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Prospects For Monitored Retrievable Storage Of High-Level Nuclear Waste

Amy McCabe Michael Fitzgerald

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 2982 authorized the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to evaluate monitored retrievable storage (MRS) as an option to manage spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In 1987, the DOE sought Congressional approval for construction of an MRS at a site identified in Tennessee, despite adamant opposition j?om the State. An amendment in late 1987 nu1Qfied DOES proposal, and established the M R S Commission and the High-Level Nuclear Waste Negotiator, institutions created as a result of the DOEfTennessee dispute. This article analyzes DOE's siting attempt in Tennessee, the actions of the Commission and Negotiator, and examines the prospects for implementation of nuclear waste po lq .

When a nuclear reactor's spent fuel pool reaches capacity operators have three choices. They can suspend plant operations, expand storage on the premises, or transfer some of the fuel to off-site storage or disposal facilities. Congress selected the third option in 1982 when it enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act ("A). This legislation authorized the US. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) to investigate distinct geologic media for the construction of deep underground repositories for high-level nuclear waste disposal, and to evaluate the utility of above-ground, monitored retrievable storage (ME) of spent nuclear fuel.

The MRS concept was certainly not novel. Studies of away-from- reactor storage surfaced in the 1970s, but received mixed reviews from those concerned with nuclear waste policy development. Critics of above- ground storage feared that once a facility was operational, incentives for permanent disposal would disappear. Proponents argued the benefits of placing the waste in a facility where it could be monitored, and perhaps reprocessed when that technology became viable. The NWPA version of "away-from-reactorN storage thus sought to satisfy both sides. Congress directed that DOE consider the long-term storage of spent fuel at an MRS and expeditiously pursue repository development.

Concomitant to DOE's 1983-87 search for a permanent repository was the development of MRS design, siting, and construction. The DOE soon concluded that an MRS could play an integral role in the nuclear waste management program. Instead of a mere nuclear waste warehouse, the agency proposed a facility where spent fuel rods could be consolidated,

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repackaged, and shipped in uniform canisters to a permanent repository. This expansion of MRS raised expectations and concerns among the nuclear waste policy community.

The DOE has enjoyed, at best, limited success in establishing its nuclear waste program. It eventually identdied final candidate sites in three states for underground storage and three in Tennessee for an MRS. However, a number of factors-some technical, some administrative, but mostly political-contributed to a policy stalemate by 1987. Washington, Texas, Nevada, and Tennessee made it clear to DOE that high-level nuclear waste was unwelcome within their borders. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA) of 1987 was Congress’ mid-course redirection of nuclear waste policy. Congress severely restricted DOE‘s authority to site and construct an MRS, and created two institutions that could either facilitate or compromise DOE‘s plans for an integrated MRS. ms article first reviews DOE‘s attempt to site an MRS in Tennessee. It then examines the actions of the MRS Commission and the High-Level Nuclear Waste Negotiator, institutions that were the direct result of the DOE/Tennessee dispute. Lessons from the Tennessee case and prospects for nuclear waste policy implementation are offered.

THE TENNESSEE MRS EXPERIENCE

Originally designed as a storage facility in the event of significant delays in the geologic repository program (U.S. DOE, 1984), the DOE eventually proposed an MRS that would perforni ”most, if not all, of the waste-preparation functions before emplacement in a [deep geologic repository]” (U.S. DOE, OCRWM, 1985a, pp. 2-3). In pursuit of its MRS, DOE engaged in an extensive candidate site evaluation process. The primary consideration was to identify a preferred and two alternative sites where an MRS facility could be constructed. Candidates sites were supposed to promise ”minimal adverse impacts on the local community or environment,” facilitate the MRS as an “integral part of the federal nuclear waste disposal system,” and allow “timely, cost effective selection” (US. DOE, OCRWM, 1985b, pp. 4-5). Eleven candidate sites in the East-Central region, where most of the civilian reactors operate, were identified. Each site had sufficient acreage to accommodate processing and storage requirements and were owned by DOE, or had already been NRC docketed for licensing as nuclear facilities, thus allowing the use of existing data for site approval (U.S. DOE, OCRWM, 1985b, p. 5) .

