Poverty and Climate Change

Poverty and Climate ChangeReducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation

prepared by:

African Development Bank Asian Development Bank Department for International Development, United Kingdom Directorate-General for Develop-ment, European Commission Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany Ministry of Foreign Affairs -Development Cooperation, The Netherlands Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development United Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeThe World Bank

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Contents

List of Boxes, Figures, Tables, Acronyms and Abbreviations IV

Foreword V

Acknowledgements VI

Executive Summary IXPoverty Reduction – the Challenge of the 21st Century IXClimate Change is Happening and Will Increasingly Affect the Poor IXAdaptation is Necessary XStrengthening Adaptation Efforts XINext Steps XII

Part 1: Climate Change and the Poor 11.1 Climate Change is a Reality 11.2 Developing Countries Will Be Particularly Affected 51.3 Adaptation is a Necessity 51.4 Existing Vulnerability to Climate Variability 51.5 Already Stressed Coping Capacities 61.6 Climate Change Compounding Existing Risks and Vulnerabilities 71.7 Implications for Poverty Eradication 11

Part 2: Adaptation Lessons from Past Experience 152.1 Addressing Vulnerability in the Context of Sustainable Livelihoods 152.2 Equitable Growth and Adaptation to Climate Change 192.3 Improving Governance to Mainstream Climate Issues

in Poverty Reduction 24

Part 3: The Way Forward 293.1 Mainstream Adaptation into Sustainable Development 293.2 Continue and Strengthen Assessment and Information Gathering 313.3 Engagement with the UNFCCC Process 313.4 Ensure Synergies with Other Multilateral Environmental Agreements 323.5 External Funding 33

Notes 35

Glossary 37

References 39

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List of BoxesBox 1 Climate Change Impacts on Malaria 9Box 2 Impacts of Climate Change on Small Island States: The Pacific 10Box 3 Drought and Livelihoods in the Sahel 16Box 4 Need for Social Capital Building to Cope with Climate Impacts 16Box 5 Mangrove Planting in Vietnam 17Box 6 Climate Information for Southern African Farmers 18Box 7 Traditional Forecasting in the Andes 19Box 8 Economic Planning for Disasters in Honduras 21Box 9 Mexico’s Experience in Funding Natural Disaster Relief 24Box 10 Public Accountability for Flood Protection in Bangladesh 24Box 11 Reducing the Vulnerability of Women to Cyclones in Bangladesh 25Box 12 Kiribati’s Mainstreaming in National Planning Processes 26Box 13 Mozambique’s Action Plan for Poverty Reduction 27

List of FiguresFigure 1 Variations in the Earth’s Surface Temperature, 1000–2100 1Figure 2 Maize Production in Selected South African Countries versus Niño 3 Data 20Figure 3 Potential Impacts of Temperature Increases on Tea Growing in Kenya 28

List of TablesTable 1 Impacts of Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Adaptive Capacity 3Table 2 Potential Impacts of Climate Change on the Millennium Development Goals 12

Acronyms and AbbreviationsGDP Gross domestic product GEF Global Environment Facility GHG Greenhouse gas IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change LDCs Least developed countries LEG Least Developed Countries Expert Group MDGs Millennium Development Goals NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action PRS Poverty Reduction Strategies PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper RCOF Regional Climate Outlook Forum UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change VARG Vulnerability and Adaptation Resource Group

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Foreword

Climate change is a serious risk to poverty reduction and threatens to undo decades of devel-opment efforts. As the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development states, “theadverse effects of climate change are already evident, natural disasters are more frequent andmore devastating and developing countries more vulnerable.” While climate change is aglobal phenomenon, its negative impacts are more severely felt by poor people and poorcountries. They are more vulnerable because of their high dependence on natural resources,and their limited capacity to cope with climate variability and extremes.

Experience suggests that the best way to address climate change impacts on the poor is byintegrating adaptation responses into development planning. This is fundamental to achievethe Millennium Development Goals, including the over-arching goal of halving extremepoverty by 2015, and sustaining progress beyond 2015.

The objective of this document is to contribute to a global dialogue on how to mainstreamand integrate adaptation to climate change into poverty reduction efforts. We hope this willmove the discussion further towards action.

While this joint paper focuses on adaptation to climate change in relation to poverty, weunderstand that adaptation has to go hand in hand with mitigation of climate change bylimiting greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. We also reaffirm that industrialized countriesshould take the lead in combating climate change and its adverse effects.

We share a commitment to assisting and working with poor people, partner governments,civil societies, and the private sector in coping with the vulnerability of the poor to climatechange. We resolve to ensure that our own institutions support this commitment.

Poul NielsonCommissioner for Developmentand Humanitarian AidChief Executive Officer for EuropeAid Co-Operation OfficeEuropean Commission

Tadao ChinoPresidentAsian Development Bank

Mark Malloch BrownAdministratorUnited Nations Development Programme

Heidemarie Wieczorek-ZeulMinisterFederal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Germany

Donald J. JohnstonSecretary-GeneralOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Klaus TöpferExecutive DirectorUnited Nations EnvironmentProgramme

Hilary Benn DFID Minister of StateUnited Kingdom

Shengman ZhangManaging DirectorThe World Bank

Agnes van Ardenne-van der HoevenMinister for Development CooperationThe Netherlands

Omar KabbajPresident,African Development Bank Group

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Acknowledgements

This document has been written by a team consisting of Piya Abeygunawardena (ADB);Yogesh Vyas (AfDB); Philipp Knill (BMZ); Tim Foy, Melissa Harrold, Paul Steele, and ThomasTanner (DFID); Danielle Hirsch, Maresa Oosterman, and Jaap Rooimans (DGIS); MarcDebois and Maria Lamin (EC); Holger Liptow, Elisabeth Mausolf, and Roda Verheyen (GTZon behalf of BMZ); Shardul Agrawala, Georg Caspary, and Remy Paris (OECD); ArunKashyap (UNDP); Ravi Sharma (UNEP); and Ajay Mathur, Mahesh Sharma, and Frank Sper-ling (World Bank).

Frank Sperling (World Bank), as Managing Editor, synthesized the content of the report,based on the contributions of the agencies. Heather Budge-Reid provided editorial support.

The writing team benefited greatly from comments by colleagues within our agencies pro-vided for the final document as well as the earlier consultation draft. These include SujataGupta, Pim Kieskamp, and Rolf Zelius (ADB); Fenella Frost, Alicia Herbert, Julian Lob-Levyt,Helen O’Connor, and Julie Thomas (DFID); Diana Wilkens and Ken Wright (DEFRA); JohnBazill, Juan Garay Amores, Anver Ghazi, Joachim Kreysa, Simon Le Grand, Jean-Paul Malin-greau, and Emmanuel Mersch (EC); Tom Jones and Michael Roeskau (OECD); Rebecca Car-man, Pascal Girot, Richard Hosier, Khalid Husain, Selim Jehan, Bo Lim, Joseph Opio-Odon-go, Jyotsna Puri, Minoru Takada, and Alvaro Umaña (UNDP); Daya Bragante and KristenHalsnaes (UNEP); Anna Ballance (UNEP-GRID Arendal); Margaret Arnold, Jeni Klugman,Kseniya Lovovsky, Panayotis Varangis, and Bob Watson (World Bank).

In addition, the following organizations provided their time and input: Henk van Schaik(Dialogue on Water and Climate); Eileen Shea (East-West Center, Climate Project Coordina-tor); Charlotte Howard and Anna McGillivray (ERM); Saleemul Huq (IIED); John Drexhage(IISD); Roberto Lenton, Maxx Dilley, and Shiv Someshwar (IRI); Balakrishna Pisupati andBrett Orlando (IUCN); Kees Dorland, Michiel van Drunen, Marcel Kok, and Peter van derWerff (IVM); Richard Klein (PIK); and Madeleen Helmer (Red Cross Climate Centre).

The consultation draft was presented at the Eighth Conference of Parties to the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change in New Delhi, 2002. Subsequently, thepaper has been widely disseminated and an electronic consultation was held from Novem-ber 15, 2002 to February 28, 2003. The authors are grateful for the large and constructivefeedback received from non-governmental organizations, the private and public sector, andinternational organizations. These comments provided valuable perspectives and views andchallenged us to revise the document in a manner that was both intellectually rigorous andsensitive to divergent opinions. We have attempted to accommodate the comments; how-ever, the responsibility for the document remains with the ten organizations involved in thewriting process.

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IX

Executive Summary

Poverty Reduction – the Challenge of the 21st CenturyDespite international efforts, poverty has become more widespread in many countries in thelast decade, making poverty reduction the core challenge for development in the 21st centu-ry. In the Millennium Declaration, 189 nations have resolved to halve extreme poverty by2015 and all agencies involved in this paper are committed to contribute to this aim. How-ever, climate change is a serious risk to poverty reduction and threatens to undo decades ofdevelopment efforts.

This paper focuses on the impacts of climate change on poverty reduction efforts in the con-text of sustaining progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and beyond. It dis-cusses ways of mainstreaming and integrating adaptation to climate change into povertyreduction and sustainable development efforts.

The chief messages emerging from this paper are:● Climate change is happening and will increasingly affect the poor.● Adaptation is necessary and there is a need to integrate responses to climate change and

adaptation measures into strategies for poverty reduction to ensure sustainable develop-ment.

This decision to focus on adaptation is deliberate and is taken with the understanding thatadaptation cannot replace mitigation efforts. The magnitude and rate of climate change willstrongly depend on efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmos-phere. The higher the concentrations of GHGs, the higher the likelihood of irreversible andgrave damage to human and biological systems. Therefore, adaptation is only one part of thesolution. Mitigation of climate change by limiting greenhouse gas concentrations in theatmosphere is the indispensable other part.

Climate Change is Happening and Will Increasingly Affect the PoorToday, it is widely agreed by the scientific community that climate change is already a reali-ty. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that humanactivities are altering our climate system and will continue to do so. Over the past century,surface temperatures have increased and associated impacts on physical and biological sys-tems are increasingly being observed. Science tells us that climate change will bring aboutgradual changes, such as sea level rise, and shifts of climatic zones due to increased temper-atures and changes in precipitation patterns. Also, climate change is very likely to increasethe frequency and magnitude of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, andstorms. While there is uncertainty in the projections with regard to the exact magnitude, rate,and regional patterns of climate change, its consequences will change the fate of many gen-erations to come and particularly impact on the poor if no appropriate measures are taken.

The impacts of climate change, and the vulnerability of poor communities to climate change,vary greatly, but generally, climate change is superimposed on existing vulnerabilities. Cli-mate change will further reduce access to drinking water, negatively affect the health of poorpeople, and will pose a real threat to food security in many countries in Africa, Asia, andLatin America. In some areas where livelihood choices are limited, decreasing crop yieldsthreaten famines, or where loss of landmass in coastal areas is anticipated, migration mightbe the only solution. The macroeconomic costs of the impacts of climate change are highlyuncertain, but very likely have the potential to threaten development in many countries.

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Poverty and Climate Change

Therefore, the task ahead is to increasethe adaptive capacity of affected poorcommunities and countries.

Part 1 of this document examines howclimate change is likely to affect theexisting vulnerability of poor peopleto climate related impacts. Accordingto the Third Assessment Report of theIPCC, developing countries are expect-ed to suffer the most from the negativeimpacts of climate change. This is dueto the economic importance of cli-mate-sensitive sectors (for example,agriculture and fisheries) for thesecountries, and to their limited human,institutional, and financial capacity toanticipate and respond to the directand indirect effects of climate change.In general, the vulnerability is highestfor least developed countries in the

tropical and subtropical areas. Hence, the countries with the fewest resources are likely tobear the greatest burden of climate change in terms of loss of life and relative effect on invest-ment and the economy.

Many sectors providing basic livelihood services to the poor in developing countries are notable to cope even with today’s climate variability and stresses. Over 96% of disaster-relateddeaths in recent years have taken place in developing countries. Often, extreme weatherevents set back the development process for decades. With fishing grounds depleting, anddroughts, floods, and storms destroying entire annual harvests in affected areas, the El Niñophenomenon serves as a prime example of how climatic variability already affects vulnera-ble countries and people today. In many developing countries, climate change alreadyincreases stresses from climate variability and extremes and will do so increasingly in thefuture.

Adaptation is NecessaryIn the view of the participating agencies, adaptation to climate change is a priority for ensur-ing the long-term effectiveness of our investment in poverty eradication and sustainabledevelopment.

Part 2 examines lessons learned in reducing poverty while strengthening the capacity ofthose living in poverty to adapt to climate change. The findings support a conclusion of theIPCC that adaptation measures, if pursued in the sustainable development framework, candiminish the damage from future climate change and climate variability.

Through the decisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC), work has been initiated to develop the adaptive capacity of poor people and thepoorer countries (Least Developed Countries) to cope with the impacts of climate change.Yet, a stronger focus must be placed on poverty reduction and sustainable development. Webelieve that the development and environment community must ensure that adaptation isnot treated as a standalone issue, but in the context of poverty reduction and the Millenni-um Development Goals (MDGs).

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Executive Summary

Many examples show that addressing poverty implies also preparing for climate variabilityand extremes. While climate change is only one of the many factors influencing poverty,immediate action should be taken to adapt to climate change impacts. We argue that manypossible interventions have already been identified, and prompt action can be taken today.

Our combined experience suggests that the best way to address climate change impacts onthe poor is by integrating adaptation measures into sustainable development and povertyreduction strategies. Only such a comprehensive approach, which provides options for poorpeople to reduce their vulnerability to current and future risks, will contribute towardsachieving the MDGs and ensure that sustainable progress is made beyond 2015.

Strengthening Adaptation EffortsMany adaptation mechanisms will be strengthened by making progress in areas such as goodgovernance, human resources, institutional structures, public finance, and natural resourcemanagement. Such progress builds the resilience of countries, communities, and householdsto all types of shocks, including climate change impacts. Strategies to cope with current cli-mate variability provide a good starting point for addressing adaptation needs in the contextof poverty reduction. Learning from experience will help to prevent the underachievementof sustainable development efforts and avoid maladaptation.

