Phoenicians - Chapter 26

8/14/2019 Phoenicians - Chapter 26

1/10

PhoeniciansChapter 26

Revolutions, war, peace, constitutions, treaties and even political and

administrative reform can be initiated by an elite leadership or culture, but to

succeed they need the popular participation, cooperation and collaboration from the

citizens to a great extent. Under Chehab, two major factors were against this

dynamic popular interaction reformist movement, they were the popular feelings of:

The Popular Distrust of the Government, and he did not really have the luxury

of time or political continuity to restructure the citizens anti-government

sentiment. In the 6-years of his office he had to prove to the public that principle of

equity and justice could replace nepotistic1 practices and corruptive trends and

habits. He had to move the people from a state-of-mind that looked at all public

officials, from serving themselves, to a group of people in public office for the

benefit of the entire community and almost impossible task, due to the past

history of Lebanon, both under the French Mandate and their new found

independence.

The Dilemma of Transcending Sectarian Interests, as you know, the religious

sectarianism is consecrated by the Constitution and Legalized by political

practice in parliamentary representation, cabinet formation, public employment and

personal status laws. The application of such sectarian balance in recruitment,

position-classification and promotion of public administrators were in direct conflict

with the merit principle he advocated. Because of this he fell short of introducing

structural reform or effectually implementing measures of change in bureaucratic

agencies this road block initiated symbolic rather than substantive changes.

As a matter of record, President Chehab had started to awaken an interest in

the people, but was unable to complete his goal. He did manage to set the stage

for a social policy and is quoted as saying near the end of his term: If the rich

continue to hold on to their privileges against everything and against all, there will

be a social revolution in Lebanon. Interestingly enough, Chehab himself paved the

way towards the same revolution, (that he tried to avert). Helena Cobban said,

1 favoritism shown by somebody in power to relatives and friends, especially in appointing them to good positions


2/10

being only partially successful in realizing his overall economic plan for Lebanon,

he was resoundingly successful in spurring the development of its rural areas.

Having set in motion the process of social change that gradually and

incrementally mobilized, galvanized and politicized the Shiites of Lebanon it

should be mentioned that in the cause of this movement and in it being greater

than economic development, the political system was running the grave risk of

instability and revolution.

His goals are precisely what could be said caused the consecutive waves of

rural-urban migration, since they initiated the process of social mobilization in the

Shia community --- later, when attacks by Israel against the Palestinian resistance

movement in the south of Lebanon, completed the process. The big difference

between the two migrations being, the 1950s migration was voluntary and

energized by the increasing economic opportunities in Beirut, while the 1970s

migration was compulsory.

Interestingly, in 1960 (2-years into his term) seeing that the country had been

stabilized and having paved the way for reforms, he offered to resign. Members of

the Parliament persuaded him to remain in office.

In 1961 he suppressed an attempted coup by the Syrian Social Nationalist

Party, and to stop any future threats, he strengthened the Lebanese intelligence

and security services preventing any foreign interference in internal affairs.

In 1964, Chehab, whose presence as the head of the country was seen by many

as the best option for stability and any future reforms, refused to allow the

Constitution to be amended for permitting him to run for another presidential

term. He backed Charles Helou, who became the next president.

He later became dissatisfied with Helous presidency, over the perceived

mishandling of the armed presence of Palestinian guerrillas in Southern Lebanon,

and over Helous moves to reinstall the traditional feudal politicians to regain

power. He was expected to contest the presidential election of 1970, but in a

historical declaration he said that his experience in office convinced him that the

people of his country were not ready to put aside feudal traditions and support

him in building a modern Lebanon. He endorsed his protg Elias Sarkis, and in

the closet vote in Lebanese history, Sarkis lost the election to the feudal leader

Suleiman Frangieh by a single vote in the National Assembly.


3/10

True to his predictions, the 1st few months of the Frangieh mandate saw the

dismantling of Lebanons intelligence and security services, a move that rapidly

allowed multiple foreign interferences in the internal affairs of Lebanon, soon

manifesting as a Palestinian military presence in 1973 and eventually the start of

civil war in 1975.

The Presidency of Charles Helou (9-23-1964 to 9-22-1970) was a period

marked by a series of political and economic crises and the attempts to confront

them, including the Intra Bank crises of 1966, the June 1967 Six Day war (Lebanon

did not participate), and additional crises of 1969 and 1970.

