Property Cases Full

7/25/2019 Property Cases Full

1/96

SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA,

represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA,

Petitioners,

- versus-

DOMINADOR MAGDUA,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 176858

Present:

CARPIO,J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,*

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,**

and

ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 15, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1]

assailing the Orders dated 8 September

2006[2]

and 13 February 2007[3]

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34,

in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.

The Facts

Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San Roque,

Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita,

sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia

(Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn1


2/96

by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared

the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs.It was then discovered that Juanita had

allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property[4]

(Affidavit) in favor of

Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show that

the land was registered under the Torrens system.

On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, forrecovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the

sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent

Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of Ricardo.

Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name

without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966,

Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima

separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third parties.

Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable

because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be

leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited from her parents.

Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed

value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte.

In an Order dated 20 February 2006,[5]

the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The

RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than the

amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.[6]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not merely

for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed

of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was

well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.

In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took

cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and

dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of

Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the

Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his

inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own

to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since

prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn6


3/96

logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardos

daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the order states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is reconsidered in so far

as the pronouncement of the Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the

action. The dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack ofjurisdiction but by reason of prescription.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order dated 13

February 2007 since petitioners raised no new issue.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of

prescription. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not conform with the

requirement of sufficient repudiation of co-ownership by Ricardo against his co-heirs in

accordance with Article 494 of the Civil Code. Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became partof public records only because it was kept by the Provincial Assessors office for real property

tax declaration purposes. However, such cannot be contemplated by law as a record or

registration affecting real properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not an act of

appropriation sufficient to be deemed as constructive notice to an adverse claim of ownership

absent a clear showing that petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the

Affidavit issued by their mother in Ricardos favor.

Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that Juanita, during her lifetime, never

renounced her signature on the Affidavit or interposed objections to Ricardos possession of the

land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an owner. Dominador contends that the

alleged written instrument dated 15 May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died was

only made known lately and conveys the possibility of being fabricated. Dominador adds that

the alleged highly questionable signature of Juanita on the Affidavit was only made an issue

after 35 years from the date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in 2001. As a
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn9


4/96

buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the defense of acquisitive prescription against

petitioners.

At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive

and may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the following circumstances: (1) theconclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly

mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based

on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of

specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is

contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are

contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain

relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such

findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[8]

We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription

based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the

property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a review of the

case is necessary.

Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 ofthe Rules of Court which states:

Section 1.Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motionto dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or

the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there isanother action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is

barredby a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case.(Emphasis supplied)

The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed on 31

May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than

30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor of Dominador without

assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed.

After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in

order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners evidence. The facts show that the land

was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-


5/96

Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as

evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters had any authority from Ricardo to

dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to

acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006

Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality to sell the

property:

On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia

Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no

moment in this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against

[his] daughters and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have

already consented to or ratified the alleged deed of sale.[9]

Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that Ricardos

possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in order

to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.[10]

Dominador merely assumed that Ricardo

had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to theRTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of

ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he

separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not

mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether

Ricardos family ever lived there.

Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for taxation

purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was

filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it isevidence of claim to possession

of the land.

Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners

cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a

clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which

states:

Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his

co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owners possession may

be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must

concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of

the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn11


6/96

made known to the cestui que trustor other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must

be clear and convincing.[11]

In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanitas death in 1989, petitioners

sought for the partition of their mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about

the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he

adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos interest in the land had now

become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to theland. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera,

[12]we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor

of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the

others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the

prescriptive period begins to run.

However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the

date petitioners received notice of Ricardos repudiation of their claims to the land.Since

petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages withthe RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls

short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be

entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive

prescription.

Further, Dominadors argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit

was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC

that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not

submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession since1966. InHeirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals,

[13]we held that the evidence relative to the

possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and

conclusive in order to establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any other

competent evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over

the land. Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the land at his own risk,

being aware as buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador

is not afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to his claim.

With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC did not err in

taking cognizance of the case.

Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),[14]

amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129

the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn13


7/96

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction.

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of

pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or

any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceedsTwenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,

where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions

for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original

jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which

involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where the

assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).The provision states:

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, orpossession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of

the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed valuedoes not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,

damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs:

Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of

such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00 according

to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the valuealone, being way below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. However

petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession,

partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of contracts are

actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.[15]

Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,[16]

we held that:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/176858.htm#_ftn17


8/96

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of

pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining thenature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a

sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether

jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would dependon the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than

the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or

a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions ascases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and

are cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover ownership and

possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit

executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land

to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2)

the validity of the deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since theprincipal action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action

is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the

rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by

the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether

the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.[17]

In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss

the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominadors rightful claim of

ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who

among the parties are legally entitled to the land.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDEthe Orders dated

8 September 2006 and 13 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch

34 in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.

SO ORDERED.


9/96

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS,petitioner-appellant,

vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,objector-appellee.

Basilio Aromin for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecijadenying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B,and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in themunicipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree ofFebruary 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director ofLands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director ofForestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excludedparcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.

As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage

Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-Generawould emphasize that for land to come under the protective gis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown thatthe land was cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales."

As proof that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is thefact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.

