“PRESUPPOSITIONS, ENTAILMENTS AND IMPLICATURES”

Diego Luis AvilaSemantics

UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE ASUNCIÓN

FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA

INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE LENGUAS

SEMANTICS

PROF. MAG. JUAN CARLOS CAMPS

“PRESUPPOSITIONS, ENTAILMENTS AND

IMPLICATURES”

DIEGO LUIS AVILA

THIRD COURSE

2013

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Presuppositions and entailments are two different aspects of the kind of information

communicated but not said. A presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior

to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions. An entailment is something

that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance. Sentences, not speakers, have

entailments.

In producing the utterance Mary's brother bought three horses, the speaker will normally be

expected to have the presuppositions that a person called Marry exists and that she has a brother.

The speaker may also hold the more specific presuppositions that Mary has only one brother and

that he has got a lot of money. All of these presuppositions are the speaker's and all of them can be

wrong. The sentence will be treated as having the entailments that Mary's brother bought

something, bought three animals, and many other similar logical consequences. These entailments

follow from the sentence, regardless of whether the speaker's beliefs are right or wrong. They are

communicated without being said.

ex. Your brother is waiting outside for you >> you have a brother

II- someone is outside, some is waiting.

Presupposition

A presupposition is treated as a relationship between two propositions. If we say that the

sentence (Gazdar, 1979) Mary's dog is cute contains the proposition p and the sentence Mary has a

dog contains the proposition q, then, using the symbol >> to mean 'presupposes', we can represent

the relationship as p >> q.

ex. Peter is bald (=p)

Peter exists (=q)

p >> q

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When we produce the opposite of the sentence in Mary's dog is cute by negating it (Mary's dog

isn't cute), we find that the relationship of presupposition doesn't change. The same presupposition

q (Mary has a dog) continues to be presupposed by NOT p (Mary's dog isn't cute), so NOT p >> q.

This property of presupposition is generally described as constancy under negation. It means that

the presupposition of a statement will remain constant, i.e. still true, even when that statement is

negated.

ex. Peter isn't bald (NOT p)

Peter exists (=q)

NOT p >> q

Types of presupposition

Presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of words, phrases, and

structures. We shall consider these linguistic forms here as indicators of potential presuppositions,

which can only become actual presuppositions in contexts with speakers. (Sauerland, 2007)

a) Existential presupposition → the possessive construction in English is associated with a

presupposition of existence. The existential presupposition is not only assumed to be present in

possessive constructions (your car >> you have a car), but in any definite noun phrase (the car).

By using these presuppositions, the speaker is assumed to be committed to the existence of the

entities named.

ex. John's children are very noisy >> John has children.

b) Factive presupposition → the presupposed information following a verb like know can be

treated as a fact, and is described as a factive presupposition. A number of other verbs, such as 3


realize (she didn't realize he was ill >> he was ill), regret (we regret telling him >> we told him), as

well as phrases involving be with aware (I wasn't aware that she was married >> she was

married), odd (it isn't odd that he left early >> he left early), and glad (i'm glad that it's over >>

it's over) have factive presuppositions.

ex. John realized he was in debt >> John was in debt.

c) Lexical presupposition → the use of one form with its asserted meaning is conventionally

interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted) meaning is understood. Each time

you say that someone manage to do something, the asserted meaning is that the person succeeded in

some way. When you say that someone didn't manage, the asserted meaning is that the person did

not succeed. In both cases, however, there is a presupposition (non-asserted) that the person tried to

do that something. Manage is conventionally interpreted as asserting succeeded and presupposing

tried. Other examples: stop (he stopped smoking >> he used to smoke), start (they started

complaining >> they weren't complaining before), again (you're late again >> you were late

before). In the case of lexical presuppositions, the speaker's use of a particular expression is taken to

presuppose another (unstated) concept, whereas in the case of a factive presupposition, the use of a

particular expression is taken to presuppose the truth of the information that is stated after it.

d) Structural presupposition → certain sentence structures have been analysed as conventionally

and regularly presupposing that part of the structure is already assumed to be true. Speakers can use

such structures to treat information as presupposed, i.e. assumed to be true, and hence to be

accepted as true by the listener. For example, wh-question in English are conventionally interpreted

with the presupposition that the information after the wh-form (e.g. when did he leave? >> he left

and where did you buy the bike? >> You bought the bike) is already known to be the case. The

listener perceives that the information presented is necessarily true rather than just the

presupposition of the person asking the question.4


ex. When did she travel to the USA? >> she travelled.

