Cll.I\PrER II

BARGAilUNG ,\4'\JD COMPROMISES

From \\1lat h.:la been outlined 1n the prev1ous chapter~

it 'i:Toul.d be cl.eo.r that the EP·\L• beginning a.a n provincial.

oppos1 tton party and later becomlrag a 'nominn.l' branch o£ a

national opposition pa~y, ~as basically striving to apearhe3d

the movement for estsbl1ahing in P~tistan a democratic politi­

cal. system lrd th a .tederal atructuro ;.;bore East Paid. stan both

politieal1y and economical1y could play its legitimate role

and get 1ts clue share; and in o!Uer to achieve this• 1t ~ros

prepared to make certain tactical compromises.

With tho resolution o£ con£11cting issues like

acceptance a£ the parity .formula, secularisat1on of the party,

etc. it seemed the EPAL could move .fortrard ~tith its programme

for complete democratisation o.f tlle Pakistani political. system

and regionr'.ll autonomy within a federal structure. But undel'­

neuth the general consensus on the surface there were under­

currents of disagreement and distrust at var1.ous J.evel.s of the

organisation. Ma~y two sats of conflict situation orystall1sod

after the party came to share pot·ter in EP and at the Centre

in 1956.

-47-

48

At the pro~c1al ~evel, the organ1sational and par-

11amentary wings • headed respectively by Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman and Ataur Rahman Khan- had serious differences of

opinion about the 4eg1timate ro1e of organisation vis-a-vis

the bureaucracy/administration. Ataur Rahman Khan, as the

Chief ~Unister heading the administration, strongly believed

in the traditional concept of an apo11t1ca1 bureaucracy

fUnctioning i.ndependentl.y o£ any political. pressure, to

implement the dec1ared policies of the Governmant without

having to be accountab1e to the !unctionariea of the rul.ing

party. On the other hand, Sheikh lluj1bur Rahman as the

party Se<:reta~;, aspiring to build a strong cadre-based party

organisation, and being very muoh at-zare ~ the n.eax-hostUe

attitude of the bureaucracy tot-mr<ls his party's p~ans and

programmes. insisted on a constant Vigil. by party ~t.rorkers on

the adm1n1strntors ~t different levels and nreas of a~is­

trntion. To h.im this might also n.,ve been a means to "nn:rard"

the 't-rorkers ensuring their loyalty. It could also be an

effort to outgrow tha typical colonial oystem established by

tile British. On the othar hand• it could be vi.e\'led as a

usua1 feature o£ parliGmentary democracy where the supremacy

o£ the party organisation over the parliamentary wing 1s a

constantly debated question. and depending on the persona11-

t1.es invol.ved the situation takes its O':m course. Anyway0

Sheikh t-'lujibur Hahman' s faith in the auprem3.cy o~ the party

organisat.i.on and his distrust o£ bureaucrats as potential.

obstacles to tha 1mpl.ement3t1on o£ the governmental pol.1cies

was almost an obsossion. 1

The potential.l.y serious but l.ocal. confl.ict, hmtever,

was overshedat1ed by a more pressing and onerous set o~ con­

f11cts ~ith £or-reaching pol.it1ca1 conse~enoes for the

country. The issues involved t"'akistan• s .foreign policy as

we41 as docestic policy regarding regional autonomy. Both

these were matters £or the Central Government's pol.iey decision

and the At•mmi League' s vieltTS on these 1rmre well knovrn. Since

ita inception, the A\1am1 League bad a very clear-cut stand on

both the issues. It stood £or a non-ul.igned .f'oreign. pol.icy

and compl.ete t.--egional. autonomy within a federal. structure

tl11th very limited powers for the Central. Government, and the

party '-*ls expected to stand by these. But Suhravtardy deviated

.from these professed prineipl.es by champio~ Pru~istan•s

alignment with the •·teGt through participation in SEATO and

Cl~i~'OO and t..l>le lU.l.itary Asoiatanee Agroement with the USA. He

1 In fact, the same att.itude manifested 1tsel.£ through his scheme { 1974-75) of a nominated "Governoru 1n each subdivision of Bang1adeoh providing constant Vig~ over administrators. Xf this was "Soviet influence"• as alleged by h.1s critics, the "influence" must have set in quite earl.y. The idea might well. have been planted at the earlier stage bf some of those t1ho• taking the cue from the Cominform s appreciation o£ the At.mmi League•s progressive ro1e, tnougnt 1t fit to work througb. the party. In the post-liberation stage. of course, the necessity for auch nwatchd.ogs" ·.:as one o£ the suggestions oZ the BangJ.adesh Pl.anning Commission .for successful. 1mp1ementat1on of the Pl.an. .see Pl.anning Commission~ Government of the People's Republic of Bangl.adeah, T~e Fir§~Jjive Yes Pl.an, 1973-;ZO (Dacca­November 19'7r. PP• 1 •

50

also apparent1y compromised East Pak~stan'Q l.egittmate

interests by l.ol!zering the priority o£ the autonOJ!\Y issue.

4'hese deviations tmre brougbt into focus mainl.y by Maul.ana

Bhasbani, the founder-President of the party, who chal.l.enged

-~uhrawardy' s legitimacy as a leader. As Suhro.".::ardy ~ms a

member of the Central Cabinet since late 1955 and al.so the

Prime lJiinister \1h.Gn the crisis around these issues \·ms preci­

pitating, Bhashan1 had an added edge over .3uhrt.umrdy. In

the organisation' s assessment the p.arliamentary ''ling' s

performance at the nati.onal. l.evel. was inade·-:uate. It 'I:TaS

aJ.so a fight between two l.eadcrs, one still only a provin­

ci~l leader but with a mass base and the other a national

leader op~~ting mainlY wit~n the urban educated section.

In thi.s .feud the t\•ro most important functionaries of the

Et>J\L sided with the national leader, thus disowning the

nominal. head o~ the party. In the final. tussl.e Suhra\ml'dy,

supported by the i'rov1nc1a1 Chi~ l-11nister Ataur iiahman Khan

and General Secretary Sheit"Jl Huj1bur !mhman, won a formal.

victory causing a split in the party and openinz the way

for the birth o~ another national party, the National A\1am1

Party (NAP) , trl. th a supposedl.y \11dor set of programmes.

the Bbaahani-SUhra\..;arciy d1f£erence over the .foroign

pol.icy iasu.e which ~Jas discernibl.e immediatel.y after Suhra,vardy

becamg the Prime M~ister o£ ?akistan.2 surfaced clearl.y

2 J

51

durins the special. Council session a£ the •~t>AL at Ka~1 on

7-8 February 1957. In his Presidential. Address3 !Jhushani

sounded a tmrning by enumerating the causes of t!le complete

rout of the Muslim Lea. ,ue. In this context he asked: n·l'ihat

~roul.d be our ideology as a political party?n - and answered

by mald.JIG a reference to t-.lhat he termed the nn.ew phUosophy

and a set of values" thro~ up by the French Revo1ution -

conceptual.lsed as the freedoms o£ thouB}1t, organisation,

eJ..."'Pression and ri.:;ht to earn one's living. He announced#

Today our aim is to procure these fundamental. rights for the people of Pwtistan •••• Peopl.e 1n thl.s country wUl certainly establ.1sh a demo­cratic life and mode of production - nothing more, nothing l.esa. Just as they \>JOUld not tolerate Hitler-type £ascism or ru1e by Q coterie, they \rould al.so not court conmr~sm.

He suggested that Pakistan shcul.d aim more or l.esa at the

"democratic system prevailinG in IJr1ta1n". i\e.ferrin.g to the

Awami League's achievements since obtaining partial i)O\'rer at

the Centre, he aaid that it had achieved seventy-i'ive per cent

of the obj·,etives but tt1enty-f'1ve per cent still r~Jmai.ned to

be done - but even that meant a lot o£ \'10rk. The r:lElin

objective of the ~enty-ona Point programme ~~ ;\L manifestos

was provtncialisation o£ a11 departments except fore1cn

af'i'airs. defence and currency bec::luae unless :.:~ast i'akistan

~a:J able to util.1ze the .forcit;n eltono.nge earned by it1 unl.ess

t1

52

departments like Commerce and Industries. Rail\'ISYS and ?oat

Offices, etc. were brought under the £ul1 control of the

Pi"Ovinoial government, un."leso East and i·lest Pakistan t>tere

acknowl.edged as having tt1o separate economies - East

Pru(istan's overall development ~s not possible. He reminded

his audience a 0 \•le have acee?ted parity of numbers in order

to enjoy parity in a11 o.i'fairs o£ the country - not to be

deprived of seventy-five per cent of total. expenditure of

the country.u He al.so pointed out that since extensive

development of agricul. ture ttas not possible due to high

density of population 1n EP - ao contrasted to the low

density in l-i.P. - the scientific remedy \'Toul.d be to indus­

trial.ise E.P. and introduce mechanised farming in t<J.P. He

al.so stresaed the need for a central. bank in East Pakistan

under the Provincial Government's control. Bhashani~ in .fact,

was repeatinG r:th:lt certain economists like Colin Cl.ark and

A. Sadeque had al.ready pointed out and what the At>Jami League

parliamentarians assisted by economists like Sadque and

academicians l.ike M.A. Choudhury and Abdur Hazzal-c. etc. had

already voiced in the Constituent Assembly and else\1here t-1hil.e

presenting a case for a federal constitution with extensive

regional. autonomy, and \'Jhat later "~:J-as .formulated into the six

Point Formula of the (post-split and. post-revival.) A\mmi

League in 1966. Their fai.l.uro was admitted by Bhashani \'then

he l.amented that even the country• s £undam.ental. la\"TS wore

unfavourable £or East PGkistan.