Born on September 25th, 1913 to a powerful Maronite family from Baabda, he

went on to graduate with honors from St Josephs University in 1929, and completed

his Law degree in 1934. He was a successful businessman who founded two

French language newspapers, Lclair du Nord and Le Jour. In 1936 he

ventured into politics when he allied with Pierre Gemayel and three others in

launching the Kataeb (Phalangist) Party. Internal disagreements between him and

Gemayel led to his leaving the organization.

His first governmental appointment was as Ambassador to the Vatican in 1947,

later serving in the Cabinet as Minister of Justice and Health 1954-1955 and as

Minister of Education 1964. He was a protg of Faud Chehab.

When he assumed office he vowed to follow his predecessors mandate, in that

he began his leadership with, as said by Khalidi, reformist zeal and had a number

of superannuated civil servants unceremoniously dismissed from their positions, a

brave thing to do in a country where every man has his connections with the

powerful,

Helou faced a bitter experience because the dismissal process was met with

wide popular dissatisfaction, the oppressed, during the election of Deputies were

chosen from those who had (in most cases) from those who had been dismissed.

This unbalance in the delegation of constitutional powers, and the radical

opposition of the oligarch group of traditional politicians, administrative corruption

and governmental inefficiency paralyzed the Helou presidency --- henceforth any

attempts to reduce corrupt appointments were radically opposed.

His regime in its return to a classical economic liberalism, and to the gradual

abandonment of planned development polices and the crises that followed are

noted.


4/10

The collapse of Intra Bank (Banque Intra) a Lebanese Bank in 1966, brought

the Lebanese economy to a halt and sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East.

The bank was founded in 1951 by Yousef Beidas [son of Palestinian author and

scholar Khalil Beidas and his Beirut born wife] and his three partners of a currency

trading house name International Traders.

On October 14th, 1966 the bank stopped payments bringing the Lebanese

economy to a screeching halt, whereas Intra Bank accounted for 15% of the total

bank deposits in the country, and 40-50% of deposits with other Lebanese-owned

banks.

Observers of the day questioned why the Lebanese Central Bank, which had

been established two-and a half years prior (April 1964), did not provide liquidity to

Intra Bank during the run on the bank. The press commentators believed that

this was due to influence from Lebanese politicians and rivals (Intra Bank before its

collapse was the largest financial house in Lebanon) who were very unhappy of the

influence and power of the Palestinian-born Beidas.

The circumstances which surrounded its downfall remain clouded in controversy

even to this day --- over the surprisingly weak support from the Lebanese

government and the public outcry and allegations of President Helous role in the

affair.

Unfortunately, the fall of the Intra Bank (even though sweeping reforms

followed) deeply affected Lebanons role as the Switzerland of banking in the Middle

East, as the fall ripped the faith of the region in Lebanons banks --- somewhat still

to this day. Demonstrating that the role of partisan politics should remain outside

of any commercial interests and trade activity.

The collapse was followed by its restructuring, with the Central Bank and the

Lebanese government taking the majority of its shares. The successor company,

officially named Intra Investment Company is still often referred to as Intra,

remained a major shareholder in Middle East Airlines, Casino du Liban, and Bank Al

Mashrek.

Intras main banking arm was Bank Al Mashrek in which it held an 84% share

following Intras acquisition (before the collapse) of a 42% share that had been held

by J.P. Morgan Overseas Capital Corporation.

By 1985 the Central Bank held the biggest single share in Intra at 27.75%,

the government of Kuwait held 19%, the government of Lebanon held 10%, the


5/10

National Bank of Kuwait held 3.75%, the government of Qatar held 3.25%, and

various other stockholders (mostly from Persian Gulf) held the remaining 36.25%.

The value of Central Bank and Lebanese government shares in late 1985 was

estimated at more than US$116 million.

The government of Helou in response to this and other crisis

implemented/pursued a number of polices:

1. It attempted to rationalize the banking sector following the Intra crisis,

and adopted measures to stimulate the economy after June-1967, that

included subsidizing industrial exports, enacting a commercial

representation law, and encouraging banks to provide medium-term loans,

2. It established a Banking Supervision Committee, a Deposit Insurance

Institution, a National Fund for Social Security, an Industrial Development

Office in the Ministry of the Economy and it continued modernizing the

Lebanese University.

