Foreword

The South Asian region remains divided by intra-regionaland intra-state conflicts diverting valuable human resources

from development of the people to less productive uses and

causing considerable disharmony and violence. This does

not augur well for South Asia which accounts for about a

Iifth of all humankind. The failure of the political regimes inresolving conflicts and bringing South Asia closer hasprompted civil society and concerned citizens of the region

to take an initiative in trying to bring together a criticalmass of opinion making elites including political leaders,

diplomats, scholars, media persons, activists and artiststowa.:ds realizing the goal of forging a South Asiancommunity.

The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) has a long-standingcommitment towards promoting the cause of regionalcooperation in South Asia. It undertook a project in thisarea of research in 1983, even before SAARC was born.Thereafter, CPR has pursued this agenda, in collaborationwith scholars and institutions from other South Asian

countrles, on issues such as governance in South Asia and

common approaches to water resource management and

water sharing in the Eastern Himalayan Rivers. The present

volume is yet another step in that direction.

DI Foreword

Perspecttues on fuLrth Asra is a product of a collectiveinlflatlve called South Asia Dialogues, undertaken by eminentmen and women in the subcontinent desirous of makingSouth Asia a peaceful and cooperative reg;ion. Spanning aperlod of seven years from lggl to 1992, the South AsiaDlalogues brought together some of the best minds in theregton with a common concer:n and vtsion. This volumepresents a compendium of selected papers presented atthese five dlalogues, containing A basketful ofideas, conceptsand concrete propositions. If these are adopted and pursuedby those who operate the levers of political power that willdetermine the destiny of over 1.3 billion people in SouthAsia, it could transform the region through a sharedendeavour for peace, progress and development. The hopeis to realise a collective vision of creaflng a South Asiancommunity in the flrst decade of the 2lst century. Theefforts of the CPR and its partners in this movement will beamply rewarded if this hope is fulfilled.

The South Asian Dialogue was made possible by sustainedflnancial support from the Ford Foundaflon, New Delhi. Asusual the Ford Foundation was not involved in tlle structureor organisation of the Dialogue. The country coodinatorswho were involved in designing and organising theseDialogues were Prof. Rehman Sobhan at Centre for policyDialogue, Dhaka, Dr. Devendra Raj Panday at the NepalSouth Asia Centre, Kathmandu, Dr. Mubashir Hasan atitre Independent Planning Commission, Lahore and prof.Kingsley de Silva at International Centre for Ethnic Studies,Colombo. The contribution of the Ford Foundation and ofthese eminent persons of South Asia is gratefullvacknowledged.

At the CPR, Dr. Navnita Chadha Behera took considerablepains to put together the present volume. CpR recopds itsdeep appreciation of her contribution to this llnal volume.

Centre Jor PolicV ResearchNew DelhiMarch 2OOO

V.A. PAI PANANDIKERPresident

The Contributors

Khaled Ahmed, is an educationist and intellectual whojoined the foreign service ofPakistan, resigning in ttre l970s.He has worked extensively as a journalist in the Nafioru asChief Editor, F-rontier Post and is now Executive Editor of theFtidry Titls. He is a frequent participant in internationalconferences on matters of national security.

Anlsuzzaman, is Professor of Bengali, at Universit5r of Dhaka.He has authored many books in Bengali and Englishtncludtng Musltr* Manas O Bangla Sahitga (Dhaka, f 964),Swanrper Sandhane (Dhaka, 19751, Purono Bangla Gadga(Dhaka, 1984), Factory Correspondence and Other BergaliDocurnerrts in the Indin Ofice l;ibrarg and Records (l,ondon,198 I), Creahuitg, ReaIiU ondldenfitU (Dhaka, 1993), CrrlturalPlwalism (Calcutta, 1993) and ldentitg, Religion and" RecentHistory (Calcutta, 1995). He has been a recipient of theBangla Academy.award for research (1970) and the EkushePadak, an award given by the state, for his contribution toeducation (1983). He was a Member of the PlanningCommission to the Government of Bangladesh during theIiberation rtrar and is currently the president of the BanglaAcademy.

Shabana Azml, is a well-known film personality and a

uul The Contributors

social and human rights activist. She has acted in bothIndian and international films. She has won several awardsfor her socially meaningful roles in Indian Cinema. presentlv,she is also a member of the RaJya Sabha, Upper Hotrse Lfthe Indian Parliament.

Navnlta Chadha Behera, is Assistant Research Dlrector,Women in Security, Conflict Management and peace{WISCOMP) based at FoundaUon for Universal Responsibility,New Delhi. She completed her doctoral studies at Universityof Kent at Canterbury (U.K.) and was an Assistant ResearchProfessor at Centre for Policy Research from Ig94 to lgg8.She has published several research papers in edited volumesand academic Journals in India and abroad, Dr. Behera isco-author of Begond. Bor;ltdaries: A Report on tte State oJNon-Offrcial Dialogues on Peore, Seatrytg anil Cooperation inSouth Asicr" published by University of Toronto, Canada,1997 and hcr forthcoming book is State, Iden@ and.Violence:Jammu, Kashmir and" Lo.dakh (Manohar Publishers).

Durga llrasad Bhandarl, is Professor of English at TribhuvanUniversity, Kathmandu. He has been Head of theDepartment, English, Tribhuvan Universit5r, ExecutiveDirector, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies and Presidentof Nepal Universitj Teachers' Association. He has also beena Visifing Scholar at Tokyo University and Sardar patelUniversity in India. Dr. Bhandari has contributed numerousarticles to popular and professional journals on literature,culture, education, politics and society.

Pran Chopra, a former Editor of The Stotesman, served asChief News Editor of All India Radio and Editorial Director ofthe Press Foundatlon of Asia. He is presently a newspapercolumnist and Honorary Professor with the Centre for policyResearch.

Radhtka Coomaraswamy, BA [Yale), JD (Colombia), LLM(Harvard). She serves on the Board of Directors of the

Tle Contributors

International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka and isUnited Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence againstWomen.

Dcv RaJ Dahal, is Associate Professor at the CentralDepArtment of Political Science, Tribhuvan University'Kathmandu. He is also an Executive Member of Coalition forAcilon on South Asian Cooperation (CASAC) and of NepalSouth Asia Centre, Kathmandu. Mr. Dahal is the author ofnumerous articles and books on subjects such as governance,

development, decentralZation and civil society.

K.M. de Stlva, Ph.D. (London), D.Litt (London) is ExecutiveDirector. International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lankaand former Professor of Sri Lanka History, University ofPeradeniya, Sri Lanka.

Meghra Guhathakurta, is a Professor and Chairperson,Department of International Relations at University of Dhaka.She is the Associate Editor of tte JournaL oJ Socirtt Studies,published by the Centre for Social Studies, Dhaka. She hascontributed numerous articles in journals, edited volumesand newspapers and has authored and edited several booksin English and Bengali. Her major publications include ThePolitics oJ British Aid Policg Formatinn : tle Case oJ BrttishAidto Bottgtadcsh, 1972-1986, SAARC BegondState CentricCooperutian Nari Rastro Motadorslo NVomen, State andIdeolog|,.N ari: Protinidhitta O Rqjniti Nvomen: Representationand Potitics), Comparatiue Feminist Perspectiue, and Liuingon the Mge: Essags on tte Chittagong HiLI Tracts.

Mubashir Hasrim, is an engineer, author, political leaderand peace promoter between India and Pakistan. He is afrequent contributor to national newspapers of his country.He was arrested and jailed by all the military dictators ofPakistan.

Nazrul Islam, is Professor of Geography at the University ofDhaka and Director ofthe Centre for Urban Studies, Dhaka.

The Contributors

He has also taught at the Asian Institute of Technologr,Bangkok. Fiis major publications include Dhaka MetropohtattFtinge Land and. Housing Deuelopment, UpgradtE a Slum inDhaka, Urban l-and. Manage\rrcnt in Banglad.esh, The IJrbonPoor in Bangladesh and Urban Research in Bangladesh Heis Editor of Bangladesh Urban" Studres, Dhaka UniversitgShrdrles in Bengali, and member of Habitat International'sBoard of Directors. Currently; he is the Chairman of theBoard of Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA).

Roushaa Jahan, a literary scholar, researcher and women'srights activist, graduated frorn the universities of Dhakaand Chicago and taught at the University ofDhaka. As a co-founder and former President of Women for Women, thefirst autonomous women's research organization inBangladesh and the vice-president of Bangladesh MahilaParishad, she has been a part ofthe dynamic and continuousprocess of the Bangladesh and international women'smovement for the last three decades. She is the author ofnumerous books and articles on the position of women ineducation, employment, culture and movement. Herpublications include Sultana's Dream and Selections Jromthe Secluded Ones {New York : The Feminist Press, lg88).

Asma Jahanglr, is a most prominent and internationallyfamous human rights activist of Pakistan. She was a co-founder of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan andserved irs its secretary-general and chairperson for slxyears.Known to young and old as Asma, a target for theobscurantist forces, she is a valiant fighter for the rights ofwomen, both in courts and in public. At present she isUnited Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights.

Slrima Klrlbamune, B.A. (Ceylon), M.A. fCeylon), Ph.D.(London), is Senior Research Fellow, International Centrefor Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka and former Professorof History, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.

V.A. Pal Panandlker, Ph.D. University of Michigan, Ann

Tte Cont'ibutors

Arbor, U.S.A., has been President and Chief Executive of theCentre for Policy Research, New Delhi since 1973. Earlier hewas Special Of{icer in the Ministry of Finance and was

associated with the Government of India as Chairman,Population Policy Committee, Planning Commission and as

Chairman of the Expenditure Commission's Committee onIndustry. In 1997, he was appointed by the Prime Ministeras member of the Group of Eminent Persons on SAARC.

A member on the Boards of several national andinternational academlc and cultural institutions, he is alsoa Life Trustee of the Population Foundatlon of India and theInternational Centre, Goa. Dr. Pai Panandiker is the authorof more than 24 books, a large number of research reportsand sweral articles in prominent English language dailiesin the country.

Dcvcndra RaJ Paaday, is a former finance secretary andfinance mlnlster of Nepal. Currently' he is engaged in civilsoclety acttvities related to the promotion of democracy,development and reglonal cooPeration' He is associated,among other insututions, with the Nepal South Asia Centre'Kathmandu, Rural Self-Reliance Development Centre,Kathmandu, Forum of Democratic Leaders-Asia/Pacific,Seoul, and Transparency International, Berlin. In additlon,Dr. Panday ls the author and editor of a number of articlesand books on the poliUcal economy of Nepal' its democraticdevelopment, good governance, corruption, and regionalcooperatlon,

G.II. Pclrk, Ph.D. (Cambridge), Professor of GeograPhy,University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka and SeniorResearch Fellow, lnternational Centre for Ethnic Studtes'Kandy, Srl Lanka.

Atlur Rahman, is a Senior Research Fellow & Chief' HumanResource Division at Bangladesh Institute of DwelopmentStudies (BIDS), Dhaka. He has been a Visiting Professor at

The Contributors

University of Lethbrldge, Post.Doctoral Fellow at Universityof London and Commonwealth Development Fellow atUniverstty of Manitoba. Dr. Rahman is also a Fellow, atCentre for Pollcy Dialogue and Editor of EcoJtle, anenvironmental Journal since 1995. He has participated inmore than two hundred national and fifty internaflonalworkshops and semlnars. He has authored and editedeighteen books in Engltsh and Bengali. His maJor publicationsinclude Beel Dakalia : Tle Enulronmentol Consequernes oJ o.

Deuelopment Dtsaster Demond. and, Marketing Aspects oJGroneen Bank : A Closer Look, Political Ecornmg oJSAARCand Peasants and Classes : A Shtdg in Di;fferentlation inBongladestt

I.A. Rehman, is a well-known journalist and leadinglntellectual of Pakistan for liberal and peoples' causes. H6was chief editor of the group of newspapers that lncludedPakistan ?imes and Imroze. I A Rehman is Director of theHuman R:lghts Commission of Pakistan and Chairman ofPaldstan-lndla Peoples'Forum for Peace and Democracy.

S.W.R. de rL Samaraslnghe, Graduated in Economics fromthe University of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri L,anka (1g67)and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from St. John's College,University of Cambrtdge, England (1980). While functioningas Director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies,he continues to be a member of the Facult5r of the Universityof Ttrlane, New Orleans, l.ouisiana. He is Director of T\rlaneInstitute of International Development (TIID), Arlington,Virgfnia. Hts publications include Historical Dtctionary oJ SriIanka (Lond,on, 1998), Demrcratlsallon rn South Asio. Thefirst I'UtU Years (Kandy, l9OB), Economic Dimenstons oJEtfuric ConJlict : Internatlonal Perspecthses (London, 1997),SecessicnJst Morrements in Comparatirse Perspctrbe (London,I 996) , and Peace Accords ond. Etluaic ConJlict(London , I 99S) .

Bccna Sarwar, is a promlnent human rights worker andpeace activist of Pakistan. She is a leader of severalorganizations worlidng for the rights of women and children.

The Contributors xiii

She has l'isited several countries in the cause of nuclearnon-proliferation and for inrprovement of relations betweenIndia and Paldstan.

Lala RuLh Sclln, is an Assistant Professor, Department ofSculpture, Dhaka University. She is the Founding Editor-tn-Chief of ART, a registered quarterly Journal. She haspublished extensively in Journals and edited volumes andheld numerous exhibiUons of her works at ShtlpakalaAcademy, Ban$adesh, Alliance Francaise and Institute ofFine Arts, University of Dhaka.

Bhab.nl Scn Gupta, is a leading scholar tn political science,polttical sociologr, internatlonal politics and South Asia.Author of 16 books and

_ more than 25 chapters . in

co-author' publications, he is also a leading columnist inIndian and South Asian newspapers and Journals. In histhree decades of academic scholarship, he has worked atColumbla Unlversity of New York City, Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, New Delhi and Centre for Policy Research, NewDelhl. He now heads the New Delhi based Centre for Studiestn Global Change. Under the pseudon5rm of Chana$a Sen,he is the author of 35 novels in Bengali, six of which havebeen translated into Hindi and other Indian languages.

Rchnan Sobhan, is currently the Executive Chalrman,Centre for Poltry Dialogue. He has held a number of importantprofesslonal positions, which include Member, BangladeshPlanning Commission, Director General, BIDS, Member, ofthe Advtsory Council of the President of Bangladesh,hesldent, Bangladesh Economic Associadon, Member, U.N.Commlttee for Dwelopment Planning, Member, GoverningCouncll of the U.N. University, Tolryo, Member of theCommisslon for a New Asia, Kuala l,ampur, Member of theBoard of tl.e Untted Nations Research Ins tute for SocialDwelopment, Geneva, and is a Member of the ExecutiveCommittee of the International Economic Association. Hehas recently been elected as Chairman of the Board ofGrameen Bank and is presently serving as a Member of the

The Contibutnrs

Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the SAARC Headsof State to address the future of SAARC. Professor Sobhanhas published extensively. His most recent books includeBarEladesh : Problems oJ Gouernance, Agrarian ReJorm andSocial Trans-;brrmtion" AId Dependerrce cutd Dorar Policg:The Case oJ Tanzcnia and Toudrds aTteory oJ Gouerrwnceand. Deuelopmertt : With Lessons jFom East Asicr-

VtJay Tcndultar, is a well-known Marathi playwright. Hebegan his career as a Journallst, but his Marathi plays onimportant social and political issues made him a well-known flgure all over the country. As recog;nition of hiscontdbuflon to Indian theatre, he has received severalcommendatlons including the Fadma Bhushan in 1984.

B.C. Vetgherc, now a Research Professor of the CPR, wasformerly Press Advisor to the Hme Minister of Indta, Edttorof The lrtdian Express and ??te Hindustan Times. He is amember of the National Comrnission on Integrated WaterResources Development Plan.