We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid down by theUnited States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United States, where somerecital is claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance of therequisites for title, should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs.McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby andRoland vs.United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that thepredecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads asfollows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous,exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act ofCongress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as againstthe Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred andfour, except when prevented by war orforce majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed althe conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to acertificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.


10/96

There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates to the open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of what, for present purposes, can be conceded tobe agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party wouldnaturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner hascultivated only about one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government,following:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color oftitle sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land? lawphil.net

The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivationof a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in theadverse possession of another. (Barr vs.Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs.Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412Smith vs.Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularlyrelating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It ishere only necessary to apply the general rule.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of

a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (Seearts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet onevery square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interestfulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.

The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The law affirms that thephrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill,we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated"public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act ofCongress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether the land is morevaluable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.


11/96

Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous occasions, what was said inthe case of Jones vs.Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sectionsis not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from objection." In the case whichgave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was foundthat there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that thephrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from Spain which arenot timber or mineral lands."

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature and, if not so

found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance, section 1820of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except asotherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forestreserves of whatever character." This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of thischapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon thecertification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than forforest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the DepartmentHead to be agricultural lands." With reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestryin the record, as to whether this land is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; alarge wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it doesnot embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of considerable extent(Higgins vs.Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262; People vs.Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp.512.)

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work onForest Law of India, states as follows:

Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to exclude some casesto which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some with which the law ought not tointerfere. It may be necessary, for example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which atpresent has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the course f time it is hoped will be"reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take in all such lands, would also take in much that was notwanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would

be almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.

B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:

A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a mere collection otrees, but an organic whole in which all parts, although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together byaccident as it were and apparently unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependentas any other beings and conditions in nature.

The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:

During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of forest and agricultural

lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentionedAct; it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest usesAlthough the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration since the passage of this acconstrued this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to protect, for the public goodwaste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past. Theterm 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood suitable forconstruction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the application of new methods every plantproducing wood has some useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymouswith forest lands or lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same landwill not bring the financial return that timber will or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.

x x x x x x x x x


12/96

The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed boards andleave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands are more valuable for forestry purposes or foragricultural purposes.

In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable under the law. In manycases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are considered as trueforest land. For instance, mountain sides which are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice andwhich, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big natural resource of the soil, by washing, isconsidered by this bureau as forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in the

Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but eventhen the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover which they fromexperience have found protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Governmentagainst other tribes on the opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribesfrom cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.

Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if mankind could notdevise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will preserve this source of like "we must look forwardto the time, remote it may be, yet equally discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance wilfade from the earth because of the ruin it has accomplished."

The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to determine

whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical and duly trained personneon the different phases of the conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set ofquestions in which the different characters of the land under inspection are discussed, namely:

Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.

Exposure: North; South; East; West.

Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.

Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed, dense forest.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under cultivation. (Indicate onsketch.)

For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?

State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate of stand in cubicmeters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each species.

If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture in vicinity, whichis not covered with timber.

Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)

Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal forest?Description and ownership of improvements.

If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of residence, andstate briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases his claim.

When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the correspondingcertificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately claimed parcel for which theissuance of a title is requested from the Court of Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to bemore adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file an


13/96

opposition, sending him all data collected during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as awitness.

It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time intervening between thenotice for the trial on an expediente of land and the day of the trial, and the difficulties in communications aswell as the distance of the land in question greatly hinder the handling of this work.

In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his delegate theexamining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring to the present forest condition of the land,

so that the court may compare them with the alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimantpresents a title issued by the proper authority or evidence of his right to the land showing that he compliedwith the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the least as such land shouldnot be considered as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely that of possession,then the public or private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should beestablished not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soicharacteristics of the land, and by comparison between this area, or different previously occupied areas, andthose areas which still preserve their primitive character.

Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of the naturalresources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of thefleeting moment must be restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for future

generations. Such is the wise stand of our Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with theForester for the Government of the United States, believes in "the control of nature's powers by man for his owngood." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature.One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain comeunder private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.

If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run ofcases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of thecitizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires todemonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proofthat the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be statedshould, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authorityon forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,

unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.

We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration,under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference tothe Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.

Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1,as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.


Manila


14/96

EN BANC

G.R. No. 36995 April 19, 1934

ALFREDO RAMIREZ and PAZ BAYOT DE RAMIREZ,applicants-appellees,vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.,oppositors.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellants.Sumulong, Lavides and Mabanag for appellees.

DIAZ, J.:

In this case the spouses Alfredo Ramirez and Paz Bayot, who are Filipino citizens applied for the registration in theirname of the parcel of land situated at Liang, in the municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna, more particularlydescribed in the plan Exhibit A and annex Exhibit A-1, which is the technical description thereof. Said land has atotal area of 203 hectares, 85 are and 44 centares. The Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and themunicipalities of Siniloan and Famy, of the Province of Laguna, opposed the application of said spouses on thealleged ground that the parcel of land in question is public forestry land which was granted by the InsularGovernment as communal forests to the above municipalities.

After due hearing which lasted two days according to the decision of the trial court, judgment was rendered thereindeclaring the applicants the true owners thereof with the right to have the same registered in their name as conjugapartnership property under the provisions of act No. 496, as amended, denying all the oppositions filed by the fouroppositors aforementioned. Said oppositors took exception to and appealed from the said judgment on the groundthat the trial court committed the following six alleged errors, to wit:

I. The lower court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibit D-2 and in not holding that the same is null andvoidab initio.

