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Table of contents

P. 3 “Central Asia and the Middle East Are Still Haunted by Their Colonial Pasts” by Raymond Hinnebusch and Sally Cummings

P. 10 “The Struggle for Land in the Middle East and Central Asia” by Brent Hierman

P. 16 “Envisioning the Future in Doha and Astana” by Kristin Eggeling P. 23 “Is Turkey Falling in Steppe with Kazakhstan?” by Michael

Mesquita and Jack Kennedy

At first glance, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Central Asia appear to be remarkably similar. Both have recently experienced colonial rule; MENA under the Ottoman, French, and British empires, and Central Asia under the Soviets. As a result of these occupations, both regions have endured conflict and post-colonial authoritarian rule. In MENA and Central Asia, most citizens also share the same faith, Islam.

A closer look at both regions reveals significant differences, however. While popular protest spread across the Middle East in 2011, Central Asian regimes remained seemingly impenetrable to change. Although Islam has played a prominent role in Middle Eastern politics, in Central Asia, secular elites have maintained a tight grip on religion, and generally outlawed faith-based parties. While the Middle East has been ravaged by war, post-Soviet Central Asia has remained relatively stable (with the exception of Tajikistan.)

Together, Muftah and Perspectives on Central Asia have collected a range of articles that delve into the similarities and differences between these two parts of the globe. In this joint special collection, authors look to history to explain the differing trajectories of each region, explore similarities when it comes to land reform programs, compare the authoritarian tendencies of Kazakhstan and Turkey’s presidents, and examine the political aspects of urban development in Astana, Kazakhstan and Doha, Qatar.

We encourage you to share your thoughts and reactions to these pieces on our site, as well as on Twitter and Facebook. Engage with the authors, ask questions, and share your own perspectives. !

We look forward to continuing the conversation and exploring the relationship between the regions Muftah and Perspectives on Central Asia cover.

Comparing the Middle East and North Africa with Central Asia Joint special issue with Muftah

When the Arab Spring erupted in late 2011, many analysts predicted the violence would spread to Central Asia. Like many Middle Eastern states, Central Asian republics are largely authoritarian, neo-patrimonial, and penetrated by outside powers. In both regions, borders have been drawn by imperial powers, cutting across supra-state Islamic, ethnic, and tribal identities.

At the same time, the two regions are different in other ways. Many Middle Eastern states emerged from intense struggles for independence and have since been wracked by instability and war. By contrast, Central Asian states were, generally, born without violent conflict, have had no inter-state wars, and have experienced much less by way of domestic instability.

While Middle Eastern regimes have relied on anti-imperialism and pan-Arab rhetoric to build their legitimacy, most post-independence Central Asian states have maintained close ties with their ex-imperial power, Russia, and suffered from less of a legitimacy deficit. During the Arab Spring, Central Asian states worked together to contain possible spill over, instead of promoting instability against one another, as some Middle Eastern countries did.

To fully understand the reasons for these and other differences, and how they may help explain Central Asia’s immunity to the Arab uprising, it is critical to examine the colonial pasts of these neighboring regions and the ways they have been impacted by the empires that ruled over them.

A Sharp Divergence

Comparing the similarities and differences between Central Asia and the Middle East was

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ARE

STILL HAUNTED BY THEIR COLONIAL PASTS

BY RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH AND SALLY CUMMINGS!

“WHILE MIDDLE EASTERN REGIMES HAVE RELIED ON ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND

PAN-ARAB RHETORIC TO BUILD THEIR LEGITIMACY, MOST POST-INDEPENDENCE, CENTRAL ASIAN STATES HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE TIES

WITH THE EX-IMPERIAL POWER, RUSSIA”

!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 3

the focus of a research project by the St. Andrews University Institute of Middle East, Central Asia, and Caucasus Studies. The results of the study were published in an edited volume1 and summarized in a journal article.2 One of the main hypotheses of the study was that variations in empire affect post-imperial stability.

As the study found, the main sources of post-imperial conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia include 1) irredentism that arises when groups seek to bring state boundaries into congruence with their identities; 2) non-inclusive regimes that do not provide citizens with opportunities to participate politically or engage economically; and 3) revisionism that occurs when radical movements or states try to challenge the regional order left behind by empires.

In both Central Asia and the Middle East, most governments have been non-inclusionary, and non-oil states in both regions have been particularly susceptible to civil war. Where the two regions part, however, is on issues of irredentism and revisionism, which are low in Central Asia but high in the Middle East. The reason for this divergence can be found in the impact of regions’ colonial past on three factors, detailed below.

The Role of Identity

Empire is experienced differently, depending on whether it frustrates or accommodates pre-existing identities. In the Middle East, a strong sense of identity, rooted in centuries of unity under Islam, predated Western imperialism. This sense of self was disrupted when World War I’s Western victors fragmented the region into multiple states under their respective spheres of influence.

Powerful supra-state ideologies, like Arabism and Islamism, rose to fill the identity gap. To remain legitimate, Middle Eastern regimes had to be seen as acting in the interest of the larger supra-state (Arab-Islamic) community against widely perceived threats from Israel and the West. Regimes that remained dependent on Western powers were seen as failing in these obligations. Many of these regimes were overthrown in a wave of

revolutions in the 1950s-60s.3 During this same period, irredentism was also pervasive. Both then and now, the two peoples denied statehood, the Kurds and Palestinians, were at the center of regional conflicts.

By contrast, Central Asia’s republics fostered, rather than frustrated, identities. While Western empires drew Middle Eastern borders for strategic convenience, Soviet ethnographers meticulously took identity, language, and economic viability into account when drawing local borders.

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 4

!

“WHERE THE TWO

REGIONS PART IS ON

ISSUES OF

IRREDENTISM AND

REVISIONISM”

!

“TO REMAIN LEGITIMATE,

MIDDLE EASTERN REGIMES

HAD TO BE SEEN AS ACTING

IN THE INTEREST OF THE

LARGER ARAB-ISLAMIC

COMMUNITY ”

!

!