Progress will require:

Improved governance, including an active civil society and open, transparent, and account-able policy and decision making processes, which can have a critical bearing on the way inwhich policies and institutions respond to the impact of climatic factors on the poor.

First steps towards mainstreaming climate issues into all national, sub-national, and sec-toral planning processes, such as Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) or national strategies forsustainable development.

Encouraging a ministry with a broad mandate, such as planning or finance, to be fully in-volved in mainstreaming adaptation, especially in countries where major climate impacts areexpected.

Combining approaches at the government and institutional level with bottom-up ap-proaches rooted in regional, national, and local knowledge.

Empowerment of communities so that they can participate in assessments and feed in theirknowledge to provide useful climate-poverty information. They will also need full access toclimate relevant information systems.

Vulnerability assessments that fully address the different shades and causes of poverty.

Access to good quality information about the impacts of climate change. This is key for ef-fective poverty reduction strategies. Early warning systems and information distribution sys-tems help to anticipate and prevent disasters.

Integration of impacts into macroeconomic projections. The rate and pattern of economicgrowth is a critical element of poverty eradication, and climatic factors can have a powerfulbearing on both. Integration will prevent climate change diverting limited resources into dis-aster relief and recovery activities and away from long-term development priorities. Thenational budget process should be the key process to identify climate change risks and toincorporate risk management so as to provide sufficient flexibility in the face of uncertainty.

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Increasing the resilience of livelihoods and infrastructure as a key component of an effec-tive poverty reduction strategy. Similarly, effective adaptation strategies should build upon,and sustain, existing livelihoods and thus take into account existing knowledge and copingstrategies of the poor. Traditional risk sharing mechanisms, such as asset pooling and kin-ship, could be complemented by micro-insurance approaches, and infrastructure design andinvestment, both for private and public use, should take into account the potential impactsof climate change.

Next StepsPart 3 makes specific recommendations for action in the areas of:● Development agency and donor activities.● Governments in developing countries.● Strengthening information and assessments.● Engagement of the UNFCCC process.● Ensuring synergies with other multilateral agreements.● Funding adaptation.

Development and environment agencies need to ensure that their efforts support the main-streaming of climate issues into general sustainable development. This requires a sector-wideexamination of existing programs as well as: a close look at existing disaster reduction andpreparedness programs to make maximum use of their ability to assess and reduce currentvulnerabilities; the development of tools and methodologies for planning in the face of risk;training and awareness raising of senior management and staff; and the improvement ofinstitutional processes to address the vulnerability of the poor in development programs.Furthermore, checks must be built in to avoid any development activity that undermines thecapacity of the poor to cope with climate variability and change.

The UN Conventions on Climate, Biodiversity, and Desertification all provide opportunitiesfor sustainable development and implementation of measures should be integrated inpoverty reduction strategies. However, many developing countries are stretched by the needto service all these international processes, leaving little time for them to engage in domes-tic implementation and determining national environmental priorities. This conflict can bereduced by, for example, maximizing synergies in reporting and other requirements and byintegrating implementation measures into general development strategies.

Reducing the vulnerability of those most at risk from the impacts of climate change and theprocess of mainstreaming adaptation into poverty reduction will require, in many cases, sub-stantial external financial resources. These resources would need to be provided through anumber of channels, which would include: bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmentaldevelopment assistance; the new funds created by the UNFCCC; and the Global Environ-ment Facility (GEF) as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC.

Development assistance should aim to reorient current practices and remove barriers to “noregrets” adaptation interventions through the integration of climate risk management indevelopment programs. This would also help to mainstream adaptation in national devel-opment planning and budgetary processes. Additional resources are required to assess andaddress climate risks in projects supported by development assistance, where climate-safedevelopment implies extra costs over and above business-as-usual. Funding by the GEF andthe new climate change funds further supports interventions that help to prepare for climatechange adaptation, and help demonstrate adaptation interventions. The nature and scope ofthis latter support is dependent on the evolving guidance from the UNFCCC, but we do haveto act now.

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Currently over 1 billion people – two thirds ofthem women – live in extreme poverty on less thanUS$1 a day. This figure rises to 2.8 billion if a stan-dard of US$2 a day is used (OECD 2001).

Climate change will compound existing poverty. Itsadverse impacts will be most striking in the devel-oping nations because of their geographical andclimatic conditions, their high dependence on nat-ural resources, and their limited capacity to adaptto a changing climate. Within these countries, thepoorest, who have the least resources and the leastcapacity to adapt, are the most vulnerable (IPCC2001a). Projected changes in the incidence, fre-quency, intensity, and duration of climate extremes(for example, heat waves, heavy precipitation, anddrought), as well as more gradual changes in theaverage climate, will notably threatentheir livelihoods – further increasinginequities between the developing anddeveloped worlds. Climate change istherefore a serious threat to povertyeradication. However, current develop-ment strategies tend to overlook climatechange risks.

An approach that uses both mitigationand adaptation is needed. Current com-mitments to mitigate climate change bylimiting the emissions of greenhousegases (GHGs) will not, even if imple-mented, stabilize the atmospheric con-centrations of these gases1. Developingadaptive capacity to minimize the dam-age to livelihoods from climate changeis a necessary strategy to complementclimate change mitigation efforts.

Climate change adaptation – all thoseresponses to climatic conditions thatreduce vulnerability – is therefore anintegral and urgent part of overall pover-ty reduction strategies. Adaptationshould not be approached as a separateactivity, isolated from other environ-mental and socioeconomic concernsthat also impact on the developmentopportunities of the poor. A compre-

hensive approach is needed that takes into accountpotential synergistic and antagonistic effectsbetween local and global environmental changesas well as socioeconomic factors.

1.1 Climate Change is a RealityToday, it is widely agreed by the scientific commu-nity that climate change is already a reality. The rateand duration of warming observed during thetwentieth century are unprecedented in the pastthousand years. Increases in maximum tempera-tures, numbers of hot days, and the heat index havebeen observed over nearly all lands during the sec-ond half of the twentieth century. Collective evi-dence suggests that the observed warming over thepast fifty years can be mostly attributed to humanactivities. The warming trend in the global average

PART 1: Climate Change and the Poor

Figure 1 Variations in the Earth´s Surface Temperature, 1000-2100. Source: IPCC 2001 a.

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surface temperature is expected to continue, withincreases projected to be in the range of 1.4 to 5.8 ºCby 2100 in comparison to 1990 (IPCC 2001a).

There is increasing observational evidence thatregional changes in climate have contributed tovarious changes in physical and biological systemsin many parts of the world (IPCC 2001a; 2001b).These include the shrinkage of glaciers, thawing ofpermafrost, changes in rainfall frequency andintensity, shifts in the growing season, early flower-ing of trees and emergence of insects, and shifts inthe distribution ranges of plants and animals inresponse to changes in climatic conditions.

On the regional level, climate change is superim-posed on the existing climatic conditions and man-ifests itself through:● Changes in average climatic conditions. For

example, some regions may become drier orwetter on average (IPCC 2001a).

● Changes in climate variability. For example,rainfall events may become more erratic insome regions.

● Changes in the frequency and magnitude ofextreme events (IPCC 2001a; 2001b).

● Changes in sea levels, which are projected torise by between 0.09 and 0.88 meters by 2100relative to 1990 (IPCC 2001a).

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Africa Increase in droughts, floods, and other extremeevents would add to stress on water resources,food security, human health, and infrastructure,constraining development.

Changes in rainfall and intensified land usewould exacerbate the desertification process(particularly in the Western Sahel and Northernand Southern Africa).

Grain yields are projected to decrease, diminish-ing food security, particularly in small food-importing countries.

Sea level rise would affect coastal settlements,flooding and coastal erosion, especially alongthe eastern Southern African coast.

Major rivers are highly sensitive to climate vari-ations and may experience decreases in run-offand water availability, affecting agriculture andhydropower systems, which may increase cross-boundary tensions.

Increase in frequency of some extreme events insome places.

Asia Extreme events have increased in temperateAsia, including floods, droughts, forest fires, andtropical cyclones.

Thermal and water stress, flood, drought, sealevel rise, and tropical cyclones would diminishfood security in countries of arid, tropical, andtemperate Asia.

Agriculture would expand and increase in pro-ductivity in northern areas.

Reduced soil moisture in the summer mayincrease land degradation and desertification.

Sea level rise and an increase in intensity oftropical cyclones would displace tens of millionsof people in low-lying coastal areas of temper-ate and tropical Asia.

Region Likely Regional Impacts of Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity

Adaptive capacity is low due to low GDP per capita,widespread poverty (the number of poor grew overthe 1990s), inequitable land distribution, and loweducation levels. There is also an absence of socialsafety nets, in particular after harvest failures.

Individual coping strategies for desertification arealready strained, leading to deepening poverty.Dependence on rain-fed agriculture is high.

More than one quarter of the population lives with-in 100 kilometers of the coast and most of Africa’slargest cities are along coasts vulnerable to sea levelrise, coastal erosion, and extreme events.

Climate change has to be recognized as a major con-cern with respect to food security, water resources,natural resources productivity and biodiversity,human health, desertification, and coastal zones.

Adaptive capacity will depend on the degree of civilorder, political openness, and sound economicmanagement.

Adaptive capacity varies between countries de-pending on social structure, culture, economiccapacity, and level of environmental degradation.

Areas of concern include water and agriculture sec-tors, water resources, food security, biodiversityconservation and natural resource management,coastal zone management, and infrastructure.

Capacity is increasing in some parts of Asia, for exam-ple the success of early warning systems for extremeweather events in Bangladesh, but is still constraineddue to poor resource bases, inequalities in income,weak institutions, and limited technology.

Table 1 Impacts of Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Adaptive CapacitySource: Adapted from IPCC 2001 b.

Latin Loss and retreat of glaciers would adverselyAmerica impact runoff and water supply in areas where

snowmelt is an important water resource.

Floods and droughts would increase in frequency,and lead to poorer water quality in some areas.

Increases in the intensity of tropical cycloneswould change the risks to life, property, andecosystems from heavy rain, flooding, stormsurges, and wind damages.

Coastal human settlements, productive activi-ties, infrastructure, and mangrove ecosystemswould be negatively affected by sea level rise.

Small Island The projected sea level rise of 5 millimeters perStates year for the next 100 years would cause en-

hanced soil erosion, loss of land, poverty, dislo-cation of people, increased risk from stormsurges, reduced resilience of coastal ecosystems,saltwater intrusion into freshwater resources,and high resource costs to respond to and adaptto changes.

Coral reefs would be negatively affected bybleaching and by reduced calcification rates dueto higher CO2 levels; mangrove, sea grass bed,and other coastal ecosystems and the associatedbiodiversity would be adversely affected by ris-ing temperatures and accelerated sea level rise.

Some social indicators have improved over the 1990sincluding adult literacy, life expectancy, and accessto safe water.

However, other factors such as high infant mortali-ty, low secondary school enrolment, and high-income inequality contribute to limiting adaptivecapacity.

Areas of particular concern are agriculture, fisheries,water resource management, infrastructure, andhealth.

Adaptive capacity of human systems is generally lowin small island states, and vulnerability high; smallisland states are likely to be among the countriesmost seriously impacted by climate change.

Areas of concern are food security, water resources,agriculture, biodiversity and coastal management,and tourism.

Islands with very limited water supplies are highlyvulnerable to the impacts of climate change on thewater balance.

Declines in coastal ecosystems would negativelyimpact reef fish and threaten reef fisheries, thosewho earn their livelihoods from reef fisheries, andthose who rely on the fisheries as a significant foodsource.

Limited arable land and soil salinization make agri-culture of small islands, both for domestic food pro-duction and cash crop exports, highly vulnerable toclimate change.

Tourism, an important source of income and foreignexchange for many islands, would face severe dis-ruption from climate change and sea level rise.

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Region Likely Regional Impacts of Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity

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1.2 Developing Countries Will Be ParticularlyAffected

The impacts of climate change vary across geo-graphical regions (IPCC 2001b). (See Table 1).

Some of the anticipated impacts of climate changeare positive (see IPCC 2001b). For example, water-scarce regions such as parts of Southeast Asia maybenefit from increased water availability. However,developing countries are likely to suffer most fromthe negative impacts of climate change (IPCC2001b). This is due to the economic importance ofclimate-sensitive sectors (for example, agricultureand fisheries) for these countries, and to their lim-ited human, institutional, and financial capacity toanticipate and respond to the direct and indirecteffects of climate change. In general, the vulnera-bility is highest for least developed countries(LDCs) in the tropical and subtropical areas.Hence, the countries with the fewest resources arelikely to bear the greatest burden of climate changein terms of loss of life and relative effect on invest-ment and the economy (IPCC 2001b).

1.3 Adaptation is a NecessityThe extent and scope of regional climate changeimpacts depend on the degree of mitigation. Whilethe urgency and scale of adaptation efforts requiredwill be lower if aggressive mitigation is undertakenearly on, some degree of adaptation is inevitable2.

Reductions in emissions of greenhouse gaseswould delay and reduce damages caused by climatechange (IPCC 2001c). Essentially, the lower thefuture stabilization level of atmos-pheric greenhouse gas concentration,the less would be the likely damage3.The UNFCCC states that: ”the partiesshould protect the climate system forthe benefit of present and future gen-erations of humankind, on the basisof equity and in accordance withtheir common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capa-bilities. Accordingly, the developedcountry Parties should take the leadin combating climate change and theadverse effects thereof.” (Article 3.1of the UNFCCC).

Even if greenhouse gas emissionswere curbed immediately, the globalaverage temperature would still con-

tinue to rise due to the slow response of the Earth’satmosphere system to past emissions. This suggeststhat any future levels of greenhouse gas concentra-tion, once stabilized, will be above current levels.

1.4 Existing Vulnerability to Climate Variability

‘Three years ago it was a very bad year. The floodwashed away all of our crops, and there was a lot ofhunger around here, to the point that many peopleactually died of hunger,’ Benin 1994.