II. The lower court erred in finding that the applicants and their predecessors in interest have been in theactual, material and physical possession of the land openly, adversely, publicly and under a claim of

ownership before 1888 up to this time.

III. The lower court erred in not holding that the applicants failed to establish the identity of the land inquestion.

IV. The lower court erred in applying section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874 and in not finding that theland in question belongs to the class of inalienable public land.

V. The lower court erred in not finding that Tomas Ilao never existed.

VI. The lower court erred in denying the Government's motion for a new trial.

According to the applicants' evidence, the land in question constituted a third part of a piece of land which, for ten oeleven years prior to the year 1897, belonged to one Tomas Ilao, also commonly known by the name of Tomas

Apat, of the municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna. The same evidence likewise shows that, after having beenin possession of the said land for nearly ten years, that is, on January 2, 1896, said party obtained from the SpanishGovernment the title, Exhibit D-2 of the record, wherein it is stated that: Whereas said Tomas Ilao, who was then 52years of age, married, farmer, and a resident of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, had applied for the adjustmentwith the Government of a parcel of land which he had in the barrio of Liang in the aforestated municipality andprovince, the provincial board for the adjustment of lands granted him the title in question on condition that heregister it in the registry of deeds within one year. It likewise appears on the third page of the document in questionthat on April 27, 1896, the same was registered as realty No. 92, Santa Cruz, on page 36 of volume I of the recordsof Siniloan, which indicates that the condition imposed by the aforesaid board was complied with.


15/96

It may be noted, however, that the so-called title (Exhibit D-2) does not bear the dry seal nor the rubric of theInspector General of Forests nor does it give the maiden name of Tomas Ilao's mother. Furthermore, the firstparagraph of the title in question, which refers to the cedula certificate of said person, reads in part as follows:

. . . whose personal data are attested to by a certificate issued by the "capitan municipal" thereof on thetwenty-third instant, in connection with the cedula certificate 10th class No. 1940344 exhibited to him by thegrantee . . ." thereby giving rise to discrepancy therein because the so-called title (Exhibit D-2), as herein-before stated, is dated January 2, 1896, while the certificate in question bears a very much later date. Onthe third page of the said document it may also be noted that the two numbers "1896", which appear therein

as the year when the proceedings therein mentioned were had, have been plainly altered, to wit: the last twofigures "96" of the former number and the figures "8" and "6" of the latter, and that the stamped paper whichforms said page does not bear the year "1896" but the years 1890-91. However, it is stamped "VALID FOR1896-97" in red ink. It is also very apparent that the land granted therein to Tomas Ilao has a total area of300 hectares.

The same evidence of the applicants-appellees likewise shows that twenty-two months and some days after TomasIlao had obtained his said title (Exhibit D-2), he sold the land covered thereby to Pablo Villegas for the sum of twohundred Mexican pesos (Exhibits D-1 and D). Thirty years later, that is, on January 7, 1928, said Pablo Villegas, inturn, sold the same land specified in Exhibit D-2 to Teodoro Kalambakal, stating in Exhibit C that the price thereofwas one thousand five hundred pesos. It was only during the time said Teodoro Kalambakal was in possessionthereof, that is, on November 8, 1928, that the land in question, which had belonged to Tomas Ilao, was declared forpurposes of taxation by the latter purchaser. In his declaration presented to that effect it was stated that thecultivated portion thereof consisted of an area of only two hectares and the uncultivated potion, 298 hectares(Exhibit E). On January 8, 1929, that is, exactly one year and one day from the date he purchased it from PabloVillegas, Teodoro Kalambakal sold one-third of said property to the herein applicants-appellees, for the sum of fouthousand pesos, having executed Exhibit B to that effect, wherein it appears that the portion sold by him had a totalarea of 100 hectares, although he stated in his testimony that it was 200 hectares. Subsequently, he sold theremaining portion thereof to Mauricio Cruz, which, according to his testimony, had an area of 538 hectares.

On a certain portion of the land in question, there are around one thousand young coffee trees about two years old,which were planted among and under the shade of timber-trees growing on the portion of lot No. 1 of the planExhibit A, indicated with the word "coffee". At the points marked 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 with red pencil on the same plan,there are likewise traces of clearings (caigin) made thereon, approximately five years prior to September 28, 1931the date of the hearing of the case in the trial court.

On the other hand, the evidence of the oppositors shows that lots Nos. 1 and 2 of the aforesaid plan Exhibit A,which compose all of the land in question, have always been thickly timbered forests and mountains (Exhibits 17 to29), for which reason many homestead applications have been turned down by the Director of Lands on the groundthat, far from being agriculture in nature, it was forestry land (Exhibits 52 to 62).

