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2 Peloponnesian War — Playbook

© 2019 GMT Games, LLC

10. SCENARIOSWhen beginning a game of Peloponnesian War, choose one of the following scenarios to play:

● Peloponnesian War—also called the Campaign Game [page 6 of the Rulebook]

● Archidamian War—the foreshortened version of the Cam-paign Game [page 8 of the Rulebook]

● Decelean War ● Fall of Athens ● 1st Peloponnesian War ● Fall of Sparta

The Peloponnesian War scenario, also called the Campaign Game, is the basic scenario as outlined in the Rulebook. The other five scenarios adhere to the same rules and setup as the Campaign Game except where they specifically differ in the rule sections that follow.

Special Rules—Whenever a scenario special rule or setup instruction contradicts anything found in the Rulebook, the scenario item always takes precedence.

Nomenclature—In the setup lists that follow, Hoplite, Cavalry and Naval counts indicate how many SPs of that type will set up in the given location. Allied unit are denoted by “(A)” preceding the unit type.

10.1 DECELEAN WARPlace the Game Turn marker on space 6 of the Game Turn track.

10.1.1 Setup: Athens (Player Side)Treasury: 7000 talentsSCI: 0Bellicosity: 6

A Athens: 3 Hoplite, 2 Cavalry

B Piraeus: 8 Naval

C Corcyra: 3 (A)Naval, 1 (A)Hoplite

D Chios: 2(A)Naval, 1 (A)Hoplite

E Naupactus: 1 Naval

F Larisa: 4 (A)Cavalry, 2 (A)Hoplite

G Syracuse: Nicias, 4 Naval, 4 Hoplite

10.1.2 Setup: Sparta (Non-Player Side)Strategy: Cause RebellionTreasury: 6000 talentsSCI: 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS10. Scenarios ..................................................... 2

10.1 Decelean War ..................................................................210.2 Fall of Athens ..................................................................410.3 1st Peloponnesian War ...................................................5Event Table—1st Peloponnesian War ....................................710.5 Fall of Sparta ..................................................................8Event Table—Fall of Sparta ..................................................15

11. Two-Player Rules ...........................................14

Example of Play .................................................16

The Peloponnesian War—A Look At Strategy ...............25Background ..........................................................................25Strategic Considerations ......................................................25Impedimenta ........................................................................26The Match is Struck .............................................................26The War Begins ....................................................................27Three Different Kinds of War in One ....................................27Period I. THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR (431-421BC) .................28Period II. THE ARMISTICE (420-413BC) ..............................30Part III. THE IONIAN or DECELEAN WAR (413-404BC) .......34

Economics of War ...............................................37

The Naval War ...................................................39

The Game As History............................................41Game Turn 1 (431 – 429BC) .................................................41Game Turn 2 (428 – 426BC) .................................................41Game Turn 3 (425 – 423BC) .................................................41Game Turn 4 (422 – 420BC) .................................................42Game Turn 5 (419 – 417BC)..................................................42Game Turn 6 (416 – 414BC) .................................................42Game Turn 7 (413 – 411BC) ..................................................43Game Turn 8 (410 – 408BC) .................................................44Game Turn 9 (407 – 405BC) .................................................44Game Turn 10 (404 – 402BC) ...............................................44

Designer’s Notes ................................................45Solitaire Play ........................................................................45Strategy ................................................................................45Operations ............................................................................46Combat and Sieges ..............................................................46Rebellion ...............................................................................46Revenue ................................................................................47Conclusion ............................................................................472nd Edition ............................................................................47

3Peloponnesian War — Playbook


Bellicosity: 6

H Sparta: Agis, Alcibiades*, Home Guard, 4 Hoplite, 1 Cavalry

*The Athenian leader has switched sides.

I Corinth: 5(A)Naval, 5 (A)Hoplite

J Thebes: 4 (A)Hoplite, 4 (A)Cavalry

K Plataea: 1 (A)Hoplite

L Heraclea: 1 (A)Hoplite

M Amphipolis: 1 (A)Hoplite

N Syracuse: Gylippus, 2 (A)Hoplite, 2 (A)Cavalry, 3(A)Naval

10.1.3 Special RulesA. The game begins with a Spartan Defensive Strategy op-

eration against the Athenian Army in Syracuse. Syracuse is an active ally of Sparta.

Historically, Athens’ primary operation was to send Nicias to capture Syracuse (the first of two Sicilian expeditions). The cost of the operation has already been deducted from the Athenian treasury.

B. No armistice can occur during this scenario.

C. Macedonian Neutrality—If a unit of either side enters Pela or Macedonia, Macedon immediately becomes an active ally of the other side. Macedon can also become active due to an Event. If the “King Perdiccas of Mace-don Changes Sides” event occurs while Macedon is still neutral, Macedon joins the Spartan side. When Macedon becomes active, immediately place 2 (A)Cavalry in Pela.

D. Leader Casualties—Spartan leaders Brasidas and Ar-chidamus have been killed. Athenian leaders Pericles and Cleon have been killed. Keep these leaders in the box.

10.1.4 Victory ConditionsThe game ends immediately and victory is determined when:a) the player changes sides from the Spartan to the Athenian

side (remember the player begins as the Athenian); orb) an armistice occurs; orc) one side surrenders; ord) turn 3 is complete.

If you have accumulated 40 or more victory points you win; otherwise you lose.

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10.2 FALL OF ATHENSPlace the Game Turn marker on space 7 of the Game Turn track.

10.2.1 Setup: Sparta (Player Side)Treasury: 6000 talentsStrategy: Cause RebellionSCI: 0Bellicosity: 5

A Sparta: Home Guard, 1 Cavalry

B Sardis: Alcibiades

C Decelea: 5 Hoplite, 2 (A)Cavalry

D Corinth: 2 (A)Naval, 5 (A)Hoplite

E Thebes: 5 (A)Hoplite, 2 (A)Cavalry

F Heraclea: 1 (A)Hoplite

G Amphipolis: 1 (A)Hoplite

H Syracuse: 2 (A)Hoplite, 2 (A)Cavalry

I Pela: 2 (A)Cavalry

J Miletus: 1 (A)Hoplite, 3 (A)Cavalry, Rebellion marker

K Abydos: Mindarus, 2 Naval, 1 (A)Naval

L Oropus: 1 Naval, 1 (A)Naval

M Panactum: 1 Hoplite

N Plataea: 1 (A)Hoplite

10.2.2 Setup: Athens (Non-Player Side)Treasury: 2000 talentsStrategy: Attack Spartan AllySCI: 0Bellicosity: 3

O Athens: 2 Hoplite

P Piraeus: 2 Naval

Q Corcyra: 2 (A)Naval, 1 (A)Hoplite

R Abydos: Thrasybulus, 2 Naval, 1 (A)Naval, 1 Hoplite, 2 (A)Hoplite

S Naupactus: 1 (A)Naval

T Argos: 3 (A)Hoplite

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10.2.3 Special RulesA. The game begins with a Spartan continuing operation.

The Spartan primary operation was to send Mindarus to Abydos. As dictated by the defensive strategy, the Athenian secondary operation was to move a force to Abydos in response.

B. No armistice can occur during this scenario.

C. Syracuse and Macedon are active Spartan allies. Argos is an active Athenian ally.

D. Thessalian Neutrality—Whenever the Post-Combat Movement Table would send an SP to Larisa, send it to Athens instead.

E. Delian League Cities in Revolt—Place Rebellion markers in Chios, Miletus, Ery-thrae, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Cyme, Teos, Colophon, Ephesus, Kos, Cnidus, Camirus, Lindus, Thasos, Eretria, Chalcis, and Carystos. Since so many Delian League spaces are in rebellion, the Athe-nian Emergency Fund rule [8.1.6] isn’t in effect.

F. Leader Casualties—The Spartan leaders of Brasidas and Archidamus have been permanently eliminated. The Athenian leaders of Pericles, Cleon, Nicias and Demosthenes have been permanently eliminated. No further Athenian leader can be eliminated during play. Alcibiades may once again become an Athenian leader if the “Demagogue for Hire” Event occurs.

10.2.4 Victory ConditionsVictory points are scored the same way as in the Pelopon-nesian War scenario. The game ends immediately and victory is determined when:a) the player changes sides from the Athenian to the Spar-

tan side (remember the player begins as the Spartan); orb) one side surrenders; orc) turn 10 is complete.

If the player has accumulated 40 or more victory points he wins; otherwise he loses.

10.3 1st PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Overview: This scenario covers the first Peloponnesian War described in Thucydides Pentecontaetia, spanning the period from 460-435BC. It consists of six turns: Turn 1: 460-458, Turn 2: 457-455, Turn 3: 454-452, Turn 4: 451-449, Turn 5: 448-446, Turn 6: 445-443

Place the Game Turn marker on space 1 of the Game Turn track.

Place the No Long Walls marker near Athens.

Note: Use the turn track on the map as normal. The dates above have no impact on play and are included for historical interest only.

10.3.1 Setup: Athens (Player Side)Leaders: You will use only the eight Athenian leaders with “1PW” in a vertical yellow band (keep the rest in the box): Pericles, Cimon, Tolmides, Sophocles, Thucydides, Lamachus, Diotimus and Hagnon. Put these eight into the Athenian draw cup.Treasury: 3500 talentsSCI: 0Bellicosity: 6

A Athens: 2 Hoplite, 1 Cavalry

B Piraeus: 6 Naval

C Lampsacus: 1 Naval

D Naupactus: 1 Naval, 1 (A)Hoplite

E Mytilene: 1 (A)Hoplite, 2 (A)Naval

F Chios: 1 (A)Naval

G Samos: 1 (A)Naval

H Byzantium: 1 (A)Naval

I Megara: 1 (A)Hoplite

J Pegea: 1 (A)Hoplite

K Plataea: 1 (A)Hoplite

10.3.2 Setup: Sparta (Non-Player Side)Leaders: You will use only the eight Spartan leaders with “1PW” in a vertical yellow band (keep the rest in the box): Dorsus, Pleisto-anax, Pausanias, Asimides, Aristeus, Cleandridas, Cnemus and Eurybatus. Put these eight into the Spartan draw cup.Treasury: 2500 talentsSCI: 0Bellicosity: 6



L Sparta: Home Guard, 9 Hoplite

M Gythium: 1 Naval

N Elis: 1 (A)Hoplite

O Corinth: 2 (A)Hoplite, 3 (A)Naval

P Thebes: 4 (A)Hoplite, 4 (A)Cavalry

10.3.3 Setup: NeutralsQ Argos: 4 (A)Hoplite, the Argos Neutral marker

R Larisa: 4 (A)Cavalry, the Thessaly Neutral marker

S Syracuse: 2 (A)Hoplite, 3 (A)Cavalry, 2 (A)Naval, the Syracuse Neutral marker

T Pela: the Macedon Neutral marker

Macedon begins with no initial forces.

10.3.4 Special RulesA. Armed Neutrals—All map spaces are associated with

Athens, Sparta or Neutral based on their color unless a Neutral marker begins in the space.

B. Thir ty Years Peace—If, at the end of any turn, both sides have a Bellicosity of 1 or 2, the game ends in a draw.

C. Hostage Embassies—Each side starts with the Hostages marker from the other side, obvi-ating the ability to attack each other’s territories [6.6]. They can only be removed via Event #7.

D. No Long Walls—As long as this marker is on the map there is an unfortified land connection between Athens and Piraeus. It can only be re-moved via Event #7.

E. Syracuse—In addition to Syracuse’s standard rules [5.5.3.2], Syracusan units can’t move until Syracuse is at-tacked by Athens.

F. Random Events—This scenario doesn’t use the standard event table. Instead, use the table on the facing page.

10.3.5 Victory ConditionsAt the end of any turn:

● If one side’s Bellicosity is 0 and the opposing side’s Bellicosity is positive, the opposing side wins.

● If both sides’ Bellicosity is 0, or if the Thirty Years Peace occurs [special rule B], the game is a draw (the historical result).

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2: Thracian Aggression—The Abdera and Maraneia spaces switch sides. Replace Allied SPs in those spaces with SPs reflecting the new alliance. Return non-Allied SPs in those spaces to their home spaces. Place a Rebel-lion marker between the two spaces to indicate a Spartan alliance; remove it when again allied with Athens.

3: Thessaly—If neutral, the Larisa and Pharsalus spaces become an Ally of Athens. If already Allied to Athens, they become neutral again. Flip the Thessaly marker to the appropriate side as a reminder of its status.

4: Lunar Eclipse / Earthquake—Operations are temporar-ily halted to appease the gods. Roll a die:1-3: A lunar eclipse affects Athens4-6: An earthquake affects Sparta

The affected side can’t conduct more than 2 operations this turn. If an earthquake occurred, place 1 Athenian Allied Hoplite in Pylos, which becomes Athenian con-trolled—place any Spartan units and leaders there into the Going Home box.

5: Egyptian Revolt—Inaros, son of Psammetichus, King of Libya, leads a revolt against Artaxerxes of Persia. Reduce Athens’ Treasury by 800 talents (to pay for forces sent to Egypt). If this event occurs a second time, reduce Ath-ens’ Treasury by 600 talents and it can’t build any units this turn. This event can occur only twice per game; thereafter treat it as no effect.

6: Phocian Aggression—Various locations are designated for Phocian attack. Roll a die:1-3: Cytinium4-6: Delphi (Sacred War)

Place a Siege marker in the indicated space. At the end of the turn, the Spartan side loses 1 Bellicosity if it doesn’t control the space. You can mark these spaces with the Phocian counters as a mnemonic.

Each of these attacks can occur only once per game. If a result has already occurred, choose the other one. Once both have occurred, treat this event as no effect.

7: Athens Rebuilds Long Walls—If the Athenian side controls both Athens and Piraeus, flip the No Long Walls marker to its Walls side and remove the two Hos-tages markers from the Strategy Matrices.

8: Oligarchic Rebellion—Roll two dice, adding them to-gether. If the resulting space is already in rebellion, roll again, adding 1 for each roll already made. If the result-ing space is not in rebellion, place a Rebellion marker there.

2: Chios 3: Thasos 4: Olynthus 5: Chalcis 6: Mytilene 7: Samos

8: Byzantium 9: Megara 10: Camirus 11: Lampsacus 12: Carystos 13+: no effect

When a Rebellion marker is placed in one of the above spaces, roll a die for each adjacent space, which also rebels on a result of 6.

9: Leader Death—In every battle this turn, if a side has a leader present and has an unmodified combat roll of 1-4, that leader dies and is permanently removed from the game. However, no side can lose more than 1 leader per turn: at the end of any turn, if a side had multiple leader deaths, randomly determine which one is permanently lost and return the others to their draw cup.

Also, if Cimon (Athenian leader) is on the map when this event occurs, he dies: permanently remove him from the game and skip the next game turn (due to the 5 years truce).

10: Thebes Attacks Plataea—Regardless of strategy, in Sparta’s first operation Plataea is automatically desig-nated as the objective. The assembled Expedition must comprise “2H, 5(A)H, 4C,” with at least 3 of the Allied Hoplites activated in the Thebes space.

11: Artaxerxes—Both sides send delegations to Persia for sup-port. Roll a die:1-5: Sparta gains 600 talents.6: Athens gains 600 talents.

12: Silver Mine Discovered—Roll a die:1-2: Sparta discovers the mine and gains 600 talents.3-6: Athens discovers the mine and gains 600 talents.

EVENT TABLE—1st PELOPONNESIAN WAR



Persia. When Sparta did go to their aid, she brought upon herself a war that was impossible for her to win and which irremedi-ably damaged her supremacy and control over Greece itself; for Persia countered Sparta by encouraging (and in part financing) a new coalition of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos to oppose Spartan domination. This combined alliance waged the so-called Corinthian War (395-87) against Sparta, defeated her decisively at sea in 394—just ten years after Aegospotami—and ultimately forced her to abandon her attempt to liberate the Greeks of Asia.

4. Certainly Sparta had no monopoly on folly. When the Athe-nians, bent on restoring their empire, chose to intervene in cities within the Persian King’s domain, the King in turn allied with Sparta in order to thwart them, and the Athenians, faced again in 387 with the loss of their Black Sea grain supply, had to renounce their imperial goals. The general agreement of 386 – known as the King’s Peace – formalized the position. Both Sparta and her opponents in Greece undertook to leave the King in complete control of his domains and, and with the threat of Persian support if it were needed, Sparta was established as the enforcer of the peace, the policeman of the Hellenes.

5. In short, Sparta’s total military victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War gained her little more than a short-lived supremacy in Greece, one that ultimately could not be main-tained without the support of Persia, who would not grant it to her unless she accepted conditions and limitations imposed by Persia. Thus it was the King of Persia who seems to have gained most from the war, for with the destruction of the Athenian Empire he recovered his territories in Asia at little cost to himself and was able to cheaply maintain his hold on them by playing off the always-contentious and now utterly disunited Greek poleis (city-states) against each other. Later Kings continued this policy with such success that none of them had to defend against invasion from the west until the Macedonians under Alexander the Great attacked Persia in 334.

6. This paragraph covers general conditions in Greece.

7. Athens, for example, could not forego another attempt to recover her imperial assets from the fifth century. Although she was for a time checked by fear of Sparta and of provoking the Great King to intervene, she recognized and seized her opportunity when the Thebans inflicted a severe defeat upon Sparta at the battle of Leuctra in 371. When the decisive impact of that battle became clear, Athens set out to regain two of the most strategic of those assets, the city of Amphipolis (the loss of which was described by Thucydides in Book 4) and the Chersonese on the Hellespont, (which Athens under Pericles had settled, and which would protect her access to the Black Sea). When the Great King was distracted and temporarily paralyzed by the revolt of the satraps (provincial governors) of Asia between 366 and 359, Athens’ attempt to recover her old empire became so offensive and blatant that three of her main allies turned against her and stalemated her in what is known as the Social War of 357-355. Then when the Great King, having restored order in Asia, threatened Athens with another round of

10.5 FALL OF SPARTA400-362BC (2-Player only)

Design Note: This is a ‘sandbox’ scenario that uses the two-player rules [page 14] but with additional political rules to show the ebb and flow of coalitions that rose with Persian gold against Sparta that led to its downfall. In this scenario you are cast in the role of Sparta or Thebes/Athens in the final battle for hegemony over Greece prior to the arrival of the Macedonians under Philip II and his son Alexander.

HistoryNote: These historical notes are verbatim from the Epilogue to The Landmark Thucydides by Robert B. Strassler; pages 549-553. They are a good précis explanation for the time period that follows the game’s main scenario and the fall of Sparta. Parenthetical notations are Book #. Paragraph # from Thucydides.

1. Covers the conclusion of the 2nd Peloponnesian War (404BC).

2. In his obituary of Pericles (2.65), which Thucydides wrote after the end of the war, he acknowledged the vital role of the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger in maintaining Sparta. Yet he says little in the body of his text about the rising importance of Persia in Greek affairs. In truth, although the Persian governor at Sardis, Tissaphernes, never did honor his promises to provide the fleet to assist Sparta, his meager financial support, along with that of Pharnabasus in the Hellespont, did permit Sparta to challenge Athens in the Aegean and to bring about the revolt of many Asian Greek cities from Athenian allegiance. It was Cyrus the Younger, however, the successor to Tissaphernes, who demanded of his father, Darius II, that real naval support be provided to Sparta, and whose active assistance and collusion with Lysander encouraged the Spartans to persevere despite setbacks. Thus even though Aegospotami was won without the help of the Persian fleet, Sparta found herself greatly indebted to Cyrus at the end of the war, and when Darius died in 404 and Cyrus began to assemble an army to support his claim to the throne Sparta had no choice but to become involved, partly by her obligation of gratitude, and partly by reflection that if Cyrus were to succeed without her aid, she would feel his wrath. So Sparta made her contribution to Cyrus’ expedition and approved the creation of a mercenary force of Greek hoplites for his army. Their adventurous journey into and out of Mesopotamia was later made famous by one of the Athenian captains, Xenophon, in his book Anabasis, “The March of the Ten Thousand.”

3. Cyrus’ army won the battle of Cunaxa near Babylon (401) but gained no victory, for Cyrus himself died in the field, and his death left Sparta, as far as the triumphant King Artaxerxes II was concerned, in an awkward position. Although efforts were made to restore amicable relations, the truth is inescapable. Alcibiades had been right when he predicted (8.46) that Sparta having liberated the Greeks of Greece from Athens could not refuse the entreaties of the Greeks of Asia to liberate them from



punitive action, the now nearly bankrupt city had no choice but to yield and finally to abandon her imperial ambitions for good.

8. Sparta’s aspirations to leadership in Greece were also dealt a fatal blow during this period. When the mass of Theban hoplites arrayed in an extraordinary formation fifty-ranks deep, broke through their opposing phalanx at Leuctra, the Spartan army’s reputation for military invincibility was forever shattered; and the Thebans, led by the great general Epaminondas, were not slow to exploit their new military advantage in order to make it permanent. In 369, Epaminondas marched into the Peloponnesus and invaded Laconia, inviolate for centuries, and on its borders founded and fortified the two great democratic bastions of Megalopolis and Ithome in Messinia – the inhabitants of the latter being given freedom from Sparta after centuries of degrading subjection. By the establishment of these two states, he reduced Sparta in a flash from a world power to a mere local wrangler intent for the rest of her independent existence on recovering the irrecoverable Messene on which Spartan power had depended.

