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Practice and Prospects for Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) in the UK:
Improving Non-Statutory Coastal Governance through
Collaboration
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the
University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Lynne McGowan Department of Civic Design
May 2011
i
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to critically assess the implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the wider context of coastal planning regimes in order to develop a more effective model of collaboration for coastal governance.
This research is set within the context of a complex system of rights and responsibilities which dominate governance of the UK coastline. Within this system of governance, ICZM stands out as a means of adopting a joined-up approach towards the many different interests in coastal areas – both on the land and at sea. However the implementation of ICZM has traditionally been weak - without statutory powers ICZM has suffered from a voluntary approach to implementation, being delivered through bodies collectively known as coastal or estuary partnerships. Coastal partnerships are highly participatory in nature, but can only deliver limited outcomes due to the lack of national coastal policies, and deficits in financial and human resources. In addition, as the Marine and Coastal Access Act and Water Framework Directive come into full legal force, with overlapping jurisdictions in the coastal zone, this raises questions for the future role of non-statutory coastal and estuary partnerships.
The research therefore addresses the problems of ICZM in two ways. First, considering ICZM in the wider context of coastal planning regimes, attention is given to the way that the problems of the coast are socially constructed. This is achieved by comparing the social construction of coastal, marine and river catchment problems using the prerequisites outlined by John Hannigan for the social construction of an environmental problem. Whilst identifying limitations in Hannigan’s model regarding the influence of certain conditions in constructing a problem, and the model’s inability to explain progress from problem definition to implementation of a solution, most significantly, it has been found organisations which are able to define a problem also dominate in the proposal and implementation of solutions. Therefore, as the “coastal problem” is subject to ambiguous definitions in which issues of the land and sea are not considered together, this has resulted in weaknesses in addressing coastal problems at the national level.
Secondly, in addressing the ways that ICZM implementation could be improved, the communicative planning approach outlined by Patsy Healey and the model of inter-organisational collaboration developed by Barbara Gray are identified as providing conditions that would enable greater integration of stakeholders within coastal partnerships, through for example open dialogue, joint learning and consensus building, and more importantly, facilitating the integration of ICZM and other coastal governance regimes. Using case studies from ICZM, Marine Planning and River Basin Management, it has been shown that by adapting Hannigan and Gray’s models into a cycle of collaborative policy making, building consensus on the nature of the problem at an early stage in decision making fosters a greater sense of ownership and willingness to participate amongst stakeholders in collaborative arrangements.
Finally, it is recommended that in trying to improve the implementation of ICZM, greater attention is given to the communication of scientific evidence in simpler, more engaging terms to build greater consensus on the nature of coastal problems, and that the model of collaborative policy making is used to help stakeholders understand the benefits of collaborative working and ensure that the right conditions are in place to aid collaboration and consensus at each stage of decision making.
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Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i
Contents ............................................................................................................................................ ii
List of Figures, Tables and Maps ......................................................................................................... v
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................................................. vii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Continued ................................................................................ viii
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER 1: Introducing the Challenge of Coastal Management in the UK ............................................1
1.1 Research Context ................................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 The Research Problem/Conceptual Framework ................................................................................. 5
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives ............................................................................................................ 18
1.4 Research Strategy and Thesis Structure ........................................................................................... 19
1.5 Overview of Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................ 19
1.6 A Note on Terminology ..................................................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 2: the Key to Integration in ICZM - the Need for a Collaborative Approach .......................... 25
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 25
2.2 Context: On the Meaning of Management ....................................................................................... 26
2.3 On the Meaning of Integration ......................................................................................................... 30
2.4 The Critique of Rational Planning and the Communicative Turn ..................................................... 39
2.5 Communicative Action and Coastal Planning Regimes ..................................................................... 48
2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 53
CHAPTER 3: Exploring the Social Construction of Coastal Management Problems .............................. 55
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 55
3.2 Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Environmental Problems ....................................... 56
3.3 the Social Construction of the “Coastal Problem” and Planning Regimes as a Response ................ 62
iii
3.4 Analysis – Drivers for the Social Construction of Different Planning Regimes ................................. 85
3.5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 95
CHAPTER 4: A Collaborative Model of Policy Making for Integrated Coastal Zone Management ......... 97
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 97
4.2 Models of the Policy Process ............................................................................................................ 98
4.3 a Collaborative Perspective on the Policy Cycle ............................................................................. 118
4.4 A synthesis model of collaborative policy making .......................................................................... 130
4.5 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 135
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY – Putting Collaboration into Practice: a Framework for Evaluating
Collaboration in Coastal Planning Regimes ..................................................................................... 137
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 137
5.2 Data Collection Strategy: a Case Study Approach .......................................................................... 139
5.3 Review of Coastal Organisations and Initiatives ............................................................................. 141
5.4 Data Collection ................................................................................................................................ 154
5.5 Case Study Protocol ........................................................................................................................ 164
5.6 Pilot Study ....................................................................................................................................... 165
5.7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 171
CHAPTER 6: Stakeholder Perspectives on the Nature of the “Coastal Problem” ................................ 172
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 172
6.2 Introduction to Case Studies ........................................................................................................... 173
6.3 Findings – Questionnaire Reporting and Interviews ....................................................................... 182
6.4 Analysis – Problem Recognition ...................................................................................................... 184
6.5 Analysis – Factors Contributing to Problem Recognition ............................................................... 204
6.6 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 210
CHAPTER 7: Incorporating Stakeholder Perspectives and Improving Integration through Collaboration
...................................................................................................................................................... 214
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 214
7.2 Consensus Building ......................................................................................................................... 216
iv
7.3 Exploring Options ............................................................................................................................ 234
7.4 Decision Making .............................................................................................................................. 249
7.5 Structuring and Implementation .................................................................................................... 259
7.6 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 269
CHAPTER 8: Conclusions: Reflections on Collaboration in Coastal Planning Regimes ........................ 279
8.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 279
8.2 Research Summary: Review of Aim and Objectives ....................................................................... 279
8.3 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 285
8.4 Recommendations .......................................................................................................................... 289
8.5 Reflections on the Methodology .................................................................................................... 297
8.6 Further Research ............................................................................................................................. 299
8.7 Final Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 300
References ..................................................................................................................................... 302
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................. 321
Appendix A: List of Coastal Organisations in the UK ........................................................................ 322
Appendix B: Online Questionnaire .................................................................................................. 335
Appendix C: List of Interviewees ..................................................................................................... 343
Appendix D: Questionnaire Responses ........................................................................................... 344
v
List of Figures, Tables and Maps
Figures
1.1 Geographical and Legal Jurisdictions in the Coastal Zone................................................ 4
1.2 The Framework of Coastal Management in England....................................................... 9
1.3 Summary of Thesis Structure........................................................................................... 21
2.1 Example of a tiered coastal management planning hierarchy......................................... 28
2.2 Nature of Property and Government Interests and Institutions in Coastal/Ocean
Areas................................................................................................................................
34
3.1 Overlapping Coastal Planning Regimes........................................................................... 62
3.2 The Case for a Coastal Problem: Contributions to the Construction of Claims in ICZM.. 92
3.3 Differing Levels of Agenda............................................................................................... 94
4.1 The Policy Process as a System of Inputs and Outputs.................................................... 101
4.2 The ICZM Policy Cycle...................................................................................................... 102
4.3 The ICOM Policy Cycle...................................................................................................... 103 4.4 The Continuing MSP Planning Cycle................................................................................ 105
4.5 Cycles of River Basin Management Planning................................................................... 105
4.6 The Collaborative Policy Making Cycle............................................................................ 134
6.1 Questionnaire Response – Scientific Evidence................................................................ 187
6.2 Questionnaire Response – Endorsement of Evidence..................................................... 187
6.3 Questionnaire Response – Champions/popularisers....................................................... 193
6.4 Questionnaire Response – the Media and Dramatic Incidents……………………………………. 195
6.5 Questionnaire Response – Economic Incentives............................................................. 197
6.6 Questionnaire Response – Outcomes of Previous Initiatives.......................................... 201
6.7 Questionnaire Response – Stakeholders Highlighting Problems and Solutions............... 203
6.8 Contributions to Claims for Coastal, Marine and Catchment Problems.......................... 213
7.1 Questionnaire Response - Reaching a General Consensus.............................................. 218
7.2 Questionnaire Response – Competing Jurisdictions as a Barrier to Integration.............. 219
7.3 Questionnaire Response – Inclusion of Stakeholders...................................................... 225
7.4 Questionnaire Response – Proposal of Partnership Working.......................................... 230
7.5 Questionnaire Response – Policy Proposals.................................................................... 236
7.6 Questionnaire Response – Institutional Arrangements................................................... 236
7.7 Questionnaire Response: Core Goals and Bargaining………………………………………………….. 240
7.8 Questionnaire Response – Increased Use of Joint Working…………………………………………. 243
7.9 Questionnaire Response – the Uneven Dispersal of Powers……………………………………….. 245
7.10 Questionnaire Response – Consensus and Coordination…………………………………………….. 251
7.11 Questionnaire Response – Public Sector Sponsors.......................................................... 254
7.12 Questionnaire Response – Legitimacy of Lead Organisation……………………………………….. 254
vi
List of Figures Continued.
7.13 Questionnaire Response – Windows of Opportunity…………………………………………………… 256
7.14 Questionnaire Response – Legal Frameworks................................................................. 261
7.15 Questionnaire Response – Allocation of Responsibilities………….…………………………………. 261
7.16 Questionnaire Response – the Plan Making Process....................................................... 264
7.17 Questionnaire Response – Financial Commitment.......................................................... 266
7.18 Questionnaire Response: Measures Becoming More Commonplace.............................. 267
8.1 The Collaborative Policy Making Cycle, Revised ............................................................. 288
List of Tables
4a Problem Solving and Stages of the Policy Cycle....................... 106 4b Conditions facilitating inter-organisational collaboration........ 127 4c Stages of the Policy cycle and collaboration............................ 131
5a Problem Recognition................................................................ 157 5b Consensus Building................................................................... 158 5c Exploring Options..................................................................... 159 5d Decision Making....................................................................... 160 5e Structuring and Implementation.............................................. 161
6a Summary of Questionnaire Completions by Planning Regime. 182
6b Questionnaire Responses for Problem Recognition................. 186
7a Consensus Building – Propositions……………………………………….. 216 7b Questionnaire Responses for Consensus Building………………… 217 7c Exploring Options – Propositions............................................. 234 7d Questionnaire Responses for Exploring Options...................... 235 7e Decision Making – Propositions……………………………………………. 249 7f Questionnaire Responses for Decision Making…………………….. 250 7g Structuring and Implementation – Propositions…………………… 259 7h Questionnaire Responses for Structuring and
Implementation…………………………………………………………………… 260
Maps
A Dorset Coast Forum Area.................................................... 147 B Severn Estuary Partnership Management Area.................. 148 C East Grampian Coastal Partnership Management Area...... 149 D Marine Spatial Planning Pilot Area...................................... 152 E Extent of the Dee River Basin District.................................. 153
vii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
CCW Countryside Council for Wales
CPRE Commission for the Protection of Rural England
CRoW Countryside Rights of Way
DCLG Department of Communities and Local Government
DEFRA Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
DoE Department of the Environment
EA Environment Agency
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EU European Union
GESAMP Joint Group of Experts on Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection
HELCOM Helsinki Commission (the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission)
HEP Human Exceptionalist/Exemptionalist Paradigm
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Seas
ICM Integrated Coastal Management
ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management
IPCC Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
MARPOL Marine Pollution (from the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships)
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
MEDI Marine Environmental Data Initiative
MMO Marine Management Organisation
MP Marine Planning
MS Marine Scotland
MSP Marine Spatial Planning
NEP New Ecological Paradigm
OSPAR Oslo-Paris Convention
PPG Planning Policy Guidance
PPS Planning Policy Statement
viii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Continued
RBD River Basin District
RBM River Basin Management
RBMP River Basin Management Plan
RCEP Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
RSPB Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
SEPA Scottish Environmental Protection Authority
SNH Scottish Natural Heritage
UKCIP United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme
UNCED United Nations Commission on Environment and Development
UNCHE United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WAG Welsh Assembly Government
WCMP Wales Coastal and Maritime Partnership
WFD Water Framework Directive
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
ix
Acknowledgements
Despite having been told on a number of occasions that writing a PhD thesis is something of a solitary
experience, this work would not have been possible without the help and encouragement I have
received along the way from a number of people. So, as is customary I would like to take this
opportunity to express my gratitude to those individuals.
My thanks go first to Sue Kidd for her ongoing support as tutor and PhD supervisor. I would also like to
acknowledge the support of Professor Greg Lloyd, who acted as my second supervisor during his tenure
at Civic Design, and Professor Cecilia Wong, whose leadership of the Civic Design Postgraduate
community in my early years as a postgraduate student helped me prepare for the intellectual
challenges ahead.
Fundamental to my being able to conduct this research was the financial support of the Economic and
Social Research Council, so I extend my gratitude to the ESRC also.
Probably one of the hardest tasks in undertaking this thesis was finding a willing group of people to take
part in case study interviews, and so I am extremely grateful to all of those individuals who gave their
time to speak to me, and in particular Stephen Hull at ABPmer, Jim Claydon, Bridget Betts at Dorset
Coast Forum, Ian Hay at East Grampian Coastal Partnership, Jonathan Mullard (formerly of the Severn
Estuary Partnership) and Linda Bigland at the Environment Agency who acted as my main points of
contact for each case study and helped me track down further contacts in one way or another.
There are many other people that have been an invaluable source of support during thesis writing at the
University of Liverpool, including Dr Peter Brown, whose boundless enthusiasm and entertainment has
provided an often needed respite from the serious business of thesis writing, and Suzanne Roebuck, Sue
Edwards and Jill Gun-Why have all provided administrative and technical support when needed.
A special vote of thanks goes to all the friends that have provided me with laughs, moral support, free
drinks and even musical accompaniment from time to time – Matthew Cocks, Tori and Andrew, Olivier
Sykes, Alex Lord, Paula and Rob, Chris and Hannah, Alex Nurse, Stephen Ackers, and Andreas Schulze
Baeing.
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my extended family – the McGowan, Chatfield and Wiggins
clans, and in particular Kathryn, David, Sue, Olivia, Emilia, Nathan, and of course my parents John and
Joan for their love and support.
1
CHAPTER 1: Introducing the Challenge of Coastal Management in the UK
1.1 Research Context
The UK’s coastline is a complex and dynamic environment of diverse landscapes, rich biodiversity and
natural resources which supports a broad range of human activities. However, this situation also means
that the coastal zone is a contested space, which is facing increasing competition for use of its resources
and at the same time needing protection from forces for change - natural environmental and manmade
pressures which threaten to diminish this resource base.
In response, coastal management in the form of coastal defences, drainage and the construction of
man-made harbours has existed since Roman times (Ballinger, 1999 and Fleming, in Barrett, 1992), and
the growth in maritime activity from the Sixteenth Century onwards has led to the introduction and
increasing use of formalised control over ocean space (Gibson, 1993), developing alongside the
regulation of land-based activities.
Although coastal management itself has many definitions, some examples offer an insight into what
coastal management is and what it is intended to achieve. Starting with the concept of management,
Ehler and Basta describe it as “a set of related activities carried out to achieve desired objectives”
(1993:7), and Kay and Alder suggest that coastal management can mean either the day-to-day direction
of activities occurring in the coastal zone (operational management), or the overall control of the
organisations which oversee those activities (strategic management) (2005:77).
According to Post and Lundin (1996:1), coastal management is “a process of governance”, or, for
America’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
“a complex interaction of laws, programs and efforts to evaluate trade-offs and make decisions
about how to use, conserve and value the resources and opportunities of the coastal zone”
(2006:1).
ICZM has also more recently been defined in the UK by the Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) as:
“Integrated Coastal Zone Management means adopting a joined-up approach towards
the many different interests in coastal areas – both on the land and at sea. It is the
2
process of harmonising the different policies and decision-making structures, and
bringing together coastal stakeholders to take concerted action towards achieving
common goals. Integrating the many different interests effectively means we can look at
the coast in a holistic way.” (DEFRA, 2009:4)
Contemporary challenges for managing the coastal zone may be classified into three main themes:
1. Complex, cumulative problems,
2. Multi-dimensional change, and
3. Escaping territorial and sectoral boundaries. (National Trust, 2006)
1.1.1 Complex, cumulative problems
Besides accommodating the natural processes of environmental change such as erosion and deposition,
one of the greatest challenges for the planning and management of coastal zones is the effects of
climate change. With sea levels predicted to rise and greater risk of extreme weather events such as
storms and floods, it is expected that global warming will change the physical, biological and
biochemical characteristics of the seas, and will reshape the physical landscape and activities that
currently take place at the coast. It is, however, currently difficult to be precise about the scale of these
effects (UKCIP, 1998, cited in Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 2002:136).
Also, the effects of pollution from land based and offshore sources contributes to changes in the coastal
environment, through the loss of biodiversity and adverse changes to water quality which can impact on
the economy and human health. Despite increasing controls and regulations designed to prevent or limit
pollution, the continuing discharge of pollutants from land-based and marine sources such as industrial
waste, sewage, oil, heavy metals and agrichemicals, plus marine and beach litter and tipping represents
an ongoing concern (see DEFRA, 2010a, Charting Progress 2).
The uncertainty and long-term nature of the effects of climate change and pollution, which are already
manifest in terms of increased environmental hazards and increasing costs of protective infrastructure
(European Commission, 1999a:7), are closely bound with the issue of resilience. Resilience is the ability
of the coastal environment to absorb pressures and maintain its essential functions, for example as a
source of fisheries or a natural defence against flooding. These issues therefore require responses over a
variety of spatial and temporal scales.
3
1.1.2 Multi-dimensional change
Approximately 16.9 million people live within 10Km of the UK’s coast (Atkins, 2004), and this number is
due to increase with population growth, longer life expectancy, increasing affluence and migration (Ibid,
p17).
The loss of traditional industries such as ship building and the decreasing popularity of British seaside
holidays in the face of overseas competition have had major negative effects for coastal communities in
the form of economic depression and social exclusion. For example Blackpool is ranked as the 24th most
deprived out of 354 local authority areas in England (House of Commons CLG Committee, 2007). Many
coastal towns are characterised by low wage, low skill seasonal employment, plus a demographic trend
of outward migration by the young and an increasing elderly population placing additional demands on
health and social services.
However, although the general perception of coastal towns is one of decline, the Seaside Towns
Research Project found that levels of unemployment are comparable to other non-coastal towns, and
that seaside towns have actually seen strong employment growth from 1971-2001, and that social and
economic problems are due to in-migration and housing demand outstripping local employment growth
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2003:5).
Whilst the tourism industry has therefore remained a major part of the coastal economy, diversification
of the economic base into new sectors such as services and ecotourism may provide more positive
benefits. However the European Commission (1999a) observes that traditional, low impact uses of the
coastal zone are being replaced with more high impact, intensive uses that may be economically
attractive in the short term but threaten the long term sustainability of the coasts natural assets.
Managing the coastal zone therefore relies on being able to balance the economic, social and
environmental dimensions of change.
1.1.3 Escaping territorial and sectoral boundaries
Arrangements for planning and managing the coastal zone have previously been characterised by an
extension of land-based policies and controls to the marine environment, a plethora of uncoordinated
sector-based policies and initiatives and a complex mix of ownership, property rights, rules and
4
regulations (Lloyd and Peel, 2004). Part of this complexity can be seen in Figure 1.1 below, which
illustrates the jurisdictions of various local and national organisations across the coastal zone.
Figure 1.1: Geographical and Legal Jurisdictions in the Coastal Zone
Source: Based on Atkins (2004), revisions by Author
Key to Organisations APHFCD - Animal and Plant Health, Fisheries and Countryside Division (Wales) CCW – Countryside Council for Wales DARD – Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (NI) DCAL – Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (NI) DECC – Department of Energy and Climate Change DEFRA – Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs DETI – Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (NI) DfT – Department for Transport
EA – Environment Agency EHS – Environment and Heritage Service (NI) JNCC – Joint Nature Conservation Committee MMO – Marine Management Organisation MS – Marine Scotland SEED – Scottish Executive Energy Directorate SEPA – Scottish Environmental Protection Authority SNH – Scottish Natural Heritage WAG – Welsh Assembly Government
5
This approach has two main disadvantages. Firstly, land use planning approaches in the past have failed
to understand the dynamics of the relationship between water resources and land management, for
example the coast of East Anglia is threatened by erosion and flooding despite – and probably because
of – investment in sea walls which trap sand and aggravate erosion in other areas (European
Commission, 1999a:8).
Secondly, initiatives for particular sectors or administrative units of planning have not fully considered
the effects they may have on other sectors or locations. Nor have they realised the potential to improve
the collection and dissemination of environmental and other data that could be achieved by inter-
sectoral and inter-organisational collaboration. The need for appropriate scientific data and information
to provide an evidence based approach to policy making and local decision making is cited as important
for any marine or coastal planning initiatives (see for example DEFRA, 2007a, European Commission,
1999a). Therefore more holistic and integrated approaches to planning for coastal zones, which consider
both geographical integration across the land-water interface and sectoral or institutional integration
are required.
This brief description of the challenges for coastal management demonstrates that the sustainability of
coastal zones represents a “wicked” problem. This phrase, first coined by Rittel and Webber in 1973,
refers to planning problems which are not easily definable and do not have definitive solutions due to
the complex nature of the political, economic and social systems within which they exist, the unknown
ramifications of introducing a solution and the lack of a definable solution – “every wicked problem can
be considered to be a symptom of another problem” (1973:165). In this sense, therefore, talk of coastal
management “problems” and “solutions” can only refer to symptoms as they manifest at particular
times.
1.2 The Research Problem/Conceptual Framework
Having established the need for a strategic framework of coastal management to meet the challenges of
sustainable development, Alder and Kay note that coastal management programs have generally
developed in response to problems experienced in the use and allocation of coastal resources, following a
period of mounting public, political and scientific pressure on governments to tackle problems (2005:19).
As such, problems of the coast may therefore be considered as socially constructed.
6
Social constructionism, in its traditional sociological sense, is not easily defined but assumes that
knowledge is historically and culturally constituted – truth is a product not of objective observation of
the world, but of social interactions and processes in which people are engaged with each other (Burr,
2003:5) and their surroundings. In fact the concept of a coastal zone itself is recognised as being based
not merely on physical or administrative lines but is socially, culturally and politically constituted (see
Kay and Alder, 2005, and Brown et al, 2002).
This research therefore takes the social construction of environmental problems as a conceptual
framework for analysing the implementation of coastal planning regimes in the UK. The fundamental
assumption of the research is that the definition of an environmental problem, and the formulation
and implementation of a solution, is the product of a process of social construction.
Based on this assumption, the research examines the development of coastal planning and management
regimes as a response to a socially constructed environmental problem.
The current framework for coastal management in England is summarised in Figure 1.2 below, and
whilst policy and planning arrangements are in a state of flux, particularly following the 2010 General
Election and the change of government, the basic elements are shown to include national policy and
government departments guiding four main management processes. These are:
Terrestrial spatial planning
Spatial planning in England is governed by policies laid down by the Department for Communities and
Local Government, and Planning Policy Statements (PPS) or Planning Policy Guidance Notes (PPGs) guide
developments onshore and down to Low Water Mark (LWM) at the coast, with PPG20: the Coast
providing the first set of policy guidance specifically for development in coastal areas, although this has
now been superseded by PPS 25: Development and Flood Risk (incorporating the supplement
Development and Coastal Change)which outlines the policies planning authorities should use in order to
prevent inappropriate development at the coast and also to protect new (and existing) developments
from physical changes to the coastline such as erosion and accretion. . Planning for coastal areas is
7
usually incorporated in Local Development Frameworks and their associated development control and
local policies, Local Area Agreements1 and Sustainable Community Strategies.
In Scotland, terrestrial planning is governed by the National Planning Framework and Scottish Planning
Policy (SPP). SPP provides a simplified set of planning policies, including those for coastal planning, and
replaces National Planning Policy Guidance which was first developed to deal with pressures related to
the exploitation of North Sea oil and gas in the 1970s, and Planning Advice Note 53:Classifying the Coast
for Planning Purposes (Scottish Office, 1998). Statutory planning control under the Town and Country
Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 and associated legislation extends to the mean low water mark of ordinary
spring tides, and to marine fish farming (Scottish Government, 2010:20) and requires that local
authorities identify coastal areas suitable for development, areas subject to significant constraints and
areas unsuitable for development such as isolated coasts.
For Wales, the Wales Spatial Plan and Planning Policy Wales provide the overarching policy for
terrestrial planning, and planning policy for coastal areas is supplemented by Technical Advice Note
(TAN) 14: Coastal Planning. In producing Local Development Plans, local authorities are expected to
consider the landward and seaward pressures on coastal systems of proposed developments, and only
propose coastal locations for those developments that need to be on the coast (Welsh Assembly
Government, 2010:78).
1 Local Area Agreements were introduced by the New Labour government and are produced by Local Strategic
Partnerships (LSPs). Currently LSPs only have funding until the end of the 2010/11 financial year and it is not known whether they will remain in existence after this date.
8
Marine Planning
Under the new Marine and Coastal Access Act, a Marine Management Organisation (MMO) has been
established that will have statutory duties for fisheries, offshore renewable energy, aggregates licensing,
construction, improving access to the coastline and creating a network of Marine Conservation Zones.
The MMO will also be responsible for a system of marine planning, which will provide strategic guidance
for use of the marine environment from High Water Mark (HWM) onshore out to 200Nm in a number of
specifically defined inshore and offshore plan areas (the proposed boundaries of these are still under
consideration).
In relation to the devolved administrations, the MMO will only operate in England – for Wales marine
management duties will be undertaken in-house by the Welsh Assembly Government, in Scotland the
requirements of the Marine (Scotland) Act will be discharged by Marine Scotland, with a national marine
plan to be prepared by the Scottish Government and regional marine plans produced by Marine
Planning Partnerships. In Northern Ireland a Northern Ireland Marine Bill is progressing through
consultation stages.
9
Government
Departments
Departments
Coastal Stakeholders
Local Strategic Partnership
Local
Development
Framework
Local Area
Agreement
Sustainable Community
Strategy
Coastal Defence Group
and Regional Flood
Defence Committees
Local Authority
Shoreline
Management
Plan
Marine
Management
Organisation
Coastal Towns
Working Group
National Planning Policy Guidance
Marine Policy
Statement
National Policy
Statements
River Basin
Management
Plan
Marine Plan Environment Agency
River Basin
Liaison Panel
Figure 1.2: the Framework of Coastal Management in England
Source: Based on DEFRA (2009), revised by author following the 2010 General Election and
the abolition of several bodies including the Infrastructure Planning Commission, Regional
Development Agencies and their associated Regional Spatial Strategies.
10
River Basin Management
Under the European Union’s Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (the Water
Framework Directive), Member States are required to reach a target of good chemical and biological
status for all inland waters, ground waters and estuaries out to 1 Nautical Mile by 2015. This is to be
achieved by through the production and implementation of River Basin Management Plans for defined
River Basin Districts. The WFD has been transposed into UK legislation by the Water Environment
(Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2003, Water Environment and Water
Services (Scotland) Act 2003 and Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) Regulations
(Northern Ireland) 2003.
In the preparation of River Basin Management Plans, each Member State’s waters will be classified
(characterised) and a statement of Significant Water Management Issues (SWMIs) will be produced for
each River Basin District. The finalised River Basin Management Plan documents, the first of which were
published for England and Wales in 2009, will contain a Programme of Measures to deliver
environmental objectives by 2015, which will include work to be undertaken by local and national
government, water companies and other organisations. In Directive 2000/60/EC, exceptions have been
made for “Heavily Modified Water Bodies” that have undergone major physical alterations for different
purposes to reach “good ecological potential” status by 2015.
River Basin Management Plans are produced by the Environment Agency in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland, and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency.
Shoreline Management
Shoreline Management Plans are non-statutory plans to deal with coastal flooding and erosions risks
and are prepared by Coastal Groups comprised of coastal local authorities and national environmental
bodies such as Countryside Council for Wales, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Environment Agency.
Plan boundaries are based on sediment cell units, that is, natural patterns of sediment (sand)
transportation, and SMPs identify the risks associated with natural processes of flooding and erosion,
present a long term policy framework to reduce these risks to people and the developed, historic and
natural environment in a sustainable manner (DEFRA, 2003).
11
SMPs provide an action plan for local authorities to work towards a set of Outcome Measures that have
been devised by the government – these include the number of households at risk from flooding or
erosion, the contribution of flood management to maintaining habitats, and the number of planning
consents given to households in flood risk areas despite Environment Agency objections.
Whilst Figure 1.2 is a far from comprehensive illustration of the institutions, regulations, strategies and
initiatives that constitute activities in the coastal zone, and concentrates mainly on the landward side of
coastal management, it demonstrates the many levels of government, organisations and decision
making elements that contribute to the overall management of the coastal zone.
Amongst the many measures that constitute the framework for coastal management in the UK, this
research focuses on one particular form of coastal management, namely Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM). Within the framework of coastal management outlined in Figure 1.2 above, the
relatively recent enactment of the Marine and Coastal Access Act in 2009 has prompted debate about
the appropriate arrangements for the planning and the management of the UK coast (Stojanovic and
Barker, 2008:347), with the role of ICZM being questioned in particular due to a number of problems
which are outlined in more detail below.
ICZM has its origins in the USA’s Coastal Zone Management Act, but has been more recently advocated
for use by UNCED through the Agenda 21 document (UNCED, 1993) and the European Union’s
Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/413/EC on the Implementation of
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (from herein known as ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC)
which currently forms the basis for ICZM activities in the UK.
The ICZM Recommendation required that Member States first conduct a stock take of the major laws,
policies, actors and institutions influencing the management of the coastal zone, and then develop a
national ICZM strategy (or several strategies) based on the eight broad principles identified through a
Demonstration Programme (1996-99) and outlined in Recommendation 2002/413/EC.
The eight ICZM principles are:
a) a broad overall perspective (thematic and geographic),
b) a long-term perspective which takes into account the precautionary principle
c) adaptive management,
12
d) local specificity,
e) working with natural processes and respecting the carrying capacity of ecosystems,
f) involving all the parties concerned in the management process,
g) support and involvement of relevant administrative bodies at national, regional and local level,
and
h) use of a combination of instruments. (CEC, 2002)
Despite such high level support for ICZM, the implementation of ICZM in the UK has been characterised
by a number of problems, which are well documented by authors such as Gubbay, (2002), McGlashan,
(2002), the Local Government Association (2002), Ballinger, (1999 and 2005), Atkins (2004), McKenna
and Cooper (2006) and Stojanovic and Shipman, (2007). These include:
1.2.1 Lack of statutory status
Although non-binding, the UK government adopted the EU’s ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC and
national ICZM strategies have been produced for each of the devolved administrations, (see Scottish
Executive, 2005, Northern Ireland Department of the Environment, 2006, Welsh Assembly Government,
2007 and DEFRA, 2009). However, these national strategies, like Recommendation 2002/413/EC, are not
legally binding and thus only provide a framework for how ICZM principles can be incorporated into
existing or future measures for coastal governance, for example through harmonising the activities of
different competent bodies in the coastal zone and integrating marine and terrestrial spatial planning
(DEFRA 2009:14). This non-formal status also explains why ICZM strategies are absent from the
framework of coastal management shown in Figure 1.2.
It is only with the introduction of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 for England and Wales, and
the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010 that the need to deliver ICZM has been fully acknowledged. Whilst both
Acts are relatively new and the finer details of how they will be implemented are to be addressed
through the publication of a joint Marine Policy Statement for the devolved administrations and the
enactment of secondary legislation, the Consultation Draft Marine Policy Statement states that:
“The UK Administrations are committed to ensuring that coastal areas, and the activities taking place
within them, are managed in an integrated and holistic way in line with the principles of Integrated
Coastal Zone Management” (HM Government 2010:23).
13
However, the lack of statutory footing for ICZM to date has had several consequences for ICZM practice,
which are outlined further below.
1.2.2 The voluntary approach to ICZM Implementation
Without statutory backing, the delivery of ICZM has proceeded via a number of different organisations
with varying degrees of support. Taking English Nature’s Estuaries Initiative, launched in 1992, and
Scottish Natural Heritage’s Focus on Firths project (launched 1993) as early models of an integrated
approach to coastal management, estuary and Firth partnerships and coastal fora alongside other ad
hoc bodies were established in response to particular local environmental issues (see Morris, 2008,
CoastNet, 2003).
The voluntary manner in which coastal organisations have been established has lead to an uneven
geographical spread of organisations around the UK, with a small number of organisations covering the
geographically large Firths of Scotland - the original Focus on Firths initiative started with three
partnerships, the Moray Firth, the Solway and Forth Estuary Forum (Allmendinger, Barker and Stead,
2002), and smaller, but more numerous groups around the English coast forming as a result of the
Estuaries Initiative (over 40 estuary Partnerships and Management Plans according to Morris,
2008:25).Using “Coastal Partnerships” as a collective term for the range of voluntary coastal
management organisations in existence, partnerships are generally formed from a mixture of interested
parties from local government, government agencies and the private sector (Stojanovic and Barker,
08:345). Hewett and Fletcher note that although the exact remit of each partnership varies, commonly
they aim to promote a more integrated approach to coastal governance through facilitating
cooperation, conflict resolution, raising awareness and gathering and disseminating information to
coastal stakeholders (2009:1).
Typically partnerships comprise of a partnership officer, a management or steering group, support staff
and task or working groups depending upon projects being undertaken at the time. An annual Forum is
also a common key activity of partnerships, functioning as a means to report to stakeholders on work
the partnership has undertaken in the last year and as a means to provide opportunities to debate
current coastal governance issues (see Fletcher, 2007, Stojanovic and Barker, 2008).
14
With no formal role in coastal governance (Fletcher, 2007), coastal partnerships rely on funding from
partners, and alongside the lack of statutory powers this has been seen by many to be a key constraint
to the delivery of projects (CoastNet, 2003: 3). The scarcity of funding for coastal partnerships also often
leads to a rapid turnover of project officers, and the loss of “corporate memory” (McGlashan,
2002:226), which subsequently poses problems in terms of maintaining relationships with stakeholders
and potential funding partners.
1.2.3 The Democratic Deficit in the Management of Coastal Resources (LGA, 2002)
Linked to the sectoral nature of coastal and marine activities and the role of central government in
decision making for such activities, it has been found that there are few opportunities for public
consultation and democratic accountability in coastal management (Stojanovic and Shipman, 2007:382).
Whilst the national ICZM Stock Take undertaken by Atkins Consultants in 2004 noted that the
participatory and locally specific nature of coastal partnerships was a relatively successful aspect of
ICZM practice, the lack of opportunities to be involved in decisions of a major strategic nature means
the ability of coastal partnerships to influence such decisions is restricted.
1.2.4 Data Requirements
As is stated by Midlen (2006), good information is needed to facilitate good management – this
information being fundamental to understanding the pressures on the coast and potential management
responses. However despite the proliferation of organisations collecting data on the environment and
socio-economic issues for both landward and marine sides of the coastal zone there is no single central
body responsible for the dissemination of coastal data. French (2004:117) also notes that “academia,
consultants, NGOs and governments often fail to promote information exchange and development of
good practice”, a point which is supported by the Local Government Association’s On the Edge – the
Coastal Strategy report, which recognised that the data needs of coastal managers could be better met
through closer networking between practitioners and research communities (LGA, 2002).
The description of ICZM practice given above therefore provides a great scope for investigating the ways
in which ICZM implementation can be improved, and indeed much improvement may be necessary in
15
order for ICZM to be effectively utilised by the UK government as part of its commitment to marine
stewardship and more broad sustainable development goals. Indeed, Stojanovic, Ballinger and Lalwani
(2004) demonstrate how many studies have already sought to prescribe measures of “successful” ICZM
practice or highlight exemplars of best practice, such as the EU’s own Demonstration Programme of 35
ICZM projects (European Commission, 1999b), Pickaver, Gilbert and Breton (2004), Burbridge (1997),
and Olsen, Tobey and Kerr (1997).
One aspect that has been identified as key to better ICZM is the notion of integration, which is intended
to remedy the core issues of uncoordinated, sectoral based coastal management and the lack of
overarching strategic plans or policies. In discussing why integration is essential to coastal zone
management, Chua (1993) emphasises how integration “provides a broader cohesive perspective”,
which assists in the attainment of sustainable development goals (p85).
Cicin-Sain (1993) and Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998) propose that integration is not a discrete
characteristic of ICZM, rather that it can be viewed as a continuum of varying degrees of more or less
integration. Along this scale, categories range from:
Fragmented approach – which represents the least integrated, sectoral-based forms of
management,
Communication,
Coordination,
Harmonisation, and
Integration – this will have a formal basis and is achieved by measures such as the creation of
new institutions or redefining the roles of existing institutions.
There is an extensive discourse around the meaning of integration in ICZM, which is examined in further
chapters of the thesis, but here it is pertinent to note that the work of coastal partnerships may help to
achieve better communication and a degree of coordination at the local level, although “integration” as
an ideal at one end of a continuum is difficult to achieve because broad-based systems of planning and
management will inevitably encompass a disparate range of values and interests that in some cases
cannot be reconciled. However, Rupprecht’s report on the implementation of ICZM in EU Member
States highlighted that “more coherent spatial planning”, “improved decision making” and “better
partner understanding” are major advantages in areas with ICZM and thus improve the acceptance and
success of management measures taken at the coast (2006, in Lymbery, 2008:13).
16
According to Selin and Chavez (1995, in Randolph, 1999:171) conflicts with complex, competing
interests are not well managed by strict, technocratic decision making processes and thus the contested
nature of coastal resources and management approaches requires a deeper understanding of the
perspectives and value judgements inherent in decision making systems. Davos (1998), recognising that
sustainability policies for coastal zones are socially constructed and focused on technocratic and
rationally defined “best” policies, calls for a more cooperative form of coastal management which not
only seeks to uncover the origin and meaning of values in order to reduce conflict and identify “correct”
policies (Davos, 1998) through public discourse, but also maximises and sustains stakeholder
involvement.
This idea of discourse as a means to effect improved coastal management gives rise to a second
assumption that is explored in the research; that improved integration and implementation of ICZM is
dependent on a continuous discourse between stakeholders on the nature of problems and solutions.
This assumption is explored by reference to collaborative planning. Collaboration finds its expression in
ICZM practice through UNCED’s Agenda 21 document, which called for a commitment to achieving
sustainable development for the marine and coastal environments, through an integrated policy and
decision making process, including all involved sectors, to promote compatibility and a balance of uses
(UNCED 1993: paragraph 17.5(a)), and in the EU’s ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC ICZM principles,
in particular the principles of involving all the parties concerned in the management process, and
support and involvement of relevant administrative bodies at national, regional and local level.
Within the UK, participation in environmental decision making is a well established process, operating
mainly through the provisions of the town and country (terrestrial) planning system in respect to
proposed developments, and processes such as Sustainability Appraisal and Environmental Impact
Assessment.
For coastal partnerships, as has already been stated, their core activities are concerned with facilitating
cooperation and resolving conflicts, awareness raising and understanding, and information
dissemination (Fletcher 2007a; Stojanovic and Barker 2008) and this work is undertaken through what is
broadly described as a “partnership approach” which has its roots in the concept of governance.
Governance, or the process of government, refers to the arrangements for the delivery of public policy
through a combination of public, private and voluntary sectors working in collaboration (see Rhodes,
1994, and Bevir, 2009). Collaboration in this instance is defined as occurring when a group of
17
stakeholders in a problem engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms and structures to
act or decide on issues related to that problem (based on Wood and Gray, 1991:146) and recognises that
the problem encountered may be insurmountable to stakeholders or organisations working alone.
In the case of ICZM, which considers cross-cutting issues of sustainable coastal development,
governance arrangements may be particularly complex as they attempt to integrate institutions,
legislation, policies, plans and programmes operating at different scales. Partnership working therefore
represents an attempt to build consensus around coastal issues and pool the resources of stakeholders
with different interests in order to deliver mutually agreed outcomes.
Davos states that “by involving all the stakeholders and integrating their input, co-operative CZM lays
the foundations for stakeholders to build a habit of cooperation, a reputation of conforming with
collective agreements, a trust that others will cooperate and an appreciation of the greater promise of
cooperation over defection (the pursuit of self-interest) for coastal zone sustainability” (1998:381).
Therefore in order to improve ICZM practice, collaborative decision making must take into account the
different ways in which stakeholders construct coastal problems and how, collectively, building mutual
agreement and trust can facilitate greater cooperation and integration. With this in mind, the following
aim and research objectives have been devised.
18
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The overall aim of this research is:
To critically assess the implementation of ICZM in the wider context of coastal planning regimes, in
order to develop a more effective model of collaboration for coastal governance.
In order to meet this research aim, the following objectives will be used to structure the research
undertaken in this thesis:
Objectives
1. To critically assess the practice of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the UK and place this
in the context of other current planning and management regimes for the coastal and marine
environment.
2. To explain the emergence of coastal planning regimes in terms of the social construction of a
“coastal problem” in order to understand the different policy responses that may occur.
3. To develop an understanding of how integration may be facilitated by collaboration between
stakeholders in coastal organisations.
4. To determine what factors are most important in practice for constructing claims about a
coastal problem, and provide a reappraisal of the social construction model proposed by John
Hannigan.
5. To evaluate how collaboration is embedded within the plan making processes of coastal
organisations and provide recommendations as to how collaborative policy making may be
improved.
Meeting each of these objectives in turn, the research will build on the findings of each of the previous
chapters, enabling a final set of conclusions and recommendations to be drawn and fulfilling the overall
research aim.
19
1.4 Research Strategy and Thesis Structure
The aim and objectives outlined above have assisted in designing a research strategy that structures the
thesis into conceptual, contextual, theoretical and analytical components which are explained below.
In the conceptual and contextual component of the thesis, the research problem (the implementation
of ICZM) is identified and set against a conceptual framework of socially constructed environmental
problems and policy responses. This is then examined in more depth through the first stage of empirical
work - a comparative study examining the social construction of coastal, marine and water catchment
problems through a desktop study of associated literature.
The theories examined in this contextual and conceptual phase meet Objectives 1, 2 and 3 and inform
the development of further research questions and the theoretical framework and methodology that is
to be used in the second empirical stage of the research. The second phase of empirical work utilises a
case study approach, which allows for phenomena to be investigated in a highly contextualised setting
(Yin, 2003). Furthermore, Denzin and Lincoln (2003) note that case study is a typical narrative form for
enquiry founded on an interpretive paradigm such as social construction.
The analysis stage of the thesis brings together the findings of the second phase of empirical work with
the theoretical framework in order to answer the research questions and provide an overall evaluation
of the collaborative policy making process in coastal planning regimes. This analysis meets Objectives 4
and 5.
1.5 Overview of Thesis Structure
The thesis structure is shown in Figure 1.3, which indicates how each chapter relates to the conceptual,
theoretical, empirical and analytical stages of the research and the overall research objectives.
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, that is, the implementation of ICZM in the context of
socially constructed environmental problems and the need for integrated, collaborative approaches to
the governance of coastal zones. This initial conceptualisation sets the scene for a discussion of the
overall research aim, objectives and methodology to be followed in the study.
20
Based on the assumption that improved integration and implementation of ICZM is dependent on a
continuous discourse between stakeholders on the nature of problems and solutions, Chapter 2
considers first the different types of integration that can or should be achieved by ICZM, and secondly
the role of collaboration in the current context of coastal management. Literature on collaborative or
communicative planning is reviewed to provide the theoretical underpinnings of the partnership
approach that characterises ICZM practice. Collaborative or communicative planning seeks to uncover
the meanings and values behind socially constructed policy discourse and as such places the focus of the
research on the substantive content of environmental decisions rather than the achievement of coastal
management goals.
In Chapter 3, the problems of the coast and the way they are socially constructed are then discussed
with reference to John Hannigan’s (1995) model of the social construction of an environmental problem.
A comparative study is undertaken of the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment (river
basin management) problems in order to ascertain how the social construction of a problem may then
influence different policy responses. Marine and catchment problems have been chosen for comparison
because their jurisdictions overlap in the coastal zone, and ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP represent
planning regimes that are directly or indirectly influenced by European policies and have broad
sustainability and integration objectives at their core. As well as providing insights into the historical
development of coastal, marine and catchment planning regimes, an analysis of the utility of Hannigan’s
model raises further questions about the way environmental problems are elevated from the status of a
problem requiring attention to an item firmly on the political agenda where solutions may then be
proposed and implemented.
Conceptualising collaborative planning as a continual process of constructing an environmental
problem, Chapter 4 considers how an environmental problem, initially defined, then progresses through
the stages of the policy making cycle. Based on the work of Barbara Gray (1985, andWood and Gray,
1991) and Richard Jarvis (2007), conditions which facilitate inter-organisational collaboration are
overlaid on the policy cycle to produce a model of collaborative policy making which provides a
theoretical framework for understanding how stakeholders in coastal planning regimes may work in a
more integrated way.
21
Figure 1.3: Summary of Thesis Structure
Source: Author
The application of this framework is elaborated in Chapter 5, which details the methodology developed
for the main phase of empirical work. This shows how the proposals made in relation to collaboration
may be used as a benchmark for assessing the extent to which collaboration is achieved in current
coastal planning regimes against a set of normative propositions. A case study approach to testing this
framework is then developed, with case studies selected from a desktop study of coastal organisations
Theoretical
Framework
Conceptual and
Contextual
Framework
Empirical
Phase I
Analysis
Empirical
Phase II
Objective 5
7. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS II: Incorporating
Stakeholder Perspectives and Improving
Integration Through Collaboration
8. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS: Reflections
on the Case Studies and Recommendations
Objective 4 6. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS I: Stakeholder
Perspectives on the Nature of the “Coastal
Problem”
5. METHODOLOGY: Putting Collaboration into
Practice: a Framework for Evaluating
Collaboration in Coastal Planning Regimes
Objective 3 4. LITERATURE REVIEW III: A Collaborative Model
of Policy Making for ICZM
Objective 2 3. LITERATURE REVIEW II: Exploring the Social
Construction of Coastal Management Problems
Objective 1
1. INTRODUCTION: The Challenge of Coastal
Management in the UK
2. LITERATURE REVIEW I: the Key to Integration in
ICZM - the Need for a Collaborative Approach
22
around the UK. The chapter then describes how five case studies have been investigated, using
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with case study stakeholders to collect data.
The next two chapters present and analyse the second phase empirical data, and are broken down into
intermediate stages of analysis relating to the main themes of the theoretical framework. Chapter 6
first provides further context for each of the individual case studies which are drawn from Marine
Planning, River Basin Management and three from ICZM. It then concentrates on the way in which
stakeholders socially construct environmental problems in the initial problem recognition phase of the
policy cycle and presents evidence to demonstrate the ways in which the prerequisites proposed by
John Hannigan (1995) as necessary for the social construction of environmental problems can be more
nuanced than is suggested, and thus not only can the model for the social construction of an
environmental problem be expanded, different factors can be seen to be more decisive in constructing
the case for coastal, marine and catchment problems.
The second findings chapter, Chapter 7, then examines the case studies as they advance through the
remaining stages of the policy making cycle, describing and analysing the processes of consensus
building, exploring options, decision making and implementation for each of the case studies. This
chapter therefore provides some insights into the collaborative planning processes taking place within
each case study and in particular reveals some important differences in the stages of consensus building
and decision making under top-down and bottom-up regimes.
Chapter 8 brings together the final conclusions of the research, considering the findings in the light of
the social construction model proposed by John Hannigan and the collaborative policy making
framework. In addition to conclusions on the way in which coastal problems are socially constructed and
how this has affected the implementation of coastal planning regimes, comments are made on the
extent to which features of the collaborative policy making framework are reflected in practice. The
implications of these findings are considered in relation not only to ICZM, but also the processes of
Marine Planning and River Basin Management, and recommendations are made on how support for
such regimes may be built through working towards a shared construction of problems. Working in this
way should facilitate better integration of organisations, policies and programmes as decision makers
are able to share information and negotiate more effectively on courses of action to be taken.
Finally, an evaluation of the methodology, including the theoretical framework and more practical
matters relating to the empirical research such as access to participants are discussed, and some further
23
avenues for investigating collaborative approaches to ICZM and other coastal planning regimes are
suggested.
24
1.6 A Note on Terminology
Coastal Management, CZM, ICAM, ICM and ICZM
In the wide range of coastal management literature, the planning and management of coastal activities
are referred to variously as coastal zone management (CZM), integrated coastal management (ICM),
integrated coastal area management (ICAM) and integrated coastal zone management (ICZM). These
terms are used somewhat interchangeably. The terms coastal management and ICZM shall be used
here – coastal management will be used in referring to the general mix of regulations, plans, policies
and institutions that make up coastal management in its broadest sense, and ICZM when referring
specifically to the form of coastal management advocated by the European Union and the Department
of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in England, unless quoting directly from another source.
Marine Planning (MP) and Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)
When work first began on this PhD thesis, consultations on a proposed Marine Bill for the UK were in
progress, with proposed legislation including the introduction of a system of Marine Spatial Planning
(MSP). When the Marine Bill gained Royal Assent in 2009 as the Marine and Coastal Access Act, the
terminology became marine planning. Marine Planning is thus used throughout unless specifically
referring to documents and discussions of marine spatial planning prior to Royal Assent.
25
CHAPTER 2: the Key to Integration in ICZM - the Need for a Collaborative Approach
2.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the context of ICZM outlined in Chapter One, presenting further background to
the evolution of ICZM practice in the UK which contributes to Objective One of the thesis, that is to
critically assess the practice Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the UK and place this in the context
of current planning and management regimes for the coastal and marine environment. The literature
reviewed in this Chapter also outlines the theories that inform a more detailed investigation of the
socially constructed nature of coastal policies and collaborative responses.
The literature examined here focuses on the policy documents at international and national levels that
provide the key drivers for ICZM, plus academic literature and reports which review how practice has
developed from those initial policy drivers and more theoretical perspectives.
The chapter starts with a dissection of the term “management” and what this means in theory for the
type of activities undertaken as part of coastal management. This includes the collective process of
learning through interaction which contributes to adaptive management of coastal zones.
Different dimensions of “Integration” are then considered, such as institutional, policy, sectoral and
spatial integration. Given the first assumption that the definition of an environmental problem, and the
formulation and implementation of a solution, is the product of a process of social construction, spatial
integration is given special consideration in terms of socially constructed notions of the coastal zone.
These dimensions are critically examined with reference to practical examples of the type of integration
under discussion.
Given the second assumption, that improved integration and implementation of ICZM is dependent on a
continuous discourse between stakeholders on the nature of problems and solutions,
attention then turns to the concept of communicative or collaborative planning. Characterised as a
highly participatory activity, the discussion of communicative planning seeks to find ways in which the
socially constructed nature of coastal management may be understood through uncovering the
understandings and values held by coastal stakeholders.
26
This communicative approach is applied to coastal partnerships in describing the rationale for
collaboration or partnership working, which includes overcoming the lack of coordination between
relevant administrative bodies and increasing stakeholder involvement in formulating and implementing
solutions to coastal problems (CEC, 2000:8). Based on the principles of communicative action, a process
in which the co-production of knowledge and consensus building on appropriate courses of action can
provide more integrated measures to ameliorate coastal problems.
2.2 Context: On the Meaning of Management
As the central object of research in this thesis is ICZM, it is constructive at the beginning of this literature
review to provide some further context on the theories which constitute the purpose and activities of
ICZM. To this end, the chapter starts with further elaboration on the meaning of management, which
was variously defined in the introductory chapter as “a process of governance”, the operational (day to
day) and strategic direction of activities, or a complex system of measures and tools used for decision
making.
This discussion is then followed by an examination of integration, which is the subject of management
actions. An understanding of the different types of integration that may be possible in ICZM thus
provides a benchmark for assessing the extent of integration already existing in coastal planning regimes
and the ways in which this might be improved.
2.2.1 Management
In the first chapter, some basic definitions of management were given (e.g. Ehler and Basta, 1993, Post
and Lundin,1996) which characterised coastal management as a system and a means of regulating
decision making and activities, either in the short or long term. Coastal management also embraces the
need for environmental stewardship (compliance with national and international environmental
legislation and promoting sustainable development), shared responsibility (operating in a multi-sectoral
framework), the precautionary principle and public information (Ballinger, 2002).
Management should provide for assessing changing conditions in order to adjust management
strategies (Ehler and Basta, 1993:10) and give continuous feedback on how ICZM programs are
progressing towards desired goals, and thus an ICZM programme can be seen as an aggregation of
27
various cyclical processes such as planning and implementation (implementation is discussed in more
detail in later chapters), and management actions.
Scura et al (1992:38) define three types of management actions associated with the production of a
Coastal Zone Management Plan, which are:
1. Institutional and organisational arrangements
2. Public intervention to influence private behaviour, e.g. imposition of taxes and levies
3. Direct government intervention or investment
In keeping with Kay and Alder’s (2005) distinction between strategic and operational management, it
can be seen that these types of management action are broadly strategic in that they seek to influence
the overall shape and direction of the management system, for example creating the optimum
organisational structures for policy design, ensuring there is sufficient political will from public, private
and third sector organisations to deliver plans and also, in the case of direct government involvement,
providing resources (financial/human) for ICZM programmes, or ensuring that legal requirements are
enforced. Management actions that may correspond to the “operational” include decision making tools
such as EIA, cost benefit analysis, participatory planning and sectoral or site specific plans, which are
implemented at lower levels in the institutional hierarchy.
In 1992 House of Commons Environment Select Committee Report on Coastal Zone Protection and
Planning recommended that there should be a hierarchy of Coastal Zone Management Plans from
national to regional and local levels, and that the government should consider establishing regional
Coastal Zone Management Groups, however these recommendations were rejected. Therefore ICZM
practice to date in the UK, with limited formal support from the government, has had only partial
success in terms of institutional and organisational arrangements, namely the creation of coastal
partnerships and their networks of stakeholders through participatory planning mechanisms such as
annual fora. With no statutory weight behind partnerships, public intervention to influence private
behaviour has come mainly from other sectoral legislation, for example related to spatial planning and
development control, EU Directives on bathing water, birds and habitats.
Planning constitutes another of the key management components as this prescribes the aims or goals to
be achieved, the means or actions that must be taken and also facilitates the monitoring and evaluation
of progress. Kay and Alder point out that like management, planning has both strategic and operational
28
dimensions, thus a strategic ICZM plan which sets the overall direction for a coastal program may in turn
cascade into operational plans and management actions (2005:77), in a tiered hierarchy as can be
shown below in Figure 2.1.
In this case, the example regional ICZM plan provides the strategic vision for management actions in the
coastal zone, such as outlining priorities for the protection of flora and fauna, with more specific
measures being elaborated in a biodiversity action plan, or identifying areas with potential for further
sectoral development, e.g. tourism or renewable energy technologies.
Figure 2.1: Example of a tiered coastal management planning hierarchy
Source: Author
In the UK, a tiered system such as this has been absent, with national ICZM strategies for the devolved
administrations not being put into place until after local and sectoral plans such as SMPs, now obsolete
Local Environment Action Plans (LEAPs) and Biodiversity Action Plans had been produced and many sub-
regional and local coastal partnerships had established their own programmes of work, for example the
Solent Forum’s Strategic Guidance (1997), and the East Riding ICZM Management Plan (2002). The
creation of Marine Planning regions under the Marine and Coastal Access Act may provide this missing
part of the hierarchy, but in coming after the range of local level plans already in existence, the
harmonisation of plans and policies may take some time to achieve.
National ICZM Strategy
Regional ICZM Plan
Sectoral Plans
(E.g. fisheries, offshore energy,
tourism and recreation)
Local Biodiversity
Plan
Shoreline Management Plan
29
2.2.2 Adaptive Management
ICZM may also utilise what is described as adaptive management, which is one of the EU’s key
principles, set out inICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC. The Recommendation states that ICZM should
be based on
“(c) adaptive management during a gradual process which will facilitate adjustment as problems
and knowledge develop. This implies that need for a sound scientific basis concerning the
evolution of the coastal zone” (CEC, 2002).
When management is considered as an adaptive process therefore, it is intended to mean more than
the process of monitoring, evaluation and corrective action – it involves learning from experience,
experimentation and the formulation of new management methods as new knowledge becomes
available, whether this is about the physical environment of the coast itself or resulting from an iterative
approach to policy design and implementation. Olsen (2001) notes that adaptive management also
means “actions can and should be taken in the face of uncertainty” (2001:329), however, regard must
be given to the precautionary principle (which is included in Recommendation 2002/413/EC as part of
the ICZM principle of a long term perspective), and thus the burden of proof faced by decision makers
wishing to proceed with incomplete knowledge about the consequences of their actions. In these
situations, Tol et al (1996) observe that by postponing decisions “more insight into the aims of actions
can be achieved and better instruments and techniques will be developed” i.e. greater learning can take
place, but even without action mitigating measures may come too late to assist in achieving goals
(1996:50) and so value judgements are needed to prescribe a course of action. The adaptive
management approach bears similarities to the ‘double loop’ model of organisational learning proposed
by Argyris and Schön (1974), which “involves questioning the role of the framing and learning systems
which underlie actual goals and strategies” (Usher and Bryant, 1989:87), in contrast to the ‘single loop’
model which merely allows for learning through the detection of error (feedback) and corrective action.
In order for such learning and adaptation to take place, a move away from the notion of “best” coastal
management towards a more cooperative system in which stakeholders can reflect and deliberate upon
appropriate coastal management measures is desirable. The second assumption of the research, that
improved integration and implementation of ICZM is dependent on a continuous discourse between
stakeholders on the nature of problems and solutions thus encompasses the idea that through
discussion, stakeholders not only learn about the perspectives of other stakeholders, but collectively
30
they begin to develop shared understandings and experiences of coastal problems and more
appropriate, consensual solutions.
The next section outlines the different dimensions of integration which may be achieved by, or
conversely facilitated by discourse amongst stakeholders.
2.3 On the Meaning of Integration
The types of management actions that occur under ICZM are not exclusive to coastal management –
they may be implemented under an array of environmental management and land use or spatial
planning programs. However, what does set them apart from other types of environmental
management actions is the degree of integration that is required to enable a functioning, multi-sectoral
management system. Tracing the history of ICZM, early attempts at coastal zone management for
example in the USA were simply termed “Coastal Zone Management”. It was not until the 1980s that
integration became recognised as an explicit feature of coastal zone management and became
established as a key characteristic of coastal programs.
Kenchington and Crawford differentiate integration from coordination, explaining that a coordinated
system is comprised of independent, generally equivalent components working to a common purpose,
whereas an integrated system is complete or unified although it will generally have subordinate
components (1993:111-12). This more accurately reflects the political context within which ICZM occurs
– that is, the hierarchy of central-local government and strategic policies – area/sectoral plans.
The same authors also note that the term “integration” had been part of coastal management discourse
since the launch of the United Nation’s Regional Seas Programme in 1975, but at that early stage its use
was ambiguous. Increasingly it became used to describe the more complex systems of coastal area
management that were being developed.
The way in which ICZM differs from the earlier form of coastal zone management is described in a
simple way by Post and Lundin, who explain that ICZM attempts a more comprehensive approach –
taking account of all the sectoral activities that affect the coastal zone and its resources and dealing with
economic and social issues as well as environmental/ecological concerns (1996:1).
31
However, this explanation of ICZM does not adequately describe the ways in which integration can or
ought to occur. For this we need to consider not only the range of activities or agents of ICZM but also
the wider sustainable development agenda.
It was the UN Stockholm Declaration of 1972 that first called for integrated resource management in
development planning (Kenchington and Crawford, 1993) and as sustainable development has become
the dominant paradigm of economic development and global governance regimes one interpretation of
integration refers to the conceptual merger of environment and development (Nichols, 99:393),
whereby the twin (and sometimes contradictory) objectives of achieving economic prosperity and the
conservation of natural resources are achieved.
In 1992, against the backdrop of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio, integration was again given prominence
as ICZM was endorsed by IPCC as “the appropriate framework *…+ to reduce vulnerability to accelerated
sea level rise” (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1998:36).
More importantly, Chapter 17 of the Agenda 21 document agreed at UNCED made a strong
commitment to achieving sustainable development for the marine and coastal environments, stating
that:
“This requires new approaches to marine and coastal area management and development, at
the national, sub-regional, regional and global levels, approaches that are integrated and are
precautionary and anticipatory in ambit” (UNCED, 1993).
Furthermore, Programme Area A for Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of Coastal
and Marine Areas, Including Exclusive Economic Zones, called on states to:
Provide for an integrated policy and decision making process, including all involved sectors, to
promote compatibility and a balance of uses (paragraph 17.5(a)).
And for:
Integration of sectoral programmes on sustainable development for settlements, agriculture,
tourism, fishing, ports and industries affecting the coastal area (paragraph 17.6(i)).
These requirements promote two forms of integration, namely institutional and sectoral integration.
32
Institutional integration can take the form of a number of measures, and Underdahl lists these as first,
redefining the domain of existing institutions - transferring issues both vertically, towards central
government to provide a more strategic overview, and horizontally, to broaden the remit of what may
be more narrowly focused, sector-based organisations (Underdahl, 1980:167). Brown et al also describe
horizontal integration as the cross-sectoral harmonisation of policy and practice or joined-up decision
making, whilst vertical integration concerns different scales of governance, from local to international
(Brown et al, 2002:21). The transfer of sectoral marine controls for aggregates, fisheries and offshore
renewable energy to the Marine Management Organisation under the Marine and Coastal Access Act
represents one such example of horizontal integration and the broadening of perspectives.
A second institutional strategy is to change decision-making procedures, for example using more
inclusive and participatory approaches such as environmental impact assessment (EIA), public hearings
and joint proposals. This may be particularly useful in the case of voluntary partnerships where the
partnership as a whole, does not, according to McKenna et al mesh effectively with external
organisations, lying “outside the loops” of power and influence of statutory bodies with decision making
powers (McKenna et al,2008:945). Giving partnerships a greater role in, for example, consultations on
Marine Plans could therefore facilitate greater institutional integration.
Third, the redistribution of resources or authority between institutions could increase capacity or create
subordinate institutions to another with a stronger leadership. The final method of institutional
integration suggested by Underdahl is the creation of a new institution, either through merger of
existing institutions, or creating a new lead institution with overall responsibility that can coordinate the
work of others. Again, the creation of the Marine Management Organisation provides an example of
how this may occur.
The second form of integration, sectoral integration, can occur across economic sectors, as identified by
Ehler and Basta (1993), for example recreation and energy, across economic and environmental sectors
(e.g. energy and marine mammal protection), or between coastal and marine sectors and other land-
based sectors such as agriculture (Cicin-Sain, 1993:25).
Other forms of integration can include spatial and temporal dimensions, covering the landward and the
marine sides of the coastal zone. The concept of the coastal zone as a unique environment forms a
substantial body of discourse within coastal management literature. Traditionally the coast has been
thought of as a frontier where the land meets the sea, although Alder and Kay (2005:1) observe that this
33
boundary is generally not a clearly defined line on a map but rather a transitional zone. It is for this
reason that the coastal zone is commonly referred to as “the interface between land and sea” (see for
example Cicin-Sain, 1998, Post and Lundin, 1996, Chua, 1993).
Alder and Kay (2005) propose two main methods of defining the coastal zone. These are in terms of
policy-oriented definitions which focus on designated areas and are politically determined, and the
biophysical, where there are interactions between the land and sea.
2.3.1 Policy Oriented Definitions of the Coastal Zone
The evolution of policy-oriented or political definitions of the coastal zone - which may take the form of
fixed or variable distance definitions, definitions according to usage (e.g. economic sectors, protected
areas and settlements) or hybrid definitions - can be traced back to the maritime activities of the
Seventeenth Century, when the “Cannon-shot rule” developed by Cornelius Bykershoek was used to
extend national territory out over the three nautical mile belt of sea around the coast (Nichols, 1999).
Yet it was not until after World War II as nations began to assert their economic rights over adjacent
seas that a new, more formalised system of national jurisdiction and responsibilities for the sea was
developed.
The Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) was agreed and came into force after being ratified by
60 states in 1982, following three Law of the Sea conferences hosted by the United Nations. UNCLOS
was highly significant in that it provided a new “constitution” for the world’s oceans (Cicin-Sain and
Knecht, 1998:69) or a framework for ocean governance covering all aspects of maritime activity.
Central to this was the establishment and acceptance of maritime zones measured from a carefully
defined baseline at mean low water mark and including:
Internal waters (on the landward side of the baseline),
Territorial waters – now extending sovereign territory out to 12 Nautical miles and “often the
domain of coastal planners” (Nichols, 99:390),
The Contiguous zone (extending from 12 to 24 Nm), in which nations can exert limited legal
powers,
Exclusive Economic Zones (extending out to a maximum of 200Nm), for which nations have sole
control over economic resources such as fishing and oil exploration, and
34
Archipelagic waters (boundaries around islands) and the continental shelf (the natural extension
of a territory along the underwater continental land mass).