During the Soviet period, the central government in Moscow gave Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks land they had long recognized as their own. Still, some errors were made, including a mismatch between ethnic and political boundaries in the Ferghana Valley, where Uzbeks spilled across the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As a result of the boundary delimitation process, Tajiks also lost much of their territory to Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, neither these nor other Central Asian groups harbored post-Soviet irredentism.

Since independence, Central Asian states have been free from the de-legitimizing effects of pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic identities. While Islam is part of these new states, it has not, for the most part, taken a revolutionary or politicized form.4 For its part, Pan-Turkism has long been a shallow, elite phenomenon that has never been remotely comparable in influence to Pan-Arabism.

Inclusion and Modernization

Whether empires create enduring anti-imperialist sentiments also depends on the indigenous elite’s political integration and the rate of economic modernization.

For many Western empires, colonies were acquired for commercial reasons and located far from the imperial state. As a result, political integration and inclusion in imperial governance did not, by and large, occur in these places. By contrast, in the Soviet Union, regional elites were assimilated into Soviet political culture and represented in central bodies that governed the empire, albeit through authoritarian practices.

Russians did not, as an ethnic group, dominate their empire as the British did theirs.5 As a result, non-Russians could simultaneously be part of the Soviet system, as well as their own national group (in what was termed “dual assimilation”). The Middle East’s indigenous people could, however, never be British or French, though there were some limited moves in that direction in Francophone North Africa.

Economically, Western imperial states incorporated the Middle East into the global economy by breaking up the Ottoman Empire, snapping regional interdependencies, and reorienting economic links, so that colonies supplied raw materials to Western industries and served as markets for Western manufacturers. The West’s Middle Eastern subjects were taxed to support their occupiers’ armies and pay off debts incurred before Western conquest. Imperial powers invested very little in education or development in these colonies, with the exception of

“RUSSIANS DID NOT,

AS AN ETHNIC

GROUP, DOMINATE

THEIR EMPIRE AS

THE BRITISH DID

THEIRS” !

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 5

!

“SINCE INDEPENDENCE, CENTRAL ASIAN STATES HAVE BEEN FREE FROM THE

DE-LEGITIMIZING EFFECTS OF PAN-TURKIC OR PAN-ISLAMIC IDENTITIES”

!

modernizing the agricultural export sector and building infrastructure linking the region to global markets.6

In the Soviet empire, Central Asia’s various economies were centrally run, with budgets controlled by Moscow. While the more peripheral parts of Central Asia, like Tajikistan, remained underdeveloped, the Soviet Union did make significant industrial investments in the region.

Though Russians made up the majority of skilled workers, engineers, and managers, natives received priority for local government jobs. The Soviets also promoted mass literacy and urbanization in Central Asia, which brought the region even closer to Russia. Following independence, many Central Asian states experienced a reversal in these developmental gains.

Differences in Mobilization Against Empire

Because of these factors, the Middle East witnessed a far greater degree of nationalist mobilization against imperialism than Central Asia did. While the Central Asian republics begrudgingly separated from the Soviet Union after its implosion in 1991, many Arabs fought to end Western rule, as well as the socio-economic and political inequalities created by their Western overlords.

Since the failed Baghdad Pact in 1955, it has been unpopular in the Middle East to associate with former imperial masters or other powerful Western countries, like the United States. In the post-imperial era, counter-hegemonic movements and revisionist states have repeatedly sought to break links with the West, using supra-state identities, like Pan-Arabism (Nasser’s Egypt, Saddam’s Iraq) or Pan-Islam (Khomeini’s Iran), to legitimize their efforts.

By contrast, in Central Asia, pre-independence autonomy movements and grievances against Moscow did not generate mass anti-Soviet sentiment before or after independence. Indeed, Central Asian populations voted to maintain their relationship with the Soviet Union just before its break-up. In striking contrast to the Middle East, Soviet credentials helped legitimize Central Asia’s emerging, post-independence leaders. The idea of a Commonwealth (CIS) joining Russia and its former colonies was also popular and officially established in 1991, and continues to this day.

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 6

!

“THE MIDDLE EAST

WITNESSED A FAR GREATER

DEGREE OF NATIONALIST

MOBILIZATION AGAINST

IMPERIALISM THAN

CENTRAL ASIA”

!

“THE SOVIETS PROMOTED

MASS LITERACY AND

URBANIZATION IN

CENTRAL ASIA, WHICH

BROUGHT THE REGION

EVEN CLOSER TO RUSSIA”

!

“IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO THE MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET CREDENTIALS HELPED

LEGITIMIZE CENTRAL ASIA’S EMERGING, POST-INDEPENDENCE LEADERS”

!

Central Asia’s pro-Russian thrust has manifested in nostalgia for the Soviet era, as well as emigration to Russia. At the elite level, a shared post-Soviet political culture continues to exist. These sentiments have made current, Russian-led security arrangements less controversial than the United States’ military presence and security treaties in the Arab world. This includes the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is a mutual defense alliance between Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and various Central Asian republics.

Arab Uprising vs. Central Asian Quiescence

When they first began to unfold, the Arab Spring protests raised questions about whether similar uprisings could spread to Central Asia. Two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the 2005 Andijan riots in Uzbekistan, suggested that, two decades after independence, Central Asia might experience the kind of instability found in its neighbors to the south.

When the Arab uprisings did not spread to Central Asia, analysts argued that the region’s immunity was a result of better economic conditions created by job opportunities in Russia, lack of viable opposition parties, more effective repression of Islamists, low Internet penetration, more robust controls over civil society, and popular fear of instability.

But, there was more to it than this. Building on their experience with containing the “Color Revolutions,” Central Asian states increased their security measures and targeted social media, in particular. While a shared Arab identity and language facilitated the uprisings’ contagious effects across the Arab world, in Central Asia, there were barriers to transmitting shared grievances because of different national languages, as well as a news media dominated by the Russian tongue. Large geographic landmasses with low population densities also impeded the formation of coordinated opposition movements in the region.