(Narayan et al. 2000)

Climate change is a very emotional subject for thePhilippines because the issue is viewed not only ascausing additional economic burdens, but as a crit-ical factor that would determine its survival as anation. Many of its people are in coastal areas andat risk from the impacts of extreme climatic events,sea level rise and degradation of marine ecosystems.The effects of climate change on agriculture,forestry and water resources will further encumbera country already reeling from a host of socio-eco-nomic and environmental problems.

(Philippines 1999)

Recent catastrophes … have shown that the poorare much more likely to be adversely affected thanthe non-poor. Because of the inadequate construc-tion, poor people’s dwellings are particularly vul-nerable; and when affected have insufficient sav-ings to address the emergencies.

(Nicaragua 2001)

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Before addressing climate change adaptation in thecontext of development, it is important to recog-nize that today’s climate already influences eco-nomic opportunities and development prospects.Poor countries and people tend to be particularlyvulnerable to deviations from average climatic con-ditions and climatic extremes (OFDA/CRED;UNDP 2003b).

Climate and climate variability are thereforeimportant elements of the complex web of factorsinfluencing people’s livelihoods. When comparingdata on natural hazards in developing and devel-oped countries, the loss of life and the number ofpeople affected tend to be considerably larger indeveloping country regions for natural disasters ofcomparable magnitude. Damages in relation toGDP are usually also higher.

Bangladesh is a prime example of a country that isparticularly vulnerable to today’s climate. With alow-lying coastline, high population density, andan economy highly dependent on agriculture, thelives and livelihoods of people are threatened byfrequent cyclones and the associated effects, suchas saltwater intrusion, that render agriculturallands unproductive. Between 1974 and 1998, thecountry experienced seven major floods (Matin1998). In 1998, about 68 percent of the country’sgeographical area was flooded, affecting more than30 million people and causing 918 fatalities(Choudhury 1998). Economic losses were estimat-ed at US$3.3 billion, equivalent to 8 percent of thecountry’s GDP (Choudhury et al. 1999).

The impact of climate variability on countries isalso well illustrated by the environmental andsocioeconomic damages associated with El Niño.El Niño is a natural recurring climatic phenome-non associated with fluctuations in the atmospher-ic pressure and sea surface temperatures in thetropical Pacific Ocean. It affects the climate on aglobal scale, with the impacts concentrated in thetropical and subtropical regions. The shift in seasurface temperature is known to affect marine pro-ductivity. On land, El Niño is associated withfloods and droughts in Latin America, Asia, andAfrica, as well as changes in extreme events and thedistribution of vector-borne diseases (IPCC2001b). El Niño has caused loss of life, destroyedlivelihoods, and affected national economies. ForEcuador, the overall costs of direct damages to agri-culture, livestock and fishing associated with the

1997–98 El Niño constituted 4.7 % of its agricul-tural GDP. Loss of harvest and rising unemploy-ment of agricultural workers led to an increase inthe incidence of poverty by 10 percentage points inthe affected municipalities (Vos et al. 1999).

Between 1970 and 1999 about 3.76 billion peoplewere affected by natural disasters in Asia, explainedin a large part by Asia’s high population density inhazard prone areas. Africa had the second highestnumber of people affected by natural disasters,largely due to frequent occurrence and the long-term effects of droughts and the importance of theagricultural sector. For the regions of Latin Americaand the Caribbean, floods had the highest cumula-tive cost, followed by windstorms, earthquakes,and droughts (Charveriat 2000).

1.5 Already Stressed Coping CapacitiesAll societies and economies have developed mech-anisms to cope with climate extremes and othernatural hazards, which they face occasionally.Trade, migration, or precautionary storage of foodare examples of strategies to cope with adverse cli-matic conditions.

This capacity to cope with climate variability andextreme weather events in itself is highly depen-dent on the level of economic development. Ingeneral, livelihood sources of the poor are usuallynarrower and more climate-sensitive than those ofthe non-poor. Extreme weather events, whichwould cause limited damage and few casualties ina developed country, often cause extensive damageand substantial loss of life in a developing country.Poor people are particularly vulnerable to devia-tions from average climatic conditions such as pro-longed drought and to natural disasters such asfloods. In periods of stress they may be forced tosell off their physical assets such as land, bicycles,and farming implements, thereby undermining thesustainability of their livelihoods over the longerterm.

Among the poor, vulnerability varies, since somegroups are more lacking in the financial, social,and political means of securing alternative liveli-hoods less exposed to risk than others. Women forexample may be constrained by social and culturalstructures that place them in inferior social posi-tions, limiting their access to income, education,public voice, and survival mechanisms. In addi-tion, the coping capacities of the poor are often

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already strained due to a number oftrends including HIV/AIDS, increas-ing population densities, and detri-mental forces associated with glob-alization. Climate change will addto these trends and increase vulnera-bilities.

1.6 Climate Change CompoundingExisting Risks and Vulnerabili-ties

Traditional coping mechanisms arebackward-looking, based on histori-cal experience and observations. Inthe face of changing patterns of cli-mate variability, and significant devi-ations from historical experience,their effectiveness may be significant-ly reduced. For example, in Tanzania,high rainfall due to the 1998 El Niñowas followed by a two-year period oferratic rainfall. This climatic shock caused some ofthe poorer farmers to give up maize farming andopt instead to sell their labor at farms in other,more productive areas. The resulting dependenceon physical working capacity as their sole endow-ment increased vulnerability, since malnutritionand disease can reduce their capacities for manuallabor.

Since the mid-1970s El Niño events have becomemore frequent, persistent and intense than theopposite cool phase (IPCC 2001a). Whether this isalready the result of climate change is the subject ofongoing scientific debate. However, such devia-tions from normal climatic conditions and previ-ous experience illustrate the additional strain cli-mate change is likely to exert on the poor, if noappropriate adaptation measures are taken. Thepoor will need to devote more of their already lim-ited resources to coping with adverse climatic conditions.

Climate change may thus force drastic changes tolivelihood strategies. Where economic diversifi-cation is low, income opportunities and henceoptions for developing alternative livelihoods inresponse to climatic changes may be limited. Insome cases migration, which is an importantcoping strategy for poor people, might be theonly solution, but will potentially cause socialdisruption.

The impacts of climate change on the poor will becontext-specific, reflecting factors such as geo-graphic location; economic, social, and culturalcharacteristics; prioritization and concerns of indi-viduals, households, and social groups; as well asinstitutional and political constraints. The follow-ing points illustrate the impacts of climate changeon poor people’s livelihoods.

Ecosystem Goods and ServicesThe degree of local environmental degradation willinfluence the vulnerability of an ecosystem to cli-mate change. Habitat fragmentation is already aleading cause of biodiversity loss and changes intemperature and moisture regimes further limithabitats necessary for the survival of species. Degra-dation of forested mountain slopes in conjunctionwith intensified rainfall may increase erosion andloss of fertile soil and affect the quality of water-sheds. Climate change is likely to lead to changesin species distribution and abundance, and in-crease the risk of extinction and loss of biodiversi-ty (IPCC 2001b).

Since some ecosystems are highly sensitive, evensmall changes can have large effects. Minor increas-es in water temperature can, for example, damagecoral reefs, exacerbating other stresses such as pol-lution and over-fishing and thereby cause a reduc-tion in fish stocks, jeopardizing fish- and tourism-dependent livelihoods.

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Precipitation is expected to increase in equatorial,middle, and high latitude regions (IPCC 2001b),which tend to suffer less from water scarcity. Asrainfall events are expected to become moreintense, the incidence of floods may increase, jeop-ardizing human settlements and infrastructure.

Increases in temperature and changes in precipita-tion are projected to accelerate the retreat and lossof glaciers (IPCC 2001a; 2001b). Associatedchanges in the timing of streamflow will havedownstream effects for agriculture. The melting ofglaciers has become a serious concern in theHimalayan region, because of the growing risk ofglacial lake out-burst floods (UNEP/ICIMOD2002; Bhutan 2000).

Agriculture and Food SecurityAgriculture is the most important sector for mostleast developed countries as the impact of agricul-tural growth on poverty reduction tends to exceedthe impact of growth in other sectors (ODI 2002).Food security is a function of several interactingfactors, including food production as well as foodpurchasing power. Climate change could worsenthe prevalence of hunger through direct negativeeffects on production and indirect impacts on pur-chasing powers.

Land degradation, price shocks, and populationgrowth are already a major concern for sustainingagricultural productivity. Changes in temperature,precipitation, and climatic extremes will add to thestress on agricultural resources in many developing

country regions and reduce the quality of landareas for agricultural production. This will beparticularly serious for areas where droughts andland degradation, including desertification, arealready severe. As access to productive land isimportant for reducing rural poverty, theimpacts of climate change on the productivity ofland will further constrain efforts to combatrural poverty.

Low-lying coastal communities will have todeal with sea level rise and the impact of cli-mate change on marine resources. Sea level risemay lead to salinization and render agricultureareas unproductive. In areas where fish consti-tute a significant source of protein for poorpeople, declining and migration of fish stocksdue to climate change and associated changesin the marine environment will further need to

Poor people are often directly dependent on goodsand services from ecosystems, either as a primary orsupplementary source of food, fodder, buildingmaterials, and fuel. This makes them highly vul-nerable to ecosystem degradation. While local eco-nomic and social conditions drive poor peopleinto marginal areas and force them to exploit nat-ural resources to support their livelihoods, climatechange further erodes the quality of the naturalresource base, thereby reinforcing conditions ofpoverty.

Changes in ecosystem composition and provisionof goods and services may also have wider eco-nomic effects. Essential ecosystem services includebreaking down wastes and pollutants, purifyingwater, and maintaining soil fertility. Climatechange will alter the quality and functioning ofecosystems, reducing their capacity to performtheir role as important life support systems. Thiswill have important impacts on key economic sec-tors such as agriculture, water supply, and others.

WaterWater scarcity is already a major problem for theworld’s poor. The number of people impacted bywater scarcity is projected to increase from about1.7 billion people today to around 5 billion peopleby 2025, independent of climate change (IPCC2001b). Climate change is projected to furtherreduce water availability in many water scarceregions, particularly in the subtropics, due toincreased frequency of droughts, increased evapo-ration, and changes in rainfall patterns and run-off.

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be considered in their impact on the local foodsecurity.

The impact of climate change on food supply variessignificantly by region. In general, crop yields areprojected to decrease in most tropical and subtrop-ical regions due to changes in temperature andrainfall (IPCC 2001b). Consequently, there is a realrisk that climate change will worsen food securityand exacerbate hunger in some developing-countryregions. In the short term, however, the greaterimpact on food security could come from the pro-jected increases and severity of extreme weatherevents rather than from gradual changes in the cli-mate (FAO 2002).

The impact of climate change on food security willbe a major concern for Africa. In conjunction withthe previously discussed changes in water supply,the production losses for Sub-Saharan countriescould be substantial as the length of suitable grow-ing periods decreases. Livestock activities and cropyields for many countries in Asia and Latin Ameri-ca are also projected to decrease.

HealthThe potential impacts of climate change on humanhealth would increase vulnerability and reduceopportunities by interfering with education andthe ability to work. While any attempt at predictingand gauging the impact of climate change onhuman health is a complicated task, it is likely thatclimate change will have both direct and indirectadverse effects on human health.

A direct effect is an increase in temperature-relatedillnesses and deaths. Prolonged intense heat wavescoupled with humidity may increase mortality andmorbidity rates, particularly among the urban poorand the elderly. Another direct effect will beincreased death and injury from extreme weatherevents such as flooding, landslides, and storms –over 96 percent of disaster-related deaths in recentyears have taken place in developing countries(World Bank 2001).

Changes in temperature and rainfall may changethe geographic range of vector-borne diseases suchas malaria and dengue fever, exposing new popula-tions to these diseases (see Box 1). Young childrenas well as pregnant women and their unborn chil-dren are especially vulnerable to malaria. Malariacontributes to perinatal mortality, low birth weight,

and maternal anemia (WHO 2002). The frequencyand severity of malaria epidemics in East Africaalready appear to have increased in correspon-dence with the increased frequency, magnitude,and persistence of the El Niño phenomenon overthe past 20 to 30 years (McMichael et al. 1996).

Box 1Climate Change Impacts on Malaria

Modeling based on IPCC (2001b) scenariossuggests that temperature rise by 2100 couldlead to significant increases in potentialbreeding grounds for malaria in parts ofBrazil, Southern Africa, and the Horn ofAfrica. In a few areas – such as parts of Na-mibia and the West African Sahel – malariarisk may fall due to excessive heat. In Africa,cities that currently are not at risk of malar-ia because of their high altitudes, such asNairobi and Harare, may be newly at risk ifthe range in which the mosquito can liveand breed increases.

Source: Gallup and Sachs 2000.

The net effect of climate change on malaria infec-tions is still uncertain, and the impacts will vary

from region to region. Nevertheless, the close linkof the occurrence of malaria and other vector-borne diseases with climatic parameters and thepotential changes in the distribution ranges of suchdiseases warrant responsive health institutions,precautionary action, and monitoring.

Climate change–induced droughts, flooding andother extreme weather events degrade and reducepotable water supplies and increase water-associat-ed diseases such as cholera and diarrhea, particu-larly in areas with inadequate sanitary infrastruc-tures. Inadequate access to safe drinking water andsanitation, combined with poor hygiene practices,are major causes of ill health and life-threateningdisease in developing countries. At present, thesediseases already kill an estimated 2.213 millionpeople per year in developing countries, of whichabout 90 percent are children under the age of five(Prüss et al. 2002). Women are particularly ex-posed to water-associated diseases through theirtraditional chores of washing and water collection.

Involuntary Displacement, Migration, and ConflictsThe direct and indirect effects of climate changeand their interaction with other vulnerabilities andenvironmental exposures may lead to mass migra-tions, as crucial resources become degraded andlivelihoods are threatened.