Whilst these definitions are widely accepted in the global marine management regime, within individual
nation states the exact nature of the coastal zone is still subject to administrative and sectoral
requirements. Cicin-Sain relates sections of the coastal zone through a political economy dimension to a
continuum of private-public property and associated governance, whereby in inland areas private
property ownership tends to dominate, coastal lands contain a mix of public and private, and in coastal
waters or the high seas public ownership and concerns are dominant. In parallel with this,
local/provincial government interests and multi-purpose agencies predominate in inland areas, with
national and international concerns and single-purpose agencies, for example for shipping or
conservation taking greater importance further out to sea (1993:27). This relationship is presented in
Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2: Nature of Property and Government Interests and Institutions in Coastal/Ocean Areas
Coastal ocean spectrum
Inland areas Coastal lands Coastal waters Offshore
waters
High seas
Nature of
Property
Private Private/public Predominantly public
Nature of
government
interests
Local/provincial Mix of local/provincial/
national
Mainly
national
Mainly
international
Nature of
government
Multi-purpose agencies Single-purpose agencies
Source: Cicin-Sain (1993:28)
In the UK, the delineation of the coastal zone is complicated further by the historic legacy of the Crown
(Gibson, 1993) which owns approximately half of the intertidal strip of land known as the foreshore
35
around the UK. The Crown Estate also owns the seabed out to the limits of territorial waters, and inland
up to mean low water mark. These boundaries were originally devised to demarcate property and were
re-enacted in the Local Government Act of 1972, without taking into account the needs of coastal zone
management (Gibson, 1993:120).
In 1992, a House of Commons Select committee on Coastal Zone Protection and Planning reported that
although there was widespread support for the treatment of the coastal zone as one integrated unit
comprised of land and sea elements, the management of these two environments formed two distinct
activities or areas of jurisdiction.
The Committee found that:
“The division between the planning control system at sea and on land may be regarded as
forming the root of many of the problems with current coastal protection and planning
policies… Harmonising the planning systems of below and above the low water mark seems to
us to be the basic requisite for an integrated approach to planning in the coastal zone”
(1992:30)
Thus a recommendation was made to harmonise landward planning control and seaward planning
control as far as the 12 Nautical Mile limit of territorial waters. However this was not enacted, and thus
the cessation of local authority planning controls at mean low water mark remains the norm in England2
(see PPG 20: the Coast), although PPG 20 also states that “Local planning authorities will need to
consider how best to define the coastal zone for their areas… based on local circumstances and the key
coast-related planning issues to be covered in their planning policies” (1992:5). Up until the enactment
of the Marine and Coastal Access Act in 2009, sectoral agencies controlled activities further out at sea,
such as aggregate extraction, however much of this sectoral legislation has now been brought under the
auspices of the Marine Management Organisation which is responsible for most marine planning and
management activity in England, whilst the Welsh Assembly Government and Marine Scotland will
undertake marine management duties for the devolved administrations. .
2 In Scotland under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997, terrestrial planning controls extend to the
mean low water mark and marine fish farming.
36
2.3.2 Biophysical Definitions of the Coastal Zone
Addressing the biophysical perspective, Alder and Kay (2005) acknowledge the link between water
catchments that may be far inland but that have an influence on estuaries and coasts, citing Ketchum’s
(1972) definition of the coastal zone as
“the band of dry land and adjacent ocean space (water and submerged land) in which terrestrial
processes and land uses directly affect oceanic processes and uses, and vice versa” (in Alder and
Kay, 2005:2)
Perhaps the most important biophysical perspective for defining the spatial unit to be the subject of
coastal management is the ecosystem approach, which may be applied to both marine and coastal
environments. Ecosystems represent functional units of interacting biotic and abiotic components that
operate as dynamic, open systems. Where the ecosystems approach is operationalised for coastal
management purposes, it is described as
“The integrated management of human activities based on knowledge of ecosystem dynamics to
achieve sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services, and maintenance of ecosystem integrity”
(ICES, 2000).
Post and Lundin (1996:3) point to the wide variations between national definitions of the coastal zone
and the arbitrary nature or convenience with which the coastal zone is placed within jurisdictional limits.
This could potentially lead to a mismatch between ecosystems and administrative boundaries (e.g.
government regions) and inadequate recognition given to the true scale of the interrelated components
that make up a particular coastal or marine ecosystem.
It should be noted that although shoreline management planning, river basin management planning,
Marine Planning and ICZM are all in theory applied to ecosystems, these forms of planning and
management are operationalised within the parameters of predefined administrative areas. In the case
of shoreline management, Coastal Groups are based on sediment cells, but responsibility for planning
lies with the adjacent local planning authorities. For river basin management, Basin Management Plans
are produced for a number of specifically delineated River Basin Management Districts. The ICES
definition of the ecosystems approach outlined above underpins the UK government’s approach to
marine stewardship as outlined in Safeguarding Our Seas: a Strategy for the Conservation and
Sustainable Development of Our Marine Environment (DEFRA, 2002) and takes a broader strategic
37
perspective than traditional coastal management boundaries, including both water catchment and high
seas influences on the coastal zone.
Although the eight ICZM principles set out by the EU in Recommendation 2002/413/EC concerning the
implementation of ICZM in Europe are based on the ecosystem approach set out in the Community’s
Sixth Environmental Action Programme, experience in the UK of implementing non-statutory ICZM has
to date been based on a weak interpretation of the coastal zone that does not give sufficient
consideration to the marine aspect of the coastal environment (Gubbay, 2002). Therefore much coastal
management/ICZM activity in the UK has focused on the land and as such is subsumed within the
framework of terrestrial spatial planning. The lack of integration between offshore, coastal and
terrestrial environments has been identified as a shortcoming of the current ICZM regime in the UK,
though this has mainly been due to the lack of coordination between the bodies responsible for
activities in each zone (DEFRA 2007b:9).
Referring to Figure 1.1 in the previous chapter which outlines the jurisdictions of government bodies in
England in the coastal and marine environment, it can be seen that the extent of the MMO’s jurisdiction
for Marine Planning overlaps with Local Planning Authorities’ jurisdiction for terrestrial spatial planning
between High and Low Water. This should facilitate some integration between marine and terrestrial
planning, and according to the recently issued Draft Marine Policy Statement this will be achieved by
ensuring consistency between marine and terrestrial planning policies and documents, liaison between
respective responsible authorities, a shared evidence base and adopting the principles of ICZM (HM
Government, 2010:23). However it could be questioned whether this approach to issues of overlap of is
really sufficient to encourage spatial integration, and how this works in practice may not be known for
several years.
Integration in the temporal dimension can refer to the seasonal changes which occur in the physical
environment, and also the integration of planning cycles with evolving ecosystems, as identified by
Olsen (2001), who cites the mismatch between cycles of governance and cycles of coastal ecosystem
change Rather than standing in isolation from natural processes, Olsen notes that governance efforts at
an intermediate time scale between short term governance initiatives and longer term periods over
which environmental change are evaluated (two to four decades) have been crucially important for
areas such as the Great Lakes and the Netherlands (2001:334). Spatial and temporal integration,
therefore, have a strong ecological component and as such may also form part of an ecosystem
approach to ICZM.
38
Integration across disciplines is also important – a 1996 GESAMP report cited in its definition of ICZM
that it “unites government and the community, science and management, sectoral and public interests”,
and on a more abstract level, the contested nature of the coastal resource and management approaches
require a deeper understanding of the perspectives and value judgements inherent in decision making
systems. Visser (2004) exemplifies this, citing Osseweijer (1999) and Van Helden (2001):
“The implementation of an integrated approach to the sustainable development of a marine park
area… shows that conflicts can be generated that appear to be about practicalities but in fact result
from the different epistemological histories of marine biology and anthropology. The conceptual
differences about the size of a territory become in practice almost a kind of ideological conflict
between the biologists and the anthropologists involved in the establishment of a marine park”
(2004:29).
The integration of policy is probably the most important form of integration as it can either constitute
an ultimate goal of ICZM to be worked towards, or it can precipitate other forms of integration, such as
the sectoral or institutional. Underdahl (1980) specifies three criteria which must be met for policy
integration to occur. These are:
1. Comprehensiveness – recognising the consequences of policy integration as a premise for
decision making, using all the information available at the time.
2. Aggregation – the ability to evaluate policy alternatives from an overall perspective rather than
by sectors or individuals. This requires the weighing of interests and setting priorities, which
may become more difficult to develop as the scope of public policy broadens and more actors
are involved.
3. Consistency - this is achieved when there is conformity in policy through vertical dimensions
(central to local government) and horizontal (all agencies working towards the same goal, e.g.
local authorities).
Whilst various types of integration are identified and characterised here, the point made in Chapter One
by Cicin-Sain (1993) and Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998) that integration is not a discrete characteristic of
ICZM, but rather a continuum, must be kept in mind. This is particularly pertinent when integration is
39
interpreted to include an element of comprehensiveness by some authors (e.g. Underdahl, 1980), or
implies it in some way (e.g. Chua, 1993).
Comprehensiveness cannot be satisfied through technical-rational approaches such as SEA/EIA, or Cost
Benefit Analysis because there is rarely complete information and understanding of all possible
alternatives in rational comprehensive systems of planning (Kay and Alder, 2005:58). However a more
pragmatic approach such as the “disjointed incrementalism” approach to policy analysis suggested by
Charles Lindblom (1977) which focuses on the remedying of day to day issues and the limitation of
analysis to a few familiar alternatives (Allmendinger, 2002:127) may also have its shortcomings, lacking
the long term perspective needed for sustainable development.
Lang (1990) goes as far as to say that
“The call for integration implicitly criticises the narrowly-based, incremental, opportunistic style
of decision making when it says in effect: ‘Let’s take a broader view, bring in more factors and
interests into the planning process… and do all this in a way that works’” (in Kenchington and
Crawford, 1993:115)
Therefore Kenchington and Crawford call for “an approach which provides a comprehensive framework
for management strategy but maximises the tactical capacity within the strategy so that management
has the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances” (1993:116).
This would allow for a more adaptive, discretionary system of management that maintains overall
strategic direction but is able to respond rapidly to changes (political, economic, in scientific knowledge
or the natural environment) and subsume these changes into the operational workings of the
management system, ensuring continued integration.
2.4 The Critique of Rational Planning and the Communicative Turn
In the previous section, as part of the discussion of the different dimensions of integration, reference
was made by Kay and Alder (2005) to the failure of technical-rational management tools and
comprehensiveness as a means of promoting further integration. Such remarks parallel those made by
Davos (1998) in Chapter One regarding the concept of “best” policies for coastal sustainability, thus
pointing to the need for a different type of integration that eschews both comprehensiveness (as a
40
technical-rational “ideal”) and the pragmatic, short term approach in favour of a more deliberative
process. In land use planning, rationality has been challenged by the communicative or collaborative
approach, based on the theories of Habermas (1984) and Foucault (1972), and applied to planning
processes by Healey (1992, 1997, and 2006), Forester (1989) and others. Both rationality and
communicative rationality are now considered below.
2.4.1 The Rational Approach
In the early Post-War period, the rational paradigm was seen as the dominant approach to decision
making in public policy and policy analysis. In essence, rationality is concerned with problem solving and
the maximisation of welfare (Innes, 1995) or “is a way of choosing the best means to attain a given end”
(Alexander, 1986) and involves “the clarification of policy goals, systematic analysis, logical generation of
policy alternatives, systematic evaluation of these alternatives and monitoring performance” (Healey et
al, 1982:8).
Rationality in policy decision making has its origins in the work of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, who
advocated an “ideal type” bureaucracy in which facts and values should be separated, and where
decision makers should concentrate on what Weber termed formal or functional rationality, that is,
concerned with means and efficiency (Allmendinger 2002:54). Friedmann notes how Weber maintained
that value judgements were the “result of culture, tradition, social position and personal preference, and
they had no place in scientific discourse”, thus acknowledging that the goals of any policy were based on
social constructions of reality (1987, in Allmendinger, 2009:64).
The choice of ends in relation to individual or organisational values using the same neutral approach is
termed substantive or value rationality (Kay and Alder, 2005:58). Bureaucrats were, in the traditions of
the physical sciences and positivist thought, to remain objective, prescribing the best course of action
based on an analysis of all the options and likely outcomes set before them, whilst ends and objectives
or goals belonged in the political realm.
Davos , noting firstly that continued calls for ICZM by bodies such as the World Coast Conference
reiterate ends whilst failing to suggest means and justify their choice (1998:379) and secondly that the
environmental conditions of coastal zones have not improved despite attempts at implementing ICZM,
contends that the continuing problems faced in coastal management “reflects subscription to the
41
positivist principle that expert-based rational analysis... suffices to determine the ‘best’ policy and
management decisions” (1998:380, citing Portney, 1991).
These comments reflect a more broadly understood argument that the scientific approach to decision
making is not without its limitations. Innes (1995) notes that policy analysts such as Herbert Simon
(1945, 1955), Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) and Rittel and Webber (1973) “came up against the
dilemmas inherent in instrumental rationality”. Low points out that the requirements of formal and
substantive rationality are fundamentally in conflict, as any attempt to produce social change involved
the distribution of power and engagement with violence or coercion. The more people strive to achieve
higher substantive goals, the greater the need for formally rational mechanisms such as the market or
bureaucracy which limit the possibility of other values such as freedom and democracy being attained
(1991:75-6).
For Simon, comprehensive rationality was impossible because decision makers lacked perfect
information and the cognitive capacity to know and evaluate all possible courses of action. Simon thus
proposed a model of “bounded rationality”. Behaving in a boundedly rational way, decision makers
adopt rules of thumb in order to simplify the choice between alternatives (Ham and Hill, 1993:84), such
rules or predecisions being based on ideological, professional, cultural or similar grounds (Howlett and
Ramesh, 2003:169).
In a similar fashion, for Lindblom, decision making proceeds by successive limited comparisons, whereby
the number of alternatives considered is limited and focused on those alternatives that do not represent
a significant deviation from existing policies. Unlike rationalism, this incremental approach considers
facts and values simultaneously, i.e. evaluation and empirical analysis is intertwined (Lindblom, 1959) in
order to select alternatives that ameliorate problems rather than aspiring to bigger goals.
Davos (1998) also cites Lindblom’s later work (1980), which points out how, given complete information,
decision analysts (coastal managers or ICZM experts) using a rational process should arrive at the same
decision, however this is not the case in reality as both decision makers and stakeholders hold different
interpretations of the problem and its solution. The failure of technically rational coastal management
to engage in a discourse on these different interpretations thus leads to residual tensions that induce
further conflict and undermine stakeholder willingness to cooperate (Davos, 1998:380).
Lack of perfect information also features in Rittel and Webber’s conception of “wicked” planning
problems, of which achieving sustainable coastal development may be considered one. In this case, the
42
accretion of knowledge about problems and solutions cannot be divorced from the social and political
contexts in which problems exist; for them problem solving “should be based on a model of planning as
an argumentative process in the course of which an image of the problem and of the solution emerges
gradually among the participants, as a product of incessant judgment, subjected to critical argument”
(Rittel and Webber, 1973:162).
2.4.2 The Communicative Turn in Planning
It is such criticisms of the rational approach to planning that precipitated a turn towards a more post-
modern, value-oriented, participatory style of planning. This style is commonly known as
communicative or collaborative planning, being built upon Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative
Action (1984), the work of Michel Foucault (1972) on the expression of social meaning and power
relations through language (Healey, 1996, 1997, in Allmendinger, 2009:197).
In keeping with Davos’ assertion that notions of “best” coastal management practice are the process of
an expert-led, technically rational approach that does not fully engage stakeholders in interpreting the
nature of problems and the way they should be addressed, Huxley explains that the communicative
planning literature recognises that technical and political neutrality “are seen to be incapable of
achieving planning’s reformative goals” (2000:369). Furthermore, Davidoff posits that “values are
inescapable elements of any rational decision making process” (with Reiner, 1962, in Campbell and
Fainstein, 2003:211).
Communicative approaches to planning therefore have many insights to offer participatory coastal
management programmes, and indeed stakeholder involvement is considered not only a cornerstone of
approaches to ICZM, as evidenced in ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC, but also to the broader
landscape of societal governance, in which Hajer and Wagenaar describe that “many pressing problems
no longer comport with the established systems of politics, administration and society. Practical needs
drive the development of cooperative efforts among new constellations of actors” (2003:2). These
conditions have given rise to what is known as deliberative or discursive democracy, that is, a
democracy that is legitimated by the ability or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the
part of those subject to collective decisions (Dryzek, 2002:1).
In this post-modern approach to planning, Howlett and Ramesh observe that the identification of
problems by policy makers in a rational process is “deceptive”, as decision makers are still subject to the
same discourses as the general public (2003:122). Therefore rationality is also shaped within a context
43
of ideologies, events and symbols that are socially constructed by decision makers. For Michel Foucault,
whose work forms the basis for much thinking about communicative planning, the study of social theory
was based on the historical formation of discourses and the production of knowledge by discursive
action.
Perry (1995) observes that Foucault advocated thinking spatially about society, and to this end planning
discourses should be seen “in their contextual places in society” (Perry, 1995, in Campbell and Fainstein,
2002:145). Thinking in this way allowed for an assessment of the intellectual structures that defined,
controlled and reproduced modes of discourse through strategic use of language. Discourse was
considered a “language game”, and, according to Arts and Tatenhove, power a diffuse characteristic of
social practices which operate through discourse (2004:349).
In his early writings on social control, for example, Foucault demonstrated how power could be
pervasive and constitutive of oppressive discourses, for example about criminality and health (Dryzek, in
Moran, Rein and Goodin, 2006:192), and that institutions such as prisons and hospitals reinforced these
social orders. Where power was exercised, Foucault envisaged the possibility of resistance or struggle
against power or dominant modes of thought, however many scholars have pointed out that Foucault
was ambiguous on what form this resistance should take (see Dryzek, 2006, Delanty, 2005 and Fischler,
2000).
Whilst this concept may be considered abstract in the context of coastal management, Foucault’s work
raises some relevant points about communication that have relevance for understanding participatory
forms of planning. Firstly, in examining how modes of thought and social orders are historically and
culturally constituted through discursive practice, Foucault demonstrates that discourses may be socially
constructed in ways which reinforce dominant views or practices.
Delanty notes that revealing how power and identity are constructed has limited usefulness for policy
relevant research (2005:112), however in the context of this thesis attempting to understand the way in
which the current framework of coastal governance is structured by the prevailing scientific or political
discourses and the ways in which problems are defined as requiring formal (statutory) or informal
(voluntary) actions may help to inform new discursive practices in coastal management.
In relation to public policy and policy analysis, Arts and Tatenhove describe how power
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“... is the organisational and discursive capacity of agencies, either in competition with one another
or jointly, to achieve outcomes in social practices, a capacity which is however co-determined by the
structural power of those social institutions in which these agencies are embedded” (2004:347).
This is particularly important for the functioning of coastal partnerships, where securing the resources to
implement projects may be based not only on an ability to negotiate with other organisations within the
system of coastal governance, but may require more fundamental changes to the system itself, such as a
change of policy or the creation of a new institution.
Habermas was also concerned with discursive action, but unlike Foucault whose main concern was with
the wider structuring of modes of thought and collective discourse, Habermas concentrated on the
“specific utterances” of individuals in their communication with others.
Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality sought to reconcile the instrumental rationality of the
“system” or political world in which the structures of economic and political order exist (Healey,
2006:50) with the “lifeworld” of people’s everyday lives, interactions and personal experiences
(Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998:1975). According to Habermas (1987, in Allmendinger, 2009) the
system envelops and shapes the lifeworld, thus limiting people’s ability to “develop, confirm and renew
their memberships in social groups and their own identities” (Habermas, quoted in Healey and Hillier,
1995:21).
Thus communicative rationality sought to uncover distorted forms of communication and reveal its
emancipatory potential (Delanty, 2005) in a critically discursive democracy, one of the central features
of this being the idea of authentic communication. Dryzek posits that authenticity reflects the extent to
which discourse is free from distorting agents or domination via the exercise of power, manipulation,
indoctrination, propaganda, deception, expressions of mere self-interest, threats, and the imposition of
ideological conformity (2002:8). To a similar end, Low outlines four claims that Habermas makes,
conveying the validity of communication or presenting an “ideal” speech situation - without these
conditions being present in the act of speech, we cannot claim to be communicating at all. These claims
are:
1. Truth of propositions about our external reality,
2. Rightness of our interpersonal relations with the other person,
3. Truthfulness about our internal subjective state,
4. Comprehensibility of our language (Low, 1991:248).
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According to Fainstein, the communicative planning model draws on a synthesis of two methodologies –
firstly an inductive enquiry, which searches for examples of best practice in democratic planning,
exploring who the practitioners were, what they did, and what institutional conditions helped or
hindered their efforts (Hoch, 1996, in Fainstein and Campbell, 2003), and secondly based on a
hypothesis of intersubjective communication and mutual understanding. It is with this proposition that
Habermas sought to “rescue the concept of reason from the narrow instrumental rationalism” (Healey,
2006:50), building knowledge and agreement through free and open discourse between individuals in a
process that was communicatively rational.
John Forester was one of the first writers to observe how planning was subject to distorted forms of
communication, stating that “the communicative character of planning practice involves much more
than how clearly planners write or speak. What planners choose to say – and choose not to say – is
politically crucial” (1989:153). In calling for a more open planning process in which there was greater
interaction between the planners and those being planned for, Forester therefore saw the role of
planners as gatekeepers, drawing attention to different possibilities and exposing powerful interests
through communicative actions (Allmendinger, 2009:138-9).
Based on Habermas’ ideas about speech, Foucault, the work of Forester and others, Healey (1992:154-6)
outlines the main components of a communicatively rational planning approach as:
Planning as an interactive and interpretive process,
Interaction within diverse and fluid discourse communities,
Interaction based on respectful discussion,
A focus and reflection on the arenas in which discussion takes place,
Acknowledgement of different ways of knowing and forms of knowledge,
Development of reflective capacity to evaluate the communicative process,
Opening up of discourse to include all interested parties, revealing further discourses and arenas
of debate,
Understanding the interests of participants, learning and mutually constructing new
understandings,
The potential for societal transformation through discussion and the power of “the better
argument”,
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A starting point for a continually evolving process of building shared understanding and desired
outcomes.
Whilst these components represent a normative position on the way communicative rationality can be
achieved, there are many aspects that can be directly related to the process of coastal management and
achieving integration. First and foremost, in providing an arena for discussion in which all points of view
are considered to be equal and valid, different and competing interests may be brought together in a
less adversarial manner.
Acknowledging different forms of knowledge and knowledge creation is particularly important in coastal
zone management, where scientists may not relate their research to management issues and coastal
managers lack the knowledge to assist scientists (GESAMP 1996, in Stojanovic et al, 2009), or local,
traditional ecological knowledge may need to be accommodated. Hedelin (2008) observes that, in
relation to water management, the integration and use of knowledge in a planning process is inherently
difficult because stakeholders hold different values and perspectives about resource management
problems (2008:231).
Sharing information and encompassing knowledge from different disciplines is not only important for
addressing the horizontal dimension of integration, between organisations and individuals of different
sectors, but also helps in trying to address issues of uncertainty, where understanding different values
and priorities that may serve as the basis for rational reasoning throughout the process (Klosterman,
1978, and Rayner, 1999, in Hedelin, 2008:232).
Opening up planning processes to diverse communities, reflecting upon the communicative process and
arenas of debate can bring about greater vertical integration by widening the scope of discussion to
include a broader range of stakeholders. When taken in conjunction with the notion of communicating
in more comprehensible language, this “opening up” could therefore include those non-expert
stakeholders not traditionally expected to be involved in discussions of a more technical, scientific
nature that usually occur at higher levels of governance and decision making, for example in designating
Marine Protected Areas.
Introducing a more reflective element to the planning process which considers where and in what
format discussions take place, planners and decision makers are also able to consider how the most
significant features of more top-down, formally imposed consultation structures (such as the public
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consultations on Local Development Plans and Sustainability Appraisals) and more informally led,
grassroots or bottom-up organisation (such as coastal fora) may be combined or redesigned to facilitate
greater dialogue between stakeholders and the search for shared values or preferred courses of action.
The communicative approach to planning is not without its criticisms, and Allmendinger and Tewdwr-
Jones (2002) provide a critique of some of the fundamental assumptions communicative planning
theory has taken and outline further questions about how communicative planning may be
operationalised. Whilst the underlying assumptions of communicative planning are significant for the
hypotheses that underpin this research, Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones’ initial discussion of
communicative planning framed as a new paradigm in planning thought are outside the scope of this
research, and thus it is sufficient to say that communicative or deliberative practice is perhaps the
hegemonic idea of planning (Ritchie and Ellis, 2010:707).
A second issue noted by Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones is that problem-solving by agreement is only
one form of collective decision making, and that bargaining or voting may also be utilised, with
bargaining particularly used where there is unequal access to power and unequal intensity of
preferences to be traded off (2002, citing Elster, 1998:7), although communicative planning theorists do
not make clear the circumstances in which the communicative approach is the most appropriate
method of decision making.
Such a criticism may be pertinent to the operation of coastal partnerships, where the delivery of
projects is highly dependent upon bargaining or persuading partners to contribute resources, for
example in undertaking research work such as marine surveys or hosting capacity building exercises.
Where decision making is highly politicised or controversial, voting is one way in which a decision can be
taken. However for some coastal partnerships, particularly those which are registered charities or
hosted by local planning authorities, taking a position on such issues may not be permissible under the
regulations governing their organisational structure and scope of activity, and thus deliberation on
potentially divisive issues may have to be avoided altogether.
A last critique of communicative action concerns the motivation of participants and the assumptions
made about the use of ideal speech. Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones observe that “the assumption that
participants will behave in such a way as to sustain fruitful deliberation ignores the fact that attitudes
towards conversation do not originate from democratic arrangements, but are more likely to be by-
products of a pre-existing culture that may be antithetical to deliberation” (2002:15) and thus
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participants may place more emphasis on winning an argument rather than engaging in a reflective,
learning process. Similarly, private interests may be seen to enter into more collaborative practices as a
means of gaining public legitimacy, and again are less concerned with the transformative potential of
such arrangements.
In considering the use of the communicative planning approach the criticisms outlined above therefore
highlight some of the potential pitfalls of communicative action. In terms of the circumstances under
which communicative action might be the most appropriate method of decision making, it should be
noted that any kind of spatial planning activity carried out by the public sector or on behalf of “the
public interest” requires an element of communicative action to gain legitimacy, whether it is for a
strategic policy such as the consultations on England’s ICZM Strategy (see DEFRA, 2006a) or more site-
specific proposals such as a planning application for a new hotel, and these processes are governed by
law (for example the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, updated by the Planning and Compulsory
Purchase Act, 2004). Thus the use of communicative action, to a certain extent, can remain bound by
existing democratic and legal structures.
2.5 Communicative Action and Coastal Planning Regimes
In the sphere of environmental or natural resource management, Crance and Draper observe that
“Because of the abundance of interdependencies operative in many resource use situations,
management efforts must be redefined to suit unique circumstances” (1996:175) and thus ICZM
represents one such example where sharing information, power and decision making are used to make
decisions in a way that commands greater support from the parties or stakeholders that will be affected
by the outcomes of such decisions. In arguing for a more inclusive and deliberative form of coastal
management, Brown et al outline four ways in which this might contribute to the development of
coastal management. These are:
Increased awareness and understanding of conflicts of interest, information and related to
interpretations of information,
Providing space for learning and participating in decision making,
Facilitating communication that builds trust and shared stakeholder knowledge about resources,
Building a platform for collective actions and new institutions of coastal management.
(2002:120).
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This collective, deliberative approach to governance is reflected in the use of the term “partnership” in
relation to coastal management in the UK, but partnership working more specifically has its roots in the
broader changes to politics and the governance of the state which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
Having defined governance in Chapter One as referring to the arrangement of actors collaborating to
deliver public policy, Rhodes (1994) and Peters (1993) describe the governance regime of the 1980s as a
“Hollowing out of the state”, whereby the decline of citizen participation in electoral politics, reduced
state involvement in direct service provision and the increase in arm’s length delivery agencies, and also
the influence of supra-national organisations such as the European Union transferring powers upwards
or downwards away from central government to regions and local level has resulted in more complex,
multi-level governance. Whilst ICZM practice in the UK bears some resemblance to the model of
hollowing out in that the central government tier has been the weakest link in delivering a programme
of ICZM as set out inICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC, this has not been accompanied by a loss or
transfer of powers because the Recommendation did not require any additional statutory powers to be
established in the lower tiers of national, regional or local government and so does not represent
hollowing out in its truest sense.
Whilst the history of joint working between organisations to deliver a common aim goes back much
further than can be described here, Skelcher describes how, in a similar vein to the comment made by
Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) above regarding new arrangements of actors forming out of the need to
tackle complex issues, partnership formation has been initiated because the conjunction of hollowing
out and cross-cutting issues has stimulated the widespread use of strategies designed to foster
collaboration in this fragmented landscape (Skelcher, 2000:8) and contributes to the development of
what he terms the “congested” state, comprised of many organisations working to deliver public policy.
It is also pertinent to note that Sullivan and Skelcher state that “Very often differing policy fields begin
with a bespoke interpretation of partnership that is not shared beyond that policy area” (2002:5) Thus
the concept of partnership working in the context of ICZM can describe a range of different
organisational structures based around the delivery of ICZM by more or less formal means, but
beginning with the ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC principles of:
(f) involving all the parties concerned(economic and social partners, the organisations representing
coastal zone residents, non-governmental organisations and the business sector) in the
management process, for example by means of agreements and based on shared responsibility;
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And
(g) support and involvement of relevant administrative bodies at national, regional and local level
between which appropriate links should be established or maintained with the aim of improved
coordination of the various existing policies. Partnership with and between regional and local
authorities should apply when appropriate; (CEC, 2002)
The principles outlined here thus emphasise both integration in the horizontal dimension, that is,
between sectors or organisations operating within the coastal zone, but also vertical integration
between multiple layers of governance. This necessitates a process of negotiation between a broad
range of public, private and voluntary sector bodies at local, regional and national level to reach
agreement about the what action is to be taken, but also requires a specific structure in which such
negotiations can take place.
In Chapter One a typical coastal partnership organisational structure was described as a partnership
officer, steering/management group and sub-groups, and it is usually representatives of core funding
agencies that make up the central body of the “partnership”. Beyond this, coastal partnerships may be
open to membership by groups or individuals with an interest in their activities. There is great variation
in several aspects of coastal partnerships and their work, which can be summarised as follows:
Administrative arrangements: these are closely bound with sources of partnership funding and
host organisations, for example many English coastal partnerships are funded by county or local
planning authorities such as the Dorset Coast Forum, Sefton Coast Partnership and East Riding
coastal Forum. These partnerships receive financial support and benefits “in kind” in the form of
office space and support staff. Some partnerships are hosted by university departments where
there is a strong academic interest in the local environment, for example the Colne Estuary
Partnership is hosted by Essex University’s department of Biological Sciences, whilst the East
Grampian Coastal Partnership is hosted by the Macaulay Land Use Institute in Aberdeen. Other
partnerships may be linked to specific projects such as English Nature’s Estuaries Initiative,
which ran from 1992 to 1998 (see Morris, 2008), and some function as charitable organisations
such as the Morecambe Bay Partnership and Solway Firth Partnership. Sources of funding
beyond host organisations can include project funding from European Union and national
bodies such as the Environment Agency, DEFRA, English Nature, private sector sponsors such as
utility companies and landowners, NGOs and small community grants or charitable funds.
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Geographical coverage: again, this aspect of coastal partnerships can be tied to specific funding
arrangements, host organisations or pre-existing landscape and conservation designations. In
some cases partnerships focus their activities on one water body or stretch of coast such as
Durham Heritage Coast, or may cover a broader area including several water bodies at county,
sub-regional or regional level, such as Devon Maritime Forum or the North West Coastal Forum.
As has previously been noted, the Firths provided the initial focus of activities for Scottish
coastal organisations, and encompass large areas of sheltered seas, estuaries and their
surrounding coastal communities, which may include large cities and industrial areas such as
Glasgow on the Firth of Clyde.
Remit: whilst some coastal organisations may have a specific remit relating to the management
of designated areas such as Heritage Coasts, European Marine Sites or Areas of Outstanding
Natural Beauty, or managing coastal flooding and erosion through Shoreline Management Plans
in the case of Coastal Groups, the majority of coastal partnerships are able to define their own
terms of reference, visions, strategies or plans. Morris (2008) notes that Estuary Management
Plans were perceived in some quarters to be conservation led, but their intended remit
encompassed broader economic development and conflict resolution themes. As was stated in
Chapter One, some of the aims of coastal partnerships include facilitating cooperation and
conflict resolution, raising awareness of coastal issues and promoting local enterprise and
providing research and consultancy functions.
The lack of a prescribed format for partnership working in coastal partnerships therefore provides great
scope for individual organisations to define their own ways of working with the resources they have
available and the stakeholders or interests present in their local area. English Nature’s Estuary
Management Plans: a co-ordinator’s guide (1992) provided an early form of guidance for coastal and
estuary partnerships for plan making and stakeholder involvement, but it was not until Lymbery’s (2008)
a Guide to Collaborative Working on the Coast – Two Heads are Better Than One that a more systematic
process for designing and implementing partnership working practices was applied to analyse the
working practices of coastal partnerships.
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In this guide Lymbery summarises some of the key theoretical and practical literature on collaborative
working, most notably the Audit Commission’s own guide to partnership working, a Fruitful Partnership
(1998), which defines partnership as “otherwise independent bodies who have agreed to cooperate to
achieve a common goal and create a separate structure to plan and achieve their goals” (1998:6) and
sets out the rationale for partnership working, encouraging organisations to consider first whether they
need to work in partnership, and if so then setting out criteria for establishing organisational structures,
identifying partners, building trust, maintaining commitment and decision making.
Lymbery refers to two further strands of literature which may be used to structure or evaluate the work
of coastal partnerships – these are Barbara Gray’s work on inter-organisational collaboration (see Gray,
1986, 1996, Wood and Gray, 1991) and Chris Huxham’s work on collaborative advantage (see Huxham,
1993, 1996). Both Gray and Huxham provide a step-wise format for understanding the process of
collaborative or partnership formation, decision making and implementation in which stakeholders are
able to explore theirs and others motives for entering into a collaborative venture, engaging in an open
debate which acknowledges differences in expectations, powers and ways of working, for example:
“don’t expect other organisations to do things the same way that yours does. Things that may be easy to
do in your organisation may, for example, require major political manoeuvring in another” (Huxham and
Vangen, 2005).
The frameworks provided by Gray and Huxham thus give practical expression to a wider literature
concerning communicative or collaborative approaches to planning, and which form one dimension of
the assumption relating to improved integration requiring a continuous discourse between
stakeholders on the nature of problems and their potential solutions.
Whilst the discussion of collaborative planning in this chapter has specifically focused on the delivery of
ICZM in the UK as a type of environmental management, such participatory and communicative forms of
environmental governance can be applied equally to other coastal planning regimes. The processes of
terrestrial spatial planning, shoreline management, river basin management and marine planning all
contain an element of public participation, whether this is mandated through legislation and formal
statements of involvement (for example Statements of Community Involvement for spatial planning, the
Working Together provisions of River Basin Management outlined by the Environment Agency and the
proposed Statements of Public Participation for Marine Planning – see DEFRA, 2010b) or recommended
practice (such as DEFRA’s 2005 Making Space for Water coastal flooding and erosion management
53
document and Shoreline Management Plan Guidance, or the principles ofICZM Recommendation
2002/413/EC).
Whilst participation in each undoubtedly contributes to the plans that are produced, much of this
participation takes place in a predetermined framework that specifies when and what form of
participation is required in the implementation of a management process. Underpinning such
frameworks for coastal management regimes are the social constructions of problems and solutions,
which determine the type of policy response that is implemented and are the subject of the first
assumption of the research.
Within the framework for coastal integration shown in Figure 1.2, measures such as spatial planning,
ICZM, marine planning, river basin management and shoreline management have all developed along
different trajectories, coming under the jurisdictions of different levels of government. In some cases,
the social construction of a problem may result in more formal, top-down styles of governance in which
central or international levels of government and their associated powers are judged to be the most
appropriate means to address cross cutting sustainability concerns, such as the European Directives
related to water quality and nature conservation. Conversely, bottom-up, voluntary approaches such as
the work of coastal partnerships in relation to ICZM, bringing together organisations in collaborative
arrangements to develop a shared power may prevail.
Therefore to fully understand the current context of ICZM implementation in the UK, it is necessary to
examine the way in which the “coastal problem” was initially constructed and the historical
development of the ICZM regime. By understanding the discourse (or discourses) which surround the
construction of coastal problems, it may then be possible to find ways in which a new discourse on the
role of communicative action and its significance for improved integration can take place. Following a
similar line of investigation for other coastal planning regimes may contribute to this understanding, as
they can serve as a useful comparator, highlighting different discourses or different consequences of
similar discourses in different contexts.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, two central features of ICZM have been introduced. First, the concept of management as
a learning process, in which going through several iterations of a planning cycle can lead to changes in
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management goals and methods. This process is enhanced when there is a greater dialogue between
stakeholders and opportunities to reflect on different perspectives of how the management process has
functioned and future directions it may take.
Secondly, in examining the meaning of integration, several dimensions of integration are identified as
being important for improving coastal management. The spatial integration of the coastal zone
represents an area in which different constructions of the physical environment overlap and this gives
rise to a complex system of regulations and plan areas. In turn, this creates a need for the integration of
institutions, sectors, policies and even academic disciplines to ensure that all stakeholders and activities
are considered in coastal management and to reduce the chances of there being duplication of efforts.
The theories of deliberation, communicative rationality and the use of language examined in this
chapter all provide some insight into the ways that coastal problems and the processes for dealing with
them are not only socially constructed by stakeholders but may continue to be reconstructed through
dialogue, which has the potential to reinforce existing power relations or governance structures and
undermine the appeal of participatory planning approaches, or open up new avenues for learning and
collaboration in a more adaptive management process. Such communicative approaches are crucial for
understanding the extent of integration in different dimensions and working towards a more integrated
form of coastal management.
In the next chapter, the process of social constructing environmental problems is considered in more
detail, in order to determine how it may impact on the implementation of coastal planning regimes in
practice.
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CHAPTER 3: Exploring the Social Construction of Coastal Management Problems
3.1 Introduction
Having established in the previous chapter the basis of collaborative planning and the potential this has
for improving different dimensions of integration in coastal management, this chapter returns to the
theme of socially constructed environmental problems and attempts to meet Objective Two, that is, to
explain the emergence of coastal planning regimes in terms of the social construction of a “coastal
problem” in order to understand the different policy responses that might occur.
In Chapter One the non-statutory and voluntary nature of ICZM initiatives in the UK was set against the
context of more complex arrangements for managing the coast, with the emergence of the Marine and
Coastal Access Act providing fresh impetus on discussions for the future role of ICZM (see Stojanovic and
Barker, 2008), particularly in light of more formal planning processes such as Marine Planning and River
Basin Management moving up the political agenda.
Considering these different parts of the framework for coastal integration to be the product of social
constructions of different problems, such as coastal development, marine management, flooding and
water quality, this chapter examines in more detail the historical development of coastal planning
regimes through the environmental sociology-social construction model proposed by John Hannigan.
First, the roots of the environmental sociology movement are established in order to demonstrate how
this perspective has much in common with the ecosystem approach advocated in ICZM. Hannigan’s
proposed model for the social construction of an environmental problem is then explained, and applied
to ICZM, Marine Planning and River Basin Management Planning to trace the emergence of planning and
management regimes as a response to the various problems of the coastal zone and marine
environment.
It is anticipated that using the social construction model it will be possible to identify those events and
discourses which have contributed to the construction of coastal problems, giving rise to the current
dominant planning and management regimes designed to ameliorate such problems. The chapter
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concludes with an evaluation of the usefulness of Hannigan’s social construction model for
understanding the ways in which coastal planning regimes come to be implemented.
3.2 Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Environmental Problems
The field of environmental sociology is a relatively new addition to the more traditional sub-disciplines
of sociology. It emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a research area identified by Catton and
Dunlap (1979) as being distinct from the sociology of environmental issues.
The sociology of environmental issues explored environmentally related phenomena, such as social
movements, resource management and recreation activities in “natural” environments through
traditional sociological perspectives (Buttel, 1987:467). In this respect the sociology of environmental
issues has at its core an anthropocentric world view, or what has been labelled the “Human
Exceptionalist Paradigm” (HEP).
The HEP assumes that people are fundamentally different from other creatures, that they can determine
their own destinies and that there are no constraints on human society (Irwin, 2001). Such a perspective
draws on the Durkheimian concept that social phenomena can only be explained by way of social facts,
which are defined as
“Ways of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an influence, or an
external constraint” (Durkheim, in Martin and McIntyre 1994:438)
Durkheim viewed social facts as “things” existing outside the individual consciousness with the power to
control an individual’s behaviour, and consisting of representations and actions which should not be
confused with biological phenomena.
In a departure from this traditional sociological thinking, environmental sociology explains social
phenomena in terms of non-social facts. Catton and Dunlap (1979) define the new environmental
sociology as involving the recognition of the fact that physical environments can influence human
behaviour and society and vice versa. This standpoint also differs from the worldview offered by the HEP
in that, although humans are seen as a species with exceptional characteristics, they are merely one of
many species existing in an ecosystem and are thus bound by environmental constraints.
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This alternative set of assumptions emphasising the interactions between humans and their
environment in an ecosystem setting has been termed by Catton and Dunlap the New Ecological or
Environmental Paradigm (NEP). The exploitative relationship between humans and their biophysical
environment is central to the NEP, which envisions a neo-Malthusian style global catastrophe resulting
from continuing population growth and unchecked economic development (Hannigan, 2006:30).
Another division central to thinking in environmental sociology is the realism versus constructionism
debate. Socially constructed knowledge is a product of interaction or communicative action rather than
objective observation of the world, and whilst the objective conditions for a potential social (or
environmental) problem may exist, it is argued that these may be insufficient for the problem to emerge
and that the existence of problems may be dependent upon groups or agencies that define a condition
or problem and attempt to do something about it (Kitsuse and Spector, 1973, in Yearley, 1991:50). This
may be the case, for example, in scientific investigations.
In terms of the environment, therefore, John Hannigan suggests an approach that is less concerned with
the objective truth about environmental problems per se but rather that social constructionist sociology
should consider how problems come to be constructed by the interaction of the social actors, types of
knowledge deployed and the power relations between these factors (Irwin, 2001:171).
Because of this approach, social constructionists have been criticised by realists for downplaying the
reality of environmental crises which are thought (by realists) to exist independently of representations
or social constructions. This is because social constructionism rejects the notion of objective facts
derived from empiricism and the imposition of truth on others, allowing for a diversity of
representations of “nature”, “the environment” and what resources are considered to be of value in
different cultural and historical settings. Indeed, the coastal zone itself may be constructed in a number
of ways by competing interest groups, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 2 in relation to the
biophysical and policy-oriented definitions.
The reductionist analysis of social constructionism offered by realists in this case ignores the fact that
such an approach has a distinct advantage in being able to explain how environmental problems are
framed and can rise to prominence, given the contested natures of reality and truth and the power
relations embedded within language and action. Dryzek notes that
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“Just because something is socially interpreted does not mean it is unreal… but people can
make very different things of these phenomena and – especially – their interconnections,
providing grist for political dispute” (2005:12).
Dickens also observes that the ‘construction versus realism’ dichotomy is misleading because realists
acknowledge that all knowledge is in some sense a social construction – it does not appear with a label
pronouncing it to be absolute truth (1996:71).
What realists object to is ‘strong social constructionism’ which denies the independent agency of the
natural world (i.e. that environmental change is a phenomena that exists in the non-human world
independent of social construction) and makes the assumption that social constructionists treat all
claims as equally valid (Dunlap and Catton, 1994).
Thus in the first instance, the realist critique finds social constructionists to lack the moral imperative to
contribute to the management of environmental problems, a normative position of the environmental
sociologist, and in the second instance, Catton and Dunlap argue that “If all truth claims have validity,
then there is no basis for endorsing some over others, and thus no basis for becoming proactive” (Ibid,
94:22). In other words, constructionism, as a relativist standpoint, offers no moral or political
foundation for action (Gergen and Gergen, 2003:228).
However Burningham and Cooper point out that within social problem research, the majority of social
constructionist analyses do not contest the reality of environmental problems. The job of the social
constructionist is not to question whether a problem exists, or to assess the validity of claims being
made about the problem (thus favouring certain positions over others), but to attempt to account for
the emergence, organisation and maintenance of claims-making activity (1999:304).
It is for this purpose, therefore, that Hannigan’s (1995) model of the social construction of
environmental problems is used as a framework to analyse the emergence of planning and
management regimes related to the coastal zone. Hannigan, acknowledging the objective conditions in
which environmental problems exist, recognising “the mess which we have created in the atmosphere,
the soil and the waterways” (1995:3), states that:
“Social construction makes a valuable contribution to environmental policy making by
asking important questions about who makes claims for the existence of environmental
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problems and who opposes them, thus allowing us to situate environmental issues within
relevant social and political contexts” (Hannigan, 2006: 33).
More importantly, the successful construction of an environmental problem is crucial to ensuring
sustained public and political attention to the perceived problem and implementing policy responses
and the analysis of how claims for water, coastal problems are constructed is vital to understanding the
current context of coastal governance and the relationship between planning and management
regimes.
Hannigan argues that there are six essential factors or prerequisites for the construction of an
environmental claim. These are:
Scientific authority for and validation of claims – in order for an environmental claim to be
made, a problem (i.e. a change in environmental conditions) must be observed and defined,
providing grounds for a claim. Observations can rarely be transformed to problems without
scientific evidence to support a claim – however, scientific truths can be matters of dispute, and
thus the public impact of such evidence may be of more importance then the correctness of the
claim.
Existence of popularisers – popularisers, in the form of moral or policy entrepreneurs can be
advocates in or outside government who are prepared to invest their time and resources for a
favourable return such as a new policy or the elevation of personal status (Kingdon, 2003:122,
or described in some literature as reticulists). Popularisers are required to raise the visibility of a
problem, commanding the attention of a wider audience of opinion-makers.
Media attention – use of the media by entrepreneurs is a necessary activity for attracting the
attentions of the general public to the claim being made. This highlights the perceived
weaknesses in prevailing institutional, legislative and policy arrangements, prompting
reconsideration of the appropriate interventions required (Peel and Lloyd, 2004:367).
Dramatisation of the problem in symbolic and visual terms – in concurrence with gaining media
attention, potential environmental problems must be dramatised in a manner which
communicates their effects in a clear fashion and heightens public concern, for example
through film, pictures, charts or rhetorical motifs that evoke an imagery of significance or risk.
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Economic incentives for taking positive action – an economic case must be made for
intervention in an environmental problem. However, economic incentives for one group may
involve costs for another (as can be seen in many preservation versus economic development
arguments in developing nations). Randall cites the incomplete specification of property rights
as a major source of conflict in natural resource use (1981:148). Without the clear definition of
rights, restrictions and penalties for the violation of such restrictions, the incentive to trade
property rights as a way of resolving conflict is reduced and the likelihood of continuing conflict
increased (Marshall et al, 1996:169).
Recruitment of an institutional sponsor – for a potential problem to move up the policy agenda,
an institutional sponsor is needed to ensure legitimacy and provide continuity towards
implementing some sort of action to ameliorate the problem, for example the introduction of
legislation or changes to existing policy. Sponsors could take the form of, for example, pressure
groups or government agencies.
Whilst these prerequisites for the successful construction of an environmental problem are presented
here in a logical sequence, the model does not necessarily follow a linear structure of consecutive steps.
As noted by Peel and Lloyd in relation to the problems of the marine environment, an emerging
institutional sponsor’s activities and the deployment of regulation and policy integration provides de
facto incentives for stakeholders (2004:369). This could translate into an example of the threat of
financial losses for non-compliance with regulation or failing to anticipate changes in an ethical
consumer driven market. However, what remains essential here is that all six prerequisites are met.
Another model of the politicisation of environmental problems was proposed by Anthony Downs in the
1972 article “Up and down with ecology – the ‘Issue-attention cycle’”. In Downs’ model environmental
problems are brought to public attention and fade from view in a linear process which shares much in
common with Hannigan’s social construction model.
In the early or pre-problem stage, scientific interest and enquiry exists. This is followed by alarmed
discovery, whereby public awareness is increased (e.g. by dramatic events, popularisers and the media),
and gives way to “euphoric enthusiasm” about society’s ability to solve this problem or ‘do something
effective’ within a short space of time (Downs, 1972:41). This forces an institutional response, for
example the establishment of new institutions, programmes or policies to deal with the problem.
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Increasingly, these stages of the cycle are becoming inseparable due to the speed at which information
moves and public pressure to act (O’Riordan, 2000:65).
It is at this point where Downs and Hannigan’s models begin to diverge. In the case of Hannigan,
institutional sponsors and economic incentives for positive action come to the fore and this maintains
interest in the perceived problem. However for Downs, realising the cost of significant progress in trying
to solve a problem (either in financial terms or by lifestyle changes) may prove to be a disincentive,
particularly when sections of society must lose some benefits, for example being reluctant to give up car
use.
These disincentives or the suppression of thoughts about the problem to be faced lead to a gradual
decline of intense public interest, and by this time another problem may be making the headlines.
Therefore an issue reaches the post-problem stage, where it exists in some sort of “limbo” (Downs,
1972:40), receiving less attention, although it may at some point recapture public interest.
Therefore the issue-attention cycle represents more of a spiral in public attention to environmental
problems – after the initial interest in the problem has waned, knowledge of the problem becomes
embedded within institutions and individuals. At the time when the issue does recapture attention,
there remains an institutional base from which to develop more effective policy (Connelly and Smith,
2003:132). And, according to Downs (1972), having gone through the cycle, the problem will attract a
higher level of attention than others still in the pre-discovery stage.
Both Hannigan and Downs thus provide examples of ways in which the identification of a problem can
lead to a new or changed public policy. Whilst Downs (1972) presents the emergence of a problem and
implementation of a solution as a gradual process, attention quickly wanes once a potential solution is
found to be not readily available. Hannigan’s model, in contrast to Downs, provides a more
contemporary perspective, reflecting the way in which the use of the media not only allows for a much
more rapid communication of information but also plays a greater role in shaping and maintaining the
discourse about the solutions to problems.
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3.3 the Social Construction of the “Coastal Problem” and Planning Regimes as a Response
In this section, Hannigan’s model of the social construction of environmental problems is used to trace
the emergence of planning and management regimes as a response to the problems of the coastal zone
and marine environment. Whilst the focus of this exercise is on ICZM, the development of ICZM will be
considered alongside Marine Planning and River Basin Management.
These two regimes have been chosen for comparison for several reasons. First, they constitute part of
the government’s framework for coastal integration as described in Chapter One and shown in Figure
1.2 alongside ICZM. Unlike Shoreline Management Plans, which have a quite specific purpose in relation
to flooding and erosion, MP and RBMP have broad sustainability objectives at their heart, whether this
is reaching good chemical and biological status for waters (in the case of RBMP), or contributing to the
government’s vision of clean, healthy, safe, productive and biologically diverse oceans and seas (HM
Government, 2010).
The second reason for choosing Marine Planning and River Basin Management is that like ICZM, they
aim to encourage different dimensions of integration. The spatial element of integration can be seen in
their overlapping jurisdictions in the coastal zone.
Figure 3.1: Overlapping Coastal Planning Regimes
Source: Author
Figure 3.1 shows that with Marine Planning extending onshore to Mean High Water and River Basin
Management Plans covering estuary waters out to 1 Nautical Mile, this overlap in plan jurisdictions
should in theory mean similar, or at an ideal end of the spectrum, harmonised plan objectives for those
Extent of ICZM - undefined
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waters. Besides this area of spatial integration, ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP seek to integrate
sectoral policies for water, coastal land or sea use through, for example, the streamlining of licensing
procedures for marine aggregates, or replacing a series of water quality Directives with one single
Directive that encompasses all water sources. However, as these regimes have emerged at different
times, examining their social constructions independently may reveal different understandings which
contribute to different types of management being utilised.
A third reason for examining these regimes is that all are driven directly or indirectly by the European
Union, but implemented at different levels in the system of coastal governance. In the case of ICZM,
ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC has been documented elsewhere in the thesis, and it has been
observed that ICZM practice in the UK tends to follow the concept of “hollowed out” government
described by Rhodes (1994) and others as there is limited regional or national government activity
between coastal partnerships and the European level. The European influence is felt most strongly in
the case of RBMP through the Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC), which was
transposed into national laws by the Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and
Wales) Regulations 2003 and the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003. River
Basin Management Plans, which are required under the Directive, are produced by the Environment
Agency for England and Wales and SEPA in Scotland at a catchment (regional) scale.
Marine Planning is more indirectly affected by the European Union than ICZM and RBMP, with the UK
government and devolved administrations appearing to act as the main driver for the Marine and
Coastal Access Act, although some of the UK’s powers in relation to the marine environment are derived
from the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the EU’s Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC).
However, the provisions of the Marine and Coastal Access Act come with some anticipation of future
European level initiatives – notably the EU’s proposal for an Integrated Maritime Policy, part of which
will include Maritime Spatial Planning for European Marine Regions. It is envisaged that implementation
of Maritime Spatial Planning will be the responsibility of Member States, (see Communication from the
Commission - Roadmap for Maritime Spatial Planning: Achieving Common Principles in the EU, CEC,
2008) and thus Marine Planning in the UK will build relevant capacity and experience early on. In
relation to marine environmental protection, the EU’s Marine Strategy Framework (which requires
Member States to achieve “good environmental status” for marine waters) also provides some impetus
for better planning and regulation of the UK’s seas.
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A final reason for selecting these regimes for comparison is the participatory element common to each
of them. Again, participation in ICZM has already been examined in Chapter Two in relation to the
principles set out inICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC. For Marine Planning, the Marine and Coastal
Access Act requires a Statement of Public Participation to be prepared by the Marine Plan Authority (the
MMO), which outlines “the policies settled by the marine plan authority for or in connection with the
involvement of interested persons in the preparation of the proposed marine plan” (Marine and Coastal
Access Act Schedule 6, Section 5 (2)), and members of the public, or those who may be affected by
implementation of the Marine Plan are able to comment on both the draft Plan and the Sustainability
Appraisal associated with the draft Plan.
In the case of RBMP, the Environment Agency states that “Involving stakeholders in water management
is one of the main themes of the WFD. Ensuring and enabling the participation and influence of
stakeholders will be an integral part of the river basin planning process” (Environment Agency,
2006a:22). Like with Marine Plans, there are a number of stages of the plan making process in which
stakeholder involvement will be possible, including consultation on the Significant Water Management
Issues (SWMI’s) for each District, the Draft RBM Plan and Sustainability Appraisal.
It can thus be seen that there are a number of common features present in ICZM, MP and RBMP,
despite them being designed to ameliorate different types of problem and being implemented with
more or less formal levels of support. Comparing and contrasting the ways in which coastal, marine and
catchment problems have been socially constructed may therefore provide some explanations as to why
the implementation of ICZM has not experienced sustained high level support and slipped down the
political agenda as a means of promoting the sustainability of coastal areas.
In the next sections, the comparison of the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment
problems uses Hannigan’s prerequisites to structure the discussion.
3.3.1 Common Origins for the Social Construction of Coastal, Marine and Catchment Problems
Coastal management in the UK in the form of coastal defences and drainage systems has existed since
Roman times (Ballinger, 1999), and the establishment of Crown property rights over intertidal and sub
tidal areas following the Norman Conquest has ensured that coastal and marine ecosystems have been
subject to more formalised controls for many centuries (Gibson, 1993). The establishment of Crown
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property rights and subsequent developments related to maritime industries were largely concerned
with ownership, control and regulation, for example in relation to jurisdiction over open seas, ship
classification and the safety of commercial shipping (Smith, 1999).
Nordstrom (2000:4) notes that at around 1800 records of human activity at the coast became less
patchy, coinciding with a sharp upturn in the intensity of human development or intervention in the
coastal environment. However, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that
the environmental protection dimensions of coastal management came to be addressed, following
successive waves of industrialisation and the diversification of sea uses, their associated land uses and
other land-based coastal activities. Therefore it is from this point that the necessary factors for the
social construction of a coastal problem start to become apparent.
In a somewhat contradictory fashion to the model proposed by Hannigan (1995), the observation of
marine and coastal environmental changes instigated the establishment of bodies concerned with
investigation and environmental protection (i.e. popularisers and institutional sponsors) before coastal
ecosystems were fully understood. For example, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES), established in 1902 for the purpose of collaborative scientific research on the marine
environment and fisheries was an acknowledgement of increasing worries about the stability of the
major fisheries in North West Europe (Smith, 1999:527).
It was not until the Post-War period that scientific studies of the impacts of development in the coastal
zone became more numerous and substantial. At the international level, major incidents such as the
Torrey Canyon oil spill in Cornwall in 1967 focused attention on the need for better coastal and marine
protection (Cicin-Sain, 1998:73), and for the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in
1972 (the Stockholm Conference), participating countries were asked to prepare reports on national
environmental conditions.
The UNCHE allowed concerns about environmental degradation to be aired for the first time in an
international context (Connelly and Smith, 2003:236), and some of the most important impacts of the
conference occurred in the ocean and coastal field. The UNCHE saw demands from the Nordic countries
of Europe for a regional convention to protect the Baltic Sea from pollution (VanDeveer, 2000:12),
paving the way for further regional cooperation structures to be set up, incorporating scientific and
technical committees and units.
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It was also at the UNCHE that the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) was created, which later
established the Regional Seas Programme, and both the London Convention (on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter) and MARPOL (the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) gained support from UNCHE.
Furthermore, in common to the social construction of marine or coastal problems and policy responses
is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which came into force in 1994. This is highly
significant in that it provided a new “constitution” for the world’s oceans (Cicin-Sain and Knecht,
1998:69), or a framework for ocean governance, covering all aspects of maritime activity such as
navigation, fishing, scientific research, dispute resolution, exploitation of the sea bed and environmental
protection.
Central to this was the establishment and acceptance of maritime zones, which have been referred to in
Chapter Two, namely the high seas, continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone, contiguous zones and
territorial seas which nations would have jurisdiction over. Nichols (1999:388) states that
“Most coastal management programmes under development worldwide subscribe to the
philosophies and regulatory blueprints that evolved in the late 1980s and 1990s under the
coastal branch of the UNCLOS regime”.
This is because UNCLOS lays down the obligation of all States to protect and preserve the environment,
and empowers States to enforce anti-pollution measures within their territorial seas, often the domain
of coastal planners (Ibid, p390). However the requirements of Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC
now mean that River Basin Management Plans must also consider the quality of estuarial waters out to
1 Nautical Mile, highlighting the need for integration across the land-sea divide.
The following sections now examine the development of ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP based on
the prerequisites outlined by John Hannigan (1995, 2006).
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3.3.2 Scientific Evidence and Authority for Problems
It has already been noted that early management of the seas was largely concerned with shipping and
legal jurisdiction over territorial and open seas, and that actors with scientific authority and the ability to
make claims did not emerge until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Thus whilst the term marine planning may be relatively new, the scientific basis for marine management
can be traced back to the work of oceanographer M.F. Maury (1806-1873), whose observations of ocean
winds and currents not only contributed to the science of meteorology but also enabled safer navigation
of the seas, with his book the Physical Geography of the Seas being of great influence in naval and
shipping circles.
Slightly later than this, according to Petts, the organisation of river management in Britain probably
began with the creation of the Thames Conservancy in 1857, and inter-basin transfers of water from
reservoirs for water supply purposes took place from the 1890s onwards (1987:201).
Whilst these events are quite specific to MP and RBMP, ICZM covers several dimensions of the coastal
environment such as the marine, biodiversity, landscape and the built environment, as a consequence
the scientific authority for coastal problems and claims comes from a number of sources.
In considering the scientific authority for a coastal problem related to the landward side of the coastal
zone, an early attempt to document the changes to land use at the coast was presented by the Council
for the Preservation of Rural England in “The English Coast – Its Development and Preservation”, which
described a “national movement seawards” (1936:3) caused by the increase in car ownership, the
growth of the seaside holiday and the invasion of commuters seeking permanent residence in coastal
towns.
This pressure resulted in continuous stretches of developed or built up areas and intrusions into
previously unspoilt sea frontage. Areas of the coast said to be “in danger of wrongful exploitation” were
those outside towns and resorts, where there was either no planning schemes in operation, or controls
were lax or non-existent (Ibid, p6).
Further observations of problems in the coastal zone came from the Scott Report (of the Committee on
Land Utilisation in Rural Areas, 1941) which observed the increasing demand for recreational
developments in rural and coastal areas. The report indicated that if such developments were allowed
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to continue being unregulated, this would have serious detrimental effects on Britain’s natural heritage.
The Scott Report recommended “that the coast of England and Wales should be considered as a whole
with a view to the prevention of further spoliation” (Stamp, 1964, in Steers, 1964:xxiv).
A more scientific study of the coast was commissioned by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning
and carried out by geomorphologist J.A Steers, who noted that
“a proper physiographical appreciation of our coasts is the necessary foundation of
comprehensive planning” (1964:xx)
Steers cites the work of H Valentin on the erosion of the Holderness coast in the East of England, where
the building of a promenade at Bridlington caused dunes to accumulate in front of the adjacent cliffs,
preventing substantial erosion, whereas further south there was more serious retreat. Despite Steers’
calls for action to prevent further damage to the coast by inappropriate development, no specific
coastal management programme was undertaken at this time (Ballinger, 1999:505).
In terms of planning for river catchments, the initial scientific authority and recognition of the problems
of river pollution and its effects downstream came from the 1971 Department of the Environment and
Welsh Office’s Report of a River Pollution Survey of England and Wales 1970 (1971) and was shortly
followed by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s Third Report on Pollution in Some
British Estuaries and Coastal Waters (1972), which picked up on the findings of the 1970 Department of
the Environment survey, pointing to the decline in the state of tidal rivers and noting that:
“A great deal of pollution ends in the sea… Some reaches the sea through rivers” (RCEP,
1972: paragraph 6)
One of the main contributors to river pollution during the 1970s and 80s was agriculture. A report
by the Advisory Council for Agriculture and Horticulture (ACAH) and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Farming (MAFF) in 1975 recognised the “deficiencies” in information on pollution
caused mainly by effluent handling practices, and it was also noted that the catchment-wide
water authorities established by the 1973 Water Act were more concerned with water supply and
sewage treatment than river quality (Ward et al, 1995).
Thus the systematic recording of agricultural pollution incidents and monitoring only began in the
1980s, and the collection of water quality data as a whole was improved by the enforcement of
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Section 41 of the Control of Pollution Act, requiring Water Authorities to maintain public registers
of their own effluents, and these Authorities also chose to include data on river quality,
groundwater and effluents from other sources (Brewin and Martin, 1987:262).
The policing of water quality standards in the England and Wales by the Environment Agency (formerly
the National Rivers Authority) and in Scotland by the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency,
provides continuous scientific authority for claims of inland and fresh water pollution incidents. Whilst
these organisations are what is known as non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), they are recognised
as an executive arm of government, in many cases acting as the “competent authority” for delivering
works required to meet European environmental standards. This status allows the Environment Agency
(and SEPA) to be viewed as a “reliable” source of scientific evidence for catchment problems.
It is pertinent to note here that under the requirements of the Water Framework Directive, the
classification of water bodies had to be completed by Member States in December 2004, and for the UK
this work was undertaken by the UK Technical Advisory Group (UKTAG). In relation to this, Newig et al
(2005) observe that this relatively rapid assessment of water bodies has consequences in terms of
lacking knowledge about the present and future conditions of the water bodies, and about the causal
relationships regarding the origins of pollution (Newig et al, 2005:336). Whilst this uncertainty may give
rise to a precautionary approach, Newig et al also go on to note that the text of the Water Framework
Directive does not refer to uncertainty, preferring the term “adequate level of confidence
and precision” (Ibid., p337). This itself may be difficult to define, and therefore create further difficulties
in decision making, but may be achieved through opening up public participation to include knowledge
of local environmental problems and knowledge of what may be socially or politically acceptable
solutions.