Sara Zalcr, has been an actress in theatre and on televlsionsince 1973. She belongs to Nagorik Natya Sampradaya, theforemost theatre group of Bangladesh and has acted lnnineteen of the group's plays for over a thousand nights.Some of the prominent international plays of these are theadaptation of Moliere's Intellechtal Ladies, Edward Albee'sEvergthirrg in tlte Garden, Albert Camus's Cross Pt rpose,Bertolt Brecht's Good Womon oJ Setzuan atd Herr Arntillaand tds Man MallL Carl Zuchmayar's The Captain oJ Kopenick,Wtlliam Shakespeare's Macfuth,Irwin Shaw's Btny the Deadand Anton Chekhov's The ka Gull. Sara has also acted inorlgtnal Bangla plays by eminent Bangla playwrights -poets like Rabindranath Tagore, Syed Shamsul Huq andHumayun Ahmed and directed several plays on the stage.Sara Zaker is Presidium member of the Bangladesh GroupTheatre Federation, and Executive Committee member ofthe Bangladesh Centre of the International Theatre Instituteand Nagorik Natya Sampradaya.

Introduction

At the commencement of the 2lst century, many in SouthAsia are re-discovering each other with a new outlook and anew mindset, exploring a new South Asian identity. SouthAsia is a well-defined geographical region with a sharedsocial, cultural and civilizational past; but its post-colonialhistory, mired in inter-state conflicts, has deeply dividedthe region. Driven by the ideologr of nationalism, the primarygoal of its post-colonial leadership waq to create natlon-states. New national borders were demarcated along withnew symbols of sovereignty like separate armed forces andvisa controls which looked at people across the newly createdboundaries as 'alien nationals'. The search for a 'national

identity' generated considerable hatred and hostility whichdominates South Asia after more than 5O years. The entirenation-building project sundered the integrated social,economic, political and strategic unity perspective of theIndian subconflnent, making South Asia a unique regionthat "entered the 2oth century as a communit5r and leaves

this century as seven nation-states divided by their historicalinheritance". t

It was only in the 1980s that changing power equations,global economic realities and the growing voices of civilsociety in South Asia restored an agenda of re-creating a

nJi Introduction

South Asian community. The end of the Cold War and theblpolar gllobal dtvide gave way to a multipolar worldcharactertzed by the increasi:ng power and influence ofregional groupings over nation-states. With the formation oftrading blocs like the European Union (EU), NAFTA andAPEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the creationof global instltutlons like WTO (World Trade OrganizaUon),forging regional alllances was rrot a matter of chorce.

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)was born in 1985 but has not been a pace-setter in changtngthe poltilcal or social dlmamics of intra-regional relations.As the polttical leadership failed to meet the challenge, civilsoclety began to take the initiative in forging links andcommunication channels at the people-to-people level.Several developments within the region have facilitated thistask.

With all seven states set on the path of economicliberallzatlon, market forces are "overtaking ttre state as anarbiter of intra-South Asian econornic relatons".2 The privatesector is a new catalyst for change. Conscious of theenormous potenilal of intra-regional trade and the increasing

. importance of regfonal economic blocs in global trading,private enterprise and business associations are setting thepace in transforming regional relationships and establlshingan institutional framework for regional coopera on andnetworklng. In May 1997, bypassing the nationalgovernments, FPCCI (The Federaflon of Paldstan Chambersof Commerce and Industry) agreed to give preference toIndian buslnessmen for imports and FICCI (The Federationof Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) agreed toevaluate Pakistani bids before importing goods from anyother countr5r.s Significantly, informal trade between Indiaand Palrdstan far exceeds the formal trade, and in the case ofIndia and Bangladesh, the two are evenly balanced. Illicittrade is serviced by an increasingly efficient informal capitalmarket, operating outside the purview of the monetary

Inffirrction

authorities; it not only flnances $2 to 3 btllion worth of

intra-regional transactions in goods and services but also

lntegrates capital markets spanning West and South Asla'4

Ltkewise. the labour markets of South Asta are being

integrated 'far beyond the understanding and lndeed the

poltttcal tolerance of their respective Home Mlnlsters"'s The

large-scale llliclt movements of people across borders, insearch of better ltvelthood, have undercut the barriers ofnational boundaries'

Cross-border trafltcking in women and children, thesmuggltng of arms and drugs, and most imPbrtant, thespill-over of ethnic conflicts causing huge outllows of refugees

such as Tamils from Sri lanka into India, Bhutanese refugees

into Nepal, Chakmas from Bangladesh into India, Afghan

refugees into Pakistan and so on have exposed the porosity

of state boundaries that cut across communities, tribes and

ethnic groups, Likewise, the three maJor river systems-theIndus, Ganga and the Brahmaputra-divided between India,

Paliistan, Nepal and Ban$adesh have resulted in disputesover water-sharing. Such transnational problems defu

national solutions and should comtriel the concernedgovernments to develop regional management strategies.

The communicatlons revolution has also challenged thenotion of state sovereignty including the power to controlradio waves and television sigpals within a na on's borders'Thts has drastically undercut the governments' monopolycontrol over information flows. The ability of the media toreach beyond naUonal frontiers and across the $obe hasfar-reaching implications for transforming national identltlesthat may no longer remaln a 'preserve of the nationalgovernments'. It cannot be treated as a'sacrosanct given",

either as an abstracted, unified identity for the cultural,ethnic and linguistic diversities within a nation or by ftnngin a rigid fashion, relationships between "imagined (national)

communities".6 A second lmplication is that people in SouthAsia are learning about each other through satellite channels,

xrJui Infodlrction

independent of governmental control. Desptte limitations ofreach as compared with terrestrial televlsion, tl.e quality ofbroadcasts and the nature of programming_mostly"cultural", with a llttle time devoted to foreign policy anclregional security issues-the satellite medium ts playing acritical role in exposing the people to diverse viewpoints andbrealdng down myths about the exclusivity of naflonalidentifles.T

The emergence and robust growth of NGOs across theSouth Asian reglon has opened a mul tude of communicationchannels, at the grassroots level, on a broad spectrum oflssues ranglng from gender, chdld labour and human rightsto ecologr, agrtculture and sclence and technologr. SeveralNGOs like the South Asia Women's Forum, South AslaPeople's Action Network and Souttr Asia people's EcologrNetwork are playtng an active role in civic mobiltzation andpublic advocacy and tn organizing acuvities across nationalboundaries in these areas. The last decade also witnessed aspurt in non-offlcial dialogues among signiflcant elementsof the body politic in South Asia.8

It was against such a backdrop that the idea of a SouthAsta Dialogue was irftiated in 1990. Patterned on thePugwash conferences, ttre baslc obJective of the dialoguewas to lnfluence public opinion and policy for creating theriecessary political and social mflieu to forge a South Asianregional consclousness and develop a South Asiancommunity. It was hoped that the "nationals" of India,Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka would, as aresult of this exercise, become "$outh Asians". The Dlalogueparticipants were intended to ibe those once part of theopinion building process of the region, committed toimprovlng the general political atmosphere in thesubcontinent and willing to work to realtze that goal. Theorganizatlon in each country entrusted with convening theDialogue was non-governmental, non-profit making andcommanded respect in their respective countries.

Intrduction xtx

The flve lnstltutlons involved were the Centre for PolicyResearch, New Delhi, India, the Centre for Policy Dtalogue,Dhaka, Bangladesh, The Nepal South Asia Centre,Kathmandu, the Independent Planning Commission, lahore,Pakistan and the Internatlonal Centre for Ethnic Studtes,Colombo, Sri Lanka. The South Asia Dialogue has evolvedover seven years from l99l to 1997. The first Dialogue washeld at the Centre for Pollcy Research in New Delhi, India in1991, the second in Kandy, Sri t anka in 1992, the third inLahore, Pakistan in 1993, the fourth in Kathmandu, Nepalin 1994 and the fifth in Dhaka, Ban$adesh in 1997.

The participants in the first Dialogue, which wasdeliberately left unstructured. sought to understand eachother better and searched for ways and means by whichmore posltive lmages of each other might be created wlthlnSouth Asia through constructive media coverage to controlas well as prevent conflicts, seek a resolution of political andidentity cleavages withln nations, and build confldence andtrust among South Asians. The second Dialogue focussedon speciflc themes like the South Asian experience in copingwith structural adJustments and economic liberaltzationpolicies, confllct resolution, and the process ofdemocratlzation in South Asia. The third Dialogue wasdwoted to explorlng a new vision for South Asia and stressedthe need to build a South Asian identity based on commonvalues rooted in historical, cultural, social, ethnic andcivilizatlonal traditlons. The fourth dialogue discussedstrategies for strengthening democracy and empowermentin South Asia including institutionalizauon of the democraticprocess, electoral reforms, decentralization of power,upholding human rights and the rule of law. The fffth andconcluding South Asia Dialogue sought to explore SouthAsia's cultural personality and notlons of communi\r inherentin the value systems shared by people in thls region. Itfocussed on how creative imagination in South Asia hasaddressed themes of social justice and human rights, women

Inffitrction

ln society and fundamentalism and communallsm throughvarious art forms includlng theatre, literature, the electronicmedla, clnema, patnting, sculpture, dance and music.

Thls volume puts together 28 out of 83 papers presentedand to that extent, may not do Justice to ttre extraordlnaryrange ofsubJects, ideas and perspectives shared by Dtaloguepartlclpants, We do hope, howwer, that by placing the

' results of this collectlve endeavour in the public domain, itwill become an Input in national and regional debates onconfllct resoluflon and dweloprnental cooperatlon.

The volume ts dtvtded tnto ffve parts. Part One presentsan alternatlve vlslon of South Asia arUculated by the civilsoclety that ls rooted ln the common lnherltance of hlstory,culture and social ethos and driven by a shared imaglnationof the people of the reglon. Mubashir Hasan criticizes theimperialist legacies, particularly the divisive tdeologr ofnationalism and top-down structures of governance andargues that a new vision of South Asia must redeftnenationalism, remodel state structures and adopt new political,social and economic agendas in a truly democratlc set-up.Devendra RaJ Panday examines the conflictual dimensionsof South Asian history and outlines the guldelines of a'NewOrder in South Asta' including the need to tap internalresources, de-ltnking natlonalist ideologies from religionand redeflnlng 'security' ln term$ of human security, that is,a nation's capaclty to fulfll its diverse needs and aspiraflonsrather than such military strength. In Bhabani Sen Gupta'spaper, a detatled analysis of lntra-state and inter-stateconflicts ts followed by a discussion of conflict resolutionstrategles. He advocates that South Asian governmentscolnmlt themselves to seven inviolable principles that shouldgovern thelr btlateral and regional relations. The next paperdeals wlth three related and vitally important issues ofpoliticized ethnicity and conflict resolution, problems ofhuman rtghts and environmental issues. K.M. de Silva, inthe first part, addresses the international, national and

Introdttction

sub-national conflicts rooted in social' economic and political

problems. The resulting violation of human rights by

lovernments, opposition and separatist forces are analysed

by Radhika Coomaraswamy in the second part' G'H' Petris

discusses the political conflicts emanating fromenvlronmental degradation, particularly the mismanagement

of natural resources and increasing population pressure

and debates the possibilities and limitations of available

opuons for protecting the environment in the region' Khalid

Ahmed stresses the need to save the SAARC process defined

as a thought process militating against the ideologr ofnatlonalism ttrat has kept the region divided. The SAARC

mind, according to him, provides an alternative intellectual

construct of South Asian civilization' visualizing a regional

sovereignty rather than a cluster of conflicttng national

sovereignfles. Durga Prasad Bhandari explores the shared

values of the South Asian region expressed through the

medium of theatre, painting, literature and television from a

Nepalese perspec ve' Vijay Tendulkar delves into ttre same

theme and highlights the shared social ethos, experienced

in his personal interactions with Muslims.

Part TWo of the volume presents five countr5r reports from

the South Asian states. These were, mostly, a collective

endeavour from each country and a critique of their respecflve

countries' policles in political, economic, social and foreign

policy arenas, presented at the First Dialogue. While the

Indian and Nepalese country reports have been revised' the

Pakistani, the Bangladeshi and the Sri Lankan countryreports appear in their original form and should be, therefore'

read for their contemporary historical value'

In Part Three, Asma Jahangir examines the threats to

democracy especially from religious fundamentalism. She

acknowledges the leading role and contribution of judicialactivism in democratizing society in many South Asian

countries and argues in favour of parliamentary activismthat may open new doors to fresh ideas and encourage

Introdtrction

greater popular participation. I.A. Rehman examinespressures on the political systems of the South Asiancountrles from ethnic demands, religious ideologies andideological challenges to democracy in India, pakistan andBangladesh. He concludes with the need to strengthenpoliucal lnstituUons and processes in the respective civilsocleties. Pai Panandiker identiftes violence and corruptionas two key problems threatening the sanctity of the Indianelectoral process. He recommends state funding for elecuonsand dlscusses alterna ve mechartisms for controlling electionflnances. AUur Rahman and Dev RaJ Dahal present a detailedanalysis of experiments in decentralization and local self_government in Ban$adesh and Nepal respectively.

In Part Four, on human rights, Meghna Guhattrakurtaargues that gender-based violence is related structurally topatriarchical norms in society and shows how religiousfundamentaltsm, trafflclidng in women and children andethnlc violence lmpact on women's rights as human rights.She also addresses the issues of ethnic and minority rtghts,state coerclon_ and freedom of speech. Anisuzzaman dealswith the lssue of socialjusflce and human rlghts as reflectedin Bangladeshi llterature over ddcades. The following threepapers by B.G, Verghese, Beena Sarwar and I.A. Rehmananalyse the working of the legal $ystems in South Asia withspecial reference to Indla and paltistan respecflvely and howspectal acts for comba ng lnsurgency impinge on the humanrtghts of mtnortty groups. Another common thread tn thesepapers lies in promottng the role of NGOs in taldng up thecause of human rights. However, while Verghese feels that'the naUonalism and sovereignty are still not obsolete.,Rehman ls critlcal of the attempts to stall a reglonal view ofhurhan rights "by raising the bogey of sovereignty-, Sarwarand Rehman call for setting up a reglonal court under aSouth Asian Human Rights Charter.

The runnlng theme of part Five on women and culturerefers to traditional stereotyped images of the female, rooted

Introduction

in the patriarchical societies of South Asia, as deptcted bymale artists and writers over the years. The female authors,on the other hand, reject male-imposed gender-divisionsand advocate the 'untenability of social expectations fromwomen to conform to gender norms at all costs and the needfor new ground rules for gender relations and basic soclalinsUtutions and structures".s Lala Rukh Selim delves intothe subJect by discussing Novera Ahmed's art-the flrstwoman who made her mark in the modern art movement inBangladesh. Roushan Jahan discusses the themes andperspec ves of Bangladeshi women wri ng-ln poetry andfiction-the differences in their world-view, the awarenessof the context in which they are located and the attitude toprevalent gender ideolory. In Shabana Azmi's paper,stereotyped portrayals of Indian women in Hindi cinema arefollowed by a discussion on the parallel, new wave cinemathat situate women in real life conditions as social beingsand not as 'obJects of display or servile, statc creatures".Likewise, Sara Zaker outlines the typical attributes ofNageekr1 the heroine of cinema and television serials inBangladesh, and puts forward some sug€;estlons to re-construct this image. Strima Kiribamune looks at how pre-modern Sri Lankan creative artists have addressed theissue of the position of women in society. Nazrul Islampresents a broad proflle of artists in all South Asian countrieswho have deplcted themes of women in society, socialJusticeand human rig;hts, communalism and fundamentalism indtfferent art forms,

The congenial atmospherics of the South Asian regionwere badly bruised in 1999 by the Kargil war between Indiaand Pakistan and by several subsequent developments. Thepromlse of a South Aslan community which looked almostpossible has received a setback. It is quite obvious that thewlelders of poltttcal power in South Asia are not yet readyfor peace and cooperation in the region. The legacy of thetwo-natlon theory which partitioned the Indian subcontinent

xnv Introdrrction

still haunts South Asia. As a result South Asia remainsdivlded. Suspicion and mistrust rule the region, addinguntold misery to the lives of over 1.3 billion people.