Loss of land mass in coastal areas due to sea levelrise is, for example, likely to lead to greater perma-nent or semi-permanent displacement of popula-tions, which may have considerable economic andpolitical ramifications. Areas most vulnerable tosea level rise lie in the tropics: the west coast ofAfrica; the north and eastern coast of South Ameri-ca; South and Southeast Asia; and small islandstates in the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Oceans(IPCC 2001a). Of the world’s 19 mega-cities (thosewith over 10 million people), 16 are on coastlinesand all but 4 are in the developing world. The poorliving in Asian mega-cities are particularly at risk,as sea level rise compounds subsidence caused byexcessive groundwater extraction in Manila,Bangkok, Shanghai, Dhaka, and Jakarta.

To this should be added the risk for potential con-flicts, including social unrest, political instability,and wars over decreasing water or other naturalresources and possible mass migration due to, forexample, land loss or degradation and extreme

weather events. Such conflicts may have consider-able costs both in macroeconomic terms and inhuman suffering.

Economy-Wide EffectsClimate change is expected to have effects on theoverall economy of poor countries, thus hamper-ing potential for economic growth. In addition,poor adaptation (see glossary) will increase theimpacts of extreme events, increasing the costs ofrehabilitation and diverting funds from longer-term development purposes.

Current extreme weather events are already takingtheir toll on developing countries’ economies,leading to loss of human and economic capital.Regions where climate change exacerbates climaticextremes and which have limited adaptive capacitywill be further constrained in their developmentprospects due to additional loss of life, privateassets, reduced productivity of important econom-ic sectors, and destruction of infrastructure 4.

This is particularly true for small countries andcountries with low economic diversity, where theimpact of climatic extremes cannot be wellabsorbed by economic activity in other regions orsectors (Box 2).

Box 2Impacts of Climate Change on SmallIsland States: The Pacific

The Pacific Islands are becoming increas-ingly vulnerable to extreme weather eventsas growing urbanization and squatter settle-ments, degradation of coastal ecosystems,and rapidly developing infrastructure oncoastal areas intensify the islands’ naturalexposure to climate events. In the 1990salone, the cost of cyclones and typhoonsexceeded US$800 million, while the 1997drought cost upwards of US$175 millioneven before nutrition-related deficiencieswere taken into account. During the1997–98 drought in Fiji US$18 million infood and water rations had to be distrib-uted.

Source: IPCC 2001b; IFRC-RCS 2002;World Bank 2000.

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Even though both people and systems appear to begenerally more vulnerable to sudden disruptivechanges than gradual ones, long-term climatechange can be just as harmful. Changes in averageclimatic conditions, as well as extremes, and loss ofproductive areas due to sea level rise, have bothbeen highlighted in their projected impacts on theagricultural sector. Countries where tourism repre-sents a major source of income may be affected bya decrease in revenues due to the effects of bothgradual climatic changes and extreme weatherevents. Such events are likely to alter the attractive-ness of certain holiday destinations, for examplecoral reef mortality is expected to reduce incomeopportunities for local populations in someregions. All these factors can affect GDP, balance ofpayments, level of indebtedness, state of publicfinances, and may divert investments from impor-tant development objectives.

1.7 Implications for Poverty EradicationPart 1 has so far illustrated that even though cli-mate change is a global threat, it is also very mucha problem for development, since poorer countries,having the least adaptive capacity and hence themost vulnerable populations, are expected to sufferthe greatest adverse effects. This is because many ofthe world’s poor are found in geographically vul-nerable places, and live under vulnerable environ-mental, socioeconomic, institutional, and politicalconditions.

Climate change provides an additional threat thatadds to, interacts with, and can reinforce existingrisks, placing additional strains on the livelihoodsand coping strategies of the poor. In 2000, leadersof 189 nations agreed on the Millennium Declara-tion that outlined eight fundamental goals. Cli-mate change challenges the achievement of the

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Millennium Development Goals: Climate Change as a Cross-Cutting Issue

Millennium Development Goal Examples of Links with Climate Change

Table 2 Potential Impacts of Climate Change on the Millennium Development Goals

Eradicate extreme poverty andhunger (Goal 1)

Health related goals: ● Combat major diseases ● Reduce infant mortality ● Improve maternal health (Goals 4, 5 & 6)

Achieve universal primaryeducation (Goal 2)

Promote gender equality andempower women (Goal 3)

Ensure environmental sustain-ability (Goal 7)

Global partnerships

● Climate change is projected to reduce poor people’s livelihood assets, for example,health, access to water, homes, and infrastructure.

● Climate change is expected to alter the path and rate of economic growth due tochanges in natural systems and resources, infrastructure, and labor productivity. Areduction in economic growth directly impacts poverty through reduced incomeopportunities.

● Climate change is projected to alter regional food security. In particular in Africa,food security is expected to worsen.

● Direct effects of climate change include increases in heat-related mortality and ill-ness associated with heat waves (which may be balanced by less winter cold-related deaths in some regions).

● Climate change may increase the prevalence of some vector-borne diseases (forexample malaria and dengue fever), and vulnerability to water, food, or person-to-person borne diseases (for example cholera and dysentery).

● Children and pregnant women are particularly susceptible to vector and water-borne diseases. Anemia – resulting from malaria – is responsible for a quarter ofmaternal mortality.

● Climate change will likely result in declining quantity and quality of drinkingwater, which is a prerequisite for good health, and exacerbate malnutrition – animportant source of ill health among children – by reducing natural resource pro-ductivity and threatening food security, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

● Links to climate change are less direct, but loss of livelihood assets (social, natur-al, physical, human, and financial capital) may reduce opportunities for full-timeeducation in numerous ways. Natural disasters and drought reduce children’savailable time (which may be diverted to household tasks), while displacementand migration can reduce access to education opportunities.

● Climate change is expected to exacerbate current gender inequalities. Depletion ofnatural resources and decreasing agricultural productivity may place additionalburdens on women’s health and reduce time available to participate in decisionmaking processes and income generating activities.

● Climate related disasters have been found to impact more severely on female-headed households, particularly where they have fewer assets to start with.

● Climate change will alter the quality and productivity of natural resources andecosystems, some of which may be irreversibly damaged, and these changes mayalso decrease biological diversity and compound existing environmental degrada-tion.

● Global climate change is a global issue and response requires global cooperation,especially to help developing countries to adapt to the adverse impacts of climatechange.

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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) andrelated national poverty eradication and sustain-able development objectives. Unless concrete andurgent steps are undertaken to reduce vulnerabilityand enhance adaptive capacity of poor people, andunless these actions are integrated in nationalstrategies for poverty eradication and sustainabledevelopment, it may be difficult to meet someMDGs by 2015 (Table 2).

Strategies to strengthen capacity to cope with cur-rent climate variability and extremes and to adaptto expected future climatic conditions are mutuallysupportive and will have immediate benefits. Theywill also help identify and take advantage of thepositive impacts of climate change.

There is much experience to date of coping with cli-mate variability and disasters from which usefullessons for adaptation can be drawn. Ensuring thatthe poor are able to adapt to current and imminentclimate variability is the first step. The task aheadfor the development community is to enhance the

adaptive capacity of the poor and poor countriesand to help to implement specific actions foraddressing climate change impacts. With this inmind, Part 2 discusses lessons learned from pastexperience with coping with climate variability.

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Adaptation is successful if it reduces the vulnera-bility of poor countries and poor people to existingclimate variability, while also building in thepotential to anticipate and react to further changesin climate in the future. The evidence from pastexperience suggests that this is best achievedthrough mainstreaming and integrating climateresponses into development and poverty eradica-tion processes, rather than by identifying and treat-ing them separately.

In this document, mainstreaming is used to describethe consideration of climate issues in decisionmaking processes such as planning and budgeting.Integration is used when specific adaptation mea-sures are added to design and implementationstrategies. Thus, integration occurs in instanceswhere adaptation is deemed to be a priority in or-der to effectively achieve development goals.

The rationale for integrating adaptation in devel-opment strategies and practices is underlined bythe fact that many of the interventions required toincrease resilience to climatic changes generallybenefit development objectives. Adaptation re-quires the development of human capital, strength-ening of institutional systems, and sound manage-ment of public finances and natural resources(Adger et al. 2003). Such processes build the re-silience of countries, communities, and house-holds to all shocks and stresses, including climatevariability and change, and are good developmentpractice in themselves.

Mainstreaming climate issues into national devel-opment policies ensures consistency between theneeds of adaptation and poverty eradication. Sepa-ration of the two runs the risk of adaptation poli-cies inadvertently conflicting with developmentand poverty policies, or conversely, developmentpolicies inadvertently increasing vulnerability toclimatic factors. Accordingly, this issue is critical tothe successful eradication of poverty and needs tobe placed at the core of national developmentprocesses.

The experiences described in this section show howclimate issues can be successfully addressed in the

context of development. They have been organizedunder:● Addressing vulnerability in the context of sus-

tainable livelihoods.● Equitable growth and adaptation to climate

change.● Improving governance to mainstream climate

issues in poverty reduction.

In practice, overlaps and synergies will occurbetween actions in these areas. Promoting suchsynergies is critical and demonstrates how diversestakeholders, including governments, civil society,and poor people themselves, must share in the taskof adapting to climate change (Conde and Lons-dale 2003).

2.1 Addressing Vulnerability in the Context ofSustainable Livelihoods

Although poor people have limited income, theyhave assets and capabilities that can be strength-ened to reduce their vulnerability to climatechange. These assets or “capital” can be groupedinto social capital, natural capital, physical capital,human capital, and financial capital (DFID 2002).Adaptation policies should focus on providing sta-ble conditions and support for making the liveli-hood assets of the poor more resilient to climatechange through resource accessibility and thereforming of policies, institutions, and processes. Itis important to ensure that sectoral and other poli-cies do not undermine, but rather reinforce, theopportunities of the poor to access resources, buildassets, and diversify their economic activities toincrease their adaptive capacity to climate change.

Social Capital and Climate ChangeTraditional systems for adapting to climate vari-ability include a range of livelihood strategies,from individual to collective savings mechanismsand migration. Social networks play a fundamentalrole for the poor by providing safety nets as animmediate response in adverse times. In addition,informal ”solidarity” networks may be constitutedor strengthened after climate-related disastersoccur. In the past, interventions from outside haveoften undermined rather than supported the effortsof informal networks. Instead, these networks

Part 2: Adaptation Lessons from Past Experience

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should be recognized for the important role theyplay in environmental management in the face ofadversity.

Box 3 indicates insights from some of the ways thatpeople in the Sahel – one of the most climate-sen-sitive areas of the world – have responded todroughts in the past. These approaches are typicalof the way subsistence farmers in many parts of theworld have coped in the face of severe shocks tolivelihoods. The lessons from the example indicatethe need to build upon existing social capital toenhance coping mechanisms of poor people toadapt to climate change.

Box 3Drought and Livelihoods in the Sahel

Livelihoods in the Sahel suffered heavilyduring and after the 1968–73 and the 1984droughts. Adaptation strategies of ruralpeople in Niger provide valuable insights:● Diversification away from agricultural

production is a common response to un-predictable harvests.

● Networks of affinity and trust pull house-holds and individuals together, althoughminor conflicts – some dating back topre-colonial relations – may pull themapart.

● The local agrarian system is dynamic andresponds to individualistic and welladapted livelihood decisions, as well asto environmental disturbances.

● Access to resources is maintained byswitching between capital assets, despitethe existence of poverty at certain timesand for certain people.

● Migrants tend to leave the community tolook for work but usually return.

Source: Batterbury and Warren 1999;Thébaud 1998.

Many traditional risk-sharing mechanisms basedon social capital, such as asset pooling and kinshipnetworks, may not work well for climate risksbecause climate risks often affect all households atthe same time. This is different from other shockssuch as impacts on households from illness, loss ofemployment, or death of the main income earner,because everyone who might be a potential source

of help also faces the same hardship. Additionally,traditional coping strategies may be ineffectivebecause of the possibility of climate changeincreasing the range of climate variability. Conse-quently, fluctuations that are, or will be, experi-enced as a result of climate change may exceed therange around which these traditional strategies arebuilt. This may be further hampered by changes insocial norms and structures, which no longer allowfor the application of traditional coping strategies(Box 4).

Box 4Need for Social Capital Building to Copewith Climate Impacts

In 2000, Kenya experienced its worstdrought in 40 years. Effects were severe forpastoralists because ancient coping mecha-nisms had broken down, either becauseland had been sold or because of barrierserected by the relatively affluent farmers,ranchers, industry, and city residents. Sometraditional drought responses, such as raid-ing of neighboring cattle and killing wild-life, have become illegal and are no longeran option. As societal norms affect tradi-tional behavior, strategies may no longer bevalid and there is the need to support thevulnerable population in identifying newstrategies that enable them to deal withadverse climate and adjust to new socioeco-nomic conditions.

Source: UNEP 2002.

Management of Natural CapitalDegradation of natural resources and increasingwater stress enhance the vulnerability of manyrural communities to climate change. Adapting toclimate change therefore needs to increase theresilience of natural systems and their productivityin order to support the livelihoods of the poor.There are, however, many examples of how policieshave undermined this and led to maladaptation.For example, the strategic development plan for theSenegal River Basin, shared by three countries,emphasized building dams to provide irrigationfor rice crops in response to water stresses. The irri-gated areas had to be subsequently abandoned dueto salinization. A modeling study showed that an

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alternative strategy for the basin of irrigated agro-forestry would have had beneficial impacts for thecatchment area, microclimate and the agriculturalproductivity of the poor (Venema et al. 1997).

Inappropriate natural resource management canexacerbate the vulnerability to climate extremes asillustrated by the impacts of Hurricane Mitch inCentral America, which were intensified because ofdeforestation and degradation of wetlands. Forestsand wetlands act as buffer systems, diminishingsurface run-off in the case of intense rains in addi-tion to providing livelihoods to local communities.The interaction between land-use practices and cli-matic impacts is also well illustrated in the YangtzeBasin in China where deforestation increasedflooding and erosion, which led to the destructionof lives and livelihoods.