Beyond the UK government’s early attempts to measure environmental conditions in the coastal
zone, the Post-War period saw a proliferation of international scientific and technical
organisations with an interest in the coastal environment, such as the World Conservation Union
(IUCN), established in 1948, which has compiled a “Red List” of endangered species for over 40
years, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), which began life as a conservation organisation in
1961 and has extended its activities to include research and policy advice, the Marine
Environmental Data Inventory (MEDI, operating since 1979 as part of UNESCO’s
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Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission), and the organisations established as part of the
UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme.
In Europe, where regional seas cooperation is relatively well established, the Regional Seas
Programme action plans have focused mainly on pollution issues containing an element of
environmental assessment, including activities such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
and monitoring, which aim to assist in environmental management decisions by allowing:
“National policy makers to manage their natural resources in a more effective and
sustainable manner and to provide information on the effectiveness of
legal/administrative measures taken to improve the quality of the environment”
(UNEP, 1991, in Dixon-Gough, 2001).
The European Environment Agency, which was established in 1990 by Regulation (EC) No 401/2009 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the European Environment Agency and
the European Environment Information and Observation Network and began work in 1994 on providing
sound environmental information to the EU and other Member Countries such as Norway and Iceland
has highlighted the impacts of human activity on the seas. The EEA’s regular State of the Environment
and Outlook reports have identified areas of concern for coastal management at an international scale,
and Van Buuren et al (2001) point to regional sea conventions on pollution prevention such as OSPAR
for the North East Atlantic and HELCOM (Baltic Sea) as major contributors to EEA reports through their
own systems of monitoring and reporting (2001:89). Indeed, the OSPAR Commission’s own Ecological
Quality Objectives (EcoQOs), developed in collaboration with the International Council for the
Exploration of the Seas to provide a link between policies and ecological indicators have been taken on
board by the European Union as examples of objectives and associated indicators to be developed
further under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Helsenfeld and Enserink, 2008:1393).
In addition, the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas definition of the ecosystems
approach provides the dominant framework for marine management activities, and underpins the UK
government’s approach to marine stewardship as outlined in Safeguarding Our Seas: a Strategy for the
Conservation and Sustainable Development of Our Marine Environment (DEFRA, 2002). Safeguarding
Our Seas notes that previous attempts at marine management have been sectorally based (Ibid, p7) and
uncoordinated, with scientific evidence for marine problems only referred to at times of crisis (Peel and
Lloyd, 2004:365). Thus more integrated and collaborative programmes of marine science have been
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proposed, that, as well as establishing an evidence base to support the development of policy, outputs
from government marine science programmes feed into the wider development of marine science
(DEFRA, 2002:70).
More recently the European Union, whose vision for a future maritime policy (as set out in its Green
Paper - Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union) rests on the twin pillars of convergence of
objectives with the Lisbon Strategy (for growth and better jobs within the Union) and the maintenance
and improvement of the ocean resource will also have implications for marine science. The Green Paper
states that ecosystem based management, built on scientific knowledge is essential to the protection of
the oceans (CEC, 2006:5), whilst innovation in marine technologies such as energy, transport and coastal
engineering will not only boost competitiveness in the maritime sector, but also contribute to the
marine knowledge base and sustainability of the seas.
The instruments used to promote a more robust evidence base in the UK include networks of marine
conservation science organisations such as the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), the Inter
Agency Committee on Marine Science and Technology (IACMST) and the Marine Information Council,
bringing together government agencies, academia, NGOs, the private sector, local and international
institutions. Specific techniques such as sea bed and habitat mapping, strategic environmental
assessment (SEA) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) have also contributed to the marine
evidence base.
The Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), which is a statutory adviser to the UK government and
the devolved administrations, has had a considerable influence on marine planning through its Review
of Marine Nature Conservation. The Review was established in 1999 by DEFRA, to examine how
effectively the UK system for protecting nature conservation in the marine environment is working and
make proposals for improvements. A number of thematic reports on, for example, draft criteria to
identify nationally important marine nature conservation features (Connor et al, 2002), a review of
literature on human impacts on the UK’s marine environment (Laffoley, 2000) and an Irish Sea Pilot
Study to test JNCC’s proposed marine conservation framework for the UK and the adjacent waters of the
North East Atlantic contributed to DEFRA’s Review of Marine Nature Conservation: Working Group
Report to the Government (DEFRA, 2004).
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In its conclusions, the Review of Marine Nature Conservation found that “the current system for marine
nature conservation... is not fit for purpose. It does not provide the means to apply the ecosystem
approach which is central to the marine stewardship process and fundamental to delivering the
Government’s vision for the marine environment of ‘clean, healthy, safe, productive and
biologically diverse oceans and seas’. Nor will it allow Government to meet its international obligations.”
(DEFRA, 2004:ii )
Amongst the many recommendations that came out of the Irish Sea Pilot and the final report, most
importantly, there was a recommendation that the UK government should undertake a trial of Marine
Spatial Planning at the regional sea scale to determine the effectiveness of applying such an approach
across all UK waters to deliver coordinated nature conservation (Key Recommendation 7). In addition,
and of particular relevance to the use of scientific evidence in the construction of marine problems,
attention was given to the appropriate scales at which ecosystem management should be carried out
(i.e. adopting and applying the marine nature conservation framework of Wider Sea, Regional Seas,
Marine Landscapes, important marine areas, and priority marine features in UK waters, Key
Recommendations 2-5), developing procedures to assess the impact of human activities at each level of
the marine nature conservation framework and to assist in the determination of the appropriate level of
response (Key Recommendation 10) and information gathering and exchange (establishing a
coordinated UK-wide marine information network, Key Recommendations 12-13 ).
Yet despite the vast body of knowledge already accumulated about the oceans and seas, Peel and Lloyd
argue that the complexity of the marine environment, the mixture of conflicting interests, rules and
rights means that as yet there is no real consensus on the nature of the marine problem or on how it
“should” be addressed (2004:366). Similarly for ICZM, the landward element of coastal zones adds to
the complexity of defining a single coastal problem. Thus it can be said that the scientific authority
element in the social construction of the marine or coastal problem has only been partially achieved.
In concluding this section, it may be said that it is international environment and development
organisations such as the UNEP, World Bank and supra national governments such as the European
Union which have provided the initial injection of resources needed to operate research and policy
programs which have acted as a source of scientific authority for coastal and marine problems and also
acted as popularisers, whilst for catchment problems, most scientific evidence has come from national
and more local-level observations. It is also pertinent to note that the idea of “scientific” authority here
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also conforms to a highly technical, rational approach to defining problems, with instruments such as
Environmental Impact Assessment providing an apparently value-neutral evidence base from which
decisions can be made. The interpretation of such evidence therefore requires the use of one or more of
Hannigan’s other prerequisites to translate this information into a claim for a problem.
3.3.3 Popularisers, Dramatisation and the Media
This section begins with coastal problems as they tend to have had the longest and most complex
history in terms of popularisation and media exposure. According to Ballinger, in the Post-War period
coastal matters became subsumed within much larger scale economic, social and administrative
reconstruction processes as a comprehensive system of town and country planning became established
(1999:505-6). With the creation of National Parks, following the National Parks and Access to the
Countryside Act of 1949, planning for coastal areas became a facet of landscape protection and
conservation.
Whilst coastal protection maintained a high profile within bodies such as the National Parks and the
National Trust, the popularisation of land use planning as a means of managing the coastal zone was
slow to occur. Ballinger (1999:506) points to the narrow focus and limited remits of the statutory bodies
engaged in coastal conservation as the main reason for the lack of progress in developing a more
holistic approach to management.
During this period of fragmented organisation, which lasted into the late 1980s, the Countryside
Commission published The Planning of the Coastline (1970a), an examination of coastal preservation
and development, and its companion document The Coastal Heritage (1970b), which provided
recommendations on improving planning policy for the coast. In Planning for the Coastline the
Countryside Commission recognised that conferring uniform protection to the entire coastal belt
resulted in weak, ambiguous policies that were difficult to implement (1970a:7). Therefore it
recommended:
Division of the coast into zones, each with their own policies,
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Management agreements with landowners where potential uses were not subject to statutory
planning controls, e.g. recreational uses, and
The designation of Heritage Coasts of high quality scenery, which would be subject to stricter
planning control.
However for the reasons outlined by Ballinger (1999) above, the only recommendation of the
Countryside Commission to be acted upon was that relating to the designation of Heritage Coasts,
which were put into operation from 1972 onwards.
In parallel with the endeavours of European States for greater cooperation on coastal issues, American
academics, environmentalists and scientists began to consider “the coast” as a definable entity rather
than a frontier transition zone between land and sea (Nichols, 1999:388).
However it was not until countries began preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in 1992 that integration became an important feature of CZM. The term
“integration” had been part of coastal management discourse since the launch of the Regional Seas
Programme in 1975 yet remained ambiguous (Kenchington and Crawford, 1993, in Nichols, p393),
although it was used increasingly in describing the more comprehensive systems of coastal area
management that were being developed.
The most important populariser for ICZM came from the UNCED at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Of all the
outputs of the Rio conference, (including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the
convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Statement of Forestry
Principles), the most significant for the field of coastal management came through Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21.
Rio and other UN conferences have brought forward the concept of reconciling economic growth and
environmental protection as “sustainable use” (Dixon-Gough, 2001:58), which provides a broad
framework for developing coastal and marine management systems.
Agenda 21 was ambitious in scope, covering all aspects of the environment, development and society,
and the importance of coastal issues was reflected in the fact that Chapter 17, titled “Protection of the
Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Coastal Areas and the
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Protection, Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources” was the longest of the 40 chapters
in the document.
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 made a strong commitment to achieving sustainable development for marine
and coastal environments, stating that:
“This requires new approaches to marine and coastal area management and development, at
the national, sub-regional, regional and global levels, approaches that are integrated and are
precautionary and anticipatory in ambit” (UNCED, 1993:paragraph 17.1).
Furthermore, Programme Area A for Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of Coastal
and Marine Areas, Including Exclusive Economic Zones, called on states to:
Provide for an integrated policy and decision making process, including all involved sectors, to
promote compatibility and a balance of uses (Ibid, paragraph 17.5(a)).
And for:
Integration of sectoral programmes on sustainable development for settlements, agriculture,
tourism, fishing, ports and industries affecting the coastal area (Ibid, paragraph 17.6(i)).
It was also in 1992 that the Commissions of the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention) and the Convention for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution from Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention) met and adopted a new Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the "OSPAR Convention"). The newly
established OSPAR Commission gave a new impetus to protecting coastal and marine environments,
adopting strategies for ecosystem and biodiversity protection, the reduction of hazardous and nuclear
substances, and prevention of eutrophication in the coastal waters of its Contracting Parties.
In the UK, the case for an updated system of coastal planning was clearly made, following concerns
expressed by bodies such as the RSPB, the Marine Conservation Society and the Countryside
Commission about the effects of human activity on the coastal environment and the perceived
inadequacy of existing administrative arrangements to protect it (Gibson, 2003:118).
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The 1992 House of Commons Environment Select Committee Report on Coastal Zone Protection and
Planning, which examined policies and responsibilities for planning and protecting the coastal zone was
highly critical of the existing planning and management regimes, noting the
“inadequacies in legislation, anomalies in the planning system, a lack of central guidance,
and overlapping and conflicting policies and responsibilities (and in some cases a lack of
action) among a host of bodies with poor coordination between them” (1992: paragraph 3).
The Select Committee made several recommendations relating to coastal management, and most
notably for land use planning, the definition of the coastal zone (as an integrated unit) for the purposes
of producing a national coastal strategy was proposed. This fed into the preparation of Planning Policy
Guidance Note (PPG) 20: Coastal Planning, requiring planning authorities to consider their own
definitions of the coastal zone based on physical features and natural processes, and, more importantly,
to recognise that on-shore development can often have an impact off shore (Department of the
Environment, 1992:5). Likewise, the environmental impacts of development outside the coastal zone on
the coast must also be considered.
A further driver of change in the UK’s coastal management framework was the EU’s Fifth Environmental
Action Plan, which was prepared in parallel with the main Rio agreements so that it shares most of their
strategic objectives and principles (Wilkinson, 1997:158 in Connelly and Smith, 2003). The Plan was
adopted in 1993, and although not binding, included a commitment to explore ICZM from a European
perspective (Allmendinger et al, 2002:176). This was achieved through a Demonstration Programme on
ICZM, comprising of 35 coastal management projects around Europe, including the Forth Estuary, Kent,
Dorset and County Down coasts and the Isle of Wight in the UK.
The Demonstration Programmes illustrated (to governments of Member States) that in complex areas,
uncoordinated policies could conflict or work at cross purposes (DEFRA p7 paragraph 3.5). This and
other lessons from the Demonstration projects formed the basis of the eight ICZM principles advocated
in the EU’s Recommendation 2002/413/EEC Concerning the Implementation of ICZM, the current driving
force for ICZM initiatives across the EU.
Although developing at a much later stage, a great deal has been done to promote marine issues and
push them into public view. For example, the Marine Conservation Society (founded in 1979 as the
Underwater Conservation Society) was established by members of the diving community with an
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interest in the conservation of the seas and marine wildlife, and now has a regular presence in Whitehall
and Westminster.
Themed “years” of the Coral Reef (1997) and the Ocean (1998) designated by America’s National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and with international support have also
helped to place marine conservation issues in the media spotlight and educate the public as to the
importance of such ecosystems.
Other means of popularising the marine problem have come from both NGOs and the state, for example
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) acts as a research based populariser (Peel and Lloyd, 2004:367),
whose Global Marine Programme uses marine scientists and other technical and policy experts to
develop solutions for sustainable fishing and the creation and management of Marine Protected Areas.
Marine Spatial Planning is also called for by the European Commission in the Maritime Green Paper in
order to help safeguard marine resources (EC, 2006:10) and plan for economic activity (Ibid, p21), whilst
early investigation into the potential role of Marine Spatial Planning for integrating marine policies was
proposed by DEFRA in Safeguarding Our Seas (2002:3). These examples demonstrate that, unlike for
ICZM where popularisers have tended to come from government and represent a broad sustainable
development policy agenda, marine popularisers have focused their discourse much more on
conservation issues and ecosystem integrity.
For river basin management and planning, within the UK the government’s own activities through
research such as that by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and the Environment Agency
has provided a sound evidence base for advocating river basin management or catchment planning. At
the European level, early concerns about groundwater, drinking and bathing water quality and
subsequent Directives have helped to promote water management issues, albeit in a more piecemeal
fashion to Member States.
Media events or images that dramatise the need for ICZM, MP and RBMP are difficult to define as so
many images or newsworthy incidents may be symptomatic of other problems or demonstrate the need
for other environmental management regimes, for example images such as the Holbeck Hall Hotel in
Scarborough collapsing into the sea following heavy rain and landslides in 19933 could be used to argue
the point for better coastal defences or managed retreat as part of Shoreline Management Plans, or
3 See http://www.bgs.ac.uk/science/landUseAndDevelopment/landslides/holbeckHall.html
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demonstrate a failure of terrestrial spatial planning, whilst the grounding of the MSC Napoli in Lyme Bay
in 2007 and the subsequent scramble for its valuable cargo which washed up on the shores of
Branscombe became headline news although the fundamental problem was the failure of the ship’s
structure to withstand extreme weather conditions4.
Brown et al (2002) cite the discovery of Seahenge, a Bronze Age monument made of a series of oak
trunks arranged in a circle around a central stump just off the coast of Norfolk as representative of the
conflicts inherent in managing the coastal zone. Seahenge was revealed in 1998 due to the tide eroding
dunes and overlying sediment, and, once exposed to air, the timbers became at risk from drying out and
crumbling. Archaeologists, land owners, local residents and even Druids expressed concern over the
fate of Seahenge, arguing over whether it should be removed for scientific analysis, whether to leave
the site intact, and the impacts of increased tourist visitors to the site. Eventually the timbers were
removed, but this incident highlighted the contested nature of coastal resources, conflicting values and
interests and the importance of having an institution to mediate in such disputes.
One organisation that has successfully dramatised the marine problem or various aspects of it, such as
whaling and over-fishing, and secured a great deal of media attention is Greenpeace. Through its use of
direct action tactics such as the 1995 boycott of Shell garages and occupation of the Brent Spar oil
platform in the North Sea (which was due to be disposed of by being sunk in the deep waters of the
North Atlantic), Greenpeace has achieved considerable recognition for its ability to change attitudes and
policies.
In the case of the Brent Spar, media and public pressure forced Shell to withdraw its plans for dumping
the Brent Spar platform at sea but this incident also raised questions about Greenpeace’s ability to
manipulate the media, as their estimates of the level of toxic waste on board the platform was grossly
overestimated. Thus their scientific authority for making claims about the potential environmental
threat was undermined and the incident also damaged their credibility with those media outlets whose
support Greenpeace relied on to communicate their claims (Connelly and Smith, 2003).
Dramatic incidents play a continuing role in highlighting various aspects of the marine problem, such as
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska which killed between 250,000 and 500,000 sea
birds, and the “ghost ships”, old US Navy vessels that were brought to Hartlepool in North East England
4 See the Marine Accident Investigation Branch report on the MSC Napoli at
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/msc_napoli.cfm
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in 2003 to be broken up but remained moored and untouched as permissions needed to complete the
works were not granted until 2008 after extensive negotiations with the Environment Agency.
As mentioned before, river management in the UK began with the Thames Conservancy in 1857, as a
response to the problems of industrial pollution and the increasing amounts of sewage being piped into
the Thames. The results of this pollution culminated in the “Great Stink” of 1858, which caused sittings
at the House of Commons to be abandoned and generated much media attention at the time.
One of the major modern environmental threats to river catchment ecosystems that have captured
media attention very successfully is acid rain. Although the problem was first noted by British scientist
Robert Angus Smith in 1852, it was not until the late 1960s that the problem began to be popularised by
a Swedish soil scientist, Svante Odén. After comparing his own data on bodies of fresh water, soils air
pollution and the chemistry of rain with that of a fisheries inspector and concluding that “acid” rain
could have serious implications for fish stocks and crop yields, Odén was compelled to publish his
findings in a national newspaper (Dagens Nyheter, 24th October, 1967) rather than a scientific journal,
thus bypassing other channels through which environmental claims may be made (such as conferences
and parliamentary reports) (Hannigan, 2006:101). This had the effect of bringing acid rain to the
attention of the Swedish government and public five years before the issue was raised at the UN
Conference on the Human Environment.
In the 21st Century, river pollution incidents such as the cyanide spill at Baia Mare, northwest Romania
in early 2000 continue to attract media attention. In the Baia Mare case, a break in a dam holding back
contaminated waters from a metal recovery plant released liquid containing 50-100 tonnes of cyanide
into the Sasar River, a tributary of the Danube. This affected approximately 2000 km of the Danube’s
water catchment in Romania, Hungary and Serbia, causing interruptions to the water supply of 24
Romanian municipalities and killing approximately 1240 tonnes of fish in Hungary (RECCEE, 2000).
Communications between neighbouring countries alerting them to the threat of river pollution from
upstream, not only served to inform the environmental authorities of the need to take precautionary
measures but also dramatised the incident by way of portraying an approaching danger spreading along
the river, with the initial spill plume taking around four weeks to travel downstream to the Danube
delta.
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It is through dramatic incidents such as the cyanide spill at Baia Mare and the media coverage given to
the effects of acid rain that the public and non-scientific institutions can begin to understand the
concept of catchment wide water management and environmental protection. By demonstrating that
an environmental problem has implications throughout an ecosystem (i.e. the catchment or river basin),
rather than occurring within a discrete spatial unit, the media, popularisers and dramatisation of
environmental problems in this case support the need for an ecosystem based approach to fresh or
inland water management. Gouldson et al, reviewing water policy instruments in the UK, also found
that the media can play an important role in raising the consequences of withdrawal from or non-
adherence to an agreement once it has been reached, thereby communicating how the enforcement of
water policy and negative consequences of non-compliance may motivate the implementation of water
protection measures.
Popularisers, the media and dramatisation thus provide several different avenues for bringing
environmental problems to the attention of a wider audience and shaping the discourse around
potential solutions. Given the way that these three factors or prerequisites often go hand in hand, it
may be difficult to establish which component has the most influence on the way stakeholders
construct problems, particularly where dramatic incidents force an immediate response which sets the
tone or direction of future discussions. Similarly, popularisers and the media have the potential to
distort or manipulate stories and events (as was evidenced by the Napoli disaster), in a way which
focuses attention on a particular aspects of a problem and potentially disregards or closes off other
possibilities for understanding the more fundamental nature of the issue at hand. Such issues require a
more gradual process in which a number of alternative perspectives can be heard without undue
prominence being given to one voice.
3.3.4 Economic Incentives and Institutional Sponsors
As is often the case with environmental issues, the European Union has emerged as the main
institutional sponsor for both river basin planning and ICZM. In the case of RBMP, the EU’s actions build
on a number of older water quality regulations such as for Nitrates (Directive 91/676/EEC on Nitrates
from Agricultural Sources) and the Treatment of Urban Waste Water (Directive 91/271/EEC).
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For ICZM, the Recommendation 2002/413/EEC provides a framework for implementation, however
Regional Sea secretariats, for example HELCOM (the Helsinki Commission) for the Baltic Sea and OSPAR
for the North East Atlantic established prior to the Recommendation also represent institutional
sponsors in their associated regions and provide additional drivers for integrated coastal and marine
management. Reference has been made in section 3.3.2 to the OSPAR Commission’s scientific
contributions to the development of European environmental initiatives such as the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive, and OSPAR has also made a commitment to support the development of marine
spatial planning which takes into account coherence between terrestrial and maritime planning using
ICZM (OSPAR Commission, 2009:16).
Within the UK, DEFRA is the main sponsor of ICZM for England, having signalled its commitment to ICZM
through Safeguarding Our Seas (DEFRA, 2002), the national ICZM Stock Take (Atkins, 2004) which was
required as part of moving towards the development of a national ICZM strategy, and more recently
producing the national strategy itself (DEFRA 2009), , although many of the landward coastal
management activities fall under the auspices of the terrestrial spatial planning system which is
overseen by the Department for Communities and Local Government.
The Local Government Association’s Special Interest Group on Coastal Issues (LGA-SIG), which is
comprised of elected members from coastal local authorities, has also acted as an institutional sponsor
for ICZM in England. Noting the need for a response to the EU’s ICZM Demonstration Programme and
Recommendation 2002/413/EC, LGA-SIG published “On the Edge – the Coastal Strategy” (LGA 2002),
which called upon the government to review planning policy guidance and create a Coastal Commission
that would produce a national strategy for England’s coasts. The LGA-SIG currently maintains a role in
promoting ICZM within local planning authorities and lobbies government on behalf of coastal
communities. The devolved administrations have also acted as sponsors in their own right or through
links with the Wales Coastal and Maritime Partnership or the Scottish Coastal Forum.
The EU’s history as an institutional sponsor of water policies can be traced back in the case of RBMP to
the early 1970s. Following two “waves” of EU water policy in which the EU moved from public health
protection (1973-86) to pollution control (1987-1992) and gained increasing competency for
environmental policy (Kallis and Butler, 2001:126-7), the European Parliament and Council of Ministers
pressed the European Commission for a more integrated approach to water policy. This resulted in the
Proposal for a Council Directive Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water
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Policy (COM (97)49), which aimed to bring together what was considered to be fragmented legislation
for water protection under a single piece of framework legislation which covers surface and ground
water protection, achieving “good status” for all waters, fair water pricing, citizen involvement, and
taking an integrated approach to water management based on the hydrological unit of river basins.
Drafting of the WFD took place with significant input from environmental NGOs, public and private
sector water suppliers, the chemical industry, Member States, local authorities and others, each with
their own particular interest in the final text of the Water Framework Directive. For example the RSPB
was concerned about the Directive’s effects on wetlands. Even within the institution of the EU, tensions
were visible between the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, who supported stricter (EP) or
more lenient approaches (CM) to environmental protection requirements and the implementation of
the WFD (Kaika, 2003:308). Directive 2000/60/EC finally came into force in December 2000.
At the current time, Marine Planning as it is being implemented in the UK lacks a European sponsor, and
so DEFRA, as authors of the Marine and Coastal Access Act are the most obvious, and as the production
of Marine Plans begins under the duties of the MMO (in England) this can be expected to take on the
lead role of institutional sponsor. NGOs have also been significant in making calls for Marine Planning,
with the Marine Conservation Society, the Wildlife Trusts, Environment LINK, Greenpeace and the RSPB
all contributing to the Marine Bill White Paper consultations in support of different measures that were
proposed in the Bill (see DEFRA, 2007b).
Others that may support the establishment of MP and have a role to play in shaping what is
implemented include the Crown Estate, as owner of the sea bad and regulator of fisheries, and the
National Trust, a major coastal landowner. Natural England may provide institutional sponsorship for
MP, but Natural England’s remit at present (to conserve and enhance biodiversity, sustainable use of the
natural environment) does not support the mix of competing and conflicting interests in the marine
environment, nor does Natural England have the statutory powers necessary to manage or control the
full range of marine activities.
Until quite recently, there has been a perceived lack of economic incentives for ICZM in the UK. As ICZM
Recommendation 2002/413/EC is non-binding, the voluntary basis for ICZM has meant there is no
obvious economic benefit or disincentives for taking up this system of management. Where ICZM is
taken up by coastal partnerships, funding is low level and inconsistent. Despite this, a report in 2008 by
Entec Consultants for DEFRA, the Local Government Association’s Coastal Special Interest Group and the
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Coastal Partnership Working Group on the Financial Benefits to Working in Partnership at the Coast
(2008) did provide some examples of savings and benefits that can be gained when stakeholders use the
services offered by coastal partnerships, for example consultancy on compliance with environmental
legislation, and improved business opportunities through networking at partnership events and
marketing.
Whilst the Entec report may be viewed as a positive step in advocating coastal partnerships and ICZM as
a way of working, it came at a time when discussions on the Marine Bill were under way and attention
was turned to the role of the Marine Management Organisation as the future lead organisation for
coastal management. Therefore at this time the existing coastal partnerships act as chief popularisers
and institutional sponsor of management for the coastal zone, with central government (through
DEFRA) attempting to find a role for coastal partnerships within the system of Marine Planning, both for
stakeholder engagement purposes and in developing plan policies. DEFRA’s latest consultation on
Marine Planning states that:
“As well as working with terrestrial planning authorities, the MMO should work closely with the
Environment Agency, Natural England, JNCC, English Heritage, IFCAs, the Crown Estate, Coastal
Partnerships and many other coastal stakeholders to integrate management of the seas with land
planning.” (DEFRA 2010b:60)
Like terrestrial spatial planning, a statutory system of MP may provide no real economic incentives –
indeed Peel and Lloyd state that “greater attention may have to be paid to a more explicit architecture
and grammar of appropriate economic incentives to support MSP intervention” (2004:369). However, in
the UK government’s most recent sustainable development strategy, Securing the Future, under the
principle of “Achieving a Sustainable Economy” the government aims to ensure that efficient resource
use is incentivised (HM Government, 2005:16). Thus the development of economic incentives may
become more important as MP is implemented. Streamlined licensing arrangements for dredging,
harbour development and offshore renewable energy under the Marine and Coastal Access Act may
provide indirect incentives for industry through increased certainty in decision making, and the
rationalisation of bureaucracy will have benefits for the licensing authorities.
In terms of economic incentives for river basin planning, the main benefits cited for implementing the
WFD include the gains to be made from tourist and recreational activities that are dependent upon
clean water such as angling. The Directive’s requirements for adequate water pricing (charges made to
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consumers for water), although intended to encourage more prudent and sustainable use of water
resources, may be seen as a burden in some cases. Page and Kaika (2003) note that the concept of
water pricing was in fact alien to some Member States before the Directive came into effect, citing the
example of Ireland, where domestic water is supplied free and costs recovered through taxation
(2003:332. Water pricing and other WFD measures were also of concern for the agricultural sector,
where any potential increase in the price of water and additional expenses related to preventing diffuse
pollution will affect the production cost and selling price of goods (Kaika, 2003:307), and the chemical
industry argued that absorbing the costs of environmental protection would “reduce their
competitiveness” (Page and Kaika, 2003:337).
Overall, the effectiveness of economic incentives for the WFD remains to be tested. Water pricing
requirements have only just come into force in 2010, and the deadline for water bodies in Member
States to reach at least “good” status is 2015. Failure to comply with environmental objectives should
incur financial penalties, however until such penalties have to be applied it will not be possible to assess
what effect they or other economic incentives contribute to making a claim for catchment problems
and the implementation of the WFD.
Economic incentives for coastal planning regimes appear to be difficult to define, considering that first,
it may be difficult to isolate the source of a problem when looking at an ecosystem as a whole,
particularly where pollution is diffuse and may be the legacy of years of poor environmental
management. Secondly, many of the returns on investing resources in some form of coastal
management are intangible – for example cleaning up or preventing pollution may improve the
environment which in turn can increase recreational use of waters, benefiting local economies through
tourism and associated activities, or simply save more expensive remedial work in years down the line.
For RBMP penalties for non-compliance will encourage positive action, although such legal actions may
be seen as a cost to be avoided rather than an additional source of income to stakeholders.
One final point may be considered in relation to economic incentives for taking action in all three
regimes, and this is the developing concept of valuing ecosystem goods and services, which are defined
as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, including food, water, natural flood relief, nutrient
recycling and other non-material benefits (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
In 2007 DEFRA noted in its Introductory Guide to Valuing Ecosystems Services that the benefits the
natural environment provides are not yet valued properly in policy and project appraisal across
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government (2007c: 2), and so called for the valuation of ecosystem services in order to ensure that
policy appraisals fully take into account the costs and benefits to the natural environment, and to
provide evidence that can underpin the development of future decision making tools and policy
instruments (Ibid, p13). For the proposed Marine Bill, a valuation of ecosystem services related to the
nature conservation measures of the Bill was undertaken by the Scottish Agricultural College and the
University of Liverpool and found that the creation of Marine Conservation Zones would bring
environmental benefits in the region of £8.6bn - £19.5bn over twenty years (DEFRA, 2008). Whilst this
was based on proposed rather than a finalised network of MCZs, and does not include benefits of the
wider system of Marine Planning, it does demonstrate some economic incentives for marine
conservation. As yet there has been no similar valuation of ecosystem services in relation to river basin
districts, or coastal zones given that they are difficult to isolate, however as techniques for ecosystem
valuation become more sophisticated it is anticipated that this approach will become more prevalent in
articulating claims for particular actions to be taken.
3.4 Analysis – Drivers for the Social Construction of Different Planning Regimes
The information presented above relating to the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment
problems highlights several interesting points, not only in terms of the historical development of each
regime, but also in the use of Hannigan’s model as a framework for understanding how an
environmental problem is defined and brought to attention, and both of these aspects will now be
commented upon.
Firstly, in trying to trace the development of coastal planning regimes from a historical perspective, it
must be noted that man’s relationship with water or the sea reaches back much further than any formal
establishment of rights and responsibilities, and takes on different forms depending on locally specific
circumstances. This long and varied history therefore makes it a complex task to determine the origins
of different constructions of the coastal, marine or catchment environments.
Considering each of the regimes in turn, starting with ICZM, the review above shows that whilst there
has been a considerable amount of research on different problems of the coast, such as erosion and
sediment movement, the intensification of land use and the loss of biodiversity, and much of this
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information has come from “credible” sources such as the UN Environment Programme and other
international environmental bodies, academics such as J.A. Steers and even reports commissioned by
national government, this body of evidence as a whole has not been brought together to produce a
strong, unified claim for a coastal problem. Similarly, media coverage, dramatic incidents and
popularisers have only provided a narrow perspective on coastal issues, highlighting a limited number of
symptoms.
In this sense the recognition or social construction of a coastal problem does not fully adhere to the
principle of a holistic perspective as outlined in ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC. Indeed Midlen
observes that in policy terms, the coast as a cohesive entity with its own problems is sidelined in favour
of visions for the marine and terrestrial (rural) environments (see Safeguarding Our Seas, DEFRA, 2002,
and the Countryside Agency’s “2020 Vision”, 1999) which fail to interpret policy in a specifically coastal
context (2006:v), thus leading to a call for the coast to be made more “visible” in mainstream policy.
Such a perspective would require a substantial debate and reconstruction of the “coastal zone” concept,
and given the ambiguous nature of this transitional zone such a debate may never be resolved. On the
other hand, attempts at spatial integration focused on overcoming the pre-existing divisions between
land and sea may be more possible through interaction between coastal stakeholders and plans or
policies that take into account the impacts of sea use on the land and vice versa.
The influence of economic incentives appears to be quite low in socially constructing a case for ICZM – a
point which may again be linked to the difficulties of combining information about land and marine
based coastal activities, and given that the magnitude of the effects of climate change are still very
much contested, it is difficult to anticipate the future costs of climate change impacts on coastal zones,
although the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change (2006) provides a clear message that the
benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweigh the costs.
It is the institutional sponsors for ICZM that may give most insight into the reasons why this regime has
not achieved statutory status and subsequently experienced implementation “failures”. Referring back
to the points made in Chapter Two regarding how communicative planning approaches help to build the
legitimacy of subsequent actions, and the hollowing of the state in which powers may be transferred
upwards or downwards from central government, it may be observed that institutional sponsors for
ICZM have originated at the international level (for example in the UN and European Union), and their
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calls for action at local levels have actually mobilised considerable support in the form of coastal
partnerships.
Whilst a form of ICZM was being advocated at international level as part of the UN’s Agenda 21, the UK
government’s rejection of the recommendations made in the House of Commons Environment Select
Committee on Coastal Protection and Planning in the same year effectively closed off one avenue of
discussion about the use of ICZM at national level, and with the Estuaries Initiative first being perceived
to have an environmental focus (see Morris, 2008) and second not considering an explicit coastal zone,
it was not until the EU Demonstration Programmes began in 1996 that ICZM really achieved prominence
on the political agenda again. With the Demonstration Programme, again, institutional sponsors at the
international level were at the forefront, and the implementation of projects at local levels may have
bypassed some of the potential debates about ICZM that were required at national level to gain further
legitimacy and support for a statutory system of ICZM. The government’s adoption of ICZM
Recommendation 2002/413/EC in 2002, at the same time as Safeguarding Our Seas thus demonstrated a
growing awareness in national government of the need for ICZM, however whilst DEFRA (and previous
incarnations of the Department of the Environment such as DETR) have facilitated ICZM actions at the
local level through the funding of projects, their own actions on ICZM specifically have remained one
step behind the capacity that has been built at local and regional level.
For the social construction of a marine problem, again scientific evidence is a key driver of problem
recognition, and in this case the distinct spatial boundary of the marine environment provides a much
clearer focus for action. International organisations are also central to the construction of the marine
problem, although in this instance there appears to be a greater orientation towards marine
conservation, with NGOs at national level such as the Marine Conservation Society and WWF acting as
chief popularisers (outside government) for a form of marine management.
Although it has been noted that use of the media and dramatic incidents may have resonance for the
construction of both coastal and marine problems, it is questionable how much influence these events
have on the long term perception of an issue and potential solutions given that the media is constantly
bringing new stories to attention and can quickly drop its interest in an issue when another story comes
along, for example the “ghost ships” were headline news at the time when they were being brought to
the UK, however the protracted legal wrangling over their eventual fate has failed to generate the same
level of national interest. This is partly because such events do not lend themselves well to dramatic
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imagery, but may also be that beyond the initial outcry the solution to this particular problem lay in the
domain of specialist knowledge that was not easily translated into a wider debate about what kind of
economic activities are deemed acceptable to the public and for the marine environment and the
manner in which they are regulated.
In terms of economic incentives, MP, like ICZM, lacks a clear economic argument to incentivise marine
planning, however, in attracting national government as an institutional sponsor the case can be made
that marine planning provides greater certainty for the private and public sectors alike about the way in
which the marine environment will be managed, and of more specific interest to the private sector,
supporting marine planning may have benefits in terms of providing a clearer, streamlined framework
for governing their activities and speeding up the decision making process. In this, the MMO may be
seen as a fair arbitrator in sources of conflict.
Finally, the social construction of a catchment/river basin problem provides a significant example of
where many of the prerequisites suggested by Hannigan as essential for the construction of problems
are, in some cases, quite poorly demonstrated. Whilst gathering scientific evidence for claims about a
river catchment problem has taken place in a systematic way through the environmental protection
agencies of government, there appears to be far fewer high-profile popularisers to take what can be
quite technical information and present this to a wider audience in a more readily understandable
format.
Similarly, beyond the examples cited earlier in the chapter of acid rain and the Baia Mare chemical spill,
there have been relatively few dramatic incidents or newsworthy stories to demonstrate why good
chemical and biological status is necessary. The reasons for this could be that “dramatic” incidents are
localised and small scale, or possibly it is because the established system of inland water regulation has
performed adequately in preventing such disasters. In this respect, the fact that the catchment problem
is built on a long-standing discourse about water quality and not framed as something novel means that
popularisers, the media and symbolic events are less significant in the case of RBMP than they would
have been in initially establishing water quality measures in the UK or at European level when the first
round of water quality Directives were issued in the mid-1970s.
As with ICZM and MP, economic incentives play only a small role in constructing the case for catchment
management, though it should be noted that the economic argument is couched in terms of a case for
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taking action to avoid negative costs rather than what Hannigan terms an “incentive for taking positive
action”, given that there are penalties for non-compliance with Directive 2000/60/EC.
The recruitment of an institutional sponsor provides the greatest influence on constructing a claim for a
catchment problem. Having an established competence in the field of environmental policy, the
European Union represents a high-level sponsor for activities related to the monitoring and setting of
water quality standards. The fact that the European Union already had powers in relation to water
quality thus makes it the natural authority for future proposals on new initiatives. At lower levels of
governance, the role of national and regional institutional sponsors is weakened due to the weight
carried by the European Union, and this will undoubtedly affect the discourse that takes place around
measures to be taken as much of the agenda is already set by Europe, but whilst the discussion on the
nature of the problem is constrained by higher level governance, there is still scope to engage a greater
number of perspectives in developing solutions at the local level.
3.4.1 The Construction of a Claim: Some Conclusions
To conclude this analysis, the literature reviewed and the discussion above shows that on paper at least,
there are slightly different drivers for each of the three coastal planning regimes examined. In all cases,
scientific evidence from a number of governmental and non-governmental sources (such as WWF or the
Environment Agency) and at all levels of governance have contributed to the recognition of some sort of
environmental problem, whether this is a natural physical process whose impacts are exacerbated by
anthropogenic activities, such as coastal development and the erosion and accretion of sediment
identified by Steers, or a directly man-made threat such as water pollution.
Yet the existence of science alone is insufficient to socially construct a coastal, marine or catchment
problem, and thus a combination of science with the other prerequisites identified by Hannigan
becomes important. For ICZM, efforts by popularisers and institutional sponsors at the international
level such as the United Nations and European Union have recognised the importance of the coastal
zone for sustainability and are not only able to promote their claims for a coastal problem, but also in
acting as an institutional sponsor propose or guide a response. This is also true for river basin
management, where the European Union is, to a large extent, already accepted as a sponsor for new
initiatives to address emerging environmental problems. For Marine Planning, it is NGOs such as the
Marine Conservation Society and Wildlife Trusts that are acting as popularisers alongside DEFRA.
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In Hannigan’s original model for the social construction of an environmental problem, use of the media
and dramatisation feature quite strongly as essential prerequisites for making a claim, as a means of
communicating more complex (scientific or technical) messages to a non-specialist audience. Examples
of such dramatisation and news stories have been highlighted here, and as such demonstrate that they
are part of constructing a claim as they can stimulate a debate about a particular issue (for example the
case of what to do about preserving Seahenge), or create an image that remains in people’s
consciousness and helps them to understand or identify with a particular argument at a later date. But
in trying to establish a direct link between such incidents and the kind of long term responses that may
be implemented by a government, either as a law, policy or programme of action, the effects of the
media and dramatic events are quite weak or diffuse in the cases of ICZM, MP and RBMP. It could
therefore be proposed that isolated incidents have a minimal influence on the construction of a claim,
and that these prerequisites may only become significant when they are seen in the context of a series
of incidents happening over a longer period of time.
Lastly, the use of economic incentives in constructing a claim for a problem is another prerequisite
where the effects can be quite diffuse when rewards are considered in relation to broad sustainable
development objectives, and less attractive when seen in terms of risk avoidance rather than a gain.
Thus for ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP again, the economic case is one of the less persuasive
elements in making a claim.
Taken as a whole, the use of Hannigan’s (1995) model for the successful social construction of an
environmental problem therefore provides a useful framework for examining how coastal or other
environmental problems are constructed, and also gives some clues as to how or what kind of response
may subsequently be developed. However in using the model to trace the development of ICZM, Marine
Planning and RBMP two important observations can be made:
1. Whilst Hannigan treats each of the six prerequisites for constructing an environmental problem
relatively equally, the literature review above shows that not all prerequisites feature equally in
making the case for a problem. As has been discussed, the presence of scientific evidence may
be strong, but use of the media may be weak, or there may be a lack of institutional sponsors to
support a claim for action.
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2. The social construction of a problem is only the beginning of a longer process, which includes a
discussion of what is to be done about the problem, the choice of a course of action and
implementation. Whilst institutional sponsors themselves might be in a position to act, for
example DEFRA can initiate the development of new policies or procedures, Hannigan’s model
does not describe the mechanism by which a claim becomes the subject of political action.
The points above thus provide two further avenues for investigation in relation to the discussion of
coastal, marine and catchment problems and the implementation of a response. In the first instance,
the fact that certain prerequisites have a stronger or weaker presence in constructing a claim for a
problem raises the possibility that Hannigan’s model of social construction can be refined to
demonstrate the more nuanced way in which each prerequisite may contribute to the way a claim is
defined and articulated.
In other words, rather than seeing Hannigan’s six prerequisites - scientific authority and validation of
claims, popularisers, media attention, dramatisation, economic and institutional sponsors - as being
discrete events (i.e. there is scientific evidence or there is not), each prerequisite may be viewed along a
spectrum of “weak” to “strong” presence indicating how persuasive they may be in constructing a claim.
Representing this visually, Figure 3.2 below shows how this may look for the construction of a coastal
problem, based on what has been found in relation to ICZM in this chapter. For each prerequisite, a
black circle has been placed along the spectrum of weak to strong presence to give an approximate
indication of the relative strengths of each component in making the case for ICZM.
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Figure 3.2: the Case for a Coastal Problem: Contributions to the Construction of Claims in ICZM
Were the same exercise to be repeated with Marine Planning and River Basin Management, based on
the literature reviewed and conclusions made in the previous section, then it could be expected that the
placement of black circles along the spectrum for each prerequisite would be slightly different,
representing for example that the presence or use of media attention and dramatisation is much less
significant in making the case for RBMP than it is for ICZM and Marine Planning.
Considering this critique of Hannigan’s model in the wider context of the research, this exercise confirms
to some extent the assertion made in Chapter One that different social constructions or definitions of a
problem can result in different planning regimes being developed. The framing of the problem therefore
has implications for the integration of space, levels of governance and policies or plans that may be
overcome through communicative efforts to understand other perspectives and build a common vision
for future actions.
Source: Author
Weak
presence
Strong
presence
Scientific Authority/Validation
Popularisers
Media Attention
Dramatisation
Economic Incentives
Institutional Sponsors
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Regarding the second point made on the use of Hannigan’s model to explain the emergence of different
coastal planning regimes, namely that the model does not adequately describe the link from defining a
problem to the implementation of a response, it is necessary to return to the literature to find other
sources which may provide this explanation. Reference has already been made to Kingdon, (1995, 2003),
whose work takes a broader perspective on the factors which contribute to problem recognition and
agenda setting.
In examining agenda setting in American politics, Kingdon uses the metaphor of streams joining
together – the political, comprising of parties, interest groups, individuals and public opinion, the policy
stream, where policies and initiatives to tackle the problem are chosen and the problem stream, in
which evidence for a problem (e.g. a sudden crisis, symbols, experiences and feedback from current
initiatives) is drawn. Similar to the “dramatisation” discussed by Hannigan, focusing events happen
suddenly, often unpredictably and attract media attention, either revealing new problems, or, as in
Downs’ (1972) issue-attention cycle whereby issues experience a decline in attention and then
recapture public interest at a later date, encouraging thinking about new ways to deal with issues that
have previously been dormant.
In describing the process of agenda setting, several “levels” of agenda are referred to. At the most
general level, all issues and ideas exist in what Birkland (2005) calls an agenda universe. Ideas or issues
with some value come to be part of the systemic agenda, which is defined by Cobb and Elder (1983) as
consisting of “all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting
public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing authority” (in
Birkland, 2005:110).
At a more significant level, issues reach the governmental or institutional agenda, which is defined by
Kingdon as “the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of
government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention to at any given
time” (2003:3). Birkland observes that an even smaller number still make it to the decision agenda –
“items that are about to be acted upon by the government” (2005:112).
Figure 3.3 shows these agendas represented in a series of concentric circles, the largest capturing all the
potential issues in the agenda universe. These issues are reduced down through the different types of
agenda closer to enaction, with the smallest number making it to the decision agenda where a solution
(i.e. a policy) will be put into place.
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Agenda Universe
Systemic Agenda
Governmental/
Institutional Agenda
Decision
Agenda
Figure 3.3: Differing Levels of Agenda
Source: Birkland (2005)
For Kingdon, ideas about a problem or solution must reach the governmental or decision agenda for any
real action to occur, and it is “policy windows” which enable policy entrepreneurs to draw together the
political, policy and problem streams at opportune moments for this to happen.
Policy windows may be opened routinely, during the normal course of political business, for example a
change in government following an election, but other policy window openings may be more
intermittent and occur when there is either a change in the political stream, i.e. a change in the political
or public mood, or when there is a change in the problem stream, whereby an issue comes to be
recognised as pressing (Kingdon, 1984). At this point policy entrepreneurs must seize the opportunity to
bring together the streams – recognition of a problem, potential solutions and a favourable public mood
- and push forward their own proposals on to the governmental agenda. Given a viable proposal, this
proposal may be taken further to the decision agenda.
Kingdon’s model therefore provides an alternative to Hannigan’s social constructionist perspective,
although it does take in many of the same conditions needed for a problem to be recognised, such as
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interest groups, symbols and dramatic events. The main deficiency of Kingdon’s model, however, is that
criticism which the author has already applied to Hannigan’s social construction model, and a point
which has also been recognised by Sabatier (1991) - that the agenda setting process outlined by Kingdon
falls short of describing the subsequent events of policy formulation and implementation, i.e. it only
covers what is termed “predecision processes” by Zahariadis (in Sabatier 1999;79) and thus could be
modified to encompass later stages of the policy cycle. Alternatively, other policy subsystems must be
explored to provide an explanatory framework for the different implementation trajectories of ICZM,
MP and RBMP.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has addressed the first assumption of the research, namely that the definition of an
environmental problem, and the formulation and implementation of a solution, is the product of a
process of social construction and Objective 2, to explain the emergence of coastal planning regimes in
terms of the social construction of a “coastal problem” in order to understand the different policy
responses that may occur.
This has been achieved through the use of John Hannigan’s framework for the social construction of an
environmental problem. In doing so, it has been found that ICZM, Marine Planning and River Basin
Management have reached different stages of implementation largely through differing combinations of
the ways that scientific evidence has been used and the weaker or stronger presence of popularisers or
institutional sponsors. The media, dramatic incidents and economic incentives have played a much
lesser role in demonstrating problems or providing a case for action.
In undertaking this analysis it has been proposed that Hannigan’s model may be refined to indicate this
weaker or stronger presence of the six prerequisites, and in doing so it may be possible to identify ways
in which certain prerequisites are more persuasive in making a case for action. Therefore, if the social
construction of a problem is better understood in terms of its component parts, it may assist in
communicating the problem amongst different stakeholders and help to build a shared understanding of
issues that need to be addressed.
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A second important point raised in this analysis is the problem of moving from the social construction of
a problem to implementing a solution. Whilst dialogue amongst stakeholders can help to identify a
common concern, neither Hannigan nor Kingdon provide any real mechanisms for explaining how an
issue is finally acted upon by government. Therefore, the next chapter will investigate the broader
process of policy making to find ways in which the possibilities for solving a coastal, marine or
catchment problem may become a reality.
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CHAPTER 4: A Collaborative Model of Policy Making for Integrated Coastal Zone Management
4.1 Introduction
This chapter represents the final part of the contextual and conceptual framework of the research, and
in doing so contributes to meeting Objective Three of the research, which is to develop an
understanding of how integration may be facilitated by collaboration between stakeholders in coastal
organisations.
In the previous chapter, the various social constructions of the coastal/marine/catchment problem were
examined using the framework proposed by John Hannigan (1995). In doing so, a number of conclusions
were drawn about how the different prerequisites of Hannigan’s model (e.g. use of the media, scientific
evidence, economic incentives) may feature more or less strongly in the rhetoric of claims made in order
to place coastal, marine or catchment problems on the political agenda for action. This presented the
possibility for developing a more nuanced model of social construction, reflecting a spectrum of
responses or discourses around the nature of the problem.
Furthermore, this exercise revealed a limitation in the use of Hannigan’s model to explore the way in
which different coastal planning regimes come to be implemented. This is because the articulation of a
problem (i.e. making a claim) and development of potential solutions to such a problem represents what
is perhaps best summed up as “agenda setting”, which is only the first stage in a larger process of policy
making and implementation.
Therefore to gain a deeper understanding of policy making and implementation this chapter explores
the broader policy making process, which has been characterised by some as a process of discourse and
negotiation between stakeholders (see Bevir, 2009; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Healey, 1997) and
provides the underlying principles for participation that are aspired to in the policy making procedures
of ICZM, MP and RBMP. Utilising literature on collaboration in planning, governance and policy analysis,
other factors which contribute to the implementation of coastal, marine and catchment policies will be
investigated.
In conjunction with the idea of collaborative approaches to policy making, this chapter also considers
the notion of top-down and bottom-up styles of implementation. Having previously observed the
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collaborative, bottom-up style of ICZM and the more instrumentally rational, top-down approaches of
MP and RBMP, and given that each regime stresses the importance of stakeholder consultation in plan
making, this raises an important issue about how stakeholder concerns and the potentially conflicting
strategic objectives of higher level government may be reconciled through deliberative practices and the
structures of coastal governance.
This issue will be examined with reference to models of inter-organisational collaboration and
governance. Klijn notes that “literature and research in the tradition of the governance network focus
primarily upon the complexity of decision making and the problems of reaching acceptable outcomes for
societal problems because of the involvement of many actors” (2008:127). In the context where
planning for coastal areas is seen as a cross cutting issue the use of collaboration in coastal planning
regimes is perhaps critical and it is therefore useful to assess how far current practice follows the
characteristics of collaboration that are deemed useful or desirable in the literature. Combining theories
of the policy process and collaboration will enable an appropriate framework to be devised for exploring
variation in the implementation of ICZM, MP and RBMP in more depth.
4.2 Models of the Policy Process
As stated in the previous chapter, Hannigan’s model of the social construction of an environmental
problem can be used to uncover information about the way the coastal, marine or catchment
management problem is framed in relation to each of the six prerequisites outlined. However, Hannigan
notes that “invoking action on an environmental claim requires an ongoing contestation by claims-
makers seeking to affect legal and political change” (2006:73) and thus following agenda setting there
must be continued negotiations between claims makers and the executive agencies of government in
order to produce outputs such as legal instruments, new policies, programmes and projects.
In order to understand the process through which policies, programmes and projects are devised, it is
helpful to draw upon theory related to the policy making process. It is first necessary however to
provide a definition of what is meant by “public policy”, that is, the product of the policy making
process. For Jenkins (1978), public policy is:
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“a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection
of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should,
in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve”.
This emphasises the complex network of decision making which takes place in the formulation of public
policy, and also the need for feasibility in the actions that are proposed.
Another definition is that provided by James Anderson, who describes public policy as “a purposive
course of action followed by an actor or a set of actors in dealing with a matter of concern” highlighting
the link between a problem, perceived or real (i.e. a socially constructed claim), and government action
(1984, in Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:7).
Within these two definitions therefore, we find key elements of what a public policy is (i.e. what it is
designed to do) and how such a policy may come about (aspects of the policy process). Further
reference to policy studies literature, in particular Hogwood and Gunn (1984) distinguish between
studies of policy, i.e. knowledge of policy and the policy process, or understanding of how policy is
made, and policy analysis – knowledge in the policy process, assisting policy analysts to make improved
policies. In this case the study of coastal planning regimes is concerned with those dimensions of policy
studies outlined by Hogwood and Gunn, i.e. examining policy content, the policy process itself and policy
outputs (1981, in Ham and Hill, 1993).
In terms of content, the previous chapters of the literature review have served to uncover something of
the histories of how coastal, marine and catchment management policies have been developed and
implemented.
Secondly, in examining the policy process, other studies of ICZM in the UK have considered it in isolation
from other coastal planning regimes (see for example McGlashan, 2002, Stojanovic and Shipman, 2007,
Midlen, 2006) and thus do not address the divergence of coastal, marine and catchment policies from
common origins. Such divergence must be considered as resulting from the different social
constructions or conceptualisations of problems and the decision making processes undertaken in order
to address such problems.
Policy processes also have direct links with the third aspect – policy outputs, as it is the policy process
that structures subsequent policy outputs. The abovementioned studies of ICZM “implementation
failures” cite the lack of statutory status and resources as reasons for such failures, but a deeper
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understanding of the participatory processes seen in Coastal Partnerships, contrasted with the more
top-down implementation approach of MP and RBMP which can be obtained through further empirical
studies, may reveal additional insights into how more appropriate outcomes may be achieved for ICZM.
As policy analysis seeks to untangle a complicated web of relationships and events, the stages model of
the policy process first devised and operationalised by Harold Lasswell (1956) may be used to
disaggregate the stages a policy or programme would go through during its “policy life” (deLeon , in
Sabatier, 1999:20).
Through the policy process model, Lasswell (1956) sought to develop a normative, rational model of
policy making which followed the stages of:
1. Intelligence gathering,
2. Promotion of policy options,
3. Prescription,
4. Invocation of the prescribed course of action,
5. Application of policy by those charged with delivery,
6. Termination, and finally
7. Appraisal.
The stages model has been refined, for example by Brewer (1974) and Hogwood and Gunn (1984), to
reflect new understandings of policy making and provide a clearer terminology for each of the stages.
But more significantly the term policy cycle has come to be used in recognition of policy succession
(Brewer and deLeon, 1983, in Howlett and Ramesh, 2003) and where repetitions of policy making and
implementation build upon each other as an expression of purposeful learning (Olsen, 2002:30).
Referring back to terminology, variations on models of the policy cycle proposed by different authors
elaborate components of policy making in different ways. Thus the first stage of “initiation” identified by
Brewer (1974) or “deciding to decide” in the case of Hogwood and Gunn (1984) refers to the detection
or conception of a problem and the recognition that action must be taken – as in the social construction
of an environmental claim. The “implementation” phase identified by Brewer, (1974) and Hogwood and
Gunn (1984), whereby decisions are translated into actions is paralleled by the “invocation” and
“application” phases outlined by Lasswell, in which sanctions are taken to enforce compliance with the
decision maker’s wishes, and may be followed by the application of measures to penalise those who do
not comply (Howlett and Ramesh 2003:12).
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Feedback – influences the political system and demands (inputs)
Inputs
Demands
Supports
Resources
The Political System
Translation/decision
processes etc.
Outputs
Policies
Laws
Policy
Outcomes
The Environment – Social, Political, Economic
Another model of policy making is that devised by Easton (1965), which views policy making as a system
akin to a natural or biological system, comprising of a series of inputs, processes, outputs and feedback,
operating in and being influenced by its surrounding environment (Birkland 2005:201). Figure 4.1 below
shows that in the input-output model, inputs take the form of policy demands (for action) and supports,
for example endorsement by voting or adherence to new regulations by various actors, which are
followed by decision making processes, whereby the political system or “black box” translates inputs
into outputs in the form of policies and laws. The outcomes or impacts of decisions feed back to the
inputs of the system, influencing future decision making.
Figure 4.1: the Policy Process as a System of Inputs and Outputs
Source: Adapted from Birkland (2005) and Hill (1997)
Easton’s systems model differs somewhat to Laswell’s stages model in that it gives greater attention to
external factors in the policy process. Lasswell’s model focuses on decision making within a limited
sphere of governmental actors or officials (Howlett and Ramesh 2003:12). Yet policy making, particularly
in the modern era of governance is dependent upon a complex network of policy actors and power
relations which both influence and are influenced by government, therefore shaping the inputs,
processes and outputs of the political system. Ham and Hill note however that Easton’s model, although
stressing the importance of the conversion process or “black box” fail to give it the same level of
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consideration as they do the inputs, and thus Easton’s model cannot provide the researcher with a full
appreciation of the dynamics inherent in decision making (1993:16).
It has been argued that policy cycle models are over simplistic, assuming that policy emerges via a
logical path when it is known that the policy process may be highly disordered (Jenkins, in Hill, 1997:31).
But what is pertinent about models of the policy cycle is their underlying logic of problem solving, a
purpose envisioned by Lasswell in his call for a scientific approach to the study of public problems
(Birkland, 2003) and also noted by Howlett and Ramesh (2003:13). Whilst such scientific approaches to
policy have been the subject of criticisms made earlier in the literature review (see Chapter 2 and the
discussion of rationality), the stages model retains its usefulness in terms of providing a structure for the
analysis of policy formulation, and in fact the plan making cycles proposed for ICZM, MP and RBMP also
adhere to a staged approach. The Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine
Environmental Protection (GESAMP) model of an integrated coastal management policy cycle (1996) is
derived directly from the work of Lasswell, Brewer and others to provide a framework for activities
associated with a “generation” of coastal management, shown in Figure 4.2 below:
Figure 4.2: The ICZM Policy Cycle
Source: Olsen (2002), adapted from GESAMP (1996)
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Olsen (2001) notes that this simplistic policy cycle is useful because it “draws attention to the
interdependencies between the steps within a generation and between successive generations of
management” (2001:328), thereby demonstrating how the inputs into an initial stage of decision making
can be built on in a process of adaptive management,
Another example of the ICZM policy cycle comes in the form of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission’s Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management (ICOM) process, which divides the
implementation of ICOM into a number of phases and smaller steps. These are shown in Figure 4.3
below, with the phases of (I) preliminary identification (of problems and planning needs), (II)
preparation of plans, (III) implementation of plans, and (IV) consolidation, replication and expansion as
ICOM becomes further institutionalised.
Figure 4.3: the ICOM Policy Cycle
Source:IOC (2006:10)
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Policy cycle models such as those by GESAMP (1996) and the IOC (2006) have also provided the
foundations for indicators to measure the progress of ICZM implementation. For example, Pickaver et al
(2004), in work for the European Commission’s ICZM Experts Working Group on indicators and data
(WG-ID) proposed a semi-quantitative set of indicators which “takes the thinking of the complex
ICZM management cycle towards much more simplified comparative analysis... it recognises that the
ICZM cycle can be broken down into a series of discrete ranked actions” (Pickaver et al, 2004:454).
The IOC’s Handbook for Measuring the Progress and Outcomes of Integrated Coastal and Ocean
Management (IOC, 2006) also outlines indicators to be used for ICOM (ecological and socioeconomic)
alongside a set of governance performance indicators which measure the performance of programme
components (e.g., status of ICOM planning and implementation), as well as the progress and quality of
interventions and of the ICOM governance process itself (IOC, 2006:12). These indicators are formulated
based on a number of broad goals such as “Enhancing information, knowledge, awareness and
participation” and associated objectives, for example ensuring adequate levels or higher education and
professional preparation for ICOM. Such indicators bring added value to the policy cycle in that they can
provide more detail about the policy sub-cycles or smaller components of a full iteration of the policy
cycle that may need to be considered and incorporated into decision making processes.
Similarly, UNESCO’s planning cycle for marine spatial planning follows that “MSP is a public process of
analysing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities in marine areas to
achieve ecological, economic and social objectives that are usually specified through a political process”
(Ehler and Douvere, 2009:18), acknowledging both the instrumental nature of planning and the
deliberative elements of decision making which are indicated by stakeholder contributions to stages in
the plan cycle (see Figure 4.4 below).
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Figure 4.4: The Continuing MSP Planning Cycle
Source: Ehler and Douvere (2009)
For river basin management, the Environment Agency’s cyclic approach incorporating the policy
framework provided by RBMPs (see Figure 4.5) demonstrates that each phase itself is composed of a
number of smaller tasks and interactions.
Figure 4.5: Cycles of River Basin Management Planning
Source: Environment Agency (2006a)
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Table 4a shows how Howlett and Ramesh (2003) compare stages of applied problem solving with
corresponding stages of the policy cycle. Each of these stages will be explained in more detail in the next
sections.
Table 4a: Problem Solving and Stages of the Policy Cycle
Applied Problem Solving Policy Cycle Stages
1. Problem recognition 1. Agenda setting
2. Proposal of a solution 2. Policy formulation
3. Choice of solution 3. Decision making
4. Putting solution into effect 4. Policy implementation
5. Monitoring results 5. Policy evaluation
Source: Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:13
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4.2.1 Problem Recognition/Agenda Setting
In the previous chapter, Hannigan’s (1995) model of the social construction of an environmental
problem was used to demonstrate how coastal, marine and catchment problems may come to be
defined by various actors. However it is not until policy makers begin discussion about a problem that it
is said to be “on the agenda” (Kraft and Furlong, 2004:81). Therefore the first stage of the policy cycle is
concerned with defining an issue and elevating it to a level of prominence whereby it is regarded as a
“public” problem requiring action from the government (Howlett and Ramesh 2003:121).
The process outlined by Hannigan demonstrates how understandings of issue definition in the policy
sciences have moved from observing the discovery of objective facts to recognition that creating
knowledge and the framing of problems is a socially constructed process. In doing so, the social
construction of a problem thus represents a discourse amongst different groups, and a competition
between groups to have their definition accepted in order to achieve a response that is consistent with
their own objectives or vision for the future of an issue. Schattschneider (1960) states that
“the group that successfully defines a problem will also be the one that defines solutions to it,
thereby prevailing in the policy debate” (in Birkland, 2005:109).
This view is also supported by Deborah Stone, who observes that
“Problem definition is strategic because groups, individuals and government agencies
deliberately and consciously fashion portrayals so as to promote their favoured course of action”
(Stone,2002, in Kraft and Furlong, 2004:133).
Given the number of potential issues a government may have to deal with at any one time, Kraft and
Furlong (2004) point out that some never capture the government’s attention. Once a problem is
defined, it must then be advanced on to the agenda for action. This event in itself is not as clear cut as it
might appear - as was seen in the previous chapter, Kingdon (1984) and others have identified different
levels of agenda that elevate issues to a greater level of importance and increase the likelihood of action
being taken, and one of the criticisms made of Hannigan’s model in Chapter 3 acknowledges that
constructing a problem is only the first step towards the implementation of a response.
Several models have been defined in order to explain the movement of issues from the systemic to the
governmental and decision agendas. Early models of agenda setting sought to find causality in the
underlying socioeconomic conditions of society, which prompted a government response, however
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these models (see Pryor (1968) and Wilensky (1975), proponents of convergence thesis, and Schneider
and Frey (1988) on political business cycles) were only able to provide a general typology of issues and
variables – social, political and economic – contributing to the agenda setting process (Howlett and
Ramesh, 2003:131; see also Sabatier, 1999). King (1973) and Hofferbert (1974) attempted to draw these
variables together in a funnel of causality, which showed decision making as a direct or indirect function
of historical-geographical conditions, socioeconomic conditions, political behaviour, institutions and
political elites (Sabatier, 1991:150) acting in a nested system. Like Easton’s model however, its “black
box” approach of converting demands to outputs does not give sufficient attention to specific causative
agents (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:132) and in particular neglects to weight the influence of elites over
mass political behaviour in driving policy decisions (Sabatier, 1991).
A further example of multivariate agenda setting is the study of agenda building in different societies by
Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976), in which an “outside initiation” model was found to apply to pluralist
societies, whereby groups outside government such as NGOs went through the steps of:
1) issue initiation, in which an issue is articulated, echoing Hannigan’s (1995) idea of popularisers or
sponsors;
2) specification, in which alternative solutions are specified in the form of demands, in the same way
that Easton’s systems model has inputs in the form of demands from groups in society;
3) expansion of public support, to create further pressure or interest, and if that is successful,
4) the issue makes entrance on to the governmental agenda.
Cobb et al also identified models more appropriate to other political systems, such as the “mobilisation”
model, likely to be found in one party states, whereby an issue may already be on the governmental
agenda and is pushed down to systemic agenda level in order to bolster support, and the “inside
initiative” model, where issues arise within the government sphere (1976:128) and supporters in
influential groups attempt to place the issue on the governmental agenda without expansion of support,
as they do not wish the issue to be contested in public.