9. After the resounding victory at Leuctra, Thebes found herself the greatest military power of free Greece. The 380s and the 370s had been the decades of Spartan hegemony; in the 360s Thebes sought to take Sparta’s place, and for a brief moment her prospects seemed good. But with the death of Epaminondas on the battlefield of Second Mantinea (362) and with the onset of the miserable Sacred War that embroiled Thebes with Phocis in a long an debilitating conflict, the threat of Theban power faded.

Historical Note: This should give you a broad overview of this period. My thanks to Robert B. Strassler, for his concise explanation of a very complicated period in Greek history.

Scenario OverviewOne player is Sparta. The other player is the Anti-Spartan Coali-tion (hereafter “Coalition”) who controls different combinations of Theban and/or Athenian forces on any given turn: Thebes uses their own force counters (blue); Athens uses Athenian forces (dark green); all other forces use Athenian Allied units (light green).

General Course of PlayOne player represents Sparta at the height of its power. This player controls the Spartan and Spartan Allied forces throughout the game. The other player represents a shifting set of anti-Spartan coalitions: on a given turn, this player controls only Theban forces, both Theban and Athenian forces, or solely Athenian forces.

When a scenario rule indicates that the Coalition player’s role is:

1. Thebes—The Coalition player commands the (blue) Theban leaders and units plus any Athenian Allied (not Athenian) units. Athenian leaders are not drawn on these turns.

2. Athens—The Coalition player commands the (dark green) Athenian leaders and units; he can’t use Theban or Athe-nian Allied units. Theban leaders are not drawn on these turns.

3. Anti-Sparta—The Coalition player commands all The-ban, Athenian, and Athenian Allied forces. A Theban leader is drawn for all odd-numbered operations (includ-ing the first operation) or an Athenian leader for each even-numbered operation. If in play, the Persian army moves as the first operation of any turn, but doesn’t effect this sequence thereafter.

Play Note: Regardless of which role the Coalition player represents that turn, he always uses the Athenian Garrison units to denote space control.

Control of SpacesAll red and green map spaces start under Spartan control except for spaces that begin the game occupied by Theban, Athenian, Athenian Garrison, or Athenian Allied forces.

The Coalition player controls any space that contains a Theban, Athenian, Athenian Allied, or Athenian Garrison unit. As the Coalition side captures spaces they receive a control marker: an Athenian strength 1 Garrison (on the back of the Siege markers). Garrisons included in the counter mix are an absolute limit, however, so Coalition control is limited. The Coalition player may voluntarily abandon control of a space at any time in order to shift a Garrison to a newly-controlled location.

Persian forces can’t permanently capture spaces, though they always control spaces their forces occupy. Once Persia is activated, Sardis remains a permanent Persian-controlled space until its army is eliminated.

10.5.1 Setup: MarkersPlace the No Long Walls marker near Athens.

Place the Game Turn marker on space 1 of the Game Turn track.

Each of the 7 turns in this scenario represents 6 years—turn 1: 401-396, turn 2: 395-390, turn 3: 389-384, turn 4: 383-378, turn 5: 377-372, turn 6: 371-366, turn 7: 365-360. Use the turn track on the map as normal: these dates have no impact on play and are included for historical interest only.



10.5.2 Setup: SpartaLeaders: You will use only the eight Spartan leaders with “FoS” in a vertical black band (keep the rest in the box): Agesilaus, Lysander, Pausanias, Dercyl-lidas, Cleombrotus, Archidamus III, Agesipolis and Antalcidas. Put all but Agesilus into the Spartan draw cup.Treasury: 6000 talentsSCI: 0Bellicosity: 10

A Sparta: Agesilaus, Home Guard, 4 Hoplite, 1 Cavalry

B Mantinea: 2 (A)Hoplite, 2 (A)Cavalry

C Gythium: 2 Naval, 1 (A)Hoplite

D Tegea: 2 (A)Hoplite

E Epidaurus: 1 (A)Hoplite, 1 (A)Naval

F Megara: 1 (A)Hoplite

G Ephesus: 3 (A)Hoplite, 2 (A)Cavalry

H Abydos: 3 (A)Naval

10.5.3 Setup: Thebes/AthensBellicosity: 10

10.5.3.1 Thebes (blue counters)Treasury: 3500SCI: 0

Leaders: You will use all eight Theban leaders: Epaminondas, Pelopidas, Gorgias, Timolaus, Androclidas, Leontidas, Ismenias and Cylon. Put all but Ismenias into the Theban draw cup.

I Thebes: Ismenias, 8 Hoplite, Sacred Band

J Delium: 1 Hoplite, 2 Cavalry

K Charonea: 1 Hoplite, 2 Cavalry

10.5.3.2 Athens (dark green counters)Treasury: 2000SCI: 0

Leaders: You will use only the eight Athenian lead-ers with “FoS” in a vertical black band (keep the rest in the box): Iphicrates, Philocles, Aristotelos, Chabrias, Eubulidos, Demostratus, Thrasybulus and Conon. Put Conon underneath the No Long Walls marker (he may enter the game as a result of an Event). Put the remainder except for Thrasybulus into the Athenian draw cup. (You will need a total of three draw cups for this scenario.)

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L Athens: Thrasybulus, 4 Hoplite, 2 Cavalry, Peltast (2-SP)

M Piraeus: 2 Naval, Garrison

N Decelea: Garrison

O Panactum: Garrison

P Sunium: Garrison

Q Plataea: Garrison

10.5.3.3 Anti-Spartan Forces (light green counters)R Elis: 2 Hoplite

S Corinth: 2 Hoplite, 3 Naval

T Argos: 2 (A)Hoplite

U Pharsalus: 2 (A)Cavalry

10.5.4 Special Rules

10.5.4.1 IncomeSparta’s income is 3500. Athenian income is 1000. Theban income is 1000.

10.5.4.2 RebellionAny space in rebellion is an enemy of Sparta and hence is friendly to the Coalition.

10.5.4.3 No Long WallsAs long as this marker is on the map, there is an unfortified land connection between Athens and Piraeus. It can only be removed via Event #10.

10.5.4.4 Ravaginga. Spaces containing only a Garrison can be ravaged, and

will effect the Athenian, not Theban, treasury. Ravag-ing does not affect the Coalition SCI.

b. All other red or green spaces affect Sparta’s treasury and SCI when ravaged.

c. Neutral spaces can’t be ravaged.

10.5.4.5 The Two SidesI. The Coalition—At no time can Coalition forces fight

each other. The Coalition player can’t choose one of his side’s spaces as an objective unless it contains an enemy force.

II. Activation Costs—The Coalition player pays for units in the following manner.

a. If Thebes: Pay all costs from the Theban treasury.

b. If Athens: Pay all costs from the Athenian treasury.

c. If Anti-Sparta: The leader used for the operation pays all costs from the respective treasury.

III. Build Costs—Build costs are paid in the following manner.

a. If Thebes: Theban units are paid for from the Theban treasury.

b. If Athens: Athenian units are paid for from the Athe-nian treasury.

c. If Anti-Sparta: The player chooses which treasury to use for each SP, regardless of color.

d. If Megapolis is in play [see 10.5.4.8], all Spartan units cost talents to be activated just like Spartan Allied units.

IV. Neutral Athens—Athens begins the game neutral to-wards Sparta (historically an ally of Sparta).

a. Athenian units can’t voluntarily attack Spartan units. Athenian Allied units can, and Athenian units can at-tack Spartan Allied units.

b. Athens can siege any green or yellow (neutral) space, but it can’t siege a Spartan space until Athens is belligerent.

c. Athens ceases to be neutral (becomes belligerent) from the first turn that the Coalition player’s role is Anti-Sparta.

d. Until Athens is belligerent, Sparta can’t attack the Athens space or any green space within 2 spaces of Athens, nor may it attack any Athenian unit unless it is a Garrison at least 3 spaces away from Athens. Sparta can attack Athenian Allied units and Theban units re-gardless of Athens’ status.

V. Manpower—

a. Whenever a Spartan land SP is eliminated, perma-nently remove it from the game. Ignore this rule if Sparta has been reduced to 3 or fewer regular (non-Home Guard) Hoplite SPs on the map.

You can still ‘make change’ using SPs that have been removed from the game as needed; just be careful not to increase the total number of Spartan land SPs remaining.

b. In any battle in which Theban land SPs are equal to or greater than opposing Spartan SPs, Sparta forfeits its +2 battle modifier for Hoplites.



VI. SCI Reset—Each side uses the SCI differently. After the Coalition player’s role has been determined, reset both SCIs to 0.

VII. Spartan SCI—During the Side Determination segment of every Political Phase, if the Spartan SCI is positive, the Spartan player rolls a die: ◦ 1-5: no effect. ◦ 6+ if Corinth is Spartan-controlled: add 1000 talents to

the Spartan treasury. ◦ 6+ if Corinth is not Spartan-controlled: Sparta takes con-

trol of Corinth. All Athenian Allied units convert to equivalent Spartan Allied units. Relocate all Athenian units to Athens (land) or Piraeus (naval) and relocate all Theban ground units to Thebes.

At the beginning of each turn, if the Spartan SCI is 0 or negative (automatic; no die roll):

a. Corinth becomes Coalition-controlled. Convert all Spartan Allied units to equivalent Athenian Allied units then relocate all Spartan units to Sparta.

b. Sparta receives a one-time gift of 600 talents (Persian Gold) that must immediately be used for red Spartan Allied units—these can be placed in any Spartan or Spartan-controlled space, but no more than 2 Hoplite and 2 Naval SPs can be placed per space.

c. Persia enters the war [see 10.5.4.6].

VIII. Coalition SCI—The Coalition player begins the scenario as Thebes (Athens is neutral) and records its successes and failures using the SCI marker per the normal solitaire rules.

During the Side Determination segment of every Political Phase, if the Coalition SCI is positive, that player rolls a die, adding 5 if either of Thebes or Athens is under Spartan control: ◦ 0-2: the Coalition player’s role is Athens this turn. ◦ 3-5: the Coalition player’s role is Thebes this turn. ◦ 6+: the Coalition player’s role is Anti-Sparta this turn.

At the beginning of each turn, if the Coalition SCI is 0 or negative (automatic; no die roll):

a. The Coalition player’s role is Anti-Sparta this turn.

b. Persia enters the conflict [see 10.5.4.6].

c. Athens receives a one-time gift of 600 talents.

IX. Athens & Thebes—

a. During the Side Determination segment of every Political Phase, if the Spartan player controls Thebes

and/or Athens, reduce the Coalition player’s SCI by 1 for each.

b. If both Athens and Thebes are enemy-occupied, all Going Home units belonging to the Coalition player are eliminated and can’t be rebuilt until one of these spaces is liberated from Spartan control.

c. If Athens or Thebes is controlled by Sparta, Theban forces can be built in Athens. If only Athens is con-trolled by Sparta, Athenian land forces can be built in Thebes. Going Home units follow the same convention.

The Coalition player can still build Athenian Allied forces in the hope of liberating one of these spaces, although this will likely result in its bellicosity going to zero at some point, ending the game.

10.5.4.6 Persia (yellow counters)I. General Rules—Persia is a non-player third

party whose forces are controlled by either side on any given turn. Persia can enter the war either via Event or due to an SCI condi-tion [see above]. Once its forces deploy on the map they remain in play until the conditions for their permanent removal have been met.

II. Persian Setup—When Persia enters the conflict, per-form the following activities in the order given:

1. Remove any non-Persian forces from Sardis to the Go-ing Home box.

2. Place the Persian leader Tissaphernes, 10 Persian Cav-alry SPs and 4 Persian Light Infantry SPs in Sardis.

Note: The light infantry designation is for historical purposes only; treat light infantry as normal land SPs.

3. Place the Tiribazus counter next to Sardis, face-down, as a reminder that Sardis: is now controlled by Persia, is considered the home space for the Persian Army, and is where Persian Army units will be placed from the Going Home box.

4. Place the Persian leader Conon and 6 Persian Naval SPs in Lindus (Rhodes).

5. Place the Persian leader Pharnabazus and 4 Persian Cavalry SPs in Cyzicus. Any non-Persian forces there are removed to the Going Home box.

III. Persian Army—The “Persian Army” is com-prised of Tissaphernes (and later Tiribazus), 10 Cavalry SPs and 4 light infantry SPs. The



Persian Army is unfriendly to both sides and will intercept either player’s forces.

a. Persian forces on the map don’t make going home de-terminations. The Persian Army only ever gets sent to the Going Home box due to a defeat. The first time the Persian Army is placed in the Going Home box, Tis-saphernes is executed: permanently replace him with Tiribazus.

b. The Persian Army will automatically replace all its losses each build phase in the space where its leader is located.

c. The Coalition player controls the Persian Army. It is always the first force moved in a turn for that side and moves at no cost. It may only move to spaces that are within 4 land and/or coastal spaces of Sardis. The Per-sian Army will always stay coherent; it will not leave forces behind as it ravages.

d. Persian forces don’t count against any Auguries rolls. The first Coalition operation conducted after the Per-sian Army moves doesn’t need to make an Auguries roll.

e. Permanently remove the Persian Army from play if: i. Either player controls Sardis.ii. King’s Peace is declared.iii. A Persian army led by Tiribazus is sent to the Go-

ing Home box due to a battle defeat.

Note: This would be the second time that the Persian army would be sent to the Going Home box as the first time removes Tissaphernes.

IV. Persian Navy—The “Persian Navy” is com-prised of Conon, (and later Pharnabazus), 6 Naval SPs and 4 Cavalry SPs.

a. As long as Conon is the leader of the Persian Navy, it is controlled by the Coalition player. Once Pharnabazus becomes leader, the Persian Navy is controlled by the Spartan player. The Persian Navy is unfriendly to both sides, however, and will intercept either player’s forces.

b. The Persian Navy will automatically replace all its losses each build phase in the space where its leader is located. If the King’s Peace is declared, permanently remove the Persian Navy from the game.

c. As long as Pharnabazus occupies Cyzicus, it can’t be declared an objective space by either side. Pharnabazus won’t move until he is the leader of the Persian Navy, but will intercept either side’s forces. If Pharnabazus is sent to the Going Home box at any time prior to con-

trolling the Persian Navy, he is placed back in Cyzicus with 4 Cavalry SPs.

d. Unlike the Persian Army (which must move first), the side in control of the Persian Navy may activate it in lieu of a regular operation. The Persian Navy doesn’t make, nor does it affect, Auguries rolls.

e. The Persian Navy doesn’t ravage spaces; it only ever controls the space it occupies.

f. The first time the Persian Navy is sent to the Going Home box due to a defeat:i. Permanently remove the Persian leader Conon

from play, placing it upside down in Cyzicus.

This serves as a reminder that Cyzicus is Persian-controlled space that can never be an objective space. Note that Conon can also be removed due to an Event.

ii. Place the Athenian leader Conon into the Athe-nian draw cup.

iii. Pharnabazus becomes the leader of the Persian Navy. Immediately relocate the Persian Navy to Cyzicus.

g. Once Pharnabazus is in charge, the Persian Navy will only move within two spaces of Cyzicus.

Play Note: The Persian fleet can be used to control Byzantium and cut the Athenian grain supply, as it did historically.

V. Persian Proclivities—While Persia is active, Sardis, Cyzicus, and any spaces occupied by Persian forces are the only spaces controlled by Persia. Persian Army forces, not Persian Navy forces, ravage any spaces that they transit following the normal rules for ravaging.

10.5.4.7 King’s PeaceThe first time the Athenian grain supply is cut for any reason, the King’s Peace is initiated, with the following effects:

a. Reduce each player’s Bellicosity by 2.

b. Permanently remove all Persian forces from the game. Sardis and Cyzicus are no longer controlled by Persia.

b. The Coalition won’t surrender unless its Bellicosity is reduced to 0.

10.5.4.8 Liberation of MessiniaAt any time, if the Anti-Sparta Coalition controls all five of Mantinea, Methydrum, Oronae, Pylos and Belmina, a Helot rebellion occurs. If so, place the Megapolis counter in Orchomenus along with a Garrison and



4 Athenian Allied Hoplite SPs. Once the Megapolis counter is in play:

● Reduce Spartan income by 1000 talents per turn; ● Spartan units no longer activate for free.

10.5.4.9 Random EventsThis scenario doesn’t use the standard event table. Instead, use the table on the facing page.

10.5.5 Victory ConditionsAt the end of any turn, if one side’s Bellicosity is 0 and the opposing side is positive, the opposing player wins. If both sides’ Bellicosity is 0, Persia wins and both players lose.

Scenario Note: This scenario is more of a journey than a destination. I have tried to capture the large range of variables, which adds historical verisimilitude at the cost of balance. You will find that results on how the story unfolds can be quite broad. The obvious Spartan strategy is to just go straight at Thebes and try to win the war in an afternoon, but the Thebans are tough, so be careful.

11. TWO-PLAYER RULESPeloponnesian War can be played as a two-player game using the following rules. Whenever a two-player rule contradicts anything found in the Rulebook, the two-player item always takes precedence. A two-player game is played normally except that each side is controlled by a player instead of one side being “run” by its strategy matrix.

Strategy MatricesThe strategy matrices aren’t used; keep them in the box.

Side & Strategy DeterminationThe Fall of Sparta scenario still utilizes the Side Determination Segment [3.1]. In any other scenario, skip the Side Determi-nation Segment of the Political Phase as well as the Strategy Determination Segment [4.1] of the Strategic Planning Phase.

Non-Player SideAll non-player procedures are ignored, with all decisions being made by the players. Additionally, certain special rules apply to the play of the active allies (see below).

Who Goes FirstDuring the Operations Phase, whichever side has the leader with the greater strategic modifier in play conducts the first initial operation [5.1], with a high die roll breaking ties. The other side will then conduct their initial operation [5.1] before moving on to continuing operations [5.3].

Deciding Where to FightDuring the Combat Phase, each player alternates choosing which combat is conducted next. The player that conducted the first operation of the turn determines the first combat.

InterceptionInterception [5.6] for the players is always voluntary instead of mandatory. In the Fall of Sparta scenario, Persian interceptions are still mandatory regardless of who controls their forces.

The AuguriesWhen making an Auguries check [5.3.1], the Athenian player rolls an unmodified die; the Spartan player must add 1 to his roll.

Siege ResolutionThe loser in a siege only loses 1 SCI (not 2, as the player normally would in the solitaire game).

Post-Combat MovementDo not use the Post-Combat Movement table (keep it in the box). Instead, each player takes his units from the Going Home box (Sparta first) and places them on the map using the following priorities:1. All Spartan land units are placed in Sparta.2. All Spartan naval units are placed in Gythium.3. All Spartan Allies are placed into any number of friendly-

controlled spaces.4. Athenian Allies are placed into any number of friendly-

controlled spaces.5. All Athenian land units are placed into Athens and/or

Piraeus.6. All Athenian naval units are placed into Piraeus or in any

friendly coastal or island space.7. All Theban units are placed into Thebes and/or into any

friendly-controlled spaces within three spaces of Thebes (including Athens).

8. If for any reason a unit can’t be placed, eliminate it.



2: Cinadon’s Revolt—Roll a die:1-5: no effect 6: Revolt! Spartan units can’t be activated for an op-

eration for the remainder of the turn.A Revolt can occur only once per game; if rolled again, treat it as no effect.

3*: Supplies from Egypt—Thebes and Athens each receive 500 talents. Place 4 (A)Naval in Lindus (and perform an immediate battle if occupied by a Spartan or Persian Force).

4: Dionysius I Aids Sparta—The first time this event oc-curs Sparta receives 400 talents and Syracuse becomes a Spartan Ally. The second time this event occurs Diony-sius declares war on Carthage—all Spartan Allied forces are placed in the Going Home box, then roll a die: if 1-3, place the Carthage Wins marker in Syracuse and all spac-es in Sicily are impassable for the remainder of the game. If 4-6, place the Syracuse Wins marker in Syracuse. If this event occurs while the Syracuse Wins marker is in Syracuse, Syracuse permanently becomes a Spartan Ally, all of Sicily is controlled by Sparta, and Sparta adds 400 to its income each Revenue Collection segment for the remainder of the game.

5: Spartan Harmost Initiatives—Execute a coup de main. Roll a die and perform an immediate Spartan siege (using the Spartan leader battle rating given in the result):1-3: Sphodrias +0, in Piraeus. Athens forms Naval

League: Anti-Spartan Coalition player places 1 (A)Naval and 1 Garrison in up to four green island spaces free of Spartan units.

4-6: Phoebiades +2, Sparta captures Cadmea: Thebes comes under Spartan control and the Anti-Spartan Coalition player is Athens until Thebes is recap-tured. Don’t make an SCI roll while this condition persists. Add Pelopidas and Epaminondas to the Athens draw cup; remove them from play if Thebes is recaptured.