The volume therefore is essentially a perspective andpartly a vision for South Asia. A more extensive visiondocument was prepared in 1998 by the Group of EminentPersons (GEP) appointed by the heads of South AsianGovernments. Together and perhaps with the help of otherefforts in the region, South Asia w'ill again come together.Thls volume is an expression of such a hope.

We wish to acknowledge the cooperatlon received fromthe contributors for revising their papers and especiallyrecord our appreciation of the generous assistance of tJre

country coordinators and the five participating lnstitutlonsin the completion of this work. At the CPR, we especiallyrecord our deep apprecia on ofthe tireless support from theChief Librarian, Mr. Kamal Jit Kumar and his colleagues.Also to Mr. Pramod Malik, Mrs. Vinodini Ramachandran,Mrs. Sarala Goplnathan and Mrs. Radhika Srinivasan wholaboured meticulously over word processing and to Mrs.Suhasini Ramaswamy for painstakingly editing themanuscript. The book could not have been published insuch a short time without the tireless work put in by theexcellent team work of Konark Publishers.

V.A. PAI PANANDIKERNAVNITA CFIADFIA BEHERA

Intro&lctlon

ENDNOTES

This integrated community had emerged out of the imperialreach of the Mughal empire and was further consolidated bythe British Rqi especially over the areas under its control.Rehman Sobhan, Redisauering o South Asian Commwitg:Civil fuciety in Search oJ Its FLture, Monograph Serles: CivilSociety No. 2, International Centre for Ethnic Studies' 1997'p.2.

Ibd., p. r3.

Economic Tbnes, 4 May 1997.

Sobhan, op. cit., pP. 16-I7.

Ibid.,p. 17.

Bhaskar Ghose, 'Cultural Diversity, Media and NewTechnologr", an unpublished paper presented at the Indo-Australian Public Poliry Conference, 23-24 October 1996'New Delhi.

'Popular Interactlons in South Asia: A Post-ModernistAgenda" in Iftkekharuzzrnan, (ed.), People-to-People Contactsrn South Asic, New Delhl: Manohar Publishers, forthcoming.

For a detailed account of such dialogues, see, Navnita Chadha

Behera, Paul M. hans and Gowher Rizvi, BegondBotndarEs:A Report on te State oJ Non-Offici.al Dialogues on Peace'

*atri@ otd Cnperation in SouthAsia, University of Toronto-York University, 1997.

Roushan Jahan, -A Different Voice: Women Writing inBangladesh', in this volume, P. 452.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

9.

Contents

Foretoord

Tlte Contributors

Introduction

PART IVOICES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

l. On a New Msion for South AsiaMubashlr Hasott

2. A Nepali Vision of South Asia 12DeuendraRg Pandag

3. Conflict Resolution in South Asia 36BhabaniSenGupta

4. South Asia: Politicised Ethnicity; Problems ofHuman Rights; and Environmental Issues 68K.M. de SilucL G.H. Peins andRadhlkaCoomaraswamu

5. Need to Save the Process 116KhaledAtmted

u

uii

n)

XXDL|I Contents

6. Politlcal Process and Institutions in South Asia L23LA. Rehman

7, \\e Shared Imagination and Cooperation inSouth Asia: Nepalese PerspectiveDwgaPrasadBhandari.

8. Muslims and IVljag'lendrnkar

148

r62

PART 2

COUNTRY REPORTS

9. The Indian Polity in 'Crisis" l8lPranChopra

10. Country Report on Pakistan 2OO

PakistaniDelegation

ll. Country Report on.Bangladesh 219RehmanSobhan

12. The State of Governance in Post- l99O Nepal 233Deuendra Rqj Pandag

13. Sri lanka-Country Paper 1992 257K.M. de Silua and S.I./IR. de A. Samorosirghe

PART 3

DEMOCRACY AND POLITY

14. Fostering DemocracyAsmaJahrngir

15. Problems of the Electoral Frocess and ElectionFunding ln IndiaV.A. Pai Panondiker

Conlents

16. Power to the People: A Case of Decentralizationin Nepal 3lODeuRcg DaIMI

17. Decentrallzatton and Development: TheBangladesh Experience 337Atiur Rahmcut

PART 4HUMAN RIGHTS

18. Human Rights and the Rule of Law inBangladeshMegtataGuhatlwklrrta

19. Social Justice and Human Rights: Refleeflons inBangladesh LiteratureAnisuzzaman't

353

2O. Human Rights and the Rule of Law 384B.G. Verghese

21. Strcngthening Democracy in South Asia:The Role of Human Rlghts and Rule of Law 4O7

BeenaSarwor

22. South Asian Perspective on Human Rightsand Environment 416LA. Rehman

PART 5

WOMEN AND CULTURE

23. Women in the Contemporary Art World ofBangladesh: Images and Reality 427kiaRukhSelim

Contents

24. A Dtfferent Voice: Women Writing in

25.

26.

27.

28.

Bangladesh 439Rottsho.nJahott

Images of Women in Hindi Cinema: Post- l95Os 454Shobana-Azmi

The Image of Women on TV and Cinema 462Sarahker

Images of the Female tn Sri Lankan Art 468Sirima- Kirbamute

Contemporary South Asian Art and Women 479Naznldlslam

INDE)( 485

PART 1

VOICES OFCTWLSOCIETY

On a New Vision for South Asia

Mubashir Hasan

PART 1

Our Imperlalist Legacy

South Asia s way of looking at itself stands deeply infested,in structure and content, with the culture of imperialism.The long and arduous encounter between the twocivilisations-Westem and South Asian-was total: political,economic, social and ideological. We were enslaved, lootedand disintegrated as well as 'educated' and 'civilised'. Inresisting imperialism South Asia itself got 'imperialised'.

TWo exceedingly harmful consequences of theimperialisation of South Asia have been:

1. Our adoption of the ideologr of nationalism as it hadevolved in t}le leading capitalist, expansionist and imperialistnatlons, and

2. Our failure to change tJ:e structure of governancedevised by the imperialist rulers with the obj ective ofsubjugating, exploiting and ruling over conquered peoples.

4 Perspectiues on Soufh Asra

Natlonallsm

To confront the imperialist power or to avall ourselves oftJle opportunitles its dornination offered, or both, we apedthe West as well as reslsted it, A section of tlle elite convinceditself that the way to progress and power was to acquirewestern weaponry, knowledge, technologr, culture and soforth. The other section among the ette convinced itself thatthe best course to fend off the imperialist domination was torej ect its civilisation and the kind of modemisaflon it offered.Labelled 'fundamentalists' and without much politicalinfluence, until recently, they advocated a return to thepurity of the original religious faiths.

It was only natural that the leaders of our twentiethcentury independence movements should get converted tothe Western ideologr of "nationalism", to fight colonialismand imperialism, They adopted the ideologr with all its basictenets and trappings such as 'national destiny', 'nationalsovereignty','national will','national economy','nationalflag', anthem, heroes, martyrs, holidays, birth registers andthe like'. In the name of the naflon-state, their new politicalrelig[on of nationalism laid claim to the highest loyalties oftheir citizens on the model of the loyalties claimed by themedieval Christian Church from its laity.

The section that simultaneously cooperated and confiontedimperialism built for itself immense political power. At thehead of the movements for independence, it inherited thereins of the government upon the departure of the colonialruler.

Self-determlnation

The doctrine of nationalism also mealt that a new nation-state had the right to covet and to acquire any geographicalarea which in its opinion was inhabited by people of its ownnafionality. Thus our struggle for independence got ftacturedinto several stru€gles.

On a N etu V rsion Jor S outh As i a

The several nation-states of South Asia that came lntobeing, as a result of the departure ofthe British, containedin their polities one section or more of the population whichhad nationallstic aspirations of its own. Adoption of thedoctrine of nationalism by ethnic groups and other aspirantsto sovereign status in specific geographical areas was only amatter of time. The results have been truly disastrous.Since 1947, the changes in tlle political map of thesubcontlnent, emd demands for further changes have beenunceasing. Our geographically intermingled communitieswhich had learnt to live in relative peace w'ith one anotherhave been rent asunder with horrific losses of life andproperty and disruption of social and psychic equanimity.The exercise of the right to determine their own futurepolitical siatus by the people of a terrltorial unit, has becomea maj or source of antagonisms.

Impertalist Governance

The leadership of the newly emerged states who becamehelrs to the British Raj embraced the stmcture of the statebuilt by the imperialists. Thousands upon thousands oflaws, rules and regulations along with the state apparatusconsisting of imperial civil and military establishments andsecret agencies devised by the British to rule over subjectpeoples were fully adopted. Several 'New Delhis' came intobeing. We chose to foreclose our options to do away with thedistincton between the governors and the governed, as wasjustly required to liberate the newly independent polities. Inmany important areas, such as that of the treatment ofminorifles, women and other weaker sections of the society,political battles continue to be waged over ttre entiresubconfinent, on the old pattern of "British versus Indian"long after the departure of the British. The states of SouthAsia conflnue to nurture the gulf, with all its multifariousantagonisms, that had separated the British rulers from itssubJects.

Perspectiues on Soufr Asra

'Those who have waged or are waging struggles, someinciptenUy, others flagrantly, in the name of autonomy,national self-determinaUon or even independence haveespecially been meted out the imperialist treatment by thenewly empowered states of South Asia. The metropolises ofour newly emerged naUon states know nothing better thanto curb. indeed to crush wi r an iron fist, tt1s a gitatingaspirants, as did London, paris, Madrid, Amsterdam orLisbon to the freedom fighters in their colonies. There islittle effort, today, to understand the nature of their struggle.To Justi$z ttre violence perpetrated by 'national' power thereis always the appeal to 'national interests'.

After Independence, the ruling elites of the new nation-states frequently manifested towards their neighbours theaggressive traits associated with the political culture ofimperlalism.

The new nation-states have not hesitated to mount hostilepropaganda campaielns agatnst each ot_her spreading fearand hatred. They have imposed cultural boycotts, restrictionson trade, travel and flow of information, and have appliedeconomlc sancdons. They have accused each other ofhegemonic designs. They have indulged in acts of subversionand sabotage and of aiding the secessionists and haveinterfered with the flow of river waters. They have acquiredterritory by force and have gone to wars for reasons quiteunlike those in the previous history of the sub-continent.

'Us'aad'Tlrey'

The structure of governance of the subcontinent wasdevised by tl e British to rule over a subJect people. It wasbased, firstly, on the assumption that the .natives', who are'inferior and uncivilised', have to be subjected, controlledand ruled. Their resources and labour have to be exploited;and secondly the almost 'divine' distinction between 'us' and'they'-the ruler and the ruled*has to be maintained. After

On aNew VtsionJor fufihAsirr

the departure of the British, those who inherited the power

of the Raj became tJle new 'us' and the ruled continued toremain'theY'.

Today, ftfty-two years after Independence, in Pakistan,

India and Bangladesh, the employees of the government,

especially in the departments of the police, revenue, judiciary,

irrigatlon, forests, income-tax, customs and those in the

military and mtglstracy' constitute a category which has a

long tradition of antagonistic relationship with theoverwhelming majority of ttre population. The dawn ofIndependence in the sub-continent has done little to alterttre relationship between the occupants of the 'chair' and

the people.

Culture of Vlolence

Perhaps the most distressing social and political featureof the societies of South Asia today is violence-whichprevails ever5rwhere at individual and state levels. Directand indirect violence by citizens, individually and collectively,

is rampant in the form of spates of murders and dacoities

and crimes against women; a horrendous toll of millions ofavoidable deaths of infants and children and of women

during childbirth; and as manifestation of extreme poverty

in the form of unemployment; malnutrition, child labour,

etc.-besides violence for political causes.

It is true that the very odstence of the state means anassemblage of armed physical coercive power. Whatdisunguishes the behaviour of civilised states from others isthe application of the coercive power without beingimmoderate, cruel, or brutal, and without infringing upon

ttre legal rights it delineates for its citizens' The successors

of the Brttish have perpetuated the mode with all the violence

that constituted its essential ingredient. At the receiving

end are the people-hundreds of millions of them. Insecure,malnourished, ill and saturated with the fear of brute

Perspectiues on South Asra

strength, violence is their only recourse and hatred theironly wealth.

The forms ofinstitution: t.ized violence in the states of SouthAsia are: widespread incarceration and torture in policestafions, Jails, and interrogation centres besides brutal actsby police, para-military and rnilitary formations agatnstagitating tribes,. rioting mobs, radical leftists, protesting labour,and against militants demanding or deemed to be demandinga share in political power in the form of autonomy or sell_determination. The burgeoning budgets of tJre police andmilitary, are a proof, if one is needed, that the situation isgetung worse, year by year.

Nothing can reinforce the urge to destroy through violentaction the 'image of ttreir common degradation', better thanthe sanction of the religion. Thus, to the list of variousgrounds for violence-autonomy, self_determination,ethnicit5r, class struggle or plain injustice_gets added thosefor caste, sect and religion. The leaders ofthe independencemovements had propagated that rvith national freedom shalldawn an era free from econornic deprivation and socialoppression. Five decades have passed and the promised eraofpeace, prosperlty, equity andjustice has yet io dawn. As amonstrous reaction to tJ e prevailing state of material andspiritual deprivation, large sections of frustrated populationsbind ttremselves to scrupulous observation of the rites ofthelr ancient faiths. Then as true faithfuls, they are ready tobomb and to kill, in the name of the faith, anvone Urevdeclare to be an enemy of their fa:ith.

PART 2

Baelcs of New Vislon

Surely, the coercive political, economic, and socialdlspensation prevalent in our soqiety, which is accepted bysome and resisted by others, the latter, by far in gpeatmajority, has fallen far short of what was required for tJle

On aNeu Vision for South Asin

liberation of our mind, the restoration of our dignity, and forthe full realisation of our pre-lndependence dreams.

The prime need of South Asia is that of reorientation of theconcept of nationalism as it stands adopted today by theruling elites ofthe South Asian nations. This concept has tobe redefined in such a way that it no longer breedsparochialism, arrogance, violence, bigotry, hatred and strifeamong its various religious, racial, and ethnic groups anddoes not lead to wars with neighbouring countries; that thereis room in its organisation for cultural diversity, ethnicindividuality and political autonomy; that one's love for one'snation-state does not correspond with one's love for its armedmight; that the highly centralised state is not necessarily theclaimant for the highest loyalty from its citizens; that thereshould be less of nationalism as a political ideologr and moreof patriotism as a vehicle of peace and humanism.

The most conspicuous features of the political landscapeof the nations of South Asia today are the following:

1. they are among the most economically deprived in theworld;

2. theirpoliUes are endowed with racial, religious and ethnicdiversity; and

3. theirhighly centralised and authoritarian states representan internal imperial dispensation with a partial externalcomponent.

In history'the combination of these three elements hasalways proved to be greatly inimical to the maintenance ofpeace and political stability and to economic and socialprogress.

Rcmodclling State Structure

The centralised state structure of the South Asian nauonshas failed to come up to the standards of civilised societies inprotecting life, liberty and property ofits citizens. It is serving

lo Perspectiues on South Asi.a

as a powerful tool for tJ'e economic exploitation of the politicallyand economically weak. It has exacerbated indeed, in mostcases given rise to, a sense ofdepr:ivation and ofbeing politicallyoppressed among ethnic, religious and other groups andminorities. This state structure has come to pose a gravethreat to the integrity of the countries in Souilr Asia. It needsto be replaced.

The transfer of substantial political, social and economicpower from the highly centrali$ed state to smaller politicaland administrative units has to be accompanied by anextensive revision of the maJor laws which constitute ttrehardware that is incapable of dispensing justice and whichis responsible for the maintenance of a yawning gulf betweenthe apparatus of ttre state and the citizens. The importantlaws requiring revision are those pertaining to land setflement,revenue, police, jails, minerals, irigation, forests, cusroms,and immigration, besides the codes of criminal and civilprocedures and so on.