e) Non- factive presupposition → what is presupposed is not true. For example, verbs like dream (I

dreamed that I was rich >> I was not rich), imagine (we imagined we were in Hawaii >> we were

not in Hawaii) and pretend (he pretends to be ill >> he is not ill) are used with the presupposition

that what follows is not true.

ex. I wish you were being honest >> you are not being honest.

f) Counterfactual presupposition → what is presupposed is not only untrue, but is the opposite

of what is true or contrary to facts. For instance, some conditional structures, generally called

counterfactual conditionals, presuppose that the information in the if- clauses, is not true at the time

of utterance (if you were my friend, you would have helped me >> you are not my friend).

ex. If you were my daughter, I would not allow you to do this >> you are not my daughter.

Projection Problem

The projection problem occurs when a simple sentence becomes part of a more complex

sentence. In this case, the meaning of some presupposition (as a part) doesn’t survive to become the

meaning of a more complex sentence (as a whole). (Yule, 1996)

a)Nobody realized that Kelly was tired

b)I imagined that Kelly was tired

c)I imagined that Kelly was tired and nobody realized that she was tired.

Through these examples, we can observe that, when the speaker utters (a), we can presuppose

that Kelly was tired and that, when the speakers utters (b), we can presuppose that Kelly was not 5


tired. However, when the speaker utters (c), we can't understand what the speaker means by that

utterance without a context because the two parts have an opposite meaning.

ex. A: John regrets loosing his wallet.

B: But he didn't loose his wallet.

If we combine these two utterances, we have the sequence 'John regrets loosing his wallet, but

he didn't loose his wallet'. Identifying the different propositions involved, we can see that the

presupposition 'John lost his wallet' does not survive as a presupposition of the combined

utterances.

a. John regrets loosing his wallet (=p)

b. John lost his wallet (=q)

c. p >> q

d. He didn't loose his wallet (=r)

e. John regrets loosing his wallet,

but he didn't loose his wallet. (=p & r)

f. p & r >> NOT q

A person will not assume the presupposition q is true when uttering e. A simple explanation of

the fact that presuppositions don't ´project´is that they are 'destroyed' by entailments. When the

person utters 'John regrets loosing his wallet, but he didn't loose his wallet', we have a

presupposition q and an entailment NOT q. This shows that entailments (necessary consequences of

what is said) are simply more powerful than presuppositions (an earlier assumptions). It may be

best to think of presuppositions as 'potential presuppositions' which only become actual

presuppositions when intended by speakers to be recognized as such within utterances. Speakers

can indeed indicate that the potential presupposition is not being presented as a strong assumption;

the speakers are not committed to the presupposition as an assumed fact.

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Ordered entailments

Generally speaking, entailment is not a pragmatic concept (i.e. having to do with the speaker

meaning), but it is considered a purely logical concept. (Kearns, 2011)

ex. Bob ate three sandwiches.

a)Something ate three sandwiches.

b)Bob did something to three sandwiches.

c)Bob ate three of something.

d)Something happened.

When a speaker utters the previous sentence, the speaker is necessarily committed to the truth of

a very large number of background entailments. On any occasion, in uttering the sentence, however,

the speaker will indicate how these entailments are to be ordered. That is, the speaker will

communicate, typically by stress, which entailment is assumed to be the foreground, or more

important for interpreting intended meaning, than any others. For example, when the speaker utters

sentence a), he indicates that the foreground entailment, and hence his main assumption, is that Bob

ate a certain number of sandwiches.

a) Bob ate THREE sandwiches.

In sentence b), the focus shifts to BOB, and the main assumption is that someone ate three

sandwiches.

b) BOB ate three sandwiches.

The stress in English functions to mark the main assumption of the speaker in producing an 7


utterance. As such, it allows the speaker to mark for the listener what the focus of the message is,

and what is being assumed.

Implicatures

Two very different elements are combined to make up the total signification of an utterance.

These elements are ordinarily called what is said and what is implicated. An implicature is a case of

saying one thing but conveying something else. So, for instance, an utterance of ‘It is a well done

work’ may, in the right context, implicate that 'It is a horrible work', even though this is not what

the sentence literally means. There are two different sort of implicature: conventional and

conversational. They have in common the property that they both convey an additional level of

meaning beyond the semantic meaning of the words uttered. (Potts, 2005)

Conventional implicatures

They are not based on the cooperative principles or maxims. They don't have to occur in

conversation and they don't depend on special contexts for their interpretation. They are associated

with specific words and result in additional conveyed meanings when those words are used,

linguistic expression like but, even, therefore, yet, and for. (Potts, 2005)

a. Mary suggested chicken, but I chose beef → implicature of 'contrast' between

information in p and q

b. p & q (+> p is in contrast to q)

a. The manager isn’t here yet (=NOT p) → the implicature 'yet' is that the present

situation is expected to be different, or perhaps the opposite later.