Note—A successful coup-induced siege sends all forces to the Going Home box (they are not eliminated). Each of these attacks can occur only once per game. If either has already occurred, don’t roll: the other automatically occurs. Once each has occurred, treat this event as no effect.

6: Agesilaus Agenda—Various locations are designated for Spartan revanchist attacks. Roll a die:1-2: Elis (Olympic Games ban)3-4: Mantinea (decompose into affiliated towns); backup =

Cytinium (same)4-6: Olynthus (break up Chalcidian League).Place a Siege marker in the indicated space. At the end of the turn, the Spartan side loses 1 Bellicosity if it doesn’t control the space.

Note—If a result has already occurred and doesn’t have a backup location, reroll until a viable result is achieved. Each of these attacks can occur only once per game—once all four have occurred, treat this event as no effect.

7: Democratic Rebellion—Roll two dice, adding them together. If the resulting space is already in rebellion, roll again, adding 1 for each roll previously made. If the re-sulting space is not in rebellion, place a Rebellion marker there.

2: Sicyon 3: Corone 4: Byzantium 5: Tegea 6: Ephesus 7: Lepreum

8: Orchomenus 9: Miletus 10: Camirus 11: Methydrum 12: Amphipolis 13+: no effect

When a Rebellion marker is placed in one of the above spaces, roll a die for each adjacent space, which also rebels on a result of 6.

8*: Battle of Cunaxa—Cyrus, younger brother of Artaxerxes, attempts to seize the throne. Roll a die:1-2: Cyrus becomes King. Sparta receives 1000 talents.3-6: Cyrus dies. Place 3 Spartan Allied Hoplites in

Abydos or the closest Spartan controlled space (his-torical result was Anabasis). Then Persia enters the war.

9: Leader Death—In every battle this turn, if a side has a leader present and has an unmodified combat roll of 1-4, that leader dies and is permanently removed from the game. Exception: Agesilaus is immune to this event. However, no side can lose more than 1 leader per turn: at the end of any turn, if a side had multiple leader deaths, randomly determine which one is permanently lost and return the others to their draw cup.

10*: Athens Rebuilds Long Walls—If still in play, remove the No Long Walls marker from the map. Then, if still in play, remove the Persian leader Conon from the game: add the Athenian Conon to the Athenian draw cup, re-locate the Persian Navy to Cyzicus, and Pharnabazus becomes the leader of the Persian Navy.

11*: Artaxerxes—Persia intervenes. Deploy Persian land and naval forces on the map.

12: Gold Mine Discovered—Roll a die:1-2: Sparta discovers the mine and gains 600 talents.3-6: Thebes/Athens discovers the mine and gains 600

talents.

* This event can occur only once per game; if rolled again, treat it as no effect.

EVENT TABLE—FALL OF SPARTA



EXAMPLE OF PLAYThis comprehensive example of play is intended as an introduction to the overall flow of the game when played solitaire. It is suggested that you first read the Game Components section on pages 2-3 of the Rulebook and the Important Game Terms on pages 4-5. Then set up the Peloponnesian War Campaign Game scenario as instructed on pages 6-7 and follow along with this narrative to acquaint yourself with the basic game system.

Note: Throughout the example bracketed numerals—such as “[4.3]”— indicate a relevant rule reference in the Rulebook.

1. The Campaign Game scenario begins in the middle of turn 1 in the Operations Phase. As stated at the end of the setup instructions, the Athenian (player) side has already conducted its initial operation [5.1] which saw Phormio’s army move to quell a rebellion in Potidaea (the actual his-torical start of the war). The action begins with the Spartan (non-player) side conducting its initial operation [5.2].

2. All non-player operations begin with a check of the De-fensive Strategy conditions located at the top of each Strategy Matrix [5.2, step 1]. A check of the Spartan con-ditions shows that none of these are in effect so the red die is rolled under the Attack Athens strategy (the Spartan Strategy marker having been set up in the associated box of the Strategy Matrix) [5.2, step 2]. The die result is “5” which makes Decelea the objective space for the operation.

Note: Any other Spartan strategy would have required that the blue die be rolled first in order to generate the objective space [5.2, step 2a].

On the Spartan Strat-egy Matrix, the blue box under the Attack Athens strategy indicates that the size of the expedition to be built by the Spartan leader Archidamus [5.2, step 3] is “12H” (12 Hop-lite) and “2C” (2 Cavalry) strength points (SPs). Archidamus activates 7H from the Sparta space, at no cost [5.1.5]. The elite Spartan Home Guard unit must remain in the space and the Spar-tan 1-SP Cavalry isn’t activated because it would take the last cavalry SP from the space when other Spartan allied cavalry SPs are available elsewhere (don’t activate the last SP of a given type unless necessary to continue the operation [5.2.1, third bullet]). The expedition still requires 5H and 2C SPs.

3. To get the remaining necessary SPs the expedition will have to move through a series of assembly spaces until the force has been built to its required size. The next nearest space is Corinth, which is temporarily designated an as-sembly space. The shortest path from Sparta to Corinth is:

The game begins with the Athenians at Potidaea where a rebellion has occurred.

The starting positions in southern Greece.



◦ Caryae » Argos » Mycenae » Cleonae » Corinth.However, Argos can’t be used for shortest route calculations if it is neutral. The next shortest route is: ◦ Belmina » Methydrum » Orchomenus » Philius » Sicyon

» Corinth.

None of these spaces are in the Zone of Influence (ZOI) of an Athenian force so the expedition under Archidamus arrives in Corinth.

4. In Corinth, 4 Spartan Allied Hoplites are activated at a cost of 800 talents (reduce the Spartan treasury from 3000 to 2200), becoming part of the expedition.

Note: Each land SP costs 200 talents to activate; each naval SP 400 talents.

One Spartan Allied Hoplite and 5 Spartan Allied Naval SPs remain, which aren’t required. The expedition still requires lH and 2C SPs. The next nearest space, Thebes is now designated an assembly space.

5. There are four equidistant paths to Thebes: ◦ Pegae » Siphae » Plataea » Thebes; ◦ Pegae » Siphae » Charonea » Thebes; ◦ Pegae » Panactum » Plataea » Thebes;

◦ Pegae » Panactum » Tanagra » Thebes.Assign odds of 1 chance in 6 for each option (rerolling any 5 or 6) to choose the route. The roll is “3” so the third route (Pegae » Panactum » Plataea » Thebes) is taken to the assembly space.

Panactum is within the ZOI of the Athenian force (Cavalry + Hoplite) in Athens. When the Spartan expedition enters Panactum, an intercep tion attempt must be made. The roll is “4” so a skirmish results. The intercepting force doesn’t move from its location. Each side rolls a die. Both roll a “2” so neither side loses an SP. Checking for immediate battle [5.7.2], the combined skirmish rolls add up to less than 11 so this condition isn’t met. The combined land SPs for both forces exceeds 8, but the intercepting force is less than 50% of the total so this condition also isn’t met and the Spartan expedition continues to the Plataea space.

Note: The only thing that can impede the movement of an expedition on an operation is a successful intercept. The presence of enemy units or fortresses don’t hinder movement, only their ZOls.

6. Since the Spartan expedition is moving toward an assem-bly space, not an objective space, Panactum and Plataea are not ravaged [5.8].

Archidamus with 7 Spartan Hoplite SPs moves to Corinth, picks up 4 Allied Hoplites, moves to Thebes and picks up another Hoplite and two Cavalry SPs, then moves to Decelea (the objective space) ravaging Oropus and Decelea along the way.



The Panactum space would have been exempted from ravaging in any case because a successful intercept had occurred there. Pegae isn’t ravaged because it is friendly to Sparta.

7. Upon arrival in Thebes, 1 Spartan Allied Hoplite and 2 Spartan Allied Cavalry SPs are activated to complete the building of the expedition. These activations cost 600 talents (reduce Spartan treasury from 2200 to 1600). Now Archidamus’ expedition is ready to invade Attica by mov-ing toward its objective space, Decelea.

8. There are two 3-space routes available: ◦ Tanagra » Oropus » Decelea; ◦ Delium » Oropus » Decelea.

A 3 out of 6 chance is assigned to each and the latter route is taken. When the expedition enters Oropus it ravages the space since the expedition is on its way to its objective, no intercept attempts occur (the space isn’t in an Athenian ZOI), and no Athenian forces are present: place a Ravaged marker there. Next the expedition enters the objective space which is in the ZOI of the Athenian force (Cavalry + Hoplite) in the Athens space. A roll of “1” for the intercept attempt

fails so there’s no skirmish; place a Ravaged marker in the space. The Spartan first operation is concluded.

9. The Athenian (player) side now attempts to conduct a continuing operation [5.3]. Since this is really the second Athenian operation (Phormio’s was the first) an auguries die roll must be made [5.3.1] which results in a “2” so the op-eration is allowed (only a roll of “6” is bad for the player side).

10. With the favor of the gods upon us the Athenian side conducts an operation. Eyeing an historical objective, the Athenian player wishes to ravage the Peloponnesian coast and challenge the Spartan fleet at Corinth. To do this the player picks Erineus as the objective space. Pericles will lead the operation. Pericles wants 3 naval SPs for the op-eration. Since there are no naval SPs in Athens but there are some in Piraeus, Pericles chooses the latter as an as-sembly space. Pericles moves to Piraeus, activates 3 naval SPs for 1200 talents (reduce the Athenian treasury from 4500 to 3300), then moves by the shortest route to Erineus.

Note: In the following paragraphs, every Spartan space identifed by an “(R)” will have a Ravaged marker placed within it [5.8].

With 3 naval SPs, Pericles ravages the Peloponnesian coast. In every Spartan-controlled space the force enters that is not intercepted by Spartan SPs, a Ravaged marker is placed.



11. Pericles’ expedition moves: ◦ Aegina » Methana (R) » Cape Seyllaeum (R) » Troezen (R)

(which could have been Idhra but a random die roll determined Troezen) » Hermione (R) » Prasiae,

where an interception is possible.

12. The Spartan force in Sparta has a ZOI (Cavalry + Hoplite) into Prasiae. The interception roll is a “5” so a skirmish occurs. Both sides roll “6” which results in no losses from the skirmish. However, the combined skirmish results are greater than 10 (6+6=12) so an immediate battle occurs. The Spartan force (which does not actually move) comprises 3 Spartan Hoplite and 1 Cavalry SPs whereas the Athenian expedition comprises 3 naval SPs. These are the condi-tions for a Null Battle [6.2.1, first bullet] so the Athenian expedition under Pericles continues moving [6.2.2]. No Ravaged marker is placed in Prasiae since an interception occurred there. Pericles then leads his expedition into: ◦ Epidaurus Limera (R) » Cythera (R) » Cape Taenarum

(R) » Corone,

where a possible intercept can occur due to the Spartan force’s ZOI from Sparta (Cavalry + Hoplite). The intercept roll is “2” so no intercept occurs and a Ravaged marker is placed in Corone (R).

13. The Athenian expedition then continues to: ◦ Asine (R) » Pylos (R) » Zacynthus (no ravaging friendly

spaces) » Cephallenia (no ravaging neutral spaces) » Oenidae (R) » Naupactus » Panormus » Erineus,

the objective space. Erineus is in the ZOI of the Spartan force in Corinth (Naval + Hoplite). The intercept fails and the Athenian second operation is concluded.

Note: If the Athenian expedition had tried to use Naupactus as an assembly space for building the expedition, none of the ravaging of the Peloponnesian coast would have occurred since the expedition would have been heading toward an assembly space, not an objective space.

14. The Spartan (non-player) side now attempts to conduct its second operation of the turn—a continuing operation. The auguries roll is a “5,” +1 for being the non-player side, re-sulting in a modified roll of “6.” This has the gods showing disfavor and the non-player side must pass.

Note: It wouldn’t have mattered anyway since, with an Attack Athens strategy, a 12H + 2C force is required and the Spartan side only has 5H (4H in Thebes and lH in Corinth) and 2C (in Thebes) that haven’t already been activated—thus an automatic pass would have occurred anyway due to insufficient forces available [5.3.2, third bullet].

15. The Athenian (player) side now attempts its third op-eration. An auguries roll of “2” means the operation is conducted. An Athenian leader is chosen by a vote of the demos (draw an Athenian leader randomly from the cup). Demosthenes is drawn and placed in Athens. Heraclea is designated as the objective space. The expedition size for

Demosthenes sails to Chios (by himself) and picks up the Allied Hoplite and naval units there. He then sails to Heraclea where he ravages the space.



the operation is to be l Hoplite and 1 Naval SP. The Athe-nian player wishes to use Allied SPs in the Chios space to conduct this operation, so Demosthenes moves to Chios from Athens by the shortest route.

Note: A leader moving without SPs can’t enter an enemy-controlled space and, if intercepted, would be removed (not eliminated) to the Going Home box and the operation canceled with no further effect.

There are three 6-space routes to Chios: ◦ Piraeus » Aegina » Kithnos » Siros » Andros » Chios; ◦ Piraeus » Sunium » Kea » Carystos » Andros » Chios; ◦ Piraeus » Sunium » Marathon » Carystos » Andros » Chios.

If you examine the map there is a shorter 5-space route: ◦ Decelea » Marathon » Carystos » Andros » Chios.

However, since a leader can’t enter an enemy-occupied space alone [5.1.6], this path isn’t legal and thus not considered. The last of the three legal routes above offers an intercep-tion possibility so a random roll must be made: assign a 2 in 6 chance to each of the three routes. The roll results in one of the two routes where no interceptions are possible so Demosthenes is placed in Chios. An Allied Hoplite and Allied Naval SP are activated at a cost of 600 talents (reduce Athenian treasury from 3300 to 2700). This completes the building of the expedition.

16. Demosthenes’ expedition takes the shortest route to Heraclea: ◦ Psara » Skiros » Sporades » Olizon » Pteleum » Heraclea.

Only Heraclea is ravaged since the other spaces along the route are friendly. The Athenian third operation ends.

Note: Since there is 1 naval SP for each land SP in the expedition, the land SPs can be transported along naval LOC’s using naval transport [5.1.4].

17. Since the Spartan side has passed, the next operation is still Athenian. A favorable auguries roll begins the fourth Athenian operation. A new leader is drawn (Cleon) and placed in Athens. Cleon the demagogue has convinced the demos of a bold move and declares Thebes as the objec-tive. For this operation Cleon will build an expedition of 6 Athenian Hoplite SPs and 1 Athenian Cavalry SP. All 7 SPs are already in Athens so they are activated at a cost of 1400 talents (reduce Athenian treasury from 2700 to 1300).

There are two shortest routes to Thebes from Athens: ◦ Panactum » Plataea » Thebes; ◦ Panactum » Tanagra » Thebes.

3 chances out of 6 are assigned to each route and the Pan-actum » Tanagra » Thebes route is taken. When Cleon’s expedition enters Tanagra he enters the ZOI of the Spartan

Allied force in Thebes (Cavalry + Hoplite). The intercept roll of “1” fails and the Athenian expedition enters Thebes where another intercept attempt occurs. This attempt is suc-cessful and a skirmish is resolved. The Athenian side rolls a “1” and the Spartans roll a “2.” One Athenian Hoplite is eliminated but since the conditions for a battle aren’t met (less than 50% of combined land SPs are within the inter-cepting force) the Athenian operation is concluded with Cleon’s expedition in Thebes.

18. Another Athenian operation is now possible but the Athe-nian player decides to voluntarily pass since his treasury is low and the Athenian Emergency Fund rule [8.1.6] would prohibit the activation of more than 1 land SP. Since both sides have passed, the Operations Phase ends.

19. Next is the Combat Phase. First, all siege situations are determined:A. There is a siege in Potidaea since the Spartan force in

the space is 5 SPs weaker than Phormio’s army—place a Siege marker on top of the Spartan force there.

B. Demosthenes’ army is in an unoccupied enemy fortress space—place a Siege marker in the Heraclea space.

C. The same conditions as in B prevail in both Decelea and Erineus—place Siege markers underneath the forces in each of those spaces.

D. In the Thebes space the Spartan force is only 1 SP weaker than the Athenian army so no siege occurs.

20. This results in four siege situations. This concludes the Siege Determination Segment.

21. Next battles are resolved. There are two battles which need to be resolved. Under the battle resolution priorities [6.2], there are no battles in a home space so the first priority is passed. The second priority applies to the situation in The-bes (a Spartan Coalition space) so that battle is resolved first.

Cleon with the remaining units in Athens (7 Hoplite SPs and 1 Cavalry SP) moves against Thebes. In a skirmish outside the city walls one Athenian Hoplite SP is lost.



22. The battle in Thebes is determined to be a land battle [6.2.1]. The Spartan roll will be modified by +1 (Cavalry superiority of 2 Spartan Allied Cavalry SPs versus 1 Athe-nian Cavalry SP), as will the Athenian roll (difference of 5 Athenian Hoplite SPs versus 4 Spartan Allied Hoplite SPs). [6.2.4]

Note: Cleon gives no benefit to Athens due to his tactical rating of zero.

A die is rolled for each side. Athens gets a modified roll of “4” (roll of 3+1) and Sparta gets a modified roll of “5” (roll of 4+1)—Sparta wins. The difference between the two modified die rolls is 1 so Athens loses 1 Hoplite SP. Cleon and the remainder of his army are then placed in the Going Home box. The Spartan force remains in Thebes, the Spartan Strategy Confidence Index (SCI) is increased to +1, and the Athenian SCI is reduced to -1. [6.2.4.1]

Since Athenian Hoplites were lost, place the Athenian Hostage marker in the Attack Sparta box on the Athenian Strategy Matrix [6.6]. This concludes the land battle.

23. There are no other non-siege spaces containing opposing forces so we look for battle situations where a force occu-pies an enemy force’s ZOI [6.2, priority #4].

Note: The force must actually be in the enemy ZOI—overlapping ZOls don’t cause battles.

24. The only battle situation which meets this criteria is where the naval ZOI of Pericles’ army extends to the Spartan force in Corinth and vice versa. Since both armies contain naval SPs, this leads to a naval battle [6.2.1, second bullet].

25. Each side rolls a die. Athens adds 3 to its roll (+2 for Athe-nian naval SPs comprising 50% or more of the army and +1 for Pericles’ tactical rating) whereas Sparta adds 2 to its roll (difference of 5 Spartan Allied naval SPs versus 3 Athenian naval SPs) [6.2.3]. Athens gets a modified result of “9” (die result of 6+3) whereas Sparta gets a modified result of “3” (die result of 1+2). The difference in the re-sults is 6 in favor of Athens, so Athens wins. The Spartans eliminate 3 participating naval SPs.

Note: The reason 3 Spartan Allied naval SPs, and not 6, were removed is because there were only 3 Athenian naval SPs and the lower amount of either the die differential or naval SPs is used.

The remaining Spartan force of 2 naval SPs and 1 Hoplite SP are placed in the Going Home box [6.2.3.1].

Even though the Spartan Allied Hoplite could not be taken as a casualty in the naval battle it is still a member of the losing force so must accompany it to the Going Home box.

Increase the Athenian SCI from -1 to 0 and decrease the Spartan SCI from +1 to 0. With no more battles to resolve, proceed to siege resolution [6.3].

26. Sieges are conducted in the order of all home spaces first (of which there are none), then all coalition spaces, then all other spaces—spaces are chosen in random order within each category. The first siege thus resolved is Decelea. A “2” is rolled, to which Archidamus’ tactical rating of 1 is added for a modified result of “3”—the siege fails: remove the Siege marker, place the Spartan force in the Going Home box, and reduce Sparta’s SCI from 0 to -1.

Note: Athens’ SCI does not increase due to a failed enemy siege.

In the Siege Determination Segment a Siege marker is placed in Potidaea, Heraclea, Erineus, and Decelea. The Athenians do not have enough SPs to conduct a siege of Thebes.

In the battle at Thebes the Spartan Allied army earns a +1 DRM for their superiority in Cavalry (2 versus 1)...

...and the Athenians earn a +1 DRM for their superiority in Hoplites (5 versus 4).



27. Next Pericles’ army besieges Erineus and gets a modified roll of “5” (die result of 4+1 for Pericles’ tactical rating) which succeeds. Remove the Siege marker, increase Ath-ens’ SCI from 0 to +1, increase the Athenian treasury from 1300 to 1600 (+300 talents for the sale of slaves), and place a Ravaged marker in Erineus. Pericles’ army remains.

Note: The Spartan SCI isn’t decreased due to a successful siege of a neutral space.

28. Next Demosthenes besieges Heraclea. A modified roll of “4” (die result of 2+2 for Demosthenes’ tactical rating) means the siege succeeds. Increase the Athenian SCI from +1 to +2, reduce the Spartan SCI from -1 to -2, increase the Athenian treasury from 1600 to 1900, and place a Rav-aged marker in Heraclea. Demosthenes’ army remains.

29. The last siege to be resolved is Potidaea. Since the be-sieging army has more naval SPs than the besieged force (which has none) a siege is resolved. the modified roll is “3” (die result of 1+2 for Phormio’s tactical rating) so the siege fails. Remove Phormio and his army to the Going Home box, remove the Siege marker, place a Ravaged marker, and reduce the Athenian SCI from +2 to 0 (since you lose 2 SCI instead of the non-player 1), leaving the Spartan Allied Hoplite SP and the Rebellion marker in the space. This concludes siege resolution.