NewAg;endas

Whereas the extensive revision of the structure of tl.e statewould only create the necessary environment for usheririg inan era ofpeace and tranquility, the actual transition to suchan era would require political, social and economic agendaswhich are founded on peace, justice and love, and on suchother cherished values which have led the world communit5rto adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and itsConventions and Protocols. The main thrust of this softwareofa truly democratic set-up has to be the creation ofconditionswhich successfully discourage if not eliminate violence-keeping in mind, always, that the prime initiator andperpetrator of violence in society is the powerful and ttrestrong.

Ttrere can be no peace, justice or love unless our societiesare in a position to produce wealth in sufficient measure

On aNew VisionJor South Asirr

and are able to effect its distribution with some degree ofequlty. Not taking part in the process of production to tfrebest of their abilities is their defence to keep the powerful-the oppressor-in their society weak, to keep him vulnerableto conquest by someone more powerful and hopefully morejust. They would not be partners in making the powerfuland the unJust stronger. They refuse to produce for him.Their cooperation is dependent upon their being sociallyand politically empowered.

For over two centuries one of the major economic problemsof South Asia has been unceasing transfer of its wealthoverseas. For the powerful nations of the industrialisedworld it has been feasible to maintain their imperialist holdthroug;h providing support to our weak and paranoiac elitesand in lieu thereof 'trade' and -aid' with ttrem on unequalterms. To reduce the exploitative component in ourcommercial and financial relationship with the industrialisedcountries, the nations of South Asia shall have to jointlyevolve the correct political and economic strategies andtacucs.

PART 3

Recommendations

l. The question of reorientating nationalism needs to befurther studied and researched. A new synthesis ofnatlonalism and self-determina on needs to be evolved.

2. The question of remodelling the state structures needsto be articulated.

3. In-depth studies and articulation of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and of the Protocols andConventions evolved under it can be a great contribution inbringing tJle nations of South Asia nearer to each other, inpreventing wars, and in settling disputes throughnegotiations, mediation and arbitration.

ll

A Nepali Vision of South Asia*

DeuendraRqi Pandag

I. Background

South Asia is a paradox in more than one respect, For acivilisation wolving through many millennia, it was thirteenyears ago that the leaders of the seven South Asian statesassembled in Dhaka to announce to the world that there isin fact such a thing called South Asia. What is more, acomfortable and constructive consensus on this question isstill missing. The leaders themselves have not trulydemonstrated from their actions, beyond ttre rituals and therhetoric, that they have a faith in what they have initiated.The positlon in terms of commitrnent is generally the sarneamong the intellectuals who can be expected to know betterwhat a disunited South Asia would mean in the so-calledglobalising world. The enthusiasm and ttre sense of a mlssion

*This essay was urrltten for the ThAd South Asia RegionalDialogue held in Lahore in 1993. Alter some editing and adapflng,an introductory sectlon and a Postscript have been added tocaphrre some important developments that bear on the theme ofthe essay.

A Nepali Vision o;f South Asia

and vision on South Asia are limited principally to thegroups of former diplomats, bureaucrats and other publicofficials together with a section of the media, who probably(or hopefully) are inspired by an urge to atone for their pastsins.

The reasons for this relative somnolence is not far toseek, given the history of the South Asian peoples which is agood illustration of an experience that common civilisationalexperience alone is not enough to create a community. Thescourge of regional conflicts today, not limited .to hostilitiesbetween India and Pakistan, is too real for any satisfactionfrom a romantic journey back into their magnilicent history.Even intra-state harmony is increasin$y disturbed in almostall countries by the revitalised ethno-nationalistic aspirations,regional agenda, and the tendency of these tensions to spillover state boundaries, with the conflict-resolutionmechanisms not properly in place. One view, therefore, hasit that South Asia will always be a home for hundreds ofcommunities, not one communit5r. The challenge, it is said,is to create a "confederation" of the communities. The spiritof such a confederation has to find its relevance, in fact, inthe minds of the leadership in every pluralistic society-even though, in reality, the image does not necessarily haveto manifest itself in its structural form. It should not surpriseus if tJle South Asian states have a difficulty in forging thespirit of a community among them by aggregating differentaspirations at the inter-state level when they cannot do sointernally within their respective territorial jurisdictions.

The traumatic history of South Asia is a story of wars andconquests, integration and secession of territories andregimes and the partition and annexation of states beforeand after the British that ruled and/ or protected almost allof them till recently. In addition, it is also a story of peoplesof different religions and ethnicities trying to live in peaceeven as this diversity is politicised and, sometimes,transoorted across territories to further compllcate the nature

l3

t4 Perspectiues on South Asra

of the conflict, The diverse geo,strategic structures andrelaflons and the conflicting domestic regime interests ofthe states that followed different rules of governance andpolitical organisations in the post-colonial period have furtherfed and fuelled the paradox. Amidst such trends andtendencies, the image of India as the central and dominantpower of South Asia has not been a source of reassurance tothe smaller states even as they are all beset with their owninternal conflicts and contradictions. There may even besome apprehension that the concretisation of South Asia asa regional (which in today's world means increasinglypolitical) community rnigfit look too much like akhrnd.Bhotator undivided Indian sub-continent, with Delhi as ttre imperialseat of power.

The region suffers from an enduring and so far the mostintractable conflict between India and Pakistan. This problemhas an overbearing effect on not only the bilateral relationsbetween the disputing partes but also on the substance,priorities and direction of discorurses on South Asia. Thatttrere are also incessant disputes between India and herother neighbours, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal,concerning anything from trans-national ethnic tension tothe sharing of river waters and influx of refugees has nothelped the process. On Indo-Nepal relations, both countriesare incuring higf,r costs on account of the opportunifieslost-through a period of at least five decades-in harnessingthe water resources for the benefit of the people in the twocountries and in the region as a whole. Given the complodtyof the economics and politics of water-sharing projects, thedelay may be understandable. It is not so, however, whenwe realise, rather inexplicably, that Nepal and India thatlook like the diplomatic version of David and Goliath havehad unsettled border disputes for decades. On Nepal's partthere is also the additional grievance that not only theIndian state but also its intelligentsia tend to take thecountry for granted. Even a sensible and much respected (in

A Nepali. Vision oJ South Asia

Nepal as well) academician-journalist like Bhabani Senguptaoccasionally forgets ttrat there is a state called Nepal (and

Bhutan) in the political map of South Asia. For example, hecan write, without sparing a thought for the sensibilities ofthese countries that, "India's national security and territorialintegrity must also take account of China's power projectionin South Asia where Tibet joins it with India and Xinxiangwtth Pakistan." Currently the atmosphere is further mired,of all things, by the dispute between Bhutan and Nepal. Theproblem arising from the entr5z into Nepal via Indian terdtoryof tens of thousands of Bhutanese and their camping inrefugee camps in Nepal-because of the "ethnicity" of theunwanted Utotsampas of Bhutan-can be resolved onlywittr their return to where they came from. The positiveaspect of India's status as a regional power can beaccentuated and a South Asian spirit engendered if itpermitted itself to be an impartial and constructve mediatorin such matters. It would be even better if India couldappropriately inspire aII its neighbours as a "mother ofdemocracy" in South Asia.

It has been said that "regional disputes in South Asiahave a tendency to self-perpetuate because they seem topossess logic and dynamics of their own." The challenge forSouth Asia, especially for its enlightened citlzenry, is toovercome this history and create a civic, diplomatic andpolitical ethos that is founded on not only a sharedcivilisational past but also a common destiny. The differingperceptions on whether ttre South Asian states in fact sharea common destiny have a bearing on the need and thecontours of ttre vision we try to conjure up here. Ttrere areviews-especially, again, in India and Pakistan-that runcounter to this premise. ltrey have their virulent, andsometimes violent, disputes between them. But both seemto take a view that they are too important and too powerfula country to "mesh around" with the smaller andeconomically unattractive states in the region. It is not

t5

l6 Perspectiues on Souttt Asin

appropriately appreciated that no South Asian country cantruly be a part of the "globalising" world, by ignoring thepossibilifies and opportunities for "regionalising" South Asia.

Any temporary gain to a cotrntry that is not a part of abroader progress that must be sought to reverse the self-destructing dynamics as stated and to unleash the forcesnecessary to build a proud and prosperous South Asiacannot be lasting. History stands witness to this lesson aswe recall the gains and losses to the two problematiccountrles, India and Paldstan, as they flirted with theirrespective extra-regional sources of support in the Cold Warera. No relationship can be constructive when its impor-tance rises only when tensions flare up between e$44-regional powers or superpowers. Earlier, an unintelligentinterpretation of the non-aligned movement by the USestablishment opened an opportunity for India to movecloser to the then Soviet Union and nearly consummatewhat the former projected as the political image of a non-aligned country. Later, the strategic importance of India tothe United States fluctuated with the progress in Sino-USrelations, following the rapprochement between them sincethe 1970s and the growth of trade and economic relationsbetween them since the 1980s. Pakistan has similarlybenefitted from the patronage of the United States onlywhen tlee latter found it in its interest to court that country.We know this from the experience in the 1965 war betweenIndia and Pakistan. We know this from the secession of EastPakistan 9fi,'ing birth to Bangladesh in I97I (it would havebeen so rewarding for South Asian solidarity and pride ifPakistan had conceded this eventuality on its own in thespirit of the "Confederation of South Asian Communities").More recently, we know this from the ups and down inPakistan's status as an ally of the US as required by thelatter's interest in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasionand the subsequent withdrawal of its troops from there.

The point is that bilateral disputes present the most

A Nepali Visbn oJSouth Asta

formidable hurdle to the securit5r and progress of SouthAsia. The internecine quarrels within and between statesare only reinforcing tJle image of South Asia as a land ofperpetual poverty, ethnic tensions, civil strife and risingreligious fundamentalism. The region is deemed increasinglyincapable of loining ttre ranks of ottrer Asian countries asthey prepare, despite their recent financial troubles, to stepinto the Asian century. This is an incredible situationbecause, after all, the region is also recognised as some oftJle largest reservoirs of technical and scientiftc minds inthe world. Ttrese people have to show that ttreir technolo-gically advanced and economically poor countries can domore than build nuclear armaments. This depends on theleaders of South Asia, the sense of their historical legacyand the vision they may carry for tJle future of their people.In the least, they need to begin anew-with a sense ofconfidence and commitment rooted in the gloriousaccomplishments of the past, the grim reality of the present,and the vast opportunities of ttre future.

tr. Need for a Vislon

A substantial section of the South Asian elite maycommand, as individuals, the status of world citizens of asort by virtue of their professions or personalaccomplishments, But they do not seem to always appreciatehow low is the standing of each of them as a nation or asocial community in ttre league of peoples interactingpolitically and economically in the world arena. South Asia'scurrent moral and material status in the world contrastssharply with the glory of one of the earliest civilisations ithad offered to humanity. With its population exceeding one-{tfth of the world's total, the region's distinction now isemphasised only by the indifferent place it commands inthe world economy and politics. The region's dubiousreputation is further emphasised by its largest contributionto world poverty. Poverty protrudes its ugly face to spoil the

t7

I8 Perspectiues on South Asia

festivities even when tJle two South Asian powers show offtheir prowess by forcing their way into the nuclear club tothe delight of their gullible citipenry.

Yet, the statesmen of the region have not woken up to theneed for a new order or a vision beyond the strategictransformation that some of them have engineered by theirtechnological achievements and their use for weaponisation.They have not understood that ttrey must try to make aclean break with their desolate record with the use of thesame technolosr for building, severally and collectively, asociety that is hospitable to all peoples in the region. Thereseems to be a lack of appreciation that fundamentalistpostures and belligerent rhetoric and actons cannot miflgatethe problems cr€ated by moral, social, political and economicerosions. Such misadventures can only reinforce thecontradictions internally, and contaminate the regiongenerally, thus threatening the peace and stability of eaChcountry, albeit, in varying degrees.

It is unfortunate that, at the moment, there is not even aconsensus on whether we in South Asia are a distinct andvlable community with a comrnon destiny, notwithstandingthe 15 years of South Asiarr Association for RegionalCooperation (SAARC). This is strange especially in view ofthe benign neglect ttrat each member state suffers separatelyand collectively-except when they invite notice throughnuclear explosions-when it comes to getting heard in theglobal decision-making or conflict-resolution processes. Thelarger countries might occasionally take satisfaction fromthe opportunity to participate in forums that seeminglyhandle global issues, but such ad hoc engagements allowlittle room for them to contribute as a rightful party toglobal governance. If we accept ourselves as a region andcooperate with one another, for example, one of us will mostcertainly be a permanent member of the Security Council ofthe United Nations when that body is expanded. WitI Indiaand Pakistan both clalming a seat, the region may altogether

A N epali Vision oi South Asia

lose what is its rightful share.

There is also a need to be clear about whether and how a

South Asian order can be articulated and pursued, with thelarger and more developed countries in the region expectinggreater prospects for their development through integrationwith economically more advanced countries of the world.India's interest in association wit}l APEC is one example.

This urge was defined some years ago in the call for a New

Asian Order that the then prime minister of India, P.V.

Narasimha Rao, made in connecfion with his visit to Japan.Since then, India has also been participating in the ASEAN

process as a partner country. I am not implying that any

membership to a regional group has to be exclusive of any

other regional arrangement. But the priorities should be

clear. Something llke a South Asian communlty can emerge

only if the first regional home of a South Asian country is aSouth Asian grouping. It needs to be stressed that, for allthe disappointments with the organisation's performanceso far, the only alternative to SAARC is a stronger SAARC.

This issue becomes more complicated when not onlyshort-term economic but also primordial instincts similarlydrive countries towards closer relationships with statesoutside the region. A relatively new-found extra-regionalaf{inity,'even if it is ostensibly based 6n 1sligi6n, can be atvariance with the social, cultural, and developmentalexperiences as a part of what we have called sharedcivilisation. Pakistan, probably as a reaction to its inabilityto find its natural moorings where it must, contnues tocourt its neighbours to the west in lran, Turkey and so on,

and more recently, in the newly independent Central Asiancountries emerglng out of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Thatsuch propositions are themselves not free of geo-strategicinstructlons is illustrated by the growing differences betweenPallstan and Iran in the aftermath of the rise of the Talibanpower in Afghanistan. An important consideraflon here iswhether inter-state cooperation in a modern age can indeed

l9

20 Perspectiues on South Asia

be forged on the basis of religious afffnities for the long_termgood of a country or a group of countries, when suchrelatlonships are bound to lack the needed political andeconomic cohesion. This should be a pertinent question,notwithstanding the prospective .clash of civilisations" a laHuntington.

For reasons as above including, most importanfly, thetnability of India and Pakistan to resolve their long and, inhuman terms, severely destructive dispute over Kashmir,ttre required sense of communit5r in South Asia has notcrystallised beyond what has been haltin$y structured underSAARC. The latter has kept the spirit of South Asia alive.But by limiting its scope of work to only a bureaucraUc andtechnical agenda and by desperately avoiding contentiousissues, SAARC has become sornething like an alien specie ina world that is becoming extremely competitive wittt everyimportant region trying to berrefit from an economic and,where possible, strategic union.

Speci{rcaltg:

l. The persistence of a Cold Warlike situation in theregion and the practice of forging extra-regional alliances forsecurity and sustenance have not served the region well.Happily, this is changing now through both internal policydesigns of specilic countries (including the exercise of nuclearoptions) and what the changed world context has forcedupon us. But the continued state of belligerence betweenttre two major countries of the region and its direct andindirect effects on the rise of terrorism, ethnic conflicts andfissiparous tendencies within both countries and elsewherehave not served the cause of either of them or of the regionas a whole,

2. The security of every nation is further threatened by ahost of other factors that are sapping the vitals of eachcountry. The social values and institutions that have held

A Nepali Vision oJSouth Asia

the diverse peoples in each country together have been

breaking down. The corrosive influence of poverty and

deprivation, on one hand, and the sense of injustice and

exploitadon of the weak by the stronger, on the other' areshaking the very foundations of our social systems thatshould be readying themselves to tap the potentials'possibilities, and responsibilities of a twenty-first century

.civilisation. Mounting corruption is a blot on our democracyeven as it is also retarding economic and social development.