However, there are also a growing number of exam-ples of improvements in the use and managementof natural resources, which have enhanced theresilience of ecosystems and had positive effects onthe livelihoods of poor people. In China, a veryhigh proportion of the land is subject to severeland degradation. In these areas, the governmenthas recently undertaken integrated ecosystemsmanagement. At the household level, eco-farmingintegrates renewable energy use such as solarpower, vineyard cultivation, and legume plantingfor fixing sand and providing forage (ADB 1999).In Vietnam, mangrove planting led to improvedresilience of the local population to climaticextremes and provided livelihood opportunities(Box 5).

Box 5 Mangrove Planting in Vietnam

The Vietnam Red Cross (VNRC) has sup-ported local communities in the northerncoastal provinces in planting 12,000 hectareof mangrove trees to break the 1.5-meterwaves typically associated with tropicaltyphoons and to act as buffer to 110 kilo-meter of sea dyke. While the program hascost US$1.1 million, the benefits havealready proved far greater. Costs of dykemaintenance have been reduced by US$7.3million each year. Furthermore, TyphoonWukong in October 2000 claimed no livesinland, caused no damage to the dyke andonly minimal damage to possessions andproperty. The mangrove planting has alsocreated livelihood opportunities for the7,750 families involved in the replantingand protection effort and who are harvest-ing shellfish among the mangroves.

Source: IFRC-RCS 2002.

Physical CapitalPolicy making and planning has often neglectedthe needs of the poor, while they are the most vul-nerable to climate-related shocks and stresses.Development strategies based only on discussionwith politically powerful groups can lead to large-scale infrastructure and technological solutionsthat undermine or are inappropriate for poorhouseholds. Furthermore, infrastructure design isoften solely based on past climatic records and maytherefore not or only insufficiently account forchanges in regional climatic conditions such asmore intense and frequent extreme weather events.By assuming no change, development policies canlead to maladaptation enhancing the vulnerabilityof a region and its population.

It may be necessary to assist poor people in makingtheir physical capital more climate resilientthrough the use of appropriate infrastructure andtechnology. For example, in September 2000, aserious flood in the Mekong delta killed over 300people and affected more than 500,000 houses.Afterwards, the Vietnam Red Cross helped to installflexible flood and typhoon resistant houses thatcan be easily restored after a disaster hits. They are

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a successful adaptation strategy with direct benefitsfor the livelihoods of the poor. Except for steelframes and a platform that allows the house to bequickly raised if water rises, all materials are cheapand locally available and the house looks similar totraditional houses.

Human CapitalClimate change presents many complex risks todifferent groups and sectors over different time-frames and localities. Adaptation is likely to be suc-cessful if people are informed about climatechange, how it affects them, and options for doingsomething about it. Successful climate changeinterventions are dependent on high-quality acces-sible information to allow effective decision mak-ing. As the impacts of climate change are difficultto predict accurately, adaptation activities need tobe flexible and responsive to new information, androbust to withstand a wide range of plausiblefutures. The use of risk management and copingthresholds is an area of applied adaptation researchof growing importance (Jones and Boer 2003;Jones and Mearns 2003).

Agricultural climate information is now used toadvise farmers about their choice of crops andmethods of cultivation, which in turn has providedmajor benefits in terms of increased yields and pre-venting food shortages. Similarly, better informa-tion and early warning systems for farmers canreduce vulnerability to inter-annual climate varia-tions and enable responses to be proactive ratherthan reactive (Box 6).

Box 6Climate Information for Southern AfricanFarmers

A recent review of the international initia-tive on Regional Climate Outlook Forums(RCOFs) has found many benefits in help-ing the poor to cope. RCOFs were first initi-ated in 1996 and gained momentum as aregional response to the major El Niño of1998. RCOFs are rapidly becoming themain regional mechanism for providingseasonal climate forecasts to policymakersand for disseminating climate informationto users, including farmers.

The forums bring together climate scientists,operational forecasters and end-users. Cli-mate outlook guidance is agreed and theimplications for climate-sensitive sectors arediscussed. The guidance is presented in termsof probabilities of rainfall being in the rangesof previous dry or wet years. The forums havehelped to develop links and mutual under-standing between meteorologists and end-users of seasonal forecasts and have stimulat-ed the development of national seasonal pre-dictive capacity in Africa. They have alsoraised awareness of the issues of inter-annualclimate variability and climate change andprovided an impetus for adaptation activities.

Source: Hulme 1996; WMO et al. 2000.

Climate information can generate substantial ben-efits in other areas as well, including water man-agement, planning and delivery of health services,and improved warning for extreme weather events.

As the poor already have a lot of knowledge abouthow to cope with climate variability, adaptationactivities should take account of this knowledge,where benefits are proven. Incorporating localknowledge into policy actions may help govern-ments to accommodate specific needs of poor peo-ple and ensure that strategies are taken up by localcommunities.

Box 7 illustrates the use of folklore by Andean com-munities, which anticipate the abundance of rain dur-ing the growing season by the brightness of the starsand adjust their crop planting strategies accordingly.

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Box 7Traditional Forecasting in the Andes

Indigenous farmers in some communitiesof the high Andes of Peru and Boliviaobserve the Pleiades star constellation togain insights into the possible weather sev-eral months into the future. They observethe overall brightness, the size, the date offirst appearance, and the position of thebrightest star in the cluster. If the starsappear clear in the pre-dawn sky, earlyabundant rains and a rich potato crop isanticipated. If the stars appear dim, a small-er harvest is expected due to late and re-duced rainfall. The farmers adjust theirplanting practices accordingly to minimizethe negative impact of these anticipatedweather conditions.

Scientists have found that the visibility ofthe constellation, which also determinesthe time of its first appearance in the sky,might be related to the presence of wispycirrus clouds high in the atmosphere, andthat these are associated with the warmphase of El Niño. Andean farmers have ineffect been forecasting El Niño for at least400 years, and are able to adjust theirplanting schedule if poor or later rains areexpected.

Source: Orlove et al. 2000.

In Southern Africa numerous adaptation tech-niques are used by poorer farmers to deal withanticipated drought. These include water and soilmanagement techniques, resistant crop varieties,and food production methods. However, thesetechniques are often known only locally, or to cer-tain ethnic groups.

It is necessary to further the understanding of howsuch traditional knowledge is, and can be, utilizedby communities, and also how climate change willimpact on the reliability of such practices in thefuture.

Financial Capital – Promoting Safety-NetMechanismsWhile the poor have limited financial assets, thereare ways for them to mobilize their own savings

and reduce financial risk. The micro-finance indus-try has grown considerably in the past twenty years,with micro-insurance a relatively recent addition(World Bank 2000). While micro-insurance facesthe standard challenges inherent in all insuranceschemes, it has to deal with additional issues aris-ing from catering to poor households that alreadyrepresent high insurance risks.

One way to overcome these difficulties is by the useof informal networks of trust that exist within wellestablished groups. Wodaabe herders in Niger haveinformal systems for managing risks, such as thehabbamae. These provide loans to replace reproduc-tive stock lost to natural events. The habbamaestocking system is illustrative of community-levelinstitutional arrangements that, with minimaladditional support, can be used to reduce income-related risks and strengthen the capacity to cope.

A number of countries are now developing moreformal schemes; for example Morocco plans tooffer sunflower and cereal grain farmers insurancethat would pay out when rainfall is below certainthresholds during critical growing periods (Mosley2000; Skees et al. 1999; Hees et al. 2002). (See alsopage 20).

2.2 Equitable Growth and Adaptation to Climate Change

Economic growth is important for generatinglivelihood opportunities for poor people, allowingthem to move out of poverty (see Bardhan 1996;Dollar and Kray 2000; Ravallion 2000). It can con-tribute to the ability of governments to provideimportant services, such as health and education,which are key to achieving the Millennium Devel-opment Goals. The extent, pattern, and distribu-tion of growth in a country is the outcome of theinteraction between its initial conditions, its insti-tutions, its policy choices, the external shocks orstimuli it receives, and chance. However, economicgrowth by itself is not a sufficient condition forpoverty eradication. The pattern or ”quality” ofeconomic growth is as important to eradicatingpoverty as the absolute level of that growth.Growth benefits the poor most when it occurs inareas of the economy that provide opportunitiesfor increased employment and higher returns forpoor people’s assets.

Climatic variability affects short-term economicgrowth in many countries. Droughts or floods

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severely disrupt economies and it can take yearsbefore the impact of such shocks fade and eco-nomies can return to their previous growth paths.Moreover, ongoing climate change will further in-crease the vulnerability of poor people, particular-ly for economies that are heavily dependent uponnatural resources (for example water) and relatedclimate sensitive economic sectors (such as agri-culture, forestry, and fisheries). Figure 2 shows theimpact of El Niño related events on the agricultur-al productivity of Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia,which also has considerable ramifications for theirGDP. As climate change is expected to exacerbateclimatic extremes associated with El Niño years,this underlines the need to address climate relatedvulnerability in the context of development strate-gies.

Climate change can depress the economy by affect-ing the sources of growth. The exact nature andscale will depend on a number of factors including:● Quality of economic growth and distribution

of its benefits.● Structure of the economy.● Ability of the government to finance important

social services such as education and health.● Longer-term implications of disruption to exist-

ing growth paths through, for example damageto infrastructure.

● Success of adaptation efforts implemented inresponse to the anticipated or experiencedchange.

Given the centrality of growth to poverty eradica-tion, there is a need for measures aimed at mini-mizing climate’s negative impacts on a country’sgrowth strategy. Experience suggests that in adopt-ing such an approach there is scope for the follow-ing interventions.

Mainstreaming Climate Issues into EconomicPlanning and the Budget ProcessWhile climatic change is just one out of severalpossible external events to which economies andsocieties are exposed, appropriate adaptationresponses may be critical to maintain growthprospects. Governments can attempt to increasethe resilience of their growth strategies throughimplementing effective adaptation policies to bothshort-term and long-term impacts of climate ontheir economies. This is best achieved by adoptingflexible economic policies based on an under-standing of climatic risks and risk management.Accordingly, climate issues should be main-streamed into national economic planning andbudgetary processes, both to ensure macroeco-nomic stability and to ensure budgetary allocationsfor activities that minimize climate risk.

Figure 2 Maize Production in Selected South African Countries* versus Niño 3 Data Source: Dilley et al. 1997

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The budget is a key process in any country for iden-tifying and funding development priorities. Giventheir growing importance within the developmentprocess, climate adaptation activities should beintegrated in the budget framework. This willensure that climate change interventions are prop-erly funded over the long term, integrated into rel-evant sectoral priorities, and balanced against othercompeting priorities.

In addition, economic management, particularly inthe face of extreme events, requires improvedmeans to manage the consequences of shocksthrough effective inclusion of contingencies for cli-matic variability within budget planning processes.For instance, as Box 8 illustrates, integration of dis-aster management as a component of macroeco-nomic projections, including public expenditureplanning, allows the exploration of more effectivefinancial options at the country and internationallevel.

Box 8Economic Planning for Disasters in Hon-duras

An exercise to model the macroeconomicimpacts of disasters in Honduras developeda framework to analyze the economicimpacts of disasters and policies to reducethem. Initially, the country estimated annu-al expected losses of US$64 million per year(0.49 percent of capital stock) due to natur-al catastrophes.

Subsequently, the macroeconomic impactsof direct losses were estimated, as shown inthe graph. Honduras considered cases inwhich access to post-disaster financing maybe limited. The figure demonstrates that ifforeign reserves are only accessible after thecatastrophe, the event could result in stag-nant GDP over the following eight years.The first trajectory, marked with boxes, rep-resents projections for expected annualgrowth rates of between 5 and 6 percent.The second growth trajectory, marked withtriangles, incorporates the effects of cata-strophic exposure assuming the countrycannot obtain sufficient foreign reserves orexternal funds to finance post-disaster loss-es. This new growth trajectory demonstratesthat catastrophe exposure has the potentialto impede future growth of the Honduraneconomy.

Source: Freeman et al. 2001.

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Increasing the Resilience of Infrastructure andInvestmentsEstimates indicate that 50 to 75 percent of econom-ic losses from Hurricane Mitch resulted from inade-quate design and location of infrastructure, such ashousing, roads, bridges, and industry (Charveriat2000). However, despite growing awareness, there iscurrently no formal mechanism for assessing theimpacts of climate events and conditions on infra-structure and development activities.

Although precise information from climate changeprojections about the probability of different cli-mate events is limited, it is important to simulatehow a range of events would impact on the out-come of a development activity; in many cases itcould potentially entail a re-examination of theactivity. Until now, the application of vulnerabilityassessment information in project appraisals hasbeen extremely limited. Cost-benefit analysis needsto highlight the impact of various scenarios on thepoorest and to incorporate, to the extent possible,an evaluation of environmental externalities(Dixon et al. 1988, 1994). Initially, such evaluationmay focus on infrastructure projects that tend tohave a long economic life, such as dams, roads,bridges, and electricity power supply and distribu-tion systems.

There are also many examples of the need forimproved climate-related codes and standards forinfrastructure design, to ensure a decrease in thevulnerability of the poor. For example, the in-creasing variability in precipitation may need larg-er reservoirs, and more frequent storms may neces-sitate redesign of coastal infrastructure to with-stand storms and storm surges. Examples of regula-tory tools include land-use planning, water-basinmanagement, and implementation of storm-resis-tant building codes. In many cases, these regulato-ry interventions exist but have limited impact anddo not pay adequate attention to the communitiesthat may be adversely impacted. It is thereforeimportant that vulnerability assessments and cli-mate-related codes and standards are integratedinto the design and maintenance of infrastructure.

Improving Management Systems and TechnologyGrowth and development in areas dependent uponnatural resources are often particularly climate sen-sitive and current patterns of resource use andmanagement may need to be changed in order topromote climate resilience.

For example, many developing countries have apersistent and systemic water crisis in terms of bothwater stress and water scarcity. With projectedchanges in climate, water stress and the frequencyand magnitudes of droughts are both likely to beexacerbated in many arid and semi-arid countriesin Africa and the Middle East (IPCC 2001b). There-fore, managing the demand for water through pol-icy instruments, including a sound regulatory envi-ronment and an incentive-based system – coveringresource rights and pollution permits – would be akey to reducing vulnerability.