53

Regarding Pakistan's foreign po11cy, repeating his

earl.1er stand he advocated a bold, independent policy enhancing

friendship among Asian and African peoples to .free this vast

area £rom all. imperialist influence. "It \'10u1d be sutcidal. n, he said~ flto engage in quarrel.s fostered by imperialists among

one• s O\'m kind". l!e had a word o.f caution: "Ne1 ther dollar

nor TOUbl.e can bring deve~opment to o:ny country." He cited

Chiang Ka1.-..shek as the glaring example of the failure of this

policy.. Kashmir \'JaS mentioned as the main obstacl.e towt.lrds

Pak-IncU.a friendship. And an appe.U \1S.S oade in the speech

to the Indian peopl.a and their '1peace l.oving" Prime Minister

Nehru to resol.ve this issue by agreeing to a .free and fair

plebiscite .•

Bhash.a.rd • s views about the '(/Orkint; of the party

referred obl.1quely to his disapproval of certain devel.opments

tli thil'l the party - both organisational. and ideological.. His

pre.ferenees l'lere made clear. For exampl.e, he said that thG

party '1!10rkers t•Tere the nl.ue bl.ood of the land", and ther~ore,

their views shoul.d be talten into account by the AL Ministry

and constant ef£orts "rare to be made to create ideol.ogica1

ur.derstanclin8 bet\1een the older and younger members. Moreover,

o~y workers ahoul.d not be subjected to diseip1inary actions,

both establ.ished and emergent leaders al.so shoul.d .face

expu.l.sion .from the party for vi.ol.uting party-d1Geip11.ne. He

al.ao t1Brned against the admission of the habitual. defectors.

lle reminded the AL !·llnisters and Parliamentarians that

the Parliamentary wing was just a part of the party0 and as

such it had to abide by the principle3, ideals and constitution

of the party. In his opi!Uon about the party organisation he

1:ras in fact supporting the General secreta!"J in the latter' s

con£11ct trith the Chief l·iinister. Or 1n other words, the

General Secretary held the same viet<T as that of the ~sident.

But even this convergence of ideas could not keep these ~'10

functionaries together. From the continuing sty1e o£ operation

o£ the then General. Secretary 1 t is a.mpl.y evident that the

e :uat1on did not chango because o£ any basic d1££erence o£

opinion, but of some other short-term considerations, one of

them being the hope£ul.ly a't'taited elections. ,•ihil.e constantly

losing in bargaining t1ith the ruling coterie a section of

Auami Leaguers led by Suhra't·mrdy obviously still. believed that

even within the framework of the 1956 constitution, ~1th a

.f'reshl.y elected national legislature the At'tami League \10uld

be able to get its demands fulfilled through normal democratic

process. And hence a lat~lying posture vis-a-'Jis the Central

p~-er structure till. the elections wre held '(1aS thought i'it.

Bhashani also believed that el.ectlons t.zere round the corner.

In the above speech he t·mnted immediate se1oetS.on of candidates

and stressed the need for round-the-cl.oc.k campaigning particu-

1arl.y in rural. areas to make the A\'lami League victorious so

that it coul.d take the l.ead in voicing the peop1e's demands.

He desired that the AL~' a vi-ctim o£ repressive measures sh.oul..d,

\'lhen in pm-rer, accept the l.egitimacy and indispensibUity of

55

opposition partien 1n democratic fUnctioning. He a~ao made it

clear that, if it continued to be in the opposition., the A\r>Jami

League Ghould be prepared to suffer fUrther repressions 1n

order to real.ise the unfUlfilled promises of the 'l't·renty-one

t'oint manifesto. He asked the Awami League to fight agninst

communalism and corruption and to sec that rel1g1on \1hich '.<Jas

a necessary requirement £or spiritual. upl.iftment onl.y, was

not used for political purposes or for exploitation.

\'lhile further stressing tha need £or regional.

autonomy Bhaahani said that the only l'IaY to create friendship

between the tl!TO wings of Pakistan was to establ.1sh compl.ete

regional autonoll\Y in botll the regions. This implied that he

had accepted SUbra\>Jardyt s argument that unless the .. est \'ling

tras unified; autonomous regional. units were inconceivable;

and the al.ternative, i.e. provincial. autonomy was not \'lhnt

the Lahore Resol.uti.on of '1940 had visualised. Dbashani fUrther

pointed. out that the demand for regional. autonomy concerned

£our and a hal.f crores of East Pakistanis "right to live"• 4

and until. this demand '11ras £ulf1l.led the A\'1S1111 League was to

£i6ht unceas~~ly both ~thin and outs~e the leg1s1atures.s

Arter having spelt out elaboratel.y the aims and

objectives, the programme and the required mode o£ action oK

4 Signi£1cantl.y, the bookl.et containing the .3ix. Point Formul.a t'.ras ti.tl.ed "Our Right to Liw".

S rhe post-spl.it and the post-revi.val. :u. di.d do so - but most oi' the time it lh"as criticised by Dhashani.

56

the party, Bhashani concluded his speech td. th an appeal to l.et

him retire £rom the party• s presidency and al.l.0\:1 him to work

as an ordinary member. He gave the reason as his 1U health

and old age. This t-ms no doubt an indicntion that the party

wus free to dispense \'tith his l.eadersh1p. In fact, t'lithin a

short tima tlle party did decide to do \'11thout himp though not

without 'mat he stood for at that juncture.

The above address read 1n the context of the back­

ground gives a clear indication of the conflict. Acco~s

\'1ritten by s?me observers and others confirm tilat the

Kagmari session tdtnessed a bitter confrontation bet\>1een two

t·rarring factions and Bhasbani is reported to have said { 1n the

subjects committee/working committee meeting) in unambiguous

terms that East Pakistan shoul.<l say n good bye" to \vest

Pakiata.n 1f the latter foUed to concede East Pakistan• s

demands. 6 If Dhashan1 used such a direct threat it \'laS only

an agitational. politician's straigbt-forward expression of

tthat had been already hinted at by AL politic inns in the

6

national ieg1slature.7

But the confrontation at ltagmari. was at its bitterest

over the foreign poli.oy issue. Suhra\!mrdy was so upset by

Bhasbani• s sarcastic remarks that he o£fered to resign amidst

protests from a group led by the EP Chief 1-tinister Ataur

Rebman Khan and the EPAL General Secretary Sheikh C1aj1bur

Rahman. Efforts \1ere a~so made to isol.ate Bhasbani by

expall.ing the Youth Leaguers - Bhashani' s mainstay- .from

7 Abu1 Mansur Ahmad concluded his seven hours long speech (on 16~ 17 January 1956) by saying, "Please do not ignore geography. Please lteep 1 t 1n mind that geography and history are inseparable tt11ns. History will not £orgive you if you ignore geography. n Dee the speech in CAP Debates, vol. 1, no. 51, 16 January 1956, and vol.-r; no. 03'2, 17 January 1956 ·7 \'!hat he told a fel-r ~reeks later "rhi1e concluding li"is Budget speech was even more revealing. He said:

I shall finish my speech tTith this warning to 1fW brothers. In tha past they exploited East Pald.stan \d. thout any constitution. 'fh.is expl.o1-tation and this injustice thoy are not1 going to perpetrate in the name of new Constitution. I£ they do that, I '1ould remind my friencla o£ that 1ll.ustrious son of England• Edmund Burl·te. Sir, Edmund Burke cried hoarse about America ••• but could not perawade the then British po11ticians to listen to ·;his advice. Edmund Burma fall.ed, his oratory faUed, but. SJ.r, A.meri.can peopl.e did not i'aU. The ocean that divided England and Amer1oa cou1d not be dried up and so geograp}ly played its ~: and created history ~then pol.iti­ci.ans faUed. In the case ~ East Pa!tistan and ~lest Pakistan I gi vo the same \'larning. I \1arll my brothers: if you ignore geography • history will. not forget you. If you overl.ook geograp~. hi.story ~·1ill. ignore you and firml.y 1nterv6U"le and, you kno'l"r, Sir, \"Jhen history intervenes, .it onl.y repeats itself.