30. The last part of the Combat Phase is the Going Home Segment [6.4]. The only armies still on the map are Peri-cles’ and Demosthenes’. First, a die is rolled for Pericles which is modified by his strategic (not tactical) rating. The modified roll ends up less than 6: leave 1 Athenian na-val SP in Erineus then place Pericles and the remaining 2 Athenian naval SPs into the Going Home box. Second, a die is rolled for Demosthenes’ army, modified to a “6” (die result of 5+1 for Demosthenes’ strategic rating): place Demosthenes into the Going Home box but leave his re-maining forces in Heraclea.

31. The remainder of the Going Home Segment has the units (not the leaders) in the Going Home box relocated onto the map according to the Post-Combat Movement Table priorities. First, segregate the SPs in the Going Home box by type (Hoplite, Cavalry, Naval) and by national-ity (Spartan, Spartan Allied, Athenian, Athenian Allied). This will create 8 stacks of units which are replaced on the map in the following manner:A. 6 Athenian Hoplite SPs—place in Athens.B. 7 Spartan Hoplite SPs—place in Sparta.C. 6 Spartan Allied Hoplite SPs—place 3 in Corinth and

3 in Thebes.D. 1 Athenian Cavalry SP—place in Athens.E. 1 Athenian Allied Cavalry SP—place in Pela.

Since Macedon is an active ally of Athens and the minimum 2 Cavalry SP limit in Pela isn’t yet met.

F. 2 Spartan Allied Cavalry SPs—place in Thebes.G. 5 Athenian Naval SPs—place in Piraeus.H. 2 Spartan Allied Naval SPs—place in Corinth.

This concludes the Combat Phase.

32. Next the Rebellion Expansion Phase is resolved. There is only one active rebellion on the map in Potidaea. Since there is a Spartan Hoplite ZOI in Potidaea, the rebellion continues [7.1] and attempts to expand [7.2]. The candi-date spaces are Methone, Olynthus, and Scione. Pydna, although adjacent, isn’t a candidate since it is a neutral space. A die is rolled for each candidate space and any re-sult of 6 will put it into rebellion.

Note: If any of these spaces were within the ZOI of a Spartan unit its roll would be modified by +2.

A “6” is rolled for Methone—place a Rebellion marker there. Since the conditions for a Helot Rebellion aren’t in effect [7.3], proceed to the Administrative Phase.

33. In the Administrative Phase revenue collection comes first. Athens has a base income of 3500 talents from which 50 talents is deducted for each friendly space that is rav-aged, in rebellion, or controlled by enemy forces. Two spaces are ravaged (Oropus and Decelea), two are in re-bellion (Potidaea and Methone) and none are captured for a net income of 3300 talents (3500 minus 200). The Athe-nian treasury is increased from 1900 to 5200.

34. Sparta’s base income is 2500 talents. Sparta has 11 ravaged spaces (Methana, Cape Seyllaeum, Troezen, Hermione, Epidaurus Limera, Cythera, Cape Taenarum, Corone, Asine, Pylos, Oenidae), 1 captured space (Heraclea; note that there’s no additional penalty for this space also being rav-aged), and no spaces in rebellion for a net income of 1900 talents (2500 minus 600). Sparta’s treasury is increased from 1600 to 3500. Of the various special revenue cases

The Rebellion spreads to Methone.



which don’t apply, most notable is the Athenian Eisphora [8.1.5]. The Athenians don’t receive this 1000 talent rev-enue due to the ravaged marker in Decelea.

35. After revenue collection comes the construction of new SPs. The non-player side always attempts to replace its losses suffered this game turn. The only Spartan losses were 3 Allied naval SPs. This amount also happens to be the limit of new construc tion allowed in one turn. These units are constructed for a cost of 600 talents: reduce the Spartan treasury from 3500 to 2900 and place 3 Spar-tan Allied naval SPs in Corinth (per the Post-Combat Movement Table priorities). The Athenian (player) side can build whatever he chooses with an upper limit of 600 talents (3 SPs at 200 talents each). He chooses to build 2 Athenian Hoplite SPs and 1 Athenian Cavalry SP which are placed in Athens.

Alternatively, instead of placing a new 1-SP Cavalry in Athens, the existing Cavalry unit there could be increased from 1 SP to 2 SPs by flipping the unit over.

36. The last Phase of the game turn is the Armistice and Surrender Phase. First, Bellicosity adjustment occurs. Sparta’s Bellicosity is reduced from 10 to 7 due to having

11 ravaged spaces (-1) and an SCI of -2. Athen’s Bellicos-ity doesn’t change, remaining at 10 [9.1].

37. Since neither side’s Bellicosity has reached 0, there is no surrender [9.2] nor are the conditions for an Armistice in effect [9.3]. Finally, all Ravaged markers are removed from the map, the Game Turn marker is advanced to the 2 box, and all leaders in the Going Home box are placed back into their respective draw cups.

38. It is now the start of turn 2 and the player must determine if he will switch sides [3.1]. Since the Athenian (player) side’s SCI is 0, it fulfills the condition of being “0 or high-er” and thus must attempt to change sides. The die result is “6” so the player will switch sides and play Sparta this turn, with Athens becoming the non-player side.

39. Next an event occurs [3.2]. The dice roll is “6” resulting in Plague in Athens. Since the conditions for this event were met due to the presence of a Spartan force in Decelea in the previous turn, the event is implemented. Remove 3 Athenian Hoplites (one third of 8 Hoplite SPs rounded up), reduce the Athenian treasury by 600 talents (cost paid for 1/4 of 10 Naval SPs, rounded up) from 5200 to 4600, and permanently remove Pericles from play.

The situation in southern Greece after all applicable SPs and generals have been moved to the Going Home box.



Put him back in the box; not in the Going Home box and not in the draw cup.

40. Since the Athenian SCI is 0, there is a Delian League Re-bellion [3.3]. The dice are rolled for event 8 on the Event Table, resulting in a 12: Amphipolis goes into rebellion (place a rebellion marker on that space). Then a die is rolled for each adjacent space: Thasos, Abdera, and Stagi-rus. A roll of 6 is achieved for Thasos, so it also goes into rebellion (place a rebellion marker on that space).

41. Now the Strategic Planning Phase is conducted. Since the player switched sides this turn a new non- player side strategy is chosen [4.1]. Roll a die, adding 1 for Nicias’ Strategic Rating. The modified result is 5 (die roll of 4+1), so the Athenian (non-player) side will conduct a Cut LOC strategy this turn. Place the Athenian Strategy marker in the Cut LOC strategy box on the Athenian Strategy Matrix.

Note: If the die roll had been modified to a 6—”Attack Sparta”—a new strategy would have been chosen due to the Athenian hostages [6.6].

Reset both sides’ SCI to 0 and begin the Operations Phase.

42. The remainder of turn 2 will be conducted as described for turn 1 earlier in this narrative. The only significant procedural difference will occur when the Athenian (non-player) side picks an objective space for any of its op-erations. When conducting an Attack Athens or Attack Sparta strategy the first die roll generates the objective space. All other strategy—Cut LOC in our example—has another step involved.

Example: During the initial Athenian operation of the Operations Phase—which will occur after the initial Spartan (player) operation—a die will be rolled which will generate an area location: 1-2 Isthmus, 3 Arcadia/Achaea, 4-5 Peloponnesus/Messenia, 6 Sicily. Once the roll has generated the area location a subsequent roll in the appropriately labeled area box will generate the objective space. Thus, if the area roll were a 6 for Sicily, a subsequent roll of 4 will generate Messina as the operation’s objective.

43. We suggest that you now complete turn 2 using the rules of play and this example to guide you. Good luck and enjoy.



THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR—A LOOK AT STRATEGY

In Memory of George E. Thibault Jr., Captain, USN (1933-2012) George was a valued friend who served his nation for 30 years as a line officer in the United States Navy. After his retirement he and I worked closely together facilitating wargames in the Pentagon. We also served together as adjunct Professors for the Naval War College where he and I taught Thucydides. When I was designing the original Peloponnesian War (Victory Games) I asked him to write a strategy analysis of the conflict, which he did in his distinctive and elegant writing style. I could think of no better tribute to my good friend than to reprise without changes his original work for this new edition of the game. Rest in peace, my friend.

BACKGROUNDFor 27 years from 431 to 404BC, Athens and her allies in

the Delian League fought Sparta and her allies in the Pelopon-nesian Confederacy. Both alliances believed they were driven to war by the other and each saw its very survival at stake. Some scholars contend it was not really a war but rather a period of power adjustment in Greece during which time rival city-states vied with each other for allies, for influence, and for treasure. The battles, the shifting alliances, and parade of generals sometimes make what happened seem more dependent on random oppor-tunity than on the logical steps in a political or military plan. However, Thucydides, the chronicler of these events, saw it as a struggle which, although it took on a life of its own at times as all long wars do, had coherent, consistent, political objectives. From the beginning, Athens fought to preserve and, if possible, enlarge its empire. Sparta fought to stop what it saw as runaway Athenian imperialism threatening to control the whole Greek world. In the end Athens was defeated.

The Peloponnesian War was not the most significant war in history, nor even the most important one in ancient times. But it was very different from the war Greece fought and won against Persia 70 years earlier. In that war a coalition of Greek states led first by Sparta then by Athens defeated the Persians after only two land and two sea battles. Dozens of battles were fought in the Peloponnesian War. Cities were leveled and whole populations killed or enslaved. The landscape of Greece was changed, along with the stature of Greece as a power in the known world and, most tragic of all, the very nature of the Greek people changed. Athens had been the intellectual ideal of the ancient world. An enlightened and sensitive people, they were slowly transformed by the pressures and eventual greed of war to financial and spiritual bankruptcy before being crushed by their sister state and former ally, Sparta. Sparta, the model of asceticism and anti-materialism ultimately won the war, but subsequently failed as well to live up to her promise and was defeated and subjugated.

The surprising thing is that Athens might have won the Peloponnesian War. The limited strategic objectives she first set for herself had been achieved in the first few years of the war. But as time went by, war became more normal than peace and, as Clausewitz suggests, once begun, the war moved toward absoluteness. Total victory seemed the only acceptable outcome. Opportunities for honorable peace settlements were rebuked by both Athens and Sparta at various time believing they were in a position to soon demand unconditional surrender. Athens over-extended her considerable capabilities, squandering her navy on questionable pursuits with little direct payoff like the invasion of Sicily, when the risk of losing the navy was very high and the price of such a loss was losing her ability to defend the lifelines on which she depended for survival. Athens also began the war led by Pericles, the wisest of men. Under Pericles, Athens moved carefully along a prudent strategic course. But two years into the war Pericles died. Athens searched for someone to take his place and, although many came forward and took the reins of the state, none were up to the task. Egos and personal agendas interfered with logic—the appeal of short term gains over-rode what might have been best in the long term—and clever arguments substituted for good judgment. Finally, squabbling, intrigue, and an inability to limit and focus on principal objec-tives took their fatal toll.

Strategic success during this long war was determined, as with all wars, by how well the opponents understood and used their capabilities, how well they assessed who their real enemy was and the impact of what he was doing, and how well they were able to bring their resources together to actually carry out their plans. In large part this reflected the quality of military leader who, most of the time, was the political leader also. If an expedition succeeded, he endured; if it failed, he was replaced. Exigencies drove leadership. A door opened by circumstances to one kind of leader today might be closed by changed cir-cumstances tomorrow. Unfortunately, too often when the state needed broad vision and moderation, it got little more than a plan for the next expedition.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONSAthens was a coastal city with an active overseas trade. She

depended for food, for markets, and for treasure on wide-flung colonies, allies, and trading partners. The farms surround-ing Athens also nour ished her, but the quantity and variety of imports from around the Aegean and beyond made local products more of a luxury than a necessity. In that respect Athens was very different from inland states which depended almost totally on being self-sufficient.

Athens was the preeminent naval power of the time. The navy protected her colonies and allies, but also served as a force multiplier in combat, giving Athens flexibility and greater lever-age against land powers than her small army would suggest.

“At Marathon we stood out against the Persians and faced them single-handed. In the later invasion, when we were



unable to meet the enemy on land, we and all our people took to our ships, and joined in the battle at Salamis. It was this battle that prevented the Persians from sailing against the Peloponnese and destroying the cities one by one; for no system of mutual defense could have been organized in face of the Persian naval superiority.” 1

But navies did more. They also brought in revenue to the state. By putting down piracy and con trolling trade routes, and by providing the means to transport armies to distant battle-fields, they were the sine qua non of empire, and empire was the source of treasure. Empires were acquired, not by controlling surrounding territory like Sparta whose army primarily engaged neighbors in border disputes, but by spreading economic and political influence well beyond one’s borders, establishing distant dependen cies and sources or revenue, like Athens. Naval power was essential to Athens in building and keeping an empire, and vital for her very survival.

Sparta, however, was geographically and philosophically a land power. As an inland city-state, she was proudly self-suffi-cient. Her needs were satisfied by what she and her neighbors could produce. Consequently, Sparta needed and maintained a strong army with approximately twice as many highly disci-plined and well-trained men under arms as Athens to protect the surrounding territory on which she and her allies depended for survival. While Sparta too had ships, she neither relied on them as Athens did, nor did she have a naval tradition in the Mahanian sense, nor naval commanders whose experience and ability could match the Athenians.

Cities on important inland trading routes or lying along the coastal trade routes were generally rich and powerful by virtue of their strategic location. Corinth, lying between Athens and Sparta at the eastern end of the Gulf of Corinth, controlled the shortest east-west trade route from the Aegean to Italy, Sicily, and beyond. Corinth had her own allies and, together, they were an important counter-balance sought by both Athens and Sparta during the war. Coastal cities and islands like Pylos, Corcyra, Epidamnus, Potidaea, and Eion controlled the sea routes around the perimeter of Greece. Ships of the time were of shallow draft and without deep keels, so could not withstand the rigors of open-ocean passage. Consequently, they followed the coast by day and put in to shore each night. Cities and islands along the coast could act as choke points, controlling who could or could not pass. These cities in the wrong hands could cut off access to needed supplies and could block the transport of armies to distant battlegrounds. Because of their strategic location, they could exert considerably more power in their area with limited military forces than a comparable city of the same size farther inland. Naturally, the control of these places was contested and their ability to produce revenue coveted. Major powers were not subtle in how they ensured these choke points were in friendly hands. Naupactus, for example, controlling the narrow western debouchement from the Gulf of Corinth, was taken by Athens in battle and settled with exiles driven out of Ithome by Sparta—therefore guaranteed to be friendly to Athens.

IMPEDIMENTANo state goes to war without much having already happened.

For Athens and Sparta, war was a place on a long path of real and perceived disagreements, neither at its beginning nor at its end. Friction, which was natural between two such different philosophies of life, blurred the lenses through which they viewed each other. At the threshold of the Peloponnesian War, Athens was the most admired state in the civilized world. She had led the successful military defeat of powerful, invading Persian armies, and her liberal democracy—the first in the world—was the model of political competence and moral sensitivity. She was the champion of individual rights. All who knew Athens yearned for her leadership. However, the wealth and power and force of Athenian philosophy, which made her a natural leader among equals, were also the seeds of corruption. In the hands of manipulative leaders Athens thirsted after empire, subjugat-ing allies, becoming their jailer for fear that, free, they would turn against her.

THE MATCH IS STRUCKAt the dawn of the 5th century BC, the cities and villages of

mainland Greece and the island towns of the Aegean watched as Athens seemed to prepare for war. Her rise to military leader-ship in the war against Persia made her the uncontested military power of the region. Why was she continuing to increase the size of her already powerful navy? Why was she now rushing to complete a wall around Athens? The Lacedæmonians tried to persuade Athens to join Sparta in tearing down all Greek fortifications, but Athens would have none of it. Athens had set her strategy and single-mindedly was putting the necessary pieces in place. She would soon be ready.

The match that lit the conflict between Athens and the Pelo-ponnesian League was, ironically, not military but economic; and it began because of Athens’ relationship with Corinth, not Sparta. The growing Delian League Navy, built around the Athenian fleet and commanded by Athenian admi rals, had for some time made trade with the west difficult, especially for Corinth. Corinth was one of the most important trading centers in Greece and had, like Athens, a long and illustrious naval tradition. The first recorded naval battle was between Corinth and Corcyra. According to Thucydides, bad blood between Corinth and Athens was not new. Corinth and Athens competed for trade, for trading partners, for allies, and for preeminence in Greece. But, the most recent cause of bitterness arose from Athens’ interference in a border dispute Corinth was having with its neighbor, Megara. Megara, which up until that time had studiously kept out of everybody’s alliance, joined the Athenian alliance to gain leverage over Corinth. Athens then built long walls along the disputed border from Megara to Nisea and gar-risoned it with Athenian troops, effectively stopping the war. With Athens already pressuring Corinthian trade routes, this latest provocation could not easily be dismissed.

Subsequently, in 433BC, Athens sided with Corcyra, Corinth’s colony, in its dispute with Corinth. Corcyra, a large,



strategically situated island off the northwest coast of Greece, was an important naval departure point. Anyone crossing the Ionian Sea from Greece to Italy, Sicily, or points west passed Corcyra with its sizeable navy. In a dispute between Corinth and Corcyra over Corcyra’s colony, Epidamnus—another strategic waypoint on the coast—the Corcyrean navy beat the Corinthian squadron decisively. However, fearing that Corinth would return with reinforcements, Corcyra asked Athens for membership in the Delian League. Athens appreciated the potential value of Corcyra’s large navy and the strategic advantage of having Corcyra firmly in Athen’s camp so agreed to an alliance.

‘’The general belief was that, whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese was bound to come. Athens had no wish to see the strong navy of Corcyra pass into the hands of Corinth ... then too it was a fact that Corcyra lay very conveniently on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily.” 2

The Corinthian navy returned and a battle ensued near Sybota, a group of islands where the Corcyreans had camped. Athenian triremes were present, but not wanting to seem to abrogate a treaty Athens had with the Peloponnese, they stood to the side to encourage the Corcyreans but not actually join in the fighting until late in the battle. The ensuing battle resulted in a draw with the Corinthian navy mauling much of the Corcyrean line of triremes, and the Corcyreans driving part of the Corin-thian navy to shore where their encampment was burned. Despite having won the battles they fought while disembarked on the shore, the Corinthians were intimidated by fresh Athenian reinforcements which arrived the next morning and backed off, not to renew the battle. Both sides claimed victory, though it was clearly a Pyrrhic one for Corinth. Corinth might wisely have had second thoughts before taking on a distant naval battle or blockading expedition against the Athenian Navy. One thing that was certain was that Athens would not stand still with Corinth threatening to take control of a key choke point on the route to the west.

Corinth retaliated by supporting its colony, Potidaea, who happened also to be Athens’ ally, in its revolt against Athens. Potidaea, on the isthmus of Pallene northeast of Athens, was another strategic choke point, this time on the route from east-ern Greece to Turkey which was vital to Athens’ access to grain through the Hellespont from the Black Sea. Enemies along the southern coast of Thrace could not be tolerated by Athens, and a successful revolt in Potidaea could encourage others in Thrace to also turn against Athens. So Athens set up a naval blockade which prevented Corinth from giving Potidaea the support she needed to carry out her revolt. The Athenian strategy worked and Potidaea’s allies, including Corinth, were driven off.

At this point, Corinth urged Sparta to declare war on Athens, claiming Athens was growing too powerful and becoming a danger to the smaller states. In fact, Athens and Sparta had enjoyed ten years of peace before these incidents, so Sparta did not accept Corinth’s arguments. Under the Thirty Years Truce, Athens had previously given up all but two of its conquests in

Greece and, under Pericles, most of its imperialist policy. But Sparta feared Athens’ long-term power. Many in Sparta believed Athens should be stopped now before she became so strong no one could confront her successfully. So, when Corinth threat-ened to pull out of the Peloponnesian Confederation and join an alliance with Argos unless Sparta agreed to move against Athens, Sparta gave in.

Alliances have many lessons, but one of the most important is how difficult it is to affect the affairs of individual states so chains of relatively small events occurring among them will not draw all of them into a conflict none of them wants. Major powers, like Athens and Sparta—with a larger world view, more at stake, and a heavier responsibility for the consequences of their actions—often can head off direct conflict despite serious con-cerns about one another. The actions of smaller allies, however, often go relatively unnoticed until they begin to pull the major partners inexorably onto a collision course as happened here.

THE WAR BEGINSSparta began by making demands of Athens she knew could

not be accepted: the expulsion of Athens’ respected leader, Pericles, on the grounds that he was implicated in a 200 year old curse on the city; Athenian withdrawal from Potidaea; restoration of autonomy to Aegina—an island in the Saronic Gulf south of Athens which straddled, and could block, the sea lanes into Praeus, the port of Athens; the release of Megara from a prohibition against trading with Athenian cities (Megaran Decrees); and finally, restoration of autonomy to all Athens’ allies. Pericles, always the voice of moderation, persuaded Athens to reply in a measured and cautious way by assuring Sparta that any disagreements with any of these people would be arbitrated according to the provisions of their treaty and reasonable con-cessions agreed to. But negotiations broke down and Sparta’s ally, Thebes, marched south and struck Athens’ ally, Plataea. It was the spring of 431BC. The Peloponnesian War had begun.