Said oppositors contend that instead of admitting Exhibit D-2, the trial court should rejected it on the ground that itwas null and void ab initio. In fact, when the document in question was executed, the Royal Decree of August 31,1888, was in full force and effect in the Philippine Islands. The decree in question classified public lands occupied byinhabitants, who were private individuals, and which were subject to adjustment with the treasury, into two groups:the first comprised those which were bounded at any point thereof by another lands belonging to the State, andthose which, although entirely bounded by private lands, had a total area of more than 30 hectares, and the second

comprised those which had an area of less than 30 hectares and were entirely bounded by lands of privateownership. The aforecited Royal Decree provided that adjustment of lands of the first group should continue to beheard and determined by the General Directorate of Civil Administration with the intervention of the InspectorGeneral of Forests. The pertinent provisions thereof relative to the question under consideration, reads as follows:

ARTICLE 1. All public lands occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands, which are subject toadjustment in accordance with the Regulation of June 25, 1888, shall be divided into two groups: The firstshall comprise those which at any point adjoin other lands belonging to the State, and those which, althoughentirely bounded by private lands, have a total area of more than 30 hectares, and the second shallcompromise those having an area of less than 30 hectares and adjoining only lands of private ownership.


16/96

ART. 2. Adjustment of lands of the first group shall continue to be made in accordance with the proceedingprescribed in the Regulation of June 25, 1880, that is, with the intervention of the Inspector General ofForests, under the supervision of the General Directorate of Civil Administration.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 4. The different divisions of field personnel (brigadas facultativas) shall be under the immediatesupervision and control of the Inspector General of Forests, and the chief of each division shall forward tosaid Inspector General the records of all cases and the plans drawn by the personnel directly in charged of

the work on each piece of land, accompanied by his report thereon. Said Inspector General, in turn, shallmake his recommendation as to the action to be taken in each case to the General Directorate of Civil

Administration.

ART. 5. For the adjustment of lands of the second group, there shall be established in each provincial capitaa "provincial board for the adjustment of lands" composed of the Civil of Military-Civil Governor as presidentthe Judge of the Court of First Instance, the Prosecuting Attorney, the provincial treasurer, if any, the ParishPriest, a continental Spanish freeholder designated by the General Directorate of Civil Administration, thetown head (Gobernadorcillo) and "Juez de Sementeras". An officer of the Department of Agriculture(Fomento) shall act as Secretary thereof, without voice or vote. There shall be no such provincial board inthe City of Manila, and the disposal of cases for adjustment therein, whatever group they belong to, shaldevolve upon the General Inspector of Forests.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 7. There shall be established in every municipality a local commission composed of a "teniente dejusticia" (in every case designated by the "Gobernadorcillo" to act by turns in all the municipal districts), the"Juez de Sementeras", and "Directorcillo" (town head's secretary) whose duty shall be to inspect the lands inquestion.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 10. The town head shall forward the record to the chief of the province on the day following the inspection ofthe land and the provincial board shall be informed thereof within five days from the date of its receipt. If the record

shows that the land under consideration has a total area of more than 30 hectares or is not entirely bounded byprivate lands, the board shall refrain from taking any cognizance thereof but shall only forward it to the GeneraDirectorate of Civil Administration. Otherwise, it shall designate a day, within 8 days from the date of the session atwhich it was informed thereof, for the appearance of the owner of the land in question and of those of the adjoininglands, upon whom summons to that effect shall be duly served. Upon their appearance, they shall be requested toshow the board whatever rights they may have to the land and the work performed thereon. In the absence of anyprotest or adverse claim and if the board is convicted that the adjustment should be gratuitous on the ground thatthe possessor has established his right thereto by prescription as provided in articles 4 and 5 of the Regulation ofJune 25, 1880, the record shall be approved and the chief of the province, in his capacity as deputy of the GeneraDirectorate of Civil Administration, shall issue the corresponding title. Failure of the aforesaid persons to appearbefore the board for the purpose above referred to, shall not prevent the resolution of the case.

If protests and claims are filed therein, the protestants and claimants as well as the possessor of the land in

question shall be requested to appear before the board which shall immediately pass upon the conflictingclaims and render the decision it deems just. The chief of the province shall issue the corresponding title tothe property in accordance with such decision.

Pursuant to the provisions of article 17 of the aforecited Royal Decree, the Overseas Minister (Ministro de Ultramar)issued instructions defining and determining the functions and powers of the provincial boards and localcommissions referred to in articles 5 and 7 thereof. Said instructions, which were published in the "Gaceta deManila" on December 20, 1888, read as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The provincial boards for the adjustment of public lands shall take charge of the adjustment othose which are situated outside the communal lands and are entirely bounded by the private lands, thearea of which is less than 30 hectares, whether they be possessed under a just title or not.


17/96

ART. 2. The provincial boards shall likewise take charge of the adjustment of those lands which, having anarea of less than 30 hectares, entirely bounded by private property and under cultivation, are situated withinthe communal lands, whether the possessor thereof be a native or not.

ART. 3. Uncultivated lands shall not be admitted to adjustment, unless such adjustment had been appliedfor prior to September 8, 1881, the date on which thee period for the filing of applications for lands of thiskind expired, in accordance with Royal Order of July 13, 1881.

ART. 4. If any of the lands, the adjustment of which devolves upon the provincial boards in accordance with

the provisions of articles 1 and 2 of these Instructions, is under cultivation, possessed under a just title, andhappens to have an area in excess of that specified in said title, the portion in excess thereof shall beadmitted to adjustment if it is cultivated or, if uncultivated, when the adjustment thereof had been applied forprior to September 8, 1881.