58

the EPAL.e

Ho't1ever, resol.utiont>Jise 11 Bhasho.ni was empo'\'Iered to

take disc1pl.1nary action against those t1hc Viol.ated the AL' s

declared policy on de£ence and mi1itary pacts; but the

$\4tu"award.y•l.ed parl.iamentary party ~19.8 also authorised to

continue in the central. coalition. 9 The i;Pi\L had earlier

indicated its position on mil.itary alliances 1n its CouncU

sessions of October 1955 and May 1956. In the former it

demanded that all military pacts should be placed before

Parliament and those not approved were to be abrogated, and

that 1n future any pact made t'li thout the prior approval. of

the Parl.iament was to be pl.aced before 1t £or approval wi.tbin

three months of its conel.usion. In the latter, the i.:.4'AL

urged £or an 1l1dependent and neutral. £ore1sn policy 3Jld

condemned the m111 tary alliances that bad cost Pakistan tho

sympat}W of the majority o£ thG Musl.im world. 10 :-3Uhra~·rardy personaU.y,. hot'1ever, bad defended all.iances by saying that zero

pl.us zero amounted only to zero. In East Pakistan in December

1956 he addressed tho Dacca University students and tried hard

to convince them of the .rati.onal.ity o£ Pakistan• s £oreign

po1icy with the same argument. And he had p1eaded the case

B

9 .Datm, 8 and 9 February 1957 •

10 Ibid., 29 October 19.55 and 21 May 1966.

59

tfell. 11

nte \iJcst Pakistan branches o£ the PAL generally

favoured an independent foreign policy. But the Central

Party organisation had n~t expressed any firm opinion on

the issue till. Suhra\m.rdy' s assumption o£ the Prime ~'11ni.ster' s

~fiee. A ola.im that it tw.d endorsed the o.fi'icial. foreign

policy t·ras questi-oned by members from Uh'FP, Sind, Karachi

and Lahore and they demanded a fUll \<Iorking Committee meeting

to discuss the issue. However, the Vlorking Committee meeting

b.e~d on 8 January 1957 confirmed the statement and approved

the expulsion of r.a.u. Usmani, Gonoral. Secretary o£ the

Central Party, i.e. APAL~' earlier announced by Suhra\'tardy,

for their dif'£ercnces on the foreign pol.i.cy issue. 12 ~arl.ier

a ~iPAL Convention sehedul.ed for 25-26 January 1957 had been

postponed tUJ. l·1ay 1957. 13 The undercurrent of dissent in

ll:est Pald.stWl surfaced 1n no time. On 8 FebrtlB.r'J 1957,

while the Bhashani-SUhrat!Jardy confrontation was going on at

Kagmari, East Paltistan. 1n L.:1hore a Convention of about a

hundred \<test Pald.stan At-zam1 Leaguers \SS held t1bich formal.1y

denounced SUhra\IIardy' a 1eadersh1p .for hi-s undemocratic attitude

11 Conversation t-rith aonw Dacca University teachers (in winter 1976) ~i.bo as students had at4"vended the moet1ng in 1956 •1here Subra'i'CU"'dY udrematicall.y" a:L1gnted from a he11eoptor right at the venue o£ the meeting and immed1ate1y started his speech.

12 pa~~. 3 December 1956, and 9 January 1957.

13 Ibid,., 2 November 1956.

60

tcnmFda the ~1PAL and more significantJ.y the convention al.so

expressed 1 ts confidence in Bh.ashani. 14

In l\brch 1957 a seven-member commi ttea of ·.-;PAL

{dissident group) and Pakistan national. Party \«Jas set up to

organise an a11-?akistan Party with G~~~ar Khan, I£t~ddin,

Usmani, P1r of fJ!anki Shari.f, Abdu1 r·1ajid Sindbi~ Abdul. Ghafur

and Mahmul Ali Qasuri. 15

Though in East Pakistan a .forma1 spllt was averted

at l<agmari, Suhrat:tar4y' s stand on foreign policy 1n clear

contravention to the AL stand caused a serious -.reakening of

the party structure both 1n the East and the ·riest wings. On

the autonomy issue Bbash.llni declared: t' .Jo united are the

people of East Pakistan on this one issue that no po11t1ca1

party., big or smal.1, ol.d or net'1, can hope to maintain its

existence on the so11 of East Palt1stan if it opposes the demand

for autonomy. u That Bhashani had correctly fel.t the pulse

of the popular l.eaders of EP \>taS confirmed beyond doubt 'llthen

on:; AprU 19.57 the East Pakistan Assembl.y, .foll.omng h1s

o£t-repeated directive, 16 passed a ~ous reso1ution-

Chief Minister Ataur Rahman abstaining- reiterating the demand

.for fUl.l. autonomy. 17 rbis resolution raised a controversy.

14 Sengupta. n. 6• P• 316.

15 rle Rafiq Afza.l. Pol.1t1oa1 Parties J.n Palt1atan,, 1947-1958 (Is1amabad, 1976), p.;i11, fn. 52.

16 Dam& 3, 6, 21 and Z7 r.Jareh 1957.

17 Se~pta, n. 6, pp. 318-19.

61

The Interior t>U.niater Ghulam Al.i Khan Tal. pur interpreted it

as a "secessionist move". 18 i4.A. KhaJ.1q, an AL central.

z.tinister from El? known to be el.ose to Suhrawardy, protested

against Tal.pur in a statement saying: "The resol.ution was

passed unanimous:ly by the members o£ tlle Bast Pakistan Assembl.y

representing .forty-t'\)JO million East Pakistanis, and it' be

J:.fal.pu£/ contends that their unanimous decision woul.d causa

joy to the enemies o£ Pakistan• then 1 t t<toul.d mean the entire

population of East Pakistan are enemies of Pak1stan.19 But

Suhrawardy bimsel..f call.ed it a "political. stunt". 20 He io

reported to have even remarked that the demand for autonomy

tms not a people• s demand and expressed his doubt \ihether

evan the leaders (voicing it) coul.d de£1ne it. Bhash3ni

reacted by releasing to the press on 5 April 1957 a pl.edge to

impl.ament the Twenty-one P(}1nts signed by Suhraward.y. 21

The party apr,arently was in disarray • For no dis­

cipl.inary action tSS talten against those 't'tho. violating the

par-ty mandate. supported the foreign pol.icy in the Central.

LegisJ.ature. Out o£ thirteen AL NPs onl.y one (Nurur Rahman)

stood by the party mandate. Ataur and Muj1b \'1ho were a·way

16 Da\lm~ 3~ 4, 5 and 7 Apr11 1957.

19 Se~pta. n. 6, pp. 318-19.

20 Da~, 4 Apr11 1957.

21 Sengupta, n. 6, PP• 318-22. See 'te..~ o£ the p1ed~e 1n Chapter I.

, I

62

tn Dacca ~men the voting took place, later issued statements 22

deo1a.r1.ng their support to SUbratmrdy' s stand on foreign pol.icy.

Numerical.ly it ~rould not have mattered even if all the thirteen

AL members had adhered to the party mandate. But it could

have saved the party from a spl.it \·rh1ch consequently weakened

East Pakistan's leverage 1n bargaining with tho central

authority.

At the Working Committee meeting of the EPAL on

3 June 1957 ega~ the so-cal1ed pro-Suhra\~Y faet1on

de.fea:ted the so-ca1J.od pro-Bb.ashan1 faction. The organising

secretary (Ali Ahad), a pro-Dhashani Youth Leaguer. \'JaG

expelled on disciplinary grounda and nine others resigned in

protest. A Council. meeting ~s 1'1.~ for 13 and 14 June 1n

DaccB. Part of the agenda as announced conc..:rned an amendment

curbing the President• s power to nominate t\·renty-f'ive members

of the Working &;ommittee. It ~s al.so announced that Bhashanl' s

resignatlon (reportedl.y offered in a letter to the General.

Secretary in I"Jarch 1957) was to be considered at this meeting.

The Juno meeting, as described by some observers, t-m.s stage­

managed by the so-callod pro-Suhrr.:.~rardy group l.ed by the

General. secretary, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. B.hashani. 1n the

meantimo had convened a Peasants• Convention in North Bonga1

and had been proteatin8 against price rise and had a1so

undertalten a 'I.<Jeaklong fast .for ael.f-purifieatlon. He was

reportedl.y rel.uctant to attend the June CouneU meeting and

22 Sengupta,. n. 8., P• 107 •

was hinting about forming a new party. 23

According to reports at th.e CounoU meeting amid.st

l.ots of confusion, violence and unconstitut~ona1 manipulations

organised by the pro-Suhral'tardy group~ a resol.ution endorsing

the Government• s foreign pol.lcy was passed. It also passoo a

resolution to oust the Youth Lcow~ers from the party. The

reaol.ution on autonomy call.ed for an amendment of the 1956

Constitution to implemant regional autonomy. The General

Secretar-:1' s report, hO\.o'!&ver,. ·mentioned that the Awami Leagtte

t-rould take up the issue after the coming genera1 elections.