Many crops, such as rice, are already at the limit oftheir temperature tolerance, and increases in meantemperature and climate variability in the tropicalcountries could result in more years with loweryields (IPCC 2001b). However, agricultural man-agement models that promote dryland agriculturecould increase the resilience of agricultural systemsand the development of drought-resistant speciescould enhance the ability to cope with reducedwater availability. Consequently, more effectiveadaptation can be achieved through improvedresource management systems and use of availabletechnology.

Spreading Risk – Enhancing the FinancialResilience of the PoorNew capacities, technical support, and policyinstruments are required that will allow the incor-poration of risk management into economic andsectoral planning instruments and improve accessby the poor to insurance and other safety-netmechanisms. A number of initiatives are currentlybeing developed in order to find a more innovativeapproach to structuring risk sharing, so that insur-ance markets can better absorb catastrophe lossesand provide affordable insurance for poor peopleand governments. This also includes the establish-ment of public-private or national-internationalpartnerships. For instance, formal sector interna-tional insurers are being sought to reinsure theportfolios of institutions like the Grameen Bank inBangladesh.

In the absence of insurance markets, householdstry to cope with weather risks by: (a) self-insuringthrough asset accumulation, savings, and access tocredit; (b) income diversification; and (c) infor-mal insurance arrangements. In most poor coun-tries and for most poor households, credit and sav-ings markets are imperfect and asset accumulation

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is never enough in times of a crisis. Diversificationto other activities is difficult because householdslack skills, information, and capital to do some-thing else. Many households adopt low-risk andlow-yield production patterns to ensure a mini-mum income. These production patterns come atthe expense of perhaps much riskier, but higher-return, production that could create incomegrowth and the build-up of capital. Finally, infor-mal insurance arrangements at the local commu-nity level often break down when faced with dis-asters that are geographically widespread, such assevere weather events, catastrophic droughts, andfloods, because all households suffer at the sametime.

Traditional insurance markets dealing with weath-er related risks have a very low penetration indeveloping countries, although there is a clearneed to establish systems to provide for insurancecoverage in cases of catastrophic weather events.However, because of the geographically wide-spread nature of many weather events, a largenumber of people will make claims at the sametime and thus local insurance companies couldface huge losses.

At the macro level, several governments in devel-oping countries have some ad hoc emergency assis-tance programs that fund post-disaster reliefefforts. Because of the ad hoc nature of these gov-ernment programs, it is not possible to find inter-national reinsurance and thus governments tend toself-insure through budgetary allocation. Such self-insured programs could run out of funds if a cata-strophic event occurs. Some governments in poor-er countries rely on donors to provide funds in caseof disasters but donor funds can be too little or toolate.

Recent developments in global financial and insur-ance/reinsurance markets are making it increasing-ly feasible to spread weather risks across countries.New financial and insurance instruments, such ascatastrophe bonds and weather insurance con-tracts, offer innovative ways of packaging the risksassumed by local insurers and governments. Forexample, catastrophe bonds issued against rainfallevents in developing countries could be appealingto international investment bankers because theirrisk would be uncorrelated with the risks of mostother financial investments. Similarly, several inter-national insurers and weather risk companies

would like to diversify their weather related riskportfolio by including weather risks in developingcountries. Market mechanisms for risk manage-ment do not always develop on their own, becausethey have historically interfered with local institu-tions and the large international markets. Govern-ments and bilateral/multilateral financial institu-tions can help establish and support the develop-ment of sustainable structures (Box 9).

An important challenge to developing weatherinsurance of this kind is the availability of reliableand verifiable data on weather patterns. Further-more, weather stations with appropriate hardwaresystems need to be put in place to ensure reliablereadings on insured events. However, weatherevents can also vary spatially, so the existence ofmicroclimates and localized disasters needs to betaken into account. In some cases, weather eventsshow a trend, for example a negative rainfall trend,signifying higher probability for droughts—thiscan pose a challenge in designing a drought insur-ance program. Hence, while insurance schemes canhelp to spread the risk of climate impacts, theirlimitations need to be carefully considered, partic-ularly because climate change may cause changesin climate variability and the occurrence of extremeevents in a region, and past experiences may notapply to the future.

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Box 9Mexico’s Experience in Funding NaturalDisaster Relief

In Mexico, in 1996, the government estab-lished a Fund for Natural Disasters(FONDEN) for post-disaster financing forreconstruction of public infrastructure andcompensation to low-income producers forcrop and livestock losses arising from nat-ural disasters. FONDEN targets the benefi-ciaries and has limits to amounts it disburs-es per beneficiary. The intention is not tocompete with private insurance. FONDENpayments are triggered only when droughts,frost, or other weather perils affect mostpeople in a region — that is, FONDEN paysout against catastrophic systemic events. Inaddition, more recently, FONDEN has start-ed to adopt objective rules for declaring cat-astrophic events. For example, FONDENrules that livestock owners are eligible fordrought payouts when cumulative rainfall isbelow either 50% of its historical average orhistorical minimum for two consecutivemonths. Similarly, frost is declared whentemperatures fall below a certain leveldepending on the crop. Using parametricrules for triggering payments removes an adhoc dimension in the declaration of cata-strophes and reduces the political interfer-ence in FONDEN’s operations. The govern-ment of Mexico is currently looking into thefeasibility of obtaining financial reinsur-ance for FONDEN to cover its exposurefrom weather risks affecting the agriculturalsector.

In addition, providing catastrophic insur-ance coverage has encouraged the forma-tion of mutual insurance funds amongstfarmer organizations. These farmer organi-zations are called fondos de aseguramiento(known as fondos), formed to providemutual crop insurance to their members.The fondos collect premiums, creatingreserves to pay indemnities and cover oper-ational costs. However, in the event of cata-strophic weather events the collected premi-ums and reserves are not sufficient to coverthe losses. This is because a catastropheaffects all farmers at the same time and the

mutual insurance needs to make paymentsto all of them at the same time. Research bythe World Bank identified drought, excesshumidity, and frost as the main weather per-ils that represent catastrophic risks for thefondos. These risks depend on the geo-graphic location of the fondos, so each oneis exposed to mainly one or two weatherrisks.

Source: World Bank 2000; Skees et al. 2001.

2.3 Improving Governance to Mainstream Cli-mate Issues in Poverty Reduction

Public institutions, including both political sys-tems and civil service institutions, are key to deter-mining and implementing effective decisions. Cli-mate change—which brings new and unknownrisks, difficult choices, and potential suddenshocks—reinforces the need for responsive andaccountable institutions. This is illustrated in anexample on constructing and maintaining floodcontrol systems in Bangladesh (Box 10), whichdemonstrates that good governance must underpineffective adaptation strategies. By making publicinstitutions responsive, participative, and account-able to those they serve, decision making processand implementation activities can be robustenough to deal with the challenge of climatechange.

Box 10Public Accountability for Flood Protectionin Bangladesh

Flooding is a fact of life in Bangladesh, withone third of cultivated land flooded in anormal monsoon year. People in the HaorBasin have learned to cope, as the flood-plains are some of the most productive fish-eries in the country and the region has afood surplus providing up to 10 percent ofnational grain supplies. But the food systemis fragile; 80 percent of people are share-croppers or landless laborers and a power-ful elite control land and fishing rights.While expected floods can be managed,flash floods can cause severe damage tohomes and crops.

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To prevent this, the Water DevelopmentBoard constructed over 800 kilometers ofembankments with responsibility for main-tenance shared between government andresidents. In 2002, after complaints by resi-dents about lack of repairs to embank-ments, construction mismanagement, lackof monitoring, and corruption, a flashflood hit just before the main harvest. Itdestroyed a third of all infrastructure and20 percent of the crop, leaving 1.4 millionpeople in the Haor Basin facing food short-ages. In response to visits to the area byactivists and government officials, relief wasprovided and steps taken to prevent a simi-lar outcome in the future. The Minister forWater Resources has agreed to stamp outcorruption in construction and some seniorWater Board officials have been removedwhile a judicial inquiry is underway.

The State Minister for Disaster Managementhas announced that, for the first time in 20years, elected officials will be involved inembankment construction and mainte-nance. However, since local governmentremains weak, a local civil society group,HUNO, is working with the local govern-ment and Water Board to develop a citizen-based monitoring system.

Sources: Sashankar 2002; DFID 2002.

The Role of Civil Society in Climate Change Policies and ProgramsFor climate adaptation to be effective, empoweringcivil society to participate in the assessment process,including identifying and implementing adaptationactivities, is especially important (see Box 11). How-ever, in order to enhance their participation, it isimportant to ensure that they have access to infor-mation, analysis, and knowledge about the impactof climate change on their lives. Vulnerabilityassessments and adaptation measures are morelikely to be realistic and effective if they have inputfrom those who will be affected by climate changeand who are best placed to manage the relevantrisks. At the same time, adaptation reflects a contin-uing learning process, and community participa-tion in the assessment process could itself enablethe community to initiate adaptation measures.

Box 11Reducing the Vulnerability of Women toCyclones in Bangladesh

The community-based cyclone prepared-ness program in Bangladesh has found thatwhere women were not involved in village-level disaster preparedness committees,responsible for maintaining cyclone shel-ters and transmitting warnings, they madeup the highest proportion of cyclone vic-tims. In Cox’s Bazaar in east Bangladesh,where women are now fully involved in dis-aster preparedness and support activities(education, reproductive health, self-helpgroups, and small and medium enterpris-es), there has been a huge reduction in thenumbers of women killed or affected.

Source: IFRC-RCS 2002.

Engaging broader civil society, including commu-nity groups, religious organizations, trade unions,professional associations, the media, and publicinterest organizations, is also important. Suchgroups can be instrumental in raising awareness ofclimate change impacts, in supporting poor peopleas they engage in adaptation activities, in providingvaluable knowledge, and in monitoring govern-mental performance and holding government toaccount in its efforts to cope with climate change.Consequently, civil society, and particularly thepoor, must be empowered to participate in theassessment process and in identifying adaptationactivities.

Monitoring and Assessment of Poverty and Climate ChangeUnderstanding how climate change is increasingthe vulnerability of the poor through its impact ontheir livelihoods, health, and economic opportuni-ties is crucial to effective policy responses.

Improved use of climate information will requirestrengthening existing institutions and processes todevelop effective procedures for information col-lection and dissemination. This will include, andin turn contribute to, the development of trust andmotivation among end-users. As well as the need toensure that climatic information is focused on theneeds of the poor, there are two kinds of chal-lenges: the first involves situations where informa-

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tion exists, but is poorly coordinated and often notused, and the second involves situations in whichrelevant information is lacking. Generally, vulnera-bility assessments for current climate variability aremore widely available, while assessments for futureclimate variability are much fewer – although grow-ing in number.

The considerable body of information about cur-rent climate variability includes the growing num-ber of vulnerability assessments at all spatial scales(UNEP 2001; Downing and Patwardhan 2003), butdespite this progress vulnerability assessments arestill limited in number for poor countries. Vulner-ability maps account for climate-induced risks tocrop production, water, health, and so on. TheWorld Food Programme has its own vulnerability-mapping unit and non-governmental organiza-tions like the Save the Children Fund also havetheir own assessments. The challenge is to increasethe effectiveness of the information by coordinat-ing data gathering efforts to avoid duplication andto ensure that the data really are being used toinform and influence decisions and action. Thereare many cases demonstrating that the real prob-lem is not lack of vulnerability assessments or earlywarning – but the lack of prompt action on suchearly warnings.

However, sometimes the problem is a lack of rele-vant and reliable poverty-climate information. Inparticular, action is needed to improve short-termimpact information and to ensure that it is used. Todate, many climate change vulnerability, impact,and adaptation assessments have focused on themedium to long term (year 2050 or even 2100).This timeframe does not coincide with the scope ofdecision making by politicians and governments,who are guided by short-term political cycles andannual budgets. Shorter-term probabilistic climateoutlooks, from the seasonal to 3–10 year timescale, could therefore be useful for the develop-ment of rapid, but preliminary, assessments. Thisfocus on the short run will help to make the assess-ments more useful for reducing poverty now. Nev-ertheless, it is important to recognize and alsoimprove the long-term projections in climatetrends to ensure that no measures are taken nowthat lead to maladaptation in the long run.

Development of possible socioeconomic scenariosfor the future has proven problematic due to thelarge uncertainties associated with projecting likely

development paths. Guidelines for the design ofsocioeconomic scenarios are now developed(UNDP 2001), and some countries – like Chinaand India – are using them as part of their assess-ments. The development of diverse scenarios basedon the integration of climate change and povertydata – including, but not limited to, Poverty Reduc-tion Strategy Papers (PRSPs) – can inform the de-sign of more effective adaptation strategies andplanning options.

In conclusion, effective and transparent institu-tions must be in place to ensure that high qualityinformation reflecting the needs of the poor is pro-duced in a participative manner, made accessible,and acted upon. This is key to effective decisionmaking.

Coordination of Adaptation by GovernmentVulnerability assessments and the identification ofcross-sectoral dimensions of climate change haveled some countries – which usually are already vul-nerable to today’s climate – to assign the generalresponsibility of climate change management to aministry with a broad mandate. In Kiribati, forexample, the national adaptation program is man-aged by the Ministry of Finance, which helps toensure a coordinated response and that other poli-cies do not inadvertently increase the vulnerabilityto climate change (Box 12).

Box 12Kiribati’s Mainstreaming in NationalPlanning Processes

Kiribati is one of the most vulnerable coun-tries in the world to the effects of climatechange, climate variability, and sea level rise.Most of the land in Tarawa, Kiribati’s largestand most populous island, is less than 3meters above sea level, with an averagewidth of only 450 meters. The islands areexposed to storm surges and to droughts,particularly during La Niña events. Manyadaptation measures that address immedi-ate risks are the same as those recommend-ed for adapting to climate change.