The director of OCRWM eventually identified three Tennessee sites- the former Clinch River Breeder Reactor site, the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation, and the canceled Tennessee Valley Authority Hartsville Nuclear Plant-as the preferred and alternative locations for an MRS facility. This was announced by the Secretary of Energy in April 1985, as

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was DOE’S intention to request Congressional approval of its MRS plans in January 1986. This gave Tennessee well under a year to complete its evaluation of the MRS proposal.

The State Evaluation The initial Tennessee reaction to the Secretary of Energy’s MRS

announcement was ”surprise and consternation” (Word and Neff, 1986, p. 577). The governor immediately ordered a comprehensive mu1 ti-agency review of the MRS proposal and called for an independent technical assessment (Word, 1986). The state obtained a $1.4 million DOE grant for its independent evaluation of the MRS proposal, of which each affected community received $100,000 for local impact studies. The review consisted of four major components: (1) a technical evaluation of the need and feasibility of an MRS; (2) a study of the probable effects of an MRS on the health, safety, and economy of the state and its citizens; (3) a citizen outreach and participation program to provide people with information regarding the M R S as well as to determine their views of it; and (4) a review of the legal and constitutional issues involved with the MRS project (Word and Neff, 1986, p. 577).

The Evaluation Report and the Governofs Decision Tennessee’s MRS review produced nearly 2,000 pages of reports and

appendices that challenged DOE on a wide range of issues. The state claimed that DOE’S siting process was flawed, and that criteria used to evaluate sites were based on environmental and ecological data that were out of date, not available, or not site specific. While the direct economic benefits of an MRS were positive, indirect costs would be excessive given public perceptions about the danger of nuclear waste facilities. The state economy would benefit from jobs and in-lieu of tax payments associated with MRS construction and operation, but most of the benefits would not be realized for ten years. Moreover, the public did not want an MRS in Tennessee, and negative public perceptions of nuclear waste and nuclear waste facilities would adversely affect state efforts to attract business and industry (Word and Neff, 1986, p. 581; Center for Business and Economic Research, 1985).

Perhaps the most significant challenges were the state’s conclusions that DOE had neither established the need for an MRS, nor demonstrated the engineering and economic feasibility of fuel rod consolidation. A comparison of the integral M X S with the No-MRS alternative, based on the original DOE criteria, showed that “an improved No-MRS alternative could be designed to have many of the advantages and functions as DOE’S MRS,” and would be $2 billion less in cost (Colglazier, 1985). Finally, the state had ”reservations” about DOE’S ability to operate the facility as designed “based on past performance and . . . DOE’S lack of experience as an NRC licensee” (Word and Neff, 1986, p. 580).

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The state report disputed DOE’S estimation of MRS costs and benefits. Yet DOE could take solace in the state’s findings that the proposed facility did not incur unacceptable danger to the health and safety of Tennesseans, and that radiological risk due to transportation of spent nuclear fuel was low and acceptable. Despite these conclusions, the governor in January 1986 announced he was opposed to the project. This largely was based on the state evaluation that an MRS was unneeded and would adversely affect business and economic development. The governor promised that, if the DOE proceeded with its MRS proposal, he would exercise the state veto and fight the agency in Congress (State of Tennessee, Office of the Governor, 1986).

