TEODORO ACAP vs. CAG.R. No. 118114. December 7, 1995.

Padilla, J.

Doctrine: Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.

FACTS: Teodoro Acap has been a tenant of a portion of land of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre since 1960. Said lot was formerly owned by Spouses Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma, which upon their death was inherited by Felixberto. In 1975, Felixberto sold the lot to Cosme Pido. Acap remained to be a registered tenant of the said land and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon his death, to his widow Laurenciana. On 1981, Pido’s wife and children executed a notarized document denominated “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” of the land in favor Edy delos Reyes.

Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement whereby Acap undertook to pay him 10 cavans of rice per year as lease rental. From 1983 onwards Acap refused to pay further lease rentals. In defense, Acap denied having entered in an oral lease agreement with delos Reyes and that he did not recognize his ownership over the land. As a matter of fact he alleged that he continued to pay Laurenciana, Pido’s wife. Delos Reyes filed a suit of recovery of possession against Acap and for the payment of rentals accruing to him as owner of the said lot. Trial court rendered decision in favor of delos Reyes ruling that there was a perfected sale between heirs of Pido and delos Reyes over the said lot and ordered Acap to deliver possession of the same to delos Reyes. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether delos Reyes acquired ownership over the lot in question.

HELD: NO. The Court noted that an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, modes of acquisition may either be original or derivative.

Original modes of acquisition include occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation. Derivative modes of acquisition on the other hand include succession mortis causa and tradition as a result of certain contracts such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum. In the instant case, the Court determined whether delos Reyes acquired ownership over the lot in question through any of the modes mentioned. It was ruled that he had not acquired ownership by virtue of sale, as opposed to the ruling of both RTC and CA. The execution of the heirs of Pido the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights was held to be not tantamount to sale. Such declaration is only one whereby heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit.

The Court further noted that waiver of hereditary rights is different from sale of hereditary rights. Sale of hereditary rights presupposes an existence of a contract of sale whereas waiver of hereditary rights is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with a knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession.

As delos Reyes is a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, he cannot claim ownership over the lot on the sole basis of the document executed. Hence, private respondent delos Reyes had not acquired ownership over Lot 1130 and consequently had no right to exact lease rentals from petitioner Acap.

Republic of the Philippines v. Leon SilimG.R. No. 140487.  April 2, 2001Kapunan, J.:

Facts:Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour

of the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.

A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact for the exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.

The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was no valid acceptance made by the donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the donation.

Issue

(1) Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC? (2) Was the condition in the donation violated?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. There was a valid acceptance.

The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: “If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.” The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.

Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal

requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.

Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to “accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.”

The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendia’s acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:

SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not prohibited by law.

(2) No. The condition was not violated.

The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected when Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

C-J YULO & SONS, INC vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC. [G.R. No. 133705.  March 31, 2005]

FACTS: On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on the condition that it shall be used for the construction of a home for the aged and infirm and for other charitable purposes and cannot be used for any other purposes without the consent of the former said land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in otherwise trust to the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable organization that Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged.

Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. 

There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation.  The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.

The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch.  As explained by the donee, it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was named as “Casa dela Merced.”  As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior written consent of the donor.

After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles.  The donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of generating funds for the completion of “Casa dela Merced.”  Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior written consent of the donor.

Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee’s non-compliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.

ISSUE: W/N revocation is proper?

HELD: NO. In Republic vs. Silim, where the donor sought to revoke the donation on the ground that the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose only, the Court ruled in favor of the donee:

Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one.  The purpose for the donation

remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school.  The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected.  In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation.  The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended.  In fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed.  Hence, considering that the donee’s acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.

Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the donee’s right of ownership over the donated property.

CALICDAN vs CEDENA[G.R. No. 155080.  February 5, 2004]

FACTS: The land in question was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate and was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.

Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon, where he resided until his death.

Petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for “Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages” against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.

Respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. On Appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that the donation was valid.

ISSUE: Whether the donation in favor of respondent was valid?

HELD: NO. As correctly held by the the trial court, the donation of the land was void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents.  Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse.

However, notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, the Court found that respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.SOLEDAD MONTANANO, ESTANISLAO JOVELLANO and ESTEBANA JOVELLANO, defendants-appellants. JOSE, ELENA AND ALODIA, ALL SURNAMED MONTANO, intervenors-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p

In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals certified this case to Us because it involves pure questions of law (pp. 70-80, Rollo).

The pertinent facts are as follows:

A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three (3) parcels of land located in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 in the amount of P1,100.00 a year. Plaintiff-appellant claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and possessor of these three (3) parcels of land covered by: Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) with an area of 3,640 square meters, Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) with an area of 1,000 square meters, and Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) with an area of 640 square meters; and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he died on January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through stealth and strategy, took possession of the above-stated parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from plaintiff-appellant, defendants-appellants refused to surrender the possession of these parcels of land. Plaintiff-appellant further claims reimbursement in the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

In their answer dated December 1, 1964, defendants-appellants deny that the three (3) parcels of land belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad Montanano as these were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies of said document were lost during the last war. The parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased sister of their grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be spent for the yearly masses to be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano. This being the case, plaintiff-appellant is now estopped from instituting this action. Defendants-appellants claim also that Edilberto Vita could not have inherited these parcels of land from Isidra Montanano as the latter's estate has never been the subject of a judicial or extra-judicial proceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of Edilberto Vita in Special Proceedings No. SC-136 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna does not make them actually a part of his estate. There is no fixed income from these parcels of land because since 1962, plaintiff-appellant, with unknown persons, has been gathering whatever crops that may be

taken therefrom. And, by reason of the malicious filing of this complaint, they seek reimbursement of the amount of P1,000.00 representing attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.

Replying to defendants-appellants' answer, plaintiff-appellant claims that Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita never executed any document on November 22, 1938 and if they had, it was thereafter repudiated, canceled and destroyed, for which reason, the three (3) parcels of land remained in the possession of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that upon the death on September 25, 1957 of Isidra Montanano, who left neither descendants nor ascendants, her surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took immediate possession of her estate; and that from the time defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of land, they have continuously gathered the fruits therefrom.

In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano sought leave of court to intervene in this case. In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967, the amended answer dated September 10, 1966, which intervenors-appellants filed jointly with Soledad Montanano, was admitted as their answer-in-intervention. Incorporated therein is a counterclaim that Soledad, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of (pp. 43-44, Record on Appeal):

(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 2,450 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 8953;

(b) A parcel of coconut and secano land situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna with an area of 15,096 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10228;

(c) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Yucos, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 2,500 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7999;

(d) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 12,865 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1233 (sic) (third parcel of land in the complaint); and

(e) A parcel of residential land, with its improvements, situated in Gen. Luna, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 167.50 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 102;

that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 10,000 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 6493; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Banago, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 9,604 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8304;

that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 4,165 square meters more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 123 (sic) (the second parcel of land in the complaint); and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 10,434 square meters, more or less; and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (the first parcel of land in the complaint);

that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 24,153 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10268; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 1,619 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8510;

that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 6,242 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8511; and

(b) A portion of a parcel of riceland situated at C. Lirio St., Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 9,691 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1184.

They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, which are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other parcels of land mentioned in their counterclaim, which are in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a donation mortis causaexecuted by Isidra Montanano on November 22, 1938 or by a donation executed by her on December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita. They pray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that plaintiff-appellant be ordered to account for the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he took possession; and that they be awarded damages corresponding to their litigation expenses.

In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant denied all the allegations contained in the answer-in-intervention and reiterated that there was no such donation executed by Isidra Montanano. If such donation were really executed, she was forced to do so at a time when she was not mentally in a position to execute and sign freely said document.

On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment adverse to all parties, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 52, Record on Appeal):

Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating evidence that the three (3) parcels of land covered in the complaint belong to the estate of

Edilberto Vita and it appearing likewise that the defendants and intervenors have not shown that the parcels of land covered in the counterclaim were validly donated to them and that they have legally accepted the donation made by Isidra Montanano, the complaint filed by the plaintiff and the counterclaim filed by the intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to the filing of a separate proceedings (sic) in Court for the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased Isidra Montanano, including that of her share in the fruits of the properties donated to her during her marriage with Edilberto Vita which is considered part of their conjugal properties. No assessment is hereby made with respect to the damages sustained by the parties as they offset each other, if any.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is now before Us raising mainly the following legal issues:

1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in the estate of Edilberto Vita (as regards the appeal of plaintiff-appellant); and

2) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa; and whether the donation dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causa or  inter vivos (with respect to the appeal of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants).

Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider that Edilberto Vita's right to the conjugal half in the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon the death of Isidra in 1957, and that such right had been vested upon him by operation of law. With respect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said two parcels, and the entirety of the third parcel as her paraphernal property, they were likewise vested upon him by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code.

In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) and Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) are conjugal properties of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita whereas the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) is the paraphernal property of Isidra Montanano. We are in conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on Appeal):

. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto Vita of his properties before his death (Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife Isidra Montanano while the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were conjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra Montanano as they were donated to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the contention of the plaintiff that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired ownership of these properties.

This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and intervenors that an the three (3) parcels of land, subject-

matter of the complaint, including all the parcels of land being claimed by them in the intervenor's counterclaim, were all paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) parcels of land supposedly received as donation by Isidra Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classified as her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative title (Art. 148, Civil Code). On the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land covered in the complaint was inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the said property was the paraphernal property of the latter.

The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3) parcels of land and the properties covered in their counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue of two (2) deeds of donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all these parcels of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo. Aside from this, the tax declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint and counterclaim are mostly in the name of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The court is convinced, therefore, that all the properties involved in t litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased Isidra Montanano.

Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership of these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Edition, p. 619). In this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.

Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege the following: 1) that a donation mortis causa (as in the case of the November 22, 1938 donation), being in the nature of a legacy, need not be accepted; their acceptance of that donation is superfluous and 2) that the December 20, 1940 donation is a donation inter vivosbecause: a) there is no stipulation or provision therein that the donation is essentially revocable; b) there was an acceptance of the donation; c) the donation was not simply made in consideration of the death of the donor but of her affection for the donees.

It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p. 50, Record on Appeal):

. . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed of donation mortis causa of November 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed, it cannot be given force and effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void and illegal in as much (sic) as they were made at the time of the execution of the document, not after the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is only after the latter's death that its acceptance maybe made.

xxx xxx xxx

However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court regarding the second allegation of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. According to the trial court (p. 50, Record on Appeal):

The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the properties covered by that counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano pursuant to a second deed of donation executed by the latter on December 20, 1940 (Exh. "3"). A careful study of the said document, however, shows that it is another deed of donation mortis causa, considering the following provisions appearing therein with respect to its effectivity:

Na bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa ng pag-aaring dito'y itinungod sa kani-kanila, matangi ang ganang napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C. Chipongian at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari, gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision sa kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan na dito'y inihayag nila ang pagtangap.

From this provision of the document, it clearly appears that the donors shall continue to be the owner and possessors of the properties involved in the donation and shall continue to enjoy the fruits of said properties while they are still living and it is only upon their death that ownership will transfer to the donees. It was the evident intent of the donors in this case to give the donation after their death. In the meantime, they retain full or naked ownership and control of the properties while they are still living and title will pass to the donees only after their death. This is donation mortis causa (Heirs of Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6600, July 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3568; Howard v. Padilla, G.R. L-7064, 7098, April 22, 1955).

The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety. Thus, based on the first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari . . . " (Emphasis

supplied), supra, it was obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos  to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, –– na kani-kaniyang pag-aaring dito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan . . . supra," We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 488:

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

It was also Our observation therein that (ibid, at p. 487):

. . . The donor only reserved for Himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce . . . a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations . . .

Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of donation is love and services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants to Isidra Montanano, as revealed by the third and fourth paragraphs therein (Exhibit "3," for the defendants):

Na sapagkat ang banal kong nais ay kung bawian man ako ng aking hiram na buhay ay matumbasan man lamang sa pamamag-itan ng isinasagawa kong pagkakaloob sa hinaharap na kasulatan yuong manga pagdamay, pagmamahal at paghahasikaso na tinanggap ko at tunay na ipinakita sa akin ng mga ditoy itinangi ko, ––

Kaya't dahil diya'y buong puso kong ibinibigay, isinusulit at ganap na IPINAGKAKALOOB, ang mga natitira ko pang mga pag-aari, na wala pang kinatutunguran o napagbibigyan, sa kaparaanang dito'y itinatagubilen ko, sa manga taong gaya nitong mga sumusunod:

xxx xxx xxx

As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830:

. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and the condition

that the donation is to take effect only after the death of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the its of the property donated should take place only after donor's death.

Along the same line of ratiocination is Our holding in Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil. 673, 677:

. . . that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift, wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the former, she donates to her the two parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa,notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after her death.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby DENIED whereas the appeal of defendants-appellants is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the counterclaim of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by virtue of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940, and b) to render an accounting of the products harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the present.

SO ORDERED.

Bonsato vs CA95 PHIL 481

FACTS: The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities.

The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case.

After trial, the CFI rendered its decision finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making

their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.ISSUE: W/N the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos?

HELD:  Donation inter vivos. If it was a donation mortis causa, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.L-4326, November 18, 1952);

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the late Domingo Bonsato.

The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner’s share of the fruits or produce (“de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueño”), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase “that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective” (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion”). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor’s death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor’s death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

SICAD V. CAThe real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

FACTS:Capiz, Dec 1979:Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of her heart, drew up a Deed in favor of her darling grandkids Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed bore the title “Deed of Donation Intervivos.”

Thereafter, Aurora’s able secretary presented the Deed to the Registrar for the purpose of canceling the original title and obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three donees.

A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached the donees; Aurora retained the document and maintained possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.

The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Simultaneously with alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation. She asserted that the donation took the nature of mortis causa and was therefore revocable anytime. She further averred that the same failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore was nullity.

Aurora’s grandchildren found their grandma’s reversal vexing. They insisted that the Deed was one intervivos and therefore irrevocable. The RTC adjudicated and found for the grandchildren.

Aurora took the case to the CA but, alas, kicked the bucket during proceedings.

The Spouses Sicad who were in possession of the property took Aurora’s her place in the litigation. Sadly, the CA reaffirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: w/n the Donation took the nature of one Intervivos

HELD: No. The donation is mortis causa.

The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the donation to take effect within her lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale of the property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to possess the property as well as the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained the certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of ownership.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it stipulated “that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible.”

A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that right to dispose of the donated property during the donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa “ the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.”

Because of Aurora’s actions, nothing was transferred by the deed of donation in question to her grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property – this would accrue to them only after ten years from Aurora’s death. Moreover, they never saw what the certificate of title looked like.

These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, envisioning a transfer of ownership only after the donor knocks on Heaven’s door.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v CAG.R. No. 77425/77450 June 19, 1991

DOCTRINEThere is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is

stipulation for automatic reversion. Nonetheless, the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.

FACTSThe administrators of the estate of deceased spouses Eusebio and Martina

De Castro filed a complaint to nullify the deed of donation, rescission of contract, and reconveyance of the property against spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao, Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.

The administrators alleged that in 1930 the De Castros executed the deed of donation over their Cavite property to the Archbishop, said deed allegedly providing that the latter cannot dispose or sell the property within 100 years from execution. The administration of the said properties was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962. And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold the property to the spouses Ignao. The Ignaos were then able to transfer the TCT under their names.

The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed and dismissed the complaint. This was reversed by the CA.

The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of action had already prescribed, relying on Art. 764 which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.

ISSUEWON the action has already prescribed

HELD / RATIO

ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. Art. 764 is not applicable in this case. The deed of donation involved expressly provided for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the, as was correctly recognized by the CA.

A judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. This cancellation can be applied in the case at bar. Art. 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general

provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined by the law on donations.

In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.

Thus, the cause of action has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.

NONETHELESS, while the action may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that the estates of the De Castros have NO CAUSE OF ACTION against the Ignaos and other petitioners.

The cause of action of the De Castros is based on the alleged breach of the resolutory condition that the property donated should not be sold within the prohibited period. Said condition, however, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership and is, therefore, contrary to public policy and should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition.