If under cultivation, the adjustment thereof shall be made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1and 2 of article 6 of the Regulation of June 25, 1880, and if not, adjustment shall be made under paragraph3 of the same article and Regulation.

Adjustment of lands the area of which is in excess of the 30 hectares shall correspond to provincial boardsonly when the area specified in the title together with that of the portion in excess does not exceed that area.

ART. 5. Adjustments shall be free only in the following cases:

1. When the land is under cultivation, and has been possessed for ten years under a just title, or for twentyyears under no title whatsoever.

2. When, possessed under just title and there being an excess in its area of not more than one-fifth of thaspecified in said title, it has been under cultivation.

In all other cases, adjustment shall be onerous, and the amount which the possessor has to pay to theTreasury shall be governed by the provisions of the Regulation of June 25, 1880.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 7. Provincial boards shall immediately remit to the General Directorate of Civil Administration alpetitions for adjustment of lands not within their jurisdiction, viz: Lands having an area of more than 30hectares, such as are, or are not entirely bounded by private lands; also all proceedings to be heard anddetermined by said department.

Judging from the area of the land in question and that of the two-third portions from which it had been segregatedupon the supposition that the three-third portions above-mentioned constitute the whole tract of land which hadoriginally passed from Tomas Ilao, it is obvious that the same belonged to the first group, as defined in the aforesaidRoyal Decree, on the ground that the area thereof greatly exceeded thirty hectares and was not entirely bounded byprivate lands. Notwithstanding such facts, the title Exhibit D-2 was not issued by the General Directorate of Civi

Administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of Forests, but merely by the provincial board, in open

violation of the laws and regulations relative thereto.

During the period and on date of the issuance of the title Exhibit D-2 in question, the Maura law was also in force inthe Philippine Islands by virtue of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. Article 6 of said law, which prescribed theprocedure for the hearing and disposal of applications for adjustment, reads as follows:

ART. 6. All petition for adjustment, for which a second petition insisting thereon has been made within theprescribed time limit, shall be disposed of in the shortest time practicable according to the laws in force priorto the present the General Directorate of Civil Administration, assisted by the Inspector General of Forestswhenever such property adjoins lands belonging to the State or contains more than 30 hectares; in all othercases they shall be disposed of by the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organizationissued May 19, 1893.


18/96

"The provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1888, are herebydissolved, as are local commissions created by the latter decree. Municipal tribunals of towns shall assume theduties of said local commissions. Before dissolving, boards of adjustment are hereby directed to deliver to theirsuccessors, the provincial boards, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession." Articles 9,12,13 and 40 of the Regulation for the enforcement of the aforesaid Decree, provide as follows:

ART. 9. Lands subject to adjustment shall continue to be classified as heretofore into two groups: The firstshall comprise those which have an area of more than 30 hectares, or, if less, when bounded at any point byother state lands, and the second shall comprise all others.

Proceedings for adjustment of lands of the first group shall be heard and determined by the GeneralDirectorate of Civil Administration with the assistance of the Inspector General of Forests.

The adjustments of the second group shall be heard and determined by the provincial boards established byRoyal Decree of 19th of May, 1893, which shall take the place of the boards of adjustment existing up to thepresent time.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 12. When petitions referring to lands included in the second group mentioned in article 9 are receivedby the General Directorate of Civil Administration they shall be referred to the presidents of the provincia

boards for examination and report, including records. The secretaries of said boards shall keep registers inwhich a record shall be entered of the receipt of all petitions for adjustment.

ART. 13. Provincial boards shall immediately remit to the General Directorate of Civil Administration alpetitions for adjustment of lands not within their jurisdiction, viz: Lands having an area of more than 30hectares, such as are, or are not entirely bounded by private lands; also all proceedings to be heard anddetermined by said department.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 40. All title deeds shall bear the father's name in full and the mother's maiden name of the persons towhom they are issued, also their age, civil status, profession, and residence, in compliance with the

provisions of Royal Order of February 15, 1893, and article 2 of the Regulations for the manner of draftingpublic documents subject to registration in the archipelago. Title deeds deficient in any of the requisiteprovisions of law shall not be admitted to registration. Said personal data covering the grantee mustcompare with his personal cedula or certificate from the captain or gobernadorcilloof his district, pursuant tocircular dated August 9, 1893, issued by the General Directorate of Civil Administration and punished on the11th in the Gazette of said month. Such credential shall be attached to the record, and the fact of its beingso attached shall be entered in the instrument of title.

The circular of the General Directorate of Civil Administration on February 14, 1894, was likewise then in force. Saidcircular declared null and void all titles issued after October 18, 1893, which did not comply with the requirement thatthey bear the dry seal and rubric of the Inspector General of Forests. The circular in question reads as follows:

GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

CIRCULAR

Inasmuch as article 28 of the Instructions for the adjustment of public lands of the Philippine Islandsexpressly provides that titles issued by the chiefs of provinces by virtue of such adjustments be drawn up onthe printed forms which this office shall furnish to the provincial boards for that purpose, in order to fullycomply with the provisions of said article and to facilitate the discovery of any violation thereof, this officehas deemed it convenient to order that all printed forms of this kind furnished to the said boards for theaforesaid purpose bear a dry seal in the form of mountains with the inscription "Office of the InspectorGeneral of Forests of the Philippine Islands-Adjustment of Lands" and the rubric of the said Inspector


19/96

General of Forests. All titles issued by my deputies after October 18, 1893, which do not comply with theserequirements are void. Furthermore each and every one of said papers shall be serially numbered.

