Н. Зевахина (НИУ ВШЭ)

В. Долгоруков (НИУ ВШЭ)

ОТиПЛ, 29.11.2012

Введение в современную лингвистическую прагматику

Embedded implicatures?!?B. Geurts and N. Pouscoulous

Anna ate some of the cookies.Bob believes that Anna ate some of the cookies.It is not the case that Bob believes that Anna ate all the

cookies.According to Bob, Anna ate some but not all of the

cookies.

Two varieties of conventionalismLexicalist approach: “Anna ate some but not all of the

cookies”.Syntax-based approach is more predictive and more popular:

a. So[Bob believes that Anna ate some of the cookies].

b. Bob believes that So[Anna ate some of the cookies].Bob believes that Anna ate some of the cookies Bob ∧

believes that ¬[Anna ate all of the cookies].Syntax-based +, lexicalist -:Bob believes that Anna ate some of the cookies ¬[Bob ∧

believes that Anna ate all of the cookies].

Local SIs{All/Most} students read some of Chierchia’s papers.{All/Most} students read some but not all of Chierchia’s

papers.

The main purpose of the paper is to argue against the mainstream conventionalism but not to argue for the Gricean account.

In Experiment 1a, some was embedded under think, deontic must, and the universal quantifier all; in Experiment 1b, the complex conditions featured think and want.

Both experiments compared the interpretation of some occurring in simple sentences with occurrences of the same word embedded in the scope of various expressions.

ParticipantsThe participants in Experiment 1a were 30 French-

speaking first-year students at the Ecole Nationale des Arts Décoratifs in Paris. Experiment 1b drew 31 participants from the same population. There was no overlap between the two groups.

Trial used in Experiments 1a-bEmilie says:

Betty thinks that Fred heard some of the Verdi operas.

Would you infer from this that Betty thinks that Fred didn’t hear all the Verdi operas?

yes no

The experiment was conducted in French.In both experiments, participants saw one control item in which some occurred in a non-embedded position.Filler items were used to conceal the purpose of the experiment; the number of filler items was 16 in Experiment 1a and 9 in Experiment 1b. Filler items had the same general format as critical items, but didn’t contain scalar expressions.

Sample sentences used in Experiments 1a-b

Results

DiscussionThese results are inconsistent with mainstream

conventionalism.First, and most importantly, whereas our data are

compatible with the view that SIs are the default in simple sentences, the complex conditions yielded local SIs at a much reduced mean rate of 35%.

Secondly, we observed fluctuations between complex conditions: local SIs were relatively frequent with think (57.5% across the two experiments), practically non-existent with must (3%), and relatively rare with all (27%) and want (32%).

These data indicate that mainstream conventionalism is on the wrong track.

Discussion (2)

The complex conditions in Experiments 1a-b were obviously more complex than the -conditions, and it ∅might be suggested that this is why we observed such low rates of local SIs.

Complex conditions curtail SI rates to varying degrees, unless it can be assumed that must sentences are more complex than all sentences, that want sentences are more complex than think sentences, and so on.

Worries about the paradigmThe inference paradigm adopted in Experiments 1a-b comes

down to collecting introspective judgements on SIs from a population of naïve native speakers. There are three reasons for suspecting that this paradigm might yield exaggerated levels of Sis.

Worry #1:If Jack is happy, Jill is happy.so: If Jill is not happy, Jack is not happy.The rate at which people will spontaneously draw a

conclusion φ from a set of premisses A will be lower than the rate at which people are prepared to endorse the corresponding argument A, therefore φ.

Worries about the paradigm (2)

Worry #2: a. Fred has heard some of the Verdi operas.b. Fred hasn’t heard all the Verdi operas.The very question whether (b) might be implied changes

the context in which (a) is interpreted: the question makes it relevant to decide whether or not the speaker believes that (b) is true. Hence, while we might not even consider (b) when (a) is presented in a more neutral setting, the inferential paradigm is bound to enhance the likelihood that the SI is endorsed.