In the Middle East, the League of Arab States was used by Gulf monarchies to encourage unrest in rival states, specifically Syria. By contrast, the member states of regional organizations in Central Asia pooled their resources to defend the status quo. Joint exercises between Russian and Central Asian forces in the Collective Security Treaty Organization were explicitly aimed at preventing the spread of unrest.

International conditions were also less favorable for revolution in Central Asia. The United States needed stable regimes in the region to guarantee its supply lines in Afghanistan. China had energy access arrangements with local regimes, while Russia was determined to counter what it saw as Western inspired subversion in its “Near Abroad.” In the Middle East, the United States and the EU had long been engaged in democracy promotion. And, while

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 7

!

“AT THE ELITE

LEVEL, A SHARED

POST-SOVIET

POLITICAL

CULTURE

CONTINUES TO

EXIST”

!

“THE LEAGUE OF ARAB

STATES BECAME AN

INSTRUMENT FOR

GULF MONARCHIES TO

ENCOURAGE UNREST

IN RIVAL STATES”

!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 8

!

generally ambivalent about the revolts, they accepted the overthrow of their Egyptian and Tunisian allies and actively intervened to oust the Libyan regime.

More importantly, as demonstrated above, Middle Eastern countries were more vulnerable to revolution than Central Asian regimes because of the differential impact made by empires that had once ruled them. Middle Eastern countries suffered from greater legitimacy deficits compared to their Central Asian counterparts. Western imperialism and periodic post-imperial intervention, notably in Palestine and Iraq, kept anti-imperialism alive in the Middle East and delegitimized alliances with former imperial states and the United States. This contributed to the weakness of Arab governments in the face of revolutionary forces.

In the Middle East, powerful transnational Islamic movements also defied and operated across artificial state boundaries, while, in Central Asia, transnational Islam remained weak because of its late emergence, blanket state-led repression, and the secularization of society under Soviet rule. These transnational Islamic movements, particularly ISIS, have had devastating effects on the Middle East.

The Power of Imperial Legacies

The experience of empire continues to affect the development of states in the Central Asian and Middle Eastern regions. In Central Asia, empire did not leave behind intractable conflicts or inspire anti-imperial movements among the region’s initially “reluctant sovereigns.”7 The situation was almost completely reversed in the Middle East. The legacy of this differential experience is playing out and will likely continue to unfold in both regions, for some time to come.

“WESTERN IMPERIALISM AND PERIODIC POST-IMPERIAL

INTERVENTION, NOTABLY IN PALESTINE AND IRAQ, KEPT ANTI-IMPERIALISM ALIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST”

!

!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 9

!

Raymond Hinnebusch is Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. He has authored and edited nine books on Middle Eastern politics, including The International

Politics of the Middle East (2015, 2nd ed.) and Syria: Revolution from Above (2001).!

1. Sally Cummings and Raymond Hinnebusch (2011), Sovereignty After Empire: Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia, Edinburgh University Press.

2. Sally Cummings and Raymond Hinnebusch (2014), “Empire and After: Toward a Framework for Comparing Empires and their Consequences in Post Imperial Middle East and Central Asia,“ Journal of Historical Sociology, 27:1, 103-131.

3. Valbjørn, Morten (2011), “Culture in the Middle East: the “western Question and the Sovereignty of Post-Imperial States in the Middle East,” in Sovereignty after Empire, pp. 222-241.

4. Frederic Volpi (2011), “Pathways of Islamist Mobilization against the State in the Middle East and Central Asia,” in Sovereignty After Empire, pp. 242-26.

5. Dominic Lieven (2003), Empire: the Russian Empire and its Rivals, London: Random House; Terry Martin (2001), An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

6. D.K. Fieldhouse (2006), Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; Alex Callinicos (2009), Imperialism and Global Political Economy, Cambridge: Polity Press.

7. Mohira Suyarkulova (2011), “Reluctant Sovereigns? Central Asian States’ Paths to Independence,” in Sovereignty After Empire, pp.127-43.

Sally Cummings is Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. She is author of ten books and edited

volumes on Central Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans, including Sovereignty After Empire (2011, with Raymond

Hinnebusch) and Understanding Central Asia (2012).!

More than a hundred years after the publication of Leo Tolstoy’s How Much Land Does a Man Need? these words still capture the desire for land ownership felt by many low-income farmers in the Middle East and Central Asia. In both regions, many of these individuals still hope to own more land, or in some cases, any land at all.

Over the past several decades, market-oriented reforms in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East have redefined the relationship between low-income farmers and the government. In some cases, these reforms have led to the formal acquisition of property rights, and the opportunity for small farmers to acquire productive lands. In other cases, however, reforms have done the opposite and cost individuals’ their property. In many cases, these measures have strengthened economic elites, at the expense of low-income farm workers, who are all too aware of this destructive dynamic.

The Struggle for Land !

The market-oriented reforms of recent decades are not the first time state agricultural policies have reshaped rural societies in Central Asia and the Middle East, or raised concerns amongst poor farmers.

This is no more apparent than in the Soviet Union’s collectivization campaign in Central Asia from 1929-1933, which sought to modernize rural life by eradicating private farming and establishing collective, state-controlled farms. Through the course of this campaign, at least a million Kazakhs, out of a population of around 4 million, perished as a result of famine. Between the 1960s and the fall of communism, these collective farms were transformed into an arm of the Soviet welfare state.

THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND IN THE MIDDLE

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

BY BRENT HIERMANN!

“IN MANY CASES, MARKET-ORIENTED LAND REFORMS HAVE STRENGTHENED

ECONOMIC ELITES, AT THE EXPENSE OF LOW-INCOME FARM WORKERS”

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 10

“Busy as we are from childhood tilling Mother Earth, we peasants have no time to let any nonsense settle in our heads. Our only trouble is that we haven't land

enough. If I had plenty of land, I shouldn't fear the Devil himself!"

As Sheila Fitzpatrick describes in her book, Stalin’s Peasants, during this period, the inherent risk of financial ruin due to crop failure was eliminated for collective farmers. While there was no hope of getting rich, collective famers had a guaranteed income regardless of their agricultural output.