Whilst Cobb et al (1976) applied these models to specific countries and their associated political
contexts, Howlett and Ramesh note that these different styles of agenda setting varied not so much by
regime as by sector (2003:135). Thus the “outside initiation” model may be more pertinent to agenda
setting in the sphere of environmental policy in the UK, where it has been demonstrated (in the previous
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chapter of the literature review) that NGOs, other interests outside government and wider public
debate have contributed substantially to agenda setting for coastal planning regimes.
The model of agenda setting proposed by Kingdon (1984), which has been elaborated in the previous
chapter, provides a different insight into agenda setting by recognising that a number of determinants
or forces may be working simultaneously and in a more unpredictable fashion than is suggested by other
models. Conversely this can also be a criticism, as Howlett and Ramesh note the model may be “too
contingent on unforeseen circumstances” (2003:138). But in acknowledging that many of the issues and
solutions that reach the governmental agenda are not new, i.e. long standing problems may be coupled
with new solutions, or audiences may go through a gradual process of “softening up” by policy
entrepreneurs, Kingdon’s model reflects the reality of policy making as an iterative cycle in which
feedback demonstrating the impacts of government interventions (Sabatier, 1991:151) may be a driver
for further policy change.
The combination of multiple variables in defining problems and outputs complicates the task of
attributing causality to a single source and thus no single model of agenda setting can provide a
comprehensive framework for explaining what issues come to be addressed by the implementation of
new policies. However the agenda setting phase does provide a bridge between the social construction
of a problem, whether this is a new problem or bringing to bear new perspectives on pre-existing
conditions, and implementing measures to tackle that problem.
4.2.2 Proposal of a Solution/Policy Formulation
This second stage of decision making can be difficult to separate from agenda setting as frequently a
problem and a potential solution may be simultaneously placed on the agenda by entrepreneurs, as can
be seen in Kingdon’s work on agenda setting (1984, 1995). In essence policy formulation is the
generation or proposal of means or courses of action to resolve a perceived problem, and in a rational
decision making process involves consideration of all possible alternatives and their consequences (Hill,
2005), although it has been established in Chapter Two that there is rarely perfect information or
analytical capacity to make this possible.
In examining policy formulation, one of the first things to reflect on is who is actually involved. Obviously
this will differ with every policy decision, but on a more general basis different theoretical propositions
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can provide some perspectives on the groups or stakeholders with a role to play. An early model
identifying collective approaches to policy formulation is the “iron triangle” metaphor, which describes
the relationship between actors operating in a particular policy domain (sector) or subsystem of
government. According to Burstein (1991) these domains are socially constructed around organisations
sharing a concern for a problem, or relationships with other organisations that are perceived to have
influence in advancing a solution.
The iron triangle encapsulates the dependent relationship between bureaucrats, governmental
committees and interest groups in that interest groups rely on bureaucrats to enact their proposals and
provide a link to government, whilst bureaucrats require the help of pressure groups to galvanise
political support for a program they are charged with delivering for an affected group (Peters, 1986, in
Rhodes, 1997). Whilst the iron triangle was representative of policy making in some domains where
issues could be “captured” by privileged groups, this closed system gave way later to pluralist and more
deliberative, open models such as the issue networks observed by Heclo (1978), Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1993) and Marsh and Rhodes (1992).
The issue networks identified by Heclo differed to the concept of iron triangles in that they featured a
broader number of participants concerned with an issue from government, interest groups, the private
sector, academia and the media, acting with “quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or
dependence on others in their environment” (1978:102) and as such issue networks were able to
communicate criticisms of policy and generate ideas for new initiatives (McFarland, 1987, in Rhodes,
1997:34). Later, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) devised by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993)
proposed two or more coalitions consisting of actors at all levels of government “who share a set of
policy beliefs” (Sabatier, 1999:09) within a policy domain, competing to promote their own interests by
manipulating governmental and public behaviour while at the same time seeking to establish a
countervailing position to other coalitions in the same domain.
Rhodes (1986, and Rhodes and Marsh, 1992) elaborates further on the pluralist view of Heclo,
identifying what Hill refers to as “networks of varying cohesiveness” (2005:69) that characterise policy
making in the UK. These networks are located along a continuum from the relatively small and exclusive
policy communities to much larger, open networks based on the distribution and exchange of resources
(which in turn implies a distribution of power) between actors.
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At one end of the continuum, policy communities most closely resemble the iron triangle in that they
display a limited membership, relatively insulated from other networks (Rhodes, 1997:38). Members of
policy communities share values and are highly interdependent in terms of exchanging resources in a
vertical dimension (as in top down implementation) to enable the delivery of services. This
interdependence makes the distribution of power in policy networks fairly balanced, and relationships
remain stable over time.
In contrast, issue networks are a much broader grouping of actors, including those who may be more or
less powerful. Whilst issue networks share a degree of interest and basic knowledge about a particular
issue, they may not necessarily share the same view of what should be done, and thus Heclo observes
that
“Increasingly it is through networks of people who regard each other as knowledgeable, or at
least needing to be answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence debated,
and alternative options worked out – though rarely in any controlled, well organised way”
(1978: 104).
In this sense policy networks are more diverse than policy communities and offer greater opportunities
for examining policy alternatives. However such diversity also brings with it an increased likelihood of
conflict and lower levels of agreement. Therefore it may be difficult to discern who is in control of
policies and decisions (Heclo 1978:102).
A key feature of proposing solutions to a problem or policy formulation is experiential learning by
interaction within the political system. Karl Deutsch (1966) is usually credited with first discussing policy
learning in theorising about the role of feedback in enhancing governmental “learning capacity” (May,
1992:332). This concept is taken up by Heclo (1974), and applied by Sabatier (1988) to Advocacy
Coalition Frameworks as “policy oriented learning”. This describes the way in which coalition members
modify their beliefs, behaviour and objectives over time based on their experiences of “dynamic system
events” such as changes in socioeconomic conditions and technology, public opinion, governing
coalitions (i.e. personnel within government), policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.
Policy oriented learning therefore has much in common with the single and double loop learning model
previously described in relation to the adaptive management principle of ICZM in Chapter Two.
Whilst Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1990) conceptualise policy oriented learning as occurring within and
across advocacy groups, May (1992) categorises policy learning into three different types. Instrumental
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learning, concerning the viability of policy interventions and implementation tools, social learning –
improving understanding of how an issue is socially constructed in order to redefine goals, and political
learning – adjusting strategies for advocating a policy idea or problem. This framework is particularly
insightful given that policy formulation in relation to coastal planning regimes is largely based on the
need to improve or streamline a number of existing policies (or correct implementation “failures” in the
case of ICZM), and also with regards to continuously improving understandings of the scientific evidence
base and stakeholder perspectives on the interactions of coastal activities. The fact that much of this
streamlining or integration has not been achieved indicates that policy learning is still at an early stage
for coastal management.
4.2.3 Choice of Solution/Decision Making
The third stage of policy making represents the activity of choosing between those alternatives that
have reached the decision agenda to effect policy change, whether this is positive (a change to the
current course of action) or negative (deciding to maintain the status quo). Traditional views of decision
making proceed from a rational comprehensive approach, that is, actors will undertake the tasks
outlined by Healey et al (1982:8) of clarifying policy goals, systematic analysis, generation of policy
alternatives, systematic analysis of these alternatives, and monitoring performance.
In Chapter Two the rational approach was criticised for presenting a normative, ideal process of decision
making that is rarely achievable (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963), and that it attempts to separate facts
from values in what is a fundamentally value-laden activity by means of systematically and objectively
viewing all available information. However the key driver of decision making is goals to be achieved, and
whether goals, images or visions are individual or collective, as noted by Andreas Faludi in his (1973)
studies of rational process planning, the acknowledgement of such visions demonstrates that values and
preferences underpin policy choice.
In response to the rational model, Herbert Simon’s model of bounded rationality demonstrated that
decision makers adopt rules of thumb in order to simplify the choice between alternatives (Ham and
Hill, 1993:84), and, rather than seeking to choose the alternative that maximises their values, decision
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makers “satisfice” or select the alternative considered good enough, in a process that Simon argued to
be a realistic analysis of decision making in practice (Simon 1957, in Ham and Hill, 1993).
In policy analysis literature, rationality is frequently contrasted with more pragmatic, action oriented
approaches (Allmendinger, 2002) to decision making, such as Charles Lindblom’s incrementalism or
Amitai Etzioni’s mixed scanning. Following his proposition that decision making proceeds by successive
limited comparisons of alternatives that are only slightly different in each case, in later work Lindblom
uses the term “disjointed incrementalism”, in which limited comparisons are used to select alternatives
that ameliorate problems on a trial and error basis rather than aspiring to more fundamental policy
change. Underpinning this idea is the notion of achieving consensus, and Lindblom (1965, in Healey,
2006:24) argued for a more negotiative “partisan mutual adjustment”, whereby decision makers,
exposed to other decision makers and alternatives engage in bargaining and negotiation to arrive at
coordinated decisions – a situation which is more representative of deliberative decision making, where
“policy formulation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality
of separate actors with separate interests, goals and strategies” (Scharpf, 1978, in Klijn, 2008:346).
Lindblom’s disjointed incrementalism has been criticised for its “power blindness” (Allmendinger,
2002:128), a point demonstrated by Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt, who note that “a sequence of
essentially incremental changes may well occur in a context in which certain parties are dominating and
therefore mutual adjustment is not occurring” (1990, in Ham and Hill, 1993:87). Furthermore,
incrementalism was seen as being conservative, its focus on short to medium term objectives being
unsuited to more fundamental policy change, according to Dror, justifying a “policy of no effort” and
acting as “an ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces prevalent in policy
making” (see Smith and May, in Hill, 1997:166). Lindblom later abandoned early assumptions about the
pluralist nature of society (Gregory, in Hill, 1997:175), stating more explicitly that “public policy making
has to be understood essentially as a political process, rather than an analytical, problem solving one”
(Ibid, p186).
As much of the policy science literature has outlined the shortcomings of incrementalism and
rationalism, scholars have sought to identify ways in which the more desirable elements of both may be
synthesised in a third model of decision making. Dror (1964) proposes a normative optimum model,
which seeks to increase both the rational and extra-rational or creative, intuitive elements of decision
making , although this allowed for some “vague” concepts of extra-rational information to be prescribed
(Smith and May in Hill, 1997:168).
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Amitai Etzioni similarly proposed a guide to decision making known as mixed scanning, which
distinguished between fundamental decisions, which set a direction and provide context for incremental
decisions (Ham and Hill, 1993:89). In the mixed scanning approach, decision makers would proceed from
a broad scan of an issue to ascertain more fundamental issues or decisions, which are then followed up
with a more detailed examination of alternatives and incremental decisions. Whilst Etzioni claimed this
combined model of rationalism and incrementalism helped to reduce the shortcomings of the other,
Smith and May point out that “fundamental decisions in one context are incremental in the other and
vice versa”, realising the possibility that decision makers hold different views of what constitutes a
fundamental issue. In this way, mixed scanning fails to reconcile the rational versus incremental debate
successfully (in Hill, 97:168).
Allmendinger notes that “it is not a giant leap to see the link between Lindblom’s emphasis on
agreement, consensus and mutual adjustment and the recent developments in collaborative planning
theory” (2002:127), which will be discussed later on in this chapter in relation to the partnership
working evident in coastal planning and management regimes. Certainly decision making has become
increasingly complex given the number of participants that are required to be involved in the process,
not just to ensure the legitimacy of decisions but also to assist in the delivery of policy. The
implementation phase of policy making is considered in the next section.
4.2.4 Implementation/Putting a Solution into Effect; and Monitoring Results/Policy Evaluation
Following a decision to amend or make a new policy and the selection of means to achieve policy goals,
decisions must then be translated into action. Birkland (2005:182) notes that prior to studies of
implementation, policy scientists assumed that “implementation largely proceeded after enactment
with little or no controversy”. Similarly Bevir observes that implementation was conceived “as a top-
down administrative and hierarchical process” (2009:104). In reality, implementation has rarely been
unproblematic, and the stages or systems models of the policy cycle have been criticised for imposing a
framework of implementation analysis that is potentially distorting (Hill 2005:21).
Implementation studies are closely related with the final policy evaluation stage of the policy cycle.
Policy evaluation, according to Howlett and Ramesh, “refers broadly to the stage of the policy process at
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which it is determined how a public policy has actually fared in action” (2003:207), and given that policy
making relates to the attainment of particular goals, it makes sense to consider the implementation and
monitoring stages together (Colebatch, 2002).
Hogwood and Gunn (1984:219) note that although evaluation is concerned with policy that has been put
into effect, decisions on the means of evaluation should not be left until this stage and the ability to
measure policy outcomes in some way must thus form part of the earlier policy formulation stage.
Evaluation can take a number of forms, and in keeping with earlier approaches to policy science, initial
models of evaluation proceeded from a neutral, systematic and rational perspective, although later
recognised that interpretation is itself a contestable issue (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:219), dependent
on different group’s understanding of the problem being addresses and their preferred solution.
Subsequently, judgements of policy “success” or “failure” may lead to, in the case of Lasswell’s original
model, policy termination, or provide feedback to earlier stages of the policy cycle in the form of the
reconstruction of policy issues, policy learning and succession.
In examining implementation, research in the 1960s and early 1970s such as Pressman and Wildavsky’s
(1973) work on the implementation of job creation schemes in Oakland sought to explain why the
programme had not achieved its goals, and in doing so the focus of implementation research turned to
“top-down” and “bottom-up” methodologies for understanding the causes of implementation failure.
Under the top-down approach policies are assumed, as has been described earlier in the section, to be
working towards a clear goal or goals that can be easily measured. The following conditions also apply:
Policy is dominated by a piece of legislation or policy statement which subsequently structures
implementation (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:189, and Sabatier, 1986)
A logical chain of command from political leaders to lower level executive agencies exists
(Howlett and Ramesh, 2003)
Implementing officials at lower levels of government share the values and goals of policy makers
and are committed to policy objectives (Sabatier, in Hill 1997:275).
The first two conditions outlined above have been applied in earlier chapters in order to determine the
nature of ICZM, MP and RBMP policies and to partially account for the different implementation
trajectories of each.
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Several authors have found the top-down model to be problematic. In the first instance, the concept of
“policy” and thus policy goals as the object of implementation requires further interpretation. Whilst
clear goals are assumed, Hill notes that policies can be “deliberately made complex, obscure, ambiguous
or even meaningless” (2005:179). Certainly for ICZM, commitments to achieving integration and
sustainability might be viewed as complex and ambiguous as stakeholder’s own constructions of these
terms will differ considerably.
Secondly, in assuming a clear chain of command from policy makers at the top of the hierarchy to lower
level executive agencies such a model fails to take into account the complexities of multi-level
governance. In Pressman and Wildavsky’s case, the need to “clear” decision at different points and by
participants with differing levels of commitment and views of policy objectives demonstrates that “the
more policy depends on such clearances, the more likely it was that the original objectives would not be
accomplished” (Colebatch, 2002:52). This is because implementation is dependent upon linkages and
cooperation between actors – where those links do not exist it results in what has come to be known as
the implementation deficit or gap. Cumulatively, such deficits may prevent policies achieving their
intended outcomes (Hill, 2005:177).
It must be noted that the implementation deficit referred to in policy literature differs somewhat from
the ICZM “failure” that has been mentioned previously. At a superficial level, both may be seen as
referring to failure to meet targets; however Pressman and Wildavsky’s original concept (1973) is based
on a quantifiable sequence of decision points. Under ICZM, where there is no easily identifiable
hierarchy of actors and the nature of decisions does not relate explicitly to the deployment of resources,
the implementation deficit concept is therefore not applicable.
Another shortcoming of the top-down approach is its failure to consider the concretisation of policy
which continues after legislation has been made (Ham and Hill, 1993:107). Although decision making
may form an earlier stage of the policy cycle, some aspects of decision making may not be feasible until
implementation occurs, such as obtaining full information and delegating responsibilities. Decisions may
lead to unforeseen conflict or require ongoing negotiations, a dimension which leads Wildavsky (with
Angela Browne) in the 1983 edition of Implementation to consider “Implementation as mutual
adaptation”. In this case the top down approach is unable to predict the chain of implementing
decisions (1983:208) and thus Wildavsky suggests that “a case can be made for the re-conceptualisation
of implementation as an exploratory rather than an unquestioning, instrumental and even subservient
type of process” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:256, in Laws and Hajer, 2006).
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As an alternative to the top-down approach to implementation studies, the bottom-up approach takes
those at the bottom of the chain of command - conceptualised as “street level bureaucrats” by Lipsky
(1980), who are able to exercise their own discretion in decision making and actions – and follows a
process of “backward mapping”. This term was defined by Richard Elmore as:
“’Backward reasoning’ from the individual and organisational choices that are the hub of the
problem to which policy is addressed, to the rules, procedures and structures that have the closest
proximity to those choices, to the policy instruments available to affect those things, and hence to
feasible policy objectives” (Elmore, 1981:1).
In doing so, Elmore (1981) questions the ability of actors to influence behaviour and the resources
required to do so, and thus bottom-up implementation research is able to focus on the formal and
informal relationships between actors in a policy subsystem (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:190),
negotiations and choices between alternatives. The main advantage of studying implementation from a
bottom-up perspective is that it is said to be free from assumptions about causal relationships and
structural relations between actors and agencies (Ham and Hill, 1993:109). Hjern (and Porter, 1981; and
Hull, 1982) goes further to propose that in the absence of such assumptions, networks may be
constructed empirically by researchers. This point therefore has particular relevance for examining
ICZM, where coastal partnerships set their own agendas in the absence of a mandate from higher levels
of government.
May (1991) notes the existence of “policies without publics”, i.e. policies made with low levels of public
participation and weakly developed issue networks which the researcher must be aware of in trying to
observe implementation from a bottom up perspective, however this situation may be unlikely in
coastal partnerships as partnerships by their very nature attempt to be inclusive of a broad range of
stakeholders.
Whilst top down and bottom up approaches both have their advantages and disadvantages, authors in
the field of policy science have found them to be complementary rather than contradictory (see
Sabatier, 1993a, in Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:190). This has lead to a synthesis or third generation of
implementation research, in which top-down elements such as the use of policy instruments and tools
to structure implementation are considered alongside the motivations and actions of street level
bureaucrats (Birkland, 2005:187). Furthermore, the concept of implementation as an ongoing process is
supported by various authors including Barrett and Fudge, who state that “the policy-action relationship
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is not a linear step-by-step progression by which a policy is translated into anticipated consequences,
but is better described as interactive and recursive” (1981:251).
Friedman, taking an organisational analysis approach to policy, recognises the role of non-governmental
actors as implementing organisations in modern governance arrangements, suggesting that “it is
essential for policy analysis to consider not only what government does but also what is done or not
done outside of government. Taking this broader view, organisations may have substantial impacts both
on the design of public programs and on the social policy environment outside of government”
(2006:483). This statement not only reiterates the possibility of a synthesised approach to studying
implementation, but also the collaborative nature of policy making and implementation, which will be
explored more fully in a later section of this chapter.
Returning to evaluation as the final stage of the policy cycle, evaluation may be legally required at a
particular time following policy implementation, coincide with business cycles or follow a political call
for review (for example after a controversy or change in government). Evaluation may be undertaken by
government, private consultants, involving the public and most of the key actors arrayed in policy
subsystems in a variety of formal and informal venues for assessing and critiquing policy outcomes and
processes (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003:209).
Whilst evaluation can take rational, objective forms reliant on empirical data from natural and physical
sciences, the inherently political nature of policy evaluation (which has already been noted) is a crucial
element of decision making for the future of a particular policy. Bovens, ‘tHart and Kuipers, considering
knowledge of policy outcomes as the product of discursive interaction between competing frameworks
(Yanow, 2000, in Bovens et al 2006) note that a socially constructed approach may recognise the
political dimension to evaluation, but not necessarily lead to better judgements.
Therefore it may be desirable for policy analysts and decision makers to be reflective about their own
constructions of policy success and failure to facilitate policy learning and the continuous reframing of
policy problems in successive iterations of the policy cycle.
4.3 a Collaborative Perspective on the Policy Cycle
In the previous section, policy making and implementation were demonstrated to involve a series of
ongoing interactions between stakeholders in debating the nature of the problem to be addressed,
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devising and implementing solutions and evaluating progress. Alongside this, the need for joint or
partnership working between stakeholders to deliver measures that tackle cross cutting issues such as
coastal, marine and catchment management have been elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2.
Whilst “stakeholder participation” in ICZM/MP/RBMP is enshrined in the principles of ICZM
Recommendation 2002/413/EC and legislation for MP/RBMP, the collaborative process needed to
deliver measures on the ground is a complex political and organisational issue which requires special
consideration. Understanding the dynamics within and between those stakeholders may help to reveal
existing examples of good practice and provide ways in which deliberative actions can be improved, and
thus the focus of the literature review now turns to organisational and collaborative theories which may
provide further perspective on the arrangements of coastal/marine/catchment governance.
In Chapter Two the work of Lymbery (2008) on the practicalities of collaborative working in coastal
partnerships, which cites the work of Chris Huxham (1996) and Barbara Gray (1996) in order to provide
organisational perspectives on why, when and how collaboration should take place was introduced.
Gray’s work, alongside the communicative planning literature also informs the writings of Judith Innes
and David Booher (2003) on consensus building in environmental management.
The main reasons why collaborative working occurs have been considered in previous chapters (for
example legal mandates, the need for a “joined-up” approach to policies, pooling resources and
ensuring legitimacy of actions), but one further reason is advanced by Huxham, namely the idea of
“Creating collaborative advantage” (1996). Huxham states that:
“Collaborative advantage will be achieved when something unusually creative is produced –
perhaps an objective is met – that no organisation could have produced on its own and when each
organisation, through collaboration, is able to achieve its own objective better than it could alone.
In some cases, it should also be possible to achieve some higher level... objectives for society as a
whole rather than just for the participating organisations” (Huxham, 1993:603).
In this definition, Huxham (1996) emphasises outcomes that can only be achieved through joint venture
– although acknowledging that in some cases partnerships need not have such ambitious objectives. Yet
the notion of collaborative advantage suggests that potential synergies arising from a collaborative
venture may be greater than the sum of its parts. Similarly to Huxham’s concept of collaborative
advantage, Sullivan and Skelcher) note that key drivers for collaboration include the aspiration to
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achieve positive outcomes for the system as a whole rather than simply for sectional gain by the
participating organisations (2002:37).
In this sense, ICZM itself may be seen as more than simply working together – the intangible benefits or
“invisible products” of collaboration as described by Hickling (1994, in Huxham 1996:15) that are the
product of engaging in a discursive process may come to the fore.
With regards to the form collaborative working should take, Barbara Gray proposes a model of inter-
organisational collaboration which focuses on domain level relationships, that is, relationships between
a set of actors joined by a common problem or interest (1985:912) much in the same way that
stakeholders may be concerned with the coastal, marine or catchment domains.
Acknowledging the existence of “wicked” problems, Gray notes that attempts by individual
organisations to manage problems are unsuccessful because at one level they are “uncoordinated and
create unanticipated problems for other stakeholders” (1985:914) and “competition for resources from
the contextual environment allows some stakeholders to promote their values at the expense of others”
(Warren, 1967, in Gray, Ibid). This uneven distribution of power within the domain has the potential to
frustrate a broader, consensus-based approach to dealing with problems.
Both of the statements above thus highlight the need for integration that is achieved through a
deliberative process. Furthermore, Gray points to the manner in which organisations socially construct
problems at organisational rather than domain level as a reason for their inability to manage dynamic
external influences. For institutions to adopt truly adaptive and integrated management they must be
willing to engage in a wider discourse about the nature of the problem and the co-production of shared
meanings, i.e. a communicative process. Collaborative practices which sustain constant interaction and
learning (Healey et al, 2000, in Innes and Booher, 2003:56) enable stakeholders to be more adaptive.
Gray’s model therefore takes the idea of inter-organisational collaboration and proposes a way in which
“domain level dynamics can be managed to improve the likelihood that collaborative relationships are
achieved and sustained” (1985:916). The process of collaborative formation is divided into three phases,
and within these phases several conditions facilitating inter-organisational collaboration are outlined,
along with a number of propositions about the circumstances which may enable or prevent more
effective inter-organisational collaboration. The phases are defined as follows:
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1. Problem setting - concerned with the identification of the stakeholders within a domain and
mutual acknowledgement of the issue which joins them.
2. Direction setting – stakeholders articulate the values which guide their individual pursuits and
begin to identify and appreciate a sense of common purpose.
3. Structuring - referred to as implementation in Gray (1989, 1996). Stakeholders undertake
negotiations to create a mutually acceptable regulative framework for the domain.
Source: Gray, 1985
Each phase is explained in more detail below.
4.3.1 Problem Setting
In the problem setting stage, collaborative action is initiated through stakeholders coming to appreciate
their interdependence with other stakeholders in the domain. In Gray’s work this represents a turn
away from traditional and potentially counterproductive adversarial approaches to problem solving,
recognising cost savings and other synergies that may arise from a negotiated outcome. Schemerhorn
(1975) also points to the cultural norms that act as an incentive to collaborative working, and in the UK
context the change from government to a culture of governance, partnership working and the statutory
requirements for stakeholder consultation in policy and plan making provide a framework that allows
collaboration to take place. To this end, Gray proposes:
1. Problem-setting efforts are enhanced when stakeholders expect that the benefits of
collaborating will outweigh the costs and when prevailing norms support collaboration. If
positive expectations are not present, incentives to induce participation will be necessary5
2. the greater the degree of recognised interdependence among stakeholders, the greater the
likelihood of initiating collaboration.
The first query Gray (1985:918) deals with is who should participate? Gray (1985) proposes that:
5 The propositions are used here in a slightly different order to that stated in Gray (1985) and thus the numbers
used do not correspond to the propositions in the original article.
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3. The stakeholder set needs to reflect the complexity of the problem under consideration if
collaboration is to occur.
3a. From an information standpoint, the more stakeholders who participate in problem solving,
the more effective the collaboration will be.
3b. Efforts to convene all stakeholders simultaneously will likely be thwarted by changing
dynamics of the domain. Therefore, inclusion of stakeholders should be viewed as a process of
continual adaptation.
The process of identifying stakeholders in collaboration is also bound with issues of legitimacy. To be a
“legitimate” stakeholder, according to Gray, means having the perceived right and capacity to
participate in the developmental process (1985:921), either by belonging to a group that may be
impacted on by decisions made in the collaborative process, or by possessing resources (financial,
information, skills) that may be utilised as part of the collaboration.
Gray’s definition of legitimacy suggests therefore that there may be some limit as to who might
participate in collaboration, in contrast to the open nature of communicative theory promoted by
Habermas (see Allmendinger, 2002). This perspective also differs somewhat from the idea of legitimacy
as endorsement or acceptance amongst an audience beyond the domain as Innes and Booher (2003)
cite, or Lotia and Hardy’s idea that stakeholders may engage in collaboration to gain legitimacy through
demonstrating their adherence to institutional norms (in Cropper et al, 2008:370). In relation to
stakeholder legitimacy, Gray therefore proposes that:
4. Shared perceptions of legitimacy are necessary to initiate problem-setting. Perceptions of
legitimacy will be shaped by historical relations and the existing power distribution among
stakeholders.
4a. Exclusion of legitimate stakeholders during problem setting will constrain subsequent
implementation of solutions.
Whilst some stakeholders may be easily identified, continuous discourse and exchanges of information
between stakeholders regarding the nature of the problem may reveal further interdependencies. In any
case, the configuration of stakeholders within a domain is dynamic (Gray 1985:919) and highly
dependent on the prevailing discourse or the state of progress towards implementing a plan.
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The issue of legitimacy also applies to the convenor of a collaborative venture. In some cases there may
be a natural or obvious convenor, i.e. an organisation or institutional sponsor that is already part of an
established network. Wood and Gray (1991) have observed other ways in which a convenor may
intervene in the domain via formal or informal means – these include the invitation by stakeholders of
someone possessing authority to become the convenor, powerful individuals or organisations may use
mandate, their formal authority or their ability to provide resources as an incentive to bring
stakeholders in to collaborative arrangements. Informally, a good facilitator who can bring stakeholders
together through their own knowledge of the domain and negotiations, and finally individuals who lack
authority but are motivated to collaborate (in the manner of policy entrepreneurs), may use their
knowledge and enthusiasm to convene stakeholders. Thus:
5. Collaboration will be enhanced by convenors who possess legitimate authority and
appreciative skills and who can serve as reticulists to rally other stakeholders to participate.
Without sufficient endorsement or acknowledgement of the convenor’s legitimate right to organise a
domain, stakeholders may be less willing to participate in the collaborative process, and convenors may
find it more difficult to exert authority over stakeholders. Healey (2006:333) points out that in some
instances, a link to formal government in collaboration, which is legitimised by its democratic mandate
may be considered appropriate, and in the case of coastal, marine and catchment regimes this may be
possible through the inclusion of elected members or civil servants in the structures of governance for
each regime respectively. However one of the most important characteristics of the convenor should be
their perceived neutrality, as convenors themselves may be subject to or exert their own powers to
influence collaborative actions (see Gray and Hay, 1986).
4.3.2 Direction Setting
Hardy and Phillips (1998, in Lotia and Hardy, 2008:376) note that the way in which a problem is defined
has important consequences for the direction of collaboration, and therefore direction setting and the
search for coincident values provides opportunities for stakeholders to not only consider new ways of
solving problems, but also can lead stakeholders to undergo a more fundamental learning process
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whereby they may reframe the problem or decide that they need to apply different values (Schön and
Rein, in Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003:45). Such “double loop” learning represents a further evolution of
collaborative arrangements that may widen the scope of activities beyond the interests which first
brought stakeholders together. Gray therefore states that:
6. Direction-setting is greatly facilitated by coincidence in values among stakeholders. Joint
information search by the stakeholders contributes to the emergence of coincident values and
mutually agreeable directions for the domain.
At this point in collaborative working, an unequal balance of power between stakeholders may affect
efforts to reach mutual agreement in direction setting. Fairclough (1992, in Lotia and Hardy, 2008:377),
in the manner of Foucault, observes that power is embedded in the existing patterns of talk and
organisational practices, thus even in the collaborative arena there is potential for dominant
stakeholders to shape the creation of meaning and direction for the collaboration in their own interests.
Whilst such an imbalance in the powers of stakeholders can be problematic, it is not necessary for
power to be distributed evenly among all stakeholders as this may in fact produce inertia.
7. Collaboration will be enhanced when power is dispersed among several rather than among
just a few stakeholders. An equal power distribution is not necessary and may prove undesirable
since it can provoke stalemate and inaction. However, a sufficient distribution of power is
necessary to insure that all stakeholders can influence direction-setting.
Without some redistribution of power, less powerful stakeholders may become disenfranchised, but this
may be overcome by a sustained recognition of interdependence and the benefits of creating
collaborative advantage.
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4.3.3 Structuring
Following problem setting and direction setting, a formalisation of relations among stakeholders (Gray
1985:928) may be necessary to maintain collaborative action. Reinforcing the interdependence of
stakeholders through assigning them roles and responsibilities will not only empower stakeholders to
influence the domain but also facilitate the implementation of agreed plans. To this end, Gray proposes
that:
8. Structuring will occur when stakeholders perceive that continued dependence upon each other
is necessary to implement their desired directions for the domain.
However, Innes and Booher note that tasks must be allocated for which stakeholders must both be
interest and have expertise in (2003:37).
Gray observes that the process of structuring may be imposed by external mandate (1985: 928) – in the
case of coastal, marine and catchment governance central government and its executive agencies may
provide the impetus for doing so, but Gray points out that:
9. Mandate alone will not generate conditions conducive to collaboration. However, coupled
with other conditions (e.g. recognition of interdependence and balance of power), mandate can
provide a structural framework for ongoing regulation of the domain.
May observes in relation to environmental management in New South Wales, Australia and New
Zealand, that cooperative rather than coercive policies still require a high level of commitment and
capacity from stakeholders in order to be successful (1995:113).
Power remains an important feature of collaboration in the structuring phase, although at this stage the
concern is less to do with ensuring an equitable dispersal of power among stakeholders who wish to
influence the problem and direction setting activities of the domain, and more to do with the
redistribution of power to the appropriate stakeholders to enable agreed actions within the domain.
10. Effective structuring involves negotiation among all stakeholders about how to regulate the
domain, including negotiations about the implementation of actions and the power distribution
necessary to do so. One outcome of structuring is an agreed upon allocation of power within the
domain.
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As a potential source of conflict, the redistribution of power and resources between stakeholders may
require a significant amount of bargaining to ensure agreement on the structures that will govern the
future direction of the domain. In a truly reciprocal dialogue, bargaining does not imply tradeoffs but
rather a search for mutually agreeable and plausible strategies (Innes and Booher, 2003:42).
One of the final conditions Gray cites as contributing to more successful collaboration is the
geographical proximity of stakeholders, which may suggest a degree of interdependency is established
prior to a specific collaborative venture and reducing cultural/financial barriers to interaction.
11. Geographic proximity facilitates structuring. Local level initiatives can best capture the
advantages associated with geography.
In the context of coastal, marine and catchment governance which is to a great extent spatially defined,
this may be considered an obvious statement, but proximity is not an indicator of shared interests and
thus the problem and direction setting phases remain crucial to ensuring effective collaboration.
The last condition which facilitates collaboration is the desire for stakeholders in the domain to
influence their contextual environment. By organising into coalitions that can engage others through
lobbying, campaigning and establishing links to other networks, stakeholders are able to manage the
direction of their own domain more effectively.
12. Successful implementation of collaborative agreements is contingent upon the stakeholders’
collective ability to positively manage changes in their contextual environment. This involves
monitoring changes and building relationships with actors outside the domain to insure that
domain-level agreements are carried out.
Table 4b summarises the conditions which Gray (1985) identifies as facilitating inter-organisational
collaboration, divided into phases.
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Table 4b: Conditions facilitating inter-organisational collaboration
Problem setting Direction setting Structuring
Recognition of
interdependence
Coincidence of values High degree of ongoing
interdependence
Identification of a requisite
number of stakeholders
Dispersion of power among
stakeholders
External mandates
Perceptions of legitimacy
among stakeholders
Redistribution of power
Legitimate/skilled convenor Influencing the contextual
environment
Positive beliefs about outcomes
Shared access to power
Source: Gray, 1985:918
To sum up, the Gray model of inter-organisational collaboration reinforces the view of policy making
and implementation as an iterative, discursive process which has been demonstrated in the examination
of the policy cycle earlier in this chapter. Similarly to the policy cycle, Gray (1996, citing Inskip, 1993)
notes that some phases are not necessarily separate and distinct but may run into each other and feed
back to earlier phases. Problems are continually reconstructed by stakeholders, and with progress
towards agreed outcomes Selin and Chavez note:
“Impacts are assessed and stakeholders re-evaluate their interest in proceeding with further
collaboration” (1995:192).
This provides stakeholders with an opportunity to return to the problem setting stage, maintaining the
cyclical process of collaborative working.
The model of collaboration proposed by Gray is not without its faults, and both Gray (1989) and Selin
and Chavez (1995) highlight some of the problems that may be encountered in trying to undertake
collaborative work, such as relational factors, i.e. a history of conflict and mistrust amongst stakeholders
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and deeply entrenched institutional cultures that do not encourage innovative procedures, although it
should be noted that such attitudes are changing in more contemporary governance approaches.
The main limitation of Gray’s model, and a point that is applied more generally to collaborative working
in the UK governance context, is that discourse presenting partnerships as “good” displays a
functionalist orientation, that is, seeking to improve the management of a process in order to enhance
the efficiency and effectiveness of individual organisations, but masking the political struggles which
take place within collaborations (Lotia and Hardy, in Cropper et al, 2008:371 and 378). Wood (and Gray,
1991) later acknowledge there may be tensions between self and collective interests within a
collaboration – indeed self interest is a motivating factor for stakeholders to join a collaboration – but it
is this need and potential for stakeholders to benefit which drives collaboration (1991:161). This
argument however does not address the central assumption of collaboration that discursive interaction
is conducive to power sharing and trust between stakeholders.
In a practical context, Huxham and Vangen (2005) identify the ways in which tensions may manifest in
collaborative settings, for example whether or not to try and bring everyone’s aims into the open, clarify
motivations and tie down agreements, although communicative action theorists, based on Habermas’
concept of ideal speech, may argue that the first of these two points is essential. Tensions may also be
apparent in when, or how much to encourage representatives to identify with the collaboration rather
than their own organisation (2005:233). Huxham and Vangen also suggest that managers of the
collaboration may isolate, deconstruct and reflect upon tensions in order to learn and intervene in
particular situations. The tensions identified may be the result of unequal power between stakeholders,
but in Huxham and Vangen’s approach to managing tension is based on pragmatism and satisficing
rather than a transformational model of partnership (2005:238).
Gray also suggests ways in which interventions can be made in inter-organisational collaborations to
moderate the factors which may prevent collaboration, in this case dealing more directly with issues of
power, for example noting that
“When more powerful parties have discursive legitimacy (Hardy and Phillips, 1998) and/or
control access to the decision making arena (Schumaker 1975; Bouwen et al 1999; Gray 2004),
a critical challenge of intervention is to ensure that cooptation of lower power partners does
not occur” (Gray, in Cropper et al, 2008:681).
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Gray goes on to note that interveners can help to level power differences by building checks and
balances to prevent cooptation and ensure elite compliance with collaborative agreements (Ibid, p682),
which suggests that formal means such as watchdogs can be adopted to prevent the abuse of
partnerships by more powerful stakeholders. The ways in which issues of power are acknowledged in
coastal planning regimes through discursive interaction may therefore form a further line in
investigating the different trajectories of implementation, and discussion on how issues of unequal
power are dealt with in coastal partnerships.
Bringing together the theoretical strands that have been examined in the literature review, it can be
seen that the processes of social construction, policy making and collaboration are closely interlinked.
Taking the social construction of a problem (Hannigan’s model) as a starting point, policy making and
implementation are driven by attempts to define a problem or issue and the design of measures to
address the problem in a manner which satisfies stakeholders. Similarly, the collaborative process is
based upon a continuous dialogue between stakeholders in order to build consensus about a problem
and establish a common vision for the future of a domain. In both the policy cycle and collaborative
processes, the social construction and reconstruction of problems allows new solutions to be sought.
These concepts can therefore be combined into a model of collaborative policy making, which is now
explained.
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4.4 A synthesis model of collaborative policy making
In examining collaborative work to produce policies for the Wales Spatial Plan, Jarvis (2007)
demonstrated that the phases of collaboration outlined by Gray (1985) can be overlaid onto phases of
the policy cycle to operationalise theories of communicative rationality within the policy process in an
attempt to ensure that a full discourse or a more communicatively rational discourse takes place. This
model of collaborative policy making has been adapted by the author based on the stages of policy
making outlined by Howlett and Ramesh (2003), the prerequisites outlined by Hannigan (1995) for the
social construction of an environmental problem and the conditions facilitating collaboration outlined by
Gray (1985) to show how the social construction of a problem not only forms the starting point for
policy making, but continues to drive actions in each stage of the policy cycle. A summary of this
synthesis is shown in table 4c (below).
In this case, the conditions have been reordered to reflect more accurately how decision making may
proceed. It is also acknowledged that certain conditions may be crucial over more than one stage of the
policy process, and so this table can only be seen as an approximation of stages and conditions that are
present. A description of the stages in the new collaborative policy model is provided in the next section.
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Table 4c: Stages of the Policy Cycle and Collaboration
Stage of Collaborative
Policy Making
Policy Cycle Stage
(Howlett and
Ramesh, 2003)
Phases of
Collaborative
Working (Gray,
1985)
Conditions for Socially Constructing an
Environmental Problem and Facilitating
Inter-Organisational Collaboration
(based on Hannigan, 1995, Kingdon,
1995 and Gray, 1985)
Problem
Recognition
Agenda Setting Problem Setting Scientific evidence and authority
Popularisers
Use of the media
Dramatisation
Economic incentives
Institutional sponsors
Feedback from previous initiatives
Consensus Building Interdependence
Identification of stakeholders
Legitimacy among stakeholders
Convenor
Beliefs about outcomes
Exploring Options Policy Formulation Direction Setting Coincidence of values
Dispersion of power
Decision Making Decision Making Structuring External mandates
Degree of ongoing interdependence
Structuring and
Implementation
Implementation
and
Evaluation
Redistribution of power
Contextual Environment
Source: Author
4.4.1 Problem Recognition
This phase begins with reference to Kingdon’s model of agenda setting (discussed in Chapter Three)
which describes how a claim, once constructed, may then move from the systematic to the
governmental agenda. Claims can be based upon the outcomes of previous initiatives, and thus
Hannigan (1995) and Kingdon (1995) are included in the table as preceding the conditions facilitating
collaboration but following evaluation to provide the link between new iterations of the policy cycle.
Problem recognition therefore begins with the construction or reconstruction of a claim.
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4.4.2 Consensus Building
Consensus building is considered as a distinct phase in this revised model as traditional policy cycle
models tend to be based upon a top-down approach to policy making focused on a narrow set of
stakeholders (see Innes and Booher, 2000, and Jarvis, 2007:83) which fails to reflect the networks of
multi-level governance and interdependencies that exist in contemporary policy making. At this stage of
policy making the domain begins to organise itself, with stakeholders beginning to appreciate their
interdependencies based on a shared observation of a problem, and they may identify other
stakeholders who should be included in the domain. The search for stakeholders may continue
throughout the policy cycle, as new stakeholders may be brought into collaboration through discussions
on the nature of the problem and what is to be done about it.
At this point ensuring the legitimacy of stakeholders is also important – building consensus may be
about who legitimately has the right to be involved in policy making as much as it is about agreeing upon
the nature of the problem. A convenor or institutional sponsor, having emerged from earlier
constructions of the problem or through the initial reorientation of the domain towards collaborative
working, can play a role in assembling what is considered the appropriate mix of stakeholders. In
addition, in building policy from the bottom-up as a voluntary exercise where mandate and/or the
element of coercion is absent, the need for stakeholders to share beliefs about the positive benefits of
working together in a communicative process is essential.
4.4.3 Exploring Options
Exploring options coincides with Howlett and Ramesh’s original idea of policy formulation (2003), with
the design of potential future policies proceeding on the basis of finding coincident values between
stakeholders and the consolidation of networks or policy communities. Subsequently, negotiating and
decision making will be influenced by the dispersal of power, but a continued acknowledgement of
interdependence can play a critical role in ensuring that differing opinions and policy options are given
due consideration.
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4.4.4 Decision Making
Interdependence continues to be a factor in the decision making phase of the policy process – whilst
Gray relates ongoing interdependence to the process of formalising or structuring collaborative
activities, the point made by Innes and Booher regarding the need to allocate tasks to stakeholders that
make the best use of their interests and expertise in order to retain their involvement (2003:37) may
also impact upon the decision that are made.
The influence of external mandates affects decision making in as much as some decision making power
may be taken away from stakeholders if there are external pressures forcing a particular way of
organisation or the use of a specific measure, for example from higher levels of government (Milward,
1982, in Gray, 85:929).
4.4.5 Structuring and Implementation
In this final phase of collaborative policy making, structuring the domain and allocation of
responsibilities enables implementation to take place. The formalisation of collaborative relationships
through legal responsibilities or agreed upon terms of reference may confer new powers or a
redistribution of powers among stakeholders. As implementation proceeds, stakeholders may gain the
collective power to influence their contextual environment, through increased political power or
control over a greater share of resources. Although not considered explicitly, evaluating the progress of
implementation efforts may give impetus to the reframing of problems and direction setting, thus
forming a new iteration of the collaborative policy making process.
Figure 4.6 below shows how the phases of the collaborative policy making cycle can be overlaid onto
Gray’s stages of inter-organisational collaboration. The inner circle of the diagram shows the stages
from Gray’s model, running in a clockwise sequence, and the outer circle the stages in collaborative
policy making which have been described above.
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Figure 4.6 the Collaborative Policy Making Cycle
Source: Author, based on Jarvis (2007)
As with models of the policy cycle previously explored, this revised version can only provide an
approximation of the sequence of events making up the policy process and attempts to combine this
process with Gray’s approach in the most appropriate way given the description of conditions
facilitating collaboration. In doing so, the revised model provides a more detailed set of factors
influencing the policy process that may be used to examine and understand the differences in
implementation that have contributed to the current context of ICZM, MP and RBMP.
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4.5 Conclusions
Following the analysis in Chapter Three of how coastal, marine and catchment problems may be socially
constructed and also recognising that the construction of a problem is only the first stage in a broader
process of policy making and action, this chapter has sought to provide the link from a problem to the
implementation of a solution through examining both models of the policy process and its constituent
parts, plus models of collaborative action which provide a more practical context within which to
consider how policy making for coastal planning regimes may work.
In doing so, it has been found that:
Despite its limitations in providing a “realistic” model of policy making, the policy cycle literature
remains a useful heuristic device for understanding the decision making process, with each
stage further understood through reference to a number of policy subsystems such as policy
communities, issue networks, incrementalism and mixed scanning. The stages model therefore
forms the basic framework for the development of coastal zone, marine and river basin
management planning.
Policy formulation is based on learning from experience and interaction with other stakeholders.
In this sense there are no entirely new ideas, rather there is a continuous reconstruction of the
problem and negotiations between stakeholders to find the most appropriate solution.
The implementation of policy may be viewed from a top down or bottom up perspective,
depending upon the presence or absence of legislation which structures the implementation
process (Sabatier, 1986:37), but these perspectives may also be seen as complementary, with a
synthesis of approaches providing insights into the structure and agents of implementation.
Considering the policy process through a collaborative perspective such as that advocated by
Barbara Gray (1985 and 1989) provides a practical setting for the construction and discussion of
problems in order to build consensus about solutions.
In summarising this chapter, attention has been brought to the way in which the social construction of a
problem continues far beyond the model outlined by John Hannigan (1995) in a process of discursive
interaction, right through all stages of policy making and implementation. Furthermore, the literature
examined in this chapter provides a framework which can be used to break down and analyse the
different factors affecting the implementation of coastal planning regimes. The next chapter describes in
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detail the way in which these concepts will be applied to the further analysis of coastal planning regimes
in order to provide insights into improving the implementation of ICZM.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY – Putting Collaboration into Practice: a Framework for Evaluating Collaboration in Coastal Planning Regimes
5.1 Introduction
Following on from the contextual and conceptual research contained within Chapters One to Four of this
thesis, Chapter Five now develops the theoretical framework that will be used in the second phase of
empirical research to meet Objective Four – to determine what factors are most important in practice
for constructing claims about a coastal problem, and provide a reappraisal of the social construction
model proposed by John Hannigan – and Objective Five – to evaluate how collaboration is embedded
within the plan making processes of coastal organisations and provide recommendations as to how
collaborative policy making may be improved.
The previous chapters have provided the conceptual and contextual framework of the thesis by
examining the ways in which an environmental problem can be socially constructed, focusing specifically
on Hannigan’s model as applied to marine, coastal and river catchment planning regimes. In doing so, it
has shown that whilst representing an initial “problem recognition” stage of the policy cycle, the manner
in which an environmental (particularly the coastal) problem is constructed can elicit weaker or stronger
policy responses, i.e. a more formalised, statutory, top-down system or a more voluntary, bottom-up
approach. However, Hannigan’s model does not accurately reflect that some of the factors recognised
as essential to the social construction of a problem may be of varying degrees of importance in the
wider discourse about the nature of the problem and what is to be done about it.
The proposition that the model can be refined to acknowledge the possibility that certain factors may be
more persuasive than others in the social construction of a problem for different coastal planning
regimes thus becomes a first line of investigation for the second phase of empirical research.
Furthermore, as the social construction model only corresponds to the first stage of the policy cycle,
there is a second issue to be addressed – namely how recognition of an environmental problem is
translated into ameliorative policies and actions through the organisation of stakeholders in
collaborative arrangements. The collaborative policy making model elaborated in Chapter Four provides
a context in which steps towards implementation can be analysed. When the social construction of
environmental problems is considered in conjunction with collaborative, top-down, bottom-up and
participatory or communicative planning approaches to implementation which broadly correlate with
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the implementation styles of ICZM, MP and RBMP respectively, these perspectives enable a more
detailed analytical framework to be built.
By taking each stage of the policy cycle in turn and breaking it down into smaller steps or components,
the opportunities presented and actions taken by stakeholders in coastal planning regimes can be
analysed with reference to the features that characterise top-down/bottom-up methods of
implementation, collaborative processes and styles of governance.
The following sections therefore outline in more detail the analytical framework which will be used to
evaluate coastal management practice in relation to four key questions:
1. How are the conditions outlined by Hannigan for the successful social construction of an
environmental problem viewed in relation to coastal planning regimes?
2. Which preconditions are most significant in making the case for action for ICZM, MP and RBMP?
3. To what extent is the collaborative model proposed by Gray reflective of coastal planning
practice?
4. As coastal planning regimes go through the policy cycle, what factors have the greatest
influence on policy formulation and decision making?
The design of the methodology for this phase of the research seeks to both further understand the key
concepts and issues at the macro scale, i.e. theories of the policy process, collaboration and
implementation, which have been identified through the literature review, and also consider whether
these normative positions accurately reflect the process of decision making and implementation within
ICZM and other coastal planning regimes. Such comparisons are facilitated through the collection of
empirical data and the triangulation of multiple data sources, using the revised collaborative policy
making framework to structure data collection.
As has been previously noted, Lymbery (2008) has outlined the potential benefits and pitfalls of
partnership or collaborative working to deliver ICZM, drawing on the work of Gray (1985, 1996), the
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Audit Commission (1998) and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002). However beyond Lymbery’s own
observations , to date this framework of understanding has not been systematically applied to the work
of coastal partnerships in order to evaluate what facets of collaborative working are employed
throughout their decision making processes. The research design therefore will attempt to
operationalise the collaborative concept in relation to more specific examples of ICZM practice.
5.2 Data Collection Strategy: a Case Study Approach
Given the analytical perspective derived from the literature review, exploring the historical development
of coastal planning regimes and their implementation, a case study approach has been chosen for the
collection and analysis of empirical data. According to Yin, a case study is an empirical enquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (2003:13). This is pertinent given the way in
which environmental problems are seen as historically and culturally constituted. Indeed Denzin and
Lincoln (2003) note that case study is a typical narrative form for enquiry founded on an interpretive
paradigm such as social construction.
Research of this kind also allows for concentration on a particular case, or small set of cases (Robson,
2002) and thick or detailed description of the context in which the construction of a problem and
implementation takes place. As this research takes ICZM in the wider context of coastal and marine
governance to explain why certain issues and the measures proposed to address them move through
the policy cycle, achieving formalised support and implementation more quickly than others, a multiple
case study approach is considered an appropriate method of enquiry. This allows an appreciation of the
relative significance of different factors in each instance and enables a comparison of the progress of
different coastal planning regimes towards implementation.
The approach to the case studies is informed by the literature review and analysis of the preceding
chapters, which has traced the social construction of coastal, marine, and river basin problems and the
regimes developed in response and has situated these within the current context of spatial planning
practice. Furthermore, the use of Gray’s (1985) model of collaboration and the policy cycle literature has
provided a systematic framework within which empirical data can be collected and evaluated against a
set of normative criteria for improved ICZM implementation. The first stage in the case study work
entailed a survey of coastal and estuary partnerships in operation in the UK in order to provide a
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“sampling frame” from which case studies could be selected. This was followed by the main case study
phase of work which consisted of a survey and structured interviews with representatives of the
selected case study organisations.
A total of five case studies have been used – three ICZM cases and one each from MP and RBMP. This
range was chosen to cover the three coastal regimes that have formed the basis of the literature review.
In using a larger number of ICZM case studies, the enquiry continues to be weighted towards exploring
collaboration and the implementation of ICZM in more depth.
In examining the social construction of the coastal problem and the development of ICZM, Marine
Planning and River Basin Management have been used as comparators against which the trajectory of
the ICZM regime in the UK has been assessed and therefore the empirical research therefore cannot
consider the current performance of ICZM in isolation.
Despite each regime emerging at different periods in time, MP and RBMP have been considered as
suitable comparators due to:
Sharing broad sustainability objectives,
The European dimension: each regime has been advocated (to a greater or lesser extent) by the
EU for use by Member States, and
The integrative nature of each regime – MP, RBMP and ICZM all represent attempts to integrate
aspects of the physical environment, different sectors and institutional arrangements.
The literature review has also shown some differences in the ways that the case for each regime is
socially constructed, and diverging trajectories in terms of the formalised support and progress towards
implementation of each, with RBMP and MP achieving more sustained and greater support from higher
levels of government (in the UK) than ICZM.
Thus a comparison of case studies from MP, RBMP and ICZM will enable an exploration of the factors
contributing to the current state of each regime in more detail, from the initial stages of social
construction (whilst at the same time testing the proposition that Hannigan’s model can be refined),
through to the establishment of legal frameworks and formal plan making procedures.
For each case study structured interviews were undertaken with key members within the hierarchy of
the organisation, such as management board or steering group members. This data was supplemented
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by additional questionnaire data obtained from the broader grouping of stakeholders, such as local
residents, representatives of voluntary groups, private and public sector organisations.
In terms of case study selection, the range of ICZM initiatives currently in operation in the UK provides a
spread of experience from which suitable examples can be drawn. However in the case of RBMP and
MP, which have more recently established institutional frameworks, there are a limited number of
practical examples to choose from. The next section provides an overview of the range of potential case
studies and the criteria used to make a final selection.
5.3 Review of Coastal Organisations and Initiatives
In applying a case study methodology to the research, a mechanism must be sought which allows for a
systematic and justifiable choice of case studies from a broader population or sampling frame. To this
end, a review of potential case studies and the establishment of case study selection criteria has been
carried out.
As has been previously noted, there are a wide range of coastal management organisations undertaking
some form of activity in different parts of the UK. However, across the range of ICZM initiatives a
number of well documented implementation failures (see for example Stojanovic and Shipman, 2007
and McGlashan, 2002) have produced a relatively uneven state of affairs with regards to the scale of
activities and impacts of coastal partnerships.
Although classifying coastal partnerships as “successful” or otherwise is contentious given the range of
objectives and activities undertaken, often with limited resources, this unevenness in development or
activity levels needs to be considered in case study selection, to ensure that the case studies chosen
provide a sufficient depth of experience and expertise to make a useful contribution to the data
collected.
The following section therefore provides an overview of existing coastal, marine and river basin
initiatives in the UK, from which potential case studies have been selected, and the rationale that has
been applied to determine those case studies which may be suitable for further examination.
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5.3.1 Establishing the Sampling Frame
As the research takes the form of a comparative case study approach, a comprehensive list of all the
coastal, estuary, river basin and marine planning initiatives was required. This was obtained through a
desktop study, utilising lists from previous reports on coastal/estuary partnerships (see Entec, 2008,
Atkins, 2004, Stojanovic and Barker, 2008), journal articles and links to coastal partnership websites
from umbrella organisations such as CoastNet, PISCES, the Scottish Coastal Forum and the Wales Coastal
and Maritime Partnership. These resources were combined to produce a list of current (and some now
defunct) potential ICZM case studies. The full list of organisations is included in Appendix A.
The Environment Agency website was used to obtain a list of all the River Basin Management Plan
districts in the UK, and the DEFRA Marine web pages (in particular the “How did we get here?” section6)
provided an albeit brief but complete list of marine planning initiatives.
Following this initial search, a total of 148 initiatives were found – 133 coastal/estuary partnerships and
coastal groups, 13 river basin districts and two marine spatial planning projects.
Having compiled this list, groups with statutory responsibilities such as Coastal Groups (responsible for
Shoreline Management Plans), Heritage Coasts, AONBs and European Marine Sites were excluded on
the grounds that they have different governance arrangements that do not fit the “voluntary” model of
partnerships that are the focus of the research (44 groups/partnerships in total). Groups that contained,
but were not exclusively based on such designations were not discounted at this point.
Further investigation was then carried out in order to determine levels of activity within each of the
potential case studies. In this instance, “activity” was taken to mean evidence that the
project/organisation was continuing to function by means of recent publications, previous or future
events such as partnership meetings, educational projects or activities such as beach cleans. A cut off
point of one year prior to the approximate date of the desktop study (Autumn 2008) was applied to
classify no/low levels of activity and eliminate those cases from further investigation. Whilst it may have
been useful to consider ICZM initiatives that had been wound up or discontinued activity as case studies
and investigate the particular reasons for their short lifespan, “inactive” organisations were ruled out on
the grounds of practicalities – those being that it may be difficult to trace sufficient numbers of
individuals involved to yield a more rounded set of interview data and questionnaire responses related
6 See www.defra.gov.uk/
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to the functioning of that initiative. As a result a further 22 coastal partnerships were discounted for
insufficient evidence of activity.
At this stage, all river basin management plans remained potential case studies given the relatively new
and concurrent nature of the RBMP making cycle. For marine planning, only two possible case studies
were found - the DEFRA/JNCC Irish Sea Pilot for Marine Conservation and Sustainable Development, and
the ABPmer/Terence O’Rourke Marine Spatial Planning Pilot for DEFRA (also known as the Marine
Spatial Planning Pilot Consortium). These projects finished in 2004 and 2006 respectively, thus placing
them in an inactive classification. However, to discount both projects from further investigation would
result in the exclusion of marine planning altogether from the list of potential case studies. A decision
was therefore taken that both projects should be included at this point, and a final selection of one
marine case study should be deferred until further selection criteria could be considered.
The next stage of refinement involved determining the extent of ICZM use within coastal/estuary
initiatives. In reviewing the aims and objectives of each coastal partnership, attention was paid to
whether or not the organisation actively supports ICZM, either by the use of ICZM as an objective in its
own right, or stating that ICZM will be promoted or used in some way to achieve given objectives. To
verify that potential case studies were in fact engaged in ICZM practice, further scrutiny of the aims,
objectives and activities of the coastal organisations was required. In this instance, explicit reference to
the use or advocacy of ICZM was sought by referring to partnership websites, strategies and business
plans where they were available. Phrases such as
“The Devon Maritime Forum, and other coastal partnerships, aim to deliver better ICZM through
improved communications and stakeholder participation”
(http://www.devonmaritimeforum.org.ukindex/czm.htm)
And
“Maintaining a strategic, integrated overview of the Moray Firth is a key role of the Partnership
and a critical component of Integrated Coastal Zone Management”
(http://www.morayfirth-partnership.org/work-2-core.html)
Were considered to be indicators of ICZM use that would allow the initiative to be considered for further
investigation. Those organisations that used or promoted ICZM in some way were considered more
suitable for case study selection as it is the continuing use of ICZM, the current state of implementation
and how it can be improved through collaboration and integration that is the main focus of the case
144
study enquiry. Reasons for organisations not taking up ICZM or discontinuing its use do remain of
interest, but this issue is partially addressed through some of the literature review findings on the
problems associated with ICZM implementation and may also feature in the more detailed case study
examinations.
At this point, the number of ICZM initiatives was reduced from 133 (including Coastal Groups and
statutory designations) to 37 possible case studies.
In the final selection of ICZM case studies, the following factors were also considered:
Time in operation: the length of time that the coastal partnership had been in operation was
considered important as more established partnerships have been able in theory, to benefit
from previous experiences of both success and overcoming organisational difficulties in order to
achieve more refined or sophisticated structures of participation, governance and
implementation. Within these more established partnerships, individuals who have been
associated with the partnership (or coastal issues more generally) will be able to reflect upon
changes in marine and coastal policy which may have influenced the direction of their
organisation and thus provide some insight into both the internal and external forces shaping
ICZM delivery. On the other hand, newer organisations may have been formed with an
understanding of the previous problems of implementation and thus may demonstrate different
types of organisation and management practices.
Geographical Spread: it was felt that it would be pertinent to include coastal partnerships from
England, Scotland and Wales in order to provide scope for including areas subject to different
types of pressures (environmental, social and economic), and perhaps more importantly offered
the opportunity to examine the ways in which ICZM is viewed and has progressed under the
devolved administrations.
Other issues: in this case other notable factors contributing to the work of individual coastal
partnerships (e.g. special projects, recognition of achievements or good practice,
number/complexity of issues under the partnership’s remit) were taken into consideration.
Following the review of coastal partnerships and other potential case studies, the five case studies that
were chosen are outlined below. The following three ICZM case studies have been chosen:
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5.3.2 England: Dorset Coast Forum
The Dorset Coast Forum was set up in 1995 and is hosted by Dorset County Council. Dorset Coast Forum
covers the area of coastline and inshore areas from Lyme Regis in the west of Dorset to Christchurch in
the east (see Map A). The Dorset Coast is home to many harbour towns and seaside resorts and holds a
number of designations for its natural resources (Heritage Coast, AONB, SPA, SAC).
In the period 1996-1999 the Dorset Coast Forum was involved in an EU ICZM Demonstration Project
centred on the production of an integrated management strategy (published 1999 and reviewed 2005).
Recently DCF has begun the C-Scope (Combining Sea and COastal Planning in Europe) project, which
looks at producing a new marine spatial plan and increased stakeholder engagement in ICZM.
This case study has therefore been chosen as it represents a relatively successful and forward looking
partnership in terms of the projects it has undertaken first as an ICZM Demonstration Project and now
looking at building capacity for MP.
5.3.3 Wales/England: Severn Estuary Partnership
The SEP covers an area from Gloucester to Minehead on the English coast and Llantwit Major on the
Welsh side of the Severn (see Map B) and incorporates a number of designated sites including SSSIs,
conservation areas and an internationally recognised wetland (Ramsar site). The partnership was set up
in 1995 as an independent, estuary - wide initiative led by local authorities and statutory agencies and is
hosted in the School of Earth and Ocean Sciences at Cardiff University.
The SEP has been chosen as it has a more complex organisational structure than other coastal groups –
Ballinger and Stojanovic (2010) describe the environmental management of the Severn as being
“hampered by a complicated administrative and institutional setting with many local authorities
bordering its shores” (2010:132) and both Welsh and English statutory bodies involved in its
management. Reflecting this complexity, the Severn Estuary Partnership also provides the secretariat
for a number of different groups, including a Joint Estuary Groups initiative, Joint Advisory Committee,
the Partnership Management Group, Association of Relevant Authorities (involved in the Severn
European Marine Site), the Coastal Group, responsible for Shoreline Management Plans and the
Standing Conference of Severnside Local Authorities (established before the Partnership to collaborate
146
on the proposed Severn Barrage). Given this organizational complexity and the number of statutory and
non-statutory activities carried out under one umbrella this case study will be useful in exploring how far
ICZM can be integrated into the partnership’s different areas of work.
5.3.4 Scotland: East Grampian Coastal Partnership
The EGCP encompasses a stretch of the east coast of Scotland from Fraserburgh in the north down to St
Cyrus with Aberdeen as its main urban centre (see Map C). EGCP represents a newer coastal partnership,
being formed in 2005 following a feasibility study by Aberdeenshire and Aberdeen City councils.
This Scottish case study is important given the Scottish Executive’s decision to make ICZM a statutory
duty in the Marine (Scotland) Act. In this case, therefore, it is anticipated that differences may be found
in the social construction of the coastal problem, or the implementation phase of the policy cycle to
explain why the statutory approach has been taken.
147
Map A: Dorset Coast Forum Area
148
Map B: Severn Estuary Partnership Management Area
Source: Severn Estuary Partnership (2001)
149
Map C: East Grampian Coastal Partnership Management Area
150
5.3.5 Selection of a Marine Case Study
In the review of coastal initiatives only two examples relating to the marine environment were found –
the JNCC Irish Sea Pilot and the ABPmer/Terence O’Rourke Marine Spatial Planning Pilot. Given that both
cases were completed studies and as such the activity criteria used to select ICZM cases was superfluous,
consideration was then given to the purpose of each project and the substantive content of the work
undertaken. The JNCC study focused on developing a marine conservation strategy, whereas the MSP
Pilot took a broader view of the management of all sea uses alongside protection of the marine
environment, so it was felt that the MSP Pilot represented a form of planning more proximate to the
principles of ICZM and therefore was selected as the marine case study.
The MSP Pilot was commissioned by DEFRA in 2004 and undertaken by a consortium consisting of ABP
Marine Environmental Research Ltd (ABPmer), Terence O’Rourke Consultants, Risk and Policy Analysts,
Geotek, Hartley Anderson and Coastal Management for Sustainability (the MSPP Consortium). Among
the objectives of the study was the undertaking of a pilot study on the feasibility of introducing a marine
spatial plan. The final report of the MSP Pilot was published in February 2006.
The MSP Pilot covered a study area of the Irish Sea including the coastal waters of Scotland, England,
Northern Ireland and Wales, but excluding the territorial waters of the Isle of Man and the Republic of
Ireland (see Map D). As the first initiative of its kind, the Pilot tested a number of aspects of marine plan
production, such as data gathering and integration with other plans, with the outcomes being used to
inform the future framework for MSP (now Marine Planning) nationally.