The government of Kiribati is moving to atwo-phase Adaptation Program, whichwould address mainstreaming adaptation intheir national development framework. The

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Box 13Mozambique’s Action Plan for PovertyReduction

Mozambique is particularly vulnerable tonatural disasters, which impact heavily onthe poor. The floods it experienced in 2000and 2001 had far-reaching social and eco-nomic consequences for the poor and thecountry’s economic growth. The impact ofnatural disasters on the poor is recognizedin Mozambique’s Action Plan for the Reduc-tion of Absolute Poverty 2001–2005, inwhich reducing vulnerability to natural dis-asters is one of the key action areas. TheAction Plan states:

Natural disasters are a risk factor, whichaffect the pace of economic growth, anddestroy assets of the poorest segments ofthe population in affected areas, reducingthem to a state of dependency, at least tem-porarily, on donations. Natural disastersaffect the living conditions of affected pop-ulations, and constitute an obstacle to adefinitive break with certain degrees andpatterns of poverty. Therefore, measuresaimed at managing these risks are of theutmost importance.

The Action Plan goes on to recommend thataction be taken to strengthen the nationalcapacity to respond to natural disaster byraising the standard of the national earlywarning system.

Source: Mozambique 2001.

In addition to national level planning, experiencesuggests that climate adaptation also needs to befollowed through to local level planning andimplementation to be effective. With increasingdecentralization, local governments are often keyto effective implementation of any policy in devel-oping countries. Adaptation strategies will requirefusing government- and institution-level approach-es with bottom-up approaches rooted in regional,national, and local knowledge (Niang-Diop andBosch 2003).

Finally, key climate-sensitive sectors, such as agri-culture and infrastructure, also need to integrate

Program is overseen by an Adaptation Work-ing Group, chaired by the Secretary to theCabinet, and managed by the Ministry ofFinance and Economic Planning. All otherconcerned Ministries are represented on theAdaptation Working Group, along with fullycommitted senior-level staff. The Prepara-tion Phase (scheduled to last two years) willinvolve a process of national consultationsbetween key government ministries, the pri-vate sector, non-governmental organiza-tions, and civil society to agree on a nation-al vision for adaptation, along with broadbenchmark indicators that would be incor-porated into national economic planning.The Implementation Phase (three to fouryears) would start once adaptation bench-marks are agreed and ideally be supportedby incremental grant financing from donorsfor top-up of public expenditures againstagreed adaptation benchmarks.

Source: Bettencourt 2002.

Mainstreaming Adaptation into PlanningProcessesAll countries have some process to identify andimplement key priorities at national, subnational,and sectoral levels. At the national level, this maybe a long-term development plan, a Poverty Reduc-tion Strategy (PRS), a five-year planning process, ora national strategy for sustainable development(OECD 2001). Mozambique’s Action Plan forPoverty Reduction represents an example of howresponses to climate risks can be integrated intonational development strategies (Box 13).

The prioritization of development interventionsnormally occurs in the Office of the President orPrime Minister, in Planning Agencies, or in Min-istries of Finance. The process varies from countryto country and, in large countries, often fromprovince to province. The priority-setting processtypically involves technical analyses as well as par-ticipatory inputs by various stakeholders. Thedesign of adaptation activities will be context spe-cific, based on the country’s specific developmentplanning process and the particular analytical andparticipatory methodologies used.

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climate adaptation activities. For example, inKenya, the total area suitable for growing tea maybe dramatically reduced with a temperatureincrease of 2°C in comparison to 1990 (Figure 3).Only higher-elevation areas would remain appro-priate for tea growing; other areas would becometoo hot to grow tea. This work demonstrates thepotential dangers of not taking climate change intoaccount in strategic sectoral planning. Mainstream-ing climate issues into broader planning activitieswould lead policymakers at least to consider theimpacts on export earnings and may encouragediversification into more climate-resilient food

crops in vulnerable areas. Whatever form the prior-ity-setting process takes, it should consider relevantclimate change adaptation activities.

As this section has demonstrated, for adaptation tobe effective, development of adaptive capacity toclimate variability and change should be main-streamed into national support for poverty reduc-tion and sustainable development. The task aheadfor the development community is to increaseadaptive capacities and help to implement specificactions for addressing climate change impacts.

Figure 3 Potential Impacts of Temperature Increases onTea Growing in Kenya

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This document has argued that climate changeimpacts severely threaten development effortsand opportunities across the developing world.Through the United Nations Framework Con-vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)5, effortshave been initiated to develop and increase theadaptive capacity of poor people and the poorercountries to the impacts of climate change. TheUNFCCC decisions accept that sustainabledevelopment must be the framework for adapta-tion activities and that both immediate andlong-term responses to the adverse impacts ofclimate change are needed.

Many of these responses are ”no regrets” mea-sures, which, if implemented, strengthen theoverall sustainable development process. No-regrets policies and measures would generate netsocial benefits whether or not there is human-induced climate change (IPCC 2001b). While inprinciple no-regrets measures are beneficial to theeconomy and their realization may in some casesrequire no or little additional funding, consider-able transaction costs may be involved in othercases. The challenge is to fine-tune policies andpractices by removing barriers that currently con-strain the adoption of no-regrets adaptationresponses. Depending on the rate and magnitudeof climate change, further specific adaptation mea-sures may become necessary and require addition-al funding. It is important to recall that the needfor, and therefore also the cost of, adaptation isultimately tied to mitigation efforts.

Below are the areas of action for all stakeholders,given an understanding that the main objective is tomainstream and integrate adaptation responses intosustainable development processes and activities.

3.1 Mainstream Adaptation into SustainableDevelopment

Development Agencies and DonorsSupport for general poverty reduction and sustain-able development lies at the core of developmentagencies’ programs. Given the gravity of climateissues and their potential impact on achieving theMillennium Development Goals by 2015 and sus-

taining progress beyond 2015, development agen-cies need to give more consideration to climatechange in their work.

International development agencies should takethe lead in internalizing climate issues in all theirwork by ensuring robustness of poverty reductionprograms to climate change. This would requiredevelopment of tools and methodologies, trainingand awareness raising of senior management andstaff, and the possible modification of their owninstitutional processes to ensure that climate vul-nerability is addressed with due diligence6.

Over recent years, several countries and regionshave developed vulnerability and adaptationassessments, as well as practical policy proposalsand strategic implementation plans to address cli-mate change. This knowledge needs to be integrat-ed into development support so as to manage cli-mate vulnerability along with other non-climaterisks in project design and implementation. Threewindows of opportunity are available to enablethis integration.

First, there is an immediate opportunity to analyzeprojects and practices that show how the transla-tion of adaptation planning and assessment intoproject design will provide real benefits. This can

Part 3: The Way Forward

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ultimately facilitate the mainstreaming of climatechange issues into national policy and sustainabledevelopment planning.

Second is the opportunity to start implementingadaptation activities where sufficient informationis available. Such activities need to be of immediateconcern to the livelihoods of poor people, such aswater resources management, land management,health, agriculture, infrastructure development,fragile ecosystems, and integrated coastal zonemanagement. There is also a need for climatechange related disaster prevention and prepared-ness to be more proactive and development-orient-ed. At the same time, development efforts shouldfully incorporate disaster prevention and pre-paredness.

Third is the opportunity to implement the priorityadaptation activities identified by the UNFCCC7,

especially in cooperation with its financial mecha-nism, the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Inthis context, collaboration between the Develop-ment and Environment Ministries of OECD coun-tries would help to harmonize adaptation withinthe development cooperation framework and with-in the UNFCCC focus (OECD 2002).

Governments in Developing CountriesThe efforts of development agencies to address cli-mate change should support and complementthose of developing-country governments in main-streaming climate issues in national developmentframeworks, sectoral planning and budgetingprocesses, and in integrating adaptation measuresin the implementation of development projects.

In the context of regional, national, and localneeds and sustainable development imperatives,adaptation interventions often form only a subsetof many desirable interventions. Interventions toaddress climate-induced increased vulnerabilitycompete with interventions to address otherimportant issues such as indebtedness, HIV/AIDS,increasing urban poverty, macroeconomic instabil-ity, and increasing inequality. Consequently, fol-lowing assessments of vulnerability and adaptationoptions, adaptation interventions, where necessary,would need to be prioritized in the context of otherdevelopment interventions. The assessment andprioritization processes would necessarily requireengagement between civil society, the government,and the private sector.

In order to internalize the identified priorities, it isnecessary to enable institutional processes to antic-ipate climate-related vulnerability. This emphasizesthe importance of the budget process. Even if thedevelopment priorities are ultimately funded insome countries through development assistance,this expenditure should be included within thebudget framework to ensure proper planning andfinancial management and the correct prioritiza-tion amongst competing demands for resourceswithin the country itself. This will ensure that theyare properly funded over the long term, that theyare integrated into relevant sectoral priorities, andthat they can be balanced against other competingpriorities.

The pervasive nature of interventions requiredacross the economy to address climate-related vul-nerability suggests that in some cases a Ministry

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with a broad mandate, for example the Ministry ofFinance or Planning, is most appropriate to coor-dinate adaptation interventions. In other cases,where vulnerability increases are largely confinedto a single sector (for example water or agricul-ture), strengthening the sectoral Ministry may bethe key institutional intervention.

3.2 Continue and Strengthen Assessment andInformation Gathering

Internalizing climate vulnerability into the devel-opment process, both within the developmentagencies as well as within country governments,will require assessments of current and future cli-mate vulnerability. Within a development project,such assessments should include both a participa-tory analysis of the vulnerability of the communi-ty, ecosystem, and socioeconomic sector that theproject addresses, and an assessment of the effectsof the project on the vulnerability of the commu-nity, ecosystem, and socioeconomic sector.

This document has argued the importance of boththe geographic specificity of increased vulnerabili-ty and of local, sometimes informal, knowledge todeal with climate variability. This highlights theimportance of capturing local knowledge, review-ing and assessing its applicability, and its dissemi-nation amongst other communities and relevantagencies.

Assessment related activities should build on thesignificant work already undertaken by many coun-tries to prepare vulnerability assessments in theframework of the preparation of National Com-munications to the UNFCCC. Best practice exam-ples are the National Communications of Mongo-lia, Ethiopia, Maldives, Yemen (Mongolia 2001;Ethiopia 2001; Maldives 2001; Yemen 2001), andthe regional assessments developed by the Pacificand the Caribbean Small Island States. Typically,these documents have been developed from theperspective of the livelihood approach, givingemphasis of the impact of climate change on peo-ple’s lives, instead of solely focusing on physicaland natural changes.

International support is important to create anenabling environment in developing countries tocarry out vulnerability assessments of relevance totheir needs and priorities. This could includestrengthening infrastructure for data collection anddissemination, capacity building for scientific and

socioeconomic assessments, and for related policyanalyses.

Vulnerability assessments and their integrationinto development policy and implementation is anevolving process. The incorporation of vulnerabili-ty assessments requires strengthening human andinstitutional capacity in national and internationaldevelopment agencies and appropriate civil societyorganizations to support the information and deci-sion making needs of individuals, and realign insti-tutional practices where appropriate. Recognizingthe importance of increased knowledge sharing,some development agencies have created an opennetwork called the Vulnerability and AdaptationResource Group (VARG) to enhance knowledgesharing8.

3.3 Engagement with the UNFCCC ProcessThe UNFCCC has played a valuable role in assist-ing countries to consider adaptation responsesthrough ”enabling activities” to promote capacitybuilding, public and political awareness creation,sustainability of institutional arrangements, sus-tainability of capacities, and integration of climatechange adaptation measures into national develop-ment policies. The first round of enabling activitiesmust be seen as a first step, but many of theseobjectives, in particular the integration of climatechange responses into national development poli-cies, are yet to be completed in any country(Amous et al. 2000). In the absence of prior expe-rience, unrealistically high goals were set consider-ing the limited funds and time available. As thefirst round was undertaken, it became apparentthat the methodologies for vulnerability and adap-tation assessment need to be further developed toenable the integration of these assessments intodevelopment practices.

However, the main reason for the weakness ofadaptation activities promoted by the internation-al community has been institutional. The processhas been led by the UNFCCC national focal points,which are normally situated within Ministries ofEnvironment, which often have limited links andleverage over other line Ministries. Developing acoherent response to adaptation requires integrat-ing climate change adaptation into the activities ofother ministries, such as Finance, Economic Affairs,Planning, and key sectoral line Ministries.

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The implementation and effectiveness of theUNFCCC process in addressing global climatechange, especially in developing countries, is close-ly linked to its ability to simultaneously furtherdevelopment and poverty reduction goals. Capaci-ty building to support and facilitate these linkageswill enhance the sensitivity of poverty reductionpolicies to climate issues.

Recently, the UNFCCC has also mandated supportfor adaptation activities through three Funds (theLeast Developed Country Fund, the Special Cli-mate Change Fund, and the Kyoto Protocol Adap-tation Fund). The LDC Fund, which is the onlyFund of the three that is currently operational, issupporting the Least Developed Countries to pre-pare National Adaptation Programmes of Action(NAPAs). This is accompanied by the formation ofthe Least Developed Countries Expert Group(LEG), which is emphasizing the focus on povertyreduction during adaptation planning.

In addition, knowledge generation and dissemina-tion related to climate impacts and vulnerabilityassessments are essential for making poverty reduc-tion strategies more effective by mainstreamingand integrating climate issues. The IPCC has playeda key role in reviewing and synthesizing informa-tion about climate change, its impacts, and poten-tial adaptation measures, with a view to informingthe UNFCCC negotiations. This knowledge needsto be made more accessible to decision makers,development agencies, and civil society in order toenable them to use it to inform their own work.

Finally, the implementation experience of thedevelopment agencies needs to be shared with theUNFCCC process with a view to informing the dia-log on opportunities available to integrate adapta-tion responses in sustainable development.Accordingly, the sharing of analytical tools andproject experience should be promoted and intera-gency collaboration should be enhanced.