Exhibit D-2 does not bear the serial number either printed or in handwriting as required by the aforecited circular.Neither is it amiss to repeat herein that the so-called title (Exhibit D-2) does not bear the required dry seal and rubricof the office of the Inspector General of Forests.

Similarly, the regulation to the effect that the maiden name of the grantee's mother should appear in the title issuedto him was then in force and strictly observed. The regulation in question which is dated May 10, 1893, and

countersigned by the Inspector General of Forests, is embodied in the circular of the Director General of CivilAdministration of the Philippine Islands which was published in the "Gaceta de Manila" on May 14th of the sameyear. Said circular reads as follows:

GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

CIRCULAR

Considering that the printed forms which were being used by the boards of adjustment in the issuance oftitles to lands adjusted with the State, do not conform stricly to the provisions of the Mortgage Law now inforce, and in compliance with the Royal Order relative thereto which was issued on February 15th last, thisDirectorate, at the instance of the Inspector General of Forests, has resolved the following:

1. the boards of adjustment of lands shall discontinue issuing title from the date this resolution is publishedin the "Gaceta de Manila".

2. The determination of adjustment cases pending hearing before said boards shall be suspended unlessthe interested parties furnish their father's surname and their mother's maiden name, their age, civil status,profession and domicile, all of which data must necessarily be stated in the titles to lands which may henceforth be issued.

3. Presidents of boards shall publish the requirements of the preceding paragraph by means of notices andtown criers in order to enable the interested parties to supply any omission in the above requisite data.

4. In order that the adjustment work may not be interrupted for any lenght of time, the presidents of boardsshall remit all printed forms used in the issuance of titles, which they may have in stock at the firstopportunity, so that they may be exchanged for others drawn up in accordance with the provisions of theMortgage law in force in the Philippine Islands, as expressly provided in the aforecited Royal Order ofFebruary 15th, last.

The circular of the General Directorate of Civil Administration of the Philippines, dated August 9, 1893, andpublished in the "Gaceta de Manila" on the 11th of the same month and year, demanded the same requisite. Saidcircular reads as follows.

GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FORESTS

CIRCULAR

It being necessary, in conformity with the provisions of the Royal Orders of January 12th and February 15thlast, to state in the adjustment titles to public lands the personal circumstances of the grantees, as stated intheir cedula certificates, and deeming it improper to require the interested parties to send said cedulacertificates either to the Inspector General of Forests or to the presidents of provincial boards for adjustmentof lands, for either guidance in drawing up said titles, both for the reason that the interested parties to whomthey may be indispensable would be deprived thereof for a long time and because of the likelihood that theymay be lost, this office, with the concurrence of the Inspector General of Forests, has resolved that in alcases in which it is not possible to examine the cedula certificate of the interested party in drawing up thetitles to adjusted lands, the Inspector General of Forests as well as the presidents of provincial boards for


20/96

the adjustment of lands may demand a certificate in connection with such document through the chief of theprovince.

This certificate shall be drawn up de oficio at the municipal court of the town where the interested partyresides, the issuing officer having before him the cedula certificate in force, which the interested party shalbe required to exhibit to that effect.

The certificate shall contain a complete copy of the contents of the cedula certificate and shall furtherindicate the maiden name of the grantee's mother, his age, civil status and profession, if such data have no

been stated therein.

Said certificate shall be signed by the "gobernadorcillo" or captain, his assistants and the interested party, orby another person of the same locality at his request if he does not know how to do so.

Your Honor will please have this circular published by means of town criers, in Spanish and in the locadialects, in all the municipalities of the province under you, for the information of the general public.

The contents of the document Exhibit D-2 show that it did not comply with the requirements above stated.

Everything said thus far shows that the title in question was not valid. It follows, therefore, that it vested no title inTomas Ilao.

If this should not be sufficient, it may be added that, in view of the provisions of article 3 of the aforesaid Decree ofthe Overseas Minister (Ministro de Ultramar), dated October 20, 1888, which reads: "Uncultivated lands shall not beadmitted for adjustment unless such adjustment had been applied for prior to September 1, 1881, the date on whichthe period for the filing of applications for lands of this kind expired, in accordance with Royal Order of July 13,1881," the presumption is that the said interested party obtained the aforesaid title Exhibit D-2 on the strength of hisaffirmation that the land covered thereby was under cultivation, otherwise such title would not have been issued tohim. Under such circumstances, it is clear that he obtained the title in question not only through error but alsothrough fraud, inasmuch as the evidence of record shows that, with the exception of a portion thereof, the landcovered thereby was never cultivated during the five years prior to September 28, 1931, when the case was heardin the trial court, judging from clearings (caigin), which were in evidence in some portions thereof, and from thetwo-year old coffee trees planted on the portion which is indicated with the word "coffee" on the plan Exhibit A. This

is shown more clearly by the fact that on the entire land and on the portion planted with young coffee trees, thereare many timber-trees, some of which are more than 40 years old according to the evidence of the oppositors.