3. The rise of ethnic conllicts and the inroads that religiousfundamentalism is making into the body politic of manycountries should be a matter of special concern. They tooowe thelr origin to social injustices perpetrated by historyand nurtured by a system of political and economicmanagement that is devoid of moral values and the requisitesense ofjustice and egalitarianism. What is more importantis that they delile the spirit of pluralism, secularism andenlightened nationalism that alone can guarantee a SouthAsia that is well adjusted within and to humanity at large.

4. The new wave of democracy notwithstanding, there is adanger that the people of the region might lose faith in thepolitical process itself. Cormption in politics is the principalsource of public apathy as well as misery. Degeneration ofpolitics into a system of trading privileges and pecuniaqr

" interests at tlre cost of public resources, and the perversionof the electoral process through the use of ill-gotten wealthor brute force have brouglrt "the South Asian democrary"into disrepute. The syndrome of "functioning anarchy"l'isualised by Galbraith many years ago may soon make thesystems unable to function, with governments becomingincreasingly incapable of governing and the people beingincreasingly unwilling to be governed in mutually supportiveroles. Or, at best, the unfolding events might vindicate thejudgements of another poliilcal commentator who, too, havingserved in a diplomatic post in India speculated about "thepossibility of democracy surviving changing India". This

2T

22 Perspectiues on South Asia

must not be allowed to happen to any country in theinterest of peace, security and development of the SouthAsian region,

5. The inability so far to develop a system of economic anddwelopment cooperation among counhies does not doJusticeto the peoples of the region who suffer from the similarproblems of frequent flooding, environmental degradation,and shortages ofenergr in a region with vast water resources.These problems can be overcome if there is no further delayin evolving a framework for harnessing the river systems ofthe region to the mutual and equitable beneflts of thecountries concerned in the region as a whole, and, mostimportantly, tJle people living there. The unexploited potentialfor rapid development of the region through cooperation intrade and lnvestment is another lacuna in a world wheremost of the important countries are deciding trading systemsthat take advantage of both protectionism and the virtues ofcommon markets.

South Asian countries thus need a new vision of themselvesand of the region as a whole as a confident communit5r thatresponds to the challenges and opportunities of the emergingworld order. India and Pakistan, in particular, have a historicresponsibility to make the future different from the past.What we need is not a utopian blueprint. The quest should befor the much-needed changes in values and the standards ofconduct of the regional leadership. This will help them toproject themselves and their countries in a light that is freeofpast prejudices and narrow-mindedness. In a positive frameof mind, the leaders will be able to visualise a future that isfull of promises to be harnessed for the promoflon of peaceand cooperation that has so faf been only talked about, inwarm words or otherwise, and not acted upon.

III. Guldtng Hnciplesl. There is a need to tap the sources of power that are

A N ePaLt Viston oJ South Asia 23

internal to South Asia. This will require' first of all' a sense

of self-respect and confidence in our own potential' There is

a need to generate necessary enthusiasm in the politcal

Ieadership of each country that they can make their societies

*or" """.tr. and prosperous if they so wish' This will then

have to translate itself into a determination to avoid intra-

state and inter-state conflicts that often surface in the

pursuit of short-term gains by transient rulers' be they

autocratic or democratic, military or civilian' This will further

require a re-definition of securif not in terms of military

strength but in terms of the capacity to fulfil the diverse

peoples' needs and aspiration. It is one of the illustrious

sons of South Asia, the late Mahabub ul Haq, who has been

most influential in articulating and promoting the concept

of human security ttrat is based on security of people' not

just of territory; security of individuals, not just of nations:

security through dwelopment, not through arms and security

of all people everywhere-'in their homes, in their jobs' in

their streets, in their communities, and in their environment'"

It is up to t)'.e leadership of South Asia to rise to this

challenge and also add, after the words "in theirenvironmenf', another three words, namely *in the region"'

2. Every nation should ftnd an ideologr for itself that is

not based on religion. Religion has occupied an importantplace in the belief systems. and social engagements of men

and women from ancient times to the modern' Religion as a

source of moral basis defining human relationships has

served human needs well in the past and can do the same in

the future. But when religion is raised to a level' beyond the

perimeter of personal faith and is allowed to interfere withthe relation between citizens and the state, it corrodes all

democratic values and conventions including the basic tenets

of political and social equality. Pakistan suffers to this day

from the contradiction it invited for itself when its founding

fattrers wished to forge a democratic polity while using

religion as the basis for nationhood' Nepal, by declaring

24 Perspectiues on South Asra

itself a "Hindu state" even unden its democratic constitutionhas opened the door for unnecessar5r conflicts ir, " "o"i.iythat has more important things to manage *t it, limitedeconomic resources agd already depleting social capital.The powerful forces of Hindufua in ttre targist democracy ofthe world have now raised doubts aborlt the ideologicalbasis of Indian democracy and its secular values. By claimingro resurrect a modern RanrqiAa through the denial of anhonourable place for the minorities, there is a danger thatthese forces may defile the central value, namely, iqualityandjustice, which to every good Hindu is the most attractivegd:f this concept of state. Every Hindu child in SouthAsia has been raised to believe that in RamrqgcL everyone isequal and not even Lord Ram is above

--the law. Thegovernments and indeed the enlightened sections of thecivil societies need to resist the untenable pressures from

religious lobbies of all kinds whose only prripo". can be todMde their peoples at a Ume when energr-shoula instead bechannelled to unite ail peoples of South Asia. In addition,the growing linkages among religious movements in theregion must be discouraged to rnake grounds for ideologiesand state systems that are based on high moral values andsecular, democratic principles g..r"d to the seryice ofhumanity.

3. Narrow nationalism can no longer be the basis foreconomic and political transactions among states in aninter-dependent world. Similarly, the pursuit olextra_regionallinkages in the interest ofthe conventional balance of powerbetween major countries in the region has often meant anadditional burden on tJre peoples of the region_in terms ofthe cost of unceasing arms-build r._,p, .""J.tion of violenceand the plight of millions of refugees. By developing aregional framework of cooperaUon, these countries can betterharness ttreir resources and tose of the extra_regionalpowers for regional peace and development. yet, perceivedvulnerabilit5r to undesirable outside influences affecting their

A Nepali Vision o/South Asia

economic and social cohesion tends to make some statesconscious of the need to emphasis their national identitiesand interests within and beyond the call of reason. Thishappens especially in the case of smaller states that are alsoeconomically disadvantaged and more underdeveloped.Politrcal sagacity of the more powerful partners in the regionsuperseding the entrenched influence and the mindset oftheir respective bureaucracies and other sections ofestablishments should generate magnanimous decisionsthat can build lasting confidence where needed.

4. The apparent cultural unity of the ruling classes of theregion with the mainstream world order is one of the factorsresponsible for a lack of vision in each country of itself andof its place in the region, and collectively in the world atlarge. The priorities, the life style and the general culturalbehaviour of the elite classes are more in tune with those oftheir external cohorts than with their "native clientele" fromwhom they are increasingly alienated. There can even becomplacency that nothing much can be done directly toameliorate the condition of the masses because that willdetract attention and divert resources away from activitiesthat are more relevant for the "global village" in thetechnological age and a new miilennium. Manifestation ofwhat is called "the colonised mind" might have conditionedeven the character arrd the intensity of dissent voicedoccasionally for equitable relationships for the South Asianpeoples in internal and global settings. This has to changeso that the ruling establishments use the ground realitiesas their frame of reference even while interacting with theoutside world to derive benefits from trade, technologr andinvestment. They have to borrow not only capital andtechnologz from outside the region but also the other liberalvalues regarding work, leisure, compassion, cooperation,resources and costs, and the difference between what isprivate and what is public in the management of interestsand resources. Our own proud heritage, too, should give us

25

26 P er s p ectia e s on South Asia

the om and the energ' we need to recharge our valuesystem.on the

ottrer things, this should help to put a brakegrowing alienation of the leadership

from people ln South Asia.

c.most

South Asian countries must strive to make theglobal resurgenc<i of democratic values and the

importance that is now placed on the need for respectingthe fundamental rights of citizens and groups of peoplesttrroughout the world. The theory that every country has aright to choose its own social system or political ideologrincluding what is fundamental about fundamental rightscannot be carried too far. Care must be taken that sucharguments do not become a vehicle for reintroducing andlegitimising authoritarianism in the region as has happenedin the recent past. The SAARC Charter makes no menflon ofdemocracy or ttre system of government which it wishes tosee developed and be instrumental in the fulfilment of theregional aspirations of the South Asian peoples. This is notsurprising given the political orientation of most of thefounding fathers of tl.e SAARC and the aimost hostilerelationship they saw between democracy and development.WitJl one or two exceptions in more recent years, none of theDeclarations of the SAARC customarily issued at the end ofthe Summit every year ever mentions anything about theimportance of democratic values and tJ e role of representativeinstitutions in nation-building. The closest that theDeclaration of the iatest Summit held in Colombo came toembracing democracy was in this obtuse formulation: 'Thel,eaders agreed that tolerance ahd mutual accommodation,combined with the strengthening of participatory governance,constituted the foundation for the sustainable economicand social development." Why our leaders are shy of admittingtheir commitment to democracy is an enigma, even as wemay agree that the Westminster model is not the only formof democracy suitable to mankind. Armed with theircommitment to democracv. the South Asian states should

A Nepali Vision oJ South Asirt

be able to withstand all outside pressures on their internalaffairs in the name of "good governance" or conditionalitiesimposed on them lbr one reason or another. At the same

time, they c€rn expose the double standards that the $obalpatriarchs or matriarchs of democracy and human rightsmay deploy in the world to serve their own interests.

6. The contemporary fashion to equate political democracywith capitalistic ideologr and the cooption of all importantpolitical forces in each country of the region into the systemof external$tnduced economic ideas and policies should be

moderated if not recast altogether in the light of the SouthAsian needs. The incapacity of the ruling classes manifestedin the absence of a vision for their countries and for theregion, as stated, may be the result of this stifli'ng influence.The myth of a global paradigm of development and uni-systemic economic management can affect indigenousanalyses and thought processes so as to obviate themeffectively. It is no consolation that the myth already standsexposed. The position of the peddlers of this philosophy isweakened considerably as they encounter one debacie afteianottrer-from Sub-Saharan Africa to East and South EastAsia even as they go on prescribing their well knownmedicines. It is opportune for South Asia to take advantageof these developments and present its own model ofdevelopment or a system of priorities and instrumentalitiesthat address its ground condition. We know that, amongother things, liberalisation as pursued now is unlikely tohelp tackle the most important problem facing the region-unemplo5rment and underemployment and ttreir relation topoverty and social conllicts. This is not to suggest that weshut out all wisdom from the outside world. But if povertywith the associated dynamics of population growth, thepoor quality of life of many and the unsustainable.lifestyle ofsome and the environmental degradation that goes with it isa present concern, South Asian scholars may be ttre bestsuited to ftnd a solution not only for their region but also for

27

28 Perspectiue s on South Asia

the "global village". South Asia is not Just a fountain ofpoverty. It also produces world Class economists and othersocial scientists. Furthermore, we do not have to learnabout Mahatma Gandhi from Schumacher of the .,Small isBeautiful" fame. Nor do we have to benumb our senses andjoin the chorus with ignorant neo-liberals who denigrateJawaharlal Nehru for his vision of a .,a socialisilc pattern ofsociety." The more powerful countries need to motivatethemselves to take moral leadership in the design of theSouth Asian destiny. This sho 'ld have an accompanyingpositive effect of de-emphasisinfg the unproductive debateover the alleged hegemonic design of one country or anotherin the region.

7. Economic management in South Asia needs to beliberated from the strangulatirlg effects of bureaucraticcontrol and the rigidities of centralised management anddecision-making. The market can indeed be used to a greaterdegree to improve efllciency in resource allocation and tounleash entrepreneurial zeal in the private sector. But theagenda of povert5r alleviation including the question ofentitlement for meeting basic needs and other areas relevantto a just social order cannot be superseded by the cold logicof economic laws. The poor can neither be overlooked nordispensed with Just because they become inconvenient tothe ruling dogma. The South Asian vision must ihusencompass a South Asian development perspective thatmust also address tJre question of trade liberalisation in theregion beyond the currently agreed preferential tradearrangements (SegfA) and the now delayed inauguration ofSAFTA to a full-fledged South Asian Economic Communit5r.The latter appears a pipe dream when judged against thecurrent reality. But if it were reaXly so, one would imeqinethat ttre scholars who have been writing about it and thegroup of eminent South Asians who have been discussing itfor some time would have to be judged irrelevant too. Whileproceeding along these lines, special arrangements to

A Nepali Visrbn o3f South Asia

safeguard the interests ofweaker and less developed partnersmust also be built in. For example, priority considerationwill have to be given to the special problems of Bangladesh,which is prone to natural disasters of a mammoth scalefrom one year to the other. We have seen that somehumanitarian aid may come from outside, but a permanentsolution to the flooding will have to be devised regionally.

8. The countries of the region should also look for acommon position and strategies in international economicnegotiations on aid, trade, debt and world environment. Thedivision that surfaced among the developing countriesprovided the vested interests at the global level to engineer a"new world order", a reformulation of the concept of the"new international economic order" that the former weredemanding earlier. The South Asian countries should resistall temptations to pursue their interests in the world inisolation of their neighbours in the region. It would beimmensely rewarding if the countries could work towardsevolving a collective stratesr that would contain externalpressures with conditionalities on aid and investment. Inthis way, they can also promote truly equitable internationaltrading arrangements as is purportedly the objective of thewTo.

To end, the realities of power are such that, in any order,internal or external, the powerful seek domination andcontrol over ttre weak. The opposite reality is that the lattercannot withstand the pressure unless they congregate andact together to enhance their leverages of power. The biggerand 'powerful" countries of South Asia may sometimes seean independent place for themselves in ttre larger worldarena. But the fact remains that the region did not enjoy aposition of importance in world politics even in the Cold Warera when they were hobnobbing with their respective patron-superpowers. Nor does it enjoy it now (except for the attentionIndia and Pakistan have attracted after their nuclear testsas discussed in the Postscript below). Any claim for status

29

Perspectiues on South Asia

or power by any one of these countries in the conduct ofworld affairs-or even their own affairs at times, as whenIndia or Paldstan wished to import certain t5pes of moderntechnologr--has gone largely unheeded. India, in particular,has been so busy in proving its prowess and worth in itsneighbourhood, as the principal inheritor of the British Raj,that there is a risk of it forfeiting what it can achieveglobally in partnership with all countries in the region.

Both India and Pakistan must accept responsibilit5r fortheir share of the blame for the slow progress in therealisation of the South Asian cohmunity. They must committhemselves to take a.lead in rectiSring the past. Even for thesettlement of the Kashmir question, all that may be neededis the appearance on the scene of a statesman who takesthe risk ttrat must.be taken and sacrifices his or her politicalcareer should suctr need arise given the nature of domesticpolitical equations. No matter w{rat and how the settlementis reached, there is bound to be a backlash in either countr5r,and someone should be prepared to suffer politically in thelarger interest of peace, security and development. Ultimatelyit is such sacrifices, not narrow-minded belligerence thatwill be recogrrised by history. In the least, there should besome room for taking advantage of tJ.e possibility of "solidarityin production and trade" as a means of avoiding wars andaihieving long-term peace and cooperation between the twocountries and in the region as a whole. This will be along thelines initiated by Robert Schuman of France some 5O yearsago when he sowed the seed of the European Union amidsta climate of distrust which was perhaps no less intensethan in South Asia at present. The move towards a Visian oJSoufh Asia can take a cue also from what a former SovietPolitburo member was reportedly alluding to in the contextof the global communit5t as a whole in a lecture he gave atColumbia University some years ago. I will end this essaywiti the very pertinent observations in question. "Whatdoes it mean to speak of a neus qualitg oJ societg? A polifical

A Nepali Visian oJ South Asia

system? Economic Effectiveness? Scientific Achievement?Wealth? No, the new quality of societ5r means elevating manthrough his morality. "

IV. Postscript

There has been little change in the status or perception ofSouth Asia as a community since the essence of the above'vision" was shared with the Dialogue colleagues six yearsago. Nor has there been any genuine eagerness on the partof the region's ruling elite in drawing the contours of SouthAsia in the 2lst century. Each country is pursuing itsinterests, by limiting its contribution to the imperatives ofmutual cooperation to rhetoric. In the meantime, somemomentous changes have taken place in the position andstakes of some individual countries. This is bound to affectthe prospects of regional security, cooperation anddevelopment. I should therefore like to briefly interrogatewhat these developments have done to the possibility oftransforming the South Asian dream, as discussed above toa reality.