Undeterred by the governor’s decision, DOE quickly announced that it would send Congress an MRS proposal. Before this intention could be fulfilled, Tennessee secured a Federal District Court injunction preventing the Secretary of Energy from presenting the proposal to Congress. Although the District Court‘s injunction was ultimately lifted by the Circuit Court, it delayed DOE’s proposal to Congress by fifteen months. During the interim the State refined its MRS evaluation, a new governor with legislative support declared he would veto an MRS, and the Tennessee Congressional delegation prepared to battle DOE in the Congress. The 1987 Amendments Act, however, forestalled that bitter contest.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

State Perspectives on the DOE’s Performance Tennessee officials developed a critical perspective on DOE’S operation

in the MRS case. Interviews reveal strong views about several aspects of the agency’s performance during the period. The state’s review team quickly concluded that DOE had done a poor job initially justifying the MRS. This reduced respect for DOE and led the state to scrutinize subsequent DOE documentation. As one top level state official viewed the initial material:

My perception is that the DOE’s MRS proposal was really sloppy and poorly prepared, and not very well thought through. It shouldn’t have been as easy for a bunch of amateurs to take it apart as it turned out to be. It gave you the feeling of fragmentation, and lacked the synthesis, and integration you‘d expect from a proposal that is as major a matter of national policy. While some attributed the report’s flaws to DOE’S use of numerous,

poorly coordinated consultants, ”who didn’t know what one another was doing,” others thought it was evidence of DOE contempt for the state. Others more charitably attributed the poor proposal to the ”tyranny of a congressional timetable for the MRS and problems with progress in the deep repository program that necessarily limited what could be

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accomplished by way of justification." The bottom line, however, was that DOES initial documentation was viewed contemptuously by many on the state evaluation team; the agency never recovered its professional reputation among the state staff.

DOE's first briefing to state officials and staff only served to exacerbate the problem. As one professional staff person recalled the DOE's first presentation:

The material DOE presented at the first meeting was little more than cartoons-literally. They were tine drawings and the feds told us "this is an MRS." Here we'd brought people with sophisticated science and technology backgrounds-geologists, masters-level people, ecologists, biologists, people with enpeering backgrounds and economists, and a good group of applied university academic-types. The presentation was just demeaning.

Another senior state administrator remembered: "It took DOE quite a long time to stop talking down to us." Though in later workshops DOE personnel were perceived to take a more "collegial and respectful" stance toward their state counterparts, the unfortunate initial impression for federal arrogance was never forgotten (Howell, 1986).

Another aspect that offended state staffers was a sense that they had been "suckered." For example, during the early meetings OCRWM created an impression that its plans were "not very far along." This made the state team think it was being consulted early enough to have a significant effect on MRS plans. DOE's credibility and good faith were damaged, in the eyes of one state professional when, shortly after the initial briefing, the state staff received 50 or 60 volumes "containing complete architectural drawings and design specifica tions for the MRS facllity itself-down to the last nut and bolt on every pump for every air handler in the building." This was taken as evidence that DOE did not really want, or plan to use, the contribution of the state's experts.

State frustration focused eventually on how DOE was perceived to have failed to share, in timely fashion, the mformation needed for effective state review of the MRS project. As the director of the evaluation staff characterized DOE-State relations:

Once something had been produced in a report or document, they'd come down and explain it to us. But they would not tell us much about what was being developed or about what had not been finalized (Smith, 1987). When DOE made clear its determination to proceed with its MRS

proposal regardless of Tennessee's review, deep resentment developed among those who had labored on the state evaluation. Tennessee did not wish simply to file a dissenting report that would accompany the OCRWM proposal to the Congress. The state hoped that its MRS evaluation would serve as a vehicle for full partnership in NWPA implementation. Tennessee aspired to help the federal government to

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”find a better way” (Smith, 1987); it allowed the use of state-sponsored science and technology expertise to persuade DOE to rethink, and ultimately modify a course of action the state ultimately judged as serving neither the national or state interest. Since Tennessee aspired to partnership in developing final DOE plans, bitterness set in when it became apparent that the agency would not reconsider its MRS choice. From the state’s perspective, then, the DOE throughout the MRS evaluation period engaged in classic “decide, announce, and defend“ behavior rather than in “consultation and cooperation.”