Bhashani•s resignation remained unaccepted. He issued a

pross sto.teoont commenting on the Council meeting and asked

the Councillors nto search. their hearts and see if they were

honest about the proceedings conducted in the soss1ontt.. He

is al.so reported to have saids "Muj1bur c-..annot understand

that U' he ho.s to secure regiona1 autonomy he must fight

against the foreign pol.ioy • tmich means mil.itary pacts. On1y

a bl.ind man cannot see that arms pr<>eured under mUitary pacts

ml.l be used against East Pakistan to sS.l.enee 1ts vo1ce.n24

Bhashani put the final. stamp on his dissociation .from the

AL When he cal.led the PNP l.eaders for a Democratic Convention

in l.lacoa on 2.5-26 Jul.y 1957 tmich £ormed the Nationa:l A\mmi

Party (NAP) \11th Bh.ashani. as the President. 25 For soma

23 Ibid •• p. 112. The author \·ra.s present at Bhashani' s Preas Conference on 8 June 1957.

24 Ibid., PP• 116-18.

25 Da~m, 26 and 27 Jul.y 1957 •

64

years to come this party provided an umbrel.l.a to the l.ef'tist

£orces of Paltistan.

Abul. Mansur Ahmad, a Centra1 l-11nister 1n Suhra\'zardy' s

Cabinet~ suspected the then President Iskandar l'1irza' s compl.1-

c1ty in the At13lD.1 League split and t~1e .formation o£ NAP. As .

a cl.ose associate of the Pt4 Abu1 :1ansur \•TaS a\"Jare that prior

to the Kapari session the President had pressed Suhra\'1ardy to

arrest Bhasbani. Failing that he must have persuaded Bhashani

to brealt away from the AL and form a nG\>1 party. 26 It \'laS

common tmo"rl.edge at the time that the spectacular Kagmari

Con£eronce organised by Bhashani t1as financed mainly by the

Ispahan1s \'lho had td.de business interests in East Pakistan and

were cl.ose to the ~·iest Pakistani power el.1te. They might bave

colluded t>Jith Mirza's alleged design to destroy East Pakistan• s

evol.ving political cohesion under the Atmmi League l.eadership.

It 1a also possible that Bhashan1, unsure o£ Subrawardy' a

com:nitment to the party programme (or Suhra1rmrdy' s motives)

and at tne same time unable to contain him on account of his

vantage positi.on in nat1ona1 po11tics, hoped that by promoting

himsel.i' :fr<>m the status o£ a provincial. 1eader to that of a

national. 1eader through the presidency of an all-Pakistan

party could fight Suhra\mrdy, U necessary, :from a position

o£ equa1 strength. lt ia quite possib1e that ·Iskandar M~za

had taken advantage o£ Bhashani' s own strategic move.

26

65

~~hatevcr ba the inntrwnentalities, basically

Bhaahanits uneompromsing attitude hastened the spli.t at a

time ttlhen the Awami League bad, against many odds, just managed

an entry into tho pottrer structure and• operating \'1ith1n

inherent limitations. was trylng to reach its objectives. At

this juncture t as Bhashani bad himsel.f pointed out, the party

needed to fight both \!lithin and outside the legisl.atures. Z1

The split sapped the party•s strength at both levels.

Curiously enough• the NAP 1tsel..f \:1SS inconsistent, 28 and its

irresolute policies neither helped party-bu11d1ng nor served

East Pal~istan' s cause - the latter being the ;etsce de

4esiatffi9Se of Bhashani•s politics at the time.

The pro-Suhrat~y faction ~r.aa no less responsible

for hardening the pro-Bhashan1 faction's attitude. If they

were convinced thnt in spite o£ his apparent inconsistencies

Suhra\mrdy •.ms moving in the right direction, that t-mD, setting

£or East Pakistan as much as possible of ita legitimate dues,

they could have tri<:!d. for a consensus \d.thin the party about

1 t instead of trying to isolate Bh.ashani by ousting thG so­

ca1led progressives from the party. But t1as it possible? With

the progressives ~ the party the AL cou1d not ultimately avoid

d S.sol'1Jling Suhrawardy' s £orelgn policy stand \'Jhich wou1d have

led to either Subrawardy' a break v1itn the party or Suhrat-tardy' s

27 See n. ;s.

28 UAP' s inconsistence via-a-via the A.L in discussed l.ater in the chapter.

66

brea..i.t with the central. power structure. Either way the AL

\tlOul.d have lost What little linkage it had established with

the po\'ler structure \1hich ,,;as both covertly and overtly hostUe

to East Palt1stan•s demands for overall. parity.

It was no secret th:"lt certain lnt·~rer:~t ~oups - the

nupport base of the existing power structure 1n \~est Pakistan

l.ilte the landl..ords and bUsiness ~oups - t-rere .higbl.y critical.

of certain pol.iey decisions taken by the Suhrawardy Ministxy

to meet the demands of economic parity between East and ~~est

Pakistan. Ta:Lukdar r-1an1ruzzaman has given a brief but pointed

ane.l.ysis of h0\'1 the business groups, annoyed by the East

Pakistani politicians' constant demands, had sougnt central

inta~ntion by appealing to President Mir~29 For exampl.e,

Rangoon'9Jell.a~ President o:t the Federation of Chambers of

commerce and Industries, in his \·1elcome address to rJJ.irza at

its Annual Dinner Gaid:

S\,Ahrat-zardy' a reaction to such nlleg3.t1ons \•za.ss

29 nt- The • pp.

30 Ibi.d. • p. 97. Gmphasis added.

67

Abul. r·bnour al.so relates several instances \•Then \>Jest

Pa~d.sta."li bureaucrats and business interests resented some o£

his decisions as the t1inister o£ Commerce and Industries to

introduce corrective ~easures for the existing economic

tmba1ance bet\1een the ~10 wtngs.'2 Thus the AL at the centre

found it quite difficult to implement decisions favouring East

Paltistan. EZforts '-mre neverthel.eas being made. And though

Suhrawaroy l'zas accused of being del.iberatel.y negl.igent of

East Pakistan• a re."!llirctnents, no specific case o£ such negU.­

gence has been recorded even by his staunch cr1ticis. F\11'­

tb.ermore, his statement (cited above) made after the AL split

t1ClS gormaJ..ised~ al.so proved that he \'1aS atill fighting for the

essential. demands of the pro-split AL. Practically, it t-rould

have been very dUficul.t for a party sharing central. power 1n

a coalition to per.torm the uinput" £unction on behalf of the \

province, perform the 'outputt £unction on behal.£ o£ the Centre

for the province. and to keep both the central. and provincia1

el.ite-aspiranta in good humour. Anyway, the A\mmi League

31 Dawn. 22 August 1957, quoted 1n ibid.~ PP• 97-98, empHasis added.

32 Abul. V~urt n. 26, PP• 409-89.

·:r.eadership £ailed to perform an inevitable multi•dtmensional

role at a very critical. moment 1n the pol.itics o£ Pakistan

and tms later blamed for its wlnerabUity in p1aying into the

hands of the West Pakistani pO\'ler elite.· The lesson thus

l.earnt seems to have had considerabl.o impact on the functio~

ing of the EPAL 1n later years - though not immodiatel.y - \•then

bargaining t.zith the pot.zer e11te was replaced by ei'£orts £or

peaceful. mass mobilisation.