THREE DIFFERENT KINDS OF WAR IN ONEThe Peloponnesian War can be divided into three periods:

1) The Archidamian or Ten Years War (431-421BC)—A period of intense ground conflict to capture territory, deny access to strategically placed allies, and harass rear areas. It was provoked by Sparta’s specious demands on Athens. It began with Sparta’s attack on Oenoe in Attica (the Pan-actum space) and continued to the Peace of Nicias ten years later.

2) The Period of Armistice (420-413BC)—A period of eight years during which Athens’ and Sparta’s allies, see-ing little to gain for themselves in observing the armistice, continued to fight one another, and Athens and Sparta looked for strategies by which one might prevail over the other. Sparta’s intervention in Sicily marked its end.



3) The Decelean or Aegean Sea War (413-404)—A period during which Sparta changed her strategy and won the war by directing her efforts at defeating Athens’ navy in the Aegean and cutting the supply lines on which Athens so depended.

PERIOD I. THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR (431-421BC)

Archidamus vs Pericles; Brasidas vs CleonArchidamus, king of Sparta, marched without delay into

Attica and attacked Oenoe. Sparta’s strategy was the traditional one of attacking the enemy directly, burning his land, killing and enslaving his people, and leveling his city. This scorched earth strategy was intended to systematically destroy Athens’ strategic infrastructure—the farms surrounding the city—as a precursor to actually taking Athens. But Pericles had other ideas. The Athenians abandoned Attica and everyone gathered within the impregnable new enceinte around Athens. Pericles reasoned that farms could be rebuilt, but without Athens, the spirit of the republic and all it stood for would be lost. The Athenians would be left with nothing.

While the Athenians remained safe within the walls of Athens, the Delian League navies ravaged the largely undefended Peloponnesian coastal towns and villages on Sparta’s flanks, destroying the source of support for Sparta’s army and forcing Sparta to fight distracting and draining rear guard actions. Sparta would not be allowed to focus its efforts in an offensive campaign. Athens was fighting a guerrilla war—here today, somewhere else tomorrow. It was not designed to destroy the Spartan army directly, but to frustrate and wear it out. This strategy was designed to make brilliant use of Athens’ strongest military asset, her navy, against which Sparta could do very little.

Pericles’ strategy was one of moderation. It was designed to undermine the effect of Sparta’s army and to show Sparta’s allies that Athens had the upper hand while Sparta was being destroyed piece-meal. Athenian power was used cautiously, keeping Sparta on the run, on the defensive, never giving Sparta time to go on the offensive with her full force. Athens stayed well within the bounds of what she could do comfortably and did not push so hard that there was danger of outrunning capabilities or money. Pericles knew this strategy would ensure continued support at home without asking for great sacrifices.



Pericles’ plan worked. Although Athens was intolerably crowded, the people were well protected. Pericles, in choosing when and where he would fight, and in depending on his essen-tially unopposed navy to sap the Peloponnesian Confederacy’s strength and morale, clearly had Sparta on the run in the first years of the war. Nonetheless, Pericles’ strategy was not without liabilities. The intense crowding in the city exacerbated if not caused the worst plague in memory, taking 10,000 lives. The landed class whose farms were being destroyed and their livestock taken lost all it owned. Daily they watched the smoke rise from their fields. They were demoralized and dispirited and wanted to fight back, but Pericles would not let them. Tensions were high and Pericles had many detractors.

But Pericles’ strategy had two weaknesses which, in the end, proved its undoing. First, the Spartan center of gravity was its army. It grew frustrated and tired, but it also continued virtually unopposed. As long as Athens failed to confront the Spartan army directly it remained a serious and far-ranging threat to Athens and her allies. Second, Athens was relying wholly on what her navy could do, but navies can’t take ground away from armies and can’t take and hold cities. So as long as Athens continued her strategy-of-the-periphery, she could wear down but could not stop Sparta. Athens also assumed her navy would always be there at her disposal. Consequently, she sometimes risked it cavalierly on less than critical objectives where the losses simply were not worth the cost. The constant coastal raiding took its toll in men and triremes without a commensurate direct toll on Spartan power. Soon, though winning, Athens was operating at the limits of her capabilities at sea.

In ancient times there was no “naval” strategy as it is known today. The navy’s principal mission was to transport the army. The most navies did against one another was to ram or capture each other’s ships to prevent them from be able to move armies into place. Transports sailed with escorting ships. If rival fleets were equal, the naval commander could not both fight his opponents escorts and protect his transports. To succeed, a navy needed overwhelming superiority or the admiral in charged needed to be a better tactician than his opponent, such as the Athenian commander, Phormio, displayed at Naupactus when with twenty ships he herded togeth er then captured or destroyed forty-seven ships of Corinth and her allies. And because ships were platforms on which armies could fight, land and naval commanders had to understand each others’ tactics and be able to work together. True superiority came from coalitions of allied fleets, such as Athens’ naval reinforcement of Corcyra’s navy in 433BC against the Corinthians.

“It was already late in the day, and both sides had sung the paean before attacking, when suddenly the Corinthian ships began to back water. They had seen in the distance twenty more Athenian Ships approaching. These had been sent out later from Athens to reinforce the original ten, since the Athenians feared (quite rightly, as it turned out) that the Corcyraeans might be defeated and that their own ten ships would not be enough to support them.” 3

Sparta understood very well that Athens relied on its navy for more than combat operations. If she could be cut off from sea-borne supplies, sitting behind the walls of Athens, the Spartan siege of Athens could be made to work. But for the time being, Sparta was persuaded that her army would prevail. Sparta’s strategy was relatively straight forward. First, to foment revolt among Athens’ allies and colonies. This would undermine Athens’ source of revenue keep the Athenians rushing sometimes at great distances and at great cost to bolster allies and put down incipient revolts. It would also reduce the size of the Athenian forces which could directly confront the Spartan army in Attica. Second, Sparta needed to be able to cut Athens’ lifelines at sea. But building a navy to challenge the Athenian navy was not an inconsequential task. It took time and money and talent, most of which were tied up in the expeditions of the Spartan army. It also took the assembling and training of crews. Triremes were simple ships, but they were unwieldy and their operation required skill and experience to coordinate. Triremes could be built, but using them effectively was quite another problem.

Cleon Changes Athens’ StrategyIn 429BC, Athens was clearly winning. But before the weak-

nesses of her strategy could become apparent, Pericles died. The coalition of moderates and liberals which Pericles had held together broke apart and three clean groupings—Cleon’s, Alcibi-ades’, and Nicia’s—maneuvered for power.

Ultimately it was Cleon’s strategy, supported by Alcibiades, that was pursued. Cleon was a far different leader than Pericles. He was impatient with Periclean moderation and believed in a full pressure strategy. Attack; give no quarter; destroy the enemy before he can destroy you; accept only unconditional surrender. Athens must set an example of strength if the empire was to be held together. In 428BC, his philosophy was put to action against the Mytileneans.

In that year, Attica was invaded for the third time and Lesbos, Athens’ long time ally off the west coast of what is now Turkey, revolted. To put down the revolt Athens sent a force to invade and occupy Mytilene, the principal city of Lesbos. Mytilene in turn appealed to Sparta for help, but a blockade of a hundred Athenian triremes prevented that help from arriving. A thou-sand Mytilene prisoners were brought back to Athens. Cleon then persuaded the Athenian assembly to authorize the killing of all Mytilenean males of military age, selling the women and children as slaves, and destroying the city—as was consistent with custom and no less than Sparta’s treatment of the Plataeans. But its harshness shocked the Athenians. At first they acceded to Cleon, but then they reversed themselves in time to save most of the people. In the end, Mitylene’s walls were torn down, its ships taken, and much of its territory confiscated.

From 426 until the armistice in 421BC, ground and naval conflict continued across and around Attica and the Pelopon-nese. Also during this period a string of earthquakes and other natural disasters occurred with great loss of life, and the plague struck again. The gods seem to be saying something, but there



were as many readings of these signs as there were factions in the governments on both sides. But the midst of this period, in 425BC, one of the turning points of the war was reached. In that year, Sparta suffered a severe defeat at Pylos, on the west coast of Greece barely 45 miles from Sparta.

At this time, Athens sent forty triremes under Eurymedon and Sophocles carrying Messinians of Naupactus which Athens planned to settle in the Spartan city of Messina, the Sicilian coastal port con trolling the narrowest point on the Straits of Messina between Sicily and Italy. They were directed to call at Corcyra enroute to put down an uprising. But before reaching Corcyra they were caught by a storm off Pylos and put into Navarino Bay for shelter. Pylos was sparsely populated; none-theless it was a strategic point which could be used to control the sea routes to Italy. Rough defenses to protect themselves from the landward approaches were put up by the sailors on the promontory of Pylos, overlooking the bay. When the storm abated the triremes continued on their way, but Demosthenes and a group remained in this fort at Pylos.

At first the Peloponnesians could not believe that Pylos had been taken. But unquestionably, an enemy force installed right at Sparta’s back door was a threat to its security. So Sparta pulled its troops back from Attica and marched to recover Pylos. Demosthenes felt that although the Athenians are fewer in number than the force Sparta would send, the terrain favored the Athenians so would equalize the forces. In the ensuing battle, Spartan hoplites were cut off from the rest of the Spartan force on the Sphacteria peninsular (the Pylos space) forming the seaward arm of the harbor. In the meanwhile, the Athenian fleet received a message of the action from Demosthenes and returned, strengthening Athens’ position.

Sparta then made a famous peace offer to the Athenian Assembly on condition their hoplites would be freed. Sparta summed up the situation to Athens this way: Athens had the upper hand. Athenian moderation now would gain Spartan moderation in the future.

“ ...Conquer your rival in generosity, and accord peace on more moderate conditions than expected.” 4

Athens was at the zenith of its success. Spartan prestige had been severely damaged, Corinthian supremacy in the northwest broken, and the Peloponnesians were without a fleet. But Cleon held to his hard line and refused Sparta’s peace offer, insisting on unconditional surrender. Sparta rejected Cleon’s ultimatum and the siege of Pylos resumed. After Cleon berated the gen-erals for taking so long, Nicias told him that if he thought he could do it faster he should lead the army himself. Forced to accept the challenge, he takes Demosthenes to help him. After an unopposed amphibious assault and the use of light missile troops which wreaked havoc on the Spartan hoplites, the Spartan force is defeated.

That same summer (425BC) the war reached a new low when Athens joined the Corcyraeans in massacring Corcyra’s enemies, ending the Corcyraean revolt. The next winter Nicias defeated the Peloponnesian ally, Cythera, seeming to signal to Sparta that they had no hope of winning the war. Sparta then stood passive as Athens ravaged its seacoast.

The Tide TurnsOver the next two years the fortunes of Athens and Sparta

completely reversed. Nicias failed to seize Megara—the impor-tant port city to the Aegean and crossroads between Athens and Corinth—and Brasidas, the Spartan general, conducted a brilliant campaign in the northeast capped by the capture of Amphipolis. Amphipolis was important to Athens, not only as a source of timber for shipbuilding and as a point through which much of the food for the region had to funnel, but as the doorway on the Strymon River to Athens’ northern allies in Macedonia and Thrace and a key on a landward march to the Hellespont.

The loss of Amphipolis was an invitation to those northern allies to defect, and signaled the end of Athens’ hope of ever recovering her empire. With the conquest of Amphipolis, Sparta’s prestige recovered and the balance of success which had so heavily tipped toward Athens was restored. Athens’ subsequent failure to take simultaneously Boeotia to the north (the Tamagra space), Delium to the northwest, and Siphae to the southwest ended even her pretensions to empire.

In the summer of 422BC both Cleon and Brasidas were killed at the battle of Amphipolis, striking a major blow to both sides and causing them to realize that what had started out as a limited war had flown out of control and brought devastation beyond all expectation. The death of Brasidas and Cleon, the leaders of their respective war parties, also opened the door to peace parties in both alliances. Their differences were not resolved, but both sides sought breathing time. Unfortunately, the truce which fol lowed was not a genuine time of peace. Both sides used the time to prepare to renew the fight.

PERIOD II. THE ARMISTICE (420-413BC)

The Fifty Year AllianceNeither Athens nor Sparta saw themselves benefitting from

the armistice. Sparta’s allies, believing they had the worst part to the bargain, quickly began looking for other alliance arrange-ments. Athens erroneously suspected Sparta was behind much of this maneuvering, so distrust and tension between the two states remained heightened. Over the next three years there ensued a complex web of inter-state intrigue and internal political change which, while not changing the balance of power, kept the level of perceived threat high.

In 421BC Nicias and Alcibiades, seeking Sparta’s friendship, were willing to shift the balance considerably toward Sparta to do so. Under the provisions of the defensive alliance Athens



and Sparta agreed to that year, the Spartan hoplites captured at Sphacteria were released and Athens promised to leave Pylos. The Athenian felt the alliance gave Sparta everything she wanted and Athens nothing, while many of Sparta’s allies saw it as a sellout of their interests by Sparta. They were encouraged by Corinth to turn to Argos—as its 30 year truce with Sparta ended—as their new leader against Athens. The Corinthians would gain in this change by upsetting the truce between Athens and Sparta and by denying Athens a relationship with Argos, an important land power.

Argos had not taken sides in the war in Attica; nonetheless, she despised Sparta for her poor showing thus far. As Argos felt she would ultimately be caught up as a belligerent against Sparta once their truce expired, she was open to an alliance arrange-ment with anyone except Sparta or Athens. She was motivated to keep at least an arm’s length away from Athens by her own aspirations to end up the leader of the Peloponnese rather than a secondary ally of the leader should Athens win. On the other hand, analogous to Corcyra at sea, Argos was the land power Athens needed. Consequently, Athens could not permit Argos either to side with Sparta or to amass an alliance of her own sufficiently large to threaten Athens.

Here different perceptions of the same threat and the poten-tial to protect oneself from it, at the least, or eliminate it, at

best, fractured the already fragile bonds that held Sparta’s allies together. When the immediate danger of conquest by either Athens or Sparta seemed to pass, many alliances, lacking cul-tural ties and common national objectives which bind states together long term, quickly fell apart. They were left with only the enduring distrust and enmity of both Sparta and Athens and their suspected designs on the smaller cities of Greece. Further exacerbating this trend was the feeling among many of the malcontented smaller cities that the big boys were now dealing exclusively in their own best interests. When Athens or Sparta were unable to carry out vari ous provisions of the peace, the small states’ suspicions seemed confirmed. The Battle of Mantinea was an example of this.

Sparta heard that its ally, Tegea, was preparing to enter into what Sparta saw as an unacceptable alliance with the Argives. Tegea was physically in the territory of Mantinea, which was allied with Athens and Argos. To have Tegea join what were already formidable potential enemies so close to Sparta would further restrict Sparta’s movement to the north and east, and would force Sparta to leave a considerably larger defensive force at home. The Argives saw an alliance with Tegea as a way to gain prestige and to right many wrongs committed by Sparta over the years, while the Mantineans saw it as a matter of self-defense against Sparta. Athens saw the alliance as necessary to the defense of Athens and, potentially, a way to further enlarge



its sphere of influence. Conflict was inevitable. Sparta inflicted very high casualties on the Argives in the battle which ensued, and won. A fifty year alliance was agreed to in which Sparta and Argos promised not to deal with Athens as long as she had forces in the Peloponnese.

In 420BC an alliance between Argos, Corinth and others was formed. Unfortunately for Athens at this time of shifting loyalties and distrust, Alcibiades came to power in Athens. A persuasive orator and gifted leader, Alcibiades was also an opportunist, and perhaps the most destructive character in this whole story. During the war he shifted sides no less than four times—always looking out for Alcibiades first, on the run to escape charges of treason and certain exile or death. Of him, Aristophanes said the people of Athens, “…love, hate, and can’t do without him.” 5

“Best rear no lion in your state, ‘tis true; But treat him like a lion if you do.” 6

As a general, Alcibiades was a major force pressing for renewal of the war. Most of the other Athenian leaders wanted to remain at peace, but Alcibiades knew the people had tasted victory and wanted the war to continue, so he played popular sentiment and prevailed.

The Melian Expedition—Undermined Ideals and a Change in Strategy

Melos is an island south of Athens about halfway to Crete. As with most of the Aegean Islands, Melos was a Spartan colony, initially neutral, trying not to take either side. Athens had once, early in the war, sent a squadron to Melos, laying waste the land and demanding the Melians submit to Athens. But despite the devastation of their lands, the Melians refused and the Athenians left without a clear resolution of the conflict. Now Athens feared Melos as a potential forward naval base for Sparta. So in 417BC the Athenians, led by Cleomedes and Tisias, surrounded Melos and ordered the garrison there to submit. The Melians argued that making enemies of neutrals was not in Athens’ long-term interest. The Athenians replied ‘who cares’ and insisted that might makes right:

“... you should try to get what is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compete and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” 7

The Melians refused to submit, so the Athenians killed the men, enslaved the women and children, and colonized the city.

The Melian expedition reveals how very much the war was changing Athens. From the moderate strategy of Pericles and his deep concern for the moral underpinnings of justice, individual freedom, and doing what was right because it was right, Athens

had sunk to the expedient of might makes right. At that moment, by her actions toward the Melians—though the Athenians did not realize it at the time—Athens lost whatever validity there was to her claim that she should lead Greece. Though Athens won future battles, what had motivated Greece to follow her was gone. No matter the quality of her military strategy, from this point on in the war, she can at best finish as no more than a transient imperialist military power, feared by others.

The Sicilian Expedition—Athens Reaches Too FarWith Athens’ fortunes going so badly, the idea of a major

military success against the Syracusans in Sicily was raised in the Athenian Assembly. A great debate followed on the merits of such a campaign. Sicily was very far away. How did it pose a threat to Athens? The Syracusans were friends of Sparta, it was argued, so if Syracuse and Sparta joined against Athens, they could indeed conquer the Delian League. If Athens could keep Syracuse busy at home skirmishing with the Athenians far from Athens and from the Peloponnese, they could then be kept out of the Peloponnesian War. On the other hand, even if Athens were successful—and no one felt that was a sure thing—the distance to Sicily made any Athenian military venture there very difficult to support and would make an occupation even more difficult.

There is also a theory that Sicily was attractive to Athens because she offered a rich, controllable source of wheat which Athens needed. The failed Athenian campaign in Egypt before the Peloponnesian War and now Athens’ actions in the northwest were both designed to gain sources of food for Athens in addition to the Euxine (Southern Russia). It would only have been logical for Athens to attempt to gain access to another source in Sicily.

Whether this theory is more valid than that Thucydides’ account, we may never know. However, whichever is correct, Athens could be mispositioning its army and navy far away where they could neither defend Athens and her seaports directly nor her vital sea lines to the Black Sea. Her allies and colonies in and around the Aegean would also be on their own, vulner-able to Spartan attack. It would be a very high risk operation and the desired outcome, keeping Sicily out of the war, might very well not even be necessary. There were no indications she was about to join Sparta against Athens. But the pressure to launch the Sicilian expedition overwhelmed the conservative arguments and, in the winter of 415BC, an Athenian military force sailed to conquer Sicily. Although Athens failed in these efforts and Syracuse did indeed help Sparta, the most Syracuse ever contributed was one squadron of ships—hardly a threat serious enough to affect the Spartan–Athenian military balance.

As the Athenian expedition was being set up, Nicias contin-ued to argue against it forcefully in the Athenian Assembly. The Assembly answered him by reminding him that Athens must control its own destiny and can’t assume the truce with Sparta would be honored. Sparta was an enemy and must, in the end, be treated like one. While Nicias’ argument sounds like the com-mander recommending prudence and restraint, he also sounds like a military commander who may be doing little more than



trying to get more forces assigned to him before embarking on a high risk expedition.

Alcibiades in turn makes the case that he should lead the force to Sicily, then goes on to show how lit tle he really knows about Sicily. Of the debate, Plutarch says,

“The Athenians had often looked longingly toward Sicily, but it was Alcibiades who inflamed their desire for conquest and persuaded them to wait no longer. Alcibiades himself thought of the conquest of Sicily as little more than a stepping stone to the conquest of Carthage and Libya and, eventually, all of Italy and Peloponnesus. Nicias…tried to stop this expedition, saying that it was impractical and extremely difficult. But Alcibiades, with his eloquence, had already convinced the people that they should sail out immediately with a large fleet and become the masters of Sicily. The Athenians knew Alcibiades well enough to know he needed restraint; and so they had chosen two other generals, Nicias and Lamachus, to aid in the campaign.” 8

Syracuse was warned of the expedition, and Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, assured the leadership that Syracuse would win if attacked. But, to give himself the greatest advan-tage against the formidable Athenian fleet, he planned to meet them at sea as they crossed open water in one body from their marshalling point at Corcyra to Iapygia, Italy (the Taras space). He reasoned they would be tired from their long sea voyage, still far enough away from Sicily not to have gained any good intelligence about Syracuse’s preparations. He would also be able to prevent them from taking on the final provisions they would need for the battle. Even a dull thrust at the Athenian force, especially if they did not expect it, might throw them off balance and cause them to reconsider. In the end it was decided to let the Athenians come all the way to Sicily where their sup ply lines would be the longest and where they could then be defeated with the full benefit of Syracuse choosing the battlefield.