DOE Perspectives on the State’s Performance Interviews with key DOE officials reveal strong views very much at

odds with the state perspective on the MRS. Compared to their state counterparts, they tended to be more positive regarding the process and far more circumspect in characterizing the motives of others. Most in DOE thought the state expected too much in the way of formal consultation at the proposal stage of the M R S . DOE felt that binding negotiations and written agreements, as well as environmental assessments based on new data, were required after Congress authorized the MRS facility-not before as Tennessee insisted. An MR!3 recommendation, in the agency’s view, needed only to be based on the best available existing information. Federal officials felt that they were as open and forthcoming as possible under the circumstances. As one official put it:

Our view was, and the federal courts subsequently agreed with us, that formal consultation and cooperation was required by NWPA after the M R S proposal was approved by the Congress. But, we went a long way with Tennessee. We gave the $1.4 million so they could conduct their own evaluation. We acted with them, gave them the opportunity to respond [to our draft proposals], and they actually did respond. So, in that sense there was effective communication with the state all along. While Tennessee complained about not getting documentation it

needed to fully assess DOE’S proposal, OCRWM officials felt that sufficient material had been provided. Moreover, despite state complaints regarding the inadequacy of DOE’S documentation, federal officials pointed out that the Environmental Assessment, and other MRS reports were in fact sufficient to meet all NWPA requirements: “we were required by the Act to submit the proposal to the EPA and NRC and we did that. . . we then shared the NRC and EPA comments with the state” (Hilley, 1987). Thus, from DOE’S perspective, its interaction with Tennessee was exemplary, as the Director of OCRWM observed: “We at DOE hold up Tennessee as an example of how to work together with a state” (Rusche, 1987). Rusche continued that “we made more money available to Tennessee, in a short time, than anybody else. And, they used it more effectively and did a better job than I think anybody ever dreamed of.”

While many of the state’s evaluators considered the site selection

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process to be fatally flawed, and utterly political, DOE contended that Tennessee expected too much; from the federal standpoint, an MRS could be sited within a wide range of locations. The NWPA directed that DOE designate a ”satisfactory,” not necessarily a ”perfect” site, as the OCRWM director pointed out: ”If you had five good sites and the choice then was between working with one or two states-and there was no real difference between the sites-why wrestle with two states?” (Rusche, 1987).

The state’s determination to focus so heavily upon the need for an MRS surprised O C R W M to a certain extent; it struck some as misguided. As one DOE staffer who interacted closely with the state throughout the enterprise noted:

I guess what surprised me the most about what the state did was that they spent a vast majority of their time in the analysis on whether there was a need for the MRS facility . . . It was not the state’s role to determine whether or not the MRS is needed . . . That decision is for Congress. The MRS is something that is of national importance and national benefit . . . If we were to let a state make these kind of need judgments, given the controversial nature of these kind of facilities, it would be extremely difficult for them to be objective. It would become almost impossible to site anything. OCRWM officials, thus, felt that the appropriate forum for deciding the

need for an M R S was Congress. They refused to bargain away their professional judgment regarding an MRS simply because Tennessee officials claimed the facility was unneeded. DOE entered the review process willing to listen to the state’s Views, but firm in its determination to proceed with the project.

High-level OCRWM officials understood the delicate, politically volatile position in which the state officials, especially the governor, found themselves on the MRS. As Commissioner Word of Tennessee remembered DOE’S attitude, ”They did everything they could to win [Governor] Alexander over to their view.” But for Rusche, OCRWM did what it did on the MRS because of ”our charge under the law to do what we thought was right and proper.” As Director of OCRWM his only regret was that he was ultimately unable to get the Governor to see it that way.