Since the earliest days of Pakistan, SUbrawardy's

prei'erenbe for secul.ar natJ.onal. parties, struggle for joint

electorates, acceptance of one unit {so that ~P instead of

being one o£ .five provinces became one of ttt~o regions) am overall parity, and above a1l., lrl.s eagerness to have tho

general. elections almost at any cost, indicate his priority

for the establ.ishment of integrative institutions as pre­

requisites for sorting out the anomalies 1n a democratic

marmer. In his eagerness, he even aacrUiced his party's

pledge to no~alignment. The criticism that followed,

botrever, seems to have overlooked certain compu1s1ons inherent

in the situation. For exaop1e, the kind of ooalitio~buildlng

:Juhra~m.rdy \!l-as striving £or required him to be a •nationa1'

leader. But he t1as yet to 1eg1tim.iso his •nationa1' identity

in t11e Pakistani or rather the l'Iest Palti.stani mind. And

therefore. \"lbat could have served him better than b.1s endorse­

ment of Pakistan • s mUJ. tary al.l.iances? After all# £rom the

Paltistani viewpoint tllese alliances t-tere entered into not

onl.y to contain the Communists, as envisaged by its ,iestern

69

al.11os, btlt al.so to contain India - the eternal. enemy of

Pakistan. Again, what could have better demonstrated his

pro-\'Jest Pakistan preferences than his attempts to revive the

Kashmir issue at the UN? Anyway, his strategy mts.tired. On

the ona hand he tms opposed by a large chunk of his 0\•1ll

support base and on the other, he \'1BS d1solmed by the suspicious

power-elite at the Centre. Those \tJho t·ranted perpetuation o£

the already establ.islled structure created on the basis o£ an

entente among the bureaucrats, tho m1li tary and the emergent

business interests t1ere alarmed at the prospect o£ democra­

tisation of the system. They real.ised tllat the East Pakistan

political temperament 1f allot-ted to take roots - 't10uld provo to

be a serious threat to the ,sta:twt .mag.. And hence, through

pol.i.tical. intrigues East Pal~istani politicians were neutralised.

A. "reeker Awami League certain:Ly made the task easier.

Due to the split in both the ~rings the A\'1alll.i League

also lost much of 1 ts leverage in terms of opportunistic

alliances at tha centre p&'ticularly at a time t'lhen the~ ~;as

v1sib1e oppositJ.on to the O·ne U.ni.t in West Paltistan. Taking

advantage o£ the s1 tuat1on, Subra•·iardy \illS dismissed .from the

post of the Prime t-11n1ster. But as the lender o£ the AL he

still remair.ed a .forco to be reckoned \11th. In the .face o£

veheaent opposition :Led by Sullrawardy against the all-out

effort of the 1\'IL-Republiean coal.ition to re-introduce separate

electorates - Chundrigar hc.d to resign• o.nd the successor,

Feroze 1~ Noon, could continue on1y ~~th cooperntion from

70

the AL l.ed by Suhrawardy and supported by a section of the

m1nori ty community. To il:Lustrate i'Urthen In r1arch 1958

when the EP Governor F'azlul Haq dismissed the AL Ministry in

EP and inotall.ed Abu Uosein Sarkar or KSP as the Chief

t·linister. Suhrtlt-tardy compelled Noon to dismiss the n£!\!7

M.inistry and the Governor as well. Again in September 1958

Suhra~y eoul.d get a Central. Government Ordinance pl~mul­

gatcd in order to overrule the Election Commission• s judge­

ment de-seating six AL members in the EP Assembly. In

October 1958 at the instance of Suhrawardy again Noon had

to drop from his cabinet those members t-tho belonged to

opposi ticn parties in EP. 'l'hus Suhra.t1Brdy still. remaine-d a

factor in central pol.itics. But his t~Y itself, though

heading the coalJ.tion £1inlstl"'J in EP was in serious troubl.e

in the province.

After the spl1:t the AL lost support of about thirty

members in the BP Assembl.y ~lho had gone over to the NAP. Out­

side the Ass0mbly al.so there \'laS soma exodus. therei'ore, the

AL needed a1lies. Its negotiations w1th a section of the

KSP eou1d not fructify because of Suhra\mrdy . ., s um11Ul.in3nesb

to have the KSP in the AL coal.i tlon. 33 The I"hlal.im League and

others used the si tuo.tion to their benafi t by maligning AL

and Sulwa~rdy - attacking them mainl.y on the el.ectorate

issue. As tllis campaign gathered momentum UAP, l(oeping ita

33 For soma detail.a see Ataur Rahman Khan. 0,1rntir Dui .Bachhar (Dacca, 1972) • Third Reprint, pp. -'t; '!rengup'Ea, n. 6, PP• '51-4; Abal. !•lansur, n. 26, PP• 52o-2.5.

71

anti-AL stance intact. decided to support it in the EP Legis­

l.ature .for the tactica~ reason that it might hel.p continuance

of tho IUnistey till the elections. Lilte tho ALIJ NAP also

appt~ended the postponement af el.ect~ons through impos~tion

of section 92-A or section 93 on soma pretext. The ~bslim

League and others carried on their anti-AL (and anti-suhra\'rardy)

campaign all over the province. The foll.ot<ting summary based

on reports publ.ished in daUy Azad (a traditional. mouth-piece

of t.~ r-n.) indicates the trend of thia campaign.

Of the fifteen meetlngs of the t1uslim League reported

ba'btreen 1 January 1958 to 2 February 1958. held in Dacca.

f\iymensi.ngh0 Chittagong, Pabna, l'ongaU0 Syedpur, Rangpur,

Kishoroganj~ etc. aix were addressed by Nurul. Am1n, three

each by I<ti. Chundrigar and Fazlur Rahman 1n addition to Shah

AzizUr Rahman and other local 1eaders. As has al.ready been

mentioned, the main targets o~ attack were joint el.ectorate

and its upholders 11 viz., the AL and SUhra't.'ardy. Their moti­

vations were described as persona1 gains, pl.acating the Hindus•

establishment o£ Indo-Pak confederation (an international.

conspiracy).. The consequences \1ere described as wealtening

of the £oundation of Pakistan and denial. of ideal.s of the

Pakistan movement, destroying the "t\10 nations" theory, 1eaving

the balance o£ potrer in al.1 consti tuenci.es in the hands of

minoritJ.es (that is Hindus), re-establishment of Hindu don­

nation in EP • perpetuation of smuggl.ing• destruction of

Pakistan's economic structure. They tried to aliena-te a

section o£ Hindus from the AL by saying that joint e1ectorates

72

would mean schedu1ed caste and scheduled tribas domination

over caste Hindus. Though some of them accused AL and Suhrawardy

of placating tne Hindus some asserted that the HindUG themselves

favoured separate electorates. It t~s also alleged that the

EP Ministry was controlled by r.tanoranjan Dhar (a Hindu leader

then belonging to P.N. Congress). It was al.so pointed out

that the Ttlenty-one Points did not include joint el.eetorates

and hence AL had no rigllt to introduce them. The AL \'13S

charged tri.th favouring corruption among Government officials.

Its failure to solve the food problem, stop sDlllggling and

prevent recurrence of fioods ~ms al.so pointed out. ~loreover,

peopl.e l'tere reminded that it tzas the AL (and Suhrawardy) \'Jhich

opposed Pakistan being called UIG1amicu, ~elusion o£

traditiona1 Isl.runic provisions 1n the Constitution, education

based on Islam,. and even wanted constitutional provision

enabling a non-I>lusl.im to become the head of the state of

Paltistan and finally~ it did not even sign the Constitution.

Further, AL .~orking Committee had supported rule by Ordinance,

Suhratorardy had congratulated Ghulam l-iohanmtad £or dissolving

the Constituent Assembly and conspired to impose the proposed

undemocratic constitut~ona1 convent~on on the country. It

'\•mo also all.eged that East Pakistan• s economy was crumbl.ing

because of maladministration i'irst by the UF and then by the

AL, and that the AL al.ODB\d.th the Congress was trying to curb

po~ers o£ the Armed Forces 1n checking s111!Jggli.ns# that the

AL would stop religious education altogether and finally,

•

Suhra.tiardy ~:anted an autocrati.c system under his authority

and that his idea of na.tionalism and coneapt of the State were

based on materialist cu1ture and seculP-r political theories

of the \'lest and hence Pal~istan could not be safe Wlder

Subravrard.y' s care. 34 Such vi.l1f ieation.s continued even after

the Central Government announcement on 16 January 1958

ordering preparation of' el.ectoral. rolls on the basis of joint

o1ectorates. t~u1ana ~~udoodi of Jamaat-e-Islam1 toured East

Palt1atan for .forty-three days. On 31 January 1958 he spoke at

Dacca Pa1tan I"'aidan £or ~Jo and a half hours elaborating on

the evil.s of joint electorates - \·lbich \•Tare no different

£rom 'ttlho.t had earl.ier been said by his t-lusl.im League counter­

parta.'5 Maul.ana Atahar Al.i of Nezam-e-Is.lam also spoke in

the same ve1n on 1 February 1958 at Klshoreganj. 36

About the same time Bhashani toured West Pakistan.