Worries about the paradigm (3)Worry #3:

The left-most syllogism is valid (90%), and many experiments confirm that people are very good at recognising that it is. The other three arguments in are not valid, yet they are accepted 63% of the time on average.

It is because all the arguments look alike. This is what we see throughout the space of syllogistic arguments: valid arguments tend to be surrounded by invalid but superficially similar arguments causing high error rates.

It is possible that the inference paradigm yields too many SIs.

In this experiment we compared the inference task with a verification task, which has been widely used in experimental research on implicatures.

It should be a more reliable instrument for gauging the rates at which people derive SIs.

Method and procedure29 Dutch-speaking students at the University of Nijmegen were presented with the same sentence in two different tasks: an inference task, like the one used in Experiments 1a-b, and a verification task. The critical sentence was (a Dutch equivalent of) the following:

(24) Some of the B’s are in the box on the left.

In the inference condition, participants had to decide whether this implies that not all the B’s are in the box on the left, and were asked to tick “yes” or “no” accordingly, as in Experiments 1a-b. In the verification condition, participants had to decide whether the same sentence correctly describes the following situation:

Method and procedure (2)

Note that, whereas in the inference task the SI is associated with a positive response, in the verification task it is associated with a negative response; therefore we had to control for the possibility of a positive response bias. In both conditions, the critical sentence was the same, and 6 similar items were used as fillers; in the verification tasks filler items were also intended as controls for a potential positive response bias. For this purpose, we used simple statements like There are more than two B’s in the box on the right, half of which were true, while the other half were false.

Results

As expected, participants derived SIs more frequently in the inference condition (62%) than in the verification condition (34%).

Since participants’ performance on the filler items in the verification task was nearly perfect (97% correct), it is unlikely that the low rate of “no” answers for the critical item was caused by a positive response bias.

The inference task boosts the rate of SIs, and moreover, it appears that the effect is quite substantial.

MonotonicityNo preference for local SIs in downward-entailing

contexts:

There is a preference for local SIs in upward-entailing contexts:

Some mainstream conventionalist theories make the same predictions for non-monotonic contexts

Experiment 3The various conventionalist positions Chierchia has

adopted over the years all imply that local SIs are preferred in UE contexts, and that is one of the predictions we tested in the next experiment.

To test the prediction that the inference paradigm yields higher rates of local Sis than does the verification paradigm.

To test the prediction, made by mainstream conventionalism, that there will be high rates of local SIs in all UE contexts, and perhaps in non-DE contexts generally.

Method and procedure26 first-year students in the humanities, all native

speakers of Dutch, were presented with two types of tasks (in Dutch), as in Experiment 2.

Results

Minimalist conventionalismWhat to do? Our poorly hidden agenda is that everybody

should return to the pragmatic fold. Another option is to leave the mainstream without giving up on conventionalism: stick to your favourite lexicalist or syntax-based brand of SIs, which will duly generate a batch of interpretations for any sentence containing scalar expressions, but refuse to make predictions about which construal is the preferred one. Leave it to pragmatics.

Experiment 4The materials of the verification task of Experiment 3

translated into English with a third response option: participants were invited to choose between “true”, “false”, and “could be either”.

Method and procedureSince the aim of this experiment was just to test

conventionalist predictions about non-DE environments, the DE sentences now merely served as controls.

The circles and the squares are connected with each other.

The green and the orange figures are connected with each other.

All the figures are orange and green.There are green circles and squares.The circles and the squares have the same colour.

Method and procedure (2)

The participants were 22 first-year linguistics students at University College London.

Understanding the notion of ambiguity:

Visiting relatives can be boring.

– It can be boring to visit relatives.

– Relatives who come to visit can be boring.

The girl hit the boy with the telescope.

– The girl hit the boy who had the telescope.

– The girl used the telescope for hitting the boy.