The Final MRS Proposal Less than a month after the governor declared his opposition, DOE

asked Congress to approve the construction of an MRS facility in Tennessee. The proposal for an integral MRS emphasized the potential for enhancing public acceptability of the deep repository program by demonstrating ”that a major federal waste management facility developed under the Act can be not only safe and environmentally sound but also a responsible corporate citizen” (OCRWM, 1987, p. 29). Also emphasized was the federal effort to accommodate state MRS concerns. Tennessee‘s evaluation studies were acknowledged and a variety of ”institutional

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measures” to accommodate state criticisms were offered. Two measures explicitly addressed Tennessee’s deep concern at being

excluded from meaningful ”consultation and cooperation’’ during implementation of the MRS plan. The first was state representation on a proposed MRS Steering Committee that would oversee MRS construction and operation. The second promised a comprehensive ”consultation-and- cooperation” (C&C) agreement to serve as an ”umbrella contract” between DOE and Tennessee covering ”all items considered important by the DOE, the State, and the local community” (OCRWM, 1987, p. 32). The C&C agreement would include procedures by which the Committee would function to determine the possible impacts of the facility, provide DOE with recommendations, and oversee the administration of financial assistance and transportation operations. Details of the agreement were to be negotiated after final congressional MRS approval; it was to be the vehicle to alleviate state concerns about transportation, health and safety, and dispute resolution. DOE left it to local governments and the state to work out ”the nature and extent” of local involvement in the C&C agreement-including whether issues of local concern would be left to negotiation or agreement ”directly between the DOE and units of local government” (OCRWM, 1987, pp. 32-33).

Tennessee quickly rejected DOE’S final proposal; both the governor and state legislature filed notices of disapproval with Congress. In its accompanying ”Statement of Reasons,” the state rejected DOE’S facility justification, the site selection process, and mitigation plan. After two years the impasse between Tennessee and DOE remained as it had begun. DOE proposed settling state concerns after Congress approved the project. The state demanded that its objections to the MRS be addressed before Congress proceeded (State of Tennessee, Department of Health and Environment, 1987).

In 1987 Congress struggled over what was to be done to redirect the high-level nuclear waste program. In December, as part of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments of 1987 (NWPAA), Congress “annulled and revoked” DOE’S proposal to locate an MRS in Oak Ridge. Two other features of NWPAA directly affected DOE’S efforts to proceed with an MRS. Congress established a commission to evaluate the technical need for an MRS facility, and authorized the appointment of a negotiator to search for states willing to host either an MRS or repository. In creating these institutions, Congress hoped to help restore credibility to DOE’S faltering program, but the progress to date has fallen short of this goal.

THE MRS COMMISSION

As provided in the NWPAA, the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1988 appointed the three-member MRS Commission. The Commission was charged to review

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DOE’S proposal to create an MRS and evaluate the technical merit of such a facility. It was also to solicit comments and obtain data from affected parties and recommend to Congress whether or not an MRS facility should be incorporated into national nuclear waste management policy (MRS Commission, 1989, p. iii).

From its inception in June 1988 until its November 1989 report to Congress, the Commission held extensive public hearings around the nation, visited commercial nuclear power plants employing at-reactor, dry cask storage of spent fuel, and travelled to Europe to examine foreign approaches to nuclear waste management. In addition to its own studies and those conducted by independent consultants, the Commission reviewed studies presented by DOE and the State of Tennessee. A revised DOE policy position on the MRS, while still advocating an integrated MRS, now supported developing the facility in stages. Initially, the facility would receive, inspect, and store spent fuel until shipment to a permanent repository; repackaging and rod consolidation could be added later if it were ”determined to be beneficial or required as the system design matures” (US. DOE, 1989a, p. 1). Tennessee introduced its own revision- the Integrated Dual Purpose Cask Concept-whereby “on-site storage at reactors and reactor-to repository transportation are considered together in a systems engineering approach” (Smith, 1988, p. 1). In other words, the state proposed the use of a single cask designed for both dry storage at the reactor and subsequent shipment to a repository. The advantages of duel- purpose casks, according to the state, are a reduction in the number of times the fuel must be handled, and a considerable reduction in overall system cost since there would be no need for an MRS.