On 3 February 1958 at Karachi he spoke of an anti-Awami

League Front - on the basis of independent and neutral. .foreign

pol.icy. 37 earlier the NAP General secretary. N.H. Usmani, at

a press conference in Dacca on 12 January 1958 bad blamed

Suhra\"mrdy for instigating East Pakistanis against the ·,·;est

Pakistania and so;,oting seeds of provinoial.ism by his utterances

34 For detai1a o£ speeches~ see Azad bet\~een 1 January and 2 February 1958.

36 Azad• 1 February 1958.

36 Ibid., 3 February 195B.

37 Ibid. • 4 February 1959.

74

like as!ting people at a bye-election nwet!ng about their

preference bet"reen bimsel.f, a Bengali and I.ftikharuddin, a

Punjabi, as their Prime Minister. Usmani, o£ course had

ear11er mentioned that rVU? ~auld support the coalition

Government for the timely hol.ding of election, but ~ould

stand by its opposition to the One U~t.3B On his return

BhashanJ. tol.d pressmen that no £air el.ection ~ou1d be posaibl.e

unl.ess the AL changed ita pol.icies. He al.so stressed the

need £or an a11-party conference to discuss economic isoues.39

Earl.ier, at a Peasants' conference at ~chart in Rangpur, he

had blamed the Provincial. Government for food shortage and

recurrence o£ f1oods.40

"hUe the AW31!11 League \!ISS being attacked by one

section for its stand on el.eetorates and branded anti-national,

and another section attacl~ed it for non-performance 1n easing

the economic situation, it had a special. meeting at Joydevpur

on 14-15 January 1958 and later organised a meeting on 21

February 19.58 nt Dacca Pa1tan Maiden to observe the Shaheed

Dibas (Martyrs* Day) presided over by lt1aul.ana Abdur Rashid

Tarltabagish, President EPAL. It \·ras addre·jsed by several

leaders. The Chief Minister, Ataur Rahman Khan, unamb1guous1y

stated that the demand .for regional. autononw \1aO the most

1mportant demand o£ EP. He mentioned that \.zhil.e the nnnua1

38 Ibid., 15 January 1958.

39 Ibi.d. • 14 February 1958.

40 :Ibi.d., 6 January 1958.

75

revenue of' \'Jest Pakistan bad increasad .from nineteen crores

to seventy erores, that of EP was on1y 1:\oronty-five croros;

the Central. Government had all the sources of revenue at their

disposal.- having ~es Tax, Tariff• ,ialt Tax, etc. umier their

control. He said with .t\11.1 reaional. autonomy many probl.ems of

EP would be solved. Repeating the demands for lteepi.ns only

defence~ external. affairs and currency with the Centre, he

appealed to the Centre to l.eave the avenues o£ incomes to

the province.. In conclusion he said that the martyrs did not

dedicate their lives £or a particul.ar larlgllage onl.y - they

sacrificed their lives for democratic demands concerning

national life; the J.ant!uage movement \'JaS one form o.f expression

only.41

Xt was a'bout this time that ld.thin the EPAL the

other crisis situation was accentuating apparently around

the long-standing con£l.1ct1ng vietTs of the Chiaf IU.n1ster

A taur Rahman Khan and the party• s General. Secretary Sheikh

~lbur Rahman on the role of the party organisation.

A'bul l''lansur, entrusted by Suhra~·rardy to solve the

probl.em, .found it to be a typi.eal. feud bet\1een the parl.iamen­

tary and organisational ~ngs accentuated by deeplY felt

convictions o£ the General. secretary. To Abu1 Ma..'"lSUr the

probl.em t1aa: "In the eyes of the secretary the District A\mmi

League is superior, to the Chie.f Minister the District

41 Ibid •• 22 February 1958.

76

r•lagistrate is superior. 42 Ataur Rahman, hcn-1evert i'e1t that

t•!ujib himseU tomnted to become the Chief rUnister and that the

~eud \~S an excuse to oust ~. He cites numerous instances

-..;hen party t-zorkers tried to infringe upon his own decision­

making power~ l.et alone day-to-day \10rki.ng of the district

official.s. 43 Ataur vzas certain th3t vlujib had mobUised a

section within the party t.o mal.ign lU.m and had been successful.

to the extent that Subrawardy doubted A taur• s credibil.ity

and wanted to replace him. Abul ~~ a~so testifies thQt

Suhra'ltmr(ly had toyed 't'li th the idea of repl.aeing A taur and

had him in mind but 4ropped it ~1hen he real.ised tht.i\t with

elect!.ons com~ close this woul.d be a '1rong strategy. 44

It is quite possible that Ataur had become more of

a liabUity than an asset due to the repercussions o£ the

Operat1on Closed Door (OCD) on Hindus and its unpopulari-ty

among a section o£ A\"lSllli Leaguers. OCD was instituted on

17 December 1957 \'then Ataur Rahman invited the Armed Forces

to check smusgl.ing in border areas of EP. This t-:as 1n clear

contravention of an earlier stand talten by the Atmmi Leagtte

against any intrusion o£ the Armed Forces 1n the civU

adm1nistration. Earl.ier, the UF Chief M1n.1ater, AbU Hosein

Sarkar" t'1as severe1y criti.cized .for calling 1n the ArlrfY to

42. Abul. Mansur. n~ 26• P• 550.

4;; Ataur, n. 33, pp. 113-225.

44 Abul. r-1ansur, n. 26~ PP• 551-4.

71

control. movement and distribution of .food. Smuggl.ing, it was

argued, '11ms a .fact that had deep-rooted economic factors

which could be removed either by legitimate border trade or

a rapid economic betterment of EP. But instead of t·rorking

to~m.rds such long-term so1utions the Chief r•tt.nister took

recourse to a doubtful corrective measure. It \"10ul.d appear

that his decision tlaS not independent of Central influence,

though he himself' denied this and shouldered all responsibi­

lity for the decision. And in spite o£ criticism from t~,

Congress and a section of the AL - both inside and outside

the Assembl.y - the Chie£ N1n1stor defended bJ.s decision tllOugll

he admitted that some excesses t-rere committed during the

operat1on.45

A taur mentions that he t"ms o£fe1~ed the Prime

Ministership by President M1rza.46 Probably President Mirza

was impressed \':ith Ataur' s open mind about the Armed Forces

and tried tO have a l1nl«1ge w1 th East Pakistan through him•

1f necessary.

Whatever ml&ht.have been the under~y1ng ~actors.

the intra-party :feud \1aS a wide~ discussed tssue - refl.ecting

further the cankerou.o state o£ the party structure.

Xn the East Pakistan Assembly, the A\romJ. League

t-ms veakened by de:feotS.ons to the i'lati.ona1 Awami Party (NAP)

at"ld w1 thdrawal. o£ Hindu support as a result o£ allegoo

45 Ataur• n. 33• PP• 266-74. 46 Ibid•, PP• 2.65-6, 296-9.

78

atrocities on Hindus during OCD administered by the Armed

Force a.

The situation enabled tlle l1ual.1m League to s.lmost

stage a comeback. For the £1rst time after the 1954 elections

could thG r.u.. hold a series o£ meetings in East Pakistan. Not

onl.y could the ukhunin (murderer) Hurul. Am1n speak at a meoting

for two and a hall' hours at Trishu1 in I•'lymensingh, he even

ehal.l~nged the AL to prove (no\·1 tlut they had access to records)

that he really \'inS respons1bl.e for the 1-tillings of 1952 for \·:hich

the At. had branded him as 0 lthuni0 • At the same mc:eting Abdus

.:.;attar alleged that, having come to pot!rer by coalescing t1ith

the Congress, AL ,,raa spendinll more money on repairing temples

than on mosques. 47 A few days lator• Abul. Kashem, Joint

Secretary o£ ML, openly said that AL .. ,,as obstructing devel.op­

ment o£ industries in ..:.P. 48

The NAP wa.s evi<lentl.y concerned at the trend set by

the t1L and Jel. but was unabl.e to resist it on its own. A

section of r~ ·.;as, therefore• in favour o£ a ~rorking alliance

withAL on the basis of a ten-point minimum programma,. Talis

was against tho exproased wish of Bhashani and the \1est

Pald..stani l..eaderahip-. But the deviationists t1ere determined not

to help the opposition 1n their efforts to disl.odge the AL

co~ition Ministry. Accord1ng1y, NAP abstained from voting on

22 March 1956 on a Government motion on Budget on Account for

47 Azad, 20 r-tarcb 1958.

4S Xbid., 16 March 1958.

79

the first three montllG and thus saved the Hinistry £rom a

certain defeat. 49 ·roo NA.P (Parliamentary Party) decided on

24 March. 1958 that although it t1~.!s a,:.ra.re o~ the anti-people

misdeeds of' tlle folinistry • to secure tile greater interest of

'tt1e country N..\P \·toul.d not endeo.vour to dislodge the a1n1stry

from powe1· :for that vroul.d pave tile ~my for th.e imposition of

·iection 193. causing delay to the coming el.ect1ons. 'l'he

meeting rcsol.ved to oppose any move by the 0 react1onary forces"

to dislod.ge the ~\in1stry and decided to continue its ncgotia-. 50 tions td.th the AL on tile basis o£ a ten-point progr-~.

