In the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) realized the danger of relying on foreign Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) sys-

tems for military operations. In 1986, former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping initiated Plan 863 to promote satellite navigation technology as one of the key proj-ects in aerospace development. Concerns about rely-ing on foreign PNT systems proved to be well-found-ed in the mid-1990s during the third Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996, as ballistic missiles launched

by the CCP in an e-ort to in.uence voters in Taiwan’s presidential election became disconnected and failed to hit their targets due to interruptions in US GPS signals. /is incident was a great humiliation for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and it strengthened the Beijing authorities’ determination to develop their own satellite navigation and positioning systems. In 2003, China accepted the European Union’s invitation to join the Galileo satellite navigation system. Due to security concerns and other di-erences, however, it

Chris Liu is a PhD student at the Graduate Institute of China Military A!airs Studies, National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at sirhc885new@gmail.com

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Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 46 (June, 2020)

Satellite Supremacy

Deployment of BeiDou satellites sharpens threat from People’s Liberation Army Chris Liu

Artist’s rendition of the GPS Block IIF interim satellite, used to keep the Navstar Global Positioning System operational.

photo: NASA

was excluded from the program, and so China em-barked on its own satellite navigation system.

Arrows and satellites

/e BeiDou-1 project was launched in 1994. In 2000, the CCP launched two satellites into geostationary or-bit to provide positioning, timing, wide area augmen-tation, and short message communication services to users in China. In 2003, a third geostationary satellite was launched. In 2004, construction began on the BeiDou-2 system, and in November 2012, BeiDou-2 began to provide users with regional positioning ser-vices in the Asia-Paci2c area. /e BeiDou-2 system contains 16 satellites with six geostationary satellites, six tilted geosynchronous orbit satellites, and four medium earth orbit (MEO) satellites. In 2019, the CCP implemented a high-density launch of “seven arrows and ten satellites.” All MEO satellites in the BeiDou-3 complex completed networking, and the

core constellation of BeiDou-3 was fully deployed. In June of 2020, China launched its last geostationary satellite into orbit. At this point, the BeiDou-3 system was truly completed, and China has now entered a new era of global service.

With the completion of the BeiDou navigation satel-lite system (BDS), the CCP’s satellite navigation and positioning technology will be integrated with geo-graphic information, Internet of things, big data, mo-bile communication, and other technologies, provid-ing more comprehensive services. It is estimated that in 2035, a comprehensive positioning, navigation, and timing system will be built with the BeiDou system

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photo: Michael Kleiman

A Minotaur I rocket lifts o! carrying the TacSat-2 micro satellite as well as NASA’s GeneSat-1 spacecraft.

´,Q�DUHDV�ZLWK�PRUH�VHYHUH�&29,'�ೂ�outbreaks, hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles used the BeiDou system to pre-cisely deliver urgently needed medical and anti-pandemic materials.“

6 E STRATEGIC VISION

at its core.Currently, the BeiDou system is already helping

China in a wide variety of areas. /e swi3 construc-tion of Huoshenshan and Leishenshan hospitals in Wuhan during the CCP’s 2ght against COVID-19 were aided by the BeiDou system’s ability to provide accurate positioning information. In areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles used the BeiDou system to precisely deliver urgently needed medical and anti-pandemic materials. /e Ministry of Transport also continued to broadcast information on the pandemic to more than six million vehicles through BeiDou terminals, which are connected to the national public supervi-sion and service platform for road freight vehicles, providing information on road conditions and trans-portation services. Faced with rapid growth in logis-tics and distribution pressure, hundreds of thousands of BeiDou terminals across China have also joined the work of anti-pandemic logistics.

/e BDS is critical to the PLA’s information war-

fare and global deployment capabilities. Without its own global navigational satellite network, it would be di4cult for the PLA’s various strategic and tactical missiles to accurately strike their targets at medium and long distances.

During the CCP’s 19th National Congress in 2017,

General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that the army should be equipped with the ability to win an in-formation warfare campaign by 2035. /is goal was originally proposed by former leader Jiang Zemin, and the schedule was set at the middle of this century. Xi Jinping moved the goal 15 years ahead, and seeks to use these 15 years to build the PLA into a world-class 2ghting force. Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping both set this current year (2020) as the key year for laying

A DF-5B intercontinental ballistic missile on display during a parade held in front of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2015.

“The BDS has an indispensable strategic importance for the PLA’s informatization and global combat capability development.“

photo: Voice of America

a solid foundation for military informatization. /e most important achievement of informatization this year was the completion of the BDS and its ability to provide global coverage. As the coverage range of the BDS expands, the distance and frequency at which the PLA’s naval and air forces can be projected out-wards will increase accordingly, and the precision strike capabilities of its missiles will increase as well. /e BDS has an indispensable strategic importance for the PLA’s informatization and global combat ca-pability development.