Although transformative, agricultural reforms in the Middle East were never as sweeping or violent as the Soviet Union’s collectivization campaigns. Two of the most extensive regional initiatives occurred in Egypt and Syria. In both cases, ruling regimes claimed their reforms responded to demands from the rural poor for a more equitable distribution of farmland.

In 1952, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a land reform campaign aimed at alleviating tremendous inequality in land ownership by establishing a land ceiling of 200 feddans (84 hectares) per person; all land above the ceiling was redistributed to landless households. Even more importantly, as Roy Prosterman has pointed out, registered tenancy laws were introduced, which supported the landless through rent price fixing and protection from eviction.

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 1 1

“AGRICULTURAL REFORMS IN

THE MIDDLE EAST WERE

NEVER AS SWEEPING OR

VIOLENT AS THE SOVIET

UNION’S COLLECTIVIZATION

CAMPAIGNS”

!

Private farmers in Tajikistan Credit: author

!

In Syria, the Baathist regime began a land reform process in 1958, which combined aspects of the Soviet and Egyptian models. As in Egypt, land ceilings reduced the influence of massive estates and provided the state with excess land to redistribute to the landless poor. In exchange for complying with the state’s agricultural plan, these newly landed farmers were able to access subsidized inputs, such as fertilizer, seeds, and fuel, as well as credit through state-organized cooperatives.

In addition to these quasi-private farms, Syria created a number of state farms with Soviet support that were intended to show off modern, socialist farming techniques.

State Withdrawal in the Middle East !

Egypt and Syria’s commitment to explicitly pro-poor agricultural policies began to weaken in the latter half of the 20th century. In response to a fiscal crisis in the 1970s, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat began pursuing a policy of infitah (openness), which reduced the role of the public sector in the economy and relied on domestic and international investment. As Raymond Hinnebusch has noted, the push for privatization, which spread from Egypt throughout the Arab world, was accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting loss of Soviet aid.

By the mid-1980s, agricultural privatization represented a counterrevolution in the Egyptian countryside, as private sector investment was sought to offset the state’s withdrawal from key components of the agricultural sector. Among the most significant aspects of Egypt’s land counter-revolution was a law passed in 1992, which reversed tenancy protections that had been in place since the 1952 land reform. The new law gave landlords the power to raise rents and evict tenants, and, as a result, led to sharp increases in rental prices and a rise in landlessness. Unsurprisingly, the law was linked to numerous disputes between farmers and landlords.

Economic liberalization represented a substantial shift in the social contract between the state and the Egyptian people. While the Nasser regime had established patronage networks with the rural poor, under Hosni Mubarak, it was the landowners who were clients of the regime. With a large proportion of the rural population feeling increasingly alienated, the Mubarak regime’s legitimacy was undermined and the groundwork for the 2011 revolution was laid.

Although agricultural reforms in Syria were more modest than those in Egypt, they had significant effects on rural society. In 2000, the regime of Bashar al-Assad privatized all state

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 12

“LIBERALIZATION

REPRESENTED A

SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT

IN THE SOCIAL

CONTRACT BETWEEN

THE STATE AND THE

EGYPTIAN PEOPLE”

!

“THE PUSH

PRIVATIZATION

WAS ACCELERATED

BY THE COLLAPSE

OF THE SOVIET

UNION AND THE

RESULTING LOSS

OF SOVIET AID”

!

“ LAND CEILINGS

REDUCED THE

INFLUENCE OF MASSIVE

ESTATES AND PROVIDED

THE STATE WITH

EXCESS LAND TO

REDISTRIBUTE”

!

lands. This led to the dissolution of state farms and the distribution of land to eligible parties, including to former owners and farm workers. This development underscored the failure of state farms to efficiently produce crops and indoctrinate the rural population.

The Syrian regime also significantly cut subsidies and credits that had been provided to independent farmers involved in cooperative farming. Reductions in credit from the state-run Agricultural and Cooperative Bank were not, however adequately offset by private sector lending options. In line with the government’s tenth five-year plan, launched in 2005, cuts were made to subsidies on fertilizer and fuel, which were critical to operating irrigation pumps.

These changes occurred during a period of acute agricultural crisis brought on by a severe drought across much of the country. The Syrian government’s inept response to the drought would become one of the main triggers of the current civil war, a conflict that is, at least partially, motivated by socio-economic inequality and discontent with the country’s powerful economic elite.

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 13

Sharecroppers in Tajikistan Credit: author

“THIS UNDERSCORED THE FAILURE OF THE STATE FARMS BOTH TO EFFICIENTLY

PRODUCE CROPS AND INDOCTRINATE THE RURAL POPULATION”

!

The Central Asian Experience !

While the Soviet Union’s collapse accelerated the pace of land reforms in the Middle East, it did not trigger it. In Central Asia, however, agricultural reforms resulted directly from the dissolution of the Soviet state, and the loss of subsidies from Moscow.

The speed at which collective farms were dissolved and land made available to farmers has varied across the region. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had privatized their old state-owned lands by 2003, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the government continues to own all land, which is leased to private individuals for long-term use. As is often the case, Turkmenistan is an outlier in the region, and has its own peculiar kind of private ownership of land — land owners are not permitted to sell or give their property away, which severely limits its economic utility.

Similarly to the Middle East, many rural farmers in Central Asia believe the process of decollectivization has disproportionately benefitted the wealthy.

In the summer of 2014, I conducted a small survey of eighty-one people in Tajikistan from ten randomly selected villages. The results revealed some dissatisfaction with the land reform process. One question in particular helped explain these sentiments. I asked respondents who would receive the bigger land share, if both applied at the same time, a wealthy businessman or a common farmer. An overwhelming majority of respondents (73.17%) indicated that a wealthy businessman would likely receive the larger share, while only 6.1% of respondents believed it would go to the common farmer.

