground forces prevented a collapse of the South Viet- namese government and made a military victory for the Viet Cong impos- sible. But more important, the willingness of the United States to deploy large ground forces on the mainland of Southeast Asia for the first time was interpreted in all the Asian capitals as a signal that Hanoi and Peking would not be able to extend their power and influence into other parts of Southeast Asia by supporting "national liberation" forces. In consequence, the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia could gain a "breathing spell" during which they would, hopefully, keep their own Communist forces under control and adopt economic and political measures to strengthen their

'Malaya received its independence from Britain in 1957, but Singapore, Sabah, Sara- wak and Brunei continued as British colonies until 1963, when all excepting Brunei were joined to Malaya to form the new state of Malaysia. Singapore withdrew from the federation in 1965 and became independent.

"For a description of the diplomatic maneuverings that took place prior to this date, see Bernard Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), chapter 3.

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own internal security. The importance to the capitals of the Southeast Asian countries of this political.psychological factor resulting from the massive U.S. intervention cannot be overemphasized.

A second reason for the shift in the political outlook in 1965 was the success of the little publicized defense of Malaysia and Singapore by Com- monwealth forces (British, Australian, New Zealand) against the Indonesian military forces in North Borneo. Sukarno had gambled that if he could exert sufficient political and military pressure against the states of North Borneo and the government of Tunku Abdul Rahman in Kuala Lumpur, he could bring about the withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Malaysia and Singapore and achieve another political victory against the "colonialists." The restrained use of force by the Commonwealth nations, plus the political support enjoyed by the Kuala Lumpur Government among its population, made it abundantly clear by 1964 to Djakarta and other capitals in the area that Sukarno's hopes for a Greater Indonesia to include all ethnic Malay peoples would not be accomplished by "confrontation" and force of arms. Containment of Indonesia's confrontation was thus a maj or military success. By 1965, Indonesia's "grand design," like Hanoi's dream of hegemony over all of French Indo-China, was thwarted by the power of Western arms allied with non-Communist Asian states which refused to be intimidated by hostile neighbors.

A third event in 1965 that affected the security situation of Southeast Asia was the failure of the Communist coup d'etat in Indonesia on October 1 and the subsequent crushing of the PKI by the Indonesian Army. The reasons for the Communists' enormous gamble at this time to eradicate the Army's influence in Indonesian politics are still not entirely clear.7 What is clear is the removal of Indonesia as a potential ally of Hanoi and Peking. Although it is doubtful that the Indonesian Army was influenced by events elsewhere in Southeast Asia when it decided to remove the PKI as a threat to its own existence, there is reason to believe that the striking changes in foreign and domestic policies that followed the Army's assumption of government power early in 1966 resulted from its assessment that the United States would not be driven out of Southeast Asia and would play a construc- tive role in helping Indonesia and other Asian nations to build their econ- omies.

FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The favorable prospects for peace and security in Southeast Asia that were set in motion by the massive deployment of American forces in Viet- nam, the build-up of air power in Thailand, and the British and Common- wealth defense of Malaysia against Indonesian confrontation were tempered by Britain's announcement in July 1967 that it planned to relinquish its defense role in the area. The real significance of this action lay in the

'For the most detailed account to date of these momentous events, see John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay, 1967).

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fact that the principal burden of protecting the nine non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia from external aggression might then fall to one great power, the United States. The big question was whether the United States was prepared to take on new commitments and accept the role of guarantor of peace in this area. In 1968 the answer is not at all clear, for it is doubtful that the American people will accept such a role without the active support of other powers and the full cooperation of the nations of Southeast Asia.

The United States joined SEATO in 1954 on the understanding that other powers-Britain and France-would participate fully in a peace-keeping mission in this area and that at least some of the Southeast Asian nations- Thailand and the Philippines-would give political support and provide military facilities. The withdrawal of French backing for the Vietnam war in the 1960s, and the British decision in 1967 to leave Malaysia and Singa- pore, removed one of the justifications for the United States' decision to join SEATO; the other factor, Asian participation in peace-keeping, remained intact, as Thailand and the Philippines granted military facilities to the United States to fight the war in Vietnam and sent their own military forces to South Vietnam. What is unclear in 1968 is whether any other great power, or potential power such as Japan, will be willing to help fill the void left by the British and whether other Southeast Asian nations will be prepared to participate in a regional security arrangement to maintain internal security against Communist subversion and insurgency in the future. The answers to these questions will significantly affect the American decision of whether to continue its defense role in the area in the 1970s.

One of the most promising developments in this direction was the formation in Bangkok in August 1967 of the Association of Southeast Asian Na. tions (ASEAN). This association, which presently includes Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, was an outgrowth of a previous association among Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines founded in 1961 and known as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). ASA was an attempt to bring into being a purely Asian organization that would settle differences among its members and promote cooperation without the participation of non-Asian nations. So long as the Vietnam war continued and Indonesia pursued confrontation against Malaysia, ASA could not become a meaningful regional organization; for without the participation of Indo- nesia, no regional association could expect to speak for the Southeast Asian nations.8 However, after the political demise of Sukarno and his leftist Indonesian government in 1966, the way was clear for Indonesia to take part in ASA or in some new grouping of Southeast Asian states. Member- ship was also offered to the new state of Singapore, which had declared its

8In 1963 President Macapagal of the Philippines proposed an association among Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia known as MAPHILINDO. This was an attempt to bring Indonesia into a regional grouping, but Sukarno used the concept for his own ambitious purposes and the proposal collapsed when he launched armed "confrontation" against Malaysia.

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independence from Malaysia in 1965. Efforts were made to bring in other Asian nations such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Ceylon, in order to satisfy Indonesian desires that the new organization not be dominated by states allied with outside powers. Although emphasis in the new association, as in ASA, was on economic and social cooperation, the door was left open to political and even security cooperation in the future.