Results

Meanwhile in the Gricean camp…Bob believes that Anna ate some of the cookies.It is not the case that Bob believes that Anna ate all the

cookies.Either Bob believes that Anna ate all the cookies or he

believes that she didn’t.Bob believes that Anna didn’t eat all the cookies.All the customers shot at some of the salesmen.Not all the customers shot at all the salesmen.All the customers shot at some but not all of the salesmen

(hence, none of the customers shot at all the salesmen).Either all the customers shot at all the salesmen or none of

the customers shot at all the salesmen.

ContrastTo rule out the possibility that scalar implicatures occur in

embedded positions, which means that, whenever an embedded SI is reported, they are not implicatures (though they may be contingent on implicatures) and special circumstances apply.

Such special circumstances may hold in the case of belief reports, as we have seen; other cases are disjunctions (Sauerland 2004; van Rooij & Schulz 2004), indefinites (van Rooij & Schulz 2004; Geurts 2006, 2009), and presupposition triggers (Geurts 2006, 2009).

If you take a salad or desert, you pay $20; but if you take both there is a surcharge. (Chierchia et al. 2008)

Experimental evidence forembedded implicatures (Chemla, Spector)

Geurts and Pouscoulous’ (2009) pictures rather difficult to decipher. If the relevant sentence is ambiguous between the literal, the global and the local readings, subjects could thus choose to ignore the local reading.

It is expected that the local reading will be hard to detect if it is not at least as relevant as the global reading. The local reading is relevant typically in a context in which we are interested in knowing, for each square, whether it is connected with some, all, or no circle.

Various authors have discussed principles which would lead participants to show a preference for the logically weakest reading of a sentence, or even to fail to be aware of the existence of a particular reading R1 when R1 entails another clearly available reading R2.

Aim of the experimentsOur aim was first to test sentences in which a scalar item

occurs in the scope of a universal quantifier (experiment 1). We then tested a case where a scalar item occurs in a non-monotonic environment (experiment 2).

Experimental design

From absolute binary judgments to graded judgments.In a case where the relevant sentence is true under the

global reading but not under the local reading, we expected our subjects to judge the sentence to be true to a lesser degree than in a case where the sentence is true under both its local and global readings.

16 native speakers of French

The 1st type of critical items

Each letter is connected with some of its circles.Literal Reading: Each letter is connected with at least one of its circles.Global Reading: Each letter is connected with at least one of its circles, and it is not the case that each letter is connected with all its circles.Local Reading: Each letter is connected with at least one of its circles, and no letter is connected with all its circles.

The 2nd type of critical items

Each letter is connected with its red circle or with its blue circle.Literal Reading: Each letter is connected with at least one of its circles.Global Reading: Each letter is connected with at least one of its circles, and it is not the case that each letter is connected with its two circles.Local Reading: Each letter is connected with exactly one of its two circles.

Each of these sentences was paired with various pictures, giving rise to the following 4 target conditions.

Control conditions: DE environments

(1) No letter is connected with some of its circles.

Possible local reading:

No letter is connected with some but not all of its circles.(2) No letter is connected with its red circle or to its blue

circle.

Possible local reading:

No letter is connected with exactly one of its two circles.

PredictionsThe theories we described differ as to whether they predict that the local readings of (1) and (2) exist or not.

Globalism predicts that the local reading does not exist and thus anticipates no difference between the conditions WEAK and STRONG.

Localism predicts that the local reading exists, and therefore that the degree to which the relevant sentences will be judged true in the condition STRONG (measured by the mean position of the cursor) will be significantly higher than in the condition WEAK since one more reading is true in the condition STRONG.

Results

Experiment 2:non-monotonic environments

Exactly one letter is connected with some of its circles.

Possible meanings:

Literal meaning: one letter is connected with some or all of its circles, the other letters are connected with no circle.

Global reading: one letter is connected with some but not all of its circles, the other letters are connected with no circle.

Local reading: one letter is connected with some but not all of its circles, the other letters may be connected with either none or all of their circles.

Exactly one letter is connected with its blue circle or with its red circle.

Possible meanings:

Literal meaning: one letter is connected with its blue circle or with its red circle or with both, the other letters are connected with no circle.