In its report to Congress, the MRS Commission concluded that both the MRS and No-MRS options were safe, and the net cost of a system including an MRS would be lower than previously estimated. It further concluded that no single discriminating factors would cause the MRS alternative to be chosen in preference to a No-MRS option. The Commission recommended that two interim storage facilities be constructed and that Congress reconsider the entire subject of interim storage by the year 2000 (MRS Commission, 1989, pp. xv-xvii).

A nuclear industry publication noted soon after the report’s release, that the recommendations were ”not receiving accolades from any of the directly affected parties” (The Radioactive Exchange, 1989, p. 13). Though critics praised the thoroughness of the Commission’s report, many disagreed with its recommendations. The electric utility industry was disappointed that two facilities with tight capacity restrictions were recommended, and that the Commission urged Congress to reconsider interim storage in the year 2000 (Mills, 1989, p. 3). Tennessee criticized the report for doing ”nothing to engender a commitment to development of a permanent repository” (Smith, 1989, p. 5) . A key congressional staffer chastised the Commission for basing the capacity limits on its “own

political judgment," rather than allowing Congress to make that decision (Cooper, 1989, pp. 2-3). The DOE disagreed with the commissioners on the storage capacity required and mechanisms for funding the proposed facilities (US DOE, 1989b, p. 17).

Some of the strongest criticism of the MRS report came from the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. In a hearing the day following the report's release the Chair pursued a line of questioning relating to the advantages of an MRS to cool spent fuel, then challenged the commissioners to explain how construction of two smaller facilities would not elicit the same public fear about a storage facility becoming a "de fact0 repository." The Senate committee was dismayed that it had not received a report that definitively answered the "need" question. As the Committee Chair remarked, the report "has made our job considerably more difficult. Like the Bible, there is something in it for everybody" (The Radioactive Exchange, 1989, p. 14).

THE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE NEGOTIATOR

The 1987 Amendments established an independent Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, located in the Executive Branch. Congress directed that the Negotiator search for a state or Indian tribe willing to host a repository or an MRS, and to negotiate terms by which interested parties would proceed with site investigations. In 1990 the former Lieutenant Governor of Idaho was appointed as Negotiator and will serve until the Office expires in January 1993.

The Negotiator has strong views about his role, and has developed a plan of action for a brief term of office. One of his first actions was to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOE that specifies the relationship between the two organizations. The document is meant to underscore the independence of the Negotiator and to establish procedures for exchanging information. Because the statute prohibits direct negotiations with local communities, the Negotiator has pledged to work through state governors, even if tribal leaders express interest in hosting a facility.

The Negotiator sought advice from a number of nuclear waste interest groups about optimal methods for public consultation. Hearings in 1991 will allow public participation in developing the formal Request for Proposals (RFP). The RFP is to be modeled after the recent DOE Supercollider proposal that generated interest in forty-five states. The Negotiator hopes that the repository and MRS will be viewed as positive economic projects, featuring incentives such as possible collocation of other federal projects, and education and employment opportunities. These incentives, combined with monetary benefits, may stimulate competition among states for one or both federal facilities (The Radioactive Exchange, 1991a, p. 9). Plans are to issue the RFP in late 1991 to governors

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and tribal leaders-all states, including Nevada and Tennessee, are to receive identical treatment.

It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the Negotiator. He must work within the parameters set forth in the NWPAA and his effectiveness depends on persuading DOE to offer innovative incentives, the desire of Congress to authorize federal concessions, and of course, the willingness of States to host the controversial projects.