An Ill Wind Before the BattleAthens sent three generals to command the operation: Alcibi-

ades, Nicias, and Lamachus. By the time they reached Sicily with their battle force, unity of command was a real problem. The three commanders disagreed fundamentally on what they should do. Alcibiades wanted to take all of Sicily, with Syracuse as the primary, though not the first, target. If taken, Alcibiades argued, the rest of Sicily could ensure the supplies they would need for the conquest of Syracuse and could help to spread revolt to Syracuse to weaken public support for a long battle. Nicias wanted to sail directly to their main objective, Selinas. Lamachus agreed with Alcibiades but believed Syracuse should be taken first, as it was the center of gravity, then the rest of the island would give up.

At this point, Alcibiades was recalled to Athens to answer charges against him. Reading between the lines, and fearing he would not fare well in Athens, he went instead to the Pelopon-nese to offer to help Sparta. Athens tried him in absentia and

sentenced him to death. Nicias and Lamachus then attacked Syracuse. Although their first attack failed, a second, which became a drawn-out siege, succeeded. Syracuse then began a serious quest for allies (Corinth and Sparta), while Athens tried to counter their efforts by attempting to put a good light on her motives. The defeat of Syracuse, Athens argued, was vital for the safety of Athens and ultimately the security of the wronged masses. In reality, nothing was gained but time. Walls were thrown up hastily by the Athenians and the Syracusans and the war continued with gains and losses by both sides until winter, when the antagonists pulled back to bury their dead, reconstitute their forces, and prepare to reengage come spring.

During the winter Nicias sent to Athens for reinforcements. They were enthusiastically approved as it looked like Athens could win if her forces were strengthened. At the same time Sparta shifted her strategy from one of raiding to one of a for-ward blockade (Decelea) to deny Athens her year-round access to her lands and her silver mines at Laurium. Then, to take some pressure off Sicily, Sparta opened a second front by marching her army to besiege Athens directly. Sparta also sent a second force to Sicily. When word of the approaching Athenian rein-forcements reached Sicily, a number of neutrals joined Syracuse for fear the reinforcements might actually tip the balance and enable Athens to win.

Athens Defeated at SeaFinally Gylippus, Sparta’s commander, decided to try to

defeat Athens at sea. Although Athens had an intimidating repu-tation at sea, some believed it was undeserved. Syracusan triremes with strengthened rams to take head-on collisions—which were developed by the Corinthians in the Gulf of Corinth—and the superior tactics of Gylippus against the lighter Athenian triremes made the difference and the Syracusans won. This victory plus the added strength of Sparta and other Sicilian allies greatly encouraged the Syracusans.

Although alarmed by the size of the Syracusan army and navy arrayed against the Athenians, an eclipse of the moon influenced Nicias to stay in place. The Syracusans won another naval battle and suc cessfully closed the mouth of the harbor, forcing the Athenians to fight even as they reconsidered. Nicias’ strategy was for a naval retreat with his army fighting a land battle at sea while pulling back. When Gylippus sees the Athenians embarking, he has proof for his men that the Athenians have met their match and are now preparing to run. Now is the time to strike and win. The ensuing naval battle was fought with the armies on shore standing aside and watching. It was confused and intense, and the Athenian navy plus a reinforcing squadron of seventy triremes was defeat ed. Then the rout of the Athenian army began. Nicias reembarked as much of his army as he could on what was left of badly mauled transports but, as the mouth of the harbor was blockaded, they were captured or sunk. The rest of the army tried to escape by land but their supplies and food were short and they were butchered. Nicias surrendered and seventy thousand Athenian prisoners were taken. Nicias and Demosthenes were executed.



PART III. THE IONIAN OR DECELEAN WAR (413-404BC)

Sparta Takes the War to AthensThe Ionian War had three parts: the revolt of allies (413-

411), the rally (410-408), and the relapse (407-404). The war was fought almost entirely in the Aegean Sea. The enemy was primarily Sparta, although Corinthian and Theban actions against Athens supported Sparta’s strategy. The deciding factor was Persian gold which enabled Sparta to replace ships quickly, to keep its army paid and well-equipped, and to maintain public support for the war at home.

The stunning Athenian defeat in Sicily greatly encouraged the Spartans. Where before they felt they were doggedly fight-ing to just hold their own, now they saw the knife edge of Athenian power—her navy—destroyed. They felt they now had a real chance of defeating Athens and maybe even taking all of Greece. They began by bringing together an army and a navy which could strike the crushing blow. Athens, being down but not out, wasted no time assembling a new army and navy as well—however, the loss of her navy in Sicily was a blow from which Athens would not recover. Without her experienced naval commanders and crews, Athenian naval capability was dependent totally on numbers. If she could build enough ships

to always face the enemy with a larger force, then perhaps she could continue win ning. Without a preponderance of numbers, however, Athens’ options were very much reduced.

Athens’ navy had always given her flexibility in objectives and operations, strategic reach, and a level of mobility which could not even be imagined for traditional armies. For Athens, victory at sea was a prerequisite for victory on land. It would take considerable time to regain her former level of joint opera-tional effectiveness, and Athens just did not have the luxury of time. Nor did Athens have the luxury of her former wealth. Her cavalier and often harsh treatment of allies caused more and more of them to seek alliance with Sparta, narrowing the pipeline of tribute supporting Athens’ war effort. At this point in the war, this was not a mere constricting of the pipeline, but its virtual closure. Athenian naval commanders spent the majority of their time collecting money from allies—after intimidating them. It was little more than blatant extortion. To complicate matters, political turmoil in Athens made for indecision and delay. A general unease spread rapidly among Athens’ allies that Athens was no longer the sure bet to win, accelerating their slide to Sparta’s side.

In 412BC Lesbos, Boeotia, and Athens’ principle Ionian allies along the eastern edge of the Aegean, including the largest



island, Chios, were either talking with Sparta about shifting their allegiance or were in open revolt against Athens. By 411BC only one quarter of the Athenian empire was not in revolt and Athens had lost major allies even in Attica. For all practical purposes the Delian League had fallen apart. At the same time, key coastal cities in Attica were being taken and occupied by Sparta, and they established a forward land blockade at Decelea. To protect the final leg of her supply lines, Athens was forced to change her strategy to one of carefully fortifying the landward approaches to any city which commanded parts of the sea route so these important cities could not be taken from the landward side. The important coastal city of Sunium, which ships had to pass as they rounded the southern tip of Attica enroute from the Aegean to Piraeus, was among the first to be rein forced.

Sparta now moved to an offense-is-the-best- defense strat-egy. Using her fleet, which was now of credible size (relative to Athen’s approximately 100 triremes) and gaining experience to match Athens’, Sparta took the fight to Athens’ center of grav-ity: to cut Athens’ eastern Aegean sea lines to the Black Sea. If Athens could not be taken directly, then by escalating the war horizontally and opening a second front along the Hellespont, Sparta would draw the Athenian forces away from the Pelo-ponnese, reducing the direct pressure on Sparta and its allies at home while dramatically increasing the pressure on Athens’ vital interests. This strategy would force Athens to divide her forces. Some would have to be left at home to defend the city as well as her allies in Attica, while the rest would have to be sent overseas to fight Spartan incursions. In neither place could Athens concentrate force against Sparta. It would also be very expensive to Athens to have to maintain high levels of forces so far from home at a time when she could ill afford to do so.

Athens would be forced to fight far from home where logistics support would be more difficult and loyalty of allies less certain. Sparta would be able to turn the tables and use Athens’ strategy of guerrilla raids all along the supply routes on which Athens so depended. This would keep Athens dashing from one vital point to the next to protect allies, put down revolts, and retake choke points; all the while having to respond to threats of direct combat at sea. Sparta could select the battlefields where it would have the greatest inherent advantage, and Athens’ navy would be worn down in the process. With her treasury low and income vastly diminished, Athens just had too much to defend to be everywhere and did not have the wherewithal to replace quickly what she lost in battle.

A further complication for Athens would be the interference of its long-time enemy, Persia. While Persia was no friend of Greece—therefore no real friend of either Athens or Sparta—Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, was an opportunist and saw the benefit to Persia of an Athenian defeat. Consequently, he offered help to Sparta which Alcibiades accepted. Sparta gave up to Persia all the lands she had conquered for the money Sparta needed to keep the war going. Tissaphernes began by paying the Peloponnesian sailor’s wages. Tissaphernes plan was to let the war continue, playing one side against the other, wearing each

other out. When the inevitable stalemate came, Tissaphernes could step in and take Greece.

Soon Alcibiades, who had continued to play all sides against the middle, lost the confidence of Sparta, and moved on to try to convince Tissaphernes to let him become the puppet ruler of Athens once all sides lost enough power and none could rule effectively. Turmoil continued to characterize the government in Athens until it finally self-destructed and a Council of 400 took power. However, their immediate steps to murder their opposition destroyed any credibility they had. An attempt to reach a peace with Sparta backfired when Sparta refused and set about trying, but failing, to take Athens by force. Alcibiades was finally called by the military as the only Athenian with the possibility of winning Tissaphernes over to Athens’ side. For-tunately for Athens, Alcibiades saw a greater gain for himself through a new government in Athens than by simply turning Athens over to the Persians. The new government of the wealthi-est citizens continued to search for clear power without finding it, but without any other faction gaining a clear advantage.

With the financing she needed and a growing naval capability, Sparta grew bolder. As at Abydus and Cynossema in 411BC, Sparta’s strategy at sea was to look for decent odds before pre-cipitating a battle. At Abydus, an Athenian naval squadron of 20 ships (later reinforced by Alcibiades) was out collecting money from allies when the Spartan, Dorieus, with 14 ships (later reinforced by Mindarus) cut the Athenians off from land by forming a barrier of ships and then fighting the Athenians from the land. The skirmish was indecisive, but Athens fought for a while, lost some ships, then took the rest and broke off the engagement and left. When Athenian reinforcements arrived, they found the Spartans at Cyzicus. Both fleets at this time had grown to 60-80 ships. This time the Athenians successfully cut the Spartans off from getting ashore—where, as it was Pelopon-nesian land, they could have found significant support—and captured the whole Peloponnesian fleet. The Athenian fleet was finding greater success in the Hellespont than it enjoyed in Sicily. Sparta offered to make peace. However, Athens, confident from this and other recent successes and from the acquisition of some new allies among the northeastern cities, refused the offer and continued fleet actions to secure its Black Sea supply route.

The Peloponnesians, having all the money they needed from the Persians, began immediately to build fifteen troop ships at Antandrus. While the ships were being built, they also built fortifications around the city which made them very popular with the citizens. However, seeing that grain was still arriving by ship daily in Piraeus for Athens, Sparta decided to move these new ships when they were finished up to the Hellespont. The fifteen troop ships sailed to Sestus. Three were sunk by the Athenian squadron on patrol in the Hellespont but the rest reached Byzantium where Sparta intended to exercise positive control over all Athenian shipping coming from the Black Sea.

In 409BC Athens sent sailors equipped as peltasts to the west coast of Turkey just as the corn was ripening. They were then to



capture towns for their crops, rob the treasuries of their money which Athens so desperately needed, enslave the people, and take any useful property. This strategy was successful for a while until Tissaphernes learned of it and routed them at Ephesus with his army. Despite their loss, however, the Athenians gathered up their dead and sailed away to Lesbos and the Hellespont. At sea they still felt safe, chasing or evading enemy ships and capturing those they could along the way.

By 408BC Athens need for money to pay the army and build more ships was especially acute. The toll to Athenian shipping from Sparta and her allies from Byzantium down through the Hellespont was significant. Athens decided to lay siege to Byz-antium to relieve this growing pressure. Siege works were built around the fortifications from which the Athenian army could launch short and long range attacks against the city, but they got nowhere. At the same time the Peloponnesians increased the number of ships attacking Athenian cities to try to force Athens to withdraw from Byantium.

However, the Athenians were able to persuade some of the Byzantines to betray the city to them. Clearchus, the governor, believing he had taken all precautions for the defense of the city, went across the straits to try to get more money to build more ships. While he was gone, at night, the Byzantine conspirators opened the city gates to the Athenians and gave up the city. The Athenian conquest of Byzantium enabled Alcibiades to return to Athens a hero; though he still had powerful enemies in Athens, and many believed rather than being Athens’ savior he was the cause of their woes. Nonetheless, Alcibiades was elected strategos with full powers.

Alcibiades subsequently raised a large force and tried to draw the Spartan commander, Lysander, into battle. At this point any strategy was better than none. Lysander had been called back to command the Peloponnesian forces. He was very popular especially with Sparta’s allies and it was felt if anyone could pull all the Peloponnesian allies together to finally launch one fatal thrust against Athens, it was Lysander. But Lysander would not fight without a clear advantage, and Alcibiades did not intend to give him that. However, against orders, one of Alcibiades’ captains, Antiochus, provoked a battle and lost. For many Athenians this was the last straw and their confidence in Alcibiades was destroyed. Once again he was replaced. Alcibi-ades’ strategy might indeed have worked, but his hand was forced and, subsequently, no strategy was followed.

The Last Battle—AegospotamiIn 404BC Lysander virtually destroyed the Athenian fleet

near Aegospotami (the Abydos space), essentially ending the war. It began with Lysander assembling a fleet at Ephesus while the Athenians were doing the same at Samos. When Lysander’s fleet was ready he sailed it for the Hellespont where he intended to intercept merchants ships out of Pontus as they sailed through the straits. Enroute, he stopped to discipline those cities which had revolted against Sparta and to enjoy the support of those where friendly Spartan troops were in charge.

The Athenians were busy raiding Chios, Ephesus and other prosperous cities for what they could provide Athens, but now the Athenian fleet of approximately 180 ships were following Lysander’s fleet. As soon as the Athenians heard that Lysander had assaulted and plundered Lampsacus, Athens’ ally, they went to Sestus (the Abydos space) to reprovision, then directly to Aegospotami two miles across the Hellespont from Lampsacus.

At daybreak the Athenian fleet formed a line of battle at the mouth of the harbor of Lampsacus, but the Peloponnesian fleet stayed in place and would not engage them. When the Athenians left late in the afternoon, Lysander sent a couple of small fast ships to follow them and see what they were doing when they disembarked. This went on for four days. Alcibiades, who was staying ashore, advised the Athenians to shift their anchorage to Sestus about 15 miles away where they could be supported by the city, as Lysander’s fleet was at Lampsacus. At Aegospotami the Athenians had only an open shore at their back. His advice was rejected.

On the fifth day Lysander took advantage of the Athenians lowered state of readiness from the inactiv ity of the previous four days. When the Athenians disembarked at the end of the day to disperse and find food, Lysander attacked at full speed. Conon, the Athenian commander, could only get his and eight other ships manned in time to meet the attack. Lysander took all the rest of the Athenian fleet. All prisoners were killed. In three days the news of the stunning Athenian defeat had reached Athens and Sparta.

Lysander then liberated Byzantium and Chalcedon (the Byz-antium space), sending the Athenian garrisons under safe passage back to Athens. He knew the more people there were in Athens, the quicker the food would run out. Lysander then set sail for Athens. The Peloponnesian navy was unopposed for the first time since the beginning of the war. After this crushing Athenian defeat, every state in Greece save Samos abandoned Athens.

Meanwhile, as Athens blockaded all her harbors but one, repaired and manned her walls, and pre pared for a final siege, the combined Spartan and Peloponnesian army marched to Athens. Lysander, on reaching the waters of Attica, returned Aegina and Melos to their peoples and devastated Salamis. His fleet then closed the remaining Athenian port, Piraeus, to all merchant ships. Athens was now surrounded. The enemy occupied all surrounding land and controlled the sea as well. Athens had no ships, no allies, no food.

For the next four months Athens tried to establish peace terms that would guarantee her freedom and permit her to keep her city walls. The Corinthians and Thebans were against any negotiated settlement and wanted the Athenians destroyed. But Sparta said they would not enslave a Greek state that had done as much for Greece as Athens had. Spartan terms were that the walls would be destroyed, all but twelve ships would be given up, exiles would be recalled, Athens would have the same



enemies and friends as Sparta, and would follow Sparta on any expeditions she might make. Athens accepted. Xenophon reports,

“ It was thought that this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece.” 9

ConclusionThe French military strategist Andre Beaupre contends that

wars are won in the mind. When the enemy is convinced he can’t win, or that continuing would be useless, victory is in hand. Destroying his military is one way of doing this but certainly not the best way if it can be avoided, for too much is lost in the process. Instead the national center of gravity must be identified and, if the threat is credible, the nation will give up.

In the case of Athens, the rational choice of a limited war to ensure the security of Athens and its allies gave way to an unlimited war without a cohe sive strategy, pursued often for no more reason that it looked like it could be won. The potential prize for Athens—total control of the territory and the way of life of Greece—was so seductive it clouded good judgment. Means drove ends. One engagement led to the next without an end short of the unattainable one of total domination of Greece. In time the inability to achieve this open-ended goal left Athens without friends and without the ability to continue, hav ing sacrificed everything including its spirit to the enterprise. Submission came with the realization that no alternatives were left, short of conscious and determined self-destruction. The strategic road that was permitted to go off the map had no other end. It never does.

‡1 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, R. Warner, translated,

New York: Penguin, 1972. Book One, p782 Ibid, p623 Thucydides, p654 Thucydides, Bk IV5 Lives From Plutarch, Random House, 1966, p816 Ibid, p817 Thucydides, Bk V, p408 Plutarch, p779 Xenophon, “A History of My Times,” Translated by Rex

Warner, Penguin Books, p108

ECONOMICS OF WARIf war is an extension of politics by other means, as Clausewitz

contended, then economics is what supplies the means. Two different politico-economic systems clashed and were largely destroyed in the crucible of the Peloponnesian War. By the war’s conclusion Athens’ economic system had collapsed and the Spartan economy was unable to sustain future Spartan hegemony.

The primary test of any economy is its ability to feed and sustain its people. By virtue of its naval power, Athens was able to extract tribute from all cor ners of its empire. However, this strength had the undesirable effect of encouraging the Athenian population to outstrip its local resource base and live beyond the means of its secure resources. Consequently, to sustain its population Athens’ required access to imported grains. Most significant Athenian military expeditions before and during the war become more understandable when one understands that an underlying objective of Athenian strategy was to gain control of one of the four major locations where surplus grain was avail-able: Egypt, Southern Russia, the Po River Valley, and Sicily.

Cimon’s campaign in Egypt (456BC), the Megaran Decree, Demosthenes’s campaign in northwest Greece, the Megaran offensive, and the Sicilian Expedition all had the primary objec-tive of securing a guaranteed grain supply for Athens. The Megaran Decree, one of the basic causes of the Peloponnesian war, was basically intended to subjugate Megara to Athens economically and allow Athenian naval vessels to portage across the isthmus, beyond Corinthian control. This route was also critical in controlling transportation costs of grain imported from the west (Po River Vally and Sicily). One of the objectives of Demosthenes’ campaign was to open portions of this route, as did the Athenian assault on Megara. When viewed from the perspective of a pop ulation (Athens) anxious about where the next years’ meals were coming from, the Sicilian expedition becomes a rational military campaign rather than the misguided act of hubris it at first seems.

Southern Russia, which was not controlled by any great power hostile to Athens, was a consistent source of grain. There was a problem, though. The Cimmerians (Russians of the Crimean Peninsula) insisted on being paid in gold, not silver. The Athe-nians were always short of gold while the Persians, who also traded with this region, continually inflated the price of grain in a bid to wage economic warfare upon their recent enemy, Athens.

To pay for the required grain imports and to sus tain a navy to protect those imports, Athens depend ed on the tribute and trade from its empire in a form of economic symbiosis. Naval power was and, to this day, is expensive to construct and oper-ate. A trireme—the capital ship of its period—cost two talents to build and about a talent per month to operate.

A talent was a measured weight of precious metal; in this period usually silver, of 60 minas. A mina weighed about one pound. A talent of gold had approximately thirteen times the



buying power of a silver talent. Gold in Greece was hard to come by until the great gold mines of Thrace were discovered during the reign of Alexander the Great’s father, Phillip II of Macedon. At today’s price (less than $15/oz) a talent of silver would be worth around $14000, yet its buying power in 5th century BC Greece was roughly equivalent to one million dollars.

The average rower in the fleet or a hoplite in the field were paid from 3 obols to one drachma per day depending on avail-able resources. (36000 obols = 6000 drachma = 60 mina = one talent). Hoplites were paid double wages to allow them to bring a servant along on campaign. Late in the war the Athenians were paying their rowers 3 obols a day. The Spartan navarch (admiral) Lysander was able to convince the Persian satrap Tissaphernes to pay his rowers 4 obols a day. This produced large scale defec-tions in Athenian mercenary rowers for the higher Spartan pay. This form of economic warfare prevented the Athenians from manning all of their available trireme hulls, effectively reducing their strength without combat.