It should be noted that whilst the MSP Pilot Study was intended to feed ideas about the marine planning
process into the Marine Bill and the subsequent operations of the Marine Management Organisation,
the self-contained format of the Pilot makes it somewhat different to what might be expected of a full
marine planning cycle, for example in that it lacks the overarching policy framework and binding
legislation which will shape future marine plans, the time frame for developing and evaluating the Pilot is
relatively short, and without a comparable suite of plans for adjoining marine areas questions of spatial
integration cannot be comprehensively considered. However, as the only attempt at holistic marine
planning to be carried out to date, this is the only logical choice for a marine case study with the caveats
mentioned above kept in mind.
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5.3.6 Selection of a River Basin Case Study
Due to the uniform way in which all RBPs have been produced by the Environment Agency, the selection
of a RBM case study was somewhat more arbitrary than for the marine and ICZM cases – the only factor
for differentiating between cases was by location. In this case the Dee River Basin Management Plan was
selected.
Having begun work on RBM Plans in 2006, each river basin district has been subject to consultation on
significant water management issues (2007) and draft RBMPs (2008-09). Full Plans for each district, with
a lifespan of six years, including the plan for the Dee river basin district, were published in late 2009.
The Dee river basin covers parts of both England and Wales, in particular a section of Snowdonia
National Park, North East Wales, Cheshire, Shropshire and the Wirral, thus raising the possibility of
investigating processes of negotiation and decision making where a top-down approach to
implementation may be in place, and where cross-border issues and conflicts may be apparent. The
extent of the Dee River Basin is shown on Map E below.
152
Map D: Marine Spatial Planning Pilot Area
Source: MSPP Consortium (2006)
153
Map E: Extent of the Dee River Basin District
Source: Environment Agency (2010)
154
5.4 Data Collection
Having selected five case studies for closer examination, the next phase of empirical research took the
form of a questionnaire and semi-structured interviews in each of the five case studies. Five key
stakeholders were interviewed for each case study (i.e. 25 in total), with these individuals coming from
the executive/management/advisory committees of each case study organisation. Five interviewees
were selected in each case as it was this was judged to include a sufficient number of individuals from
what were known to be relatively small groups of potential interviewees, and because with five case
studies it was felt that the final number of interviews undertaken would yield an extensive dataset from
which discussion could be drawn.
The executive/management/advisory groups were targeted because it was judged that the individuals
would have been more closely involved in the organisation’s discussions about plan making and so have
a more detailed working knowledge of how their case study organisation functions and wider issues
surrounding coastal management. Within each set of case study interviews, the partnership
officer/project manager was included and used as a “gatekeeper” to obtain access to other potential
interviewees and wider questionnaire respondents who may be members or participants in the activities
of the case study organisation but outside the main management structure.
Given the uniqueness of each coastal partnership/initiative and the availability of potential interviewees,
it was not possible to prescribe the exact makeup of each case study set, however the author sought to
ensure that the interviewees represented a broad range of interests such as the academic and private
sectors, local government, NGOs, residents and user groups.
5.4.1 Questionnaire Design
Following on from the proposal made in the literature review (Chapter Three) that the steps in
Hannigan’s social construction model can take on greater or lesser significance to reflect the more
nuanced way in which each criterion can be met, a questionnaire was devised that reproduced the
conditions deemed necessary for the social construction of a problem and subsequently for
collaboration to occur. In this way the questionnaire attempted to measure both how respondents view
the steps that have or have not featured in the implementation of their particular planning regime, and
what factors may be more or less important in moving towards implementation.
155
The questionnaire formed the basis of the semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and takes
the format of a series of statements about events within the collaborative policy making cycle which the
respondent may have experienced, with them then asked to indicate to what extent they agree with
each statement along a scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. This scale is used in order to
produce a uniform set (or sets) of data related to each case study that would be difficult to obtain via a
more open-ended line of questioning and the author’s interpretation of personalised responses.
The following tables (Tables 5a to 5e) demonstrate how the questionnaire statements and interview
questions have been derived from the literature used to inform the collaborative policy making cycle.
The questionnaire was organised in sections based on those in the collaborative policy making cycle, and
the conditions or aspects of policy making which are central to each stage are listed, along with Gray’s
propositions relating to inter-organisational collaboration. In some cases, the propositions, statements
and questions produced are derived directly from the literature (e.g. Gray, Hannigan, Kingdon), and in
other cases reflect the more generic aspects of policy making.
The wording of the questionnaire is largely generic and applicable to all three planning regimes under
consideration, thus allowing for three versions of the questionnaire to be used that are identical in all
respects apart from references to coast, marine, and catchments, or ICZM, MSP (as it was at the time)
and RBMP. The statements used are positively phrased in order to provide grounding or a baseline
against which respondents may formulate their opinions of what is happening or has happened for their
particular sector, for example “A general consensus on the nature of the marine/coastal/river basin
problem has been reached between actors”.
The questionnaire was administered in two ways. Firstly all key stakeholders were sent the
questionnaire to complete prior to the interview in order to inform the interviewee about the focus of
the interviews and also provide the author with a starting point for discussion against the various points
covered. In addition it was helpful in providing an indication of particular issues that may be of interest
in the interview, e.g. cases of extreme disagreement, and also where evidence might be helpful to
support a claim about an experience or external pressures shaping the way their case study organisation
has developed.
The second method of questionnaire completion was via an online version which was targeted at the
broader constituency of the case study organisations and associated interested parties. In this instance
“broader constituency” is defined as individuals paying a subscription or membership fee to the
156
organisation directly, individuals within an affiliated organisation, such as a private sector firm, public
sector organisation or NGO, or those who have shown a degree of interest in the case study
organisation by means of joining one of the case studies’ mailing lists. Potential respondents were
invited to complete the questionnaire by an email circulated from the case study organisation, or a link
posted on the organisation’s own website.
A full version of the questionnaire as it appeared online is shown in Appendix B, with additional spaces
for respondents to fill in personal details (this was made optional for those wishing to remain
anonymous) and additional comments relating to the questions they have been asked. The ordering of
statements in the questionnaire is somewhat different to the way they have been set out in the tables –
this was done to ensure a more natural flow of statements mirroring how events may take place in
practice, and also to avoid the grouping of some statements that may appear to be relating to similar
themes.
157
Conditions for Collaborative Policy
Making/Other Issues to be
Considered
Propositions Online Questionnaire Statements [and additional interview questions]
Scientific Evidence/Validation Scientific evidence defines and orientates
interpretations of an environmental condition
The originators of scientific evidence are subject to
perceptions of credibility in terms of process and
political ideology
There is clear scientific evidence demonstrating that coastal/marine/river
basin resources are under critical pressure and that new approaches to
tackling these problems are urgently needed.
This scientific evidence has received international endorsement at the
highest level.
[If not, is it important to have such endorsement?]
Popularisers
The implications of problems detected through
scientific evidence must be communicated in a way
that demonstrates the need to prevent potential
negative consequences
The case for action has been vigorously championed by key
individuals/organisations.
[Who? If not, who should be taking the lead?]
Media Attention/Dramatisation
Focusing events, crises and metaphors can highlight
problems as distinct and requiring new solutions
Media coverage of dramatic incidents such as oil spills/floods has helped to
focus the attention of a wider audience on measures to tackle
coastal/marine/catchment issues.
[Does this coverage provide sufficient long term interest?]
Economic Incentives
Financial benefits or potential losses need to be
demonstrated to motivate individuals and
organisations to take action
An explicit economic case for undertaking ICZM/MSP/RBMP has been
articulated.
[Which organisation/publication has made a good case? If the case has not
been made, why not?]
Institutional Sponsors
The ongoing contestation of a claim requires
organisations that are able to sustain interest in the
problem and persuade others of the need for action
Governmental and non-governmental coastal/marine/catchment
stakeholders are playing an important role in continuing to highlight
problems and potential solutions.
[Which groups?]
Feedback from existing policy
implementation (Kingdon)
Systematic monitoring and evaluation of existing
programmes and policies may bring to light new
problems or policy failures
A disparity between the intended and actual outcomes of previous
initiatives has contributed to recognition of the need for a new approach to
coastal/marine/catchment issues.
[Are there other factors which have also contributed, e.g. general lack of
coastal/marine/catchment policies?]
Table 5a: Problem Recognition
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Table 5b: Consensus Building
Conditions for
Collaborative Policy
Making/Other Issues
to be Considered
Propositions Online Questionnaire Statements [and additional interview questions]
Interdependence
The greater the degree of recognised interdependence among
stakeholders, the greater the likelihood of initiating collaboration.
A general consensus on the nature of the coastal/marine/ catchment
problem has been reached between stakeholders.
[If not, why not? What evidence is there for this?]
There has been recognition that the competing jurisdictions and
interests of government departments have prevented more integrated
measures to tackle coastal/marine/catchment issues being proposed.
Identification of
stakeholders
The stakeholder set needs to reflect the complexity of the problem under
consideration if collaboration is to occur.
From an information standpoint, the more stakeholders who participate
in problem solving, the more effective the collaboration will be.
Efforts to convene all stakeholders simultaneously will likely be thwarted
by changing dynamics of the domain. Therefore, inclusion of
stakeholders should be viewed as a process of continual adaptation.
A full range of stakeholders have been included in the discussion of the
coastal/ marine/catchment problem.
[Who has not been included that perhaps should be?]
Legitimacy among
stakeholders
Shared perceptions of legitimacy are necessary to initiate problem-
setting. Perceptions of legitimacy will be shaped by historical relations
and the existing power distribution among stakeholders.
Exclusion of legitimate stakeholders during problem setting will
constrain subsequent implementation of solutions.
(See identification of stakeholders, convenor)
Convenor Collaboration will be enhanced by convenors who possess legitimate
authority and appreciative skills and who can serve as reticulists to rally
other stakeholders to participate.
[What role has the chair played in bringing together stakeholders and
overseeing negotiations between them?]
Beliefs about outcomes Problem-setting efforts are enhanced when stakeholders expect that the
benefits of collaborating will outweigh the costs and when prevailing
norms support collaboration. If positive expectations are not present,
incentives to induce participation will be necessary
Partnership working has been proposed as an important step towards
achieving coastal/marine/catchment objectives.
[If so, by whom?]
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Table 5c: Exploring Options
Conditions for Collaborative
Policy Making/Other Issues to
be Considered
Propositions Online Questionnaire Statements [and additional interview
questions]
Policy Design
Direction setting may be influenced by previous
iterations of the policy cycle and attempts at problem
solving. Collaboration should facilitate discussion and
appraisal of stakeholders’ previous experiences in a
learning process that assists joint information searches
and direction setting.
There is evidence of experimentation by key players in relation to
policy proposals for the coastal zone/marine/river basins.
[Examples?]
There is evidence of experimentation by key players in relation to
new institutional arrangements for coastal zone
management/marine planning/catchment planning. [Examples?]
Coincidence of values Direction-setting is greatly facilitated by coincidence in
values among stakeholders. Joint information search
by the stakeholders contributes to the emergence of
coincident values and mutually agreeable directions
for the domain.
The core goals of ICZM/MSP/RBMP have been built through
bargaining between interested parties.
[If so - has this been a long process? Have certain groups been
absent or excluded from negotiations?]
Joint working between actors at similar spatial/administrative
scales is increasing. [Examples?]
Dispersion of power
Collaboration will be enhanced when power is
dispersed among several rather than among just a few
stakeholders. An equal power distribution is not
necessary and may prove undesirable since it can
provoke stalemate and inaction. However, a sufficient
distribution of power is necessary to insure that all
stakeholders can influence direction-setting.
There is recognition that the dispersal of powers between
stakeholders is uneven and that those powers may have to be
redirected to achieve change.
[Evidence for this?]
160
Table 5d: Decision Making
Conditions for Collaborative
Policy Making/Other Issues to be
Considered
Propositions Online Questionnaire Statements [and additional interview
questions]
External mandates/political
context
Mandate alone will not generate conditions
conducive to collaboration. However, coupled
with other conditions (e.g. recognition of
interdependence and balance of power),
mandate can provide a structural framework for
ongoing regulation of the domain.
There have been clear “windows of opportunity” or events
enabling coastal/marine/catchment policies to be placed in the
legislative programme.
[If yes, what were those opportunities?]
There are now clear national public sector sponsors who are taking
a lead in forwarding action on coastal/marine/catchment
management/planning initiatives.
[Who are they? Or who should they be?]
The emergence of a lead organisation or organisations has been
legitimised by negotiation between stakeholders.
[Is there evidence to suggest that the process has not been truly
democratic?]
Degree of ongoing
interdependence
Structuring will occur when stakeholders perceive
that continued dependence upon each other is
necessary to implement their desired directions
for the domain.
There is now consensus and effective coordination between
stakeholders at national and local levels.
161
Table 5e: Structuring and Implementation
Conditions for Collaborative
Policy Making/Other Issues to
be Considered
Propositions Online Questionnaire Statements [and additional interview
questions]
Redistribution of power
Effective structuring involves negotiation
among all stakeholders about how to
regulate the domain, including negotiations
about the implementation of actions and the
power distribution necessary to do so. One
outcome of structuring is an agreed upon
allocation of power within the domain.
There is a clear and consistent legal framework in place to aid
the delivery of ICZM/MSP/RBMP.
[If not, what needs to be put in place?]
Formal responsibilities for promoting
coastal/marine/catchment issues, taking objectives forward
and overseeing implementation have been allocated.
[Have responsibilities been allocated fairly/to the most
appropriate agencies?]
The plan making process for ICZM/MSP/RBMP is clearly set
out.
Implementation Processes For implementation to occur, there must be
agreement upon the allocation of necessary
resources (financial and human) for practical
actions to be undertaken.
Long term financial commitment is in place for the
implementation of ICZM/MSP/RBMP.
Contextual Environment Successful implementation of collaborative
agreements is contingent upon the
stakeholders’ collective ability to positively
manage changes in their contextual
environment. This involves monitoring
changes and building relationships with
actors outside the domain to insure that
domain-level agreements are carried out.
Work on measures to address coastal/marine/catchment
issues is becoming more commonplace.
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5.4.2 Interviews
As has been stated in the previous section on questionnaire design and usage, interviewees were
asked to complete the questionnaire and return it prior to the interview to enable their responses to
form the basis for a semi-structured interview.
At the interview stage the author reviewed with the interviewee each of their responses to the
statements in the questionnaire and asked them to elaborate on or justify their position, i.e.
whether they agree, or disagree that an event has occurred (or in the case of a “neither” response
may have partially occurred). In some cases, elaboration simply entailed asking the interviewee to
provide evidence or examples, such as events that have focused attention on coastal problems or
explaining the ways in which they have undertaken joint working with other organisations.
Acknowledging that other questionnaire responses may be based much more upon the
interviewees’ personal perceptions and opinions, some follow up interview questions (outlined in
the previous section) were used to tease out the issues that brought the interviewee to a particular
position.
The author recorded all interviews where consent was given (and where practicable, given that
some interviews took place in loud, busy locations – in such circumstances notes were taken) and
transcribed the interviews to produce an accurate record of the conversations that took place and
also to provide evidence that could contribute to the overall analysis and evaluation of coastal
management practices.
A full list of interviewees is included in Appendix C. A total of twenty six interviews were undertaken,
five each for the MSP, Dorset, East Grampian and the Severn Estuary case studies, and six for the
Dee River Basin (the sixth interview in this case was due to an additional questionnaire respondent
coming forward at a late stage, indicating a willingness to be interviewed). Ten interviews were
conducted over the telephone and the remainder were undertaken in person.
5.4.3 Evaluation of Findings
Having completed the second empirical phase of the research, it was recognised that the data must
be assembled in some way so as to allow for a meaningful triangulation and interpretation of
different viewpoints using documentary sources and evidence from interviews and questionnaires.
The structure of the questionnaire assisted in this by providing both a simple, clear framework for
disaggregating questionnaire and interview data on a topic by topic basis, relating to the stages of
163
the collaborative policy cycle, and also provided a simple quantitative indicator of the conditions
present/absent in the work of each case study that could be used to corroborate the views given by
interviewees.
To provide further assistance in assigning interview data to particular topics and themes, interview
transcripts and notes were organised using N.Vivo computer software. This allows the coding of data
into “nodes” or user-defined categorisations that may be independent or linked in a hierarchy
(“trees”).
An initial set of tree nodes were set up related directly to each of the questionnaire
statements/interview questions, and these were incorporated into sets based on each section of the
questionnaire or stage of the policy cycle. By reading through transcripts and assigning portions of
text to nodes, further “free” (independent) nodes were added in an iterative process to
accommodate additional useful information that was not already captured by the existing tree
nodes. The additional free nodes included:
- References to other organisations, individuals, documents, projects
- Examples of “best practice”
- Issues of power held by stakeholders
- Sources of conflict (e.g. inconsistent policies, conflict between competing interests)
- Convenors or Chairs of case study organisations
- Miscellaneous comments
David and Sutton (2004) note that computer assisted qualitative data analysis software such as
N.Vivo is unable to analyse data in a way that draws meaningful conclusions (2004:253); however it
does provide a basis for analysis. In this instance assigning interview data to specific nodes allowed
for a closer examination and comparison of practices within and across each of the case studies as it
helps to visualise and establish relationships between different cases and individuals. In this sense
N.Vivo provided a useful tool in organising data to review how collaboration occurs (or not) in
current coastal planning practice, ultimately enabling the author to answer the questions set out in
the earlier part of this chapter.
164
5.5 Case Study Protocol
In undertaking data collection for multiple case studies, it was necessary to ensure that the method
of conducting case study research was carefully planned and consistent in terms of the preparation,
procedures followed and analysis used across each case study. To this end Yin (2003) states that the
use of a case study protocol is essential for guiding the case study, anticipating problems and
ensuring that a complete set of data is obtained given the constraints involved in a research project
(e.g. scheduling and accessing information).
Following on from the decision to adopt a case study approach to research and the initial selection
of case studies, a research protocol was drawn up outlining the necessary actions that would enable
data collection for each case study to be undertaken. These steps included:
Background research/documentary review for case study areas
Identification of key contacts/gatekeepers for each case study organisation
Preparation and sending of introductory communication to gatekeepers
Arrangement and undertaking of interviews with key stakeholders and dissemination of
questionnaires
Writing up interviews
Whilst it was important to plan ahead for the research involving multiple case studies, it was also
recognised that the case study protocol could not be entirely prescriptive and that the research
design should be flexible enough to accommodate any adjustments to the data collection strategy
made as a result of initial findings or pilot studies.
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5.6 Pilot Study
In order to test the proposed data collection strategy, it was decided that the first case study
undertaken should be used as a pilot study. Yin (2003:79) describes the pilot case study as helpful to
refine data collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be
followed, and thus provides an opportunity at an early stage in the collection of empirical data for
the researcher to reflect upon both the practical application of data collection methods and the
usefulness of the data being collected.
In this particular instance, the Marine Spatial Planning case study was used as the pilot as this was
the first case study in which the author was able to establish contact with the central figures leading
the Irish Sea Pilot Project in a relatively short space of time. Because the MSP Pilot was a completed
project, a key contact or gatekeeper for obtaining further access to participants in the study was
sought by reference to project meeting minutes and the MSP Pilot Final Report (MSPP Consortium,
2006).
Due to the more disparate nature of the participants and lead researchers in the MSP Pilot, initial
contact was made with three members of the Project Management Group – Stephen Hull of
ABPmer, Jim Claydon (working at Terence O’Rourke Consultants at the time of the project) and Dr
Bob Earll of Communications (formerly Coastal) Management for Sustainability (CMS). All three
individuals were asked to complete the draft questionnaire prior to being interviewed.
Where respondents did not return their questionnaire before hand, this necessitated the author to
discuss each point of the questionnaire in turn during the interview. Two of these interviews were
carried out over the telephone, whilst one was face to face. During these discussions a snowball
technique was used to locate and obtain access to further members of the original Project
Management Group. Subsequently, a further two individuals responded to the request for
interviews. Both interviews were carried out face to face. All of the interviews that were undertaken
for the pilot were recorded with the interviewees’ consent. This relieved the author of having to take
notes during the conversation, which may have interrupted the flow of dialogue, and allowed for the
interviews to be comprehensively transcribed at a later date.
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5.6.1 Pilot Study Evaluation
Following this pilot case study, a number of criteria regarding data collection methods were
considered and these are outlined below. As the pilot also formed part of the main empirical work
an analysis and interpretation of the data collected cannot be given full consideration without
reference to the other case studies to be undertaken and thus is only mentioned in this section
briefly. A more detailed report will be contained within the following chapters of the thesis.
In evaluating how the proposed data collection strategy worked in practice, the following points
were considered:
Targeting and accessing key stakeholders
Questionnaire deployment and response rates
Interview location, structure, ethics and confidentiality
Interview experiences and interviewee feedback
Adjustments to the data collection strategy
The first stage in setting up case studies was to identify a gatekeeper or gatekeepers for each
initiative or organisation in order to access a wider number of potential interviewees and
questionnaire respondents. As the MSP Pilot concluded in 2006 and was undertaken by a
consortium rather than a sole organisation it was anticipated that key individuals may be more
difficult to reach as there was no longer a central point of contact and also because those involved
may have moved on from their place of employment at the time of the project. In this case
individuals who were already known to the author because of their work on the MSP pilot and
ongoing work in marine policy were identified as potential gatekeepers.
All three gatekeepers were contacted by email and/or telephone and given sufficient explanation of
the research were willing to assist. Initial conversations with these gatekeepers were also extremely
useful in terms of locating other former members of the Project Management Group – both those
that were easily contactable and those who had moved on from their previous work. Knowing which
members of the Project Management Group retained an interest in MSP, the gatekeepers were
asked to inform a more refined list of potential interviewees and questionnaire recipients.
Whilst the use of a number of gatekeepers in relation to one case study proved effective for this
pilot, it was anticipated that the “live” nature of the other case studies and their organisation
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through a central officer or manager would mean that it would only be necessary to contact one
gatekeeper for future case studies.
With regards to questionnaire deployment and response rates, the lack of a central point of contact
to feed the questionnaire out to a wider group of respondents again proved problematic and contact
details had to be assembled from a variety of sources. The secondary target group (or intended
recipients) of the questionnaire were the members of the MSP Stakeholder Advisory Group as listed
in the Appendix of the Final Report (MSPP Consortium, 2006). An email list of approximately 50
individuals from the 217 listed was drawn up using web searches and making use of conference
delegate lists. Given the time elapsed since the completion of the MSP pilot and the time needed to
assemble a comprehensive list it was decided that this was a sufficient number of potential
respondents to yield an acceptable level of responses.
These individuals were then sent an email outlining the purpose of the research and a link to the
online version of the questionnaire. Twelve individuals in addition to the five pilot case study
interviewees eventually completed the questionnaire, giving a response rate of 34% from the total
number of Advisory Group members contacted. Whilst this may be considered relatively low,
administering a questionnaire in this fashion can be susceptible to the same pitfalls as a postal
questionnaire in terms of achieving a desired level of response. Once the questionnaire has been
sent the author has limited control over forcing recipients to respond – factors such as time
available, good will and the current interests of recipients come into play. On the other hand an
online questionnaire can be deployed much more rapidly than a postal survey and people may be
more willing to reply to something that has the convenience of being submitted electronically. In
addition, the responses are automatically collated, making it easier for the author to spot emerging
trends as the number of responses increases.
Of the initial interviews with gatekeepers, the telephone interviews were easier to arrange from a
logistical perspective and involved smaller costs, but may have made it more difficult to build a
rapport between interviewer and interviewee, and also for the interviewer to gauge responses, for
example whether a pause was due to confusion and lack of understanding or simply the interviewee
taking time to prepare a more considered, coherent response.
Overall it was found that face to face interviews were the preferred situation for the author as these
interviews tended to last for a longer period of time and yield more in depth responses to
questioning. It was also helpful in instances where the interviewee had not completed the
questionnaire before hand to give them a copy to look through (and complete) during the interview.
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For telephone interviews where the interviewee had not completed the questionnaire, both
interviewer and interviewee were more conscious of time constraints, which may have led to more
brief answers, and given that the repetitive style of the questionnaire did not lend itself particularly
well to telephone surveys, some of the less contentious (but nevertheless important) issues may
have been glossed over. However overall it was judged that telephone interviews were a valid
means of data collection given that the key stakeholders interviewed in this way were able to
provide useful information and opinions on the questions asked.
Looking more broadly at the use of the questionnaire to guide semi-structured interviews, this was
extremely useful in terms of providing an overall narrative which could be explained at the start of
meetings to indicate to the interviewee the line of questioning that was taken. Where questionnaire
responses had been completed prior to the interview, this allowed the interviewer to focus the line
of questioning on particular areas of strong agreement or disagreement for further elaboration. In
cases where the interviewee had given neutral answers the author was also able to ascertain
whether this was due to a lack of understanding of the question, insufficient experience of the
subject/issue or the maintenance of an impartial position on the part of the interviewee.
In instances where the questionnaire had not been completed prior to interview, this necessitated a
more rigid approach to questioning where all of the statements in the questionnaire were explored.
Whilst this allowed the questionnaire to be completed during the interview and each statement to
be discussed, this had to be balanced with the need to examine areas of contention or particular
anecdotal offerings in more depth. Therefore it was preferred that interviewees should have
completed, or at least read the questionnaire prior to interview to allow for more consideration of
their responses, but it was also recognised that the work schedule of the interviewee or the time lag
between arranging and actually participating in interviews may affect the likelihood of obtaining a
questionnaire response before interviews took place.
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5.6.2 Ethics
A final consideration in relation to the collection of questionnaire and interview data was
confidentiality. It was the author’s intention to record all interviews for the purpose of transcription
and maintaining a complete and accurate record of the conversations that had taken place.
Therefore at the start of each interview consent was sought from each participant for their interview
to be recorded (both telephone and face to face interviews). Participants were also given
reassurance that the information given would be anonymised in the reporting of findings in the
thesis. In all cases for the pilot study the interviewees gave their consent, and the reassurance of
non-disclosure allowed interviewees to be more frank with regards to naming individuals or
organisations in illustrating their points.
Alongside this view the caveat applies that one may not truly know the extent to which an
interviewee is giving their honest opinion, particularly in cases where interviewer and interviewee
are meeting for the first time, or when the interviewee may be under pressure to uphold a
“corporate” position. Therefore it must be assumed that the interpersonal skills of the interviewer
are a direct influence on the willingness of interviewees to reveal particular opinions or facts.
5.6.3 Additional Feedback
The main purpose of the pilot case study was testing the practicalities and viability of the proposed
data collection strategy, both from the perspective of the author and also utilising additional
feedback such as comments from the pilot interviewees and other peers. This feedback has proved
invaluable, not only in providing useful information that has added to the author’s own knowledge
of people, projects or events, but also in refining the author’s interview technique and revising the
questionnaire.
In using the questionnaire as a guide for interviewing, interviewees were able to comment on the
wording of the questionnaire and their own understanding of what each of the statements meant. In
cases where the interviewee felt that the statements were ambiguous or unclear, both the
interviewee and the author were able to share their thoughts on what the statement was asking the
respondent to consider, and where necessary the author was able to elucidate upon the issue to be
explored in each particular case.
Of the comments received on the questionnaire, the main points that were problematic in terms of
their interpretation were those relating to the statements on “experimentation” in relation to
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institutional arrangements and policy proposals for the regimes under investigation. In the majority
of pilot interviews the word “experiment” was treated with some caution as it was not widely used
in planning and management terminology, however “precedent” and “best practice” featured in the
responses of interviewees to the statements. Whilst these terms were potentially useful in making
the questionnaire statements clearer, it was felt that their use could also result in leading
respondents, as both phrases imply that current practice seeks to emulate something that has been
tried before and thus does not necessarily encourage thinking about other, perhaps less successful
initiatives the respondent may have experienced. With this in mind, it was decided not to change the
wording of the questionnaire at this point.
One significant change was made to the questionnaire following the pilot study – a “don’t know”
option was added to the potential responses for each statement. Whilst the author’s intent in using
a multiple choice style of questioning was to force questionnaire recipients to take a position on
each of the statements, it became apparent from interviews that in cases where the interviewees
had no knowledge or experience of the situations alluded to then a “don’t know” response was
more accurate than a neutral “neither agree nor disagree”. Taking a neutral position implies some
knowledge of, but an impartiality or indifference to the situation in question and thus should be
considered differently to a view which suggested inexperience.
5.6.4 Pilot Study Summary
As a means of confirming the validity of the proposed research method, the pilot study indicated
that the case study approach was both viable and appropriate given the nature of the research
objectives and the types of organisations/initiatives being investigated. Thus the case study protocol
outlined earlier in this chapter served as the approach to data collection taken in the remaining four
case studies.
What was highlighted the most in this test of the proposed data collection strategy was the potential
difficulties in gaining access to individuals and the crucial role played by gatekeepers in providing a
link to other people, utilising a “snowball” technique where necessary. The additional feedback from
interviewees regarding the questionnaire helped to ensure that a more accurate or honest record of
people’s opinions was also incorporated into the findings.
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5.7 Conclusion
Having investigated the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment problems as a first
phase of empirical data collection, this chapter has sought to outline how the conclusions and
assumptions made about Hannigan’s model can be tested. The methodology provided for this
second phase of research also enables further investigation of how ICZM, MP and RBMP have been
implemented, with reference to Gray’s model of inter-organisational collaboration and the ways in
which collaboration may be incorporated into policy making to improve integration between
stakeholders and other policy sectors or domains. The next chapter will present data and analysis
from the five case studies that have been chosen.
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CHAPTER 6: Stakeholder Perspectives on the Nature of the “Coastal Problem”
6.1 Introduction
This and the following chapters outline and analyse the findings from the second phase of empirical
work, that is, the case study research undertaken on the ICZM, MP and RBMP cases which were
identified in the methodology chapter by a desktop survey of coastal organisations. This chapter in
particular focuses on Objective Four, which is to determine what factors are most important in
practice for constructing claims about a coastal problem, and provide a reappraisal of the social
construction model proposed by John Hannigan (1995).
The chapter begins with a more detailed description of the case study organisations, relating to the
structure and the activities they are engaged in, thus providing an understanding of the context in
which each of the case studies operates.
Subsequently for the analysis, data from questionnaire responses and semi-structured interviews are
compared against the propositions that comprise the collaborative policy making cycle developed at
the end of the literature review in order to determine the extent to which those aspects or steps
deemed to facilitate better collaborative processes are evident in the practices of each of the case
studies. In discussing and analysing the findings, attempts will be made to answer the four key
questions outlined at the start of the methodology chapter, namely:
1. How are the conditions outlined by Hannigan for the successful social construction of an
environmental problem viewed in relation to coastal planning regimes?
2. Which preconditions are most significant in making the case for action for ICZM, MP and
RBMP?
3. To what extent is the collaborative model proposed by Gray reflective of coastal planning
practice?
4. As coastal planning regimes go through the policy cycle, what factors have the greatest
influence on policy formulation and decision making?
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The overall analysis is structured according to the five sections used to define the collaborative
policy making cycle and provide the framework for data collection, i.e. problem recognition,
consensus building, exploring options, decision making and finally structuring and implementation.
Each of these sections is taken in turn for detailed examination. In this chapter, the stage of problem
recognition is considered in relation to questions 1 and 2 as they focus on the social construction of
an environmental problem and agenda setting. In the next chapter, questions 3 and 4 on
collaboration and the delivery of ICZM are considered alongside the remaining policy cycle stages.
Bringing all the findings together, objective 5 takes the findings from the previous questions and
examines the implications these findings have for collaborative policy making in coastal planning
regimes.
6.2 Introduction to Case Studies
6.2.1 Dorset Coast Forum - Background
As described in the methodology chapter, the DCF was established in 1995 and covers an area from
Lyme Regis to Christchurch (see Map A). The establishment of the Forum followed the publication of
two documents by Dorset County Council; The Dorset Coast Today and The Future of the Dorset
Coast and a successful conference in 1994 which brought together a number of stakeholders to
discuss the issues affecting the management of the Dorset Coast (Dorset Coast Forum, 2005). At the
conference remarks by keynote speaker Professor Denys Brunsden on the geological and historical
features of the Dorset Coast precipitated an interest in pursuing World Heritage Site status for the
area, and after subsequent discussions on this matter the idea of a Coastal Forum took off (work on
World Heritage Status continued separately and the Jurassic Coast Dorset and East Devon World
Heritage Site was designated in 2001).
Following its inception in 1995, the DCF began work based on three main aims which are still in place
today – these are to:
Encourage co-operation and dialogue between all the different interests and users of the
coast
Gather and disseminate relevant information
Review and contribute to existing policies at all levels; national, regional and local
(Borough of Poole, 2009)
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DCF - Activities
Dorset Coast Forum’s current publicity leaflet states that since its establishment, DCF “has sought to
meet the challenge of delivering Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM)” (Borough of Poole,
2009). One of the first major activities undertaken by the DCF was the preparation of the Dorset
Coast Strategy, a project which was funded by the European Union’s Environment - LIFE Initiative
and focused on the production of an integrated management strategy for the stretch of open coast
to the south of Dorset County. As part of this work DCF published fifteen topic papers on aspects
such as coastal defence, tourism, maritime industry, pollution and environmental quality and wildlife
and the discussion generated by these topic papers fed into the production of the final strategy
document which was published in 1999 and is reviewed every three years.
In the time the Forum has been operating it has hosted a number of other projects, including a
Marine and Coast Atlas, marine archaeological record, personal watercraft and bathing safety
projects, and most recently the C-Scope (Combining Sea and COastal Planning in Europe) project
which will use the sailing events of the 2012 Olympic Games to provide a focal point for developing
capacity in marine management alongside seascape and landscape mapping, a comprehensive
seabed map and an offshore renewable energy capacity study.
DCF –Organisational Structure
The DCF is hosted and underwritten by Dorset County Council and has a steering group made up
exclusively from funding partners such as Bournemouth Borough Council, Environment Agency,
Dorset Wildlife Trust, Weymouth and Portland Borough Council and Dorset County Council itself. The
Forum officers are considered to be employees of the Dorset Coast Forum, although their offices are
based at Dorset County Council, and the Forum also has an independent Chair. The wider
membership of the Forum consists of affiliated organisations based locally and nationally including
for example Poole and Bournemouth Borough Councils, fishing associations, maritime industries,
port authorities, tourism interests, AONB trusts and other conservation bodies, Government Office
for the South West, DEFRA and the MMO. For specific project work, short term “Task and finish”
groups are utilised. Currently there are over 220 organisations listed as members of the DCF from the
public, private and voluntary sectors.
DCF organises two public meetings per year for members to discuss the work of the Forum and local,
national and international coastal issues and produces a monthly e-newsletter informing members of
the latest events, consultations and policy developments.
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6.2.2 Severn Estuary Partnership -Background
The Severn Estuary Partnership (originally the Severn Estuary Strategy) was formed in 1995 by local
authorities, the Environment Agency and the Countryside Agencies for England and Wales (now
English Nature and the Countryside Council for Wales respectively) with the intention of encouraging
a more coordinated approach between agencies and organisations and their management activities
(SEP, 2001:3). The Severn Estuary Strategy, produced in 2001, cites the House of Commons Select
Committee on the Environment report on Coastal Zone Protection and Planning (1992), Planning
Policy Guidance Note 20 (PPG20) “Coastal Planning” and its Welsh equivalent Planning Guidance
(Wales) Technical Advice Note (TAN) 14 on the lack of coordinated decision making, the need for an
integrated approach to coastal planning and management and the need for voluntary Estuary
Management Plans. It is noted that given the Estuary’s location between two different systems of
governance (in Wales and the South West of England) this “results in parallel agencies and
organisations and, because of the different systems under which these operate, sometimes leads to
different management practices” (SEP, 2001:4). Therefore, the Severn Estuary Strategy’s overall aim
is to bring together all those involved in the development, management and use of the Estuary
within a framework which encourages the integration of their interests and responsibilities to
achieve common objectives (Ibid, p3).
SEP - Activities
During its existence the SEP has undertaken a wide range of activities including the Severn Wonders
festival to promote the estuary, provided consultation responses to policies and proposals affecting
the Severn, and been involved in research for European-funded projects on coastal management
such as Corepoint and CoastAtlantic. Between 2005-2007 SEP provided the Secretariat for Les
Esturiales, a European partnership of municipal and regional Authorities with responsibility for the
sustainable management of several European Estuaries, focused on promoting a sustainable and
holistic approach to their future management and development through co-operative activities,
including exchanges of experience, lobbying and technical projects.
The Severn Estuary is a particularly dynamic and sensitive environment, with numerous wildlife and
conservation designations such as a Ramsar site, SPAs, SACs, SSSIs and a European Marine Site (see
Map B). With one of the largest tidal ranges in the world, this has led to proposals for a tidal energy
scheme to harness the potential for renewable energy generation, and a feasibility study on five tidal
energy options for the Severn has been carried out by a cross-governmental team lead by the
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Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). As the Severn Estuary Partnership represents a
wide variety of interests it is unable to provide any kind of position statement on the Partnership’s
own preferred option for a renewable energy scheme, however it can provide information to
members and facilitate discussion through its newsletters, annual Forum and other meetings.
SEP - Organisational Structure
The Severn Estuary Partnership represents a more complex organisational structure than the other
ICZM case studies, reflecting the numerous issues and activities affecting the Estuary. The Severn
Estuary Partnership is hosted by the University of Cardiff and provides the secretariat for a number
of groups, including:
the Association of Severn Relevant Authorities (ASERA) – bringing together authorities with
statutory duties for conservation on the Severn (for example in relation to SACs, SPAs and
the European Marine Site) to ensure duties are discharged in the most efficient way.
the Severn Estuary Coastal Group, operating since 1993 to produce Shoreline Management
Plans for the Bristol Channel, and
the Standing Conference of Severnside Local Authorities (SCOSLA)
A Joint Advisory Committee of decision-makers from local authorities, statutory bodies and other
key interest groups oversee the direction of the SEP and provide advice on estuary-wide issues, and
a management group of representatives of funding bodies guide the work of SEP staff. The JAC and
Management Group have separate chairs – that for the JAC being a political representative (MP or
Councillor), and the Management Group chair being an officer from a local authority or statutory
body.
The Partnership has held an annual Forum since 2006 for members and the wider public to meet and
discuss the work of the Partnership and current issues affecting the Severn.
At the time of undertaking case study interviews, the SEP was going through a period of change,
having recently appointed a new Partnership Manager, Jonathan Mullard. One of the main duties
undertaken by the Partnership Manager is to review the SEP’s operating procedures, a process
which has involved developing a new set of strategic principles to guide the Partnership’s work,
drafting a new business plan and communications strategy. Having already consulted the Joint
Advisory Committee on what they thought the main issues were for the Severn, a draft business plan
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was to be put to the Joint Advisory Committee shortly after case study interviews had been
completed.
6.2.3 East Grampian Coastal Partnership - Background
The East Grampian Coastal Partnership was formed in 2005, having been proposed by Aberdeen City
and Aberdeenshire Councils. Besides the numerous local issues motivating the creation of the EGCP,
such as marine litter, recognition that this was the one area of Scotland’s east coast that did not
already have some kind of coastal management group or partnership provided the impetus for the
formation of the Partnership. Prior to this a feasibility study on the establishment of a coastal
partnership was undertaken with the supervision of a steering committee and the assistance of local
university students and published in 2004. Subsequently money to fund the partnership for two
years was secured in November 20047.
EGCP - Activities
The aim of EGCP is “to assist in the delivery of Integrated Coastal Zone Management between
Fraserburgh and the mouth of the River North Esk on the East coast of Scotland” (see Map C) through
a variety of initatives such as promoting sustainable development to the local communities,
protecting the natural and cultural heritage of the coast, stakeholder engagement in consultations
and networking, initiating research and practical projects in conjunction with other organisations and
to influence national coastal management policies.
Some specific examples of the work done by EGCP include setting up a successful dolphin survey in
conjunction with a local ferry company operating services to the Northern Isles, an “Adopt a Beach”
scheme to tackle marine litter through talks, volunteer beach cleans and the provision of cleaning
equipment, the issuing of Community Grants to other local organisations in order to help them with
activities that preserve, enhance, promote or increase access to the natural environment. EGCP has
also taken a role in the creation and implementation of the North East Scotland Marine Local
Biodiversity Action Plan, part of the UK and devolved administration’s commitments to the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity.
Besides its coastal work, EGCP is also a founding member of the North East Scotland Area Advisory
Group, which assists the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in producing a Scottish river basin
7 see egcp.org.uk/partnership/partnershipbackground.php
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management plan as required under Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC by providing locally
focused input on plan preparation, priorities, setting objectives and developing an Area
Management Plan.
EGCP - Organisational Structure
The Partnership is hosted by the Macaulay Institute (an interdisciplinary research centre focusing on
sustainable land use and natural resources) and comprises of an independent chair, an executive
group made up from representatives of the organisations which fund EGCP such as Scottish Natural
Heritage, Aberdeen City and Aberdeenshire Councils, and the Macaulay Institute, who oversee the
day to day management of the Partnership. The Partnership also has a management group of
organisations with an interest in the East Grampian coast such as SNH, the Scottish Coastal Forum
and Aberdeen Harbour. The wider membership of EGCP is open to affiliated groups, organisations
and individuals. An AGM and seminar is held to discuss the work of the Partnership and wider issues.
At the time of undertaking case study research, the EGCP Business Plan 2007-2010 indicated that
EGCP was investigating a possible move to formal company structure with a Board of Directors
replacing the management group and a paid chairperson (EGCP, 2007:2), however this change to the
organisation has not taken place.
6.2.4 The Marine Spatial Planning Pilot - Background
In the Safeguarding Our Seas document, published in 2002, DEFRA announced that it would explore
the role of spatial planning for the marine environment (2002:3) and also noted the need to increase
cooperation in spatial planning processes for the marine environment in order to integrate and
manage conflicting sea use pressures (Ibid, p8). Following the announcement in 2004 of DEFRA’s
plans for a new Marine Bill, a Marine Spatial Planning Pilot was commissioned by DEFRA to research
options for developing, implementing and managing marine spatial planning in the UK. This work
was undertaken by the MSPP Consortium which included ABPmer, Terence O’Rourke, Risk and Policy
Analysts, Geotek, Hartley Anderson and Coastal (now Communications) Management for
Sustainability.
The MSP Pilot - Activities
The pilot study had two main elements, firstly to review existing spatial planning practices and how
they might be applied to the UK’s marine and coastal waters, and secondly to undertake a pilot
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study to assess the feasibility of developing and applying a marine spatial plan for UK waters (MSPP
Consortium, 2006).
The programme of work for the pilot comprised of a number of elements:
a literature review,
the development of a suggested process for marine spatial planning and management,
a pilot project that simulated the development of a marine spatial plan for the Irish Sea (see
Map D),
an exploration of the relationship between regional marine spatial plans and the plethora
[of] existing marine plans,
preparation of an initial Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), and
preparation of a final report including conclusions and recommendations (MSPP Consortium,
2006:ii)
The MSP Pilot - Organisational Structure
As a unique project rather than an organisation with long term objectives, the management of the
project was overseen by a Project Management Group chaired by DEFRA and consisting of
approximately twenty eight individuals8 representing government departments, the devolved
administrations and the consultancies involved in the delivering the project. In order to facilitate
some form of stakeholder engagement, a wider Stakeholder Advisory Group consisting of 217
individuals from the government departments, local authorities, the private sector including harbour
companies and the energy sector, academia, NGOs, coastal partnerships, fisheries, conservation
groups, recreational users and others (MSPP Consortium, 2006:52) were invited to participate in a
number of meetings, workshops and comment on consultation documents through the MSP
Consortium website.
6.2.5 The Dee River Basin Management Plan - Background
In anticipation of transposing Water Framework Directive2000/60/EC into UK law, the Dee River
Basin and indeed all other river basins in England and Wales have a shared background, with their
borders being decided upon by the Environment Agency. The Dee RBD covers an area of 2,251 Km2
which includes north east Wales, parts of Cheshire, Shropshire and the Wirral (see Map E) and the
8 Having been unable to find a definitive list of members for the Project Management Group, this figure has
been obtained by reference to the minutes of Management Group meetings.
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Dee Estuary, containing mud flats and salt marshes, is both an SSSI and Ramsar site. In order to
prepare river basin management plans for each district, the EA has undertaken a process of
monitoring and classification for water bodies within each district according to their chemical and
ecological characteristics, and also spatial dimensions such as latitude, longitude and tidal range
have been used to define estuarine and coastal waters. Classification of water bodies into artificial
and heavily modified, groundwater, surface water, lakes, rivers, estuarine and coastal waters and
protected areas, reported in the draft RBMPs for each district, has then facilitated the identification
of pressures and risks to water bodies (significant water management issues).
The Dee RBMP - Activities
The production of RBMPs has followed a strict timetable throughout their preparation. In 2006 the
EA produced the “Working Together” consultation documents for each RBD, outlining how the
production of RBMPs may take place and how stakeholders can get involved. At the end of the
consultation period in June 2007, responses to the Working Together documents were published,
highlighting who had responded, their concerns and how these would be addressed by the EA in
RBMP production, for example in the case of the Dee there were a total of seventeen respondents,
ten of whom made responses that were copied to other RBDs and seven that were specific to the
Dee (Environment Agency, 2007). These responses then enabled the EA to produce an amended list
of plans and strategies that should be taken into consideration when producing the Dee RBMP, and
also helped to compile a more comprehensive list of stakeholder groups that may provide channels
for further communication of the WFD.
A second round of consultation on Significant Water Management Issues for each RBD took place
between July 2006 and January 2008.This highlighted specific problems for the Dee RBD, which were
grouped into:
alien species, such as North American Signal Crayfish and Japanese Knotweed;
commercial fisheries – illegal fishing and removal of undersized cockles
diffuse pollution - rural (nitrates, metals, pesticides, phosphates and sediments)
diffuse pollution – urban and transport (nitrates, metals, pesticides, phosphates, sediments,
run-off from industrial estates and building sites)
point source pollution (organic pollution, pesticides, phosphorus and sediments).
The third stage of consultation followed the publication of draft RMBPs for each district, lasting from
December 2008 to June 2009. Finally, the full River Basin Management Plan for the Dee, alongside
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RBMPs for all other RBDs, was published in December 2009. The plan contains a summary of the
Programme of Measures that will be used to meet the objectives of the WFD, outlining which
stakeholders will have responsibility for undertaking each of the measures.
The Dee RBMP - Organisation
For each RBD a Liaison Panel has been set up to assist in engaging wider stakeholders. Water for Life
and Livelihoods states that Liaison Panels should consist of up to 15 partners, including bodies with
statutory powers and others that will put measures into action (Environment Agency 2006a:26). As a
cross-border RBD, the Dee Panel consists of a slightly larger number of members, reflecting the need
for representatives and their counterparts on both sides of the English-Welsh border to be involved.
The Liaison Panel has several roles:
discussing and negotiating between deliverers and regulators on the Programme of
Measures for RBMPs,
scrutinising the plan-making process,
ensuring progress in the implementation of the WFD, and
providing a link between their sector, feeding back information to peers and representing
their sector’s interests to other members of the Panel and the EA. (DEFRA/WAG, 2005, in
Environment Agency, 2006a)
The Dee Liaison Panel currently meets publicly twice a year.
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6.3 Findings – Questionnaire Reporting and Interviews
Having contextualised the case studies, attention now turns to the description and analysis of case
study findings. This will start with a report on the results of administering the questionnaire as this
gives some insight into the range of participants who have contributed to the empirical data used,
and the results of undertaking the questionnaire also provide the foundations for data analysis in
which the broad picture obtained from the questionnaire results can be triangulated with more
specific, qualitative interview data for comparison and evaluation. The total number of
questionnaires completed is shown in Table 6a below.
Table 6a: Summary of Questionnaire Completions by Planning Regime
Total
completions
Number completed by
interview participants
Number completed by
non-interviewees
ICZM 40 15 25
MSP 17 5 12
RBMP 6 6 0
Source: Author
The differences in response rates for each of the case studies can be accounted for by two main
reasons. Firstly, the potential number of respondents for each case study was dictated by the size of
the case study organisation and the number of interviewees coming from each regime. Therefore
with three ICZM case studies and fifteen interviewees compared to five each for MP and RBMP, the
response rate was already somewhat skewed. In terms of respondents from the wider membership
of each case study organisation, again, for the ICZM case studies, a larger number of respondents
may be expected, with each organisation having a membership in excess of one hundred individuals
or representatives of organisations. In the MP case study, only one fifth of the original Stakeholder
Advisory Group could be contacted. In the River Basin Management case study, the Dee Liaison
Panel consisted of only 16 members, therefore a small number of responses was inevitable, and the
actual figure of 6 out of 16 represents a not insignificant proportion (38%) of the Panel.
The second factor accounting for the response rates may be the way in which the questionnaire was
administered, as this varied across the case studies. For the ICZM questionnaire, participants (other
than interviewees) were either invited to respond through an email from the partnership officer, or
a link was placed on the web pages of the organisation. Whilst the anonymous nature of the
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questionnaire prevents a comprehensive breakdown of the numbers of ICZM respondents by
affiliation to a case study organisation, however the author was able to gauge an approximate
weighting based on the time period over which responses were collected, and knowing
approximately when the questionnaire was released into the public domain by each organisation.
In this instance, the majority of (non-interviewee) ICZM questionnaire responses are thought to have
come from the membership of the Dorset Coast Forum. This was also the only ICZM case study in
which the questionnaire was administered through an email invitation, and thus the more direct
communication and implicit endorsement of the research through email distribution by the
partnership officer has been influential in eliciting a higher response rate.
Given the variability in response rate across the three questionnaires, and the relatively low number
of respondents, it was considered that it would not be representative to base comparisons and
analysis on the raw numbers collated in response to each of the statements. Therefore, in the
following sections, questionnaire responses are reported as percentages showing the proportion of
people in each regime who selected “Agree strongly”, “Agree somewhat” or other options for each
statement. Presenting data in percentage form also allows for a more convenient comparison across
the three questionnaires as this standardised format eliminates the problem of differing sample
sizes.
It is important to note the timing of this phase of case study work, as historical and current policy
developments can be a major influence on the responses given to particular questions about the
ways in which coastal planning regimes are being implemented. Case study interviews were carried
out between May and December 2009, with the Marine Planning case study completed first (May –
June), followed by the Dee River Basin Management Plan (May – August), Dorset Coast Forum
(August to October), Severn Estuary Partnership (October – November) and finally East Grampian
Coastal Partnership (November – December).
At the beginning of this period the Marine Bill was still going through Parliament on its way to
becoming the Marine and Coastal Access Act, only receiving Royal Assent on 12th November 2009
(the Marine (Scotland) Act followed in March 2010). This fact was of particular relevance to both the
marine planning case study and the ICZM cases, as there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
the final contents of the Marine Acts and subsequent enabling legislation that would both structure
the implementation of marine planning and outline how ICZM would be incorporated into marine
planning activities.
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Similarly for River Basin Management Plans, the interview period covered a time when consultations
on Draft RBMPs were drawing to a close and the final Plans were being drawn up, and thus
interviewees may have moved from an initial position at the time of interview to a different position
by the time interviews for all the case studies had been completed. However, the design of the
research limited the author to capturing a set of views at a particular point in time in the
implementation of each regime. A full list of interviewees is included in Appendix C, and a table of
questionnaire responses is included in Appendix D.
The following section now describes the research findings for the problem recognition stage of
collaborative policy making.
6.4 Analysis – Problem Recognition
In the problem recognition stage, as described by the literature review, problems may become
known to stakeholders through a process of social construction, whereby the creation of knowledge
about a condition and its definition as a problem is highly dependent upon the historical, social and
cultural norms of the society within which claims-makers exist. Under John Hannigan’s (1995) model
for the successful social construction of an environmental problem, six essential prerequisites are
outlined for making claims. These are:
Scientific authority for and validation of claims,
Existence of popularisers who can bridge environmentalism and science,
Media attention in which the problem is framed as novel and important,
Dramatisation of the problem in symbolic and visual terms,
Economic incentives for taking positive action, and
Recruitment of an institutional sponsor who can ensure both legitimacy and continuity
Furthermore, Kingdon (1984, 2003) observes that feedback from previous iterations of the policy
cycle related to the implementation and monitoring of policies or programmes may contribute to
new claims about the existence of a problem (and proposed solutions), which in turn initiates a new
phase of agenda setting. However, it was found in the literature review that Hannigan’s model
considers that all six prerequisites are necessary and given equal weighting in the impact they have
upon the social construction of a problem, and that the extent to which each prerequisite may be
apparent in the rhetoric of claims makers may vary considerably, for example scientific evidence for
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a problem may be minimal, or media exposure may be limited to a particular audience. This raises
the possibility for the six prerequisites to be seen not as a set of discrete criteria, but rather a more
nuanced continuum of weak to strong presence. Similarly, these prerequisites may feature more or
less prominently in claims making, so for example the economic case for action may be emphasised
more than any other prerequisite in trying to move the problem up the political agenda. In order to
test these hypotheses, the first part of the questionnaire and interview questions were used to
determine how respondents viewed Hannigan’s prerequisites in relation to their own particular
ICZM, MSP or RBMP work.
A table of questionnaire responses relating to each of the propositions on problem recognition is
shown on the next page. In addition, for each proposition a summary graph of questionnaire
responses related to each of the propositions is shown, followed by a description of the additional
information gathered from interviews also relating to the propositions. The final section of this
chapter will draw together all the findings related to problem recognition to discuss how this relates
to problem recognition in each of the planning regimes studied and the implications this has for
policy development, and also examines how, in the light of these findings, Hannigan’s model may be
further developed.
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Table 6b: Questionnaire Responses for Problem Recognition
There is clear scientific evidence demonstrating that coastal/marine/river basin resources are under
critical pressure and that new approaches to tackling these problems are urgently needed.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 14 19 1 0 0 1 5
MSP 9 8 0 0 0 0 0
RBMP 3 1 2 0 0 0 0
This scientific evidence has received international endorsement at the highest level.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 7 18 6 1 0 3 5
MSP 6 8 0 3 0 0 0
RBMP 2 1 2 0 0 1 0
The case for action has been vigorously championed by key individuals/organisations.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 12 16 3 1 1 2 5
MSP 9 5 1 1 1 0 0
RBMP 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
Media coverage of dramatic incidents such as oil spills/floods has helped to focus the attention of a wider
audience on measures to tackle coastal/marine/catchment issues.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 2 19 9 4 1 0 5
MSP 4 8 1 3 0 1 0
RBMP 1 4 1 0 0 0 0
An explicit economic case for undertaking ICZM/MSP/RBMP has been articulated.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 2 8 4 13 6 2 5
MSP 2 8 3 0 3 1 0
RBMP 0 2 2 1 1 0 0
A disparity between the intended and actual outcomes of previous initiatives has contributed to
recognition of the need for a new approach to coastal/marine/catchment issues.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 10 13 7 1 1 3 5
MSP 1 8 6 2 0 0 0
RBMP 1 2 3 0 0 0 0
Governmental and non-governmental coastal/marine/catchment stakeholders are playing an important role in continuing to highlight problems and potential solutions.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 9 24 0 0 2 0 5
MSP 7 10 0 0 0 0 0
RBMP 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
Source: Author
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6.4.1 Existence and endorsement of scientific evidence
Figure 6.1: Questionnaire Response – Scientific Evidence
Figure 6.2: Questionnaire Response – Endorsement of Evidence
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
There is clear scientific evidence demonstrating that coastal/marine/river basin resources are under critical
pressure and that new approaches to tackling these problems are urgently needed.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
This scientific evidence has received international endorsement at the highest level.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
Source: Author
188
In the modern political context of evidence based policy making, the need for scientific studies of
resource use and its impacts are crucial to evaluating the current situation and anticipating future
trends or policy directions. The questionnaire responses to the first statement regarding the
existence of scientific evidence demonstrating pressures on coastal/marine/catchment resources
(shown in Figure 6.1) therefore reflect this, with the majority of respondents across ICZM and MP
agreeing strongly or somewhat that such pressures have been demonstrated.
For example, at a general level, there was a great awareness of research and reports in relation to
the proposals for the Marine Bill, such as the Charting Progress report by DEFRA (DEFRA, 2005b).
However, it was felt by some respondents that the number of reports can be overwhelming and thus
difficult to interpret, for example one respondent from a coastal partnership stated that:
“There’s all sorts of consultations and loads of different levels of policy making and reporting,
whether it be the WFD or DEFRA consultations which come out one a week at the moment...
There’s a lot of information gathering going on, but combining that into anything meaningful is
not happening, or it doesn’t seem that it is possible to find a simple digest”
Similarly, another interviewee described people being “swamped” with consultation and report
overload, citing the need for documents to be more succinct and simple.
The volume of scientific evidence and the need for information to be distilled into simpler, clearer
messages is an issue that may be further addressed by the popularisers described by Hannigan, or
those stories and events which capture public attention. For MP, the fact that there has not yet been
an opportunity beyond the Pilot for plan-makers to gather information limits to some extent further
comment on the availability of evidence in this particular case study, although there is increasing
awareness of climate change, it’s likely impacts and the need for mitigation, and potential damage
to ecosystem goods and services through overfishing and pollution. These particular topics are
emerging as the main areas of science or research focusing thoughts on the need for marine
planning, with one interviewee stating:
“there are many things where people are saying there’s danger of local extinction, as a result of
human pressure, there are things that climate change is going to lead to, geographic shifts, and
I think more broadly than when we talk about marine resources we can talk about the supply of
ecosystem goods and services and human use of those, and there’s lots of evidence about
conflicts between human use activities which may be limiting the value of ecosystem goods and
services”.
189
For those working within coastal partnerships, interpretation of data “is difficult because talking
about a lot of different branches of science, coming from different sources”, and where evidence is
compartmentalised,
“getting people to agree to a common vision or a common set of priorities or to agree which
indicators might be used to identify sustainable practice appears to be very difficult”.
Indeed, only one person cited DEFRA’s Charting Progress as presenting an integrated assessment of
the health of marine and coastal areas, but acknowledged that “more data and long term monitoring
is required to understand a number of factors”.
The ability to understand scientific evidence may account for the views of respondents in relation to
scientific evidence and River Basin Management, where a greater proportion (approximately one
third) of respondents gave a “neither agree nor disagree” answer. Interviews revealed it was not the
presence or absence of evidence that was in dispute, rather that the data provided by UKTAG for
classifying water bodies was “aimed at the professionally interested, and the size of the documents
for a starter is a complete turn off”.
With regards to the makeup of the Liaison Panel being representatives of various interests such as
consumers or recreational users (i.e. non-specialists) and the technical nature of data collection
related to RBMP, one respondent made the point that:
“One doesn’t know if what the scientist is saying is – what’s the word? Conventional scientific
wisdom. Which is not going to be argued about, or an individual’s view which may be
somewhat unique to them”,
Thus demonstrating that the communication of evidence from a purely scientific perspective alone,
may be insufficient to convey the existence of a problem.
In acknowledging the existence of scientific evidence for a claim, the endorsement of such evidence
at a higher level and the credibility of coastal, marine or catchment data should be considered in
tandem. For this second statement on the questionnaire (responses shown in Figure 6.2 above),
again the majority of respondents were in agreement that much of the evidence had the
endorsement of DEFRA at the least, and also bodies such as the EU, OSPAR and ICES – although
similarly to the point made about non-specialists taking RBM data at face value one respondent from
a coastal partnership noted in relation to the evidence needs of policy makers that
“If UK government said, for instance on climate change, said this is the problem and they define
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it simply, and this is the data held by UKCIP for instance, that’s what they’d run with, even
though the scientists around the [case study area] might think that’s not quite correct”.
This statement indicates a difficulty in disaggregating what is known about problems at a national or
international level from what evidence is needed to make a case at local level for action to be taken.
Another way in which the endorsement of scientific evidence was considered to be problematic by
interviewees was in relation to the urgency of problems and the need for a precautionary approach,
balancing immediate and urgent priorities with assembling a credible and comprehensive evidence
base to justify action. As far as RBMP is concerned, some respondents noted that for the first round
of RBM Plans, plan-making was proceeding due to time and other resource constraints without a
comprehensive assessment of all the water bodies in the Dee river basin, with one member of the
panel stating:
“If we had our way we’d like to go out and monitor and sample all the water bodies, but we’ve
not been able to do that, and therefore we’ve just had to do it on a risk based approach. So that
isn’t necessarily the best situation to find yourself in, however, unfortunately, that’s the reality
and I think you just have to do the best job with what you’ve got”.
This view confirms the point made by Newig et al (2005) and outlined in section 3.3.2 that the
classification of water bodies (which was due to be completed in December 2004) would have to
proceed without full information, however the contribution of stakeholders in consultation could
contribute to a sufficient level of confidence in decision making.
For ICZM, this pragmatism and precautionary approach is also evident – one partnership officer
saying that “waiting for science to be proven is not good management because people probably deep
down know something like climate change *is happening+”. This view demonstrates how a solution to
a problem may be needed more quickly than information about possible alternatives or
consequences of actions can be assembled. The need for a precautionary approach was also
observed by another partnership officer who noted that:
“You’ve got to look at the evidence base, you’ve also got to look at risks associated with the
evidence... you’ve actually got to weigh the evidence you’ve got and the evidence you haven’t
got before proceeding”.
So whilst the existence of scientific evidence and authority or endorsement of such evidence is
generally regarded as important, at the case study specific or local level it is recognised that such
prerequisites may be secondary to dealing with immediate needs. . In these cases, anecdotal or
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“grey” evidence as one interviewee described it is prevalent and can potentially contribute to
eliminating uncertainty or the rapid assessment of situations, although this brings its own problems
in terms of usefulness, because this local knowledge provided by stakeholders “isn’t in a format
that’s appropriate and can be fed into the system”. Therefore regardless of whether the information
is factually correct, it lacks the quality assurance that may be associated with the methodological
rigour expected from “official” sources. One partnership officer explains:
“You’ve got people going out to sea, not just fishermen – people who drive the ferries, all those
people who’ve been doing that year in year out, and sometimes they’re in a better position to
identify any of the problems or opportunities and should be utilised more within science”.
This view is supported by another partnership officer, who said that “I think *anecdotal evidence+ is
just as important to incorporate into any decision making process, I think it’s maybe not as easy to
find an agreed way to do that or an agreed format to do that”.
The value of “grey” or anecdotal evidence is summed up by one interviewee, noting:
“That’s the cultural dimension that people’s perceptions of an area are important... I really do
appreciate that the character of an area is very much down to perception and those who have
lived there all their lives really do have a right to have that taken into account and not to see
unnecessary, probably damaging, change”
The emergence of perceived problems over a period of time and subjective rather than “objective”
scientific evidence also demonstrates the difficulties coastal partnerships have in linking science with
making the case for ICZM at local level. In relation to this issue, one interviewee claimed that coastal
partnerships “lack rigorous processes for dealing with data, that is, they don't have the means to
assess or interpret that information which may be useful to them” – a point which can be tied back
to earlier comments about volume of scientific evidence available and the inability to disaggregate
this into simpler, meaningful messages. Partnerships have attempted to address these gaps in a way
by preparing “State of the Coast” type reports, for example Dorset Coast Forum’s Topic Papers and
Rapid Coastal Zone Assessment (2004), but there is no evidence to suggest such information
gathering exercises have an impact on an audience beyond those already involved with the
partnerships in some way.
To summarise, the following points can be made about the existence of, and authority for scientific
evidence:
Much of the evidence needed to make a claim is available, though there are occasions
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where uncertainty or incomplete information still exists. Given the complexity of this data it
is difficult to distil a clear picture about the state of the area (coast, marine, or catchment)
being dealt with.
Alongside the complexity of scientific information, there are difficulties in translating what is
known generally to a locally specific evidence base for coastal planning regimes, in particular
ICZM.
The origins or credibility of scientific evidence is considered to be important in all regimes,
however emotive and intuitive concerns about environmental change are highly valued and
there needs to be more robust processes for feeding such information into decision making.
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6.4.2 Existence of Champions/Popularisers Who Can Bridge Environmentalism and Science
Figure 6.3: Questionnaire Response – Champions/popularisers
This part of problem recognition has some clear links with the earlier discussions on scientific
evidence and the ability to interpret data, as popularisers may provide alternative channel through
which some of this interpretation might occur.