The intuition reflected in these responses is that wealthy, well-connected elites are manipulating the rules to dispossess average farmers of their land. This fear has been openly articulated in debates in Tajikistan over legislation to permit the sale of land use rights, and, in Kazakhstan, over land privatization. In the Kazakhstani debate, critics argued the land code should be renamed the “Code on Latifundia,” the Roman and South American term for large estates dominated by a single landlord.

The Continued Politicization of Land !

This is all to say that the state’s withdrawal from parts of the agricultural sector in both the Middle East and Central Asia has changed the locus of political power, but has not

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 14

“THE INTUITION IS THAT WEALTHY, WELL-CONNECTED ELITES ARE

MANIPULATING THE RULES TO DISPOSSESS AVERAGE FARMERS OF THEIR LAND”

!

“AS IS OFTEN THE

CASE,

TURKMENISTAN IS AN

OUTLIER IN THE

REGION AND HAS ITS

OWN PECULIAR KIND

OF PRIVATE

OWNERSHIP OF LAND”

!

!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 15

!

Brent Hierman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military Institute. He received his Ph.D. from Indiana

University Bloomington in 2011. His research interests include inter-ethnic relations, and rural political economy in Central Asia. Brent has published some of his research in

Europe-Asia Studies, Nationalities Papers, and Problems of Post-Communism.!

depoliticized economic relations. While some small farmers have certainly benefitted from these reforms, others have struggled. For many in both regions, well-connected economic elites have replaced state bureaucracies as the dominant political actors.

Land certificate for private farmer, Tajikistan Credit: author

Across centuries and geographies, political elites have used the construction of capital cities as a central tool of governance. Through iconic buildings, historical sights, and architectural experiments, those in power have used the design of their capitals to form national identities, and showcase global prestige. But while traditional capitals were built around honoring history, the archetypal capital city of the 21st century also hints at political ambitions and dreams for the future.

Since the start of this century, the capitals of various Arabian Gulf and Central Asian countries have experienced a construction boom. Both regions are home to young, non-democratic states rich in natural resources. For these states, sovereignty has been more the result of a retreating empire than self-determined nationalist struggles.

In this context, building up the capital city has become an import tool for local elites to construct national identity and solidify independent statehood. This mixture of rentierism and authoritarianism has favored fast and spectacular urban development, which is further driven by an urge for recognition as a viable member of the international community.

In two regional states, Qatar and Kazakhstan, urban development and state building have followed similar trajectories. Their respective capital cities, Doha and Astana, are prime examples of development visions that have literally been built into urban centers. In both cities, official narratives have described urban construction projects in ways that demonstrate the connection between the environment being created and the process of state building. In both cases, these narratives have revolved around globalist, developmental tropes that highlight each city’s role in the state’s growth, and depict the regime as best positioned to realize a prosperous future for the country.

ENVISIONING THE FUTURE IN

DOHA AND ASTANA

BY KRISTIN EGGELING!

“DOHA AND ASTANA ARE PRIME EXAMPLES OF DEVELOPMENT VISIONS THAT

HAVE LITERALLY BEEN BUILT INTO URBAN CENTERS”

!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 16

!

“BUILDING UP THE CAPITAL

CITY BECAME AN IMPORT

TOOL TO CONSTRUCT

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND

SOLIDIFY INDEPENDENT

STATEHOOD”

!

Doha: “A world-class hub”

Until well into the 20th century, Doha was nothing more than an underdeveloped village. Today, the city is filled with skyscrapers and iconic landmarks.

Doha’s urban development began after Qatar’s independence in 1973, fueled by revenues from oil and gas. The first major project undertaken by Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, was to transform the city’s natural bay into a perfect crescent shape to beautify Doha’s central waterfront area.

It was followed by the construction of an elaborate promenade, called ‘Al Corniche,’ after its counterpart in Monaco. The project provided the Khalifa government with a highly visible opportunity to transform the city and instill a sense of pride among its people.

According to anthropologist Sharon Nagy, local lore has it that Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi was driven along the Doha Corniche during an official state-visit to Qatar, and decided that his capital needed a waterfront just as impressive. The story is a source of local pride, since UAE cities, especially Dubai and Abu Dhabi, are generally considered to be more aesthetically modern and sophisticated than Doha.!

While the Corniche may have sparked Doha’s development, today, it is hard to tease out the most important project, since the city is constantly under construction. Nevertheless, Doha’s waterfront area is still a central arena for urban development, stretching from the newly opened Hamad International Airport in the south to Lusail City, a major construction project on the northern tip of Doha. Star-architect I.M. Pei’s internationally acclaimed Museum of Islamic Art, and the Sheraton Hotel, which was Doha’s first landmark built in the 1970s, are in this part of the city. !

There are also two other outstanding projects currently under construction near the water: the New National Museum of Qatar, and the redevelopment of Doha’s traditional downtown area, called Msheireb. Upon completion, the New National Museum will be one of the first buildings visitors will see when driving into the city. With its interlocking glass and concrete panels, it has been described as a unique construction that cements Doha’s emerging identity as the region’s cultural capital. !

For its part, the Msheireb development has been characterized as fusing ‘tradition’ with ‘modernity’. Building on traditional local practices of lighting, cooling, and irrigation, it has been portrayed as a unique, downtown regeneration project that creates a way of life rooted in Qatari culture, while influenced by Western modernity.!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 17

“UNTIL WELL INTO THE 20TH CENTURY, DOHA WAS NOTHING MORE THAN

AN UNDERDEVELOPED VILLAGE – TODAY, THE CITY IS FILLED WITH

SKYSCRAPERS AND ICONIC LANDMARKS.”

!

!

A second site of concentrated urban development can be found away from the shoreline in the northeast of the city. Called Education City, this 3500-acre, self-enclosed, campus-like development, houses local branches of eight world-class universities, including Georgetown and Northwestern University. According to the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development, Education City reflects “Doha’s emerging knowledge-based urbanism.” Among the most prominent buildings in Education City are the Qatar National Library, designed by the world-renowned Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas, and the recently opened Qatar Faculty for Islamic Studies, which was shortlisted for the prestigious World Building of the Year award in 2015. !