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b. NOT p is true (+> p expressed to be true later)

a. Mary was hungry and ready to go to bed (p &q, +> p plus q) → two statements

containing static information are joined by 'and', the implicature is simply ' in addition' or

'plus'

b. Mary put on her pj’s and went to bed (p &q, +> q after p) → two statements contain

dynamic action, related information the implicature of 'and' is 'and then' indicating sequence.

Conversational implicatures

Conversational implicatures are not tied to the particular words and phrases in an utterance but

arise instead from contextual factors and the understanding that conventions are observed in

conversation. (Sauerland, 2007)

ex. A: I hope you went to the bank and to the chemist.

B: I went to the back.

(Speaker B doesn't mention going to the chemist. Speaker A infers that what is not mention was

not visited)

We can represent the structure of what was said, with b (=bank) and c (=chemist). Using the

symbol +> for an implicature, we can also represent the additional conveyed meaning.

A: b & c?

B: b (+> NOT c)

Another example:9


A: Bill and Martha are leaving tomorrow.

B: I’ll miss Martha.

This example works exactly the same way as the one shown before.

Generalized conversational implicatures

A generalized implicature is a conversational implicature that is inferable without reference to a

special context, no special knowledge is required in the context to calculate the additional conveyed

meaning (Sauerland, 2007). One common example in English involves any phrase with an

indefinite article of the type 'a/an X'. These phrases are typically interpreted according to the

generalized conversational implicature that : an X +> not speaker's X.

ex. John walked into a house yesterday and saw a dog → this expression implies that the house

is not John’s house.

The first example provided before could serve as a Generalized Conversational Implicature, as

anyone would know what the bank and the chemists’ are, but you would need a specific context to

know about Bill and Martha, in the second example.

Scalar implicatures

Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word which expresses one value

from a scale of values (all, most, many, some, few; always, often, sometimes). When producing an

utterance, a speaker selects the word from the scale which is the most informative and truthful in the

circumstances. In the utterance some of the boys went to the party, the word some implicates "not all

of the boys went to the party." When any form of the scale is asserted, the negative of all forms

higher on the scale is implicated (+> not most, +> not many). (Potts, 2005)

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Scalar implicatures can be cancelled by another scalar implicature referring to the same

particular thing. For example: “I bought some presents for you in London, not some, in fact many!”

There, “many” is cancelling “some” for the extents of the scalar implicature.

This may be confusing if we take into account entailments, but let’s consider another example:

“John or Mary made a mistake, in fact both of them did.” If this cancellation was due to an

entailment, the second part of the sentence could not be possible because it is not true that in every

situation that John or Mary made a mistake, both of them did it; the first part of the sentence, in

terms of entailments, conceives as true that not both John and Mary made a mistake, but just one of

them.

Particularized conversational implicatures

A particularized implicature is a conversational implicature that is derivable only in a specific

context. Because they are by far the most common, particularized converstional implicatures are

typically called implicatures. (Sauerland, 2007)

A: What has happened to the roast chicken?

B: The dog is looking very happy.

In the above exchange, A will likely derive the implicature "the dog ate the roast beef" from B’s

statement.

Another example:

A: Where did I leave the car keys?

B: The car’s on the drive.

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Properties of conversational implicatures

Conversational implicatures can be denied, calculated, suspended, cancelled, and reinforced.

a. You have won five dollars (+> ONLY five)

b. You have won at least five dollars (suspend implicature +> only)

c. You have won five dollars, in fact, you have won ten (cancel implicature +> only by

adding new information after 'in fact')

d. You have won five dollars, that's four more than one (reinforced implicature with

additional information)

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Works Cited

Gazdar, Gerald. Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form. New York:

Academic, 1979. Print.

Kearns, Kate. Semantics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print.

Potts, Christopher. The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.

Sauerland, Uli, and Penka Stateva. Presupposition and Implicature in Compositional Semantics.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print.

Yule, George. The Study of Language. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print.

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“PRESUPPOSITIONS, ENTAILMENTS AND IMPLICATURES”