The questionnaire results relating to this matter (in Figure 6.3) show there is relatively high levels of
agreement across all three regimes that champions or popularisers have been present and helped to
make the case for particular regimes. Interviews have revealed that such popularisers are mainly
from the NGO and academic sectors - for example the RSPB is cited by interviewees from both the
marine and RBMP case studies as important for highlighting the changes to bird populations and
habitats and the need for new legislation to protect these assets. WWF, MCS and the Wildlife Trusts
are also regarded as vocal in the marine sector. In terms of academic popularisers, Professor Hance
Smith and more broadly the personnel within the School of Earth and Ocean Sciences at Cardiff
University are cited as influential upon the development of sea use planning and coastal
management.
Where academic popularisers do seem to be missing is in the East Grampian case study, as one
interviewee put it, “in Scotland we don't have the same academic interest level”. This is also the case
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
The case for action has been vigorously championed by key individuals/organisations.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
194
for RBMP, however one interviewee pointed out that:
“because we’ve had a panel of people made up of lots of different sectors, they all want to
represent their own views”,
Thus indicating that the various members of the Liaison Panel themselves may bring their own
specialist knowledge to bear on communicating problems.
For Dorset Coast there have been some quite specific popularisers, reflecting a local dimension to
gathering and communicating scientific evidence that is not seen in the other case studies. In
particular, Malcolm Turnbull, an employee of Dorset County Council was singled out for the work he
undertook whilst working as a countryside ranger for the Council in the 1980s, reviewing the state of
the Dorset Coast and making recommendations for future resource management.
This section shows therefore, that although popularisers can contribute to understanding science
and advocating appropriate courses of action, the range of popularisers in terms of the sectors they
represent are in fact quite small. There is an absence of popularisers from central government, with
only one individual, Steve Collins at DEFRA being cited as a champion of ICZM and an important
contact point for coastal partnership officers, and, apart from in the RBM case, few individuals from
the commercial or industrial sectors taking on such a role.
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6.4.3 Use of the Media/Dramatisation
Figure 6.4: Questionnaire Response – the Media and Dramatic Incidents
The question of media attention to dramatic incidents and its influence on the public interest in
coastal/marine/catchment issues generated a high level of discussion in interviews. The
questionnaire results (displayed in Figure 6.4) show agreement across all three regimes that the
media has focused attention, but there is a degree of scepticism on the part of ICZM respondents
about the impacts this has had.
One area of consensus across all case studies is, as the original question may have suggested, that
negative or bad news stories tend to be those that are reported, “in a very specific and emotive
manner” as one interviewee described it, and also in a way that does not get to the heart of the
matter. An interviewee from the Dee case study noted in relation to flooding:
“pensioner marooned in bungalow for ten hours is the sort of thing that gets everyone’s
attention but in fact the real issue in the catchment might be that people have been managing
the land in an inappropriate manner since the last war because of the government policy of bad
drainage, and that’s why the people are flooded”
The symbolism of such dramatic incidents certainly places a problem in people’s minds, but can also
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Media coverage of dramatic incidents such as oil spills/floods has helped to focus the attention of a wider audience on measures to
tackle coastal issues.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
196
be deceptive – on the Severn, one interviewee observed that in terms of getting media interest, “the
Severn Barrage does, tidal power which includes the barrage doesn’t”, at a time when feasibility
studies for tidal power options were still in progress. Similarly, public interest in the Dee RBMP was
influenced negatively by flooding events. One interviewee explained:
“Unfortunately the initial consultation started last summer, which was the start of the period of
the severe flooding in the Severn. Not surprisingly people who responded to the EA across
England and Wales were rather concerned about flooding because that obviously impacts
directly on ordinary people and, people didn’t care that the WFD was bigger than that”.
Another claimed the floods “tempered a lot of the responses we got to the Significant Water
Management Issues *document+, and it actually took the focus off”.
The audience for media events was questioned by some interviewees, as one explained, “The
question assumes that there is a wider, interested audience for news on coastal issues. Experience
suggests that this is not necessarily the case - those who live within a coastal area are, generally,
more tuned into coastal matters but only as they directly affect their own interests”. The point about
personal interest is emphasized by another, who notes:
“you can have all the science in the world about sea level rise and whatever, until it’s washing
someone’s house away or the road or it’s affecting them, then suddenly people will take notice
and do something about it”.
A further aspect of the audience for media messages is the extent to which they impact upon
decision making. In the case of MSP, only one interviewee noted that climate change was “keeping
the attention span up”, suggesting that this example replaces that of oil spills given in the
questionnaire as a more contemporary dramatic news item. Two interviewees played down the
urgency that media interest may possibly bring to the case for marine planning; one noting that the
way MSP had come about was “nothing to do with instantaneousness, but long hard, full frontal
campaigning”, and the other:
“I can see the argument but I think it has to be a sustained evidence based argument to really
make an appropriate response to the issues.”
One somewhat unusual dimension to the discussion of media influence that was apparent in several
interviews was reference to the BBC’s “Coast” documentary series. Whilst many felt that this tended
to focus on the more idiosyncratic aspects of coastal and marine activity rather than the mundane or
routine, the series was perceived as being positive in terms of raising awareness of coastal areas.
197
But, like more dramatic incidents, one interviewee said “I do not know whether this has led to an
understanding of the need for a more integrated approach to planning and management”.
In this sense it appears then that the media and symbolic events may only provide superficial views
on coastal, marine and catchment issues that do not create a sustained interest or contribution to
the debate about the way problems are managed. For one interviewee, the problem of the media is
summarised thus:
“The media want simplistic messages, and I don't think an area of activity like coastal and
marine management always provides simple messages, particularly given the multiplicity of
partners and issues in the subject area.”
6.4.4 Economic Incentives for Taking Action
Figure 6.5: Questionnaire Response – Economic Incentives
The existence of an economic case for taking action on coastal, marine or catchment problems
produced quite a varying response across all three regimes, with a much broader scale of agreement
0 10 20 30 40 50
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
An explicit economic case for undertaking ICZM/MSP/RBMP has been articulated.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
198
and disagreement, for example Figure 6.5 shows MSP respondents both agreeing strongly and
disagreeing strongly, low levels of agreement in the case of RBMP, and a significant proportion
disagreeing either somewhat or strongly for ICZM.
As with the problem of general scientific evidence for a problem and trying to link this with a locally
or regime-specific case, interviews revealed a split in economic arguments between the need to
address environmental changes generally, (for example in order to prevent further decline and
escalating costs of remediation, or maintaining profitable resources such as fish stocks and tourist
attractions) and direct financial benefits of having measures such as the WFD or marine planning in
place.
For MP, some interviewees who agreed that the economic case had been made cited the
evaluations contained within the MSP Pilot study and initial Regulatory Impact Assessment.
However, this evaluation tended to focus on the benefits of a more integrated system of planning
consents and coordination of sea uses, such as managing conflict between incompatible activities
like dredging and laying cables, and reducing costs related with planning risk and uncertainty, and as
one of the interviewees who helped to prepare the RIA pointed out, “it remains to be seen what
marine planning will actually cost and also what marine planning will actually deliver”.
On the other hand, even when costs can be shown, as is the case for the Dee RBMP, this still might
not produce a convincing case for action. According to one Liaison Panel member:
“The impact assessment data we have seen so far shows – if I use the more traditional phrase
cost benefit analysis – it shows the costs are many times the benefits”.
And, from another member:
“The way that it looks at the moment is that there’s an awful lot of expenditure going on water
quality improvement and ecology improvements, however the benefits have not been made
tangible enough”.
A third Dee interviewee stated, quite bluntly, that the “UK government has got no choice” in
meeting the targets of the WFD and that the financial argument was “irrelevant”. However, taken in
the context of the current economic crisis in the UK and the concerns felt by both government and
the private sector regarding any kind of additional expenditure, reservations about the cost
effectiveness of environmental improvements can justifiably be seen as a major influence on the
way in which stakeholders view the economics of implementing the WFD.
Within the ICZM case studies, there are also difficulties in trying to articulate an economic argument.
199
For the Dorset Coast Forum, reflecting the move of some coastal partnerships towards a service
provision model, the economic benefits of integrated working are currently being demonstrated
through the C-Scope project, part of which is looking at zones for different sea uses and areas where
economic activity can take place or is compatible with other uses, and through the resources and
services they can offer to others such as providing GIS mapping services to local marine industries.
In the Severn Estuary Partnership it has also been recognised that the Partnership needs to
demonstrate the “added value” they are able to bring to wider management processes. Noting that
“people see that simplistically as more pairs of hands”, one interviewee stated that “if you’ve got one
ecologist that’s hard pressed, and one planning manager that’s hard pressed, and then there’s an
organisation like the SEP that’s got expertise in coastal zone management that can help them deliver
some of their statutory targets, then we sound more interesting”.
One further issue in making the economic case for ICZM that is highlighted by interviewees from
both SEP and EGCP is establishing the value of the assets and resources already in existence. One
interviewee said “one of the calls that has been made endlessly on the Severn has been to the
partnership officers... the need for an economic valuation of the Severn in the context of renewable
energy and some of these big schemes... I think the discussions have been trying to get an evaluation
of the environment rather than ICZM as a process”.
In EGCP project work around promoting quality of life and tourism assets has been a central activity,
and alongside this it has been found that “individual sectors are belatedly realising that the only way
people in government are going to take them seriously is if they have facts relating to cold, hard
cash. So they are trying to provide this evidence, and these component parts could be put together to
make a case for ICZM. But there are few economists who would be in a position to understand what
they are looking at”.
A final point in relation to the economic case for ICZM is the Entec report on financial benefits to
working in partnership at the coast, prepared for DEFRA, the Local Government Association Coastal
Special Interest Group and the Coastal Partnerships Working Group (Entec, 2008). In interviews it
was evident that this document was viewed with scepticism by those people working closely with
coastal partnerships – one interviewee described it as a “missed opportunity” that “didn't hit the
target”, whilst another referred to the use of a small number of case studies and the “narrow” focus
of the research. However the same individual acknowledged that the report had generated
discussion within DEFRA, helping them to have more recognition for coastal partnerships.
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There are some general points raised by attempting to make an economic case for any of the three
regimes, the main one of these being the difficulty in trying to capture or assign values to public or
intangible goods. In relation to MSP, one interviewee noted that the sea itself is a type of public
good, and that:
“the question of value relates to the question of power, and the question of power to some
extent relates to access to institutions which make decisions”.
It was also claimed that “some organisations have got no device for even coping with non-financial
based value systems”.
Another intangible benefit was seen as the “insurance”, as one interviewee termed it, provided by
implementing an effective, integrated management process. This view was supported by another
interviewee, who stated that “the economic argument for getting ICZM efficiently right as best as we
can is quite strong... I don't think there’s any point in divorcing good ICZM practice from the socio-
economics of the community in which you’re working”.
In relation to MP the potential tensions between economic interests such as offshore renewables or
aquaculture and Marine Conservation Zones in situations that “would be better dealt with through
integrated marine planning” also demonstrated the need for the most appropriate measures to be
in place to prevent future conflicts.
The comments generated by the questionnaire and interviews in relation to economic incentives,
like the use of scientific evidence, present a complex picture of the way in which information is
interpreted, in both general terms of the benefits of working (together) to prevent unsustainable or
negative patterns of development, and specifically on the costs or benefits derived from
implementing a particular regime. Of course, notions of what costs or benefits are considered
worthwhile cannot be divorced from the political and cultural contexts in which environments and
their problems are constructed. Therefore, attempting to build a case for action on a purely
economic basis is not possible.
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6.4.5 Outcomes of Previous Initiatives
Figure 6.6: Questionnaire Response – Outcomes of Previous Initiatives
Source: Author
Although this topic in the questionnaire does not come directly from Hannigan’s prerequisites, but
rather a synthesis of feedback elements used by Kingdon, knowledge of previous initiatives through
monitoring and evaluation remains important as a factor somewhere between scientific evidence of
a problem and the dramatic or symbolic phenomena that can motivate claims making.
The questionnaire results (in Figure 6.6) show a range of responses from quite strong agreement to
indifference, with only very small numbers in the cases of MP and ICZM disagreeing. What the
questionnaire results alone do not show is that the understandings of interviewees of the relative
achievements of previous initiatives are not so much framed in terms of “failure” to meet specified
objectives, but rather the identification of gaps in the prevailing systems of planning and
management.
For MP, one interviewee believed that “there is very strong agreement that the existing system
doesn’t cope with the realities of what goes on”, and another, considering MSP in the light of coastal
and estuary strategies that were unable to deliver real benefits stated:
“I think certainly marine spatial planning as a concept really came out of the Irish Sea Pilot
marine conservation review that JNCC pushed – they were the ones that proposed having a pilot
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
A disparity between the intended and actual outcomes of previous initiatives has contributed to recognition of the need for a new approach to
coastal/marine/catchment issues.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
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study on MSP to look at what it could contribute. They were coming from a nature conservation
perspective, but they were seeing MSP as something more holistic”.
This illustrates a view of MP as a more distinct approach to marine and coastal management that
attempts to do something different rather than simply being reactive to the mistakes of the past.
The novelty of the Marine Bill is also supported by reference to the literature review carried out as
part of the MSP Pilot, which searched for examples of MSP practice from other countries. This
literature review was described by one interviewee as “remarkably empty”, with a focus on Belgian
marine planning practices and little else. Such evidence shows that not only were gaps identified in
national policy, but the policy vacuum was more widespread at the European level.
For RBMP, the need for a more integrated approach was indentified “to bring all the disparate
legislation under one umbrella and give it all a commonality”. One interviewee observed:
“Nowadays people, even the engineers in places like the EA are realising that you have to think
much more broadly and you’ve got to think of the whole catchment, what it is that’s happening
across the whole”.
The problems of ICZM “implementation failure” due to the non-statutory nature of ICZM activities in
the UK have been well documented by others (and referred to earlier in this thesis), and are
confirmed by interviewees. One describes “the ability of coastal partnerships to produce their own
management plans for delivering ICZM locally is very useful, but there has been a lack of policy at
government level”. Another stated:
“Their management plans have tended to become left on the shelf, therefore there is a need for
a tiered, statutory system of coastal and marine management”.
Such a statement shows a further development of the argument, being coupled with a particular
solution to the problem and thus beginning to show a more comprehensive argument for improving
the system of ICZM. This more developed argument can then move the problems of ICZM further
through the process of agenda setting.
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6.4.6 Stakeholders Continuing to Highlight Problems and Potential Solutions
Figure 6.7: Questionnaire Response – Stakeholders Highlighting Problems and Solutions
Source: Author
Here the questionnaire turned to the final prerequisite of Hannigan’s model to examine those
organisations or individuals that may act as public sector sponsors, legitimising claims about a
problem and advocating particular responses. In many ways the questionnaire and interview
responses to this issue (see Figure 6.7) bear great similarity to those regarding popularisers or
champions, representing a line of continuity from the recognition of a problem to devising a
solution.
The WWF and RSPB stand out particularly as a sponsor in ICZM and MP, with one interviewee
noting:
“they have been good for ICZM in the past, but their focus has changed onto marine planning
and I’m sure that’s just the way it should be, I think it’s probably part of a cycle that they started
off with coastal management because it was perceived as being an easy fix about fifteen years
ago”.
As MSP followed on in the cycle from ICZM, “the wildlife trusts were the ones that were on the case
first, but actually the nature conservation agencies [were] pressured and then came on board, then
DEFRA”. Separately, the Crown Estate, which facilitated the establishment of a Seabed User and
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Governmental and non-governmental coastal/marine/catchment stakeholders are playing an important role in continuing to highlight
problems and potential solutions.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
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Developers Group representing marine industries, were noted as supporters of the Marine Bill, with
one interviewee noting the joint statements produced, “setting out a lot of areas of agreement on
the need for action”.
For the WFD, sponsors have been less obvious, but progress towards implementation has brought to
light organisations that may act as sponsors for further iterations of the plan making cycle. One
Liaison Panel member said:
“the consultation in its initial stages is starting to flag up a few organisations that are maybe
saying actually we are doing this, or we are doing that, and if we can understand the issues in
the water bodies and the pressures we can then think of things we can do”.
Therefore by going through a full cycle of RBM planning (or indeed a full policy cycle), problems and
solutions may be reframed by sponsors in a way which is not currently being seen.
Whilst the work of NGOs is viewed positively in all cases, there is one significant caveat. As one
interviewee described, “it’s a continually evolving iterative process and NGOs are very much ahead
of the curve in a lot of this because they don't have to worry about actually implementing policy”. In
such cases, where an organisation lacks the resources to deliver a proposed solution the
construction of a claim must therefore precede or form part of a collaborative dialogue about
potential solutions to the problem and how they may be achieved.
6.5 Analysis – Factors Contributing to Problem Recognition
Returning to the four key research questions, the first of these has now been addressed by the
description given above of the case studies in relation to problem recognition and Hannigan’s model
of the social construction of an environmental problem. An analysis of this data now forms the basis
for addressing the second question, namely:
Which preconditions are most significant in making the case for action for ICZM, MP and
RBMP?
As part of the discussion of which preconditions or factors feature most prominently in the rhetoric
of claims makers, some further commentary will be made on the usefulness of Hannigan’s model as
a framework for attempting to analyse the way in which problems are constructed. As has been
proposed in the literature review (Chapter Three), it may be possible to refine Hannigan’s model,
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reflecting the nuanced way in which each of the prerequisites can have a weaker or stronger
presence in the construction of a claim.
Using the questionnaire and interview data that has now been reported, it will be possible to
demonstrate to what extent the model may be redeveloped to show such nuances. Furthermore,
the identification of significant factors in making the case for coastal, marine and catchment
problems may help to explain how an issue moves from “problem recognition” on to the
governmental agenda and towards implementation of a solution.
Given that Yearley (1992) and Hannigan (2005) note that the origins of claims about environmental
problems are rooted in scientific findings, it is no surprise that the presence of scientific evidence
features strongly in the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment problems, however the
questionnaire and interview data shows that there is not one factor alone which defines the case for
action in each of the three planning regimes as all of Hannigan’s prerequisites are evident to a
greater or lesser extent.
For the ICZM cases, the social construction of a coastal problem can clearly be seen to be based on
four main prerequisites. In the first instance, the existence of scientific knowledge, despite some of
the difficulties described by interviewees relating to its interpretation, is a very significant factor as
the sheer number of scientific reports being published and research work undertaken both inform
stakeholders and support their claim for a problem.
Whilst there is a slightly lower level of agreement in questionnaire responses on whether there has
been endorsement for this evidence, “grey” evidence, or bottom up information from networks of
stakeholders, also contributes substantially to knowledge of more locally specific issues. Such local
information appears to be widely accepted as valuable by local stakeholders, however awareness of
methodological shortcomings may prevent such knowledge being used more forcefully in claims
making.
The work of popularisers is important too, particularly those popularisers from the academic and
local government sectors. Their specialist knowledge of coastal problems and ability to communicate
this through networks of peers and to a wider audience not only helps to draw attention to
problems, but also places them in a role as institutional sponsors as they advocate a particular
course of action to remediate current problems. The role of academics and local government as
popularisers and sponsors remains particularly strong as the NGO sector is observed to have moved
its support towards other measures for dealing with coastal issues, such as Marine Planning and
Marine Conservation Zones.
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The role of the media in highlighting coastal problems has already been noted for the way in which
coastal problems may be portrayed in a negative or simplistic light, and thus this prerequisite shows
itself to be a weaker element in claims making.
Economic incentives are also weakly represented in the claim for a coastal problem, as those
working within coastal partnerships did not feel that opportunities such as the Entec report (2008)
had been comprehensive or persuasive enough to articulate the financial benefits of working
through coastal partnerships. At a broader scale too, although generic benefits or incentives are
understood, the difficulty in attributing costs, particularly when the extent of environmental change
or value of existing assets are contested, is difficult to determine. Such uncertainty or contestation
then prevents claims for coastal problems or arguments in favour of ICZM based on economic
incentives being made effectively.
The recognition of ICZM “implementation failures” and lack of integrated working is the last factor to
have a marked effect on claims making. Having already been through one or more iterations of the
policy cycle, conceptions of a coastal problem are framed in terms of a more persistent management
issue that requires attention and as such has the potential to shift the discourse from being purely a
case of problem definition to exploring solutions. This is especially the case when
popularisers/sponsors have a large influence in shaping the discourse around their own
constructions of ICZM failure and improved practice, which may be defined in the scientific-rational
manner observed by Davos (1998)
To summarise, claims making for ICZM is based mainly on the prerequisites of scientific evidence,
popularisers who maintain a role as institutional sponsors, and the knowledge or experiences of
previous initiatives. Media attention has a limited impact on coastal problems, and economic
incentives for taking positive action, although superficially apparent, are not expressed in clear
enough terms.
In the case of MP, scientific evidence again is a crucial component of claims making, especially in
relation to the understanding of environmental impacts on marine ecosystem goods and services,
climate change, resource depletion and in developing the potential for offshore renewable energy.
As in the other planning regimes, endorsement of the evidence is considered less important, but
nevertheless necessary. The existence of popularisers from the NGO sector such as WWF, the
Marine Conservation Society and Wildlife Trusts bringing evidence of marine ecosystem degradation
to a wider audience has helped to translate some of that science into a more pressing case for
action, albeit on a conservation-led basis and feeding perhaps more directly into the call for Marine
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Conservation Zones as part of the Marine Bill rather than marine planning itself.
The continued support of NGOs as institutional sponsors for marine planning represents another of
Hannigan’s prerequisites that shows strongly in terms of making the case for action on marine
problems. However, one notable absence from interviews on the topic of institutional sponsors has
been international organisations or sponsors such as the UN, OSPAR or even the EU. Indeed, only
one person referred to international pressures that may legitimise the call for a Marine Bill, saying:
“It is to the UK’s credit that it is carrying on with the Marine Bill without waiting for the EU
Marine Strategy Framework Directive to be implemented.”
The media, which is another central component to Hannigan’s model, and dramatisation of marine
problems appears to be of limited influence – as one questionnaire respondent noted, “most marine
issues are not necessarily dramatic but can be diffuse and permitted”. In this sense, the media
response to the complex causes and cumulative impacts of marine ecosystem degradation is
constrained by the long term nature of problem emergence, and, lacking the urgency of action, or in
the case of diffuse pollution, the kind of imagery that resonates with a broader audience, some
marine problems are in fact difficult to portray in simple visual terms. This observation also goes
some way to confirming the point made by another interviewee that the communication of marine
problems and the subsequent development of the Marine Bill has been founded upon sustained
campaigning from NGOs and institutional sponsors rather than reactions to one-off incidents that
briefly highlight particularly acute or critical issues.
In terms of the economic case for tackling marine problems, the questionnaire responses show that
this prerequisite features less strongly in its presence when considered in relation to scientific
evidence or media attention. This appears unusual, given that most interviewees were able to cite
the RIA for the MSP Pilot and broader financial benefits, for example of protecting fisheries.
However, many of the positive responses fall into the “agree somewhat” rather than the “agree
strongly” category, perhaps marking that the articulation of general benefits of protecting the
marine environment are more widely known than the economic case for MSP itself.
As has already been pointed out, the actual cost of implementing the Marine and Coastal Access Act
(and in particular marine planning) and the financial benefits to be derived from its implementation
are not truly known, given the broad value range given in the DEFRA (2008a) valuation of benefits
from Marine Conservation Zones and the deficit in information related to other aspects of Marine
Planning. Nevertheless it should be noted that since the MSP Pilot and case study interviews that a
growing literature on valuing ecosystem goods and services has developed, see for example the
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World Bank (2009). Had such research been available earlier, this might have provoked a stronger
agreement amongst questionnaire respondents about the presence of economic incentives for
taking positive action.
The disparity between the intended and actual outcomes of previous initiatives also proves to be a
weaker factor in making the case for MP, despite being acknowledged in interviews; however it has
been noted that this is largely due to the identification of gaps in policy coverage rather than
respondents experiencing a failure to implement measures that meet specific targets.
In this instance, therefore, considering the prerequisites that hold the greatest weight in socially
constructing claims for a marine problem, a combination of the existence of scientific evidence,
endorsement, popularisers and institutional sponsors appear to be the main drivers. A note of
caution must be attached, however to this and all other cases in which an environmental problem is
socially constructed – as one interviewee pointed out in relation to the scientific evidence for a
marine problem:
“...management decisions are all about judgments based on science and informed by science
and I think sometimes people try and pretend that it’s just science which you use, but the
amount of judgment in many cases can often be quite large, and sometimes there may be very
little science and a lot of judgment. I think we’d normally argue that it’s important that there is
science, but you recognise there comes a point at which doing the science stops and judgment
and negotiation begins”.
This demonstrates, that even where “objective” information exists, many other claims and counter-
claims will affect the interpretation of evidence and hence the social construction of the problem.
The media, economic incentives and the impacts of previous initiatives, whilst all present in claims
making, have not been the decisive factors in the social construction of the marine problem.
For RBMP, the social construction of a catchment problem is based on a much more rounded view of
Hannigan’s prerequisites than is found in the marine case, with no standout factor driving problem
recognition. Scientific evidence and its endorsement still feature relatively strongly in constructing a
problem, however there is a tension between the “official” science of UKTAG and the Environment
Agency that is used to classify water bodies, and what is either known or not understood by the
Liaison Panel Members. Such tensions highlight the issue of top-down power in the implementation
of the WFD as the organisation that will have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that objectives are
met is also the organisation that defines the “problem” (i.e. waters that do not have good chemical
and biological status). This is turn is reflected in the lack of confidence some Panel members express
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in the classification process, thereby limiting the impact science has in individual constructions of the
problem.
In common with the MSP case, popularisers from the NGO/conservation sector are an important
part of making the case for RBMP, however the water quality objectives and targets set by the WFD
are secondary to the more stringent Birds and Habitats Directives (Directives 2009/147/EC and
92/43/EEC respectively), which require Special Protection Areas and Special Areas of Conservation
that include many inland water bodies and estuaries to be maintained in favourable conservation
status. Thus the support of NGOs for the WFD may be in recognition of its contribution to more
ambitious conservation targets, rather than as a standalone piece of legislation. Also for this reason,
NGOs retain a role as institutional sponsors of RBMP alongside the Environment Agency. As has been
stated, progress towards implementation is starting to “flag up” new sponsors, but by and large this
prerequisite has not proven to be a significant part of the discourse on catchment problems.
Media attention to problems in the case of RBMP is again, in common with MSP, of limited influence
and even liable to frustrate or distort claims making about water quality issues, as has been shown in
the case of flooding events and the way these shaped people’s responses to RBM consultations. The
WFD may also be of little interest to the media because water quality improvements have a
professional interest base but minor relevance to the general public. As one interviewee explained:
“unless it impacts on people I don't think there would be that focus of attention – and to be fair,
when you think of water quality it would have that reaction if drinking water was affected.”
Without the dramatic, or personal experience of such problems, the public cannot be engaged to
any great extent.
Both questionnaire responses and interviews have indicated that economic incentives for action in
the case of RBMP are very few, and rather it is the negative aspects of the costs of delivering the
Programme of Measures that generate the most discussion. Therefore, although economic
arguments are an important part of the discourse in constructing a catchment problem, the
apparent lack of incentives for taking positive action means that this prerequisite presents itself
weakly in the overall construction of a problem. Finally, the impact of feedback from previous
initiatives, or more specifically the identification of gaps in water management measures are
recognised as contributing relatively strongly to the construction of claims for RBM.
In the social construction of catchment problems, therefore, whilst all of Hannigan’s prerequisites
are present and discussed by the interviewees, the actual definition of the problem tends to take
place at a higher level than the river basin district level represented by interviewees. The result of
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this is a lack of engagement in the construction of the problem, which is evident in the criticisms of
scientific evidence and negative comments on the economics of implementing the Programme of
Measures. If a more bottom-up approach were to be taken, this would be seen in the stronger
presence of certain prerequisites as a groundswell of opinion may build up around, for example,
evidence of deteriorating water quality or the need to replace or reform existing legislation. The
social construction of a catchment problem thus clearly demonstrates the need for greater discourse
and collaboration in problem definition and agenda setting.
6.6 Conclusions
Returning to the first two key questions outlined in the methodology and at the beginning of this
chapter:
1. How are the conditions outlined by Hannigan for the successful social construction of an
environmental problem viewed in relation to coastal planning regimes? And
2. Which preconditions are most significant in making the case for action for ICZM, MP and
RBMP?
The first of these questions has now been answered - following the literature review in Chapter
Three which examined the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment problems from a
theoretical perspective, the empirical investigation of the same issues seen through the eyes of
stakeholders which has been reported in the preceding sections provides additional answers to this
question (albeit through a limited number of stakeholder perspectives). The interview and
questionnaire data also provides the evidence needed to determine an answer to the second
question of which preconditions are most persuasive in making a case for the construction of a
problem.
Furthermore, the interview data has revealed some interesting debates about the social
construction of problems which could only have been alluded to through the examination of
literature in Chapter Three, with some of the ideas about top-down and bottom-up styles of
implementation and the links between different levels of governance becoming more apparent.
In attempting to determine which preconditions are most significant for the social construction of
coastal, marine and catchment problems, both the questionnaire responses and interviews
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demonstrate that scientific evidence is considered the most important aspect of constructing a
claim, although this is to be expected.
Where each regime differs on this aspect of constructing a claim is in the origins and credibility of
such evidence – this is particularly so in the case of ICZM where there may be difficulties in distilling
evidence into simpler forms and there are tensions created in the synthesis of what might be termed
credible or conventional scientific evidence from sources such as DEFRA and OSPAR and equally
valued “grey” or local-level observations. This is in contrast to Marine Planning, where evidence
seems to be more widely accepted and understood, but more interestingly in the case of RBMP a
significant issue is revealed in the top-down nature of the way waters have been classified at a
higher level by UKTAG and the Environment Agency and this evidence has been handed down to
regional and local level. This implies a democratic deficit in the way that information is produced,
and like with the tensions evident in the use of conventional and “grey” evidence for ICZM,
demonstrates to some extent the need for greater collaborative working to build a shared
understanding of scientific evidence. This shared understanding should encompass different layers
of governance and address not only the significance and interpretation of evidence by different
groups, but also begin to cover gaps in data that are problematic to all stakeholders.
Considering popularisers and institutional sponsors together as they are often one and the same,
both are quite significant in all cases, however RBMP shows a lower presence of popularisers or
champions than ICZM or MP, and this again may be linked to the way in which drivers for action are
top-down pressures from within the political system rather than external forces such as the NGO
sector which is prevalent in Marine Planning, or the more bottom-up academic and local figureheads
that contribute to calls for ICZM.
Possibly the least significant precondition in claims making is the use of the media or dramatic
incidents. Although the questionnaire responses showed that the media and dramatisation are
present, their potential to distort arguments or perspectives was quite clear in the case of RBMP and
flooding issues and also was noted in ICZM for its potential to draw attention away from more
fundamental issues. In the case of Marine Planning, sustained campaigning rather than isolated
incidents were considered to be a more realistic foundation for action.
The low significance of the media can also be related to the additional prerequisite used in the
questionnaire based on Kingdon’s recognition of feedback in agenda setting. This has been an
important factor to acknowledge and bring out in discussions of problem recognition, demonstrating
that much of claims-makers problem recognition stems from a discourse around knowledge of
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existing earlier or less sophisticated constructions of coastal, marine and catchment problems and
the search for improved ways to deal them, rather than the framing of problems as “novel”
(Hannigan 2006:78) which may be the case when the media brings something to light.
Finally, the significance of economic incentives is thought to be relatively low, and their usefulness in
arguing the case for action is difficult to discern, given that more may be known about the costs of
taking action (as in the case of RBMP) than is known about the potential benefits. In some cases the
lack of information leads to an economic case in favour being disputed outright, as is shown in Figure
6.5 by the number of respondents who disagree somewhat or strongly for each regime.
However one caveat must be added to the discussion of economic incentives regarding the makeup
of the sets of case study interviewees and questionnaire respondents, that being for interviews a
relatively low number of individuals from the private sector were spoken to, and the anonymous
nature of the questionnaire means it is not possible to say what proportion of respondents came
from the private sector. This being the case, it may be said that for many participants in the case
study research economic aspects of coastal management, although understood, are not a primary
concern or motivation, and this may have influenced levels of agreement or disagreement on the
presence of an economic case.
To bring to a close this discussion of which preconditions or prerequisites of Hannigan’s model are
most significant for the social construction of coastal, marine or catchment problems it is necessary
to return to the statements made in Chapter Three about how Hannigan’s model may be refined to
show the more nuanced way in which claims can be made, with Figure 3.2 used to give a visual
representation of how this may be demonstrated in relation to ICZM. This exercise may now be
repeated for ICZM, MP and RBMP, with the empirical data reviewed in this chapter used to inform
approximate indicators of the way in which each prerequisite features in claims making.
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Figure 6.8: Contributions to Claims for Coastal, Marine and Catchment Problems
Figure 6.8 above thus demonstrates the main findings related to the first theme in the empirical
work – namely how coastal, marine and catchment problems are socially constructed through
different values and discourses about what constitutes a “problem”, with scientific evidence,
popularisers and institutional sponsors featuring most strongly in most cases9. The consequences of
the way these problems are framed for implementing a response will be discussed in the next
chapter.
9 Positions along the scale in Figure 6.8 are based on a combined percentage of “agree strongly” and “agree
somewhat” responses to questionnaire statements.
Source: Author
Weak
presence
Strong
presence
Scientific Authority/Validation
Popularisers
Media Attention
Dramatisation
Economic Incentives
Institutional Sponsors
Key
Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Marine Planning
River Basin Management Planning
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CHAPTER 7: Incorporating Stakeholder Perspectives and Improving Integration through Collaboration
7.1 Introduction
Following on from the analysis of the “Problem recognition” phase of the collaborative policy making
cycle in Chapter Six, which focused on the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment
problems in practice, this chapter now focuses on the remaining stages of the cycle, which is shown
in Figure 4.6 below, and contributes to meeting the first part of Objective Five, which is to evaluate
how collaboration is embedded within the plan making processes of coastal organisations and
provide recommendations as to how collaborative policy making may be improved.
Figure 4.6: the Collaborative Policy Making Cycle
Source: Author, based on Jarvis (2007)
In presenting the findings from the remaining sections of the questionnaire and associated interview
responses, this chapter attempts to answer the third and fourth key questions set out at the end of
the literature review, namely:
To what extent is the collaborative model proposed by Gray reflective of coastal planning
practice?
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As coastal planning regimes go through the policy cycle, what factors have the greatest
influence on policy formulation and decision making?
The sections of this chapter therefore consider the stages of consensus building, exploring options,
decision making and structuring and implementation. For each stage in the policy cycle, the main
findings from the questionnaires and interviews are described based on the propositions outlined by
Gray and others derived from the author from an analysis of the policy cycle. At the end of each
policy stage, some key findings will be noted on how the propositions made about the collaborative
policy making cycle are being addressed in practice. The final section of the chapter will draw
together some overall conclusions on the way collaboration is utilised in ICZM, Marine Planning and
River Basin Management Planning.
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7.2 Consensus Building
As the policy cycle moves on following the social construction of an environmental problem or the
problem recognition stage, there comes a period of consensus building. It is at this point when
individual constructions of the problem are brought together, and through a process of coalescence,
individuals or organisations begin to find the common ground which will facilitate further
collaborative action. Table 7a below outlines the propositions that have been explored in this
section, and Table 7b shows questionnaire responses to consensus building propositions.
Table 7a: Consensus Building – Propositions
Conditions for Collaborative
Policy Making/Other Issues
to be Considered
Propositions
Interdependence
The greater the degree of recognised interdependence among stakeholders, the
greater the likelihood of initiating collaboration.
Identification of
stakeholders
The stakeholder set needs to reflect the complexity of the problem under
consideration if collaboration is to occur.
From an information standpoint, the more stakeholders who participate in
problem solving, the more effective the collaboration will be.
Efforts to convene all stakeholders simultaneously will likely be thwarted by
changing dynamics of the domain. Therefore, inclusion of stakeholders should be
viewed as a process of continual adaptation.
Legitimacy among
stakeholders
Shared perceptions of legitimacy are necessary to initiate problem-setting.
Perceptions of legitimacy will be shaped by historical relations and the existing
power distribution among stakeholders.
Exclusion of legitimate stakeholders during problem setting will constrain
subsequent implementation of solutions.
Convenor Collaboration will be enhanced by convenors who possess legitimate authority
and appreciative skills and who can serve as reticulists to rally other stakeholders
to participate.
Beliefs about outcomes Problem-setting efforts are enhanced when stakeholders expect that the benefits
of collaborating will outweigh the costs and when prevailing norms support
collaboration. If positive expectations are not present, incentives to induce
participation will be necessary
Source: Author
217
Table 7b: Questionnaire Responses for Consensus Building
A general consensus on the nature of the coastal/marine/ catchment problem has been reached between
stakeholders.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 1 12 6 8 7 0 6
MSP 2 8 0 5 1 0 1
RBMP 0 3 0 3 0 0 0
There has been recognition that the competing jurisdictions and interests of government departments have prevented more integrated measures to tackle coastal/marine/catchment issues being proposed.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 13 14 4 0 0 3 6
MSP 9 7 0 0 0 0 1
RBMP 1 2 1 1 0 1 0
A full range of stakeholders have been included in the discussion of the coastal/ marine/catchment
problem.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 6 18 0 8 1 1 6
MSP 5 9 0 1 1 0 1
RBMP 0 4 1 0 1 0 0
Partnership working has been proposed as an important step towards achieving
coastal/marine/catchment objectives.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 19 9 2 2 1 1 6
MSP 7 9 0 0 0 0 1
RBMP 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
Source: Author
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7.2.1 Interdependence: Consensus on the Nature of the Problem, and Recognising the Lack of
Integration as a Barrier to Collaborative Working
In reporting the data gathered about interviewees’ experiences of consensus building, the
statements on reaching a general consensus on the nature of the problem and recognising that the
competing jurisdictions of government departments have prevented integrated measures are
considered together (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). This is largely due to the fact that the lack of
integrated working has been recognised by interviewees as key driver in the social construction of
coastal/marine/catchment problems and thus forms the basis for much thinking about the areas in
which stakeholders are able to find consensus.
Figure 7.1: Questionnaire Response – Reaching a General Consensus
Looking broadly at the questionnaire responses, it can be seen that on the issue of achieving a
general consensus, in Figure 7.1 there is a majority in agreement for MP, although a significant
number also disagree, there are equal numbers agreeing and disagreeing for RBMP, and a much
more varied range from “agree somewhat” to strong disagreement for ICZM.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
A general consensus on the nature of the coastal/marine/catchment problem has been reached
between stakeholders
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
219
Figure 7.2: Questionnaire Response – Competing Jurisdictions as a Barrier to Integration
Source: Author
On the statement regarding recognition that the competing jurisdictions and interests of
government departments have prevented more integrated measures being proposed, there is a
much higher level of agreement across all three regimes (see Figure 7.2).
As has been mentioned previously, the recognition of sectoral ways of working and the lack of
integration and its role in the construction of problems is a major driver of change in coastal
planning regimes and is most apparent in the case of MP, where there is quite a high level of
respondents noting the way in which sectoral working practices have been a barrier to integration.
Said one respondent:
“The marine area suffers from a sectoral response, and a plethora of regulatory controls and
organisations – it is hoped that the Marine Bill will rectify this”.
And another:
“I got involved with marine policy things in the late 1980s, the sectoralised way of looking at
the universe was pretty obvious then really... In a certain sense it’s perfectly legitimate, there
was a kind of pecking order, the nation’s interest was served, that was the way business was
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
There has been recognition that the competing jurisdictions and interests of government departments have prevented more
integrated measures to tackle coastal/marine/catchment issues being proposed
ICZM
MP
RBMP
220
done. The realities of sectoral problems have been around for as long as I’ve known anything
about marine policy, so they must have been around for a great deal longer than that”.
Recognition of the shortcomings of sectoral marine management therefore provides some grounds
for consensus, and a foundation from which collaborative working can be built, however in this
initial phase of coalescence there are still many underlying tensions between different sectors that
will be affected by the Marine and Coastal Access Act, and is particularly the case with fisheries, as
this is a far from homogenous group, including individuals engaged in recreational pursuits right
through to large commercial fleets. One MP interviewee notes that fisheries are “not a coherent set
of interests”. Nevertheless, their stakeholder input remains crucial to consensus building.
At the simplest level, one questionnaire respondent stated on reaching a general consensus, that
“while there may be agreement on problems that does not extend to solutions”. This view is shared
by another MP interviewee, who states that:
“there’s a strong consensus I think that there does need to be stronger management of the
marine environment – exactly how that would happen or how that would be done is still subject
to a variety of interpretations.”
The situation for Marine Planning was also clouded by the lack of detail pertaining to the Marine Bill
as it was at the time of interviews, with matters such as how MP would be implemented by the
MMO and the actual boundaries of plan areas yet to be decided. However, the issue of options or
potential solutions will be further examined later in this chapter.
For the Dee RBMP, where there are equal levels of agreement and disagreement on whether or not
consensus has been reached, it is not the lack of integration that is considered to be the main
problem but rather some “sectional interests” becoming aware of poor water quality through their
own observations and monitoring, and acting without relating their own issues to a broader
understanding of water quality. Thus:
“there’s obvious water bodies where you just know – everyone knows there’s a problem.”
Where there is disagreement or a lack of consensus on RBM relates to two main aspects – firstly the
way in which the existence of water quality problems are to a certain extent defined by the
Environment Agency/UKTAG, and secondly due to the perspectives of “sectional interests” as to the
causes of the problem. In the first instance, the work of the Environment Agency and Liaison Panels
in developing the RBMP is based on the classification of water bodies by EA/UKTAG on a national
basis, and as one Panel member states:
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“I suppose the parameters are set, the Directive says we have to achieve this water status for
water bodies whether they are modified or natural by timescale. You have to bear in mind that
other European legislation exists that sets more stringent targets, which will prevail. So the
agenda is set rather strictly.”
As classification has been undertaken on a broad scale and without full information on all water
bodies, one Panel member described the way in which large bodies of water such as rivers which
have very different physical characteristics at different points along their entire length have been
classified in a way that does not reflect localized issues. The classification of water bodies in this top-
down way does not necessarily close down the debate, but the process appears to lack some
transparency, and thus there is potential to create more dialogue in an attempt to discern the
reasons why water bodies may have been classified in a particular way. One interviewee explained:
“It may be that where we’ve put it down as perhaps moderate or good status it could be that
another organisation is aware of issues or problems within other parts of that water body and it’s
getting the understanding as to how and why we’ve given it that designation when they know
there may be issues.”
Therefore, as was suggested in the previous chapter, there is scope for stakeholders not only to
learn from others through discussion on the way waters are classified, but to fill gaps in knowledge
by integrating data contributed by other sources.
With regards to the issue of “sectional interests”, one interviewee described the following situation:
“what you would have, I think, is probably a consensus view that there is a need to comply with
the WFD... my guess is that people representing each sectional interest would probably be
reasonably comfortable that everybody else’s interests had been fully addressed, but not
necessarily entirely convinced that their own had.”
This demonstrates that there may be consensus on the broad nature of the problem and the need to
address it, but at an individual stakeholder level there is the possibility that not all organisations feel
that their concerns have been taken into consideration. “Sectional interests” are also a key part in
recognising competing jurisdictions that have prevented integrated working, particularly at
government level – one Liaison Panel member pointed out that post-privatisation, the division of
utility companies into other companies with different functions has created some organisational
complexity, whilst another stated:
“there are so many government departments involved. One is the Treasury, and the Treasury are
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determined that whatever happens, nothing gets paid for out of general taxation. You then have
the Environment Agency, which reports to DEFRA and WAG – it needs to find a solution which
works best in terms of meeting the WFD requirements but doesn’t upset the Treasury”.
This comment also highlights resource concerns which are considered more closely in the structuring
and implementation section later in this chapter, but what is apparent here is that competing
objectives of government departments and agencies, plus the additional dimension of having to
satisfy the requirements of governments on both sides of the English-Welsh border generates
further difficulties in attempting to reach consensus.
In the case of ICZM, there is also a relatively significant level of disagreement on the issue of
consensus, as there is in RBMP. Some of this is again due to sectional or sectoral perspectives on the
nature of the problem, with landward and marine elements of the coast being considered separately
in the construction of the coastal problem. Whilst there is recognition that some stakeholders with
entirely opposing views will never come to agreement, one respondent noting that “the principle of
building consensus is irrefutable, that’s what we’re supposed to do. But there will be cases when
you’re just not going to get it, because the two or three parties involved are poles apart
philosophically”, what is more evident in the ICZM case studies are the tensions between consensus
at a higher, strategic level and the need to address local issues. Particularly important in this respect
is the issue of time, which is elaborated by one interviewee from DCF as:
“people in business are thinking this week, next week, the year for their profits, then you’ve got
local people looking at maybe the next ten years because that’s how long they’ve lived in that
house, their children have grown up there. Then you get the academics who are looking at the
longer term”
The issue of consensus at different scales is also highlighted by another DCF interviewee, who notes
that:
“broad scale is much more easy to build consensus, local scale more difficult and resolving that
is an issue of capacity, sharing ideas, sharing information, openly as well.”
The views of DCF interviewees here may be seen in contrast however to the consensus building that
has taken place at different scales in Scotland, as exemplified by the EGCP and the wider work of the
Scottish government. At the local level, one EGCP member stated that consensus building “must be
reasonably easy, because we’ve never had a vote”, referring to the lack of dispute that has featured
in the Partnership’s activities. The Partnership as a vehicle for building consensus is also
demonstrated through the EGCP’s work on the Making the Most of the Coast report, which was seen
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by one interviewee as important for flagging up areas where more work needs to be done to
understand the nature of local problems and find solutions. Also of significance was the observation
made by one interviewee that:
“if you get people round the table and get everybody to understand each other’s point of view,
it’s difficult to have too big a fight, because everyone has the same needs and interest generally,
you can pull them together”.
This statement therefore shows the value of an early discourse on the nature of the problem and an
initial recognition of interdependence between stakeholders which is crucial for later stages of
collaboration.
In addition, interviewees from EGCP noted that the work of the Scottish Coastal Forum, and the
Scottish government’s formation of the Advisory Group on Marine and Coastal Strategy (AGMACS) in
2005. This brought together approximately 25 different stakeholders including the Scottish Coastal
Forum and “invited them to say what the problems were in terms of their own understanding”. This
work has subsequently fed in to the Marine (Scotland) Act of 2009, specifically in the development
of Scottish Marine Regions as a focus for coastal and marine policy, showing how a more bottom-up
perspective can be brought to bear on national policy issues that has the potential to facilitate
spatial and policy integration between local, regional and national levels.
Whilst there are signs of increasing integration between coastal actors in Scotland, the Severn
Estuary Partnership represents an area where the problems of integration are particularly acute and
recognised as a barrier to estuary-wide programmes of action. Said one interviewee:
“…the English-Welsh border, I suppose they’re not competing but they are parallel jurisdictions.
The slight variations make it difficult to bring together truly integrated measures, and just things
like funding streams - DEFRA’s recent Coastal Pathfinder funding stream, that’s only for
England, so if you wanted to take an integrated approach on the Estuary you can’t do it”.
Another also explained:
“There aren’t always comparable partners across the estuary if you like. Even within local
government you’ve got unitary authorities in Wales, and a mixture of unitary authorities,
counties and districts in England. So you haven’t even got consistency in the organisational
structures.”
This issue stems from devolution and, as one interviewee explained, “Certainly as far as the Severn is
concerned, and that’s no disrespect to the Welsh Assembly Government, they’re just a young
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democracy and they want to cover the whole of their patch”. This is highly significant for the
implementation of programmes, and may certainly cause problems if separate Marine Plans for
Wales and England are to be produced, but can also be seen as an area where a consensus can be
found on the need to integrate policies for both sides.
In discussing other issues of consensus for the SEP, some interviewees referred to an exercise
undertaken as part of the work on producing the Severn Estuary Strategy, which was published in
2001. In order to identify priorities for the strategy from a wider list of issues, academics from
University College London conducted workshops using a Stakeholder Decision Analysis technique
(based on Multi-Criteria Analysis) to derive an agreed list. Whilst describing that “the actual final list
was not quite what everyone would expect, but everyone was happy with the process they’d gone
through and some of the underlying values towards estuary resources were certainly built up on
consensus”, it was also acknowledged that this prioritised list was later rejected in favour of another
list, thus undermining the outcomes of a well received initiative.
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7.2.2 Identification and Legitimacy of Stakeholders; Convenor
In Gray’s propositions on the identification of stakeholders, sufficient numbers of stakeholders are
required to reflect the complexity of the problem under consideration, and by extension to provide
information that can assist in developing solutions.The questionnaire statement on stakeholder
engagement generated a great deal of discussion in interviews, and quite a varied set of responses
as is shown in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Questionnaire Response – Inclusion of Stakeholders
Source: Author
In the case of Marine Planning, there was quite a high level of agreement that all stakeholders had
had the opportunity to participate in the development of the Marine Bill through a series of
Stakeholder Workshops and in responding to the various consultation documents that DEFRA
published in the run-up to the final Marine Bill, with one interviewee remarking that “Everything has
had a high profile and been widely consulted on, and everyone who wanted to get involved could
have been”.
However, there was recognition that much of the discussion so far had been about process and high
level strategy, and in this case the general public had not been fully engaged, partly because of
people’s relationship with the sea - one interviewee explaining that “the public are considerably
underrepresented when you move a mile, two miles, ten miles offshore... the public are not
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
A full range of stakeholders have been included in the discussion ofthe coastal/marine/catchment problem
ICZM
MP
RBMP
226
particularly well enfranchised in relation to marine affairs” and thus the main stakeholders that have
been active in consultations are the private sector, government departments and NGOs.
The wider public’s relationship with marine matters also accounted for some of the disagreement
on whether or not the full range of stakeholders had been included for Marine Planning, and given
that there will be further opportunities to participate in Marine Planning at regional level in the
future, this point confirms Gray’s proposition that stakeholder inclusion is unlikely to involve all
stakeholders simultaneously, and the identification of “the public” or publics is a process of
adaptation to local circumstances where more differentiated perspectives on marine problems and
solutions may come into play.
However it was also noted that there are some groups of stakeholders that are particularly difficult
to engage, those mainly being traditional, independent fisheries. This loose body of stakeholders
was described by one interviewee as “all very fragmented, and so it is probably impossible to
accommodate all of their interests”.
For RBMP the disparate nature of stakeholders under one umbrella group was also considered a
problem in terms of engagement, with fisheries again problematic – one interviewee citing the
example that “trout and salmon fishers have different views on the environmental conditions they
favour for their respective activity”, and thus one representative acting on behalf of a wider body
may be insufficient to convey a series of views.
Similarly, the engagement of a limited number of private sector representatives on the Panel could
not be considered to speak for both large and small enterprises and the diverse range of activities
contained within those groups, but the makeup of the Panel was prescribed nationally (based on the
guidance in the Environment Agency’s Water for Life and Livelihoods document), and this required a
more pragmatic approach to representation – as one interviewee explained, “with the best will in
the world it’s an almost impossible task to ask that small group of panel members to make sure that
everybody in their sector is covered and the message gets out”.
One final point to note on identifying stakeholders in River Basin Management is that whilst there
has been recognition of the need to improve sectoral representation, not all types of water body are
represented on the Panel – although the WFD covers estuary waters out to 1 Nautical Mile, apart
from the Environment Agency, there is no specific sea use representation. The inclusion of additional
stakeholders was therefore not only seen to help make the planning process more democratic, but
as was found in Chapter Six, and outlined in Gray’s propositions on stakeholder identification, a
bigger set of stakeholders can contribute further information on water bodies to assist in prioritising
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planning measures, and thus there may be a need to widen Panel Membership to ensure full
representation and better information.
The longer history of ICZM practice again has implications for the views expressed on the matter of
stakeholder inclusion as it did in the previous statement on the proposal of partnership working. In
the Severn and the Dorset cases the private sector was seen as a difficult stakeholder to engage,
which may in part be due to the lack of economic incentives described in the social construction of
coastal problems in Chapter Six, although there had been efforts to get them involved. One
interviewee noted that
“it’s very hard to bring the industry in and it's needed, a) because they bring a source of finance
and also a different perspective because the public and private sector are very different beasts”,
although the establishment of the Dorset Marine Network, a forum for Maritime businesses was
identified as a potential link in to the network of business stakeholders.
For the Severn, besides the lack of involvement from the private sector it was noted that there was
under representation of local government, with some authorities described as “drifting in and out”,
which can be a sign of the stakeholder set naturally changing with the political context, however
efforts were being made to attract those stakeholders to the Partnership. One interviewee noted:
“there’s an attempt to get the councillors and people involved – the attempt to get some sort of
democratic representation but I think the level of discussion internally within those local
authorities is very weak,”
Alluding to the fact that even though representatives may be engaged in the Partnership at an
individual level, but can only provide a weak link to their own organisation in terms of reporting on
the work of the Partnership – “it’s almost as if they go to the meetings, tick a box, they’ve done their
business” and thus such representatives are not able to fully develop the idea of interdependence
and foster a culture of joint working between the Partnership and the organisation they represent.
The East Grampian Coastal Partnership appears to have fared somewhat better in its attempts to
engage stakeholders, with one interviewee stating:
“I think we’ve been pretty successful – because there’s so much input from stakeholders, and the
public, at our first few meetings when we started off, we were getting 130-140 people coming to
the AGM which was always run as a workshop, they could participate in the workshop so that
they can help themselves and the next year’s programme”
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As with all the other cases there are a few exceptions to this high level of engagement, with fisheries
again being a difficult sector (because they are usually out at sea and unable to attend meetings, or
in some cases they choose not to be involved because of differing perspectives), but the private
sector has had a greater presence – apart from the oil and gas sectors, which “have only just started
to attend meetings”, and in common with the remark made in Chapter Six about the lack of
academic interest in coastal partnerships in Scotland, it was noted that “academics are there on
paper but not in reality”.
Legitimacy among Stakeholders
In identifying stakeholders, Gray proposes that the perception of shared legitimacy is important to
initiate problem setting, and that this perception is shaped by historical relations and power
distribution between stakeholders. In asking about stakeholders in the questionnaire, no explicit
reference was made to stakeholders having a perceived “right” to be included in a collaborative
venture, however it can be inferred from interview responses across the board that in theory at
least, there are no barriers to participation from the broadest number of stakeholders. Where
stakeholder groups have been identified as missing from the planning process (such as the general
public in RBMP and MP), this is not because of deliberate exclusion, but more likely because some
groups feel that their own duties or functions do not require entering into collaboration (as is
evidenced by the number of statutory bodies or private sector enterprise missing from ICZM), or the
subject of discussion does not engage, being either too technical (in the case of RBMP) or strategic
and disconnected from local issues (for Marine Planning).
In relation to this matter, the perceived legitimacy of stakeholders must also be taken into
consideration in the search for a full set of stakeholders. Remarkably, this issue was only brought up
by one of the interviewees, who stated that:
“I’m not even sure that individually we have the right to define who are stakeholders, that’s
biased.”
The same interviewee also raised the point that some partnerships do restrict membership, not
permitting individuals to join unless they are affiliated to another organisation, and although this
measure is primarily to reduce the risk of more vociferous individuals taking control of debates for
narrow interests, it does highlight the fact that there appears to be little questioning within
Partnerships of what “legitimate” stakeholders should be.
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Convenor
One aspect of stakeholder involvement that must be referred to in terms of identifying participants
is the role of the convenor or chair in bringing stakeholders into the collaboration. Apart from their
perceived neutrality, convenors must possess knowledge of other stakeholders who may have an
interest in the problem to be addressed or an ability to contribute to a solution. Like the issue of
legitimacy, the role of convenor was not asked about explicitly in the questionnaire but did form one
of the follow-up questions in relation to identifying stakeholders.
In the case of RBMP and Marine Planning as newer regimes, the Environment Agency and DEFRA
serve as convenors respectively, and whilst it was noted that the discussions on the Marine Bill had
provided opportunities for all stakeholders to become involved, the “process led” nature of RBMP
and the lack of engagement signifies that as convenor, the Environment Agency is perhaps not
making sufficient or innovative efforts to engage a broader audience. However, as the RBMP process
is laid down nationally, this problem cannot be attributed to the Dee Liaison Panel.
In the coastal partnerships, the organizational structure allowed a division of functions between the
partnership officers as convenors with the main responsibility for reaching out to stakeholders and
the “chairman”, as an individual who presided over meetings and can “bring people together in a
neutral environment”, or act as a central point of contact, as one partnership officer explained:
“it offers us horizontal and vertical integration – so he can deal with people on his level while I
deal with the plebs, or he can deal with the people who are high up but don't know what’s going
on and I can deal with the people who are actually doing things on the ground.”
In addition, the legitimacy of the chairs in each of the partnerships was widely accepted, with no
evidence of their position being contested – although it was pointed out by one interviewee that
their organisation did not deal with “any earth shattering decisions that matter, but if it did that [the
appointment of the chair] would be the kind of thing that would be under scrutiny”.
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7.2.3 Beliefs about Outcomes: the Proposal of Partnership Working
Finally for the consensus building stage, stakeholders must possess beliefs that the benefits of
collaboration will outweigh costs, and thus willingness to enter into joint working can indicate
stakeholder’s perceptions of positive benefits. This issue has been addressed through the
questionnaire statement regarding the proposal of partnership working. On this statement of the
questionnaire there was largely agreement across all three regimes, with a few exceptions in the
case of ICZM, as is shown in Figure 7.4 below.
Figure 7.4: Questionnaire Response – Proposal of Partnership Working
Source: Author
For Marine Planning, as a relatively new concept that is still being developed at higher levels of
government, DEFRA is noted as a driver for partnership working across government departments,
although similar to the point made regarding the WFD and the interests of the Treasury preventing
integrated working, one interviewee explaining that:
“The biggest difficulty is actually not I think with the users of marine environments, but the
difficulty is actually bringing together government departments who are notoriously difficult to
get to work together and understand each other’s point of view and I think that’s still an issue”
This comment is supported by the views of another interviewee, who observes that the idea of
partnership or collaborative working is not new to marine users;
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Partnership working has been proposed as an important steptowards achieving coastal/marine/catchment objectives
ICZM
MP
RBMP
231
“there is a lot of general collaboration, most industries have realised that they can’t beat
conservation interests so they’ve got to work with them, and sometimes that’s begrudging
cooperation, but a lot of the more mature industries get across that’s just the price of doing
business, and try and build relationships and do it smarter.”
The first of these two comments shows that there are potential problems of achieving horizontal
integration at central government level for Marine Planning – one questionnaire respondent
providing the additional comment that 'Partnership' has been proposed, but only on limited and
conditional terms understood by Government, which could allude to the fact that the delivery of
Marine Planning will be primarily through the MMO and thus partnership in the sense of marine
planning functions does not imply a more equal relationship between government departments and
executive agencies on the one hand and regional or local stakeholders on the other.
More positively, there is evidence at local levels that the idea of partnership working is already
understood, which may be as a result of recognising the marine “problem” partially stems from a
lack of integration between organisations, and this may have a greater influence in establishing
interdependence and the positive benefits of collaboration.
Evidence from the RBMP case study also suggests that the proposal for partnership working is not
entirely new, but whilst, as has been noted, there are definite issues with government departments
working together, in contrast to Marine Planning the local level shows more varying degrees of
enthusiasm for collaboration. Within bodies that already have a mandate to work together
partnership working is widely accepted, and as one interviewee explained, “the actual panel has
worked well I think, bearing in mind that over fifty per cent of this area is in Wales. In Wales, because
of the size of our country there’s been a long history of folk working together... The philosophy is not
strange from a professional dimension”. However, another interviewee stated more negatively that:
“I think the reality is that however much people want to work together, that practical ability to
do so is constrained by the fact that so many of the stakeholders have conflicting objectives.”
However as River Basin Management Plans require a high level of stakeholder input and
coordination to achieve all of the actions set out in the Programme of Measures, one interviewee
observed that the use of partnership working will have to increase, noting:
“there’s a general understanding that in order to accomplish what is required under the WFD
there will need to be a lot more partnership working, because it’s not about the Environment
Agency doing it all, it’s about everybody doing their bit... Some sectors are very proactive with
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partnership working, and there’s others where it’s a new thing to them, before this happened
they weren’t really involved, they just had their own remit”
The small professional community working within the Plan area may be able to facilitate
collaboration through existing relationships, however the top-down requirements of the WFD meant
that some stakeholders with “conflicting objectives” drawn into the RBM process without sufficient
appreciation of interdependencies may undertake work to fulfill their own obligations in respect of
the WFD, but could be unaware of potential synergies and shared resources that can be utilized to
their own advantage through collaboration.
For ICZM, as would be expected, the concept of partnership working has had the longest time to
become established and as such the majority of interviewees from the Severn, East Grampian and
Dorset were able to provide a positive commentary on the use of partnership working for their
respective organisations, with the Estuaries Initiative, Focus on Firths and to a lesser extent the
production of Environment Agency Local Environment Action Plans (LEAPs) cited as early initiatives
that have paved the way for current forms of partnership working – in this respect they set a
precedent for partnership working that is absent from Marine Planning and RBMP.
In the Dorset Coast Forum, a “fantastic track record of collaborative working” was cited, which can
be traced back to the work around the EU Demonstration Programme for ICZM, the campaign for
the World Heritage Site and even earlier than that to the State of the Dorset Coast work undertaken
in the 1980s.
To understand why some respondents to the ICZM questionnaire disagreed on the matter of
partnership working being proposed, a point made by interviewees from both the Severn Estuary
Partnership and EGCP may provide some answers. One EGCP interviewee explained:
“The whole concept of partnership as well is difficult to explain to some, sometimes – because
people are used to thinking in silos and used to thinking for their own interests. So you have to
do quite a bit of breaking down barriers in order to rebuild things, to try and get them to change
their perspective”
This example helps to demonstrate how the positive benefits of entering into collaborative working
must be clearly explained in order to gain the support of stakeholders. For the SEP, one interviewee
stated that “collaborative working is being used as a term a lot, particularly by the Partnership itself,
and the secretariat of the Partnership mainly, but in fact it’s not been that well articulated”. This
collaborative working has taken the form of joint working projects such as CoastAtlantic (producing
development guidance notes for the species and habitats of the Severn), the Severn Estuary Coastal
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Group (for Shoreline Management Plans) and the European Marine Site, yet this work has been
undertaken by a relatively limited set of stakeholders.
Noting the lack of a formal constitution for the Severn Estuary Partnership, the same interviewee
also stated “there should be the roles and responsibilities of the partners not just the secretariat, and
I think that’s been weakly developed, from that point of view as a Coastal Partnership we’re probably
less well developed than some of the others”. In this case, the need for terms of reference that
defines the Partnership and its purpose may help to achieve buy-in from other stakeholders.
To summarise, the key points from this section on consensus building are:
Within ICZM, MP and RBMP there are still disagreements about the nature of the problem
and possible solutions stemming from the way problems are socially constructed, but there
is a consensus about the lack of integration across government departments being a barrier
to collaborative working in all three planning regimes.
Difficulties in ensuring representation of a wide range of interests on River Basin Liaison
Panels means that a full range of stakeholders has yet to be included in the River Basin
planning process. Efforts to identify and include stakeholders for Marine Planning and ICZM
are considered to be more successful, but there are still some stakeholders that are not fully
engaged.
Low levels of public engagement in RBMP and Marine Planning may be attributed to the
technical or strategic nature of discussion, however there is scope for public engagement to
increase and other stakeholders to come forward as the political context changes and moves
on.
The concept of partnership working is still relatively new in terms of marine and river basin
management, however in ICZM where it is well established there are still problems in
convincing some stakeholders of the benefits of collaboration.
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7.3 Exploring Options
For this section of the policy cycle, the questionnaire and interviews explore how, once some level of
consensus and interdependence has been established, stakeholders may begin to search for
solutions to a common problem, through joint information searches, innovation (early attempts at
policy design), negotiation and addressing issues of power between stakeholders. Table 7c below
shows the propositions related to exploring options and Table 7d the questionnaire responses to
those propositions.
Table 7c: Exploring Options - Propositions
Conditions for
Collaborative Policy
Making/Other Issues to be
Considered
Propositions
Policy Design
Direction setting may be influenced by previous iterations of the policy
cycle and attempts at problem solving. Collaboration should facilitate
discussion and appraisal of stakeholders’ previous experiences in a
learning process that assists joint information searches and direction
setting.
Coincidence of values Direction-setting is greatly facilitated by coincidence in values among
stakeholders. Joint information search by the stakeholders contributes
to the emergence of coincident values and mutually agreeable
directions for the domain.
Dispersion of power
Collaboration will be enhanced when power is dispersed among several
rather than among just a few stakeholders. An equal power
distribution is not necessary and may prove undesirable since it can
provoke stalemate and inaction. However, a sufficient distribution of
power is necessary to insure that all stakeholders can influence
direction-setting.