3. In public services, it continued implementing large-scale projects started

during the previous administration, and it installed communications

equipment, the Bahrain cable, and a satellite earthstation.

Despite his efforts to promote Lebanons development, during his tenure one

other factor caused major discord in his administration, that of the Arab-Israeli June

1967 War in which Lebanon did not participate nevertheless had serious

repercussions on all aspects of Lebanese life. The most significant one being the

increased role of Palestinian guerilla groups role in the Israel conflict and the use of

southern Lebanon as their base of operations. Their presence went against his

effort to maintain a confessional balance, where the tension between the Muslim

and Christian Lebanese reached critical impasse a number of times over the

Palestinians.

The Muslims viewed the Palestinian guerrillas as upholding a sacred cause that

deserved full-scale support while the Christians looked at their presence and

unrestricted guerrilla activity as a threat to Lebanons security and development.

Where they feared both Israeli reprisals and the general undermining of

governmental authority within Lebanon, if curbs were not imposed on the guerrillas.

The Helou administration worked very hard to satisfy the conflicting demands made


6/10

by the guerillas, Arab governments, Israel, and inside Lebanon the political and

religious elements.

The same confessional elite that had come together to defend its sectarian,

political and economic interests against Chehabism by the late 60s was sharply

divided over the issue of the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon.

The pro-system parties (or) Establishment Alliance showed their interests in the

terms of extreme Lebononism or Maronitism, with representation from

Chamouns National Liberal Party (NLP), Eddes National Bloc (NB), and

Gemayels Kataeb Party (LKP). They all based their political desire to safeguard

their institutional prerogatives, guaranteed by the 1926 Constitution and the 1943

National Pact, ---- by putting the slogan of Lebanon first, concentrating exclusively

on the encroachment of the Palestinians into internal Lebanese affairs.

Although he managed to keep Lebanon out of the Arab-Israel 1967 War, his

administration was still affected with the on-going differences between Israel and

the People Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP).

On July 22nd, 1968 terrorists (that were later associated with the PLFP) hijacked

an El Al plane on its way from Israel to Rome, forcing it to land in Algiers. About

four-months later, in the early afternoon of November 26th, two terrorists arrive in

Athens from Beirut International, fired at another El Al plane ready to take off --- as

a result, an Israeli citizen was killed, a stewardess was wounded and the plane

damaged.

Only quick intervention by Israeli security and the capture of the terrorists

prevented a further tragedy. The PFLP made a claim that the operation was theirs,

and at this time Beirut was a center for Arab terrorism.

In response the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) decided to attack aircraft

belonging to Arab airlines that were at the Beirut Airport for an airborne

commando operation. Operation Gift.

The original plan by the IDF was to hijack the planes, but after the Athens attack

they revised the plan to possibility of destroying the aircraft. A similar order was

issued to the Israel Air Force; aircraft were immediately placed on alert and serviced

for war.

Two days later on Saturday, the 28th of December, 1968 the operational task

force assembled at Ramat-David Airbase, ready for action. A forward base was

established at Betzet Airport to enable helicopters to land there in case they


7/10

should run low on fuel. The mission, planned to a T and which every task force

member memorized was:

To sabotage the maximum number of airplanes belonging to Arab airlines at

Beirut International Airport, while avoiding harm to civilians and damage to aircraft

belonging to other airlines, to damage installations, and (if) the number of planes

were to small to sabotage military aircraft that might be in the military area of the

airport.

Their plan appeared as such:

The airport was divided into three primary operational sectors the eastern

sector the western sector and the terminal area. Each sector assigned a force of

20-22 fighters. They were commanded from a forward command group headed by

the then Chief Paratrooper and Infantry Officer, Brigadier General Rafael Eitan


8/10

(Raful). The forward command group consisted of 12 fighters, including the Head of

the General Staff Branch, Nadal, who was deputy commander of the operation.

The unit under the command of Lt Colonel Uzi (Uzi Force) was ordered to land

a Super-Frelon helicopter in the north-western edge of the runway. They were to

sabotage aircraft on the western part of the airport up to the boundary of the

forces sector of operation, and the north western corner of the passenger terminal.

The force was to then proceed to the London evacuation area which was the

intersection of the two runways.