Exhibit 4, which is an authentic and genuine title to property issued to Pablo Acero y Alcantara by the chief of theProvince of Laguna, seven months after the alleged issuance of Exhibit D-2, and which refers to a parcel of landhaving an area of 6 hectares, 54 are and 82 centares, serves not only to show how strictly the provisions of theaforecited decrees, laws, and regulations were then observed and complied with, in connection with the manner inwhich titles were issued and the persons issuing them when the land covered thereby did not exceed 30 hectares inarea, and, when they exceeded 30 hectares, the dry seal and rubric which such titles should bear and thestatements or certificates which they should contain relative to the full name and surname together with the maidenname of the mother of the person or persons in whose favor they were issued, but also proves that Exhibit D-2 inquestion is fictitious and not genuine. Said Exhibit 4 was issued by the chief of the Province of Laguna because theland covered thereby had an area of less than thirty hectares. It bears the dry seal and rubric of the Inspector

General Directorate of Civil Administration on February 14, 1894; indicates the maiden name of the mother of thegrantee Pablo Acero y Alcantara, and has the serial number relative to the issuance thereof printed at the top of theleft margin.

Comparing the statements and certificates contained in the two documents above-mentioned, Exhibit D-2 andExhibit 4, in connection with the cedula certificates of their respective grantees, it is inconceivable how it waspossible to issue Tomas Ilao a cedula certificate date January 23, 1896, with a number (No. 1,940,344 10th class)which is very much higher than of the one issued to Pablo Acero y Alcantara (No. 43,723 10th class) on a muchlater date, that is, on February 28, 1896. It should further be noted that the two cedula certificates in question hadbeen issued in the same municipality of Siniloan, Laguna.


21/96

Furthermore, the very contents of Exhibit D-2 indicate that it is fraudulent. The certificate referred to in its firstparagraph states that the cedula certificate of Tomas Ilao was issued on the "23d instant", that is, on January 23,1896, while said exhibit was issued on the 2d of the same month and year, according to the date appearing therein.

In the case the foregoing are deemed insufficient, it should be added that the evidence of the oppositors shows thatno trace of the issuance of the so-called title Exhibit D-2 of Tomas Ilao, or of the proceeding thereof, could be foundin the National Library or Division of Archives where the records of all titles to property issued during the Spanishregime, are kept.

It is therefore evident that the trial court committed the firs error alleged in the appellant's brief. Exhibit D-2 shouldhave been rejected not only because it is null and void but also because it is fictitious or forged and therefore notgenuine.

Inasmuch as this court is convinced that Exhibit D-2 did not vest Tomas Ilao with any right, he could not thereforevalidly sell the land which allegedly sold to Pablo Villegas on October 15, 1897, according to Exhibit D-1. With muchless reason could the latter sell it to Teodoro Kalambakal on the ground that he did not even take possession norclaim ownership thereof in spite of the alleged execution of the aforesaid document in his favor. Exhibit 48, which isthe record of the proceeding in the homestead application of said Pablo Villegas, and particularly his applicationtherein, prove that in 1918, long before he sold the land of which the parcel in question was a portion, as claimed bythe herein appellees, and long after he purchased it from Tomas Ilao, as also claimed, said Pablo Villegas did nothave any land, having so declared under oath in his application above-mentioned. Furthermore, he never declared i

as his property for taxation purposes at any place, much less in the municipalities of Siniloan at Famy where saidland is situated. All these circumstances show beyond doubt that he not only did not possessor occupy the land inquestion but was not even aware of the existence of the deed of sale Exhibit D-1 which was allegedly executed byTomas Ilao in his favor.

The foregoing likewise shows that Teodoro Kalambakal's alleged purchase of the land from Pablo Villegas isfictitious on the ground that, if the latter had no land of his own he could not have sold what is now claimed to havebeen bought by the former. The preponderance of evidence, more than anything else, leads as to the conviction thatTeodoro Kalambakal was aware of the manner in which the so-called title Exhibit D-2 was fabricated. Of this there isno doubt because when he went to the land in question on or about the month of July, 1929, for the purpose ofindicating the boundaries thereof to Forester Valentin Sajor, who was sent by the Bureau of Forestry to inspect it inthe connection with the former's application to the said bureau for the registration thereof, he made the mistake ofnarrating how he became the owner of the land by means of some old documents scattered in the house of a friend

in Siniloan, who told him that he could have them because they might be of use to him.

If Teodolo Kalambakal neither acquired anything from Pablo Villegas nor actually possessed the land which heclaimed to have bought from the latter, transfer thereof which he made in favor of the appellees-spouses wouldserve them nothing on the ground that it did not vest them with any right whatsoever. Said spouses, no doubt, wereled to believe that Exhibit D-2 was valid. It should be born in mind that, as before stated, the only acts TeodoroKalambakal which may in some way serve as evidence of his claims of ownership of the land in question were hishaving declared it as his property for taxation purposes in Laguna on November 8, 1928, and his occasional visits tothe land about the same year. It cannot even be said that the clearings (caigin), of which there were some tracesthereon and which might have been made about five years prior to September 28, 1931, according to the evidence,had been made by Kalambakal's order, because there is nothing of record to justify such conclusion. Neither is itnecessary to dwell upon the young coffee trees on the ground that their age (two years) clearly proves that they

have been planted during the time applicants-appellees were in possession thereof.