Source: Author
235
Table 7d: Questionnaire Responses for Exploring Options
There is evidence of experimentation by key players in relation to policy proposals for the coastal
zone/marine/river basins.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 2 14 6 2 2 7 7
MSP 2 6 4 3 1 0 1
RBMP 0 1 4 1 0 0 0
There is evidence of experimentation by key players in relation to new institutional arrangements for coastal zone management/marine planning/catchment planning.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 3 11 6 5 1 7 7
MSP 2 5 5 3 1 0 1
RBMP 0 2 3 1 0 0 0
The core goals of ICZM/MSP/RBMP have been built through bargaining between interested parties.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 2 14 9 3 3 1 8
MSP 0 7 2 3 3 2 2
RBMP 0 3 1 0 2 0 0
Joint working between actors at similar spatial/administrative scales is increasing.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 3 19 7 1 0 3 7
MSP 2 6 5 2 0 1 1
RBMP 1 2 2 0 0 1 0
There is recognition that the dispersal of powers between stakeholders is uneven and that those powers
may have to be redirected to achieve change.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 4 15 5 4 1 4 7
MSP 4 4 2 3 1 2 1
RBMP 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
Source: Author
7.3.1 Policy Design: Experimentation in Relation to Policy Proposals and Institutional Arrangements
The questionnaire statements on evidence of experimentation in relation to policy proposals and
institutional arrangements are reported together here as the two events are often linked together as
part of the same initiative. The questionnaire responses for these two statements are shown in
Figures 7.5 and 7.6.
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Figure 7.5: Questionnaire Response – Policy Proposals
Figure 7.6: Questionnaire Response – Institutional Arrangements
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
There is evidence of experimentation by key players in relation to policy proposals for the coastal zone/marine/catchments
ICZM
MP
RBMP
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
There is evidence of experimentation by key players in relation to institutional arrangements for the coastal zone
management/marine spatial planning/river basin management
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
Source: Author
237
Figure 7.5 shows that in relation to all three planning regimes, there is evidence of both agreement
and disagreement over whether or not there has been experimentation regarding policy proposals,
with the most uncertainty being displayed in the case of RBMP. This lack of certainty can be directly
related to the top-down nature in which the WFD has been implemented and the way in which
policies have been “imposed” on the Environment Agency, and this argument extends to the
institutional arrangement of the Liaison Panel whose makeup was subject to national guidance, as
discussed in Section 7.2 on consensus building. In trying to ascertain why the Panel had been set up
in the particular form it currently takes, one interviewee explained:
“I think that was the decided method of doing it, because they *the Environment Agency+
recognised that they needed a strategic, high level group of people who were in a position to
make informed decisions and had enough clout, should we say, to actually make those
decisions.”
Furthermore, the lack of evidence pertaining to experimentation on policy and institutional
arrangements for RBMP can be attributed to the relative newness of the WFD itself – whilst the
implementation of water quality Directives is not new, the WFD represents a different, more
inclusionary approach to water management that does not simply rely on technical solutions.
Therefore, apart from an EA pilot project on remediating metal mine waters, and one interviewees’
citation of the United Utilities Sustainable Catchment Management Programme (SCaMP) initiative,
which is a limited scale project undertaken on its own lands, the process of River Basin Management
has not been built on a foundation of previous experience and with little “buy-in” from stakeholders
on the ground.
For Marine Planning Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show a more clear agreement (but still some disagreement)
on the evidence for policy and institutional experiments. Again, the newness of the approach is a
limiting factor in terms of the breadth of prior experiences, and indeed one interviewee remarked
that
“I don’t think we’ve had any experimentation, I think we’ve tended to have surveys of what goes
on elsewhere, and very little. There’s very little comes out of that as there’s very little planning
goes on in the marine environment”
However where there was clear agreement the experiences cited were not all marine examples – in
one instance an interviewee referred to ICZM activities as a precursor to the Marine Bill, but also
acknowledged that there was a large transfer of terrestrial planning ideas to the way in which
marine planning was to be organised:
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“most of the things that people raised about the planning process had been done ad nauseam in
the terrestrial context, and basically are complete non-issues. We took most of that on board,
simply because there are regional spatial plans, people are used to doing that sort of thing,
they’re used to doing participation, in relation to that used to reporting on it, used to the
process of it, and so it’s not a problem.”
The expectation that the Marine Planning process could be adapted from the terrestrial planning
system represents a case where experimentation, learning and the subsequent legitimisation of
terrestrial planning approaches brings a ready-made degree of consensus into the discussion of
options for the marine system.
In relation to institutional arrangements, another interviewee noted that:
“I don’t think there are many precedents for the marine planning that’s been proposed in the UK
or for the MMO – I think there are examples of organisations and processes around the world
which give us some idea of how things might work, but I still think that what’s planned in the UK
is rather at the forefront of practice”.
Talking more specifically about the discussion of proposed institutional arrangements and the MMO,
the same interviewee also observed:
“I think we’ll get what we get. On the other hand I think much of that has arisen as a result of a
consensual debate rather than a formal consideration of options and some real tensions in
terms of how they might operate.”
And therefore this statement indicates to some extent that despite the lack of precedent for the
Marine Planning structures being proposed, with consensus and shared beliefs about outcomes,
stakeholders are willing to engage in Marine Planning as “an act of faith”.
The lack of experimentation in RBMP and Marine Planning is in contrast to what is reported for
ICZM, where many more examples of “experiments” were cited, although these were on a quite
small scale. One interesting feature of the ICZM cases examined is that in terms of institutional
arrangements, the overall structure for each of the Partnerships has remained the same, in being
composed of a core staff, steering, advisory or working groups and the host organisation.
The activities of the Dorset Coast Forum which were provided as examples of experiments included
DEFRA’s Rural Pathfinder scheme, with DCF undertaking scenario planning for a number of coastal
issues, including tidal stream technology, sea level rise and flooding, and as a consequence one
interviewee noted that “we also replicated the methodology for that for other projects that we’re
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still doing, so we’ve got a way of doing it that makes it easy, it’s worked”. Also, the C-SCoPE project
for marine planning currently being undertaken by DCF is hoped to provide an exemplar or model
for marine planning at local level.
For the Severn Estuary Partnership, one interviewee explained that with regards to institutional
arrangements, “trying to institutionalise ourselves to create a more formal partnership has been
thwarted – I think there have been a lot of good ideas, particularly institutional arrangements, but
they’ve been thwarted by legal departments” and thus experimentation has been through other
collaborative projects such as Corepoint (COastal REsearch and Policy INTegration) one of the
outputs of which was a series of ICZM training workshops for potential partners, which “helped
engage with certain individuals in local authorities, and some of those have kept going”, and ASERA,
the Association of Severn Estuary Relevant Authorities, which was formed to assist local authorities
in discharging their responsibilities for the designated conservation areas of the Severn, including
and SPA, SAC and Ramsar site and has resulted in the production of a joint management scheme.
In the East Grampian Coastal Partnership, as the newest of the ICZM case studies, there were no real
examples of experimentation in either policy or institutional arrangements, however it was pointed
out that in the establishment of the Partnership, the feasibility study undertaken recommended
starting the Partnership on a voluntary basis and then moving to become a registered charity limited
by public guarantee, like the Moray Firth Partnership, the benefits of this being “Stability and
opportunities for funding”. However, the Marine Bill (for Scotland) was said to be “holding back any
changes to organisation”. Nevertheless, at a more strategic level within Scotland, the example of the
Sustainable Scottish Marine Environment Initiative (SSMEI) was cited as a series of experiments in
making marine plans that will have implications for the coastal and marine policies that coastal
partnerships are expected to deliver in the future.
Whilst the greatest scope for experimentation in relation to policy and institutional arrangements
can be found in the bottom-up approach of ICZM, the short-term nature of many ICZM projects such
as DCF’s Rural Pathfinder or SEP’s Corepoint work, lack of resources, including staff and the “loss of
corporate memory” referred to by McGlashan (2002) in Chapter One, shows that even with an
appreciation of interdependence, access to stakeholders with more resources and more power is
needed to ensure that there is a continuity of successful initiatives and that knowledge accrued
through policy learning is not lost.
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7.3.2 Coincident Values: Core Goals and Joint Working
The use of bargaining and negotiation to build core goals or set a direction for collaborative working
provided a more noticeable level of disagreement in each of the case studies as is demonstrated in
the questionnaire results shown in Figure 7.7. This disagreement was most apparent in interviews
undertaken for the Dee RBMP and the MSP Pilot.
Figure 7.7: Questionnaire Response: Core Goals and Bargaining
In discussing negotiations for direction setting on the WFD, some reference must be made to the
international level - one interviewee noted that the priorities and for individual Member States were
different, and therefore some negotiation must have taken place internationally in order for this to
be possible. However at its most acute, the level of disagreement between interviewees for the
RBMP case study is illustrated by one individual who stated quite bluntly that “there is no bargaining
at all on river basin liaison panels”, which may be a reference to the element of compulsion involved
in implementing the WFD, and another who observed that:
“There isn’t much leeway for consensus - in the short term resources are limited and what do we
tackle first? That’s the debate we have most importantly with the Assembly, because that’s
where the money in Wales comes from.”
At the more positive end of the spectrum, one interviewee described a considerable amount of
negotiation and bargaining between the Environment Agency and conservation groups who “want
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
The core goals of ICZM/MSP/RBMP have been built through bargaining between interested parties
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
241
more ambition in the plan”. However this appears to have been without the participation of other
stakeholders, and may be seen to demonstrate that one particular set of values or pressures have
been brought to bear on a limited set of negotiations.
A final point related to the perceived lack of bargaining in the RBMP process is related to the issues
raised in Chapter Six regarding the construction of a catchment problem, and the low level of
understanding in how this had been achieved, with one interviewee noting that a lot of the current
measures in the first plan cycle were “investigatory stuff – projects to find out more about the
problem”. This shows that decision making is proceeding on the basis of limited information, which
may be a barrier to engaging a full set of stakeholders in decision making, but also raised the
possibility there was still a great deal of scope for future negotiations as more information can be
presented to stakeholders.
In the marine planning case study interviewees were able to provide slightly more evidence that
direction setting had been achieved through bargaining, with one interviewee noting that:
“It has been a bargaining process, not just locally but nationally and internationally of course.
We are now in the process of a national marine strategy and a marine policy statement should
be emerging which ought to set those goals”
Here the international dimension referred to flags up the issue of devolution and the different ways
in which Marine Planning will be administered, although at this time work on a draft Marine Policy
Statement for all the devolved administrations was at an early stage and the process of bargaining in
some respects may therefore be said to be incomplete.
Where there was disagreement about the use of bargaining to determine the goals of Marine
Planning, in one interviewee’s perspective this was down to the fact that “Until we start to define
the areas on the ground which can be used for certain things or not, then we won’t have any core
goals coming out”. However this perspective was challenged by another interviewee, who noted
that the absence of bargaining was because:
“...consensus emerged through the marine planning pilot about what MSP could do and what it
should be trying to do.”
Suggesting that the proposed mechanism of marine planning was, to a certain extent, more easily
agreed upon, but that the overall purpose of the system was still the subject of ongoing contestation
and negotiation between stakeholders.
242
The voluntary nature of coastal partnerships and lack of statutory functions meant that there were
some different issues involved when it came to bargaining and negotiation in ICZM, with one
interviewee from the SEP describing their core goals as “quite loose” and that there has been a lack
of dialogue on goals and priorities because “it’s all fairly vague stuff that doesn’t really matter that
one’s higher than the other on a list of programmes”. At the same time it was acknowledged that
there had been negotiation on some of the smaller projects undertaken by the SEP with respect to
nature conservation issues and trying to reach agreement with statutory agencies, but there had
been a lack of broader engagement since the production of the SEP Strategy, where the Multi-
Criteria Analysis exercise carried out by UCL had helped to identify priorities on a consensual basis,
and this lack of engagement was a problem that needed to be addressed.
For both DCF and EGCP, a number of interviewees stated that their respective coastal partnerships
had only had a small experience of bargaining themselves, but had a greater role in facilitating
bargaining between other stakeholders. For EGCP this had been done on occasion through acting as
an independent information broker to allow other parties to come to decisions based on the
information presented, describing how on one local issue concerning a bridge over some coastal
waters:
“We did an engineering report and an environmental report which we sponsored, and then we
presented it to Aberdeenshire Council and the Community Council, we presented it to a local
nature reserve, and chaired the meeting to let them discuss it”.
Similarly for the DCF, the facilitating role in decision making was noted in that:
“because local CPs know their people, they know both sides of the story, or even more than both
sides because sometimes there are more than two issues there at once, I think that as long as
the coastal partnership is seen as independent and has no personal objectives one way or the
other, I think that it’s a very good way of achieving that.”
However in this instance the issue at stake itself would determine the length of negotiations, which
often required building up trust with stakeholders over a long period of time, and what sort of
compromise might be required.
There is a danger within coastal partnerships that some goals are easily negotiated because they are
broad “motherhood and apple pie” type objectives that are difficult to oppose, but avoid addressing
more fundamental tensions between stakeholders, and thus where coastal partnerships act as
facilitators between stakeholders, remaining neutral but participating in a joint information search
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and discussions, this ultimately helps to bring about greater awareness between stakeholders of
other perspectives and common ground.
Increased Use of Joint Working
For this statement on joint working, evidence was sought on the way in which stakeholders may
begin to share coincident values through working together on joint initiatives, and thus the
questionnaire responses (shown in Figure 7.8) and interview data showed a relatively
straightforward pattern of agreement.
For ICZM the use of joint working is already an established way of working, and thus interviewees
spoke only of successful examples, such as sea bed mapping for the Dorset Coast in association with
the Wildlife Trust, and consultation on the new Marine Conservation Zone for the South West. In the
EGCP Operation Dune Watch was considered to be a highly successful joint working project with the
local police force to prevent quad biking on sand dunes and find a new, more suitable location for
such activities to take place.
Figure 7.8: Questionnaire Response – Increased Use of Joint Working
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Joint working between actors at similar spatial/administrative scales is increasing
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
244
For Marine Planning, one interviewee observed that:
“One of the trends that I’ve detected is that while we still don’t have a system of MSP, lots of
people are going off talking about it, doing it – Dorset Coast Forum have got their big slice of
European money, Solent is starting to do a little bit…”
This demonstrates that whilst at the strategic level, and particularly at the time of the interview,
there may have been some hesitation and acquiescence over initiating new joint ventures, and a
top-down style of implementation might still ultimately dictate the process of final decision making.
At more local levels stakeholders were already beginning to build capacity for joint work on marine
planning. The voluntary nature of this work was also noted, with one interviewee stating that
increased joint working was “Not really through any statutory processes”.
For RBMP, like Marine Planning, the use of joint working is still a new concept for many of the
stakeholders involved in delivering the WFD measures, and may come through an element of
compulsion from higher levels of government. The resource dimension of joint activities was cited as
something that can be a weakness or an opportunity, with one interviewee observing:
“It’s determined in some respects by whether there is any funding to do it, because if you’re
going to work together it’s either got to be your day job that you’re resourced to do anyway or
you’d have to find funding from somewhere else”
From this it can be inferred that without incentives, there are still many problems to overcome in
terms of integrating stakeholders through a collaborative process. Besides these comments, no
concrete examples of joint working outside the statutory Planning process for RBMP were cited,
other than the need for more stakeholders to come forward and contribute to the Programme of
Measures, showing that there is still a large gap in this instance in engaging stakeholders with
coincident values.
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7.3.3 Dispersal of Powers between Stakeholders
Whilst this is the only statement in the questionnaire to refer explicitly to the distribution of power
between stakeholders, many of the conclusions that can be drawn from analysing the questionnaire
and interview data have already been expressed in relation to other statements that have been
discussed. These conclusions come in relation to the top-down and bottom-up nature of the
different regimes, although the questionnaire responses shown in Figure 7.9 show a relatively even
spread of agreement and disagreement across all three regimes.
Figure 7.9: Questionnaire Response – the Uneven Dispersal of Powers
Within the RBMP and Marine case studies, there was much greater recognition that the dispersal of
power was uneven, with one Panel member from the RBMP case study acknowledging that the
Environment Agency, as the competent authority for delivering WFD has ultimate control over what
is done. This confirms what has already been assumed about the top-down nature of the WFD, and
according to Gray’s proposition, this concentration of power is not conducive to collaboration.
However there was scope for some powers to be redirected through other stakeholders exercising
their own power, as one stated:
“it’s up to each sector to ensure that they contribute and therefore they have got power in that
respect”
Whilst this imbalance of power could be seen as negative, another stakeholder made the point that
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
There is recognition that the dispersal of powers betweenstakeholders is uneven and that those powers may have to be
redirected to achieve change.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
246
“the trouble with the WFD, the really big things that need doing, need national resources and
leadership. Agri-environmental matters, bathing water issues, flood policy issues, are things
which the voluntary sector are not going to get – can’t get involved with because it’s so huge.”
Thus it is recognised that many potential stakeholders are not sufficiently engaged and therefore not
empowered in any way to contribute to meeting WFD objectives, but that the dispersal of power
may not necessarily be helpful, because strong leadership and a wealth of resources are needed.
This supports the idea that the dispersal of powers is not always desirable, but the question of
ensuring equal access to power and achieving buy-in from stakeholders with regards to RBMP
remains only partially addressed.
For the marine case as well the uneven nature of power dispersal between stakeholders was
recognised, with one questionnaire respondent adding the comment that in relation to the Marine
Bill proposals “the deckchairs may have been moved but key powerful stakeholders (oil and gas,
Crown Estate etc) have retained their powers almost undiminished or even reinforced”, yet there was
some disagreement as to whether such powerful stakeholders from the private sector would have
undue influence – with one interviewee pointing out
“My view is that I don’t generally see industry getting its own way because it shouts loudest and
has the most money. I’m more intent to see industry humbled by the Habitats regulations and
having to do what they’re told and jump as high as they’re told”
There was also recognition within the marine case that with the Marine Bill being at an early stage in
its development, powers may come to be redirected as implementation progresses and the political
context changes – this point being illustrated by an interviewee who proposed that:
“What will become evident as things go on is the relative power of the participating bodies and
the effectiveness of their lobbies and that’s going to change... but this is no different from any
discussion about sustainability where effectively the ground rules of sustainability will change
with the political circumstances”
This raises the possibility that through the MMO and the roll-out of the Marine Planning system,
more stakeholders may become empowered or enabled to carry out certain functions. Although as
with RBMP, the marine case study could provide no concrete answers as to whether power should
be redirected, and if so how – one interviewee remarking that “it’s definitely not even, but I’m not
sure how you can try and rectify that – I think you just have to try and be as rounded and inclusive as
possible”.
247
Inclusivity is one of the ways in which the issue of power was addressed by coastal partnerships,
with interviewees from the ICZM case studies acknowledging that although there are some
stakeholders that are naturally bigger or hold more powers than others, the structure of the
organisations meant that in most circumstances coastal partnerships were relatively successful in
maintaining an appropriate balance of powers - no one stakeholder was seen to be wielding more
power than the others. For the East Grampian Coastal Partnership one interviewee noted that “as
stakeholders have remained constant everyone has come to understand each other – power is not an
issue”, and this opinion was supported by another interviewee who stated that “I don't think any one
organisation has undue influence”.
For the Dorset Coast Forum, a similar story applied – it was noted that within Forum meetings,
“people can actually say what they think and feel and that allows good business to get done because
of it”, and on the issue of the core funding bodies and any potential influence they might have on
direction setting, one interviewee noted that:
“the fact that it was only certain organisation that did buy in didn’t mean you would push their
values more than anyone else’s - they realised it was all for the common good”
Thus demonstrating that the core funders, whilst not conceding power, understand that they are
equal partners in a collaborative process that has far reaching, positive benefits.
In the Severn estuary, the complexity of responsibilities has brought about some more differing
perspectives on the issue of power. Whilst in the production of the Severn Estuary Strategy, “there
was an attempt to provide a level playing field and I think the process we actually went through did
work quite well, people did feel like equal partners” it was noted that there were particular
difficulties in trying to get bodies with statutory powers fully engaged with the Partnership because,
and particularly in one case, “they probably see the SEP as being powerless in the context of all these
statutory responsibilities”.
Rather than the problem of having overly powerful stakeholders at the table, therefore, the SEP
demonstrates that there may be an unwillingness on the part of some stakeholders to engage with
those less powerful. As one interviewee described on a coastal access project:
“it took a lot of negotiation and watering down of the original proposals to get the bodies with
the powers to come to the table”.
However, it was also observed that “we have opened a few doors to get those with power working
with those who in a statutory sense have less power and responsibility”, and thus the work of the
248
Partnership in bringing together different stakeholders may be showing signs that the perception of
uneven powers may be overcome though collaborative working.
A final point to note on the dispersal of power and ICZM is that access to power in the form of
organisations with more formal or statutory duties can be equated with access to resources that are
crucial for the day to day functioning of coastal partnerships. However, the examples of EGCP and
DCF in particular show that by building up shared beliefs about the benefits of collaborative working,
relationships between stakeholders of uneven powers can be sustained.
To summarise this section of exploring options, the key points are:
Where there has been experimentation in relation to both policy proposals and institutional
arrangements, this has been relatively limited in terms of the number of “experiments” (for
Marine Planning and RBMP) or in the scale of the initiative (for ICZM), therefore providing
fewer opportunities for learning from experience.
There has been a lack of negotiation and bargaining on core goals for RBMP, and thus
coincident values are not apparent, with some stakeholders feeling that their individual
concerns and interests have not been addressed. Less negotiation has been required for
Marine Planning and ICZM because consensus has been built, but some issues can still be
contentious.
Whilst the concept of joint working is well established for ICZM, showing greater awareness
and development of coincident values, there are only limited but increasing examples of
collaboration for Marine Planning and RBMP.
The uneven dispersal of power between stakeholders is perceived to be greater in Marine
Planning and RBMP than it is in ICZM, where efforts have been made to create a setting in
which stakeholders are treated equally.
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7.4 Decision Making
The decision making phase of the collaborative policy making cycle encompasses ideas about the
process by which direction setting efforts are crystallized in the production of policies, strategies or
plans, and thus considers collaborative conditions such as bargaining, windows of opportunity that
may push particular options further up the agenda, and the building of structures that facilitate
ongoing collaboration and implementation of decisions. Table 7e shows the propositions related to
this stage of the collaborative policy cycle, and Table 7f the questionnaire responses to these
propositions.
Table 7e: Decision Making - Propositions
Conditions for Collaborative
Policy Making/Other Issues
to be Considered
Propositions
Degree of ongoing
interdependence
Structuring will occur when stakeholders perceive that continued
dependence upon each other is necessary to implement their
desired directions for the domain.
External mandates/political
context
Mandate alone will not generate conditions conducive to
collaboration. However, coupled with other conditions (e.g.
recognition of interdependence and balance of power), mandate
can provide a structural framework for ongoing regulation of the
domain.
Source: Author
250
Table 7f: Questionnaire Responses for Decision Making
There is now consensus and effective coordination between stakeholders at national and local levels.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 2 6 6 11 5 2 8
MSP 1 1 4 3 6 0 2
RBMP 0 0 4 0 2 0 0
There are now clear national public sector sponsors who are taking a lead in forwarding action on coastal/marine/catchment management/planning initiatives.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 2 23 1 2 0 4 8
MSP 5 4 3 2 0 1 2
RBMP 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
The emergence of a lead organisation or organisations has been legitimised by negotiation between stakeholders.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 0 9 12 2 5 4 8
MSP 1 4 2 4 3 1 2
RBMP 0 2 0 4 0 0 0
There have been clear “windows of opportunity” or events enabling coastal/marine/catchment policies to be placed in the legislative programme.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 5 17 4 3 1 2 8
MSP 1 7 1 3 2 1 2
RBMP 0 3 2 1 0 0 0
Source: Author
7.4.1 Ongoing Interdependence: Consensus and Coordination between Stakeholders
As the decision making phase of policy making begins to produce some more tangible structures for
collaborative working, it is expected that this will be reflected in an increased level of consensus and
coordination, which can signify increasing horizontal and vertical integration between stakeholders.
Figure 7.10 below shows that for RBMP, this consensus and coordination has quite clearly not
occurred, whilst for Marine Planning and ICZM there are some quite different perceptions about the
level of consensus and coordination.
251
Figure 7.10: Questionnaire Response – Consensus and Coordination
For Marine Planning, the main points of agreement related to consensus and coordination at the
national level, with one interviewee observing that:
“there’s now UK high level objectives, there’ll be a UK Marine Policy Statement, probably with a
few regional emphases, which is good, and UK monitoring is going to be dealt with at a UK level
as well, so there are reasonable levels of cooperation at a high level”
It was also noted that groups such as Wildlife Link and the Seabed Users Development Group,
convened by the Crown Estate had worked together to produce a joint position statement in the
early stages of the Marine Bill. However, possible tensions between the devolved administrations on
Marine Planning provided one instance of where horizontal integration could be weak, with one
interviewee stating:
“I am slightly worried that we have this division of UK waters as a result of the devolved
administrations having responsibility for different parts. I think there is potential there for some
rather difficult negotiations in the long term and potentially some unravelling of quite an
important concept which is that there should be fairly consistent policy.”
In terms of vertical integration, the absence of regional or local level stakeholders was also cited as a
reason for disagreeing with the questionnaire statement, with interviewees referring to local
authorities “just going to be one of the stakeholders that are involved in the marine planning
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
There is now consensus and effective coordination between stakeholders at national and local levels
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
252
process” in regional marine plans, although whilst still in the consultation stages of the Marine Bill,
another interviewee made the point that “it needs the spatial planning system to come into place”
before the true extent of consensus and coordination can be fully discerned.
Similarly, for RBMP, the lack of coordination was seen to be the main reason for questionnaire
respondents disagreeing strongly, with one interviewee noting “the lack of local authority
involvement”. This view was supported by another interviewee who explained how the problem of
local authority involvement was being addressed:
“I think they are starting to get on board with it now because WAG wrote a letter for chief
planning officers to say you really need to sit up and take notice, because this is going to affect
your job, this is your day job”.
Thus there are some signs of improvement, but as one interviewee noted, “Whether there’s a
general consensus and whether it is truly effective coordination, only time will tell. I think it’ll happen
eventually”, showing that whilst at this early stage of plan implementation, the benefits of
collaboration have not been made clearly enough to engage even stakeholders with a major role to
play in delivering WFD objectives. This has implications both for delivering plans to schedule, if
stakeholders are slow on the uptake, but also can be a barrier to further collaboration because
issues of building a shared consensus and trust have not been resolved.
In the coastal partnerships, where there have been more opportunities for building consensus and
coordination, there were still relatively high levels of disagreement. At the local level, whilst there is
some coordination and consensus, it was observed that “where there’s local issues there is more
conflict” and the potential for small but vociferous interests to upset the balance of consensus. In
some instances the issue of representatives sent from partner organisations was observed as
something which could have impacts both horizontally and vertically, as one interviewee from the
Severn Estuary Partnership described:
“...because it’s a non-statutory function you get someone generally fairly low to mid ranking,
with one or two exceptions to get engaged. There’s a huge turnover then, and they can’t embed
from the bottom up the structures are needed”
This comment therefore shows how, even if some level of coordination can be achieved, this can be
quite fragile, and without continuity in key individuals, consensus and coordination can be easily
lost. Such problems require a twin-track solution to be overcome – in the short term, additional
funding may help to maintain human resources and “corporate memory”, and in turn this may assist
in bringing about a long term strategic change in stakeholders perceptions, not only of collaboration
253
as a way of working, but also in taking ICZM as a fundamental approach to managing their coastal
interests.
7.4.2 External Mandates: Public Sector Sponsors and Legitimacy of Lead Organisation
In considering the emergence of public sector sponsors and the legitimacy of lead organisations, it is
acknowledged that for policies to be implemented there must, in most cases, be some kind of
government intervention, and thus the statements on the questionnaire relating to these two
separate issues are closely linked. Taken together, Figures 7.11 and 7.12 show that whilst there is
agreement on the existence of public sector sponsors, there is more disagreement over the
legitimacy of lead organisations.
For Marine Planning, one interviewee stated on public sponsors that “I don’t think they’re very clear”
and that perhaps NGOs were the main sponsors, whilst the lack of engagement from local planning
authorities was also noted, however there was wide agreement from other interviewees that DEFRA
was the one clear public sector sponsor. In terms of DEFRA being the lead organisation (and creating
the MMO), it was stated that:
“coming out of the pilot, it was suggesting that a new body was required to deliver marine
planning, that said WAG will probably do it in house. Scotland has created Marine Scotland, so
yes, I think it came out by consensus, everybody could see there wasn’t really anyone else given
what would be required to be done, it didn’t sit comfortably with any of the existing actors”.
However one questionnaire respondent claimed that “*the] MMO was largely non-negotiable, as
was its subjugation to the parent Department” demonstrating an opposing view, which was also
supported by one interviewee who believed that the Marine and Fisheries Agency, who would
become a significant part of the MMO, were “entrenched in a close working relationship with
fishermen” and thus not sufficiently equipped to undertake the function of Marine Planning.
254
Figure 7.11: Questionnaire Response – Public Sector Sponsors
Figure 7.12: Questionnaire Response – Legitimacy of Lead Organisation
For River Basin Management, the identification of a public sector sponsor is clearer cut, with the
Environment Agency acting as the key driver for River Basin Planning, though it was acknowledged
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
There are now clear national public sector sponsors who are taking a lead in forwarding action on coastal management/marine/catchment initiatives.
ICZM
MP
RBMP
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
The emergence of a lead organisation or organisations has been legitimised by negotiation between stakeholders
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
Source: Author
255
that “DEFRA and WAG have been very supportive of the process”. Regarding the legitimacy of the EA
as lead organisation, again, like the MSP case study there was disagreement as to whether there had
been any discussion of the EA’s role as leader, with one interviewee noting
“I think everybody recognises that the Agency is the competent authority and in some respects
some are quite happy to let them get on with it, but there’s not really been any negotiation on
that”,
Whilst disagreeing more strongly, another interviewee stated that “It wasn’t a question of accepting,
they appointed themselves as the lead organisation and there was never any opportunity to
challenge that”, demonstrating that a high-level mandate does not generate sufficient support for
an organisation to be accepted as a leading, and also more powerful, partner in collaboration.
Lastly, in considering the ICZM case studies, the identification of public sponsors proved somewhat
clearer cut, with the establishment of coastal partnerships, and particularly Dorset Coastal Forum,
which is hosted by Dorset County Council, seen as a good example of the public sector taking the
initiative, though it was recognised that there was often “inertia” from other partners with regards
to taking a lead once another partner had assumed the role.
At the national level, some interviewees expressed that they would like DEFRA to take a greater lead
on ICZM, but acknowledged that this could cause problems for the perceived neutrality of
partnerships if they were to have more guidance (or more funding) from this one particular source,
and the same criticism was also applied to partnerships that are reliant upon a host organisation,
with one interviewee noting that “it would be nice to actually have an independent, transparent
person whose job it is to field the concerns or flack”. However, the provision of resources or benefits
“in kind” from many host organisations as noted by Atkins (2004) is crucial for the survival of smaller
organisations.
Windows of Opportunity
“Windows of opportunity” were described in Chapter Three as a concept developed by John Kingdon
(1995) in which the streams of the political (groups of actors), policy (policy proposals) and problems
(evidence of a problem) are brought together at opportune moments to push an idea onto the
governmental agenda. The response to the issue of “windows of opportunity” in this section (and
shown in Figure 7.13) reflects to some extent the relative maturity of ICZM compared to Marine
Planning and RBMP as there is a greater recognition that such windows have been present at one
256
time or another, and within the Marine and RBM case studies differences of opinion may be
attributed to the top-down or bottom-up nature of policy formation.
Figure 7.13: Questionnaire Response – Windows of Opportunity
In the case of ICZM, the 1992 House of Commons Environment Select Committee report on Coastal
Planning was cited as an early window of opportunity that would have further embedded the use of
ICZM more formally into land use planning policy, however as one interviewee noted, following the
rejection of the recommendations in the report the Estuaries Initiative and voluntary coastal
partnerships became “a kneejerk response”. Moving forward, the Entec report of the financial
benefits of coastal partnerships (Entec, 2008) and DEFRA’s own ICZM Strategy for England (DEFRA,
2009a) were cited as further missed opportunities as they failed to make the case for ICZM strongly
enough – one interviewee describing their hopes for the DEFRA report as:
“what I would have liked that to have done is given a clear steer to coastal regions and
authorities on what they do next – how do you go about setting up an ICZM type project or
partnership in your area? It needs to be supported, what needs to be put in place, how are
DEFRA going to help, what guidance is there?”
Consultations on the Marine Bill and the proposed system of Marine Spatial Planning were also
noted as an opportunity, and particularly for the Dorset Coast Forum this had been the catalyst for
their C-SCoPE project, where it was explained that
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
There have been clear “windows of opportunity” or events enabling coastal management/marine/catchment policies to
be placed in the legislative programme
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
257
“There has been a window of opportunity and we have chosen the area because of the [2012]
Olympics, because it will be showcased. It ticks a box with the Olympic Games Committee,
because they want to finance a green Olympics. But it’s definitely a window of opportunity”.
Also working on a more pragmatic basis at the local level, smaller “windows of opportunity” for
coastal partnerships were cited by interviewees as being related to funding, with one interviewee
from EGCP stating that “with more money the partnership can do more work”, and developing that
point further for the Severn Estuary, another interviewee observed that:
“We’re entering a period when government bodies, local authorities, statutory agencies all have
less resources. So how can we convince someone in the SEP to put some of their diminishing
resources, whether that’s cash or staff time - and staff time is a big expense for people - into the
Severn Estuary?”
From these examples, it may therefore be said that windows of opportunity have not resulted in a
fundamental change. Referring back to the conclusions made in Chapter Six, the definition of a
coastal problem is not clear cut, and thus may have contributed to a lack of clarity in the problem
stream. This may also have affected the higher levels of government, as it appears they have not
been sufficiently active in championing the case for ICZM, thus presenting issues in the political
stream.
These small but perhaps more frequent windows of opportunity for ICZM can be seen in contrast to
RBMP, where the WFD was described as “something we’ll have to implement and we’ll have to do
because it’s a Directive”. The lack of any real windows was also attributed to the way in which the
Water Framework Directive had been imposed, with one interviewee explaining that:
“It’s been more of a top down process, because you’re talking about things that happen on the
ground that force opinion and policy”.
In this sense, the political stream proves problematic again, in that it is only the highest level of
government that is truly responsible for the WFD, and the policy stream is also shown to be weak as
the top-down approach lacks the bargaining or consensus needed to legitimise the solution
proposed.
The fact that windows of opportunity were also “quite few and far between” for marine planning
was also observed, however this was seen to be as more part of the natural cycle of policy making
than because of imposition from above. The Labour Party’s election manifesto commitment to a
Marine Bill was identified as placing marine issues on the political agenda, however two
258
interviewees referred to the “long gestation” of the Marine Bill, and the fact that “you have to look
back at what the NGOs have been pressing for, for a very long time now - they got all party support
for the Marine Bill, so that’s the other thing that helped them make progress with it” suggesting that
despite having the political, policy and problem streams evident, there was a more gradual process
taking place to move marine planning up the governmental agenda.
Summarising the decision making section, the following points are highlighted:
There is a degree of consensus and coordination for ICZM, demonstrating continuing
interdependence, although this may be easily lost because of scarce resources to maintain
activities, whilst coordination is still developing for Marine Planning and RBMP.
There is recognition of lead organisations for ICZM, MP and RBMP, but they have not
necessarily achieved this role through legitimizing debates, and thus perceptions of more
powerful stakeholders still prevail.
The “windows of opportunity” for Marine Planning and RBMP have been relatively few, but
for ICZM more frequent windows that could have resulted in greater government support
have been missed.
259
7.5 Structuring and Implementation
In this final stage of the collaborative policy making cycle, decisions are operationalised through the
implementation of legal frameworks, policies and programmes that recognise the continuing
interdependence of stakeholders in collaborative arrangements. The propositions for this stage of
policy making are shown in Table 7g, and questionnaire responses to the propositions in Table 7h. As
the questionnaire and interviews for this research were conducted prior to the Marine Bill receiving
Royal Assent, and at an early stage in the first cycle of River Basin Management Planning, many of
the views presented in response to this section of the questionnaire were speculative, although
some key points could still be discerned. These are explained below.
Table 7g: Structuring and Implementation - Propositions
Conditions for
Collaborative Policy
Making/Other Issues
to be Considered
Propositions
Redistribution of
power
Effective structuring involves negotiation among all stakeholders
about how to regulate the domain, including negotiations about the
implementation of actions and the power distribution necessary to do
so. One outcome of structuring is an agreed upon allocation of power
within the domain.
Implementation
Processes
For implementation to occur there must be agreement upon the
allocation of necessary resources (financial and human) for practical
actions to be undertaken.
Contextual
Environment
Successful implementation of collaborative agreements is contingent
upon the stakeholders’ collective ability to positively manage changes
in their contextual environment. This involves monitoring changes and
building relationships with actors outside the domain to insure that
domain-level agreements are carried out.
Source: Author
260
Table 7h: Questionnaire Responses for Structuring and Implementation
There is a clear and consistent legal framework in place to aid the delivery of ICZM/MSP/RBMP.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 1 2 5 12 9 3 8
MSP 2 4 1 5 3 0 2
RBMP 2 1 0 3 0 0 0
Formal responsibilities for promoting coastal/marine/catchment issues, taking objectives forward and
overseeing implementation have been allocated.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 1 7 5 10 6 3 8
MSP 2 6 0 3 4 0 2
RBMP 0 1 2 2 1 0 0
The plan making process for ICZM/MSP/RBMP is clearly set out
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 1 6 3 12 7 3 8
MSP 2 3 1 4 5 0 2
RBMP 1 4 0 0 1 0 0
Long term financial commitment is in place for the implementation of ICZM/MSP/RBMP.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 1 2 2 8 16 3 8
MSP 0 1 5 4 5 0 2
RBMP 0 1 0 1 4 0 0
Work on measures to address coastal/marine/catchment issues is becoming more commonplace.
Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
No Answer
ICZM 1 24 4 1 0 2 8
MSP 2 9 4 0 0 0 2
RBMP 0 4 0 0 2 0 0
Source: Author
7.5.1 Redistribution of Power: Legal Frameworks and Allocation of Responsibilities
As with other statements featured in the questionnaire, these two issues are closely linked as the
legal frameworks for ICZM, MSP and RBMP provide the structure for enabling the delivery of policies
through assigning roles and powers to (some) stakeholders. Figures 7.14 and 7.15 show the
responses to statements on these two issues.
261
Figure 7.14: Questionnaire Response – Legal Frameworks
Figure 7.15: Questionnaire Response – Allocation of Responsibilities
Of all the planning regimes examined, Marine Planning is the least advanced in its implementation
and thus the picture of structuring and implementation that was elicited from the questionnaires
and interviews is somewhat ambiguous, as is illustrated through the extremes of agreement and
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
There is a clear and consistent legal framework in place to aid the delivery of ICZM/MSP/RBMP
ICZM
MP
RBMP
0 10 20 30 40 50
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Formal responsibilities for promoting coastal/marine/catchment issues, taking objectives forward
and overseeing implementation have been allocated
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
Source: Author
262
disagreement shown in Figures 7.14 and 7.15. In terms of the legal framework for MP, one
interviewee noted that “we’re moving towards it, and I’m not sure that the legal framework is all
that contentious”, but on the other hand another interviewee observed that:
“We’ll see what the Marine Bill brings in practice but since it’s completely untested I’m a bit
afraid that the Marine Bill won’t deliver what we hope it will deliver”.
Similarly on the allocation of responsibilities for Marine Planning, the embryonic nature of the
Marine Bill leads one interviewee to state that:
“I think that taking the objectives forward bit is interesting because it comes more to the heart
of what marine planning and management is. I haven’t seen any flesh on the bones of how
objectives will be incorporated into marine plans, and monitored and reported against”,
However, from the perspective of another interviewee, the transfer of the Marine and Fisheries
Agency and Sea Fisheries Committees into the MMO (with Sea Fisheries being replaced by Inshore
Fisheries and Conservation Authorities) meant that some responsibilities would remain from the
previous system of fisheries management, but would be “somewhat enhanced” under the Bill.
For RBMP, the legal framework was described as “clearly set out as in it’s been decided at a national
level, this is the way we’re going to go with it, and it’s been cascaded down to processes, writing
plans and consultation” and thus the plan making process was also clearly laid out, but it was also
acknowledged that the top-down way in which the WFD was implemented meant that there was
“not an awful lot of room for manoeuvrability”. Another interviewee criticised this top-down
approach for making plans “hard for people outside the process to understand”, and that this would
have future implications for stakeholder’s ability to influence improvements to water quality in the
future.
In terms of the allocation of responsibilities, one interviewee claimed that there was “no clarity
whatsoever on what will be delivered” but that most of the responsibilities would be down to the
Environment Agency, although at this stage the Programme of Measures, which is the main
mechanism for allocating responsibilities to different stakeholders for delivering the objectives set
out in River Basin Management Plans was not fully developed, leading to one Panel member to state
that:
“There still some sectors which haven’t got as much against them and that’s been highlighted in
the consultation... when we do have a better understanding of the issues we will have to push
changes forward that address those issues, whatever way that happens to be”.
263
Thus there is further scope for responsibilities to be allocated on the basis of new iterations of the
policy cycle and a more sophisticated or developed understanding of water quality problems.
The lack of a statutory footing for ICZM was described in Chapter One of this thesis as one of the
main obstacles to implementation, and therefore it was unsurprising in the questionnaire responses
(in Figure 7.15) to see that there was a significant disagreement with the statement on legal
frameworks. However, some interviewees questioned the need for ICZM to have its own legal
framework, noting in one case that:
“I think the legal structure for ICZM is again this shopping basket of everything from the
Habitats Directives to the SSSI and SAC systems, the AONB systems... we’ve got all these bits of
legislation, what I’d like to think of is that they are in my shopping basket, and I can go around
my legal supermarket and I can pick off the shelves.”
Similarly, another respondent from EGCP made the point that “we’ve had some interesting
discussions about whether ICZM delivers marine planning, or marine planning delivers ICZM. But in
the end I suppose it all comes down to the fact that if you do all this, ultimately you are delivering an
integrated approach to coastal management”.
Without a formally agreed framework for ICZM at national level, the question of responsibilities also
produced a high level of dispute in the questionnaire responses, with the absence of guidance from
national government leading to uncertainty about the role of coastal partnerships and the plan
making process, and within partnerships themselves a lack of national steering produced a situation
in which partnerships may struggle to maintain a balance of responsibilities between core staff and
partner organisations – for the Severn Estuary Partnership it was noted that “it’s always been very
hand to mouth, there’s no funding structure, it very much relies on ad hoc approaches to local
authorities and others to put money into it and time and effort”, and from another interviewee
“If you focus all your aspirations for activity on the staff team you aren’t going to get much
done. The tasks in the business plan will have to be done by the partners.”
Yet despite these problems, the progress of the Marine Bill was seen by all ICZM case studies as
central to coastal partnerships clarifying their own position within the framework of coastal
management responsibilities, and whilst the full details of the Bill and the future system of Marine
Planning were not known, this brought a level of uncertainty to the future implementation of ICZM
as well.
264
7.5.2 Implementation Processes: Plan Making
Negotiations to create a legal framework and allocation of responsibilities in coastal planning
regimes provide a structure which enables implementation to occur. Therefore the format of plan-
making is itself a product of negotiation.
Figure 7.16 shows questionnaire responses on the development of the plan-making process.
Figure 7.16: Questionnaire Response – the Plan Making Process
Many of the issues surrounding the plan-making process are closely linked to responsibilities for
ICZM, RBMP and Marine Planning, and thus to avoid repetition of points it is sufficient to say here
that for RBMP, the top-down nature of the process meant that respondents did agree that a clear
process had been set out, but that this structure was imposed nationally rather than fully
negotiated. Similarly for ICZM, lack of agreement could be attributed to the argument that DEFRA
had not provided sufficient guidance on ICZM – although it was noted that the original Estuaries
Initiative guidance from 1992 provided a blueprint for collaborative working that was still largely
relevant.
On the plan making process for Marine Planning, although the potential transfer of ideas from the
terrestrial planning system was alluded to in Section 7.3 of this chapter with respect to experiments
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentageof respondents
The plan making process for ICZM/MSP/RBMP is clearly set out
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
265
in policy and institutional arrangements, there was some speculation on the form plan making would
take, with one interviewee stating:
“if it’s anything like regional planning, it will have to have quite a strong participatory
component to it, which actually will involve a wide range of stakeholders who will actively
participate, certainly the way we conceived of it in the Pilot”
Yet with only an initial draft Marine Policy Statement being in place at that time, another
interviewee was more uncertain, noting:
“the MPS is going to be some rough guidance. The consultation documents, all they’ve ever
talked about is the MPS and marine plans. Marine plans sit somewhere else and the marine
policy statement has never specified any more clearly”.
This position may have changed somewhat since interviews were undertaken, but demonstrates
how the tiering of legislation, policy and plans must follow a logical sequence to provide clarity for
plan making.
Financial Commitment
This statement on the questionnaire directly relates to having the appropriate framework of roles
and responsibilities in place for each planning regime, and thus many of the responses to the
statement on financial commitment (shown in Figure 7.17 below) have been tempered by the level
of uncertainty that was expressed in section 7.5.1 in relation to such frameworks being in place.
Also, an awareness of the economic crisis, the threat of wide ranging cuts in government spending
and the expectations of a General Election were cited as reasons for the low level of agreement that
funding was in place.
266
Figure 7.17: Questionnaire Response – Financial Commitment
For Marine Planning, it was noted that there was “a general concern that planning for the MMO
they’ve not appreciated the scale of the resources for marine planning”, and similarly for River Basin
Management, one Panel member surmised on the government’s financial commitments to the WFD
that “they *the government+ know it has to be implemented, I guess they intend to but just exactly
how much that is likely to be is another thing”.
Where financial commitment is already known to be weak for ICZM, discussion regarding financial
resources returned to the theme of neutrality that was previously explored in relation to lead
organisations in Section 7.4.3, with interviewees noting that although additional funding would
enable partnerships to do many more things, “A partnership at the moment can really criticise
DEFRA heavily – I keep saying DEFRA but it doesn’t have to be DEFRA – we can criticise them heavily
at the moment and that’s fine. But if you were in their pocket, how could you do that? You wouldn’t
have that neutrality any more, you’d be partisan”. Thus whilst financial resources may be available
to coastal partnerships on a short term, sporadic basis as is evidenced by the numerous small scale
projects undertaken, any long term financial commitment would require potentially difficult
discussions between stakeholders to establish how the balance of power would be spread between
funding or higher level funding and non-funding partners to ensure more equitable roles in the
direction setting or decision making phase of collaboration.
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Long term financial commitment is in place for the implementation of ICZM/MSP/RBMP
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
267
7.5.3 Contextual Environment: Increasing Use of Coastal/Marine/Catchment Measures
This final statement on the questionnaire addresses the way in which stakeholders have been or are
able to influence their contextual environment through the increasingly routine or commonplace use
of ICZM, Marine Planning or RBMP. Whilst there is an anticipatory element to some of the
questionnaire and interview responses on the use of Marine Planning and River Basin Management,
Figure 7.18 shows that by and large, it was agreed that measures to address coastal, marine or
catchment problems are increasing across all three regimes.
The ICZM case studies present an area where coastal management is already being done in some
way, and thus across the case studies there was a general feeling that despite resource issues and a
lower level of support from central government, achievements were being made in the production
of management plans, research projects and in liaising with other stakeholders, and thus there was a
momentum of activity.
Figure 7.18: Questionnaire Response: Measures Becoming More Commonplace
For Marine Planning, an increase in strategic actions was noted, with one interviewee observing that
“at policy level, with the WFD coming along as well, there are various attempts at trying to solve the
marine problem going on. More is being done, but we probably haven’t quite got there yet”. The
establishment of Marine Conservation Zones also served as an example of greater activity in
managing the marine environment.
0 20 40 60 80
Don't Know
Disagree Strongly
Disagree Somewhat
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree Somewhat
Agree Strongly
Percentage of respondents
Work on measures to address coastal/marine/catchment issues is becoming more commonplace
ICZM
MP
RBMP
Source: Author
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With River Basin Management, whilst there was some agreement that more activities were taking
place, it was acknowledged that there was still further investigatory work to be done, and that “the
biggest problem at the moment is when you don’t really have a full understanding of the some of the
issues it’s very difficult to come up with measures”, showing that future activities would be
dependent upon feedback from the current measures being undertaken for River Basin
Management and the reframing or reconstruction of catchment problems.
To summarise the structuring and implementation stage, the following points are of most
significance:
RBMP was seen to have a clearer legal framework and plan making process than either
Marine Planning or ICZM, however this was developed at a high level without the agreement
of stakeholders that would be required to implement plans. This meant that there was some
uncertainty as to what the RBMP framework would ultimately deliver.
Financial commitment is uncertain for Marine Planning and RBMP, and thus may require
further negotiation and clarification of responsibilities, but in ICZM where funding has
historically been hard to come by this is also attached to issues of convening stakeholders
maintaining neutrality.
There is an increasing use of measures to address coastal, marine and catchment problems,
showing that overall, conditions conducive to collaboration are improving.
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7.6 Conclusions
Having described and analysed the full collaborative policy making cycle in sections 7.2 to 7.5, this
section draws some conclusions on the relationship between the propositions outlined by Gray
(1985) that facilitate inter-organisational collaboration and the conditions present in the five case
studies from ICZM, Marine Planning and River Basin Management. In doing so, the fourth key
research question is addressed:
As coastal planning regimes go through the policy cycle, what factors have the greatest
influence on policy formulation and decision making?
Furthermore, an evaluation of the collaborative policy making cycle itself will also be undertaken,
considering its use as both a general theory of the policy process and as a methodological
framework for investigating collaboration.
The collaborative policy making cycle used in this research is a synthesis of several approaches,
including John Hannigan’s (1995) model of the social construction of environmental problem, which
was found in Chapter Three to represent an initial step in the policy process, general models of the
policy process, from Lasswell (1956), Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Howlett and Ramesh (2003),
and the work of Barbara Gray on conditions facilitating inter-organisational collaboration.
In drawing these theories together, an attempt has been made to define policy making in a way
which reflects communicative approaches to planning, some of the characteristics of which are
described by Healey (1992) as interaction, openness, acknowledging and respecting different values,
reflexivity, creating mutual understandings and building shared outcomes, and it is hypothesized
that through this communicative or collaborative approach, coastal stakeholders can facilitate
further integration of different perspectives on coastal problems, policies, processes, and even
spatial dimensions of the coastal zone.
7.6.1 Problem Recognition: the Foundation for Policy Making
Whilst the problem recognition stage of the collaborative policy making cycle was analysed in the
previous chapter, the main conclusions from this analysis must be reiterated as this provides the
foundation for the events that occur in the later stages of the cycle. In summary, the key findings of
Chapter Six were:
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The social construction model developed by Hannigan (1995) does not in itself reveal the
nuanced way in which factors deemed necessary for the social construction of problems
appear in constructing claims – some factors or prerequisites are more persuasive, and thus
Hannigan’s model can be developed to reflect this.
Problem recognition is only the first step in the policy cycle – neither Hannigan’s model of
social construction, nor Kingdon’s (1995) model of agenda setting and “windows of
opportunity” can fully explain the leap from problem recognition to implementation of a
solution.
The social construction of the coastal problem is based upon a fragmented evidence base
that does not provide a holistic picture of the interface between land and sea, however
strong institutional sponsorship from European and other international bodies has ensured
that ICZM has been taken up on a less formal basis in the UK.
The social construction of the marine problem is based mainly on scientific evidence,
pressure from NGOs and recognition that there needs to be greater integration between
sectors using the marine environment.
The social construction of the catchment problem is driven by the European Union and an
inherited definition of water quality problems from central government that is not fully
understood, nor does it accurately reflect local circumstances.
The first two of these points are related to the theoretical underpinnings of problem recognition,
and whilst they are important these matters have been explored fully in Chapter Six. Therefore for
this chapter, the remaining three points on the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment
problems must be borne in mind when analysing the way in which policies come to be formed.
In Chapter One the fundamental assumption of this research was identified as being that the
definition of an environmental problem, and the formulation and implementation of a solution, is the
product of a process of social construction. Therefore the social construction of coastal, marine and
catchment problems are of utmost importance in shaping the events that happen in the later stages
of the policy making cycle.
This is most clearly demonstrated in the case of River Basin Management, where the historical
recognition of poor water quality as a European-wide problem has gone through several iterations of
the policy cycle, or “waves” of policy, as described by Kallis and Butler (2001), and a number of
existing Directives were brought together under Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC. Having an
established competency for water quality matters, the top-down approach to managing the water
environment was therefore easily transferred to managing river basins, and referring to Howlett and
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Ramesh’s characterisation of the top-down approach to implementation (2003, see also Chapter
Four of this thesis) the WFD provides a dominant piece of legislation which structures subsequent
actions.
At the other end of the spectrum, the more ambiguous way in which the coastal problem is
constructed has also proved problematic in terms of structuring a response. In the first place, it must
be remembered that the notion of a “coastal zone” is itself a social construct and subject to different
interpretations based on historic and cultural contexts, as was demonstrated in Chapter Two.
Therefore whilst international popularisers/sponsors of coastal problems have been present, the
response to coastal problems has been weaker, with ICZM Recommendation 2002/413/EC providing
a framework for more concerted action. As ICZM was not taken up with great enthusiasm in national
government and embedded into environmental policies, NGOs, local and academic champions have
provided the impetus for delivering ICZM through coastal partnerships. Without a formal structure
for implementation, ICZM has thus developed on the basis of bottom-up joint working between
voluntary arrangements of stakeholders.
Between the top-down approach of the WFD and the bottom-up approach of ICZM, the social
construction of Marine Planning captures elements of both, with NGOs acting as a significant
bottom-up driver for constructing the marine problem, and then the government providing the top-
down element by taking Marine Planning forward through the Marine Bill.
Therefore in the problem recognition stage of policy making, top-down and bottom-up elements of
implementation are already beginning to manifest, and this is carried through to subsequent stages
of the policy cycle.
7.6.2 Building Consensus
In the consensus building stage, the coastal, marine and catchment domains begin to organise
themselves as a solution to their respective problems is sought. The conditions outlined by Gray
relevant to consensus building are:
Interdependence – the greater degree of interdependence, the greater the chance of
initiating collaborative working.
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Identification of stakeholders – the stakeholder set must reflect the complexity of the
problem and a greater number can provide more information, however it is noted that the
stakeholder set will change over time.
Legitimacy – stakeholders must acknowledge other’s legitimacy, and exclusion of
stakeholders may constrain future collaborative working.
Beliefs about outcomes – when stakeholders believe that the benefits of collaboration are
greater than the costs they are more likely to join collaborative efforts.
In this stage, the initial process of problem recognition again provides the basis for subsequent
actions. In Marine Planning and ICZM, where there is not necessarily consensus on the nature of the
problem, but the competing interests of government departments have been recognised as
preventing integration, it has been found that stakeholders understand to a certain extent that they
are interdependent and need to find joint solutions to their problems. Consequently, in beginning to
search for solutions, this has opened out opportunities for stakeholders to become engaged through
consultations and stakeholder workshops (for example on the Marine Bill), or through open forums
and meetings in the case of ICZM, creating positive beliefs about finding a solution to the
coastal/marine problem.
Where problem definition has been dominated by one particular perspective, in the case of RBMP,
opportunities for stakeholder engagement have still been present, but without having contributed
to problem definition in the first place, stakeholders that should be involved in RBMP lack a broader
sense of “ownership” of the problem. Also because water quality is constructed as a matter for the
institution of the European Union to deal with, and the Environment Agency (or SEPA for Scotland)
has been imposed as a convenor for River Basin Management efforts without an exploration of other
possible leaders, the message of interdependence and the need for joint problem solving is not
successfully conveyed. Beliefs about outcomes are also affected by this top-down construction of
catchment problems, as without ownership of the problem, stakeholders may not feel that it is in
their interest to collaborate. It is for these reasons that many of the stakeholders who have a major
role to play in delivering the Programme of Measures are absent from the early stages of decision
making in RBMP.
In considering the issue of legitimacy of stakeholders, one positive trend is noted across all three
planning regimes – whilst it was noted that no specific reference was made to stakeholder legitimacy
in the questionnaire, the general perception of interviewees was that the planning process for their
respective regime should be as open as possible in order that the interests of all sectors are
addressed. This confirms the assumption made in choosing Marine Planning and RBMP to compare
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against ICZM that all three regimes, in theory at least, promote a participatory, inclusive approach to
planning. Thus in identifying stakeholders or interests that have been absent from collaborative
efforts, this is not due to deliberate exclusion, but rather a failure to communicate the benefits of
collaboration widely.
7.6.3 Exploring Options
In this stage of the collaborative policy making cycle, the following conditions are considered to
facilitate collaboration:
Policy design – previous iterations of the policy cycle and experimentation in policy and
institutional arrangements facilitates joint learning between stakeholders
Coincident values – information search and the emergence of coincident values helps
direction setting
Dispersion of power – a dispersal of power between stakeholders is considered conducive to
collaboration, but an equal distribution may provoke stalemate.
In the exploring options stage, the top-down and bottom-up approach are still central to explaining
the findings of this section, and also the relative maturity of each planning regime becomes an
important factor. Thus whilst there are no real “experiments” in the case of River Basin
Management, the fact that the River Basin Planning process has been imposed from national
government has to be tempered with the fact that this first iteration of the policy cycle is the
experiment in one sense, representing a steep learning curve for all stakeholders as they adapt to a
new planning system, and in many cases, collaboration as a new way of working which may facilitate
the development of coincident values in future.
Similarly for Marine Planning, whilst a richer body of experience (particularly in terrestrial planning)
is cited as a foundation for the proposed new system, the marine environment is more multi-
dimensional than land-based planning, and less well understood. An adaptive system of marine
management of which Marine Planning is part, will be key to accommodating learning from joint
information searches and further consensus building.
In exploring options for ICZM, frequent interaction between stakeholders at local levels in small
projects provides evidence of learning and developing coincident values, however the weakness of
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vertical links between local and national levels of governance or statutory bodies are highlighted as a
barrier to consensus and accessing more powerful stakeholders who can facilitate further direction
setting and structuring of the domain through formal means such as legislation, policies and the
provision of resources.
Finally in the exploring options stage, the issue of power and the uneven dispersal of powers
between stakeholders is addressed. Whilst the majority of views are pragmatic and recognise that
the dispersal of power is uneven and that it may be difficult or even undesirable to redistribute
power, the causes of this uneven dispersal must be related back to the original social construction of
the problem – thus with catchment problems conceived of as a European-wide issue, power is
invested in the European Union, national government and their executive agencies. For ICZM, lack of
clarity on the nature of the coastal problem and an agreed solution thus results in those agencies
that do have power (statutory bodies) failing to use them to their best effect, leaving less powerful
stakeholders (the coastal partnerships) struggling to move forward on a set of ambiguous objectives
or principles.
7.6.4 Decision Making
In the decision making stage, the following conditions are considered necessary:
External mandates – external mandates, coupled with ongoing interdependence and an
appropriate balance of power can provide a structure for collaborative work.
Degree of ongoing interdependence – continuing interdependence must be recognised for
implementation to occur.
For this stage of the policy making cycle therefore, questionnaire and case study interviews asked
about events which provide examples of decision making and structuring for their planning regime,
such as the emergence and legitimacy of lead organisations and windows of opportunity, and
ongoing interdependence was determined by reference to the levels of coordination and consensus
between stakeholders at different levels of governance.
In the case of ICZM, weakness in vertical linkages again proved to be a fundamental cause of
problems – at the local level, coastal partnerships are widely accepted as a legitimate lead
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organisation for coastal management activities, however the number of missed windows of
opportunity such as the rejection of the House of Commons Environment Select Committee
recommendations in 1992 and DEFRA’s 2009 ICZM Strategy for England have meant an absence of
strong national support for ICZM. This absence of support is only just being addressed now through
the Marine (Scotland) Act, which places a statutory duty on local authorities to deliver ICZM, and the
UK government’s draft Marine Policy Statement (HM Government, 2010), which commits the UK’s
devolved administrations to manage coastal areas in line with the principles of ICZM.
For RBMP and Marine Planning, windows of opportunity have been noted as less significant, and
therefore top-down and bottom-up political drivers have been key to decision making. In the case of
Marine Planning, long term campaigning from NGOs and the work of the MSP Pilot has brought
Marine Planning to the fore, although there is broad recognition that DEFRA or the MMO is the most
appropriate lead organisation to take Marine Planning forward. Thus a synthesis of top-down and
bottom-up approaches has brought stakeholders together with more powerful partners (national
government) on a consensual basis to provide a structure for the domain. In the case of RBMP, the
top-down approach has positioned the Environment Agency as a lead organisation (though this may
be in large part due to its historical responsibilities for water quality measures), without legitimising
debates or any exploration of alternative sponsors.
7.6.5 Structuring and Implementation
For this final stage of collaborative policy making, the following conditions must be in place:
Redistribution of power – structuring the domain involves negotiating and setting rules for
regulation of the domain, including an agreed allocation of power.
Implementation processes – agreement on the allocation of resources is needed to facilitate
practical action.
Contextual environment – the collective ability of stakeholders to influence their domain
and build relationships with actors outside the domain.
In section 7.5 it was noted that for RBMP and Marine Planning in particular, the relative newness of
these planning systems meant that the findings of the structuring and implementation stage were
based on suppositions about the way those respective regimes would develop, and thus concluding
comments here will be limited to observing that the top-down nature of RBMP does provide a clear
structure for implementation, but without proper expression of the benefits of collaboration, there
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remains some gaps in allocating responsibilities to those stakeholders needed to fulfill the
Programme of Measures, whilst for Marine Planning consensus on a final Marine Policy Statement is
required to realize the full extent of collaborative working and integration that may be possible.
However ICZM, being the most mature of the three regimes provides more substantial evidence
upon which conclusions about structuring and implementation may be drawn. In this stage,
structuring is characterised as bringing a degree of formalisation to collaborative arrangements
through legal frameworks, allocation of responsibilities, a systematic plan making process and
providing financial resources, and thus as a non-statutory system of management, these conditions
are largely absent from ICZM.
However this does not prevent coastal partnerships from delivering ICZM, as even without a
formally structured planning and management system in place, goal setting and plan making is able
to progress at the local level through consensus building and negotiation. In the exploring options
stage (section 7.3 of this chapter), the strategic principles of coastal partnerships were referred to as
“motherhood and apple pie”, reflecting a view that they may be broad enough to be uncontroversial
and indefinable, however this point also demonstrates that without a clear definition of the coastal
problem at higher levels of governance, it may not be possible to provide a clear direction for coastal
policy that can be cascaded down to the stakeholders that deliver ICZM on the ground.
In Chapter Four, the following quote from Schattschneider was used to illustrate the way in which
discourses around “problems” are shaped:
“the group that successfully defines a problem will also be the one that defines solutions to it,
thereby prevailing in the policy debate” (1960, in Birkland, 2005:109).
Through this analysis, it has been demonstrated that the above quote holds true, as the manner in
which coastal, marine and catchment problems are defined by more or less powerful groups dictates
whether solutions are implemented by top-down, bottom-up or synthesis approaches.
7.6.6 Some Conclusions on the Collaborative Policy Making Cycle
In undertaking the second phase of empirical work that has been the subject of this chapter, some
comments must be made on the use of the collaborative policy making cycle framework as both a
theory and methodology for investigating how collaboration is used in practice.
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At the beginning of Section 7.6, reference was made to the way in which the collaborative policy
making cycle has been built on a synthesis of John Hannigan’s (1995) social construction of an
environmental problem, stages of the policy cycle outlined by Howlett and Ramesh (2003) and
Barbara Gray’s conditions facilitating inter-organisational collaboration (adapted by Jarvis, 2007),
and reflecting some of the characteristics outlined by Healey (1992) of communicative planning
theory. In this synthesis, the work of Hannigan (1995) and Gray (1985) provides a number of
propositions about conditions which must be present in order to first define a problem (in the case
of Hannigan) and then devise and implement a structure for collaborative efforts to solve a problem
(Gray). Whilst there are some overlaps in the social construction of a problem and what Gray terms
the “problem setting” phase of collaboration, the two sets of propositions combined and set within
the framework of the staged policy cycle (with some additional propositions from the author added
to capture other elements of policy making) provides a full set of criteria against which collaboration
in policy making can be evaluated.
In addition, referring back to the conclusions of Chapter Three in which Hannigan’s (1995) social
construction model was found to be insufficient to fully explain how problem recognition then leads
to implementation of a solution, by appending Gray’s model to Hannigan’s, this extended set of
propositions or prerequisites provides a logical progression from problem recognition, through
direction setting and decision making to implementation, thereby addressing one of the major
shortcomings of Hannigan’s model.