As diverse as the city’s urban development projects are, their importance for the country’s leaders lies in their symbolic value as investments in Qatar’s future. The Qatar National Vision, published in 2008 under the patronage of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani and his son Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, outlines a comprehensive plan to transform Qatar into “an advanced country by 2030.” !

Under this plan, Qatar aims to achieve sustainable development

“RUSSIANS DID NOT,

AS AN ETHNIC

GROUP, DOMINATE

THEIR EMPIRE AS

THE BRITISH DID

THEIRS” !

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 18

Doha Credit: author

in its economic, social, human, and environmental spheres, by that year. Underlying this vision is the transformation of Qatar’s economy from a hydrocarbon to a knowledge-based one. To achieve this, the document envisions Doha becoming a globally recognized hub for sports, culture, and education, a place where East meets West, and modernity is enriched by tradition.!

While only time will tell whether Doha can realize this vision, the city’s global image is arguably moving in the right direction. In 2000, the popular Lonely Planet travel book called Doha “the dullest place on earth.” In 2016, the same series described Doha as “a great city in the making” that “is on its way of realizing the grand vision of its founding fathers.”!

!

Astana: “Another wonder of the world” !

Like Doha, Astana, is new to urban development. The city is younger than its Qatari counterpart, and its fast-moving development an even more recent phenomenon. While it is not located on the sea, Astana’s landscape is also shaped by the flow of water. The river Ishim runs through the city, splitting it into left and right banks. Over the last years, the left bank has become synonymous with Astana’s urban development, as most of the city’s spectacular construction projects are concentrated here. !

Throughout its history, Kazakhstan has had many capital cities. Astana (meaning ‘capital city’, and previously called Tselinograd and Akmola) became the country’s capital on December 10, 1997. Before this, Almaty, which is still Kazakhstan’s largest metropolis, served as the seat of government. Shortly after independence, in 1994, the Kazakh government decided to move the capital from Almaty, purportedly because of its limited space for social and economic development, geographic proximity to China, and penchant for earthquakes. !

To justify Astana’s selection, Kazakhstan’s political elite argued that its location was more economically advantageous, and that it served as a natural bridge between Europe and Asia. But, examining the country’s post-independence landscape suggests the decision was also motivated by political factors. !

For one thing, Astana represents a symbolic break with the state’s more recent Soviet past, when Almaty was the capital. Additionally, the decision to move the capital provided President Nursultan Nazarbayev with an opportunity to limit the influence of old elites in and around Almaty. !

“THE

DULLEST

PLACE ON

EARTH”

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 19

“ASTANA IS YOUNGER

THAN DOHA AND ITS

FAST-MOVING

DEVELOPMENT AN

EVEN MORE RECENT

PHENOMENON”

!

“FOR ONE THING, ASTANA REPRESENTS A SYMBOLIC BREAK WITH

THE STATE’S MORE RECENT SOVIET PAST”

Moving the capital helped shape Kazakhstan’s global image as a modern and progressive state. Reflecting on the decision in 2012, Nazarbayev described Astana as an important site for showcasing the country to the world, and claimed that, without it, Kazakhstan would not have been awarded the presidency of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010, or the right to host the 2017 EXPO; the EXPO is part of the World Fair system, but smaller and more specialized than its World Fair counterparts. !

Moving the capital northward reflected concerns with domestic stability, and served the government’s interest in reinterpreting Kazakhstan’s history along ethnic Kazakh lines. Fearing potential secessionist moves from the north’s predominantly Russian-speaking ethnic Slavic population, the government encouraged thousands of ethnic Kazakhs to move to the new capital. This migration eased ethnic imbalances in the north, and provided the government with the opportunity to promote Kazakhstan as an ethnically diverse and peaceful country. !

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 20

“NAZARBAYEV DESCRIBED

ASTANA AS AN

IMPORTANT SITE FOR

SHOWCASING THE

COUNTRY TO THE WORLD”

Astana Credit: Alex J. Butler

Astana’s Development !

Against this backdrop, the Kazakh government has made every effort to turn Astana into an economic, cultural, and educational hub. Promising an influx of international investment and visitors, Nazarbayev’s government has promoted the city’s future potential to develop a sense of both domestic and global pride in Kazakhstan. !

In more practical terms, Astana’s evolution has been in line with Kazakhstan’s official development strategies, namely the ‘Kazakhstan 2030’ strategy, published in 1997, and its updated version ‘Kazakhstan 2050,’ published in 2012. The 1997 strategy envisioned Kazakhstan's transformation into a secure, socially mobile, and economically strong country by 2030. The 2050 strategy further expands these ambitions, with the eventual goal of entering the ‘top 30 club of most developed states in the world’ by that year. !

As one step toward achieving this countrywide transformation, Nazarbayev’s government has held a number of national and international architectural competitions to ensure the new capital adequately represents the new state. !

In 1998, Japanese architect Kisho Kurokawa’s concept of “symbiotic architecture,” which envisioned a sustainable city with urbanized structures that existed in harmony with the natural environment, was chosen as the first master plan for Astana. But, while Kurokawa’s plan was a very elaborate general strategy for urban development, its details for the city’s actual architectural appearance were less clear. As a result, from the beginning, there was a conflict between Kurokawa’s plan and the development ambitions of local planners and outside investors. In 2005, the government largely abandoned Kurokawa’s plan, saying the architect did not anticipate the city’s fast development. !

But, this bump in the road has not prevented the government from realizing its modern development vision through a number of grand construction projects. These include the Baitarek tower, a tall, 97 meter (318 feet) high, white building that was built in 1997 to mark

the capital’s transfer that year. It is thought to represent the tree of life, which carries the egg of the sacred bird, Samruk. According to Kazakh folklore, Samruk laid an egg in the crown of the tree every spring, symbolizing the sun, fertility, and new beginnings. Reinterpreting the story in the context of the 2050 strategy, the tower embodies the state, with its “historical roots, strong support, and a tendency to future prosperity.”!