Haji t1onamtro.d ~anesh o£ I~\!' defended his party• a

stand by defini.ng its role in the Assembly as ffi po51t1vi7 one

of steering the Government in tho right direction. It \.S.S

not, he saidp /fi. negat1"97 one o£ just dislodging the

. linistry. Ataur Rahman gratified, congratulated Ni\P for its

support.51 At this point even Bhas.hani himself issued a

statement from &.>anchbibi in Bogura asking tbe peopl.e to resist

the consp1racy for dismantling the AL coalition t11nistry.52

In its Parl.iamenta.ry Party meeting in Dacca on 30 t·'larch 1958

£ji\P reiterated its reso~ve and m1rned the people to rama1n

49 Ataur. n. 33, P• 28. Ray, n. 2, P• 145.

50 Azs.d, 26 March 1958.

51 .Speech b:l Danesh. in .EP Asseobl.y on 26 r-1arch 1959, and statement o~ Ataur Rahman, in Itte£ag, 27 March 1958.

52 See report of BhashanJ.' s speech titl.ed "~hal~ranter Birudelhe :t.u.'tth1a Uaran", lt7.efn.g 0 'Z7 t1arc.."l 1958.

80

vigUant and united and defeat the conspiracy hatched by

reactionary gorces to reintroduce separate electorates. This

meeting ~~ressed concern over the efforts to create political

1nstab111ty in the country by machination of reactionary )

£orces.5' But even the EP branch o:f the ~mP was not unnnimous.

une of its staltW.rts, Yar t'!ohammad Khan, once a prominent Auami

Leaguer of Dacca \'lho had beon a founder momuer of NA1:>, left

the party. In a state::wnt he accused iu\l-' lenders o£ being

opportunists D.nd coormmists. He ·.:1t1;; convinced that those

m~~mbors of the party tfrlo \>Tished the country \"roll \"rere innctlvep

and the active Ol'lGS ware using Bnas:lS.ni for their Ot"m er.d onl.y

to thrO'l'l l11m att1ay once their purpose \'l3S served. He CilB.rged

that the NAP ~ras not meant for "c~ea.n politics" and \10ul.d "do

more harm to Paki ;tan than any other political partyn. 54

It seems that organisationally, the N,\P ·:as so t1eak

that .for sheer tactical. reasons, if not £or anyt~1ing else,

the NAP was compelled to have some linkage td.tb the AL.,

Nevertheless, 1t tried to project itsei£ as the AL's saviour.

'.i.'he Atromi League's troubl.os were many. The AL M1n1stry was

l.oaing its foothol.d in tne EP Assembly; intra-party

aquabbl.ings t"1ere gaining 1n dimension; the 1'-lusl.im League t-ma

trying, in its o~m way. to 'l'liden its base. Above all,

;3uhra,·1ardy • the onl.y natJ.onal l.eader o£ the party was sub­

jected to severe criticism- some o£ ... m.tcll were for ap;,Jarentl.y

53 Azad,, 31 ~larCh 1958.

54 .rttefaq, 29 i"arch 1958.

81

valid reasons. Still, many ~ast Pal<tist:mis dei'ected from

their parties to join the AL. And interestingly, most of

them did so because the;,r perceived the AL as 5uhra\1ardy' s

party and believed that it could ensure progress. The l.eader­

ship \'laS credited \'lith dedication,. forobearance and self­

lessness. It is interesting to note that during tile first

quarter of 1958 at l.eaat 4,000 ~st Pakistanis joined tlle

At'truni League for these qualities. K'iost o£ them came £rom

the KSP .tol.lot·red by IIAL and i·u\P. ·rhoy waro politicnl. t·;orkcrs,

social. 1:1orkers, doctors. lawyers, teachers, and businessmen

.from the fo~l.O"ttting districts: Chi ttaGong, ilacca, .Jyl.hat,

.tymensingh, Faridpur~> Noalthal..i, Jessoro, Khul.na, Dogura and

aa.risal. (not yet a district). l~orth Dengal. vro.s not reportedly

represented 1n the above. North Bengal., 1 t should be noted

had been t:ne l.eust developed area of i:4st Pai.d.stan and lacked

communicat.ion £acUities with the rest of the pl't()Vince.

Bhashani had a comparativel.y ntronger ho~d over this area

mainly because o£ h1s peasant-conacioua activities.

The 4,217 who reported~y joined the AL during this

period put £o~~ about ~1enty reasons for their op~ion and

~ubrawardyts ~eadersbip scored the maximum• c1ose1y fo11o~

by a be11af that onl.y the Awami League could ensure the

progress oZ the country on desired l.ines and that the A\.;ami.

League 1eadersh1p cou1d be ro11ed on for its sacrifices and

:forebea.ranoe.55

55 See Tables and·Charts II.1.

82

During the same period the AL was al.so reported to

have been establ.ishing branches, havtng \'torkers• conferences,

electing oi'fice-bearers" forminu Avrami volunteer corps at

di.fferent local. l.evels like the ward, t:ilalla, union and sub­

divisions.56 Besides, 3Ubra\·mrdy himsel.£ undertook c:-xtensive

tours~ edclressing public meetings. Bettroen :1arch 1957 and

February 1958 tlle £.PAL won five out a€ six by-elections in

Bast ?akistan.57

It may also be mentioned that during the same period

no such party•builcling activities t-tere reported about other

parties operating in EP - not even by their oZ£ictal./unoffic1al

mouthpieces. They seemed mostl.y busy in addressing meetings

all over the province creating an impression that they \~re

outmanoeuvering the AwamJ. League. The Central. Government•s

rating of the parties can somewhat be gauged from a party-~tise

brealtup of Import Licence quotas £or cars al.lotted to parties

in July 1958.58 In this AL "ras bracketed tlith l,.lL and Republican

Party - the parties running tho Central Government at the time

though it i.s intriguing to note that the Republ.ican Party td.th

no base 1n EP 't<taa a~so a~lotted a quota equal. to that of ML

and AL in EP.

56 l>'or details see Ittet'ag, 1 Jc.muary 1958 to 2B March 1958.

57 Dal'tn~ 31 f1arch and 4, 5? 23 December 19.57 and 6 February ana 1 t•brch 1958.

58 See Tabl.es and Charts II.2.

83

There was a third dimension to the A\-rami League-o s

problems~ It ~m.s no secret that the Governor of EP, Fazlul Haq,

thou[;h he \ms not su·,~posed to dobb1e in party pol.i ties - \•Tas

tryinG very much to operate polS. tically through the KSP • So,

uhen the Chief .r.:an1ster belonging to the AL advised him to

proro@le the J\ssemb1y on 30 P.areh 1958 the Governor bastUy

dismissed the Chief ~istor on the pl.eu that the CM no l.onger

cor.m!nlVled confidence of the House. Simultaneousl.y Abu aosein

Sarltar of KSP tms a;pointed the ~hie£ I1inister on '1 March

1958. But Suhra~~y•s indispensability for the Noon Ilinistry•s

survival resuscitated the Ataur I·linistry in EP.

was di.smissed and tlle Act1n6 Governor, the Chief secretary o£

EP, a CSP of'fieer, dismissed Abu Hosein on 1 April 1958 and

re-appointed the previous (Ataur) f.Jinistry. The same day a

confidence motion in Ataur r11nistry movQd by Muj1b and seconded

by Mallmut1 Al.i o£ NAP was passed l1i tb 182 votes in favour.

117 against• and ten members abstaining. Presumably, Fazlu1

Haq• s endeavour t-Jas to outtt11t At-rami League's e.fforts to bpy

time for reaching an agreement t·Tith NAP and 'thus stabUiae its

position. He was stalled by a Suhrawardy-Noon entente. But

the AL-iMP understanding al.so did not fructi.fy. As a result

HAP \'li thdre\., 1 ts support to the ru.nistry 't1hich lost on a cut

motion on 19 June 1958. The K..:JP r11n1stry took o£t'1ce o:nl.y to

be defeated in a no-confidence motion on 22 June 1959. Tab1ed

by Hujib and supported by l'lAP, it \'Tcls passed vtith 156 in .favour

and 142 against. Section 193 t-ras imposed but :LUted on 25

84

August 1958 foll.o~ing a demand from al.l quarters and Ataur \llaS

re-insta~l.ed as Cr-t. But, as both A taur and Abul. Mansur say,

meam1hUe 3uhratmrdy had almost conceded to a factional. demand

to repl.ace A taur; he to-Tas retained only as a stop-gap arrange­

ment til.l. the el.eotions and ~tas not oven consulted for prepa­

ration of the min1ster1a1 list.59

Resuming power for the third time within a period of

one year• Ataur Rahman found the province agitated over the

fall 1n jute prices and the rise 1n prices of essential commo­

dities. In Dacca there ,-;ere demonstrations demanding his

resignatlon if he failed to bring do~~ prices. reachers of

privately run school.s and collegGs were on hunger strike

demanding enhanced Dearness Allot~ance, etc. 60

Agitation ~or economic distress was nothing netot in

EP. But with the general. el.ect1ons round the corner such a

situation was alarming Kor any party seeking to return to povrer.