Taking this collaborative policy making cycle as a methodology for analysing coastal planning
regimes, one strength of the model has been identified as its usefulness as a tool for benchmarking
degrees of collaboration within coastal planning regimes. Whilst the notion of “best” ICZM practice
has been criticized by Davos (1998) and reference has been made to the failures of “ideal”,
technical-rational planning processes, rather than try to eliminate values or politics from decision
making, the model of collaboration proposed by Gray incorporates the search for coincident
stakeholder values as a driver of collaboration. In this sense, therefore, the propositions made by
Gray as conducive to collaborative working represent an ideal situation, but an ideal situation in
which individual values and preferences are revealed rather than obscured in the decision making
process.
Subsequently, by incorporating values and preferences into the process of decision making,
Hannigan and Gray’s propositions combined can be used to demonstrate how the relative powers of
stakeholders influence and structure decision making – first through attempts to define a problem,
where the findings of this and the previous chapter have shown that, for example, the dominant
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discourse of the European Union around water quality places them in a position of being a powerful
institutional sponsor and leader of efforts to solve the problem, and that in subsequent stages of
decision making, these powers are not truly dispersed amongst other stakeholders. On the other
hand, an ambiguous definition of the coastal problem disperses power amongst a number of
stakeholders, and efforts to combine these powers in collaborative relationships are hampered by
weak linkages between more and less powerful stakeholders.
Finally, the applicability of the collaborative policy making framework to other examples of policy
making will be discussed more fully in the concluding chapter (Chapter Eight), however here it will
be pointed out that in applying the framework to three environmental planning regimes that are
seen to originate from different levels of government and with varying degrees of formality, it has
been demonstrated that the collaborative policy making cycle can provide a synthesis approach to
investigating top-down and bottom-up styles of implementation.
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusions: Reflections on Collaboration in Coastal Planning Regimes
8.1 Introduction
This final chapter of the thesis brings together the main findings of the research in order to provide
some final conclusions about the use of collaboration in coastal planning regimes and make
recommendations for future policy development and research.
The chapter begins with a review of the aim and objectives of the research and the key findings from
each chapter. These findings are discussed with reference to the research objectives, and some
overall conclusions of the thesis are presented. This is followed by a critical reflection upon the
research methodology, its strengths and weaknesses, and possibilities for future development.
To conclude, a set of recommendations for the use of collaboration in ICZM and the broader field of
coastal management will be provided.
8.2 Research Summary: Review of Aim and Objectives
In order to summarise the research that has been undertaken, reference must be made to the
research aim and objectives, and the thesis structure set out in Chapter One.
Aim
To critically assess the implementation of ICZM in the wider context of coastal planning regimes, in
order to develop a more effective model of collaboration for coastal governance.
Objectives
1. To critically assess the practice Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the UK and place
this in the context of current planning and management regimes for the coastal and marine
environment.
2. To explain the emergence of coastal planning regimes in terms of the social construction of a
“coastal problem” in order to understand the different policy responses that may occur.
3. To develop an understanding of how integration may be facilitated by collaboration
between stakeholders in coastal organisations.
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4. To determine what factors are most important in practice for constructing claims about a
coastal problem, and provide a reappraisal of the social construction model proposed by
John Hannigan.
5. To evaluate how collaboration is embedded within the plan making processes of coastal
organisations and provide recommendations as to how collaborative policy making may be
improved.
Figure 1.3: Summary of Thesis Structure
Source: Author
Theoretical
Framework
Conceptual and
Contextual
Framework
Empirical
Phase I
Analysis
Empirical
Phase II
Objective 5
7. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS II: Incorporating
Stakeholder Perspectives and Improving
Integration Through Collaboration
8. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS: Reflections
on the Case Studies and Recommendations
Objective 4 6. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS I: Stakeholder
Perspectives on the Nature of the “Coastal
Problem”
5. METHODOLOGY: Putting Collaboration into
Practice: a Framework for Evaluating
Collaboration in Coastal Planning Regimes
Objective 3 4. LITERATURE REVIEW III: A Collaborative Model
of Policy Making for ICZM
Objective 2 3. LITERATURE REVIEW II: Exploring the Social
Construction of Coastal Management Problems
Objective 1
1. INTRODUCTION: The Challenge of Coastal
Management in the UK
2. LITERATURE REVIEW I: the Key to Integration in
ICZM - the Need for a Collaborative Approach
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Objective One: To critically assess the practice Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the UK and
place this in the context of current planning and management regimes for the coastal and marine
environment.
In meeting Objective One of the research, Chapters One and Two introduced the practice of ICZM,
which was proposed as one of the ways in which the complex problems of the coast could be
addressed through the coordination and integration of activities on both sides of the land-sea divide.
However, a number of ICZM “ implementation failures” had been observed in the UK, for example
by the Local Government Association (2002) and Stojanovic and Shipman (2007), relating to, most
importantly, a lack of national ICZM policy, the voluntary nature of coastal partnerships (the
organisations which attempt to promote and deliver ICZM) and information gaps. Furthermore, the
failures of ICZM were set against a backdrop of other newly emerging planning regimes which have
implications for coastal management, including Marine Planning and River Basin Management, as
required under the European Union’s Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC, which raised issues
about the future of ICZM implementation.
It was at this point that two fundamental hypotheses of the research were introduced, first:
the definition of an environmental problem, and the formulation and implementation of a
solution, is the product of a process of social construction,
and secondly:
improved integration and implementation of ICZM is dependent on a continuous discourse
between stakeholders on the nature of problems and solutions.
In Chapter Two, much attention was given to exploring the meaning and different dimensions of
integration which underpin ICZM activities, including integration in horizontal and vertical, spatial
and temporal dimensions, and integration of sectors, institutions, policies and across disciplines.
Communicative planning, as characterised by Healey (1992) may facilitate integration through open
and inclusive planning processes which recognise different constructions of knowledge, possibilities
for learning and opportunities for building consensus around the nature of problems and common
objectives. Communicative planning theory therefore supports the second assumption of the thesis,
that improved integration and implementation of ICZM is dependent on a continuous discourse
between stakeholders.
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Objective Two: To explain the emergence of coastal planning regimes in terms of the social
construction of a “coastal problem” in order to understand the different policy responses that may
occur.
This objective relates specifically to Chapter Three and the first phase of empirical work. Building on
the assumption of Chapter One, that the definition of an environmental problem, and the
formulation and implementation of a solution, is the product of a process of social construction, this
chapter sought to examine how coastal problems were socially constructed using John Hannigan’s
(1995) model of the social construction of an environmental problem. Hannnigan’s model outlines
six prerequisites that must be present in order to socially construct a claim, including scientific
authority for and validation of claims, the existence of popularisers who can link science and
environmentalism, use of the media, dramatisation of the problem in visual or symbolic terms,
economic incentives for taking positive action and the recruitment of an institutional sponsor.
In determining how different social constructions of an environmental problem may lead to different
policy responses, the social construction of coastal problems was compared against the social
construction of the marine problem (which provided the grounds for a proposed new system of
Marine Spatial Planning) and river basin or catchment problems, which formed the basis of the
European Union’s new Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC. These regimes were chosen for
comparison because of similarities in terms of their broad sustainability and integration objectives,
and participatory processes.
The findings of this comparison are divided into two parts. First, in comparing the social construction
of coastal, marine and catchment problems, it was found that for ICZM, despite the support of high
profile institutional sponsors such as the European Union, the division of scientific evidence between
the land and marine sides of the coastal zone prevented a holistic picture of coastal problems being
constructed. For Marine Planning, scientific evidence and pressure from NGOs were found to be key
aspects of defining the marine problem, and for RBMP, strong leadership from the European Union
as a populariser and institutional sponsor provided the basis for defining a European-wide
catchment or water quality problem.
Finally, in evaluating Hannigan’s model as a means of exploring the social construction of
environmental problems, it was found that the model did not reflect the nuanced way in which
certain prerequisites featured more or less strongly in the construction of a problem, for example, as
use of the media and economic incentives for action were less persuasive in making a case for ICZM.
Also, the social construction model did not provide an adequate explanatory framework for
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exploring the process of decision making and policy formulation once a problem had been defined.
These two points provided grounds for further investigation of the way “problems” were socially
constructed in practice, and how this definition might lead to a solution.
Objective Three: To develop an understanding of how integration may be facilitated by
collaboration between stakeholders in coastal organisations.
For this objective, the thesis built on some early insights into the different dimensions of integration
featured in Chapter Two, and, based on the assumption that improved integration and
implementation of ICZM is dependent on a continuous discourse between stakeholders on the nature
of problems and solutions, a collaborative policy making cycle based on the prerequisites outlined by
Hannigan for the social construction of problems and the work of Barbara Gray (1985) adapted by
Jarvis (2007), was proposed as a method of incorporating discourse and consensus building between
stakeholders into every stage of the policy cycle.
This model of collaborative policy making was then used as the basis for the second stage of
empirical work. A case study approach was taken to investigating the use of collaboration within the
three planning regimes of ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP, with the propositions of the
collaborative policy cycle being turned into a series of generic questionnaire statements designed to
capture the way in which coastal, marine or catchment problems are constructed and also
examining the extent to which conditions facilitating collaboration are present. The questionnaire
also formed the basis for semi-structured interviews with representatives from each of the case
study organisations.
Objective Four: To determine what factors are most important in practice for constructing claims
about a coastal problem, and provide a reappraisal of the social construction model proposed by
John Hannigan (1995).
This objective has been met by a combination of the first phase of empirical work in Chapter Three,
which examined the social construction of coastal, marine and catchment problems through a
literature review, and the second phase of empirical work which is based on the case study research
and reported in Chapter Six.
In Chapter Three, following an initial literature review it was proposed that Hannigan’s model could
be refined to show the more nuanced way in which problems are constructed. Through the
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collaborative policy making cycle and questionnaire developed in Chapters Four and Five
respectively, the case studies from ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP were used to test this theory,
with questionnaire respondents providing their own perspectives on how coastal, marine and
catchment problems are constructed, and by appending propositions about the use of collaboration,
it was possible to see how problem recognition influenced the remaining stages of the policy cycle.
The findings of this questionnaire showed how prerequisites such as scientific evidence,
endorsement of evidence and institutional sponsors were stronger elements in claims making for
each regime, and in particular the issue of who defines problems was identified as key to explaining
the way regimes move through the policy cycle.
In reconsidering Hannigan (1995), it was therefore found that acknowledging a more nuanced
perspective of Hannigan’s model, in which prerequisites may display a weak or strong presence,
provided a more accurate evaluation of the social construction of environmental problems. The
addition of a statement in the questionnaire relating to the achievements of previous policy
initiatives also enabled the model to take account of problems that are reconstructed through
repeated iterations of the policy cycle.
Objective Five: To evaluate how collaboration is embedded within the plan making processes of
coastal organisations and provide recommendations as to how collaborative policy making may be
improved.
This objective has been partly met by the second phase of empirical work which is reported in
Chapter Seven and is completed by the conclusions and recommendations featured in this chapter.
In Chapter Seven it was found that the use of collaboration varies considerably across ICZM, Marine
Planning and RBMP, with ICZM displaying high levels of collaborative working at the local level, but
failing to engage what might be considered more powerful stakeholders from statutory bodies and
national government due to vague definitions of the “coastal problem” and a lack of shared beliefs
about the benefits of collaboration. In RBMP, collaborative working was found to be minimal due to
the top-down nature of implementation which excluded many stakeholders from the decision
making process, and in Marine Planning, limited collaboration had been fostered by recognising a
lack of integration in previous initiatives.
The final set of conclusions and recommendations that contribute to Objective Five are now
considered below.
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8.3 Conclusions
Having reviewed the research objectives, the conclusions presented here contribute to meeting the
overall aim of the thesis, which is:
To critically assess the implementation of ICZM in the wider context of coastal planning regimes,
in order to develop a more effective model of collaboration for coastal governance.
The conclusions therefore address three main issues – the social construction of environmental
problems, the collaborative policy making cycle and the implications of this research for coastal
planning regimes.
The Socially Constructed Nature of Environmental Problems
In Chapter One, the socially constructed nature of environmental problems was identified as a
catalyst for implementing different policy regimes and in Chapter Three, this assumption was
explored using John Hannigan’s (1995) propositions for the social construction of an environmental
problem, which had previously been used by Peel and Lloyd (2004) to analyse the emerging system
of Marine Spatial Planning.
In choosing to compare the social construction of ICZM against Marine Planning and River Basin
Management Planning, this research has revealed not only insights into the way that the “coastal
problem” is socially constructed, but also opened up the research to consider what, if anything, may
be learned from the implementation of other coastal planning regimes that may contribute to the
theories and future practice of ICZM. Using a comparative study approach in this way therefore
represented a departure from previous studies of ICZM, the majority of which have been limited to
comparing examples of practice from within the field of ICZM (see for example McGlashan 2002,
Gubbay, 2002, and Stojanovic and Shipman, 2007) as a means of defining shortcomings and
contributing to improved practice.
Whilst it is acknowledged that applying Hannigan’s model to coastal planning regimes is not a new
idea, the application of this approach in the thesis has enabled a reappraisal and development of
Hannigan’s original concept. Testing the model through first a literature review, this identified the
potentially nuanced way in which the prerequisites suggested by Hannigan contribute to social
construction, and then a survey of stakeholder perspectives of socially constructed problems helped
to confirm this observation, demonstrating that in the coastal planning regimes investigated,
different combinations of scientific evidence, popularisers or institutional sponsors are the main
factors driving the social construction of problems, whilst the use of the media, dramatisation of the
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problem in symbolic terms and economic incentives for taking action are not necessarily as
persuasive in claims making.
This conclusion also highlights the fact that coastal, marine and catchment problems are not “novel”
in a manner that captures attention through the media, but based on a longer term discourse and
understandings of previous attempts to address problems. The inclusion of a statement in the
“Problem recognition” section of the questionnaire which encouraged respondents to think about
the success or failures of previous initiatives thus provided an additional factor which is not
addressed in Hannigan’s model - the importance of feedback from previous iterations of the policy
cycle for reframing environmental problems.
Also in Chapter Three, the initial testing of Hannigan’s model identified its lack of explanatory
powers in relation to moving from the social construction or definition of a problem to
implementation of a response. This has been addressed through the development of the
collaborative policy making cycle, and the conclusions of this phase of the research are now
discussed.
The Collaborative Policy Making Cycle
As described in Chapters Four and Seven, the collaborative policy making cycle used in this thesis
represents a combination of theories, and by combining the propositions of Hannigan (1995) on the
social construction of environmental problems with Barbara Gray’s (1985) conditions facilitating
inter-organisational collaboration into a staged policy making cycle, this extended set of propositions
enhances two theoretical frameworks, and in a similar vein to the governance performance
indicators developed by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission for Integrated Coastal
and Ocean Management (IOC, 2006), the collaborative policy making cycle and its associated
propositions provide a set of normative criteria against which collaborative policy making can be
evaluated.
First, with regards to the gap identified in Chapter Three between problem definition and
implementation of a response, appending the Hannigan model with Gray’s propositions, the
collaborative policy making model bridges this gap and the two sets of propositions together provide
a logical extension of the social construction model into further stages of policy making.
In evaluating the implementation of ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP against the conditions set out
in the collaborative policy making cycle, the social construction or definition of the problem was
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found to be fundamental in structuring the process of decision making and policy implementation
that followed. This is because the Gray model is founded on learning and the search for common
ground between organisations, whether this is in the construction of a problem or agreeing a
common future for the domain. Therefore at every stage of the policy cycle a process of
constructing and reconstructing the problem takes place as stakeholders share information and
attempt to reach agreement on issues such as the balance of power in collaborative arrangements
and rules that structure implementation.
In addition, the diagram used to represent the collaborative policy making cycle first developed in
Chapter Four (see Figure 4.6) can be further developed to show how the social construction of
problems drives the remaining stages of the policy cycle. In Figure 8.1, an outer circle has been
added to the collaborative policy making cycle, and within this arrows show the construction of the
problem driving progress through each stage of decision making.
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Figure 8.1: The Collaborative Policy Making Cycle, Revised
Source: Author
A further conclusion that can be drawn from examining the social construction of coastal planning
regimes and the way they progress through the collaborative policy making cycle is about the power
relations attached to definitions of problems. In Chapter Two, the work of Foucault (1972) was
drawn upon in exploring how powers exercised through the use of language may reinforce dominant
discourses and social practice, and this is clearly evidenced in the way that the definition of water
quality problems by the European Union structures a top-down policy response in the form of Water
Framework Directive 2000/60/EC.
On the other hand, where there is no clear definition of the coastal problem, such powers are
dispersed – whilst this has benefits for coastal partnerships in that they are able to set their own
agendas and build networks from the bottom up, the absence of a more powerful stakeholder (such
as national government) in the problem recognition stage also limits access to power in later stages
of decision making. This is demonstrated by the references interviewees made to the role of DEFRA
in ICZM, and the fact that clearer guidance from DEFRA on the role of coastal partnerships or the
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implementation of ICZM was considered desirable. Thus the collaborative policy making cycle, in
presenting a normative set of criteria for an open and democratic process of decision making, also
serves to expose dominant structures of power which may adversely affect attempts at consensus
building and collaborative working.
A final conclusion of this section concerns the applicability of the collaborative policy making cycle to
other problems or policy regimes. In Gray’s original series of conditions facilitating inter-
organisational collaboration (1985), Gray concludes that “collaboration is a viable and necessary
approach to confronting many complex problems faced by our society. Constructive response to
problems such as declining industries, acid rain and others which affect multiple sectors of society
require analysis at the domain level and the pooling of information and resources amongst various
stakeholders” (1985:931), but that further comparative studies are necessary to understand how
each of these conditions contributes to successful collaboration in different settings (Ibid, p932).
Therefore the research undertaken here using Gray’s propositions represents further testing of
these conditions in three settings simultaneously, the only drawback of the approach being that as
the Dee River Basin Management Plan and Marine Planning are still at an early stage of
implementation, the collaborative policy making model as a whole is more suited to examining
planning regimes that have been through at least one complete iteration of the policy cycle.
In appending Hannigan’s prerequisites for the social construction of environmental problems, it may
be considered that this adapts the Gray model specifically for use in situations that have a distinct
spatial or environmental dimension. This may be true to a certain extent, given that the construction
of environmental problems is in large parts reliant on scientific evidence and the ability to
communicate scientific findings in an effective manner through popularisers, the media or symbols,
however the prerequisites outlined by Hannigan (1995) are largely generic in character and thus
adaptable to problems outside the environmental sphere.
8.4 Recommendations
The final objective of this thesis was to evaluate how collaboration is embedded within the plan
making processes of coastal organisations and provide recommendations as to how collaborative
policy making may be improved. The first part of this objective was addressed in Chapter Seven in
presenting and analysing the findings of the second phase of empirical research, that is, the case
study research on the Marine Spatial Planning Pilot, Dee River Basin Management Plan, Severn
Estuary Partnership, Dorset Coast Forum and the East Grampian Coastal Partnership.
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In Chapter Seven it was found that for each of the three planning regimes examined, the social
construction of the problem, whether coastal, marine or catchment structured the decision making
process, and thus the extent to which the conditions facilitating collaboration are present or absent.
Subsequently for RBMP, the high level nature of problem definition and decision making means
there is an absence of negotiation and consensus building. In Marine Planning joint information
searches (in the form of the MSP Pilot), has facilitated a greater consensus on the nature of the
problem and consensus on Marine Planning as a solution to the marine problem. Finally for ICZM,
the ambiguous definition of the coastal problem and the uneven distribution of powers between
stakeholders leads to higher levels of collaboration at local level, but weak links between local and
national levels of governance, which has hindered more formalised and powerful arrangements of
stakeholders implementing solutions (hence the “implementation failures” identified in Chapter
One).
In providing recommendations as to how collaborative policy making may be improved, it is helpful
to return to the references made in Chapter Two about the ways in which notions of the coastal
zone can be constructed in terms of biophysical and policy definitions. In particular, Cicin-Sain (1993)
suggests that coastal/marine zones can be differentiated along a spectrum of property and
government interests, with the governance of inland waters dominated by local level institutions
and private property interests, whilst in the offshore and high sea zones, public interests and
international governance regimes prevail (see Figure 2.2, reproduced below).
This comparison of coastal governance interests along the continuum of private-public property also
serves to highlight an important relationship between different levels of governance, stakeholders
and “ownership” in the sense of engagement in coastal planning regimes. Ownership in the decision
making process encompasses a number of characteristics that were identified in communicative
planning by Healey (1992), including the ability of stakeholders to have their opinions heard
respectfully and to contribute to developing solutions, and thus is directly linked with Gray’s
proposed condition of positive beliefs about outcomes in collaborative arrangements (see Gray,
1985).
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Figure 2.2: Nature of Property and Government Interests and Institutions in Coastal/Ocean Areas
Coastal ocean spectrum
Inland areas Coastal lands Coastal waters Offshore
waters
High seas
Nature of
Property
Private Private/public Predominantly public
Nature of
government
interests
Local/provincial Mix of local/provincial/
national
Mainly
national
Mainly
international
Nature of
government
Multi-purpose agencies Single-purpose agencies
Source: Cicin-Sain (1993:28)
For Marine Planning, the MMO represents a departure from Cicin-Sain’s (1993) continuum in that as
a body representing a mix of regional, national and international interests, the MMO will also be a
multiple-purpose agency, and this reflects the construction of the marine problem in terms of a lack
of integration between sectors and government departments.
For RBMP, the nature of RBMP implementation stands in complete contrast to Cicin-Sain’s
continuum, with international and national government (top-down) interests dominating ownership
of catchment problems and solutions, where it is expected that ownership should be greatest in
local stakeholders and local government agencies. The findings from the Dee RBMP case study show
that this is not the case, with several interviewees regarding decision making for RBMP as taking
place at a higher strategic level than the individual river basin, and thus limiting engagement and
ownership of the RBMP process at local levels.
For ICZM, Cicin-Sain’s (1993) continuum of interests and governance represents a fair approximation
of ICZM practice in the UK, whereby numerous short-term projects foster the ownership of activities
aimed at resolving coastal problems by local coastal stakeholders. However the division between
land and marine sides of the coastal zone, and the weak link between local and national levels of
government fails to reflect the mix of interests suggested by Cicin-Sain, and thus ICZM activities may
lack the strategic coherence that can be provided by a degree of coordination originating at the
national level.
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Bearing these points, and the earlier conclusions about the social construction of environmental
problems and collaborative policy making in mind, the following recommendations are made to
assist collaborative efforts in coastal governance. Some of the recommendations are generic, and
some relate specifically to ICZM. The recommendations relate to two main themes - first, clarifying
“problems” and second, increasing use of collaborative approaches.
Clarifying “Problems”
In Chapter Four, reference was made to the work of Schattschneider (1960) and Stone (2002), who
both identify that those groups who are able to identify a problem are subsequently able to shape
solutions to fit their own interests. In relation to this, the social construction of coastal, marine and
catchment problems has been found to be fundamental to subsequent phases of decision making.
Evidence from the case studies shows that problems in interpreting and communicating complex,
sometimes technical data, can disenfranchise stakeholders at an early stage of the policy cycle, as is
evidenced by the comment that “There’s a lot of information gathering going on, but combining that
into anything meaningful is not happening, or it doesn’t seem that it is possible to find a simple
digest” (p187), and the case of River Basin Management, where reports on water body classification
were described as being aimed at the “professionally interested” (p188) and inaccessible to a wider
audience. In addition, data must be appropriate to the scale of the plan area or jurisdiction of
stakeholders to ensure that it is relevant and meaningful to stakeholders “on the ground”. Thus the
following propositions are made:
Recommendation 1: Clarify data needs
This has relevance to all three planning regimes, but is particularly aimed at coastal partnerships
and those organisations which have links with coastal partnerships, such as DEFRA, the MMO
and Natural England.
In the case study interviews it was stated that “getting people... to agree which indicators might
be used to identify sustainable practice appears to be very difficult” (p??).
ThereforeStakeholders should give greater consideration to selecting a small number of data
sets out of the many data sources that are available, and also identify additional sources of
information they may need to better understand existing and potential problems. This would
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enable more robust claims for action to be made regarding newly discovered problems, or
provide a stronger evidence base to justify management decisions within an existing policy
framework.
Also, in embarking on any data collection exercise, organisations with powers in relation to data
collection and monitoring should consider a scoping or pre-consultation exercise which allows
other stakeholders to outline what information would be most useful for them.
For coastal partnerships, entering into this debate could require some negotiation to engage
other data collecting organisations in a joint information search of the type elucidated by Gray
(1985) as part of consensus building. However, such arrangements can be mutually beneficial in
terms of drawing new stakeholders and resources into collaboration and also facilitating the
creation of new information, either by interpreting information in a new way, or constructing
entirely new data sets.
Whilst it may not be possible to guarantee the feasibility of meeting information requests,
however this would allow stakeholders an early opportunity to outline their concerns, and in
attempting to reach consensus about what information should be collected, this may facilitate
further agreement about the nature of the problem.
Recommendation 2: Communicate messages in simpler terms
This is relevant to coastal partnerships and river basin management.
As has been explained above, the sheer volume environmental data being produced can be
problematic for distilling simple messages, and also the technical nature of some of this
information as shown in the case of River Basin Management is unhelpful to a broader audience
of stakeholders. The findings of Chapters Three and Six on the social construction of problems
found that communication through visual and symbolic means, for example through the media
and negative news stories featured less prominently in constructing claims in the case studies,
despite being a fundamental part of Hannigan’s model of social construction.
This finding does not preclude communication in symbolic and visual terms, however, and thus
following on from Recommendation One (above) which advocates a more selective approach to
data use, communicating technical data in more simple, understandable terms, using a “report
card” format may be appropriate. This could incorporate ideas such as a traffic light system to
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signify good, average and bad situations (for example in water quality or monitoring beach
litter) alongside short explanations of key messages that can help stakeholders to recognise
issues that must be prioritised.
Specifically in relation to ICZM, reference has been made by interviewees to “State of the
Coast” reports that have either been produced (for Dorset Coast Forum) or are in preparation
(for East Grampian Coastal Partnership and Severn Estuary Partnership). These reports reflect
local concerns and priorities, and thus there may be great variation in content from one report
to another. However, a standard template for “State of the Coast” reports focused on a small
number of key indicators would allow an aggregation of data from multiple areas that could
feed upwards into national policy making, giving a greater role to coastal partnerships in helping
to design and deliver coastal policy.
Increasing Use of Collaborative Approaches
Gray (1985) notes that “inability to achieve the appropriate conditions during each phase *of
collaboration+ may be the best source of explanations to date for why collaborative efforts fail”
(1985:932) and in the findings of Chapter Seven it was found that another of the reasons why there
may be lower levels of engagement from some sectors in collaboration is because shared beliefs
about outcomes or the benefits of collaborative working are not present. Many benefits of
collaborative working, including “improved decision making” and “more coherent spatial planning”
are intangible and thus hard to communicate, therefore the following recommendations are made:
Recommendation 3: Adopt the Collaborative Policy Making Model
This is relevant for River Basin Management and Marine Planning.
Whilst section 7.2 showed that in most cases partnership working had been proposed for their
respective regime, and for ICZM had become embedded in ways of working, there are still some
major barriers to be overcome for RBMP and marine planning in terms of identifying a broader
set of stakeholders (see section 7.2.2 - with the general public being absent from consultations),
negotiating core goals (a particular problem for RBMP, where there has been a perceived lack of
negotiation - section 7.3.2) and achieving a greater dispersal of powers between stakeholders
(section 7.3.3). These issues may resolve themselves as river basin and marine planning
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progress and become more familiar ways of working, however all stakeholders can gain further
insights into the steps needed to achieve a more collaborative style of working through
understanding the process of collaboration as it is articulated by Gray (1985), the Audit
Commission (1998) or the collaborative policy making cycle contained within this thesis.
Having an awareness of progress through the policy cycle will thus help stakeholders to identify
what conditions should be in place - and which conditions are not - at each stage of decision
making. This will enable efforts to be redirected at facilitating the conditions that are conducive
to collaborative working, for example it may be necessary to find new ways of articulating the
benefits of partnership working to ensure that the widest possible range of stakeholders
become involved.
Recommendation 4: Acknowledge collaboration as an adaptive, learning process
This is relevant to coastal partnerships, river basin management and marine planning.
Healey’s characteristics of communicative planning include “Development of reflective capacity
to evaluate the communicative process” and “A starting point for a continually evolving process
of building shared understanding and desired outcomes” (Healey, 1992: 154-6). Taking the
findings of section 7.4 and 7.5 which examine decision making and implementation, it can be
seen from the relatively low levels of agreement on whether coordination has been achieved
(Figure 7.10) and the mixed responses to the questions of having a legal framework in place
(Figure 7.14) and the allocation of responsibilities (Figure 7.15) that current arrangements for
ICZM, Marine Planning and RBMP have potential for a great deal of improvement.
Therefore it must be assumed that stakeholders cannot create perfect collaborative conditions
first time and may need to be pragmatic in working with less than ideal situations to begin with.
However, adopting a collaborative approach to policy making can foster improved governance
through filling information gaps, increasing horizontal and vertical integration of organisations
and policy initiatives, sharing examples of best practice and evaluating and refining decision
making processes.
Finally, some comments must be made on the integration of the coastal governance regimes that
have been the subject of this thesis. As noted in Chapter Seven, many of the findings related to later
stages of the collaborative policy cycle were based on speculative views about the implementation
of RBMP, Marine Planning and an uncertain future for ICZM in the face of new arrangements for
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Marine Planning. However one thing that may facilitate collaboration in all cases is greater
consideration and coordination with the other planning regimes. In particular, the lack of coastal
representatives on the Dee River Basin Liaison Panel has been noted in collaborative arrangements,
and the division of land and seaward sides in defining the coastal problem have been cited for the
ambiguous position of ICZM. Furthermore, the weak links between coastal partnerships and more
formal bodies have been identified as central to “implementation failures”, however as there is no
statutory body with responsibility for the coastal zone, coastal partnerships should look to both
Marine Planning and River Basin Management as opportunities to build stronger alliances.
The coastal zone may be a peripheral area for both river basins and the marine zones; however a
partnership of inland water, coastal and marine interests could deliver much greater benefits for
coastal sustainability.
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8.5 Reflections on the Methodology
In this conclusion chapter, the use of social constructionist and collaborative theories as a
methodology have been considered separately, and therefore this set of reflections is concentrated
on more practical aspects of the methodology used. In undertaking this research, it was identified
that in order to investigate the social construction of coastal problems and understand how this
influences coastal planning in practice, two phases of empirical research would be required. The
first, comprising of a literature review tracing the development of coastal planning through John
Hannigan’s (1995) model for the social construction of an environmental problem, is contained
within Chapter Three. Besides the comments made earlier in this chapter regarding the findings of
Chapter Three, this first phase of empirical work provided a sound theoretical basis on which
subsequent chapters could be built, but also represents an exercise that could feature as a
standalone piece of research in its own right, demonstrating the usefulness of the social
constructionist approach for understanding the development of environmental policy regimes.
For the second phase of empirical research, the case study approach was much more problematic,
and these issues are addressed here. The main problems encountered in undertaking the case study
research revolve around the issues of:
1. Communication with case study organisations – in terms of key contacts or gatekeepers,
selecting interviewees and questionnaire distribution, and
2. The structure of the questionnaire.
In the first instance, Chapter Five describes how, once each case study was selected, contact was
established with a key individual or gatekeeper in the case study organisations in order to gain
endorsement of the research and provide access to interviewees and questionnaire respondents.
Whilst it was felt that approaching an individual with a formal role in the day to day workings of the
case study organisation such as a partnership officer was appropriate in terms of going through
“official” channels, this route into the organisations is not without its own set of problems. As was
pointed out in Chapter One, many coastal partnerships have suffered due to a rapid staff turnover
and what McGlashan (2002) terms a loss of “corporate memory”. This being the case, partnership
officers may not have been the most suitable gatekeeper for accessing interviewees, in particular
those who have not been working with their organisation since its formation (or for an extended
period of time). More recently appointed officers may lack the knowledge of which individuals can
provide the most useful information regarding the history of the organisation, personnel and
projects, or understanding of the organisation’s place in the wider context of coastal planning
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regimes. In a similar vein, partnership officers were considered to be suitable candidates for
interviews because of their assumed knowledge, however their perspectives on the organisation
they work for may be a reflection of their own roles and responsibilities at a particular point in time
and not free from bias.
With these points in mind, an alternative key contact or gatekeeper is suggested here as being the
chairman of the organisation (although it is noted that no such position existed for the MSP case
study). For reasons of ethical practice and courtesy, it remains necessary to seek the consent and
support of partnership staff, however the main advantages of using the chair as a gatekeeper would
be that they possibly have a greater knowledge about the organisation, and rather than soliciting
interviewees through an email distributed by the partnership officer, the chair may be able to advise
more comprehensively on the suitability of other potential interviewees. This would facilitate a more
rounded set of interviewees to be targeted than is the case when dependent upon responses to a
generic email or letter, and through further personal contact a greater number of interviews may
have been possible.
The disadvantages of relying upon one key contact also manifested in the relatively low response to
the online questionnaires. Whilst it is widely known that administering surveys by mail
(electronically or physically) can yield low results, attempts to target the wider membership of the
ICZM case studies were adversely affected by data protection and privacy issues, in that some
partnership staff were unable to send an emailed invitation to the online questionnaire on behalf of
the author through their mailing lists. In these cases, a link to the questionnaire was placed on the
case study organisation’s own website, and although the exact number of responses obtained from
these web links can only be estimated, it is assumed that they account for less than 5% of the total
responses. Therefore as a strategy to obtain further data that would complement the questionnaire
responses from interviewees, this method proved unsuccessful. The low overall response rate also
meant that in Chapters Six and Seven, descriptions of questionnaire responses could only be
referred to in terms of “high” and “low” levels of agreement as the true figures were judged to be
insufficient for quantitative analysis.
As with accessing interviewees, a more personal approach to collecting questionnaire responses
could have been taken. In conducting the case study research, the author attended a number of
partnership meetings, forums and events where potential questionnaire respondents were present,
and these occasions could have been used to distribute and collate questionnaires by face to face
methods. This would have removed the emphasis on the online questionnaire as the main method
of gathering responses, and enabled a better balance to be maintained in terms of number of
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responses from each organisation which was not possible using the email invitation or web link
options.
A second set of problems encountered in undertaking the case study research was regarding the
structure of the questionnaire. In Chapters Six and Seven, the questionnaire results display a
significant number of “don’t know” responses to some statements, in particular in Section 3 of the
questionnaire, which asked about experimentation in policy and institutional design and the
dispersal of power between stakeholders. The number of “don’t know” responses suggests that
some questionnaire respondents did not understand what the statement was asking, and that more
care should be taken to ensure that the use of academic or abstract language is avoided.
8.6 Further Research
Whilst this thesis explores collaboration and ICZM implementation in the UK in some depth, it must
be acknowledged that this represents only one aspect of ICZM and the broader topic of coastal and
marine governance. Thus there are several potential avenues for investigation which may build upon
the work undertaken here, and some suggestions for further research are now outlined below.
A first possibility for further research is related to the use of science and scientific evidence by
coastal partnerships. Throughout the thesis, the use of scientific evidence has been highlighted as
crucial for the social construction of claims about a coastal, marine or catchment problem, and
research has shown that data may not be available in the right format (i.e. not at a scale appropriate
to local needs, or not covering the land and seaward sides of the coastal zone together) or that
decision makers may lack the capacity to interpret complex data. Stojanovic et al (2009) describe
one way in which these problems may be overcome in coastal partnerships through the use of
research networks, or more specifically developing research strategies – “multi disciplinary
programmes of applied research to support policy making and management decisions” (Stojanovic et
al, 2009:902), through setting priorities for research, identifying information gaps and future
research needs in order to assist management decisions.
Such research networks may be beneficial to coastal partnerships in discovering and improving
understanding of scientific data, and therefore future research may consider how research strategies
and networks can contribute to consensus building – whether this is helping to build a more
common social construction of problems through the communication of evidence and comparing
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this with coastal partnerships where no such strategy is in place. Stojanovic et al (Ibid) note that
research agenda initiatives “have achieved various levels of success and longevity” (p909), and so
further research on this theme would also provide an opportunity to consider if the research agenda
idea has been taken up more widely since the original study.
A second area for further exploration, also linked to the social construction of problems, focuses on
the valuation of ecosystem goods and services. Earlier in the thesis (in chapters Three and Seven),
attention was drawn to the lack of clearly articulated or weak economic arguments for coastal
planning regimes, with DEFRA’s Marine Nature Conservation Proposals – Valuing the Benefits report
(DEFRA, 2008a) highlighted as an example of the ecosystem goods and services approach to placing
a monetary value on the supply and benefits of natural resources. Whilst ecosystem valuation is a
relatively new tool to aid decision making, and like other types of environmental information may be
inexact or at a scale too broad for meaningful individual initiatives, the growing use of this technique
raises possibilities to investigate how economic arguments could play a more fundamental role in
the construction of environmental problems and drive new solutions.
A final area for further research may be a comparative study of collaboration and ICZM
implementation in other European countries. Such a study could focus on other EU Member States
where there is a voluntary approach to ICZM implementation and examine how conditions
facilitating collaboration are being met in a context where the pressures and drivers for ICZM may be
different. For example in Italy, at the time when Member States were due to report on their national
stock takes of ICZM in 2006, it was noted that there was no national strategy in place and that
implementation was hindered by the highly decentralised nature of government (Rupprecht Consult
and IOC, 2006:152). A comparative study could also consider collaboration in those Member States
where there are greater top-down pressures or obligations to undertake ICZM such as in Spain,
where the 1988 Shores Act, 1989 Law for the Protection of Nature Areas and the recent signing of
the ICZM Protocol of the Barcelona Convention are key drivers for coastal management both within
Spain and at a transnational level (de Vivero and Mateos, 2005).
8.7 Final Conclusions
These final remarks consider how the thesis as a whole has contributed to the research aim, which
was to critically assess the implementation of ICZM in the wider context of coastal planning regimes,
in order to develop a more effective model of collaboration for coastal governance.
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In undertaking this research it was therefore decided to compare the implementation of ICZM with
practice in River Basin Management Planning and the Marine Spatial Planning Pilot. Whilst it is
acknowledged that there are many other plans and management tools that contribute to the overall
framework of coastal management (such as Shoreline Management Plans, terrestrial spatial planning
and nature conservation designations) and that these too would have been in some way suitable for
comparisons, Marine Planning and RBMP were chosen to reflect different spatial dimensions of the
coastal zone and different layers of governance, including the national and international.
Throughout the thesis it has been argued that the implementation of ICZM (and other coastal
planning regimes) is founded on the social construction of environmental problems, and the
outcomes of this research demonstrate clearly that where powerful stakeholders are able to define
the problem, as is the case in RBMP, then they are also able to dominate the subsequent stages of
the policy cycle, which in turn has implications for the degree of collaboration and stakeholder
engagement that may be possible in developing and delivering solutions. In contrast, the definition
of ICZM was found to be vague, and thus there is a coalescence of stakeholder interests around local
issues, but a lack of overall direction for more strategic levels of coastal policy making.
Also in examining the social construction of environmental problems, it has been possible to provide
a critique of John Hannigan’s (1995) model for the social construction of environmental problems.
Having identified shortcomings in terms of the model’s ability to differentiate between prerequisites
which are most influential in framing environmental problems, the empirical work of this thesis has
shown how different combinations of “weak” or “strong” prerequisites also shape decision making
processes. Furthermore, the model’s lack of explanatory power in relation to the move from
problem definition to implementation of a solution has been addressed through appending
Hannigan’s propositions with a series of propositions suggested by Barbara Gray (1985) that
facilitate inter-organisational collaboration.
This new model of collaborative policy making therefore provides the foundations for a more
effective form of coastal governance. As the recommendations of this thesis have already stated,
developing a deeper understanding of the nature of the problem to be addressed can facilitate
greater engagement of stakeholders in decision making processes. This sense of ownership in the
decision making process can thus help to maintain shared consensus and encourage learning
between stakeholders, thus helping to increase the combined powers of stakeholders in
collaborative arrangements.
302
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APPENDICES
322
Appendix A: List of Coastal Organisations in the UK
In the following table listing coastal organisations in the UK, the following abbreviations have been
used:
Administered by/host:
AONBP – AONB Partnership
C – County Council
CC – Charitable Company
CP – Country Park
HA – Harbour/Port Authority
LPA – local planning authority
R – Regional government
RC – registered charity
SR – Sub regional government
US – Secretariat within university/academic institution
Use of ICZM/Other designations
AONB – Designated Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
CG – Coastal Group (Shoreline Management Planning)
HC – Designated Heritage Coast
N – ICZM neither promoted nor used
N2K – Natura 2000 site
P – ICZM promoted
SAC – Special Area of Conservation
SPA – Special Protection Area
U – ICZM used
Structure
AG – Advisory Group
CG – Coordinating Group
Con.C – Consultative Committee
Coun. – Council of Members
F – Forum (annual or other frequency)
FG – Funding Group
JAC – Joint Advisory Committee
LG – Liaison Group
MC – Management Committee
MG - Management Group
M/PB – Management/Partnership Board
SbG – Sub/working groups
StG – Steering Group
PAS – Secretariat within planning authority
T - Trustees
TG – Task Groups
UG – Users Group
?? Denotes information not found
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
323
ENGLAND
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Action Mersey Estuary10 ≈1992 RC N StG, SbG, Contributed to Mersey Estuary Management Plan
Wound up 2007
Action Ribble Estuary 1992 RC N StG, AG, UG
Ribble Estuary Strategy, 1997
Joined with Mersey Basin Campaign, wound up 2010
Action Wirral Rivers ≈1992 RC N StG, SbG Action Plan -
Alde & Ore Estuary Planning Partnership
2003 LPA AONB StG Alde coast and Estuary Strategy (ACES)
Alde and Ore Futures Project
Atlantic Living Coastlines Project 1996 SR U, P StG - EU ICZM Demonstration Project, report on sustainability indicators
Avon Estuary Conservation Forum ?? AONBP AONB F, TG Management Plan 2002-07, 2009-14 plan in preparation.
-
Blackwater Project ?? ?? ?? ?? - No evidence of activity, possibly wound up 2005
Bournemouth Seafront Forum ?? LPA ?? ?? Seafront Strategy, 2006 No Bournemouth Seafront Forum found, Business Forums proposed on Bournemouth Council website
Charmouth Heritage Coast Centre 1985 RC HC ?? - Tourist attraction, part of Jurassic Coast WHS
Chichester Harbour Conservancy 1971 AONBP/HA AONB, U
JAC, SbG Management Plan 2009-14 -
Cleveland Way Project (1969) SR N ?? n/a National Trail
10
The Action partnerships (Mersey Estuary, Ribble Estuary and Wirral Rivers) were all projects of the Mersey Basin Campaign
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
324
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Colne Estuary Partnership 1999 LPA/US11 ?? MG, AG Management Strategy not found
Part of Essex Estuaries EMS
Crouch & Roach Estuary Partnership
2003 LPA U StG, F Estuary Management Plan Part of Essex Estuaries EMS , no evidence of activity since 2006
Dart Estuary Partnership/Dart Estuary Environmental Management
≈1997/ 2004
?? AONB, P
StG, F Environmental Management Plan
Wound up 2007, some activities continued by S Devon AONB
Dee Estuary Strategy 1992 LPA ?? ?? Agenda for Action, 1998, Business Plan, 1999
No evidence of activity post 2000
Devon Maritime Forum 2005 C U, P StG, TG, F Strategic Overview, Business model, Action Plan
-
Dorset Coast Forum 1996 C U, P StG, SbG, F
Dorset Coast Strategy, 1999
C-Scope Project, World Heritage Site
Dorset and East Devon Coast World Heritage Site (Jurassic Coast)
200112 ?? U StG, AG, SbG
WHS Management Plan 2009-2014
-
Druridge Bay Partnership/Country Park
2006 C ?? StG Druridge Bay Strategy 2006-2010
-
Duddon Estuary Partnership 1992 C U Con.C, SbG, TG
Strategy (1998) Ramsar, SPA, SAC
Durham Heritage Coast 200313 C HC, P, U
StG, TG Business Plan, Management Plan
11
Originally a partnership between Colchester and Tendring Councils with Natural England, now administered by Brightlingsea Harbour Commissioners and University of Essex. 12
This is the date World Heritage Site status was designated 13
Heritage Coast designated 2001. Current organisation a successor to the Durham Heritage Coast “Turning the Tide” Millennium Project .
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
325
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Durlston Marine Project 1970s14 CP ?? ?? - Part of AONB and Purbeck Heritage Coast
East Riding Coastal Forum ≈2002 LPA U ?? ICZM Management Plan, 2002
No evidence of activity post 2005
Erme Estuary Management Advisory Group
≈2002 AONBP AONB AG Management Plan 2003-08 -
Essex Estuaries Initiative ≈1994 C EMS ?? - Constituent groups (Crouch and Roach, Blackwater, Colne) functioning independently
Exe Estuary Management Partnership
1992 C U MG, WG Management Plan 2006-2011
-
Exmoor Heritage Coast ?? ?? HC ?? - Part of Exmoor National Park
Falmouth Bay and Estuaries Initiative
199215 C ?? ?? Management Plan, 1997 No evidence of activity found post 2001, Fal-Helford SAC managed by Cornwall Council
Flamborough Head Heritage Coast 1979 LPA HC AG Flamborough Management Strategy, 2007
SAC, EMS
Fowey Estuary Partnership 1997 ?? N/? AG, SbG, F
Management Plan 1997, reviewed 2003
-
Hamble Estuary Partnership 2003 HA U StG, SbG, F
Estuary Management Plan, 2003-08
-
Hampshire Coast -16 C U PAS Coastal Strategy, 1991 Contribution to Solent Forum and EMS, Rural Pathfinder (streamlined consents, harbours)
14
Durlston Country Park Established in the 1970s. No date for initiation of the Marine Project found. 15
Part of English Nature Estuaries Initiative 16
Part of Hampshire County Council
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
326
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Hamstead and Tennyson Heritage Coasts
1974 C AONB, HC
StG, AG, SbG, F
Management Plan, 1986 Managed as part of Isle of Wight AONB since 1992
Humber Estuary Industry Nature Conservation Association
2000 Reg. Co. ?? Core team,
partners
- SONET Report (with Tees INCA)
Humber Estuary Partnership ?? ?? ?? - - Information not found
Humber Management Scheme 2005 ?? N Relevant Auth.
Group, AG,
Management Scheme, 2005, Business plan 2008-2010
European Marine Site
Irish Sea Forum 1990 US P ?? - Wound up 2006
Isle of Wight Estuaries Project ?? C U Co. Council
Medina Estuary Management Plan, Western Yar Management Plan
-
Kent Coastal Network 2004 C ?? SbG, F - Register of projects by other organisations
Lundy Island Marine Nature Reserve
1986 ?? U MG, F - No Take Zone, Marine Conservation Zone
Medway Swale Estuary Partnership 2002 C N Unclear Vision, Strategy Recreational Disturbance study with Natural England
Mersey Basin Campaign 1985 RC N Coun., AG,
Mersey Estuary Plan, 1995 Wound up 2010
Morecambe Bay Partnership 1992 RC U, P MB (trustees)
Strategy, 1996, EMS secretariat, SPA, SAC
Norfolk Coast Partnership 1991 AONBP ?? MG, F Management Plan 2004-09, 2009-14
Heritage Coast
North Cornwall Heritage Coast and Countryside Service
?? C HC Unclear - Heritage Coast
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
327
17
Steering Group made up of Borough of Poole, Dorset County Council, Natural England, Environment Agency, Poole Harbour Commissioners, Purbeck District Council, Southern Sea Fisheries District Committee and Wessex Water Services Ltd. 18
Managed by White Cliffs Countryside Partnership
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
North Devon AONB Partnership 2004 AONBP AONB Partnership Committee
Strategy 2004-09 -
North West Coastal Forum 2000 R Y MB, SbG, F Coastal Communities overview
NW Coastal Trail
North Yorkshire and Cleveland Coastal Forum
2002 SR U SbG, F Coastal Forum Strategy, Biodiversity Plan
Heritage Coast Plan
North Yorkshire and Cleveland Heritage Coast
1974 Managed by N Yorkshire and Cleveland CF
HC SbG Draft management plan, 2007-12
Part of N Yorkshire National Park
Partnership of Irish Sea Coast and Estuaries (PISCES)
?? ?? ?? ?? Review of Coastal Initiatives in the North West
Inactive since 2003
Poole Harbour Steering Group ?? LPA ?? See footnote17
Aquatic management plan
European Marine Site
Ravenglass Coastal Partnership ≈2006 LPA ?? ?? - SAC, SSSI
Romney Marsh Countryside Project
1996 See footnote18 ?? ?? - Awareness raising for local area through leaflets, trails, countryside stewardship projects
Rye Bay Countryside Project ≈1996 ?? ?? ?? - No information found: Rye Bay Countryside Office part of LPA
Salcombe-Kingsbridge Estuary Conservation Forum
?? AONBP AONB, HC
F, ? Management Plan 2005-2010 under review
-
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
328
19
Solent EMS secretariat is provided by the Solent Forum 20
Date of AONB designation 21
Heritage Coast designated in 1986, first AONB Joint Advisory Committee established 1992
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Sefton Coastal Strategy Unit ?? LPA ?? ?? - -
Sefton Coast Partnership 1978/2001 LPA U, P PB, CG, TG ICZM Plan, Management Plan
Preparing SMP
Severn Estuary Partnership 1995 US U, P MG, JAC, F Severn Estuary Strategy Preparing SMP
Solent EMS 2000 C19 N AG, SbG Management Scheme SAC, SPA, Ramsar site
Solent Forum 1995 C U, P StG, SbG, F Strategic Guidance, 1997, State of the Solent Report
Towards Solent Marine Planning (SoMaP)
Solway Coast AONB Unit 196420 AONBP ?? JAC Management Plan 2004-09
Dune habitat restoration project
Solway Firth Partnership 1994 Charitable Co U, P T, AG, SbG, F
Strategy, Business Plan -
Solway Rural Initiative 1992 Ltd Co. ?? ?? - Wound up 2006
South Devon AONB Partnership 200321 LPA/C AONB, HC
Partnership Committee,
FG, AG
Management Plan 2009-14
-
Spurn Heritage Coast ?? ?? HC ?? Spurn Management Strategy
SPA, Ramsar site
St Agnes Heritage Coast ?? C HC unclear - -
St Bees Heritage Coast ?? LPA HC unclear - -
Stour and Orwell Estuaries Management Group
≈1992 C AONB MG, F Management Plan, 1996, Management Scheme 2003
SPA, European Marine Site
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
329
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Suffolk Coast Futures ≈2008 LPA U, P Unclear - Alde and Ore Futures project, Coastal Change Pathfinder
Suffolk Coast and Heaths Partnership
1970 AONBP U, AONB
P
Unclear Management Plan 2008-13
-
Tamar Estuaries Consultative Forum
1994 LPA U F, SbG, LG, AG
Management Plan, 1997, 2001 and 2006-12
-
Taw Torridge Estuary Forum 1980 LPA N SbG - UNESCO International Biosphere within Forum area
Tees Estuary Industry Nature Conservation Association (INCA)
1988 Reg. Co. ?? Core team, partners
- State of the Natural Environment of the Tees Estuary (SONET) Report
Tees Estuary Management Partnership
?? ?? ?? ?? - Not found; see Tees Estuary INCA
Teign Estuary Partnership ≈2000 LPA U StG, F Estuary Management Plan
Cycleau river basin management project
Thames Estuary Partnership ≈1993 RC U MG, T, SbG, F
Management Guidance, Thames Strategy East, Habitat Action Plan
Habitat and Species audit, Discovery Programme (heritage)
Thanet Coast Project 2001 LPA ?? MG, AG Management Scheme 2007
European Marine Site
Torbay Coast and Countryside Trust
2000 RC ?? T Strategic Plan 2002-12 Green infrastructure project, cultural heritage project
Torbay Marine Partnership ?? ?? ?? ?? - Information not found
Wash Estuary Strategy Group 1994 unclear P, U SbG Estuary Management Plan, 2004
European Marine Site, Ramsar site
Wear Estuary Forum ?? ?? ?? ?? - Information not found
Western Yar Estuary Management Committee
≈1995 C/HA U LG, MC Management Plan, 2004 SPA, SAC, Ramsar
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
330
22
Original Heritage Coast designated in 1982, extended 1Nm seaward in 1992
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Wirral Coastal Partnership 2007 LPA ?? ?? - No further information found
Yealm Estuary Management Group
≈1997 AONBP AONB MG Management Plan 2007-2012
SACs in management area
WALES
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Anglesey Coastal Path Project ?? C N ?? - Campaigning for National Trail Status
Ceredigion Marine Heritage Coast
199222 C HC ?? - -
Coed Cymru Ynys Mon 1989 RC N ?? - Archaeology project
Conway Estuary Users Group ?? ?? ?? ?? - -
Glamorgan Heritage Coast Project
?? C ?? - - -
Millennium Coastal Park ?? C ?? ?? - -
North Wales Coastal Forum ?? ?? ?? ?? - -
Pembrokeshire Coastal Forum 2000 SR U, P StG, SbG ICZM Framework, 2005
Input into Wales Spatial Plan by Pembroke Havens Delivery Steering Group (PHDSG) on links with Ireland
Wales Coastal Forum ?? ?? ?? ?? - -
Wales Coastal and Maritime Partnership
2002 N U, P AG Coastal tourism Strategy, 2008
Input into Marine and Coastal Access Act, advise to WAG on ICZM review
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
331
23
Also known as the Outer Hebrides Coastal Marine Partnership
SCOTLAND
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Atlantic Coast (Wester Ross) Project
2004 LPA Y StG, Community
Liaison Group
Integrated Coastal Plan Project completed July 2006
Berwickshire SSMEI 2006 C ?? StG Report due late 2010 Fisheries, harbour and visitor management work packages
Clyde SSMEI 2002 Part of Clyde Forum
U StG Marine Spatial Plan in draft, final plan due mid-late 2010
Marine Plan to be implemented by Firth of Clyde Forum
Coast Hebrides23 2007 LPA U, P Research Advisory
Group
Coastal Zone strategy in preparation
Coast Care (beach management), Coast Adapt (climate change mitigation)
Cromarty Firth Liaison Group 1992 Part of Moray Firth
Partnership
?? ?? Management Strategy, Action Plan
-
East Grampian Coastal Partnership
2005 US U EG, MG Business Plan 2007-2010
Making the Most of the Coast Plan, Community Grants
Fair Isle Marine Environment and Tourism Initiative
1996 ?? U SbG Marine Action Plan Local Marine Plan as part of SSMEI
Firth of Clyde Forum 1993 CC U Core Group, F
Integrated Management Plan and Strategy, 2000
Management Plan superseded by Clyde SSMEI
Forth Estuary Forum 1993 RC U, P MG, F Integrated Management Strategy, 1999, Business Plan
Managed realignment feasibility project, access initiative, litter campaign
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
332
Organisation name Established Administered by
Use of ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Loch Ryan Advisory Management Forum
1997 CC ? F Strategy, 1999 No website found, but evidence of existence in 2008
Moray Firth Partnership 1996 RC U BoD, Strategic
Group
- SAC, Community Grants, offshore wind consultation
Orkney Coastal Studies Forum ?? ?? ?? ?? - No information found
Orkney Marine and Coastal Forum
1999 ?? U ?? Coastal Management Strategy
No evidence of activity post 2004
Scottish Coastal Forum 1996 N P Plenary group
Strategy for Scotland’s Coast and Inshore Waters, 2004
Contributions to Marine (Scotland) Act, multiple ICZM research reports
Shetland SSMEI 2006 US U StG, Draft Marine Spatial Plan
-
Sound of Mull SSMEI 2007 C P, U WG, LG, SbG
Marine Plan in production, draft published early 2010
-
Tay Estuary Forum 1997 US P SG, SbG, F Management Plan, 2009, Theme Framework, 2000
-
The Minch Project – Loch Torridon
1999 LPA/SR P PAS/ unclear
Study in 2007 -
The Minch Project 1996 SR P PAS/ unclear
- inactive
Western Isles Coastal Zone Management Forum
2002 C U StG Harbour Development Plan, erosion survey
No evidence of activity post 2004
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
333
NORTHERN IRELAND
Organisation name Established Administered
by
Use of
ICZM
Structure Plans/Strategies Other
Northern Ireland Coastal Forum 2006 National P Committee/
unclear
ICZM Strategy, 2006 -
Strangford Lough Initiative 1992 R/National SPA,
SAC,
N2K
MC SD Strategy, Strategies
for SPA and SAC
-
Appendix A: Coastal Organisations in the UK
334
Coastal Groups (for Shoreline Management Planning)
England
Anglian Coastal Authorities Group
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Coastal Group
Liverpool Bay Coastal Group
Lyme Bay and S Devon Coastline Group
North Devon Somerset Avon Coastal Group
North East Coastal Authorities Group
North West Coastal Group
Northumberland Coastal Group
Northumbrian Coastal Group
South Downs Coastal Group
Southern Coastal Group
Southeast Coastal Group
South Hams Coastal Group
Wales
Cardigan Bay Forum
Carmarthen Bay and Swansea Bay Coastal Engineering Group
Severn Estuary Coastal Group
Teifi Estuary Environmental Management Initiative
Ynys Enlli to Llandudno Coastal Group
River Basin Districts
Anglia
Dee
Humber
Neagh Bann (N. Ireland/Eire)
North Eastern (N. Ireland)
North West
North Western (N. Ireland/Eire)
Northumbria
Scotland
Severn
Shannon (N Ireland/Eire)
Solway Tweed
South East
South West
Thames
Western Wales
335
Appendix B: Online Questionnaire
This Appendix shows the pages of the online questionnaire as it appeared to respondents.
The example is taken from the ICZM case studies, but apart from references to coastal (ICZM),
marine (MSP) or catchments (RBMP) all questionnaires are identical
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
Appendix C: List of Interviewees
(In alphabetical order)
Tony Andrews Dwr Cymru/Welsh Water
George Ashworth Monmouthshire Council and Chair of Severn Estuary Partnership
Management Group
Steve Atkins North West and North Wales Sea Fisheries Committee
Stuart Ballard Save Our Severn
Dr. Rhoda Ballinger School of Earth and Ocean Sciences, Cardiff University
Chris Barrow Bristol City Council
Bridget Betts Dorset Coast Forum
Linda Bigland Environment Agency
Simon Boyland United Utilities
Prof. Denys Brunsden Retired academic, former chair of Dorset Coast Forum
Dr. Jim Claydon Consultant
Dr. Bob Earll Consultant
Rhona Fairgrieve Scottish Coastal Forum
Tony Flux The National Trust
Anne-Marie Gauld Aberdeen City Council
Medea Gravelle Consultant
Ian Hay East Grampian Coastal Partnership
Carolyn Heeps Fred Olsen Renewables
Stephen Hull ABPmer
Ewan Lawrie Scottish Natural Heritage
Jim Masters Devon Maritime Forum
Capt. Robbie Middleton Consultant, and Chair, East Grampian Coastal Partnership
Jonathan Mullard Severn Estuary Partnership
Paul Roberts Consumer Council for Water
Howard Stevenson Local Area Fisheries Advisory Group
Mike Willis Countryside Council for Wales
344
Appendix D: Questionnaire Responses
ICZM Questionnaire
Statement Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
Skipped Question
Pro
ble
m R
eco
gnit
ion
4 14 19 1 0 0 1 5
5 7 18 6 1 0 3 5
6 12 16 3 1 1 2 5
7 2 19 9 4 1 0 5
8 2 8 4 13 6 2 5
9 10 13 7 1 1 3 5
10 9 24 0 0 2 0 5
11 n n n n n n 27
Co
nse
nsu
s B
uild
ing 12 1 12 6 8 7 0 6
13 13 14 4 0 0 3 6
14 19 9 2 2 1 1 6
15 6 18 0 8 1 1 6
16 n n n n n n 26
Exp
lori
ng
Op
tio
ns 17 2 14 6 2 2 7 7
18 3 11 6 5 1 7 7
19 4 15 5 4 1 4 7
20 3 19 7 1 0 3 7
21 n n n n n n 31
De
cisi
on
Mak
ing
22 2 14 9 3 3 1 8
23 5 17 4 3 1 2 8
24 2 23 1 2 0 4 8
25 0 9 12 2 5 4 8
26 2 6 6 11 5 2 8
27 n n n n n n 32
Stru
ctu
rin
g an
d
Imp
lem
enta
tio
n
28 1 2 5 12 9 3 8
29 1 2 2 8 16 3 8
30 1 7 5 10 6 3 8
31 1 6 3 12 7 3 8
32 1 24 4 1 0 2 8
33 n n n n n n 31
Note: the numbers shown are counts of individual responses to the questionnaire, not percentages.
345
Questionnaire Responses – MSP Questionnaire
Statement Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
Skipped Question
Pro
ble
m R
eco
gnit
ion
4 9 8 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 8 0 3 0 0 0
6 9 5 1 1 1 0 0
7 4 8 1 3 0 1 0
8 2 8 3 0 3 1 0
9 1 8 6 2 0 0 0
10 7 10 0 0 0 0 0
11 n n n n n n 11
Co
nse
nsu
s B
uild
ing 12 2 8 0 5 1 0 1
13 9 7 0 0 0 0 1
14 7 9 0 0 0 0 1
15 5 9 0 1 1 0 1
16 n n n n n n 10
Exp
lori
ng
Op
tio
ns 17 2 6 4 3 1 0 1
18 2 5 5 3 1 0 1
19 4 4 2 3 1 2 1
20 2 6 5 2 0 1 1
21 n n n n n n 12
De
cisi
on
Mak
ing
22 0 7 2 3 3 2 2
23 1 7 1 3 2 1 2
24 5 4 3 2 0 1 2
25 1 4 2 4 3 1 2
26 1 1 4 3 6 0 2
27 n n n n n n 13
Stru
ctu
rin
g an
d
Imp
lem
enta
tio
n
28 2 4 1 5 3 0 2
29 0 1 5 4 5 0 2
30 2 6 0 3 4 0 2
31 2 3 1 4 5 0 2
32 2 9 4 0 0 0 2
33 n n n n n n 13
346
Questionnaire Responses – RBMP Questionnaire
Statement Agree Strongly
Agree Somewhat
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Don’t Know
Skipped Question
Pro
ble
m R
eco
gnit
ion
4 3 1 2 0 0 0 0
5 2 1 2 0 0 1 0
6 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
7 1 4 1 0 0 0 0
8 0 2 2 1 1 0 0
9 1 2 3 0 0 0 0
10 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
11 n n n n n n 6
Co
nse
nsu
s B
uild
ing 12 0 3 0 3 0 0 0
13 1 2 1 1 0 1 0
14 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
15 0 4 1 0 1 0 0
16 n n n n n n 6
Exp
lori
ng
Op
tio
ns 17 0 1 4 1 0 0 0
18 0 2 3 1 0 0 0
19 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
20 1 2 2 0 0 1 0
21 n n n n n n 5
De
cisi
on
Mak
ing
22 0 3 1 0 2 0 0
23 0 3 2 1 0 0 0
24 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
25 0 2 0 4 0 0 0
26 0 0 4 0 2 0 0
27 n n n n n n 5
Stru
ctu
rin
g an
d
Imp
lem
enta
tio
n
28 2 1 0 3 0 0 0
29 0 1 0 1 4 0 0
30 0 1 2 2 1 0 0
31 1 4 0 0 1 0 0
32 0 4 0 0 2 0 0
33 n n n n n n 5
347
ICZM Questionnaire - Personal Details Section
27 respondents gave their full name
28 respondents gave the name of an organisation they represent
Length of involvement in coastal issues:
Time Number of respondents
Less than a year 1
1-2 years 1
2-5 years 8
5-10 years 9
Over 10 years 21
MSP Questionnaire
13 respondents gave their full name
14 respondents gave the name of an organisation they represent
Length of involvement in marine issues:
Time Number of respondents
Less than a year 0
1-2 years 0
2-5 years 2
5-10 years 2
Over 10 years 13
RBMP Questionnaire
6 (all) respondents gave their full name
6 (all) respondents gave the name of an organisation they represent
Length of involvement in catchment issues:
Time Number of respondents
Less than a year 0
1-2 years 1
2-5 years 0
5-10 years 0
Over 10 years 5
![Coastal zone [autosaved]](https://img.pdfslide.us/doc/110x75/58ab9f8c1a28abdf3c8b46b5/coastal-zone-autosaved.jpg)