3.4 Ensure Synergies with Other MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements

The Rio Conventions reflect the commitment ofthe international community to protect the globalenvironment, on the basis of common but differ-entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.In this context OECD countries have a specialresponsibility for leadership on sustainable devel-opment worldwide, both historically and because

of the influence they exert on the global economyand environment. This responsibility includeshelping developing countries to pursue a sustain-able development path. In this context it is essen-tial that the linkages between poverty reductionand the global environment are recognized andaddressed through appropriate responses (OECD2002).

This implies that the UNFCCC, the UN Conven-tion on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), the UNConvention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD),and the international agreements on forests areassessed in their local impact on poverty and syn-ergies between conventions are utilized.

Many countries have already taken initiatives toidentify prioritized adaptation interventions. Inthis context, the Least Developed Countries arepreparing NAPAs in accordance with UNFCCCguidelines. In addition, prioritized adaptationinterventions have also been identified in NationalBiodiversity Conservation Plans (prepared inresponse to the Convention on Biological Diversi-ty), the National Action Plans (prepared in re-sponse to the Convention to Combat Desertifica-tion), and the National Environmental ActionPlans.

Currently, many environmental ministries arestretched by the need to service all these interna-tional processes, leaving little time for them toengage in domestic implementation and determin-ing national environmental priorities. This conflictcan be reduced by maximizing synergies in report-ing and other requirements for these internationalagreements. For a poor person it does not fromwhich convention the intervention comes. It is im-portant that these interventions improve welfareand are sustainable. Streamlining national respons-es to the various global environmental conventionswould also help to minimize the diversion ofscarce human resources from primary sustainabledevelopment activities.

Sustainable interventions that improve economicand social welfare can be ensured by addressingsynergies between conventions on the regional andlocal levels. Impacts of climate change can alsoaffect projects and objectives of the other Conven-tions. For example, changes in temperature andrainfall regimes are expected to impact on speciesdistribution and the goods and services provided

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by ecosystems. Conservation measures aiming atthe long-term protection of biodiversity andecosystems should take such changes into account.Integrating diverse initiatives will help to achieve astrong synergy between the goals of these globalenvironmental conventions and the sustainabledevelopment process.

3.5 External FundingMainstreaming climate issues in developmentplanning would help to ensure that adaptationmeasures are taken, where this proves to be neces-sary for achieving sustainable development. As aresult, the majority of financial resource needs foradaptation interventions could be part of, andchanneled through, national development bud-gets, with appropriate support from bilateral andmultilateral agencies and from non–official devel-opment aid sources. Within this context, all coun-tries would use their national processes (long-termdevelopment plans, poverty reduction strategy,national strategy for sustainable development, etc.)to identify and implement key priorities. Thiswould ensure the effectiveness of the interventionssince they would be matched by a medium-termexpenditure framework that would allocate re-sources (from national and external sources) tothese nationally determined adaptation priorities.It would also ensure that adaptation is addressed asa development issue, and not only as a one-dimen-sional environmental issue.

However, the development of capacity, as well asthe implementation of specific measures to copewith the adverse effects of climate change, will inmany cases require substantial external resources toreduce the vulnerability and increase the resilienceof those most at risk. While all demands for exter-nal financial support should result from nationalplanning processes in developing countries, thereare three ways to channel external support:● Through regular development assistance chan-

nels; this could be bilateral, multilateral,and/or non-governmental assistance includingpublic-private partnerships.

● Through the GEF in its role as the financialmechanism of the UNFCCC.

● Through the new Funds created by the UNFCCC.

It is crucial that external financial support is avail-able to developing countries as they integrate adap-tation in their own sustainable developmentefforts, especially in interventions for poverty

reduction. This external funding is required to sup-port: vulnerability assessments; identification, pri-oritization and preparation of adaptation interven-tions; and the mainstreaming and integration ofthese interventions in national and sectoral plan-ning and implementation, through the removal ofbarriers to the adoption of no-regrets interventions.These barriers could include information andknowledge gaps, weak human and institutionalcapacity, inappropriate policy context, and lack oftransactional experience in planning and imple-menting adaptation measures.

At the same time, external financial support wouldalso be required for implementing specific adapta-tion measures that address the increased vulnera-bility of poor people due to the adverse impacts ofclimate change. The nature and scope of supportfor these activities from the GEF and the new cli-mate change Funds would depend on the evolvingguidance from the UNFCCC.

Finally, it is essential to ensure the rapid availabili-ty of external funding for adaptation interventions.This is required to address the many cases in whichadequate information on vulnerability, and on itsreduction through adaptation measures in sustain-able development programs, is already available.There is the need to implement pilot projects as thepowerful learning-by-doing experience from theseinterventions would reinforce the next steps.

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35

1. Besides, the sea level and ice sheets would con-tinue to respond to warming for many centuriesafter greenhouse gas concentrations have beenstabilized. Climate Change 2001; Statement ofthe IPCC Chairman at CoP7.

2. Adaptation will, however, not prevent all dam-ages.

3. In the year 2000 the atmospheric concentrationof carbon dioxide (CO2) was about 370 parts permillion (ppm), which represents about a 30 per-cent increase when compared to pre-industriallevels (IPCC 2001a). A future stabilization levelof the CO2 concentration at, for example, 550ppm is likely to lead to lower damages than astabilization at a higher level, say 750 ppm,because the associated climatic changes are like-ly to exert less pressure on natural and humansystems. Over the next 250 years, the projectedtemperature increase, compared to the 1990global average, is expected to be 1.9 to 5.1 ºC forCO2 concentration stabilization at 550 ppm,and 2.8 to 7.0 ºC at 750 ppm (IPCC 2001a).These projected changes in temperature repre-sent global averages, with the increases beinghigher over most land areas and lower overocean surfaces.

4. Besides agriculture, infrastructure plays a crucialrole in improving economic conditions in devel-oping countries. According to World Bank esti-mates 1% increase in the stock of infrastructuretranslates to a 1% increase in GDP (UNDP2001).

5. The United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the1992 Earth Summit in Rio. Its ultimate objectiveis the, ”stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-trations in the atmosphere at a level that will pre-vent dangerous anthropogenic interference withthe climate system. Such a level should beachieved within a timeframe sufficient to allowecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,to ensure that food production is not threatenedand to enable economic development to proceedin a sustainable manner” (Article 2, UNFCCC).

The Conference of the Parties (CoP) is thesupreme decision making body of the UNFCCC.It is charged with promoting and reviewing theimplementation of the Convention. At the ThirdCoP in Kyoto, the Parties agreed on a politicalframework for emissions reduction (the KyotoProtocol, UNFCCC 1997), while Parties decidedon the implementation arrangements for theKyoto Protocol at the Seventh CoP in Marrakesh.The Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC 2001), as wellas the UNFCCC Declaration at the subsequentEighth CoP in Delhi emphasized the need toaddress adaptation, along with mitigationefforts. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) isthe financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, and isprovided guidance by the CoP on activities eli-gible for support.

6. Methodologies to assess and manage climaterisks and highlight consideration of adaptationinterventions from a purely technical to ahuman development perspective are currentlyavailable. (Jones and Boer 2003; Jones andMearns 2003). The underlying approach empha-sizes that adaptation is a process (UNDP 2003a)and needs to be assessed with appropriate indi-cators under a proper monitoring and evalua-tion framework for effectiveness (Perez and Yohe2003).

7. UNFCCC Decision 5/CP7 and 6/CP7.

8. The Vulnerability and Adaptation ResourceGroup (VARG) is an informal network of bilat-eral and multilateral agencies that was formed topromote an open discussion of adaptationissues. The mission of VARG is to facilitate theintegration of climate change adaptationresponses in the development process throughthe sharing, assessment, synthesis, and dissemi-nation of existing knowledge and experience.The target audience are developing countries,the UNFCCC process, civil society, and develop-ment agencies. Participating agencies so far haveincluded: ADB, BMZ, CIDA, DFID, DGIS, EC,GEF, GTZ, OECD, UNDP, UNEP, USAID, USEPA,and the World Bank.

Notes

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37

Adaptation in natural or human systems is aresponse to actual or expected climate stimuli ortheir effects, which moderates harm or exploitsbeneficial opportunities. In this paper adapta-tion refers to all those responses to climatic con-ditions that may be used to reduce vulnerability.Adaptation is a very broad concept and can beused in a variety of ways. Adaptation to the(expected) negative impacts of climate changegenerally takes place in two ways: anticipatory(before impacts take place) and reactive (as aresponse to initial impacts). In natural systemsadaptation is reactive by definition. In humansystems adaptation can be both anticipatory andreactive and can be implemented by public andprivate actors. Private actors include individuals,households, communities, commercial compa-nies and other actors, such as NGOs. Publicactors include government bodies at all levels(Klein 2001; IPCC 2001b).

Adaptive capacity can be defined as the ability ofpeople and systems to adjust to climate change,for example, by individual or collective copingstrategies for the reduction and mitigation ofrisks or by changes in practices, processes orstructures of systems. Adaptive capacity cannotbe easily measured and is not well understood.But it is related to general levels of sustainabledevelopment such as political stability (civilconflict, functioning democracy), economicwell-being (GDP growth, incidence of poverty),human and social capital (literacy, life expectan-cy, level of local organization, micro-financeinstitutions) and climate specific aspects (suchas existing disaster prevention and mitigationsystems).

Climate can be viewed as average weather. It repre-sents the state of the climate system over a giventime period and is usually described by themeans and variation of variables such as tem-perature, precipitation, and wind, most com-monly associated with weather.

”Climate variability refers to variations in the meanstate and other statistics (such as standard devi-ations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the

climate on all temporal and spatial scalesbeyond that of individual weather events. Vari-ability may be due to natural internal processeswithin the climate system (internal variability),or to variations in natural or anthropogenicexternal forcing (external variability)” (IPCC2001a; 2001b).

”Climate change refers to any change in climateover time, whether due to natural variability oras a result of human activity. This usage differsfrom that in the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),which defines ”climate change” as: ‘change inclimate which is attributed directly or indirectlyto human activity that alters the composition ofthe global atmosphere and which is in additionto natural variability observed over comparabletime periods” (IPCC 2001a; 2001b).

Disaster is a serious disruption of the functioningof a community or a society causing widespreadhuman, material, economic or environmentallosses which exceed the ability of the affectedcommunity/society to cope using its ownresources (UN/ISDR 2002).

Disaster risk reduction represents the systematicdevelopment and application of policies, strate-gies, and practices to minimize vulnerabilitiesand disaster risks throughout a society, to avoidor to limit adverse impact of hazards, within thebroad context of sustainable development(UN/ISDR 2002).

Integration is used in this document when specificadaptation measures are added to design andimplementation strategies. Thus, integrationoccurs in instances where adaptation to climateimpacts is deemed to be a priority in order toeffectively achieve development goals.

Livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets(including both material and social resources),and activities required for a means of living. Alivelihood is sustainable when it can cope withand recover from stresses and shocks and main-tain or enhance its capabilities and assets both

Glossary

38

now and in the future, while not underminingthe natural resource base (adapted from Cham-bers and Conway 1992).

Mainstreaming in this document is used to describethe consideration of climate issues in decisionmaking processes such as planning and budgeting.

Mitigation entails all human interventions thatreduce the sources or enhance the sinks of green-house gases (adapted from IPCC 2001a; 2001b).

Official development assistance is defined as thoseflows to countries on Part I of the DAC List ofAid Recipients [developing countries] and tomultilateral institutions for flows to Part I aidrecipients which are:i. provided by official agencies, including state

and local governments, or by their executiveagencies; and

ii. each transaction of which:a) is administered with the promotion of theeconomic development and welfare of devel-oping countries as its main objectiveb) is concessional in character and conveys agrant element of at least 25 percent (calculat-ed at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) (OECD2000).

”No regrets” policies and measures would generatenet social benefits whether or not there ishuman-induced climate change (adapted fromIPCC 2001b).

Poverty is now widely viewed as encompassingboth income and non-income dimensions ofdeprivation, including lack of income and othermaterial means; lack of access to basic social ser-vices such as education, health, and safe water;lack of personal security; and lack of empower-ment to participate in the political process andin decisions that influence someone’s life. Thedynamics of poverty also are better understood,and extreme vulnerability to external shocks isnow seen as one of its major features (UNDP1997).

Preparedness includes all activities and measurestaken in advance to ensure effective response tothe impact of disaster, including the issuance oftimely and effective early warnings and the tem-porary removal of people and property from athreatened location (UN/ISDR 2002).

Prevention includes all activities taken to outrightavoid the adverse impacts of hazards and relatedenvironmental, technological and biologicaldisasters (UN/ISDR 2002).

Resilience is the amount of change a system canundergo without changing state (IPCC 2001b).

Sink includes any process, activity, or mechanismthat removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or aprecursor of a greenhouse gas or aerosol fromthe atmosphere (IPCC 2001a; 2001b).

Source includes any process, activity, or mechanismthat releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or aprecursor of a greenhouse gas or aerosol into theatmosphere (IPCC 2001a; 2001b).

Sustainable development is defined as developmentthat meets the needs of the present withoutcompromising the capacity of future generationsto meet their own needs.

Vulnerability is a more dynamic concept than pov-erty, since it captures the sense that people movein and out of poverty. The meaning of vulnera-bility encompasses exposure to risk, hazards,shocks and stress, difficulty in coping with con-tingencies, and access to assets. In the context ofclimate change, vulnerability to climate changeis used in this report to mean the risk that cli-mate change will cause a decline in the well-being of poor people and poor countries. Thismeans the degree to which a system is suscepti-ble to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects ofclimate change, including climate variability andextremes. This vulnerability is a function of thecharacter, magnitude, and rate of climate varia-tion to which a system is exposed, and its adap-tive capacity.

39

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LayoutPeter Philips, MediaCompany Berlin Suhel al-Janabi, GeoMedia, Bonn

Photo Credits Suhel al-Janabi, GeoMedia Photo Archive:

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p.X, p.5, p.9, p.11, p.13, GTZ:

p.2, p.18, p.23Francis Dobbs, Word Bank Photo Library:

p.7Ray Witlin, Word Bank Photo Library:

p.29Sophia Bettencourt, World Bank:

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Asian Development Bank

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