Under the circumstances even remaining 1n power tJ.U the

el.ections uas doubtfu1 because o£ uncertain allies. The

tension thus created \-."BS further hightened by a hoatUe Speaker

of the provincial. legislature~ The Speaker reported1y had

al.\mys been a troubl.e malter for the Government. P.1embers from

both the Treasury and Opposition benches had wanted to brtns

a no-confidence motion against h1m for his (unsuccessful.)

attempts to get sanetion £or increased expenditure £or his

59 Abul. l\7ansur. n .. 26, PP• 551-6, and Ataur, n. 33, pp. 302-6.

60 Ataur. n. 33, PP• 306-8.

85

secretariat and enact legislation giving him more p~rors. In

June 1958 Suhra,-rardy stal.l.ed it. In Au,cust the move \ro.s

resumed, but without the Opposition's co-operation.

Opposition• s xol.te .face ,,.-as, hOl'Jever, not unexpected. It \iSS

\1idely believed that whUa returning £rom abroad the Spealter

had met the President and had received certain 1nstruotions.61

~iith the Budget for three quarters stUl. to be passed the

Opposition '.tmB trying to toppl.e the Ministry, create a dead­

lock de1aying elections - a situation that would have been

\'IC lcomed by Mirza. Reportedly some KSP members also \'Janted

to settle persona1 scores.62

The process o£ discredittng the Ministry started on

20 Septee1ber with a demand £or expel.11ng six AL members from

the House, as they held public offices and \iere declared

ineligibl.e by the ~lection Commission. But the position was

not ciear because the Central Government by a special ordinance

had set aside the El.ection Commission• s verdict. The Spealter

reserved his ruling tUl 23 September and a1so d1salJ.ovred NAP

member De\•ran f'iahbub Alit s no-confidence motion against him.

~-.hen in the midst of confUsS.on created by physical violence

the Speaker left the House. the Deputy Speaker Sbahed All,

an r\warn~ Leaguer took over. Mahbub Ali • s motion and another

one proposed by Peter Paul Gomes o£ PI-le ( r-'Ianoranjan Dhar

61 For deta11s see. ibid •• PP• 307-9.

62 Ray. n. 21 p. 148.

86

group) declaring the Spcalter insano, t.~rc passed amidst con­

fusicn.6'

Just as the Oppoai tlon demand tTas not so much in

deference to the sanctity of the Election Co~isslon's verdict

as to expl.o1 t the si tuatlon to reduce the AL strength in the

House. the AL also, using its leverage at the Centre, utilised

the Ordinance £or its own purpose and thereby undermined the

authority of the Election ~ommiss1on- t·lhich is very much an

essential part of democratic .tunct1on1ng. It al.so exposed • the hollo~r;nass of both the political system and the gove~

mental structure in Pakistan.

By 23 September, the AL had boen able to purchase

au,Jport from some KSP members. Reduced 1n numerical. strength,

the Opposition took r·:·course to phystc.-"ll strength and tried to

prevent the Acting Speaker Shahed Ali (an Awami Leaguer) £rom

.functioning. Chairs cmd other handy objects were hurled at

him. ne was injured and talten to hospital.. Another member

on the panel o£ Chairmen, Ziaul. Hasan~ carried on the business

o£ tho !iouse \>thich \'12S prorogued the next day. Shahed Al.i

died of mal t1ple injuries on the 26th. Opposition members ~1ho

were arrested for rowdyism in the House were freed on bail.. 64

Abul. tJiansur l.aments, "Sh.ahed Ali died by the brickbats of the

Opposition whil.e de~ending the At~ League. Yet enemies of

East Bengal. said - and still say - it \'lt\S the Awami League

63 For detail.s see ibid •• p. 149. and lttefag, and Pakiatgn Obserycr {Dacca) ~t 21 Se?tembor 1958.

64 Ray, n .. 2o PP• 149-50; sengupta, n. 6, PP• 411-13.

87

that kUl.ed Shnhed Al.i. n He calls it nfnl.so al.l.egation" • 6S

nut the Awami League cannot bo absolved of certa~ responsibi­

lity for the t:Tay tho situation \'JUS developing over the past

few months. It ~ms made more fluid by the erratic functioning

of ;;he tiAP. AnY\·ny, ~'lis tragic episode \138 al.leged to have

been the main reason for the subsequent fiJ.artio.l Law. But 1n

bet\-1een Noon~ al:legedly in:~tigatecl by President Mirza0

cajoled the AwamJ. League into aceer)ting ministerial posts at the

Centre. By accepting this the Atm.mi League again \·:ent against

its ow.n earlier decision. This could be interpreted as its

being vul.nerabl.e to designs by the pot·Ter el.ite. But taktns

into consideration the aspirations of the A~nuni League leader­

ship as symbolised by Suhrawardy to evolve a national consensus

for even regionul. issues it could be interpreted as an

expression of flexibility needed fer resolution of intra­

societal cleavages. The fact \1US that all politicnl parties of

Pakistan frequently Changed their stands to suit limited

purposes. For exarnpl.e. the EP-NAP alternatively supported

and o,-,posed directly and/or indirectly- the AL Ministry 1n

EP; the Muslim League all o£ a sudden b~e a critic of

Paltistan• G pro-·~·: est .foreign policy. U the A\•raml League under

Suhratmrdy• s l.endorship was responsibl.e for cre::1t1ns a

chaotic situation d.ue to mishandl.ing o.f various isauos that

hastened the subsequent m111tarisat1on of the system, the

as

l"luslim League undar the leadership o£ Khan Abdul. aayyum Khan

was equally responsibl.e f'or 1 t by projecting an out-of­

proportion rebellious stance. The situation became the more

unmanageable because in N\'IFP and 31nd the anti-one Unit

congregation of leaders of various shades like Ghaffar Khan,

G.t-1. 5ayed, t•1d. Ayub Khuro, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, Pir Pasaro

and Pir of t·ianki Shari£ t-ras becoming stronger. In Baluchistan

the Khan of Kalat became openly rebel.lious. All these taken

togother \'fare al,arm1ns for a Head o£ state Who neither had

any p·ol1 tical. support base nor legi tlmaoy, but sti.ll aspired

to Il13intain the stnt,uq .m!2.• Taking advantage of the chaotic

political situation, be imposed Nartial Lat,t, abrogated the

Constitution, clissol.ved. National and Provincial Assemblies,

dismissed a.ll. f-1inistera, banned poli't1ca1 parties and even

froze their assets and defended his preemptive action by

saying, "I have no sanction of latr or o£ Constitution. I

have onl..y the sanction of nw consoience.n66 Tal.ukdar

t4aniruzzaman attributes this to the 0 laclt o£ commitment to

the democratic process by a. smal.l. group of elite who gathered

aroun.1 President r'11rza", and concludes by saying: "If £ree

e1ections had been held in 1957 or at least in early 1958,

be.fo.re the political. rot set in, the popular support of tha

~10 major parties ffihs.t is, AWclmi League and Musl1m Le~!fl.7

66 ~..ruoted from ~~ (London), 20 October 1958, in Saleem M.M. Qureshi~arty Politics ~ the Second Republic o~ Pakistan", f11dp.r Eaat J ~~ ( ~.~ashir1gton), vol.. 209 no. 4, AutUmn 966, pp. ~2.

89

woul.d have been rei'lectecl 1n the Assemblies and the interven­

tion of the A~ could thus have been averted.n67 Dut it

appears that President Mirza and company could deliberately

bypass this obvious solution simply by taking advantage of

the lack o~ societal cohesion ref1ected 1n the lopsided

management of politics by the avaUabl.e political leader­

ship.

In the nascent state of Paltistan, tha complex task

of state and nati~building ~ms further complicated b,y the

negative character of the Pakistan movement, Pakistan• s

divided geography, the dUference 1n stages of pol.J..tical.

consciousness of di£ferent regions and the background and

composition of Paltistan' s ruling elJ..te. And these coul.d not

be handled skil.£ull.y towards a solution by the avaUable

leadarsh!.p. Therefore, the fundamental natura of the polity

stil.l. remained uncl.ear. From the military point of Vie'tr

this \'ras an unhappy and critical situation. Consequentl.y, in

the Armed Fox~es personal and or~sational aspirations

mingled and converged \'lith that o:f the bureaucracy and the

emergent business community. And the resul. ting entente tool-t

PClkistan a l.ong t:my from a democratic-federal. structure -

something ~hat the Awami League and some other pol1tica1

parties bad set as their goa1.

67 Maniruzzaman, n. 29. P• 138.