A Trireme cost the equivalent of 2 million dollars to build and one million dollars per month to oper ate. The Athenian navy at the beginning of the war possessed 300 triremes of which about 100 were actively operated at any one time for approximately 8 months per year. The average tribute from the empire was around 500 talents a year which was raised to 1000 to 1500 talents a year in the 4th year of the war on.

Ultimately, it was Persian gold which enabled Sparta to maintain a fleet that encouraged war-weary Athenian allies to rebel. These rebellions reduced the tribute required to sustain the Athenian navy. With the economic link between navy and empire broken, the Athenian navy’s resilience was destroyed. Sparta’s ability to wage a successful economic war set up the military victory. At Aegospotami the pain became a nightmare and Athens soon surrendered. This victory lead to temporary Spartan hegemony over Greece.

But Sparta’s hegemony of Greece could not be sustained by an inherently weak economy which almost failed to maintain its victorious war effort. The Spartan economic system was based on earlier con quests of neighboring cities which were demo-graphically Messenian. These Messenian descendants, known as Helots, were serfs who were part and parcel to the fertile soil where they were born, worked, and died. Each Spartan citizen was given the criteria for citizenship: a plot of land to support him and his mess. In this manner the Spartan economy stayed on a constant war footing. This enabled the Spartan citizens to drill and maintain a permanent standing army.

Spartan citizens for the most part were not allowed to handle or possess money. The economy worked off an elaborate barter system for internal trade and a class of freemen (perioccoi) who had a role not entirely understood but which partly entailed external trade and reservist military obligations. The constant Athenian raiding of the Peloponnesian coast and establishment

of bases allowed many helots to defect and reduced the internal Spartan labor pool.

These defections and destruction of property reduced the via-bility of Spartan holdings and significantly reduced the number of citizen’s available for the standing Spartan army. Historians have held, probably wrongly, that it was a severe reduction in Spartan birth rates which resulted in the small size of the Spartan army at Leuctra. More likely the war-damaged Spartan economy had simply lost the ability to support a large army in the field. The Athenian strategy of economic attrition worked, but the strategy’s drain on Athenian resources—coupled with the Sicilian disaster and Persian economic intervention—carried the day for Sparta.

Each side had its own economic Achilles heel. To field a large professional army, the Spartans relied on a subsistence society based on agriculture and sup ported by slave labor. The Athenians relied on the tribute of a politically subjugated empire to supply the funds which supported a navy whose role was to maintain access to overseas grain. The Athenian strategy of economic attrition required patience and a stable long term commitment to succeed. The death of Pericles and the aggressive desire of his successors for quicker results prevented this outcome. The Spartan strategy to fragment the Athenian empire succeeded because Athens blundered, Persia intervened, and Sparta decided that the ends it was seeking was worth compromising all of its ethics. The final result was a Spartan victory which won the war but lost the peace.



THE NAVAL WARThe Athenian Navy dominated the Aegean Sea, and with it

Athens built an empire. The instrument of that naval power was the trireme, a relatively fragile craft whose exact design has been unresolved for centuries. However, in the past few years a trireme was built by the Greek Navy based on archaeological evidence from ancient shipwrecks. Essentially, a trireme was analagous to a large racing shell. Its lack of seaworthiness, sleeping quarters, and limited logistic cargo space greatly restricted its endurance and forced it to stay close to shore.

The trireme’s low freeboard made it vulnerable to being swamped in rough seas; consequently the fleet rarely went beyond sight of land so they could always put ashore in a sudden storm. It was not uncommon for an entire fleet to be sunk or damaged in heavy weather as illustrated by the Persian fleet’s major losses during their invasion of Greece in 480BC.

The trireme’s limited internal sleeping and eating space restricted its operations to coasts where available forage and water permitted the crew to go ashore each night to eat and sleep. These limitations tied naval forces to the same shore-based logistics arrangements as armies.

Rowers and steersman were the key to an operationally effective trireme. The steersman translated the motive powers of the rowers into the ship’s maneuvers. It was the quality of the Athenian steersman, even after the Sicilian disaster, that enabled the Athenian navy to continue to defeat fleet after fleet until the war’s end. The trireme’s “engine,” its 170 rowers arranged in three tiers, required considerable practice to work their oars in unison to a called cadence, maneuvering the ship at the speeds required and according to the tactics of the day. Modern crew teams measure their training by “time on the water” or simply miles rowed. The more the crew rows together the more efficient they become and the faster and longer they can row. In ancient Greece, it was usually the side whose rowers had greater endur-ance and speed that determined victory.

Practice, which was expensive, needed to be constant and regular or the crews would lose their edge. So the navy’s mission of protecting Athens’ overseas trade not only was necessary to keep the state economically viable, but was a requisite just to keep the navy effective. The Athenian Navy’s relationship with the empire was, therefore, not only economic, but symbiotic.

Ancient naval battles usually resembled a land battle on floating platforms. The opposing forces would close with each other and the action would be decided by marines boarding the enemy’s triremes, by missile troops, and by armed rowers. However, the Athenians developed a new doctrine emphasiz-ing the ship’s secondary weapon: the ram. The ram was located in the ship’s bow and was used to punch a hole in the enemy trireme’s side and sink it. The Athenian emphasis on ramming over boarding allowed them to carry fewer Marines which, in turn, allowed for a lighter, more maneuverable ship design.

Constant operations in peacetime gave the Athenian navy the practice required to carry out the more com plex maneuvers necessitated by their ramming doctrine.

The Peloponnesian navy relied primarily on the older more conservative doctrine of boarding. Therefore, they built ships with more space for marines. More space meant larger, slower ships, less capable of opposing the Athenian ramming doctrine. However, what they lacked in maneuverability, they attempted to make up for in guile. Athenian ramming doctrine required more sea room than boarding tactics to get into position and come up to ramming speed. Peloponnesian admirals attempted to deny the Athenians sea room whenever possible to thwart any attempts to mount a successful ramming attack. However, despite Athens’ preference to use their ramming doctrine, the majority of their victories were achieved the old fashioned way with boarding.

A naval battle resembled a land battle. The opposing fleets would square off against each other in opposing lines just like a Hoplite battle. Superior numbers were beneficial as they allowed one fleet to overlap the flanks of the opposing formation with-out maneuver. There were two basic offensive maneuvers: the Periplus and Diekplus. The Periplus was a flanking maneuver whereby some ships on the fleet’s extreme flanks rowed around the enemy fleet and took their line in the flank and rear. Here swifter rowing ships would have an advantage as they could move around a flank faster than less experienced ships could react. This maneuver required sea room. A less experienced or smaller fleet would endeavor to deny this maneuver by anchor-ing its flanks on coastal features, such as in a harbor. In this example it is easy to visualize how an ancient naval battle was very similar to a land battle where the land forces would often attempt to anchor their flanks on an impassable land feature, such as a river or mountain, to prevent their flank from being turned.

The Diekplus was a pass-through maneuver attempted only by a highly skilled fleet such as the Athenians. The attacking ships approached the enemy line in column, usually lead by a flagship. The lead ship would back-water at the last moment and use the momentum of the enemy to shear off one bank of its oars. The lead ship, followed by the remainder of the column, would then maneuver into the enemy’s flanks and rear through the hole made in the enemy line. The Diekplus could be neutralized by having a double line formation, but this tactic shortened the first line, increasing the chances of a Periplus maneuver.

Defensive maneuvers were to anchor the flanks of a fleet close inshore with a double line and land units in support who could actually wade out and help endangered ships. Then the fleet would attempt to force a bow-on-bow collision, turning the battle into a large boarding action. One very unsuccessful defensive maneuver (Kyklos) was to have the fleet form a circle with the bows of the ships facing outward, equivalent of a land force forming square. The one time this formation was used, the outnumbered Athenians rowed around the periphery in an ever tightening circle. When the circled ships began to foul with each other, the Athenians attacked and wiped them out.



The classic application of the ram doctrine was accomplished early in the war, in the Gulf of Corinth, by the Athenian Admiral Phormio. By combining the ramming doctrine with a forward blockade of the Peloponnese, he denied the Peloponnesian fleets the practice and experience they needed to threaten Athenian naval supremacy. One can imagine every time a green Corinthian crew went for a row, along would come an Athenian dreadnought to ruin their day.

A review of the naval battles fought during the Peloponnesian war (see table below) finds the Athenians winning most of their battles even though they are outnumbered, whereas the Pelo-ponnesians win the majority of their battles only when they had superior numbers. Another interesting point is that the winner of a trireme battle usually does not lose many ships. This is because triremes, by the nature of their construction, don’t usually sink when they are holed under the water line, but swamp and float near the surface. The winner of a naval battle would gain control of the waters in which the engagement was fought and tow his wrecks to shore where he could easily repair them. However, the loser would not only lose his wrecks but also the crews. It was lore that the winner would expend great effort in recovering crews from sunk vessels. The victorious Athenian admirals at the battle of Arginusae failed in this sacred responsibility and were subsequently executed.

Defeat confers one advantage to a determined opponent over time: experience in what doesn’t work. Once the Peloponnesian fleet gained some experience, they looked for opportunities to con-duct battles in enclosed waters where Athenians could be denied maneuvering opportunities; to increase the number of missile troops carried on board to wound enemy rowers; to strengthen the bows of their ships to force head on collisions which the lighter Athenian triremes could not handle. Applications of these tactics countered many of the Athenian doctrinal advantages and drove naval battles once again into board ing actions which favored the side with superior numbers. It was with these tactics that the Syra-cusans defeated the Athenians in the Great Harbor of Syracuse.

The disaster of the Sicilian expeditions resulted in the destruc-tion of approximately two-thirds of the Athenian navy and strategic naval parity for the Peloponnesians. From this point on the Spartans, with Persian gold, were able to form a succession of fleets that could carry the war into the eastern Aegean. The presence of a Spartan fleet-in-being encouraged and supported rebellions among Athe-nian tribute-paying allies, which reduced the income available to support the Athenian fleet. With the economic symbiosis between fleet and empire broken, even a string of impressive Athenian naval victories could not stave off ultimate defeat. When the main Athenian fleet was destroyed at Aegospotami there was no money left in the treasury to build another, so Athens finally succumbed.

Peloponnesian War Data—Naval Battles

Battle Year Admiral (At)

Admiral (Sp)

Force Ratio

Triremes (At)

Triremes (Sp)

Losses (At)

Losses (Sp)

Winner Pkill

Loser Pkill

off Patras 429 Phormio* Cnemus 0.43 20 47 0 12 0.60 0.00Naupactus 429 Phormio* Cnemus 0.26 20 77 0 6 0.30 0.00Sybota Islands 428 ? ?* 1.36 72 53 13 1 0.25 0.01Pylos 426 Demosthenes* Agis 1.63 70 43 0 5 0.07 0.00off Syracuse I 413 Nicias* ? 0.75 60 80 3 11 0.18 0.04off Erineus 413 Diphilus* Polyanthes 1.32 33 25 0 3 0.09 0.00off Syracuse II 413 Nicias# Gylippus# 0.94 75 80 3 3 0.04 0.04off Syracuse III 413 Nicias Gylippus* 0.94 72 77 3 0 0.04 0.00off Syracuse IV 413 Demosthenes Gylippus* 0.88 76 86 18 0 0.21 0.00off Syracuse V 413 Demosthenes Gylippus* 1.47 110 75 50 25 0.67 0.23Cynossema 411 Thrasyllus* Mindarus 0.88 76 86 15 21 0.28 0.17off Abydos 411 Trasybulus* Mindarus 0.77 74 96 0 30 0.41 0.00Cyzicus 410 Alcibiades* Mindarus 1.43 86 60 0 60 0.70 0.00off Lesbos 409 Thrasyllus* Hemocrates 0.8 20 25 0 5 0.20 0.00Notium 407 Antiochus Lysander* 0.89 80 90 20 0 0.22 0.00Arginussae 406 Protomachus* Callicratidas 1.25 150 120 25 70 0.47 0.21Aegospotami 405 Conon Lysander* 0.97 180 185 179 0 0.97 0.00

Avg Trireme Pkill 0.33 0.04Avg Battle Force Ration 1.00

Battles Won By Larger Force 47%Battles Won By Smaller Force 47%

Draws 6%Battles Won By Athens When Superior 40%Battles Won By Athens When Inferior 60%Battles Won By Sparta When Superior 67%Battles Won By Sparta When Inferior 33%

Key:* = Winner# = DrawAt = Athens and the Delian LeagueSp = Sparta and her friendsWinner Pkill = Defender losses vs. Attacker StrengthLoser Pkill = Attacker losses vs. Defender StrengthForce Ratio = Athens vs. Sparta



THE GAME AS HISTORYThis section captures the highlights of the war and shows how the game would portray those events. In the game, as in the actual war, there are many smaller operations which aren’t covered. The intent is to give the player the feel for how the game portrays the major aspects of the conflict.

GAME TURN 1 (431 – 429BC)

Historical Chronology ◦ Three incursions by King Archidamus of Sparta into Attica. ◦ Potidaea falls after a 2 year siege. ◦ The Athenian fleet operates along the coast of the

Peloponnese. ◦ Plague breaks out in Athens; Pericles dies.

Game ● Operation conducted by Archidamus with Athens as the objective space. A ravaged marker is placed in the Athens space precluding the collection of domestic funds (Eisphora).

● Phormio conducts a successful siege of Potidaea and the rebellion ceases.

● Athenian naval and land force, with Cephellania as an objec-tive space, move around the Peloponnese leaving ravaged markers in the coastal spaces traversed on the way to the objective. This type of operation is how the game depicts the Athenian coastal raiding strategy.

● An event (roll of 6) occurs at the begin ning of turn 2 which results in a plague and significant personnel losses, as Pericles is taken permanently out of play.


Historical Chronology ◦ Island of Lesbos rebels. ◦ Plataea is destroyed by Thebes. ◦ Athenian naval forces raid the east coast of the Peloponnese. ◦ Athenian force fails to capture Melos. ◦ Athenian naval forces operate against Syracuse. ◦ Athenian force lead by Demosthenes conducts operations

in Ambracia. ◦ Corcyran Civil War.

Game ● A successful rebellion caused by Sparta results in Mytilene rebelling, and the subsequent spread of the rebellion to most of the adjacent spaces on the island.

● Spartan expedition with Plataea as its objective con ducts a successful siege and captures the space.

● Athenian naval force with Hermione as its objective ravages the intervening spaces and fails in its siege of Hermione.

● Athenian naval force fails in its siege of Melos. ● Athenian land force conducts a successful siege of Ambracia. ● Athenian naval force conducts a victorious naval battle against a Syracusan naval force, then leaves one strength point as a garrison in Messina.

● At the beginning of turn 3 the random event (die roll of 10) is the Corcyran Civil War.


Historical Chronology ◦ Athenian force lands on Pylos, provoking a Spartan

response that results in a small Spartan force being cap-tured on the Island of Sphacteria.

◦ Spartan force under Brasidas captures Amphipolis and other cities in the region.

◦ Athenian naval forces operate along the Peloponnesian coast and capture Methana.

◦ Athenian land force is defeated in a major land battle at Delium.

Game ● Athenian naval and land force moves to Pylos, causing a defensive strategy operation that results in a Spartan defeat and the taking of hostages by the Athenians.

● Spartan force under Brasidas (2 Hoplite SPs) moves to Amphipolis and captures the space by a successful siege.

● Athenian naval force conducts a successful siege and captures Methana while ravaging the intervening spaces.

● Athenian force occupies Delium which places it in the ZOI of the Theban cavalry, resulting in a land battle with heavy Athenian losses.

Battle of DeliumBattle Space Location: Delium

Leaders: Athens has Cleon (actually Hippocrates, a member of Cleon’s faction) whereas Sparta is con ducting an intercept and has no leader.

Athens: 3 Hoplite SPs

Sparta: 3 Allied Hoplite SPs, 2 Allied Cavalry SPs

Battle Factors: Hoplites equal, Sparta has cavalry advantage (+1)

Combat Adjudication: Sparta has a +1 (cavalry advantage); Athens no die modifier

Battle Result: Die roll differential of 2 causes 2 Athenian Hoplite SPs to be eliminated; Sparta has hostages.




Historical Chronology ◦ Rebellion in Chalcidice (spaces adjacent to Olynthus) spreads. ◦ Athenian force moves to recapture Amphipolis and is

decisively beaten in a land battle. Both Cleon and Brasidas are killed in the battle.

Game ● The rebellion roll of 8 results in Olynthus and several adjacent spaces rebelling.

● The random event (roll of 11) calls for potential leader deaths. ● Athenian force moves to Amphipolis (a defensive strategy option) and loses the battle against the Spartans there; leader casualty die rolls occur.

Battle of AmphipolisBattle Space Location: Amphipolis

Leaders: Athens has Cleon; Sparta has Brasidas

Athens: 1 Hoplite SP, 1 Allied Cavalry SP

Sparta: 1 Hoplite SPs

Battle Factors: Spartan hoplites (+2 Sparta), leader (+2 Sparta), Athens (+1 cavalry)

Combat Adjudication: Sparta has a +4 (leader and Spartan hoplite advantage), Athens has a +1 (cavalry)

Battle Result: Die roll differential of 3 which results in 1 Athe-nian Hoplite SP being eliminated; Sparta has hostages; both leaders killed.


Historical Chronology ◦ Peace of Nicias concluded

Game ● Armistice conditions are met; no game turn.


Historical Chronology ◦ Battle of Mantinea is fought between Argos and its allies

(including Athens) and the Spartans and their allies. This battle actually occurs in 418BC.

◦ Athens launches first Sicilian expedition against Syracuse. ◦ Athens attacks and captures Melos. ◦ Peace of Nicias ends in 415BC with King Agis’s invasion

of Attica and his capture of Decelea.

Game ● The random event from the armistice causes Argos to enter the war (roll of 10).

● The random event for the turn sees Alcibiades change sides; his counter is placed in Sparta.

● The placing of Argive forces in Argos causes a defensive Spar-tan reaction resulting in a land bat tle which the Argives lose.

Battle of MantineaBattle Space Location: Mantinea

Leaders: Athens has no leader; Sparta has Agis

Athens: 4 Allied Hoplite SPs, 1 Cavalry SP

Sparta: 3 Hoplite SPs

Battle Factors: Sparta (+2 Spartan hoplites), leader (+1 Sparta); Athens has a cavalry (+1) and strength (+1) advantage

Combat Adjudication: Sparta has a net +1 advantage (leader and Spartan hoplites) over Athens (cavalry and strength)

Battle Result: Die roll differential of 2 which results in 1 Athe-nian Allied Hoplite SP being eliminated.

Note: There would have been 2 Athenian Allied Hoplites eliminated but the presence of the 1 Athenian Cavalry SP reduces the Athenian losses to 1.

● A large Athenian force (Nicias with 5 Naval SPs, 2 Hoplite SPs) moves to Messina and remains there after fighting a combined battle versus Syracusan forces.

In actuality the Athenian forces were in the proximity of Syracuse but this is how the game shows them being in the vicinity.

First Battle for SyracuseBattle Space Location: Syracuse

Leaders: Athens has Nicias; Sparta has no leader

Athens: 3 Naval SPs, 1 Allied Naval SP, 2 Hoplite SPs

Sparta: 2 Allied Naval SPs, 2 Allied Hoplite SPs, 2 Allied Cavalry SPs

Naval Battle Factors: Athens (+2 Athenian naval SPs and +2 strength)

Land Battle Factors: Sparta has cavalry advantage (+1)

Naval Combat Adjudication: Athens has a +4 (Athenian naval SPs)



Land Combat Adjudication: Sparta has +1 (Cavalry) added to its roll.

Naval Battle Result: Die roll differential of 1 results in 1 Spartan Allied Naval SP being eliminated, which allows a land battle to be conducted.

Land Battle Result: Die roll differential of 2 which results in 1 Spartan Allied Hoplite SP being eliminated.

Note: There would have been 2 Spartan Allied Hoplites eliminated, but the presence of the 2 Spartan Allied Cavalry SP results in the losses being reduced by one which are the lowest possible.

● Athenian naval force conducts a successful siege and captures Melos.

● A Spartan force (Agis with 7 Spartan Hoplite SPs, 4 Allied Hoplite SPs and 1 Allied Cavalry SP) moves to Decelea, successfully sieges and captures the space, then remains there.


Historical Chronology ◦ Athens sends a second expedition to reinforce its attack

against Syracuse. ◦ Athenian forces in Sicily are destroyed. ◦ Numerous rebellions occur in the Delian League, especially

in the Hellespont. ◦ Sparta sends naval forces to support rebellions. ◦ Athens wins battle of Cynossema in the Hellespont. ◦ Persia enters the war.

Game ● The event (roll of 5) has Persia enter the war. ● The rebellion roll results in Lampsacus and adjacent spaces (Abydos) rising in rebellion.

● Another Athenian force is sent to Sicily (Demosthenes with 3 Naval SPs, 2 Hoplites, and 1 Allied Hoplite SP) using Messina as an assembly space, with the entire combined forces ending up in Syracuse.