India and Pakistan tried to make a "clean break with thedesolate past" by conducting eleven nuclear tests betweenthem in the heat of May this year. There can be no doubt inanyone's mind that this development will affect whateverlittle solidarity has still remained among the two powerfulstates of the region. The tests have affected not only therelation between India and Pakistan. They have affected thehopes and aspirations of every country in theirneighbourhood. The ritualistic completion of the near-fruitless and purposeless Tenth SAARC Summit held inColombo under t].e shadow of these nuclear tests is anillustration of the case.

Ironically, the two regional adversaries that trained theirnuclear guns on each other now find themselves in thesame boat as they together suffer the burden of economic

31

32 Perspectiues on Sotfth Asio"

sancilons imposed by tl-e West. But their togetherness goesonly as far as the suffering of their innocent people. Onewould ordinarily e>rpect tllat their common grievances againstthe West (chiefly the US) along with their joint contributionsto exposing the monopolistic position of ttre five establishednuclear powers on the issue of nuclear proliferation wouldbring the two countries together. It is even possible thatboth India and Pakistan have earned the understanding ofmillions of people in the third world (but not necessarily ofthe naUon states) who can take satisfaction that the doublestandards of the West on the nuclear issue has not goneunchallenged. A South Asia with a history of less discordwould have found a God-given opportunity for forgingsolidarity and meaningful cooperation between India andPakistan as both negotiate with the West against the pressurethat they are now under to sign the CTBT. But this is not tobe. When bottr countries show little sign of deceleratingtheir traditional belligerence, the recent events can only addto the complodty of regional security, not otherwise.

South Asia is now a region with two nuclear powers. It isalso a region that inhabits 4O per cent of all poor people and46 per cent of all illiterate adults in the developing world.This is where the "vision ttring" as the former US President,George Bush might say, becomes important. Vision is not aborrowed wisdom, for that reason, it is also immune tosanctions. The two most important countries of the regionhave to take interest in fully developing a process that meetsthe challenge and harnesses the potential as we enter a newera amidst the burden of growing population, increasingdebts and rising unemployment. It has been said that the'next millennium can begin with the South Asian Century"because tJre development frontier may shift from East Asiato South Asia. It is up to the political leadership in eachcountry of the region to seize this possibility. The SouthAsian Century if it is to be relevant for all South Asians andnot merely for the upwardly mobile middle classes tJlat are

A NepatiVision oJSouth Asia

hooked to the so-called global economy has to embrace a

wtde range of agenda-from social and cultural to poliilcal

and economic. Governance is going to be even more of a

challenge than now if a chasm is allowed to develop furtherbetween the rich and the poor, the privileged and the ordinary

and one geographic re$on and another' Even if thls were

not so, it will be difficult to take pride or satisfaction from

the expanding markets for consumption goods and the

growth in economic activites they entail when, for example'

85 million South Asian children or nearly 5O per cent ofthose in the developing world remain malnourished'

There have been some posifive developments. That the

constituUonal process has survived in all countries that got

ini ated or reintroduced to the practice only recently shouldgive some satlsfactlon. It is another matter that the outputof tJrese regimes could have been more relevant and benellcial

for the people. Similarly, as a foreign minister (later prime

minister), Inder Kumar Gujral made a big contribution'though far from being a lasting one perhaps' when he

presented his doctrine, one element of which is non-

reciprocity in economic relations with smaller neighbours(that is not asking for a quid pro quo by India) in economic

relaUons with "neighbours like Nepal, Ban$adesh, Bhutan,Maldtves and Sri Lanka". A concrete outcome of that doctrinehas already been seen in the Trade Treaty between Nepal

and India in 1996 that did away wittr all the non-tariffbarriers against Nepali exports to India-something tl-athad been a sore point in the relations between the twocountries for a long time.

It is important to note, however, that even this veryposiuve development was burdened by the legacy of thecomplex relauons and unremitung discord between Indiaand Pakistan. I.K. Gujral who is not an enthusiastic supporterof nuclear tests by India and who has also opposed signingthe CTtsT was nonetheless unable to articulate his doctrinein such a mElnner that there was room for improvement in

33

34 Perspectiues on South Asra

the relations between India a4d pakistan and collecUveaction by ttrem under ttrat frampwork. As it happened, theotherwise highly welcome initiative was perceived by someas one whose basic purpose was to isolate pakistan in SouthAsia like yet another of Gujral's initiatives-the scheme forsub-regional cooperation for development among Bangladesh,Bhutan, Nepal and North-east India.

That I have to end this essay by reverting to tJle relationbetween India and Pakistan is s!.rnbolic of the centrality ofthls issue in any vision that we may try to define in ourminds on South Asia. [t seems to me that the relationsbetween the two countries may not revert to a lastingimprovement until the domesgc political order in botJlcountrles gains maturity in such a way that it is capable ofproducing mentally and politically secure leaders. Democracycannot flourish and regional cooperation cannot improvewhen insecure rulers, whether democratic or autocratic,have to prop up their regimeg on the foundation of afundamentalist myth, the threat of a .foreigyt hand" or anexternal enemy they are forced to invent for their survival.Fortunately, with the gradual growth of the .,South AsianCivil Society", there are now at least some people andgroups that appear 'Visionaryt'. Many individuals andorganisations are struggling intellectually and withprogrammes on the ground to find ways and means ofenhancing understanding and cooperation among peoplesand states in the interest of all of the more than I.3 billionpeople of ttre region. For example, there are groups workingfor human rights and for the rights of the children and thehandicapped in individual countries and collectively in theregion. In the economic sphere, there is a proposal for thedevelopment of a South Asian Economic Communitygenerated from within the civil society. These are goodsigns. It is the success of these efforts that may eventuallyinfluence the course of events in South Asia.

A NepaliVision oJ SoutttAsia

REFERENCES

Brezinski, Zbigniew, 'Power and Morality", World Moniton Marc}r

1993.

Grant, Bruce, God"s and PolitLcians: Politics as Culture-AnAustrcrtian Vieu oJ India, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books'

1982.

Haq, Mahabub ul, and Khadija Haq' Humo:n DeDelopment in South

Asia 1998, Karachi: O>ford University Press for Ttre Human

Development Centre, 1998.

Harison, Selig, "South Asia and the United States: A Chance for a

Fresh Start", Ctrrent History, March 1992.

Khatri, Shrtdhar, "Natonal Security and Conflict Resolution inSouth Asia", South Asia: Vision & PerspectiDe, Lahore:Independent Planning Commission of Pakistan, 1994'

Nandy, Ashis, Thc Intimote Enemy: Loss anl Reauery oJ SeLJ

Ilnder Colonirtlisnu Delhi: Oxford University Press' 1989'

Nandy, Ashis, "Interview: Hunger is more Powerful thanNationalism', HimalThe South Asian Magazine, t I :9, September

1998.

Pinder, John, European Communitg: The BuiJding o..f a Uni'on, New

York : Odord University Press, 1991.

Sen Gupta, Bhabani, "Conflict Resolution in South Asia", in thisvolume.

35

Conflict Resolution inSouth Asia

Bhnbani Sen Gupta*

South Asia is the habitat of a billion people, a region thathas seen more wars than most others since it carne intobeing in the first flush of decolonizaflon. What is known asSouth Asia now-a geopolitical region of seven disparatestates: Indla, Paktstan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sn Lanka, Maldivesand Bangladesh-used to be the British Indian Empire. Itbears the poet's famous epitapLr of the wtrite man whowanted to change its traditional societies: .A fool lies herewho tried to hustle the East,"

Not that South Asia has not been hustled in the last fiftyyears. Its member states have seen ups and downs of rulersand ruling systems. In what Sam'uel Hunting[on has calledthe 'third wave of democracy- of democratization of allstates of the region, with the exception of the tiny monarchyofBhutan, all are now governed by representatives ofpeople

*This chapter is the original verslo[r of the paper written for theThird South Asia Regional Dialogue held in Lahore, pakistan in1993.

Cotlllict Resoltttlon in Soutlr Asta

elected ln freedom and accountable to parliaments. r SouthAsta has wltnessed four major wars and a minor one.2

Relations among the region's seven na ons are markedmore by mutual mistrust and non-cooperafion than bygood-netghbourllness. It is a latecomer to regionalism. Eventtrough lts organisation for regional cooperatlon-€AARC-is now more than fifteen years old this region remalnsstrate6gcally divided. It has not even tried seriously to developa regional approach to security and stability, far less todisarmament and arms control. Peace and conflictmanagement and resolutlon studles do not figure in thecurriculum of South Asian universities, nor on the agendaof most of its research institutions. Since the mid-8Os,South Asia has been one of the most heavily armed thirdworld regions. Here, national power ambitions of Indta andPaldstan mingled with the superpower rivalries, and inter-state ethnlc tensions meshed with domestic conlllcts build ahigh reglon-wide threshold of tensions, confrontations, andconllicts. Indeed three of its member states: India, Paldstanand Sri Lanka carry an overload of conllicts. South Asiansdo not have to go outside their region to test what Homerwrote ln his eptc the Odysseg: 'We are qulck to flare up, weraces of men on the earth,'

AProfle of the Rcglor

South Asla is a reglon marked with serious lmbalances ofthe essentlal attributes of states - territory, population andnatural resources. India towers over a cluster of small andweak naflons except Pakistan. The two large 'distantneighbours" were born into a well of mutual psychologicaland ideologfcal hostility from which they are still to get out.The basic conllictual relations in South Asia are betweenIndta and Pakistan, though India's national security andterritorial tntegrity must also take account of China's pourerprojecflon in South Asla where Tibet Joins tt wlth India andXirudang wtth Pakistan. The smaller nations, or several of

37

38 Perspectiues on South Asia

them, will, at any given time, peqceive India as the hegemonicpower and their perception will often tre conffrmed by nuancesof trndia's behaviour. The key to security and stability inSouth Asia, and,to conflict control and resolution, lies in theunfriendly relaflons of India a4d pakistan. Both now haveacquired capabitrity to make nuclear weapons, if they havenot already made some bombs or devices. Both are emergingas missile powers, and India is seen try. some as a powerbuilding a blue-water navy..3

Conflict Resoluhan in South Asia

southern districts of the small kingdom wher€ the majorityof the population is of Nepali origin while the Drupkas hold

powerinThimphu. Some 5O,OOO Bhutanese oJNepali origin

irave escaped to Nepal through India aftelbeing pushed outby Bhutanese security personnel' Since 1984 India has

been accusing Pakistafl of extending material assistance to

secessionist Sikh militants ffghting for "Khalistan" in PunJab'

In the Kashmir Valley, Patlstan is lnvolved in helping the

anti{ndian struggle of four million Muslims. These domestlc

conflicts extending to the neighbouring countries reinforcethe s€nse of insecurit5r of the ruling elltes, erode the stabilityof the state systems and institutions and generate pressures

to expand arrnies and larger inventories of imported armsand equipment. In recent years, the armed forces of SriIa.nka and Ban$adesh have been expanded rapidly strainingthe development resources of the two countries, increasingtheir foreign debts eind enhancing their dependencies on

foreiggr aid.a

Nature of Conlllct ln South Asia

The nature of conllict in the region has shown a stubbornpersistence. The main conflict. as noted, is between Indiaand Pakistan. It has territorial, religiousideological, ethnic,political and strategic dimensions, making it one of the mostenduring conflicts in the third world. Minor territorialdisputes do exist between India and Bangladesh, but thesource of conflict here is ethnicity and religion, andBangladesh's tilt towards Pakistan since the installatlon ofmilitary rule in August 1975. Ethnicity is almost the onlycause of sharp dtfferences between India and Sri Lankawhich in 1987 came close to a military conflict; India sent aPeace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka at the explicitrequest of its then President J'R' Jayewardene. In twoyears, the IPI(F grew nearly I0O,OO0 strong and it $otbogged down in an expensive guerilla war wit}. the militaritrebels of the Northern province of Jaffna named "Liberatlon

40 Perspectiues on South Asla.

Tigers of Tamil Eelam {LT-|E)". president RanasinghePremadasa soon after assuming office in January lggg,asked for the lmmediate withdrawal of the force, which wasnow seen by Sri Lankans as an ..occupation army.. The IpKFleft the island in March lggO but the relationslip betweenIndta and Sri Lanka has since then remained less thanwarm.s There are no territorial or any other disputes betweenIndta and Nepal. However, during the two decades of rule bvan auttroritarian monarch, Nepal, in Indian perception,souglrt to strike a closer relationship with China ttran Indiansbeliwed was good for their country's security. India tookparticular obJecton to Nepal's purchase of several truckloadsof weapons from China, while the King failed to get Indianrecognition of Nepal as a peace Z/],ne. Alandlocked countrv.Nepal, is totally dependerit on India for an exit to theoceans; even otherwlse, Nepal's trade and commerce isoverwhelmtngfy with India. Disputes over whether thereshould be a slngle trade-cum-transit agreement betweenNepal and Indla or two separate ones have heavily strainedthe reladonship. In lggo, however, India conceded twos€parate treaties to Nepal. This, togettrer with the restorationof democracy in the kingdom in 199O, has returned theIndo-Nepalese relationship to a relaxed, mutually beneficialnornralcy.

Territory, ethntcity and religion are, then, the three maincauses of conflict ln South Asia. The smaller neighbours areapprehenslve of India's towering slze and resent its hegemonicbehaviour. India on tts part, without proclaiming a doctrineof inlluence, makes it clear to the smaller neighbours thatthey must pa,y due regard to its own security sensitlvitiesand needs as a large country with borders with pakistanand China and also as an Jndian Ocean power. Theneigfrbours complain t]ut India pays scant regard to tJreirsecurity sensttivitles and at times does not mlnd trespassingon their sorrerelgnty.6

Btlateral disputes between India and pal<istan have a central

ConflictResolrttion in South Asta

place in the South Astan syndrome of conlltcts, The roots ofthts conflict go back to the colonial period when the imperialdoctrine of divide and rule ftnally led to the partttion of BritishIndta lnto Indla and Paldstan. The two sovereign nations wereborn in mutual rejection and hostility. The rivalrywas lgligiousand ideological-Pakistan proclaiming itself an Islamic statewhile India commltted to build a secular and democraticsociety. The total strategic divide into which the two neiglrbourswere born was reinforced by the cold warring external powerssince the fifties. Paldstan Joined the US sponsored regionalmilitary alhances ostenslbly to contain Sovlet and communistpower, actually to get a security cover agalnst India. And,India found its own friend in the USSR.

Since the 1980s India and Pakistan have become majorimporters of weapon systems putfing South Asia on theworld map of mtlttartzation. India's arms imports ln the1978-88 decade escalated nearly 8O0 per cent, from $36Omillion to $3.2 billion. Pakistan's milltary imports Jumpedfrom $210 million in 1978 to $6OO million in 1984 to comedown to $34O million in 1988. However, Pakistan receivedhuge caches of weapons from ttre United States as outrightgrant, according to an authoritative US account: In India,military spending increased at the rate of 5.8 per centthroughout the decade. Military e4renditure in Paklstanincreased at the much more rapid pace of 1O per centduring the decade and at 7 .l per cent of the last half. Anessentially large increase occurred in 1983, when Pakistanimilltary ercpendlture Jumped nearly 26 per cent.