Joint operations backbone

/e CCP proposed the goal of army reform and modernization in its 3rd Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. /e goal is closely related to the CCP’s ability to achieve modernized joint opera-tions. /e C4ISR system forms the backbone of the

joint operations’ command mechanism, of which the most critical is the use of space-based systems for reconnaissance.

/e PLA’s Strategic Support Force operates and oversees space systems. /e terminal equipment of the system can be installed on various platforms on land, sea, and air and provide positioning infor-mation including latitude, longitude, and time in a standard format, and then upload information to the joint operations command center at all levels to form a common image of the battle2eld. Such an im-age is used as the basis for military commanders to make decisions. A3er the BDS completes its regional and global formation, the joint combat capabilities of the PLA’s various branches will be strengthened even further.

China’s BDS system not only meets the country’s own needs but also provides an option for other coun-tries, especially those that are not allies of the United

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A ‘smokey’ surface-to-air missile is launched during training, giving o! a distinct heat signature for realistic evasion training for pilots.

photo: Ian McMahon

States. /erefore, the BDS system can also enhance China’s relations with other countries and strengthen its military diplomacy.

In addition to the BDS system, China’s other satellite systems, such as those for reconnaissance and com-munications, are growing rapidly in terms of both quality and quantity. /e CCP has demonstrated a determined attitude to surpass Russia and catch up with the United States in its development and deploy-ment of space-based systems.

Taiwan’s so!-kill capability

In response to improvements in China’s military satellite capability, Taiwan has developed a num-ber of countermeasures. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) has developed a so3-kill capability, which is able to jam GPS and BDS signals.

Important military facilities in Taiwan, including the Armed Forces Joint Operations Command Center and the Jiashan Base in Hualien, are all equipped with de-

vices designed to prevent PLA ballistic missiles from hitting their targets. In addition to jamming BeiDou signals, Taiwan’s armed forces can send out false sig-nals to confuse the CCP’s satellite positioning system and make its missiles hit false targets, so that damage can be reduced. Moreover, in view of the fact that PLA satellites can carry out reconnaissance at any time above Taiwan’s key military installations, the NCSIST has produced a synthetic aperture radar satellite coun-termeasure system to degrade China’s reconnaissance abilities. When PLA satellites pass over Taiwan’s strate-gic bases, the synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance and detection vehicles will detect the frequency band. High-frequency and low-frequency synthetic aperture radar jamming vehicles will then be deployed to coun-ter and jam the signals. /is will hamper or prevent the PLA from obtaining usable imagery of sensitive military sites and areas in Taiwan. In terms of hard-kill capability, Taiwan’s forces can use their arsenal of Wan Chien, or Ten /ousand Swords, air-to-ground cruise missiles, produced by the NCSIST, to neutralize BeiDou support stations in China.

US Air Force’s Communications/Navigation Outage Forecast System (C/NOFS).

photo: NASA

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With the completion of the BDS system, China’s military power will only continue to grow. Taiwan must take concrete steps to strengthen its space ca-pabilities by deepening military cooperation with the United States, Japan, and other countries that have a vested interest in preventing a Chinese take-over of Taiwan. In particular, Taiwan must improve its ability to conduct reconnaissance, which would enhance its ability to conduct strikes against the en-emy, and develop satellite jamming and other anti-satellite systems.

Secondly, in response to the PLA’s growing num-ber of long-range satellite-guided weapons, the BDS will be the PLA’s only long-range weapon guidance system. It is estimated that the CCP’s Dongfeng mis-siles, long-range missiles, anti-ship missiles, some air force air-to-air missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles will be fully converted to the BDS. Taiwan should mitigate the PLA’s o-ensive capabilities by developing advanced jamming systems, which will

decrease the accuracy and e-ectiveness of the PLA’s satellite-guided weapons.

Furthermore, satellite combat and anti-jamming exercises must be added to actual military exercises and computer-driven wargaming to strengthen the professional skills of military o4cers and soldiers. In response to enemy threats and warfare capabilities, Taiwan’s military must develop its electronic warfare units, navigation and countermeasure equipment construction, education, and training.

Taiwanese education o4cials should also promote 2elds like aerospace. Only by strengthening people’s understanding and support of aerospace technol-ogy, and by integrating R&D talent and resources, can schools e-ectively cultivate the expertise that the nation needs. Currently, the government has not yet set a clear direction for the cultivation of aerospace talent. Government and industry should work to-gether to develop and retain local talent in the aero-space sector. Q

Chinese rockets and space vehicles on display at a military museum.photo: Gary Todd

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