Beyond Baitarek, there are two other buildings that carry comparable symbolic weight: the Palace of Peace and Accord, and the Khan Shatyr. !

The Palace, locally referred to as “the pyramid,” was designed by British star-architect,

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 21

“ASTANA’S EVOLUTION HAS

BEEN IN LINE WITH

KAZAKHSTAN’S OFFICIAL

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES”

!

“THE TOWER EMBODIES

THE STATE, WITH ITS

‘HISTORICAL ROOTS,

STRONG SUPPORT, AND

A TENDENCY TO

FUTURE PROSPERITY’ ”

!

!

Kristin Eggeling is a second-year PhD student in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. Her

research focuses on state-branding, everyday politics and legitimation strategies in non-democratic regimes. She is currently based in Doha, Qatar

as a Visiting Researcher at the Gulf Studies Centre at Qatar University.!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 22

Norman Foster, and houses religious and cultural meeting places. Explaining its design, Nazarbayev stressed that the “four sides of our Palace are oriented to the four sides of the world”, and represent Kazakhstan’s embrace of “all people of all nations and practicing different religions.” !

Differing slightly from the Palace, the Khan Shatyr is a translucent, tent-like construction also designed by Foster and meant to represent a traditional Kazakh yurt. Marketed as a “lifestyle center”, the Khan provides family entertainment, retail space, and a beach club with white sand flown in form the Maldives. The peculiarity of these two landmarks points to the fact that Kazakhstan lacks a strong urban and architectural heritage; and that, in its place, imaginative means have been used in an attempt to express a uniquely Kazakh urban style. !

!

Doha and Astana !

Examining the narratives that surround urban development in Doha and Astana, one is struck by their similarities. Leaders in both places have depicted their cities as emerging metropolises, places that both unify citizens and express identities. Doha has been marketed as a “world-class hub,” while Astana is presented as “another world wonder.” These narratives provide some insight into what these cities truly are: political statements serving political interests. While they are impressive, their landmarks and glorious waterfronts are fully intended to convey a message to the world. !

In Qatar and Kazakhstan, and in the Gulf and Central Asia more broadly, urban development serves the state building visions of ruling regimes. While these cities are marketed as “visionary,” we must not forget whose vision they represent. Although the desert and the steppe may forever seem vast and empty, Doha and Astana serve as reminders of their leaders’ ambitions and political power.

“LEADERS IN BOTH PLACES HAVE DEPICTED THEIR CITIES AS EMERGING

METROPOLISES, PLACES THAT BOTH UNIFY CITIZENS AND EXPRESS IDENTITIES”

!

Kazakhstan and Turkey are two very different countries. But, at the helm of each, is a leader with political ambitions that dominate the state. While Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdo!an and Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev have different levels of authority and control, their political success has largely come through manipulating their countries’ constitutions, consolidating elite political networks, and using the states’ resource wealth to reward and punish allies and opponents.

Contrasting the political strategies of these two figures reveals much about how ambitious, dictatorial leaders in the Middle East and Central Asia maintain and entrench their power.

Manipulating a Constitution

At the age of seventy-six, Nazarbayev has served as president and dictator of Kazakhstan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Throughout his rule, Nazarbayev has used constitutional amendments to entrench his position and influence.

A constitutional referendum in 1995 considerably expanded Nazarbayev’s power by giving him control over appointing the prime minister, ministers, heads of regional administrations, as well as the ability to dissolve parliament. In 2007, constitutional amendments, which gave some powers to parliament, also lifted the term limits for Nazarbayev to serve as president. In 2010, parliament passed a law that gave Nazarbayev special status as ‘leader of the nation,’ while extending life-long immunity from prosecution to both him and his family members.

Taken as a whole, these measures have given Nazarbayev a great deal of influence over domestic and foreign policy, and made both him and his family virtually unaccountable for their actions.

Adopting a similar strategy, Erdo!an has tried to use his country’s constitution to consolidate his own power. Since assuming the presidency in 2014, he has made no secret of his desire to change the constitution in favor of an executive system that centralizes authority in his hands.

Historically, Turkey has been a parliamentary system, with institutional checks to prevent accumulations of power in a single executive figure. As history has demonstrated, however, whenever there have been formal barriers to his ambition, Erdo!an has simply changed the rules of the game.

IS TURKEY FALLING IN STEPPE WITH

KAZAKHSTAN?

BY MICHAEL MESQUITA AND JACK KENNEDY!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 23

In 2007, the AKP, Erdo!an’s party, called for a referendum aimed at changing the constitution so that the president would no longer be nominated and elected by parliament and, instead, selected by popular vote. The amendment limited the president to a term of five years instead of the previous seven, but allowed all presidents who were elected after the amendment’s implementation to stand for a second term.

In retrospect, these changes were intended to position Erdo!an for a seamless transition from prime minister to president, at the expense of his political rivals, and to shift Turkey away from a parliamentary system.

Another constitutional referendum was held in 2010, which was even more important. This referendum was a power play by the AKP, aimed at removing the military’s outsized influence on Turkish politics. Since the military coup of 1980, the Turkish army had served as the ultimate guardian of the country’s political order. Under Turkey’s 1982 constitution, it was insulated from political pressure and prosecution.

The referendum was successful and, as a result, members of the armed forces were stripped of their immunity from civilian prosecution. Mass trials of the military’s high command quickly followed, allowing Erdo!an to remove the most potent challenge to his power.

The 2010 referendum brought reforms to the judiciary that also benefitted Erdo!an. Turkey’s Constitutional Court was increased in size from eleven to seventeen permanent justices. While superficially the move was intended to comply with EU standards, in reality, it was used to stack the court with allies of Erdo!an and the AKP. The pool of available judges for promotion to the Constitutional Court was widened to include an additional five lower courts, as well as senior administrative officers and lawyers. This gave the president, who can appoint four of the Court’s members, even more of a chance to select someone to his liking.