Sri Lanka, a country that has historically had very lowmilitary o<penditure (in 1988 Sri Lanka's military orpenditurewas a mere 3 per cent of India's military expenditure), isnwertheless the third largest South Asian country in termsof milttary expenditures. As a result of the intense civil warplaguing the countr5r, Sri Lanka experienced phenomenalgrowth in military expenditure of 29.2 per cent during theflrst five years of the decade and 17.3 per cent during thedecade as a whole.T

4l

42 Perspectiues on South Asra

In the nuclear arena, however, India and Pakistan havereached the take-off stage, capable of generating a regionalnuclear weapons arms yace. Inflia which exploded a nucleardevice "for peaceful purposes" ln 1974 declared its decisionnot to make weapons, though, since the late 198Os, inresponse to international, mostly American, disclosures ofPakistan's acquired or nearly acquired weapons capability,India has several times publicly brandished its "option."konard Spector, of the Carnegie Foundation, said of thethen Prime Minister Fajiv Gandhi's statement in June 1985,.that India "could quickly exercise its nuclearweapons option"to suggest tlat India had already acquired the capability tomake nuclear weapons.s Spectbr was certain that Pakistanwas in fervdnt pursuit of the bomb. '"Itte real question iswhat is the point at which Islamabad's efforts will level off. "e

The point evidently was reached as the Bushadministraflon took over in Washington DC. For the firsttime President Bush refused to certify to the Congress inOctober 1990. that Pakistan dld noi "possess', io. *u"trying to make, nuclear weapons. As a result, US mtlitaryand economic aid to Pakistan has remained suspendedslnce then under the Pressler Amendment.

Regardless of what kind of capability the two countriesmay hav€ acquired, weapons actually produced, and, if so,the slze of thelr arsenals, it is now assumed bv bot]. countries

Conflict Resohrtion in South Asia

that.both of them have the capability. Both countries have

strong nuclear lobbies even as both officially keep denyinghaving embarked upon making nuclear weapons. An Indianstrategic e>qrert sees South Asia passing through ttrree-nuclear regimes"-first, a "rudimentary nuclear regime" inwhich both India and Pakistan have unrefined weapons,Pakistan obtains operational status with the gas centrifugeenrichment plant at Kahuta, and moves steadily to increase

that throughout. India, however, remains at its 1974 'one

bomb capacity'. Second, an 'intermediate nuclear regime',in which Pakistan has stockpiled enriched uranium for tenbombs but has not increased their efficiency by raising theyield to weight ratio. "This posture of ambiguity forces NewDelhi to explicitly test its plutonium devices." Third, asophisticated nuclear regime, in which India has coordlnatedits atomic erierg/, space and electronics with the needs ofnatiohal defence. "An Indian ballistic missile (MRBM)

capability emerges. These could be targeted against Pakistanicities or against China's military targets (such as airfields)in Tibet. Once the deployment of MRBM starts there is aclear possibility that Pakistan too may attempt to gear up itspresent lnciplent space programme towards the manufactureof IRBMs. The net redult may be the emergence of strategicstability between India and Pakistan."ro

PakHan's dominant nuclear stance is a mirror image ofIndta's with tJre exception that Pakistan's belief is that theUnited States is 'putting one-sided unfair pressure on

and confused for well over a decade" without bringing it anyDeneIlt.

"Conventional defence not only has proven inadequatefor Pakistan, it also has proved to be a. heavy financial

,43

44 Perspectiues on South Asio

burden , . . with nuclear weapons (a conventional) balanceis not required since nuclear weapons are absolute_whereno balance is possible since it is not essential to possessmore or stronger strategic explosives than tJre rest in orderto be accounted as a atomic power in the political andmtlitary sense. . ."

'In fact, given the economic viability of acquiring nuclearweapons capabllity tn relation to the civilian factor (throug;hthe benefits of the civil nuclear fuel cycle) on the one hand,and the crippling impact of development of huge conventionalforces weapons expenditure on the other, it would seem as ifPakistan has no option bui to develop lts nuclear weaponscapability-given its politico-strategic regional compulsions .'r r

In Paldstan according to an English daily, it is regardedas 'unpatriotic" to criticise the country's nuclear prog3ammeand to suggest that it should not make nuclear tveapons.l2In Indta, a small but vocal lobhy against nuclear weaponse>dsts. r3 It will be ineffectual, however, if the decision istaken at the political level to use the nuclear option. InI991, strategic thlnking in India began to absorb the realit5rthat bottr countries possess nuclear capability. This realityentered war and peace calculations of both militaryleaderships and introduced a certain measure of cautlon inengagtng in the decades-old game of confrontaflon andtensions. ra

Natlon Buildrng and Conflicts ln South Asla

The process of nation-building has been far from peacefulin South Asia. Conllict attended the birth of the hrin statesof India and Paldstan. In Sri Ianka. Prime Minister SWRDBandaranaike was killed by an a.ssassin, a Buddhist monk.Bangladesh was born of a liberation war. Four successiveheads of state were assassinated between 1975 and lggl,when ttre countr5r disposed of its third military ruIer andproclaimed a democratic state with the Westminster modelof parltamentar5r democracy.

Conflict Resolufibn ur Soulh Asra

Several other outbursts of bloody conflict must also beattributed to the st5rle and model of nation-building. In India,reorganisation of the British Indian provinces and theintegraflon offormer princely states into a more orderly systemof states in the 1950s and 196Os was attended by collectiveviolence. The Indian government used the coercive power ofthe state to suppress violent separatist insurgencies inNagaland and Mizoram. The Pakistan government similarlysuppressed an armed uprising in Baluchistan in the lg7os.Bangladesh confronted the Buddhist tribe of the Chakmas irrthe Chittagong Hill Region as soon as it attained itsindependence from Pakistan. In almost every one of thesesignificant cases ofinternal conflict, South Asian states haveblamed one or more neighbours of instigating, fuelling andsupporting the separatist or anti-state elements.

It must be noted that t]le collective violent movementsagainst the state have occurred in democracies rather thanmilitary dictatorships. The Baluchis rose in an armed rebelliondemanding larger autonomy and a greater share of theresource-cake only after military rule ended in Pakistan anda democratic government was set up in 1972. To be sure, therebellion in Sind began during the late General Ziaul Haq,smllitary rule; butits current marked aggravation has occurredin the last four years of democracy in Pakistan. The Chakmasin Ban$adesh rebelled during the first year of Independencewhen tJle country had a democratic regime. Ttrese examplescertainly do not JusUff dictatorial or authoritative rule ttratdenies liberties and freedom to all citizens to a greater orlesser degree. In a democratic regime, people have the rightto assert their demands and aspirations. Deprived andhumiliated, they sometimes take to arms and come inconfrontation with the powerful coercive machinery of theState. Dictatorships paper over internal conflicts with sternrepression and denial ofafreedom ofexpression and assembly.When dictatorships collapse, conflicts come olrt intothe open.

ZTD

46 Perspectiues on South Asid.

Reltglous and Ethntc Coafllcts

Unlike other regions of the third world, the South Asianstates have been spared violent class-oriented revolutions.The JVP insurgenry iir Sri Lanka in 197 I was an insurrectionrather than a grassroots revolution: it was wiped out by thegovernment.

Domestic conflict in South .A,sia has been broadly of twotypes: religious (commonly called communal in this region)and ethno-political. Religious wars and. conflicts are. notpeculiar to South Asia only. TLrey marked the evolution ofpolitical sociefies in Europe fro;n the feudal times of ttre firststages of the industrial revolution. Even today, Catholicsand Protestants are in a state of war with one another inNorthern Ireland. In South Asia, Hindu-Muslim riots inBritish India had occurred for hundreds of years.Independence and nation-building have not brought theseconflicts to an end; sometimesi the process of developmenthas accentuated communal killings. Political parties fuelthem with a view to win votes. Currently, politically andculturally assertive rellgious fundamentalisms severely straincivil societies in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. If communalriots have been few and far between in Bangladesh, it isbecause Muslims and Hindus fought and died together inthe war of liberatlon, creating a spirit of togetherness whichthe Islamic state and fundamehtalists have not been able todemolish.

Since the l980s, ethno-political conflicts have put SouthAsian states under persistent strain because they are

-qualitatively different from communal clashes. l,arge minorityethnic groups with a territory and language and culture oftheir own assert their separate identities which did notconfront ttrese states earlier. The Sikhs of Punjab ask forindependence-Khalistan-frorn India because they believethat their identity and secular and religious rights havebeen denied by the rulers of the country. Sindhis ask for

Conflict Resohrtion in South Asia

Sindhu Desh, a separate land of Sindhis, alleging that theirlegitimate aspirations had been refused by the rulers ofPakistan. The Tamils of Jaffna demand a separate Tamil"Homeland" because they find the Sinhala majoritydetermined to deny them the status they believe islegitimately theirs. The Muslims of the valley of Kashmirhave been in a state of rebellion, segments of ttrem demanding"independence," because they found that India had cynicallyviolated the terms and conditions of Jammu and Kashmir'saccession to the Indian Union in 1947.

hessures of Democracy

The process of development has generated numerouspressures on the political systems in South Asia and, evenmore pointedly, on the power structures ttrat have grown inthe different states. The pressures are essentially forrecognition of the democratic rights of the people-indeedthe masses-living on the outskirts of the power structure.The numerous economic, social, cultural and politicalcontradictions of the Souttr Asian political societies,.whichare still largely feudal and have just entered the dislocationof industrial revolutions, inevitably generate conflicts. Someof the conflicts provide d5mamics of positive change and are,therefore, to be welcomed. Some of the contradictionscha-llenge deep rooted atavistic centres of power and generatedestructive conflicts like communal tensions and clashes.Political and social demands of deprived populations areoften dubbed as anti-nationai by the rulers and the twoinevitably clash.

Analyses of the architecture of building the South Asianstates provide insight into the origins and ramifications ofsome conflicts in each country. In India, partition and thereligious killings that attended Independence hardened theleaders' attitude towards federalism and decentralisationand created a strong bias for centralism. Democracy andsecularism became the motto of the state and the two-

47

4A Perspectiues on South Asia

nation theory haunted the ellte like Banquo's gfiost. Hencethe inordinate delay in granting the legitlmate demand ofthe Sikhs for a state in which they would enjoy a clear anddominant maJority. This is the root of the Khalistanmovement. Kashmir's autonomy was gradually diminishedbecause of the fear that the Pakistan-sponsored two-nationdoctrine would alienate the Muslims of the Valley againstIndia. It was not realised by the rulers that denial of autonomywould turn the Muslims of the Valley against India withdeadlier effect than the two-nation doctrine.

In India, since the mid- l97os, over-centralisation of powerand resources at an imperial centre and systematicdiminishing of the states' powers generated demands forfederalism, decentralisation and grassroots democratic self-government. Less dweloped parts of the large states demandseparate statehood; exploited deprived tribals-8o milioninhabiting a long stretch of land across the waistline ofIndia-ask for self-ruIe. As these demands and the struggilesthat manifest them are denied and dubbed disintegrativeand separatist, some of these movements tend to get violent.The social and political conflicts that dot the Indian landscapeat present are basically diverse manifestations of the demandsand struggle for democratic self-government. They challengethe architecture of state building from below and are seenby the rulers as disintegrative and separatist. In realitythese are more integrative as they promise to enlarge thefrontiers of democracy and build the democratic state frombelow.

In Paldstan, the running conflict has been between militaryrule and representative democracy. The great casualty ofthis conflict was East Pakistan which broke away in 1971-72 after a bloody liberation war. Though Pakistan was now amore homogeneous, medium-size state, it was still multi-national, and dominated by Pufrjab. In democratic interludesthe nationalities that felt deprived and suppressed asked forredress of their grievences. Thus a bloody conflict broke out

ConJlict Resolution tn South Asia 49

in Baluchistan in the 1970s' The lawless rule of the MQM in

ttarachi and Hyderabad cities and the breakdown of law and

order in the rest of the Sind province spawned Ziaul Haq s

-tfittty rule as well as the current democratic phase' In

1992, ihe MQM, the party of the Muhajirs-Muslims who

migrated from India-was reportedly workingfor - J.innahnur'"

" !t"t" comprislng Karachi and Hyderabad leading to

dismemberment of Sind. A relationship of attrition between

the secular values of parliamentary democracy and the

orthodox Islamic values of the Shariat nibble at the stabilit5r

of tJre political system and work as a magnet of division and

alienation. Islamic fundamentalism is used to cover up the

deeper social, cultural and political contradictions of the

Pallistani society, at times with success' Meanwhile' the

legacy of military rule has fragmented the power structure'

In ttre ruling Troika, the military and the bureaucracy are

believed to wield greater power than the elected

representatives of the PeoPle.

In Sri Lanka, the fundamental cleavage is between the

two large ethnic communities, Sinhalese and Tamils' who

iniUally fought together for national independence but later

drifted apart. The Sinhalese saw the Tamils to be favourites

of the Raj. Indeed, the stubborn refusal of the maJority

ethnic community to recognise Sri l,anka as a country of

plural ettrnicity or nationality has got it into tlle protracted-armed

conflict with the Tamils of the north and the north-

eastern provinces. Also, the failure of the ruling elite to

design a scheme of devolution of power in order to build a

stronger foundation of its democratic system brought a lot

of strain on tJre government in Colombo'

In Bangladesh, the power-hungry military robbed the

people of ihe fruits of their liberation struggle and distorted

the insUtutions of government-the legislature, the judiciary'

the bureaucracy and the press. Even the founder of the

State, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, betrayed a strong preference

for authoritarian personalized rule. After 16 years of military

50 Perspectiues on South Asc

rule, Bangladesh has a democracy that resembles theWestminster model more closely than pakistan,s where theConstitution reserves a cluster of crucial powers for theP-resident. Bangladesh's mellower brand of Isiam has sparedthe countr5r the bitter and divisive contradiction betweensecular values of democracy and atavistic values of religiousorthodoxy that we nobce in pakistan. However, the country,sfundamental contradiction between power and mass povert5rremains a perpetual source of conflict especially as thlbenellcence of western donors shrinks a.rd th. country,slongstanding dependency on foreign aid comes home toroost.

Nepal has followed a more or less similar track_longyears of authoritarian monarchical rule ffnally yielding to amass struAgle of unprecedented magnitude in lgg0_91 thatcreated a constitutional monarchy with a sovereignparllament. The democratic system, however, is perched ona feudal foundation, on mass poverty

".,d h"lpl"""dependency on foreign assistance. Its deveiopment or decaywill depend largely on the ability of the elected representativesof the people to improve the lMng condition of th. -"""."and exploit the forest and water resources ofthe country forgeneration of wealth. It has built-in problems of ethnicity ornationality which can be resolved only with democracy atthe local level, glving each ethnlc entity the right to governitseH to tJle extent possible.

_Jhc beautiful tiny kingdom of Bhutan, placid and peacefultill the other day, is going tl.rough a potentially tearingconllict between the Drupkas who have the patronage of thepalace and the Nepalis who are being thrown out as illegalmigrants. Some 60,O0O Bhutanese of Nepali origin havetaken shelter in a border district of Nepal, Jnaph, and arebetng given some subsistence by the UN Refugee ReliefOrganisation.

ConJlict Resolttlton tn South Asia

Inter-State Conflicts

In South Asia, only India and Pakistan have a generic

conflict which is over Kashmir. It has become each nation's

symbol of national ettros-the Islamic fullilment of Pakistan

and the secular-democratic state doctrine of India' Itssolution by mutual bilateral negotiations will prove to be far

from easy. There is a sharp element of irony in the Kashmir

situation. After the Shimla Agreement of 1972' the Line of

Control dividing the Indian and Pakistani parts of the state

gained dejure recognition for 17 years. Itwas de-recognised

in 1989 when the people of the valley of Kashmir rose inrebellion against India and received immediate military'logistical, political and moral support from Pakistan' Unlike

in 1965. on this occasion, however, the Pal'iistanis did notdespatch a large number of troops into the Valley provoldng

a full-scale war wtth India' In 199O-9f , India and Pal'dstan

engaged in rhetorical brinkmanship while their troops stood

eye-to-eye along the Funjab and RaJasthan borders' But the

Pakistani military cautioned the political leaders from the

beginning against provoking India to war' With their help tothe Kashmir militants, Pakistan staked its claim to the

entire state, demanded a UN supervised plebiscite (ignoring

ttre fact that the UN Security Council's resolution of 1948

was more unacceptable to it than to India). The two countriesare thus locked in what is called' in strateg$c language, a

low intensity conllict. It has been bleeding both countries,India more than Pakistan.