The 2nd force under the command of Major Digli) was order to land south of the

area of the main building and to sabotage the planes then the troops were to

precede to the London evacuation point and in the event of a sea evacuation they

were to secure a bridge head on the shore.

The 3rd force, 22 men of the 35th Brigades Reconnaissance Company, under the

command of Captain Negbi, was ordered to land at the northern edge of the

eastern runway and to sabotage the planes situated from that point southward to

its sector boundary, the passenger terminal, and then evacuate as the others.

Helicopter Squadron Commander Lt Colonel Eliezer Cheetah Cohen, in a light

helicopter along with a Paratroop officer, a flight surgeon and flight mechanic were

ordered to block the area operations eastward and northward from the air.

The decision in sabotaging the aircraft was to place a charge in the front and

one of the wings wheel wells, were the resulting explosion would not only damage

the unit but the wing fire would completely destroy it. Each aircraft on separate

explosions, it was considered to link the charges and provide a simultaneous

explosion.

Evacuation would use one of the following routes:

1. From intersection of the two runways (London) where the forces were to

assemble after completing their mission --- Three Super-Frelon helicopters to

be used

2. From a point on the seacoast (Rome), the use of Israel Navy missile boats

with navy commando support

3. From the main runway, two Nord aircraft would be used

If a mishap were to take place, the navy commandos or with the support of 36-

soldiers (on standby at Ramat-David) would assist in the forces evacuation.


9/10

The entire operation was to last 30-minutes from the landing of the first

helicopter until the take-off of the last evacuation helicopter.

H hour, which had been set for 2200 hours on Saturday, was advanced by of

an hour following an update that there would be more Arab airplanes on the ground

at 2115 hour than at 2200 hours.

Logistics involved

Six each Super-Frelon helicopters plus to in reserve

Seven Bell helicopters and one in reserve (5 as rescue or evacuation force, one

for the forward command group and another for patrol and transmission)

Four Nord aircraft (one in reserve), (two for evacuation, two for dropping flares,

transmission, and naval rescue.

Two Boeings would serve for transmission

Two skyhawks and two Vautours were in reserve for illumination and attack

They Navy they would provide (as backup) two Torpedo boats, four Saar class

missile boats, and thirteen rubber dinghies as well as the navy commandos.

The helicopters took off from Ramat Davice air base at 2037 hours, calculating

45 minute travel time for the Super-Frelon units and 53-minutes for the Bells. The

grouped about 12 kilometers (7.45 miles) west of Rosh Hanikra and from there

approached the coast flying northward. When they approached the airport, the

helicopters dropped to 200-300 feet, and at 2118 hours the 3 Super-Frelons landed

at intervals of several minutes. AT H plus 5 minutes, the Bell forward command

post landed and the 2nd Bell hovered above, opposite the international airport on

patrol and blocking the mission.

Lt Colonel Eliezer Cheetah Cohen at the controls of blocking mission dropped

on 2 passes 95-smoke grenades and 20-smoke flares on the northern perimeters of

the airfield. He then dropped nails on the roads leading to the airport

succeeding in halting 6-vehicles traveling to the airport cars trying to leave the

airport and Beirut city police and fire vehicles trying reach the airport created an

effective block. He did also fire warning bursts at vehicles trying to enter the

airport.

The Uzi force (northern edge of the western runway) confronted 3-groups of

aircraft, 1st group had five planes, 2nd two to three and the 3rd group three planes.

The planes in the 3rd group being close to each other boom collectively. They then

secured the area and began to plant explosive charges working from north to south


10/10

and then proceeded to blow up each plane individually. They did not enter the

military area, as when the attack started the lights were distinguished they missed

a number of planes being serviced.

In total they destroyed four planes in the 1st group, 2nd group they left alone, and

the 3rd group they destroyed all of them six commercial jets destroyed.

The Digli force (southern area) destroyed three aircraft.

The Negbi force (along eastern lane) indented to blow up four planes, but in his

forces confusion did not accomplish his mission, afflicting damage in premature

explosions. They did request permission to blow up a fuel depot, but were denied.

They were all successfully evacuated. Their results:

14 airplanes owned by Middle East Airlines (MEA) and Air Libea

Two Boeing 707s, three Comet Cs, four Caravels and four Vicount planes and 1

V.C. Estimated value: $42 - $44 million.

Documents

Phoenicians - Chapter 26