Still unsatisfied, Erdo!an began maneuvering for further constitutional amendments that would give the president legally binding executive powers and the authority to potentially disband parliament. After the AKP failed to secure a majority in the June 2015 parliamentary elections, it seemed these changes would not materialize. But, after the newly seated parliament failed to form a coalition government, snap elections were called in November. The AKP won this contest, thanks to a sustained media campaign intended to maximize fears over instability in the country.

Though this result seemed to bode well for Erdo!an’s political ambitions, the Turkish opposition has, so far, prevented him from securing his position as the country’s de facto dictator. While members of Turkey's opposition are known for their mutual antipathy, they found a degree of common ground in an absolute refusal to endorse Erdo!an's ambitions for a third constitutional referendum; similar barriers have been virtually non-existent in Kazakhstan, where no meaningful political opposition exists.

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 24

!

“MASS TRIALS OF THE

MILITARY’S HIGH

COMMAND ALLOWED

ERDO!AN TO

REMOVE THE MOST

POTENT CHALLENGE

TO HIS POWER.”

!

“TURKEY'S OPPOSITION FOUND

COMMON GROUND IN AN

ABSOLUTE REFUSAL TO

ENDORSE ERDO!AN'S

AMBITIONS FOR A THIRD

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM

– SIMILAR BARRIERS HAVE BEEN

VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT IN

KAZAKHSTAN”

!

!

Nurturing Elite Networks

For both Nazarbayev and Erdo!an, consolidating power has required more than just passing laws. It has also demanded networks of loyal, elite business and political allies.

In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has developed an inner circle that represents his interests in the government and economy. This elite’s top tier is composed of the president’s family. His eldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, became deputy prime minister in September 2015. Her son, Nurali Aliyev, is deputy mayor of the capital, Astana.

Nazarbayev’s family members are also among the wealthiest individuals in the country. His middle daughter, Dinara, and her husband, Timur Kulibayev, hold stakes in important sectors, such as finance, oil, and gas.

For his part, Erdo!an has developed an elite network that is specifically aimed at circumventing his political opponents, and exerting his control and influence over the state. Figures like Ethem Sancak and Mehmet Cengiz have become notorious for allegedly contributing millions of dollars to purchase media outlets that have been converted into pro-government mouthpieces. In return for their loyalty, these men have obtained preferential access to tenders for massive state infrastructure projects that have driven the growth of the AKP's economy.

In September 2015, Erdo!an manipulated elections for the AKP's main policy-making unit, the Central Decision and Administrative Board, to secure places for his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, and other political allies. At least 34 percent of the appointees elected in September had a direct personal relationship with Erdo!an.

The brother of Erdo!an's lawyer has also been appointed head of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, effectively giving Erdo!an oversight over political and judicial decision-making. In November 2015, when Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto!lu announced his new cabinet, it included key positions for Erdo!an’s son-in-law and several of his long-term personal advisors.

Maintaining Loyalty

In both Kazakhstan and Turkey, the president has maintained political loyalty through the distribution of resource wealth. While the intentions are the same, the type of resources available for distribution in the two countries differs.

“IN BOTH COUNTRIES THE PRESIDENT HAS MAINTAINED POLITICAL

LOYALTY THROUGH THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH” !

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 25

!

“NAZARBAYEV HAS

DEVELOPED AN INNER CIRCLE

THAT REPRESENTS HIS

INTERESTS IN THE

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY”

!

“ERDO!AN HAS

DEVELOPED AN ELITE

NETWORK SPECIFICALLY

AIMED AT

CIRCUMVENTING HIS

POLITICAL OPPONENTS”

!

!

Perspectives on Central Asia 10, Apri l 2016 26

!

Jack Kennedy is the lead MENA Analyst at West Sands Advisory Limited. An Arabic speaker, Jack has traveled the wider region and last worked in the Middle East (2014)

with the European External Action Service. @jackkennedy13!

Michael Mesquita is a Senior Analyst, CIS, at West Sands Advisory Limited, a political risk advisory firm based in St. Andrews, Scotland. After serving in Kazakhstan as a Peace Corps volunteer for over two years, he completed a

postgraduate degree in Central Asian studies at the University of St. Andrews. @mikemesquita!

In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has rewarded his elite network with wealth from the country’s vast oil reserves. He has also distributed positions in government and valuable, state-run enterprise to his allies. With his close connections to Nazarbayev and his family, Karim Massimov, Kazakhstan’s longest serving prime minister, heads the state’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, Samruk-Kazyna, and has allegedly secured interests in the telecoms industry.

Lacking access to the same kind of natural resources, Erdo!an has distributed valuable state procurement contracts to his business allies, in exchange for public displays of loyalty and contributions to NGOs run by his family members. As president, Erdo!an has managed to secure a private discretionary fund estimated at $700 million, which he has leveraged to finance his political agenda, as well as legislation establishing a parallel court system he has used to seize his opponents’ business assets.

A Contested Path to Regime Consolidation

The perennial concern for any dictator is what the future holds, if and when he is no longer in power. Over more than twenty-five years as Kazakhstan’s unchallenged ruler, Nazarbayev has relied on informal tools of influence to create a political system that has ensured his family’s wealth and legacy will remain secure when he leaves office. This approach has fundamentally undermined democratic development in Kazakhstan and limited the state’s economic potential.

Undeniably, the Turkish political environment is far less dysfunctional and retains democratic institutions. But, despite its tradition of multi-party politics and a history of checks to authoritarianism, Turkey’s democracy is under threat from Erdo!an’s ambitions. With a single-minded approach to personal power, Erdo!an has undermined the country’s political institutions.

Comparing Kazakhstan and Turkey reveals the pressures and incentives for capturing state power in the Middle East and Central Asia. It suggests that a vibrant opposition is key to preventing authoritarianism. At the same time, even in a country like Turkey, where party politics is vibrant, elite networks and control over resource wealth can go a long way toward chipping away at the institutional obstacles that prevent a dictator from rising to power.

“COMPARING KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKEY REVEALS THE PRESSURES AND INCENTIVES

FOR CAPTURING STATE POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA” !