LESSONS AND PROSPECTS

The Tennessee MRS case vividly demonstrates that DOE’S traditional approach of ”decide, announce, and defend“ cannot work in siting nuclear waste facilities. Tennessee’s deep and continued resentment of DOE indicates that it is time for the agency to try something new. Though the NWPAA requires that DOE provide a state with at least six-months notice before it is designated as an MRS site, this period is certain to be considered insufficient by any “candidate” stat-ven by those in the state who begin with an open-mind about the project. It takes time as well as resources to build support and opposition to an M R S , and when it comes to nuclear waste it is harder and more time-consuming to win friends. DOE would do well to learn from its MRS experience in Tennessee and open consultation with candidate states at the earliest possible moment.

The Tennessee case also demonstrates that states have developed formidable resources with which to review, evaluate, and if need be (and it now seems as if the need is always there) challenge, the federal government on science and technology issues. With this in mind, DOE needs to carefully review the substance, depth, and the tone of its plans as these are presented in the states under the NWPA and NWPAA. Anything short of excellence in its operations-whether in science and technology or in public relations matters-reduces confidence in DOE’S competence; this only serves to embolden opponents and dispirit allies.

Congress envisioned in the MRS Commission an independent body possessed of technical expertise and objectivity that finally would settle the “need” for an MRS. Judging from reactions to the Commission‘s report, it is apparent that nearly every affected party expected substantially more than the Commission could ever deliver. While most praised those aspects of the Commission’s report with which they agreed, some made no secret of their frustration that commissioners did not provide unqualified answers to complicated MRS questions. In fact, several senators appeared more concerned about political problems associated with the report‘s findings than the technical reasons commissioners offered to support their conclusions. The key lesson here is that it is difficult to get, if not impractical to expect, politicians to closely examine complex scientific and

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technical issues surrounding the nuclear waste program. DOE has now developed a waste acceptance schedule that is contingent

on having an h4RS operational by January 1998. Facility siting therefore leads OCRWM’s nuclear waste agenda. The agency‘s FY92 budget request includes $32.2 million for MRS development based on the agency’s goal of locating a facility in 1992, and submitting an Environmental Impact Statement and a license application to the NRC in FY95 (The Radioactive Exchange, 1991b, p. 10). In accordance with NWPAA, an h4RS facility can be sited either by DOE or through efforts of the Negotiator. But because the NWPAA prohibits the construction of an MRS facility until the NRC has issued a construction license for the repository, DOE program plans assume that Congress will agree to modify the linkage if DOE seeks congressional action and the Negotiator successfully locates a state willing to host an MRs (U.S. GAO, 1990, p. 24).

Successful location of a site by the negotiator, however, seems unlikely. The NWPAA focuses the actions of the negotiator on striking a deal with state governments. Ironically, state governments have proven to be the most recalcitrant actors in any recent DOE siting attempts. This recalcitrance reflects the concerns noted above, especially DOE’s lack of credibility or perceived competence. The DOE simply is not trusted. It may be that little can be done at this late stage to build confidence in DOE’S ability to implement nuclear waste policy. The legacy of the AEC, DOE’s own troubled history, the poor performance of the agency and its contractors as ”corporate citizens,” are baggage OCRWM always carries into negotiations with subnational officials and citizens. Focused leadership and unflagging commitment at the highest levels of the organization will have to be deployed in support of the nuclear waste management program; OCRWM alone cannot handle the job. To begin to restore DOE’s tarnished reputation as a corporate citizen, the Congress will have to put pressure on, and provide sufficient resources for, DOE environmental clean-up operations around the nation. Until this happens, OCRWM’s word just is not going to be worth much to those who must accept the costs and risks associated with nuclear waste facilities. The DOE would be prudent quickly to develop contingency plans for nuclear waste storage-its prospects for siting an MRS facility and for constructing a permanent repository are troubled indeed.

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monitored storage site fir Tennem. Knoxville, TN.: University of Tennessee, College of Business Administration.

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Remarks to the American Nuclear Society. San Francisco, CA. Hilley, R. (1987, February). Assistant Director, US. DOE, Office of Civilian

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Rusche, B. (1987, March). Director, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Personal interview, Tucson, AZ.

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