Granting that the applicants-appellees have been in possession of the land in question from the date on which theypurchased it in 1929 and had planted it with young coffee trees, it may be inferred from the foregoing that theirpossession only commenced from that year in view of the fact that Teodoro Kalambakal from whom they bought itdid not possess it in the legal sense. The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting itevery once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession. (Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7Phil., 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil., 562.)

Therefore, there can be no doubt that the trial court committed the second error as alleged in the appellants brief.


22/96

With respect to the fourth alleged error which the appellants contend was committted by the trial court, this court,after examining and studying the provisions of section 45, paragraph (b) of Act No. 2874 which amended section 54paragraph 6 of Act No. 926, is compelled to hold that the contention of said appellants is likewise correct.

The judgement of the trial court adjudicating the land in question to the appellees under the aforecited legalprovisions, is based on a false premise, to wit: that the land in the question is agricultural in nature. The evidencepresented as well as that heretofore stated shows that it is forestry land. This kind of land is not subject toregistration on the ground that it has been occupied for the period of time therein prescribed (Ankron vsGovernment of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10), particularly when, as already stated, neither the applicant-

appellees nor Teodoro Kalambakal nor Pablo Villegas nor Tomas Ilao, in this case, possessed the land in questionjointly or separately, in succession, under the conditions prescribed by the law, that is, openly, continouslyexclusively and under a bona fide claim of ownership, from the year 1888, nothwithstanding the attempt of theapplicants-appellees to prove the contrary. The only thing that, in a way, seems certain is that the applicant-appellees cultivated the land in question for the first time in 1929 or 1930, by means of laborers who planted youngcoffee trees thereon. However, that took place after the deed of sale Exhibit B had been executed by TeodoroKalambakal in their favor and this fact does not entitle them to register it in their name, either under Act. No. 496 orunder Act No. 926.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the third, fifth and sixth allegederrors relied upon in the appellants' brief.

Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is not in the accordance with the law nor supported by theevidence presented during the trial, it is hereby reversed. The petition of the applicant-appellees is hereby deniedand the land in question is declared forestry land, without special pronouncement, however, as to costs. So ordered.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-67399 November 19, 1985

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (The Director of Lands), petitioner,vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AVELINO LEYCO, LEANDRO LEYCO, ZARA LEYCO,JUSTINA LEYCO and FELIPA LEYCO, represented by LEANDRO LEYCO, respondents.

Solicitor General for petitioner.

Restituto L. Opis for respondents.

MAKASIAR, C.J.:

Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed in totothat of the trial court.

In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance of Marinduque, Avelino, Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa alsurnamed LEYCO applied for judicial confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with a combined area of138.5413 hectares (pp. 1-9, ROA).

The Director of lands for the Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition.


23/96

Respondent applicants' alleged possession of Lots 1 and 2 of Psu-133612 (consisting of 138.5413 hectares) from1962 up to the filing of their application for registration in 1976 about 14 years only does not constitutepossession under claim of ownership so as to entitle them to a State grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land

Act (Com. Act No. 141), as amended.

Respondent applicants failed to establish conclusively that they and their predecessor-in-interest were in continuouspossession and occupancy of the lots in question under bona fide claim of ownership. Even the alleged long-timepossession by respondent applicants' mother, Fausta de Jesus, who claimed to have entered into possession of theland in question in 1911 until her death in 1962, does not appear to be indubitable.

The tax declarations presented as evidence by respondent applicants are not by themselves conclusive proof oftheir alleged possession under claim of ownership over the lots in question. The earliest tax declaration is dated1927 while the others are recent tax declarations.

Respondent applicants presented the following exhibits:

Exh. M-2" Tax Declaration No. 3431 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut(15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of landassessed at P3,590.00 and value of improvements assessed at P9,070.00 or a total value ofP12,660.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 664.

Exh. M-3" Tax Declaration No. 664 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut(15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of landassessed at 114,360 and value of improvements assessed at P11,340 or a total value of P15,700.This TD cancelled TD No. 4023.

Exh. M-4" Tax Declaration No. 4023 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconutand cogon lands, with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 1,012 coconut fruit bearing treesTotal value of land assessed at P 2,900.00 while value of improvements assessed at P 5,570.00 or atotal assessed value of P 8,470.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 3480.

Exh. M-5" Tax Declaration No. 3480 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconutland with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 1364 coconut trees (fruit bearing). Value of land

assessed at P 3,500.00 and value of improvements thereon assessed at P7,500.00 or a total valueof P11,900.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 2778.

Exh. M-6" Tax Declaration No. 2778 (1955) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconutland with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 620 coconut trees fruit bearing. Value of landassessed at P2,330.00 and value of improvements assessed at P2,920.00 or a total assessed valueof P5,250.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 475.

Exh. M-7" Tax Declaration No. 475 (1949) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut(6.0000 has.) and cogon (17.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 500 coconut trees bearing fruits and 120coconut trees not bearing fruits. Total value of land assessed at P940.00 and improvements aP1550.00 or a total value of P2490.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 5319.

Exh. M-8" Tax Declaration No. 5319 (1928) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declaredas"Cogonalos para cocal, cogonalos para paste,"with an area of 23.0000 has . . Planted to150 "ponos de cocos frutales."Value of land

Documents

Property Cases Full