ASEAN offers both a hope and a danger for cooperation among the South- east Asian nations. The hope is that after years of struggle against colonial rule and Communist pressures, the new nations of the region will have an opportunity to join in a purely Asian endeavor without the participation, and thereby the direction, of non-Asian powers. This concept has great at- traction for the Asian states and appeals to the nationalist yearnings of their educated elites to exercise an independent voice in world affairs. The danger lies in oversized expectations for the fledging regional association. Despite each member's desire for an organization that is independent of great power influence, there is considerable difference of viewpoint among the five ASEAN nations about how the security of the region may best be arranged.

Thailand and the Philippines are unlikely to diminish their reliance on SEATO as the principal means of insuring their defense against Communist aggression. Malaysia and Singapore want to maintain a Commonwealth presence on their soil even after the British leave because at present they do not have the capability of resisting aggression from their neighbors that might be needed if the current favorable political situation in the area should deteriorate. Indonesia does not consider it necessary to join any alliance with an outside power to insure its security; however, Foreign Minister Malik stated in the spring of 1968 that Indonesia would not object to Aus- tralian and New Zealand forces remaining in Malaysia and Singapore after the British leave. In fact, Indonesia seemed willing to assume the role of mediator in Vietnam if the opposing sides desired it.9 Thus, considerable differences exist among the ASEAN states on how to deal with security matters; for this reason, ASEAN's possible security role has been deemphasized by its members during the association's first year.

For the future, however, there is a growing area of accommodation between the objectives of ASEAN, on the one hand, and the objectives of SEATO and the Comonwealth on the other. Assuming that the Paris peace talks on Vietnam eventually bring about a halt in the fighting and a settlement that does not permit South Vietnam to be absorbed by the Communists, the prospects for peace and relative stability in Southeast Asia in the 1970s appear to be reasonably good. In this case, the need for large, non-Asian military forces based in the area would be considerably less than at present. The withdrawal of major British forces by the end of 1971, under conditions

9Early in May 1968, Indonesia offered to have peace talks held aboard an Indonesian ship in international waters. The offer was accepted by the United States, but rejected by Hanoi.

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of peace and stability in the Malaysia/Singapore/Indonesia area, would not appear to be so great a risk. Furthermore, the continued presence of modest Australian and New Zealand forces in Singapore and Malaysia would contribute to stability in this area and reduce the necessity for Ma- laysia, Singapore and Indonesia to spend large amounts on strengthening their own defenses and thereby hinder their economic development pro- grams.10 However, Australia and New Zealand would probably not under- take such a role unless they were assured that the United States intended to retain a presence in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam war is ended. Similarly, on the mainland of Southeast Asia, a satisfactory solution of the Vietnam war, one guaranteed by the great powers, would make it less important for American combat forces to be stationed on the mainland.

There is no reason to believe that a cessation of fighting in Vietnam will lessen the threat of Communist subversion and insurgency throughout Southeast Asia should there be a deterioration in the economic conditions; also, there remains the possibility of new confrontations or tensions among the non-Communist nations themselves. It is in this respect that ASEAN- or some broader association of Asian states such as the Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC) -might be able to make significant contributions to peace in the area by providing a framework in which Southeast Asian nations can cooperate on essentially internal security problems and solve political problems before they develop into hostilities among the states.11 Were ASEAN able to grow in the post-Vietnam war period to include other Asian states, such as Australia and New Zealand, the prospects for peace- keeping in the area would be greatly enhanced. Economic assistance from the former colonial powers-France, Britain and the Netherlands-and from the only Asian nation with substantial economic resources-Japan- could then be channeled into a regional grouping that had already determined its own priorities. Regional security in Southeast Asia could thus be strengthened by collective efforts to bring the nations of the area into a closer political and economic community.

However, defense of the area against external aggression must for some time continue to be provided by the great powers, particularly the United States, because the Southeast Asian nations will not in the foreseeable future have the military capability to resist aggression or pressures from a united and hostile China. None of the former European colonial powers appears willing to commit forces to Asia for this purpose in the 1970s. The task will fall to those nations that have important interests there: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps Japan. Australia and New Zealand appear willing to continue to play a role in partnership with

"0At a five-nation Commonwealth meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1968, the basis was laid for future cooperation among Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand in defense matters as the British phase out of their bases; however, no final commitments were made for the period after 1971.

"A case in point is the recent problem between Malaysia and the Philippines over the North Borneo state of Sabah, which became part of Malaysia in 1963.

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the United States. Japan, however, is more likely in the foreseeable future to make its contribution in the economic rather than the security field.

A key question for the future defense of Southeast Asia, and ultimately for its security, is whether the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will find it in their mutual interest to cooperate in keeping the peace in this area, or whether they will become rivals there. The fact that they found it mutually advantage- ous in 1962 to cooperate in arranging a peace in Laos, rather than let the crisis develop into a larger war, was a promising beginning. If these two powers are willing to cooperate similarly in arranging a settlement in Viet- nam, this could have a most favorable effect on security prospects in South- east Asia as well as in other parts of Asia. If such cooperation is possible, the threat to Southeast Asia of a nuclear-armed China in the 1970s will be greatly reduced. But without such cooperation among the super-powers, the defense of Southeast Asia in the future will be a much more difficult task. That is why it is essential that a new regional grouping, such as ASEAN, assume responsibility for maintaining internal security in Southeast Asia while the United States continues to provide the major deterrent against overt massive aggression, conventional warfare or nuclear blackmail.

DONALD NUECHTERLEIN is a civilian official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

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Documents

Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia · Asian Communist power until the new nations of Southeast Asia could strengthen their own political and economic institutions and