The Ignaos won. The CA decision is reversed.

PAJARILLO VS IAC

Facts:

Perfecta baleen died in 1945 leaving a 28-hectare lot. Perfecta was survived by sister Juana and brother Felipe.

May 1946 Juana and Felipe executed an Extrajudicial Sale of the Estate of Perfecta, which states that Felipe and Juana agreed to carry out the requests of perfecta that in consideration of her love and affection it be donated to Salud who is the daughter of Juana.

June 1946 Salud executed the following public instrument which states:

“that I Salud the only done do hereby receive and accept this donation and further express my gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donors, Felipe and Juana.1951, acceding to the request of her mother Juana, Salud transferred possession of the lot to her mother who was them living with Claudio Salud’s brother and his family. During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes.

May 25, 1956 Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio for 12,000. Claudio had the land registered in his name and was issue tct.

1963, Juana died.

1965 Salud filed a complaint for reconveyance on the ground that deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and its registration was null and void.

Claudio argues that the fact that acceptance was made in separate instrument was not noted in both instruments as required by the civil code.

ISSUE: WON THE DONATION IS VALID

HELD:

YES.

It is true that there is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that authentic notice of the acceptance was made by Salud to Felipe. And while the first instrument contains the statement that “the done does hereby accept this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor” the only signatories thereof were Felipe and Juana. That was in fact the reason for separate instrument f acceptance signed by Salud a month later.

A strict interpretation of art 633 of the old civil code, can lead to no other conclusion that on the annulment of the donation for being defective in for. This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of art. 633.

A literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions it is also a policy of the court to avoid such an interpretation.The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. Here it is not even, suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud.

The donation cannot be declared ineffective just because there is no notation in the EJS of donees acceptance that would be placing too much stress on mere form over the substance. It would also be disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in these separate instrument and as later acknowledge and as latter acknowledged by Juana.

EDUVIGIS J. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

PLANA, J.:

This a petition for review of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 65338-H reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. and dismissing petitioner's complaint for revocation of donation against herein private respondents Teresita, Lydia and all surnamed De Leon.

In Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents.

In 1974, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that—

(a) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother. the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and

(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.

In 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 21049) invoking Article 760, paragraph 3 of the New Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 760, Ever donation inter vivos made by a person having no children or descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as provided in the next article, by the happening of any of these events:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) If the donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation. It did not find merit in defendants' claim that the lot, by donor and her deceased brother, Maximo Cruz, because the donor's ownership was deemed admitted by the donees by accepting the deed of donation. It also rejected defendants' argument that the donation did not impair the legitime, saying that claim was "beside the point" and did not limit plaintiff's right under Art. 760 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint. It found that.—

a) the trial court took into consideration only Article 760 of the Civil Code and ignored Article 761 which states: " In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child.

(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another lot in Dolores Taytay Rizal, although the subject of a pending litigation valued at P273,420.00 in 1977.

(c) The donated lot did not belong entirely to Eduvigis as ½ thereof belonged to her brother Maximo Cruz, grandfather of defendants. 1974 it had a total market value of P17,000. One-half thereof was P8,500. Adding thereto a P50,000 value of the apartment house constructed thereon, the total value of the donation would still be within the free portion of donor's estate and therefore would not impair the legitime of the adopted child.

(d) In an action for revocation of donation, the donor has the burden to show that the donation has impaired the legitime of the subsequent child; but in this case, Eduvigis did not even allege it in her complaint.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner imputes to the appellate court alleged errors which boil down to the question as to whether under the facts as established and the law, the decision under review correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. We hold that it did.

In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor.

Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject to litigation.

The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., are on leave.

CENTRAL PHIL UNIV. vs. Court of Appeals 246 SCRA 511

FACTS:

1. CPU: (1939) Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donationConditions of the donation:

a)     Land should be utilized exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college.b)     College shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party.c)      Land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus”d)     Income from that land shall be put in “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund” for improvement

of the facility.

2. HEIRS (LOPEZ): (1989) filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages:

a)     Non-compliance with the conditions.b)     Negotiation with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land.

*CPU argued:        right to file action has prescribed                                             no violation because did not use property

          *Lower Court sided with LOPEZ HEIRS.