Global reading: one letter is connected with exactly one of its two circles, the other letters are connected with no circle.

Local reading: one letter is connected with exactly one of its two circles, the other letters may be connected with either none or both of their circles.

Method and procedure16 native speakers of French

Results

Universal free choice?Bob van Tiel

Several observations speak in favor of an SI approach.Like SIs, FCIs are absent in DE contexts.

You cannot have coffee or tea.In UE contexts, FCIs can be cancelled by professing

ignorance about the truth of the FCIs.

You can take coffee or tea, but I do not know which.

Both pragmatic and conventionalist accounts of SIs have the means to account for singular FCIs. But only the conventionalist account predicts FCIs to occur in embedded positions.

In support of the latter account, Chemla (2009) found that participants consider the universal FCIs as robust as their singular counterparts:

Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009b)’s account is based on the intuition that universal FCIs are confined to permission-giving sentences.

Of course, it remains to give an explanation as to why universal FCIs are licensed in permission-giving contexts. According to Geurts and Pouscoulous, someone who says (7) actually performs a distributive speech act. The speaker gives permission not to the group as a whole, but to every individual member of the group. The problem of universal free choice thus boils down to the problem of singular free choice.

Methods and procedure

Methods and procedure (2)According to Geurts and Pouscoulous, the universal FCIs

attested by Chemla are caused by the particular speech act performed by means of the sentences in question.

Only FCIs in sentences that can be used to give permission survive embedding under a universal quantifier.

That is, the effect on the robustness of FCIs of embedding a free choice sentence under a universal quantifier should be significantly bigger for sentences that cannot be used to give permission than for sentences that can.

This hypothesis was tested in an inference task.

Methods and procedure (3)In the Baseline version, participants encountered

only unembedded free choice sentences. In the Embedded version, the same sentences were embedded under a universal quantifier.

54 Dutch participantsFillers

Every guest took a sausage and a slice of bacon from the barbecue.

If everyone votes for or against the motion, a second vote will not be necessary.

Critical itemsDeontic modals

Johan may take a ham or cheese sandwich.

Every visitor may take a ham or cheese sandwich.Dynamic modals

Karin can write a haiku or a limerick.

Every pupil can write a haiku or a limerick.Epistemic modals

According to the doctor, Piet might have the flu or the measles.

According to the doctor, every pupil might have the flu or the measles.

Existential quantifiers

Some players received a yellow or red card during the match.

Every match, some players received a yellow or red card.

Results

DiscussionUniversal FCIs are indeed less robust in sentences

that cannot be used to grant permission. In fact, only the Deontic condition did not show a significant main effect of Version. That is, the mean robustness of singular and universal FCIs did not differ significantly in the Deontic condition, as opposed to the other target conditions.

Universal FCIs are not absent in at least the Epistemic and Existential conditions. Only in the Dynamic condition might it be argued that FCIs actually disappear under embedding.

Discussion (2)Permission vs. description

Every visitor can take a cocktail or some lemonade.

Every student was allowed to take an apple or a pear.The effect of embedding on the robustness of FCIs

licensed by permission-giving sentences was not significantly bigger than the effect of embedding on permission reports.

This provides strong evidence that universal FCIs cannot be explained as distributive speech acts.

Explanation for the variance observed

One explanation might be that sentences involving deontic or epistemic modalities require a greater deal of speaker competence than sentences involving dynamic modality or existential quantification.

Properties and abilities can usually be observed, permission and knowledge cannot.

Partial knowledge about permission and knowledge is thus less likely than partial knowledge about properties and abilities.

Since a reading without FCIs expresses partial knowledge, this might have caused more participants to derive FCIs for sentences involving deontic or epistemic modality.

Further researchSo if FCIs are SIs, similar findings are expected for

the derivation of FCIs. Until these have been found, it is impossible to say conclusively whether universal FCIs jeopardize a pragmatic account of SIs or whether SI interpretations of FCIs are consistently off the mark.