● Sparta sends naval and land reinforcements (Gylippus with 2 Allied Naval SPs and 2 Hoplites) and the entire Athenian force is destroyed in a large combined battle.

Second Battle for SyracuseBattle Space Location: Syracuse

Leaders: Athens has Nicias and Demosthenes; Sparta has Gylippus

Athens: 3 Naval SPs, 1 Allied Naval SP, 4 Hoplite SPs

Sparta: 3 Naval SPs, 2 Hoplite SPs, 2 Allied Hoplite SPs, 2 Allied Cavalry SPs

Naval Battle Factors: Naval SPs (+2 Athenian naval SPs / +l Strength), leaders (Gylippus +2 whereas Nicias +0 is used because he has the lowest tactical rating)

Land Battle Factors: Hoplites (equal), Sparta has cavalry advan-tage (+1), leader (Gylippus +2 whereas Nicias +0 is used because he has the lowest tactical rating)

Naval Combat Adjudication: Athens has a +3 (Athenian naval SPs present and of greater strength) whereas Gylippus has +2 for a net of +1.

Land Combat Adjudication: Sparta has +3 added to its die roll.

Naval Battle Result: Die roll differential of 4 results in 3 Athe-nian Naval SPs being eliminated, which allows a land battle to be conducted.

Note: In the real battle the remaining Naval SPs were burned by the Athenians. In the game, however, you can’t eliminate more enemy Naval SPs than you had in the battle.

Land Battle Result: Die roll differential of 4 which results in 4 Athenian Hoplite SPs being eliminated.

● Spartan naval forces, using the cause rebellion strategy, are sent to Chios and Abydos to support rebellions in these areas. Athenian forces move to Samos.

● Athenian naval force using a defensive strategy moves to Abydos and defeats the Spartans in three naval engagements (Cynossema, action off Abydos, and Cyzicus). The Spartans are forced to withdraw.

Design Note: The battle of Cyzicus actually took place in 410, but the three battles constituted a campaign, which in the game is resolved as one engagement.

Battles of Cynossema, Action off Abydos, and Cyzi-cusBattle Space Location: Abydos

Leaders: Athens has Thrasybulus; Sparta has Mindarus

Athens: 3 Naval SPs

Sparta: 3 Naval SPs

Naval Battle Factors: Naval SPs (+2 Athenian naval SPs), leaders (Thrasybulus +2, Mindarus +1)

Naval Combat Adjudication: Athens has a +4 (Athenian naval SPs / Thrasybulus +2), Sparta has + 1 (Mindarus +1) for a net of +3 for the Athenians.

Naval Battle Result: Die roll differential of 3 results in 3 Spartan Naval SPs being eliminated.




Historical Chronology ◦ Numerous Delian league rebellions occur in Ionia and

Caria. ◦ Alcibiades joins the Persians and then returns to the Athe-

nian side. In actuality this occurs over the course of game turns 7 and 8.

Game ● The event for this turn (roll of 7) causes Alcibiades to switch to the Persian side; place Alcibiades in Sardis.

Alcibiades would then require an additional event to rejoin the Athenian side. Even a game is hard pressed to keep up with Alcibiades. The chronology recreates this by having this event occur for the rest of the game, out of sync with the historical events.

● Both sides are short of funds but small naval engagements occur as Athenian forces put down rebellions against Spartan opposition.


Historical Chronology ◦ Athens loses a naval battle to Spartan forces lead by

Lysander near Notium (the Teos space). ◦ Alcibiades goes into exile. ◦ Athens wins naval battle of Arginusae.

Game ● Event (roll of 7) has Alcibiades return to Athens and he is once again available as an Athenian leader.

● Athenian naval force is defeated by Spartan force in Teos.

Battle of NotiumBattle Space Location: Teos

Leaders: Athens has no leader; Sparta has Lysander

Athens: 3 Naval SPs, 1 Allied Naval SP

Sparta: 4 Naval SPs

Naval Battle Factors: Naval SPs (+2 Athenian mixed naval SPs), leaders (Lysander +2)

Naval Combat Adjudication: Athens has a +2 (Athenian naval SPs), Sparta has +2 (Lysander +2) for a net of 0.

Naval Battle Result: Die roll differential of 1 results in 1 Athe-nian Naval SP being eliminated.

● Athenian naval force defeats a Spartan naval force in the Arginusae space, then fights a second smaller battle in the Mytilene space; the rebellion in that space is put down.

Battles of ArginusaeBattle Space Location: Arginusae

Leaders: Athens has Thrasybulus; Sparta has Callicratidas

Athens: 6 Naval SPs

Sparta: 5 Naval SPs

Naval Battle Factors: Naval SPs (+2 Athenian naval SPs / +1 strength), leaders (Thrasybulus +2, Callicratidas +1)

Naval Combat Adjudication: Athens has a +5 (Athenian naval SPs, strength, Thrasybulus +2), Sparta has + 1 for a net of +4 for the Athenians.

Naval Battle Result: Die roll differential of 3 results in 3 Spartan Naval SPs being eliminated.

GAME TURN 10 (404 – 402BC)

Historical Chronology ◦ Athens loses battle of Aegospotami (actually 405BC, in

the Abydos space). ◦ Sparta successfully besieges Athens; the war is over.

Game ● Event (roll of 7) has Alcibiades removed from the game. ● Athens loses a major naval battle in the Abydos space, cutting Athens’ line of communication with the Euxine.

Battle of AegospotamiBattle Space Location: Abydos

Leaders: Athens has no leader (actually Conon, but he was ashore); Sparta has Lysander

Athens: 6 Naval SPs, 1 Allied Naval SP

Sparta: 7 Naval SPs

Naval Battle Factors: Naval SPs (+2 Athenian naval SPs present), leaders (Lysander +2)

Naval Combat Adjudication: Athens has a +2 (Athenian naval SPs present); Sparta has +2 (Lysander +2) for a net of 0.

Naval Battle Result: Die roll differential of 5 results in 5 Athe-nian Naval SPs being eliminated.

● With Athens’ line of communications to the Euxine cut a successful siege is conducted against the Athens space, which ends the game.



DESIGNER’S NOTES

SOLITAIRE PLAYThere were several design problems associated with this

game, some of which aren’t unique to the Peloponnesian War. The old problem of how to create an interesting and competi-tive solitaire game without the use of a computer was the main challenge. Even computers aren’t a panacea, as witnessed by the World Chess Champion Gary Kasparov annihilating the chess computer program “Deep Thought” in only 18 moves. Although the computer knew all of the tactics and could look ahead many more moves than a human, strategically it could not compete with the World Champion. This anecdote illustrates the prob-lem of enabling any game system, even one run by a main frame computer, to analyze a situation strategically.

The solution to the problem came to me as I was reading about the life of Alcibiades. Alcibiades was the “bad boy” of Athens. He was smart, trained by Socrates, and came from a rich family. He had the potential to be one of the greats but he lacked one thing: a sense of shame (Aidos). As a consequence, he was capable of outrageous acts which consistently got him into trouble. By the end of the Peloponnesian War he had fought for Athens, Sparta, Persia, Athens again, and finally chose self-imposed exile. Hence, the idea of the player switching sides originated with the career of Alcibiades.

By periodically having the player switch sides the game system would only have to come up with logical and histori-cally accurate operations for a short period of time. As soon as the player starts to overcome the system with superior play, he is forced to switch sides and play from the weakened position. The player’s role evolved from one of winning with a particular side (as is the case in all other solitaire games) to one where his performance is judged upon his use of strategy to shorten the war and ensure its decisive conclusion. The player supplies the strategic vision and the solitaire system provides the history.

STRATEGYThe heart of the system is in the strategy matrixes and the

strategic ratings of the leaders. The leaders represent actual personages and the tactical rating is a measure of their combat capabilities. The strategic rating, however, represents a particular faction’s perspective on the war as embodied by the named leader. Leaders rated strategically as 0 or -1 represent conservative fac-tions, while those with positive strategic rat ings are conversely more risk-oriented and aggressive.

In this manner the non-player side pursues a strategy con-sistent with its ruling faction’s proclivities. If the game system outplays the player he is unlikely to switch sides and the suc-cessful non-player strategy will continue to be pursued. Player success will lead to either a new non-player strategy or the player switching sides.

Each side has its own center of gravity. Athens is a naval power and consequently must prevent Spartan forces from moving into the Aegean and threatening her line of communi-cation. Sparta is a land power which must endeavor to conquer Athens through large battles while staving off the ravaging of her coasts. Victory for Athens usually results from the gradual attrition of Sparta through a series of small battles and numer-ous sieges of relatively undefended locations. This is difficult for the player to achieve since he will have interruptions in his long-term control of Athens. Sparta on the other hand needs to build up its naval power and strike a short decisive blow to the Athenian line of communication when the opportunity presents itself. It is in this context that an appreciation of the map and the key locations is in order.

The Saronic Gulf (the Aegina space) controls naval access to the Aegean and the Athenian lines of communication. As long as the Athenian navy is in Piraeus and approximately eight naval strength points in size (200 Triremes), it is very difficult for Spartan expeditions to move overseas. This is as it should be. It was the destruction of almost 200 Athenian triremes in the Sicilian disaster which enabled Sparta to move forces overseas. These Spartan naval forces interdicted tribute from Athenian allies, encouraged Delian League rebellions, and eventually cut Athenian access to the Crimean granaries on the Euxine (Black Sea). Once the Athenian line of communication was cut, a suc-cessful siege of Athens was finally concluded (404BC).

Sparta’s strategic dilemma is how to prevent Athenian naval raiding from crippling its finances and ability to wage war. For Sparta this revolves around Gythium, Corinth, and supporting Delian League rebellions. By declaring objectives on the west coast of the Peloponnese, an Athenian expedition will typically ravage from 10 to 15 spaces which will reduce Spartan revenue by at least twenty percent. Strong Spartan fleets at Gythium and Corinth will inhibit the free movement of these Athenian expeditions, but also create tempting targets for superior quality Athenian naval forces. Offensively, the support of Delian League rebellions will force the diversion of Athenian naval forces and revenues to suppress these revolts instead of their being used directly against Sparta.

The strategy matrixes are a representation of these options. These interactive charts are designed to implement strategies historically consistent with the tendencies of the faction in power. The traditional Spartan strategy was to go ravage the enemy’s territory—fight a hoplite battle—then go home after a glori ous victory had imposed their will and an oligarchic govern-ment upon the vanquished. More aggressive strategies entailed sending forces overseas for lengthy periods of time; something which was not considered culturally acceptable. Archidamus and Pleistoanax, the kings of Sparta, embodied these traditional doctrines. The more aggressive commanders in the game (Bra-sidas, Gylippus, Lysander) represent more aggressive Spartan factions. The Athenian strategy, as conceived by Pericles, was a departure from the time honored one of letting a hoplite battle decide the war. He envisioned refusing to fight a hoplite battle



by remaining behind the walls of Athens while causing damage to Sparta through the application of naval power. After Pericles died of the plague, new more aggressive leaders such as Cleon and Alcibiades applied military power more offensively (as indicated by their ratings and the types of strategies that are precluded due to their die roll modifier).

OPERATIONSEach operation actually represents a series of military expe-

ditions conducted in a particular part of the map over a three year period. Many diverse types of operations are simulated through the universal technique of having an army move to an objective space. The fact that an army ravages enemy spaces on its way to an objective simulates the pillaging of enemy property as a technique of warfare. Successful operations revolve around positioning forces so that they block enemy movement and force combat through the application of their zones of influence (ZOI). A force’s ZOI is based on its composition. Naval power has a longer reach than does land power and is good for all operations except those against exclusively land forces. Land forces are only useful for blocking enemy movement if they are in a strategic location such as the Isthmus of Corinth, or represent a mixed force containing cavalry.

Operations continue until resources become scarce (lack of money), forces aren’t available, or the auguries indicate that the gods are displeased (bad die roll before operation). Within these limitations the player and the strategy matrixes must allocate force in the pursuit of coherent strategy objectives.

COMBAT AND SIEGESAn analysis of ancient hoplite battles reveals the following

dynamic. Land battles were usually decided by the relative lengths of the hoplite battlelines and the quality of the individual commanders. The tactics of deep battlelines did not come into vogue until Epaminondas, although a similar tactic was used to good effect by the Thebans at Delium. The auxiliary units represented by cavalry in the game (light troops and cavalry) only seemed to make a difference when one side had a large advan-tage in numbers; otherwise the opposing auxiliaries tended to cancel each other out. The only other key variable was that the Spartans were professionals and in the Peloponnesian War, with one exception, never lost a key land engagement. This excep-tion had mitigating circum stances insofar as the force defeated at Sphacteria was isolated on an island with the Athenians controlling the surrounding waters.

The casualties from a hoplite battle tended to be rather one-sided. The winner consistently lost approximately 5% of his force, which in game terms is usually far less than one strength point. The loser lost (on average) about 14% of his hoplite force. However, the loser’s casualties were far more variable and could be devastating as the result of the total rout of an army, such as occurred to the Athenians at Delium.

Naval Battles work off of a similar concept. The key variables were the relative length of the opposing trireme battlelines and the quality of the admirals. Usually the success of boarding actions and the ability to envelop an enemy flank determined a naval battle’s outcome. The big Athenian advantage was in the quality of their steersmen, a factor which continued to produce victories right up until the end of the war. Although Phor-mio—perhaps the best admiral from this period—was able to overcome larger battlelines with superior tactics and leadership, it was usually the larger fleet that won.

The loser in a naval battle usually lost one trireme for every three enemy triremes present. Ancient triremes rarely sank, even when rammed, unless the weather was bad. As a consequence the winner of the battle could usually recover his lost ships and, in the long run, would sustain very few trireme losses.

Siegecraft as an art of war was poorly understood by the Greeks. There were a few interesting excep tions, but for the most part any decently constructed and defended wall would suffice to stop an attack. If Thucydides is to be believed, even hastily thrown-up walls were sufficient to stop an assault and force a siege. Sieges were usually decided by starving the garrison into submission. This process usually took more than a year of constant blockade to accomplish. Assaults were rarely attempted against fortifications unless the walls were particularly weak.

Sieges were very costly to conduct. Just prior to the war the Athenian siege of Samos cost over 1300 talents to conduct and almost three years to accom plish. The success rate in sieges seemed to be almost entirely dependent on the skills of the besieging commander once the blockade of the fortress had been effected.

REBELLIONDue to the high cost of sieges the key Spartan strategy early

in the war was to get the Delian League allies to rebel, thus depriving Athens of their revenues and forcing them to dispatch expensive naval forces to suppress these insurrections. When things were going well for Athens it was hard for Sparta to interest anyone in revolting, especially since reinforcements could not get past the Athenian navy. It was the Spartan commander Brasidas who was able to move a small force overland and get the Chalcidice (the Olynthus and Amphipolis space region) to rise in revolt. It was the Athenian admiral Thucydides’ inability to prevent the loss of Amphipolis to Brasidas that gave him the spare time to write his famous book after he was sent into early retirement.

Each side was successful at causing rebellions approximately 50% of the time (Sparta 8 for 15, Athens 5 for 12), hence the die range when this strategy is attempted in the game. The other problem with rebellions is that they can spread. In the game, if a rebellion isn’t supported by the opposing side, it is quite easy for the player to dispatch a force which will succeed in quelling the revolt. If, however, the rebellion is supported, a costly siege may



occur and the probability of the rebellion spreading increases. In the later part of the war it was the ability of Sparta to maintain a fleet in the eastern Aegean that fueled and expanded a long series of rebellions that denied Athens the revenue required to recover from a major defeat. As long as the Athenians continued to win, they survived; but the losses sustained at Aegospotami could not be replaced due to the lack of finances, and the war soon ended.

Sparta was vulnerable to uprisings by the helots (Messenian serfs) who supplied the labor pool that sustained the Spartan economy. By creating safe havens for fugitive helots, the Athe-nians created long-term problems for the Spartan war machine that hampered its ability to sustain forces in the field. The strategy did not succeed during the war, but its effects contributed to Sparta’s near-term defeat by Thebes, and a long-term decline in Spartiate population.

REVENUEStrategic games examine the macro dynamics of warfare.

The key variable is money. Money, measured in talents, fuels all aspects of operations. For conceptual purposes a talent in this period had the approximate buying power of a million dollars. For informational purposes one talent equaled 6,000 drachma, which equaled 36,000 obols.

It was the size of the respective treasuries that was a better indicator of military potential than the forces that could be put in the field. Historically, it was Lysander convincing the Per-sians to raise the rate of pay for the rowers in the Spartan fleet from 3 obols to 4 which caused huge defections in mercenary rowers who were only being paid 3 obols by the Athenians. It was the damage caused by Lysander’s “fleet in being” that pre-vented the Athenians from amassing the revenue necessary to compete finan cially with Persian gold. This maneuver weakened the Athenian fleet by preventing them from manning all of the trireme hulls that they possessed. In this example money, or the lack thereof, translated directly into military strength.

Athens received tribute from its allies in exchange for pro-tection. Only Chios and Corcyra contributed ships instead of money. In the beginning of the war the yearly tribute from the league was a little less than 500 talents per year, with a treasury of 6000 talents. Once the war was in full swing Athens raised the tribute to approximately 1000 talents per year and periodically taxed the rich (Eisphora). The Eisphora was not well liked and was avoided when possible, especially if Attica (the Athens space and environs) had been recently ravaged, since the rich relied on their estate revenues for income.

Sparta’s economy operated on an internal barter system which, coupled with its legal system, placed the state on a per-manent war economy. This allowed the Spartan citizens to stay in shape and drill while helots worked the land. The Pelopon-nesian League (modern term) worked off a levy system. Allies of Sparta did not pay tribute but supplied forces to operate under

Spartan leadership when requested. For simplicity’s sake, I have approximated the operational capability of these forces and translated it into money. The Athenians can affect this income by either ravaging the Peloponnese and reducing its productivity (and hence the size of the force that it can support) or by the conquest of Sparta’s major allies Thebes and Corinth, both of which had reasonably prosperous economies.

CONCLUSIONThe Peloponnesian War was decided by a combination of

strategy, leadership, and economics. By manipulating these three factors, all of the important strategies and options available to the actual belligerents have been included within the game system. I hope this game will give you, the player, a better appreciation of the dynamics behind the war and the persons who fought it.

2nd EDITIONI had no plans to ever reprint this design, but Gene Billingsley

apparently had other ideas as supported by the GMT tribe. So, first off thanks to all for wanting to see this one get a fresh coat of paint and the addition of some new scenarios.

To be candid I did not want to do too much as I have always been happy with the original. I of course added in known errata and I altered a few numbers to make it a bit harder as the tribe is now a tougher set of veterans than first tussled with this game back in the early 1990’s.

The biggest change is I asked to have someone other than myself rewrite the rules and I want to thank Chad Jensen for signing up for this task. I think he has done an admirable job in recasting and cleaning up my ancient scrolls from the last century.

I wanted to do something special for this edition, so I dusted off my books and decided to tell you the story of what happened before and after Sparta won the 2nd Peloponnesian War. Based on my recent publication of Pericles, I had all of the research done for implementing a new 1st Peloponnesian War scenario. It uses the same strategy matrices, but captures a few nuances that made this first clash less decisive and shorter in duration.

The significant addition to this edition is the Fall of Sparta scenario. As far as I can tell this may be the first time this tumultuous period has been looked at in a wargame, but if I’m incorrect its clearly the most recent. This new scenario is for two players only, but with a significant twist. One side represents Sparta and for most of this time King Agesilaus who followed a very aggressive un-Spartan agenda. He was opposed during this period by a shifting set of alliances as represented by the opposing player as Thebes and sometimes Athens. This shifting set of conflicts was overlaid by Persian intervention and at times dominance over the military situation in Asia and the Aegean.

I have attempted to tell this very complicated story with a ‘sandbox’ scenario that covers this important, but obscure period



of Greek history. In keeping with the solitaire system mechanic of switching sides, the Anti-Spartan player vacillates between controlling Thebes, Athens and their combination as you try and prosecute the destruction of Sparta. The scenario main narrative tells the story of Thebes and its multi-decade effort to replace Sparta as the hegemon of Greece. However, the complication is Thebes, for a time, was occupied by Spartan troops, while Athens vacillated between neutrality, Sparta’s reluctant ally, and aggressive revanchist. Hence the utility of the switching sides mechanic to represent this chaotic situation.

As the anti-Spartan side you will have to juggle shifting leadership and forces to prevail as you fight a more coherent but undermanned Sparta. In the historical end Thebes defeated Sparta at the Battle of Leuctra (371 BC), but that was just the beginning of the end. It took several Theban coalition invasions

of the Peloponnesus before Sparta finally succumbed with the architect of its demise (Epaminondas) lying dead. This very Shakespearian end soon led to the rise of Macedon, but I have already told that story.

I hope you enjoy this walk down memory lane.

Mark HermanNew York CityDecember 2018

Documents

Playbook - adobeindd.com€¦ · 4 Playbook 2019 GMT Games, LLC 10.2 FALL OF ATHENS Place the Game Turn marker on space 7 of the Game Turn track. 10.2.1 Setup: Sparta (Player Side)