ISSUES:

1. WON CPU failed to comply conditions given there was no fixed period? YES2. WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO

HELD:

RTC ILOILO DECISION REINSTATEDCA DECISION MODIFIEDRECONVEYANCE TO LOPEZ HEIRS WITH COSTS

1.   RESOLUTORY CONDITION: upon fulfillment, terminates an enforceable obligation.a.    Rights are lost once the condition is fulfilled.b.   Entitles parties to resort back to original positions.c.    Takes effect if either parties do not comply with his/her engagements (in which

complaining party may sue for dissolution of contract with damages)

2.   ARTICLE 1181: CONDITIONAL OBLIGATIONSAcquisition of rights, extinguishment/loss of acquired, shall depend on happening event that constitutes the condition.

a. Donating land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is RESOLUTORY IN CONDITION. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked and all rights the donee may have acquired shall be lost and extinguished.

b. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so.

c. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

d.   RECONVEYANCE: property held by a trustee/mortgage is returned to its owner on his request.

3.   ARTICLE 1197: OBLIGATIONS WITH NO FIXED PERIOD

GENERAL RULE: Period can be inferred from its nature or circumstances.Court can fix the duration because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance.

a. CASE AT HAND: General rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50 years has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so.

b.   Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

TEOTIMO EDUARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO BELDA and ESTELITA ANA

Nature: A petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.

Facts: Domingo Belda and Estelita Ana were the registered owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 118 located at Sorsogon and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4991 issued on October 5, 1962.

On March 1, 1963, a letter was sent by the Land Investigator Serafin Valcarcel of the Bureau of Lands to Domingo and Cipriano Bulan calling them to a conference to settle the wrongful issuance of title to the property they both occupy. At this conference, neither Domingo nor Bulan appeared but Teotimo Eduarte did.

On August 9, 1963, Eduarte wrote a letter to the Director of Lands requesting him not to give due course to Domingo and Estelita’s application for a free patent title over lot 118 since what Domingo and Estelita are occupying is Lot 138 which was titled in the name of Bulan who refused to accept said title.

After the Office of the Director of lands took note of Eduarte’s protest, an investigation was conducted which revealed that Eduarte is in actual possession of lot 118 while Domingo and Estelita occupy lot 138. The District Land Officer recommended that the free patent application of respondents should refer to lot 138 and the homestead application of petitioner should refer to lot 118.

Eduarte remained and continuously occupied lot 118 until on December 10, 1986 Domingo and Estelita filed with the RTC of Irosin, a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Eduarte, averring that sometime in August 1985, Eduarte by means of force, threats and intimidation entered the subject to lot without their consent thereby depriving them of their possession of the premises.

Traversing the complaint, Eduarte asserts that he is the rightful owner of the property in question; that he has been in possession of the same since 1942; that the title relied upon by Domingo and Estelita was erroneously issued in their name which was acknowledged by the Bureau of Lands; that Domingo and Estelita fully know that they are not the owners of the lot in dispute.

The lower court also ruled that petitioner can attack the validity of respondents' title only through a direct and not by a collateral proceeding. Decision affirmed by CA, with modifications.

Issue: Whether or not Eduarte can, in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by Domingo and Estelita, the registered owners, assail the validity of their title.

Held: It must be stressed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it based, it becomes incontrovertible. The decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of fraud within one year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.

In the case at bench, petitioner raised the following affirmative defense in his answer:

3. That the defendant is the true and lawful owner and in actual possession of that certain parcel of land which is more particularly described as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the sole basis of the plaintiff in adversely claiming the aforesaid property is due to the erroneous issuance of OCT No. P-4991 in his name which covers said Lot No. 118 and this mistaken and erroneous issuance has been duly acknowledged and investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands;

6. That plaintiff has never been in actual possession of said Lot No. 118 and therefore he is not lawfully entitled to such certificate of title No. P-4991, which under the circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same to the defendant;

The foregoing allegations attack the validity of the original certificate of title issued in favor of private respondents by the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. This is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

The issue of the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purposes. Whether or not respondents have the right to claim ownership of the subject land is beyond the province of the instant petition.