India has posted half a million troops in the state and is

spending Rs. 30 million a day to save it from the Jaws ofPakistan. The cost for Pakistan is not precisely known.However, the demand for an independent Kashmir is as

unacceptable to Pakistan as it is to India though some

Pakistanis now acknowledge that there can be no settlementwithout the free consent of the people of Kashmir. Pakistancan hardly snatch away from India the Valley with fourmillion Mustms. 'Itre deadlock is, therefore, difftcult to

5l

52 Perspectiues on South Asra

break except on the basis of give_and_take. pakistan isunable to give because of its national position and alsobecause Kashmir is a gainful issue in its electoral politics. Itis politically impossible for any Indian government to let thestate go to Pakistan. Kashmir, therefore, threatens to freezethe relationship between the trvo major nations in Sou rAsia in a state of permanent tension and confrontauon.

However, the cloudy sl$/ is not entirely without a silverlining. In recent years, several streams of unofficial dialo5gueshave been flowing between pakistan and India with a view toinfluencing the two governmerrts to adopt a more flodbleposiflon to relax the near-frozen relationship. An eminentformer Pakistani diplomat has suggested a .,basket approach,',dividing the issues between the two countries into tbur'baskets" and suggesting that these baskets be taken upaccording to an agreed priority, each basket, bearing positivifruits of accord and under$tanding making lts owncontribution to the overall relationship. lssues like theSiachin Glacier, the Wullar Dam, the Sir Creek navalboundary are easier to resolve. If their resolutiorr opens uptrade, cultural and {nformation flows between the twoneighbours, some shine will descend on the cloudy overallrelationship. The Kashmir problem will eventually have tobe settled more or less along the current line of control,perhaps giving Pakistan territorial concessions in certainspecifiic areas, and opening up tJle border between the two.parts of Kashmir so that Kashmiris can travel and tradebetween them freely.

Milttary Intervention

In the late l98os and earl5r lggos, direct or indirectmilitary intervention by a South Asian countr5r in the internalaffalrs of another, either at the request of a beleagueredgovernment or in a clandestine but easily discernible mannerhave added a sharp edge to regional conflicts. The Indtandespatch of a peace-keeping force to Sri Lanka in lgg7 was

Conflict Resotution in South Asia

legitimate because it was done at the specific request of thethen Sri t ankan President. But the complex rdmifications ofthe intervention-the expansion of tJle force from 4,OOO to1,OO,O0O, its long and costly military engagement with theLTTE, the role it played in Sri Lanka's internal politics likesafeguarding the national election, and enabling the Colombogou".n-"ttfto divert almost its entire military force to theSouth to reduce the JVP rebellion, the demand of Premadasafor the withdrawal of the IPKF immediately after his electionas President and his dubbing the IPKF as an "occupafionarmy" and flnally and, tragically, the assassination of RaJiv

Gandhi at the hands of a LTTE female suicide cadre-consfitute a melancholy episode from which all South Asianstates have great lessons to learn.

No South Aslan count4r can afford its internal schisms todebauch to a stage when it has to solicit military intervenflonfrom a neighbour or a distant government. Militaryinterventons, if at all essential as a measure of last resort,must be like a surgical operation, finished quickly and theknife sheathed as soon as the operation is over. Interventionby a regional peace-kegping force is far more constructivethan intervention by a single nation, which in South Asia,can only be India. Intervention by an extra-regional forcewill not be acceptable to India unless India itself is includedin the force or unless the UN is the intervening authority.

Indirect clandestine military operation in a neighbouringcountry leads to "pro:rqr wars- or low intensity conflicts. Thisis going on between India and Pakistan since the mid- l98oswith the outbreak of tJle 'Khalistan' rebellion and, on a largescale, since the 1989 uprising in Kashmir. Indian denialsnotwithstanding, it would be idle to claim that India is doingnothing to pay Pakistan in its own coin. There are reportsttrat the ULFA rebels in Assam are training in Bangladeshand Chakma rebels in India. The reports are routinelydenied by the respective governments, but th€y go on

53

Perspectiue s on Sottth Asia

appearing in the mass media and they do influence offlcialrelaflons with one another.

End of the Cold War

It is often mistakenly argued that the end of the Cold Warhas had no positive impact on Souttr Asia and that theregion's own little cold war continues unabated. The factsare otherwise. Both India and Pakistan have lost theirpatron states whose generous transfer of weapons andspares kept the two armies batfle-fit. The cut-off of Americanmilitary aid to Pakistan since October 1990 had diminishedthe army's war-making ability. India has lost the assuredsupply of 7O per cent of its weapons from the USSR as wellas the supply of spares. All countries in South Asia areunder pressure to reduce military expenditure. In lgg2-98,India cut its military budget in real terms by six per centand Pakistan increased its own by an insignificant two percent. As the end of the Cold War has ruled out a nuclear warbetween t]le US and Russia, so has it mled out a conventionalwar between Pakistan and India.

After the Cold War's end, the overall strategic situation inthe South has improved. Relations between Nepal and Indiahave never been better; India's relations with Bangladeshhave improved in spite of the strain created by the issue ofillegal migrations. President Premadasa, on a short visit toDelhi as chairman of SAARC in early Octob er 1992, declaredthat there were no conflictual trilateral issues between thetwo countries. Even SAARC has begun to move tentativelyand falteringly towards the concept of a South Asian freetrade area. Private investment from India has begun to flowinto Nepal; trade between India and Bangladesh has beensteadily increasing, and even Pakistan and India are buyingand selling to one another in stealth. India and Sri Lankahave been discussing the prospects of expanding Indo-Lanka trade links.

Co4llict Resolution rn South Asia

India's position in the world has changed with the end ofthe Cold War. It is no longer seen as an ally of the USSRwhich is no more. India is now part of what once used to becalled the "free world," or more precisely, the world capitalisteconomy. Its relations with the United States, Japan,Germany, tJ.e EC, Russia and countries of the Pacilic rimare improving and assuming more of an economic andtechnological context. Its market of 3OO million buyers ofconsumer durables, with 50 million Indians enjoying alifestyle that is higher than that of the average American,will surely attract foreign investment sooner rather thanlater. Once India becomes rich, and its rate of GDP growthgets close to China's, the geo-human situation in SouthAsia will begin to change, and many of today's conflicts willyield to mutually beneficial cooperation.

For a while, the melancholy turn of events in the formerUSSR and Yugoslavia generated a false hope that all or mostethnic groups struggling for independence in South Asiawould succeed in their objectives and that the multinationalstates of South Asia would break apart. Most Pakistaniswere certain in 199O that nothing could stop the Kashmiripeoples'bid for separation from India or that Punjab willbreak away from India like Ukraine or Moldavia did from tl.eUSSR. The separatist euphoria has already waned if it hasnot withered altogether. South Asian multinational statesystems are fundamentally different from the way the USSRwas created. No multinational state in South Asia is going tobreak up; the units are bound together by single civilisationalties; the states are strong enough to turn away the tide ofseparatism; no state is going to openly intervene to separatea limb from a neighbouring state.

However, the end of the Cold War has brought in waves ofdemocracy and self-determinatlon. These waves not onlyoverthrew dictatorial or otherwise authoritarian regimes,they also built up pressures for the recognition of the rightof self-determination of geographically and culturally

55

56 Perspectiaes on South Asia

identiflable ethnic groups or nationalities. The centre ofconflict in South Asia will shift from the external to theinternal though, in the peculiar ethnic overflow character ofthe region, demands and struggles of nationalities fordemocracy and self-determinafion, for equality and justice,will often strain inter-state relations.

The last but by no means the least constructive impact ofthe end of the cold war of South Asia is the, metamorphosisin the image of China among the South Asian nations.India's relations with China have improved sigprificantly andare in the process of further improvement. What is moststgntficant is tllat India does not regard China's relationswith Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as hostile to its owninterests and is reconciled to the Chinese policy tosimultaneously build friendly ties with Indla and Paftistan.The change in China's erstwhile posiUon on Kashmir and itspresent emphasis that Kashnrir is an issue to be setfledbilaterally between India and Pakistan (both regarded byChina as friendly) through peaceful negotiations, and India'scorrect stand on the status of Tibet have helped cementSino-Indian relations. A strong Confldence-Building Regime(CBR) has been erected along the Sino{ndian border ensuringthat there no border incidents, while negotiatlons for thesettlement of the long-disputed border have begun to showpromise of success. The end of the Cold War has broughtChina to the Non-Aligned Movement as an observer.

Confllct Control, M4nagcmcnt and Resolution: PollcyRecommcndatlong

The nature and dimensions of South Asian conflicts havebeen discussed in detail in the foregoing sections. To sumup, the conflicts are of four tJpes, triggered by three causes.First, the generic conflict between India and Pakistan. Itshottest manlfestaflon is Kashnlir. Second, conllicts involvingcross-border nationalities or ethnic groups like Tamils,Nepalis and Bengali Muslims and Hindus. Third, inter-

Coqflict Resofutbn tn South Asia

religious clashes. And fourth, demands and struggles forself-determination by nationalities or ethnic groups whohave found their own still-to-be-recognised identity withinthe larger identity of the nation-states.

Then there are threat perceptions. At several defence-oriented seminars in Delhi held in recent times, delegatesfrom the smaller South Asian countries reiterated that thelarge size of India's military power-army, air force andnavy - makes them feel threatened and insecure. There isthe traditional South Asian perception of India as ahegemony, a perception ttrat has often been sustained byIndian diplomatic rhetoric or national behaviour.

However, ttrreat perceptions alone do not make conflicts.They do render the building of mutual trust and confidencedifficult. The territorial as5rmmetry of South Asia cannot bewished away. India with its large size, huge population,common borders with China and Pakistan and a coastlinethat exposes it to (possible though not probable) attacks bynaval powers must have a defence force that is considerableto be commensurate for its security. However, certain newpolicies adopted and pursued by India should reduce andmellow threat percepUons.

India as the giant power in South Asia must build otherconcepts of securit5r-mutual security, collective security,adequate and not maximalist security. It must constantlyensure its neighbours that they have not only nothing tofear from it but everything to gain from its strength. Jointmilitary exercises, a network of confidence-buildingmeasures, periodical meetings of defence chiefs and ministersand joint mechanisms for regional security against dmgs,arms peddlers and terrorism will reduce threat perceptionsand generate mutual confidence. The concept of zero-sumrelations must be totally and permanently banished fromSouth Asia.

Resolution of lesser conflictual problems like Siachin, Sir

DI

58 Perspecthses on South Asia

Creek and the Wullar Dam will dlefinitely lower the thresholdof Pakistan's enemy perceptions of India. On this more-than-modest threshold of mutual confidence, opening ofcommercial, econornic, technological, cultural relaflons, evenon a moderate scale, will strengthen mutual trust andconfidence and build a mutual stake in peace. The massmedia will have to abandon their sole concentration onbuilding images of enmity and hostility. While differencesand disputes will continue to be reported and commentedupon, and the points of view of each projected to the other,the mass media should also report positive developments inother countries and give legittunate importance to the loweringof the conflict threshold. Of the utmost importance is thefree flow of information between the neighbouringdemocracies. Both India and Pakistan must abandon thelanguage of confrontation, rejection, spite and hatred infavour of a language of restraint, of regard for one another'spolitlcal systems and cultural and social achievements.

The current multi-channel unofficial dialogues and jointstatements by eminent individuals of both countries urginga lowering of confrontation and even a modest opening toone another must be continued and expanded. Many moreexchanges of scholars, Journalibts, artists and musicians,social workers, civil right acth'ist$, parliamentary delegationswill help open up the long-closed minds of Indians andPakistanis with regard to one another.

Mutually agreed reduction of force levels and militarybudgets together with confidence-building measures alongthe frontiers of t]le two countries will also reduce threatperceptions.

With regard to Kashmir, the only rational policy for bothcountries is to begin talks within the framework of theShimla Agreement but without giving up either's well-knownpositions on other aspects of the issue. However, as thetalks proceed, neither country should expect early progress

Co4llict Resoltttion in South Asia

towards a solution according to its own preferred positon.Oflicials and unofficial experts can work separately and,/ ortogether to explore various ways and means to build aregime in Kashmir that would be acceptable to both. Inpolitical life what is desirable is often not possible orattainable; hence the need for mutual compromise andaccommodation. India cannot hand over the state of Jammuand Kashmir to Pakistan nor can pakistan abandon itsnational position on Kashmir. A compromise will have to beachieved, and the two countries must reconcile themselvesto the reality that this will take time.

India cannot start serious talks with pakistan before ithas brought its own part of Kashmir, specifically the Valley,under normal political conditions which means a politicalsettlement with the Kashmiri Muslims and rejuvenating thedemocratic process. Once this has been attained-and it isnot going to happen tomorrow-the Kashmiris on both sidesmay be taken in as a third party to the talks for a finalsettlement. Surely Jammu and Ladakh will refuse to accepta settlement that is weighted in favour of the Muslims orPakistan. Nor can "Azad Kashmir" and the NorthernTerritories be excluded from the negotiafions process. Anindependent sovereign state of Kashmir will not be acceptableto either India or Pakistan, nor indeed to China in view of itspossible repercussions on Tibet and Xinxiang. But acombined Kashmir of the Muslims on both sides with thema)dmum autonomy and with equal ties with India andPakistan looks like an ideal solution once trrst and conlidencebetween the two countries has been firmly established.Both Indians and Pakistanis will be sobered by the thoughtthat a war alone muted the Kashmir issue for lZ years. Theycannot afford to risk another war to resolve the issue .,once

and for ever", as some people in both countries someumessuggest. Territorial disputes have taken many ye€rs roresolve elsewhere in the world. Once the two countries agreethat the issue is disputed and must be settled peacefully

59

60 Perspectives on South Asta

through negotiations, time should be hugged as an ally anda helper not an enemy and an obstructor.

On the nuclear issue, both countries find themselvesgrtdlocked to their national posltions. For India, the nuclearprogramme and the elusive'option" with capability to makethe bomb proven, constitute a sJrmbol of national status.India exploded the device in 1974, in response to Chinagoing nuclear a decade before. Did Indira Gandhi anilclpatethat tl'.e Indian explosion would immediately trigger aPalrristani resolve to acquire nuclear capability whatever thecost? Now that both countries have acquired capability'their flrst task is to mutually freeze this capability andensure that no weaponisation takes place in either nation.India will not find it possible to sign tl.e NPT without acompensating status symbol which may be permanentmembership of the UN Security Council.

The immediate task is to make South Asia nuclear safe ifit cannot be made nuclear-free. A nuclear-safe region wouldrequire India and Pakistan to sign a series of bilateralagreements freezlng their capability at the present level,pledging not to use their capability against one another,providing mutual inspecfion of, one or more nuclear plantsin etther country, adopting an open skies policy, and initiatingcooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energ5/, particularlyin the field of medicine.

In the case of conflicts emanating from spill-over of ettrnicgroups across borders, a three-pronged approach to control,management and resolution needs to be adopted' Firstly'naflonal governments must find all ways and means to give

the maximum posslble political satisfaction to ethnicminorities demanding self-government or "independence".Empirical studies show that refusal on the part of those inpower to grant moderate demands of democratic self-rulepushes ttre concerned groups, or their youth fringes toarmed extremism. Armed militancy is relaflvely easy in the

Conflict Resolution in South Asia

present world where regions and nations are awash witharms; there is a huge open arms bazaar, and almost eachnationality has a diaspora that can come to its aid witharms and funds.

Once a conflict has broken out, care must be taken toinsulate the overflowing ethnic groups in the neighbouringcountry from getting involved. This is a very difficult taskbut no South Asian country must allow its territory to beused against the interest and security of a neighbouringcountr5r. The governments of involved neigfibouring countriesmust frequenfly consult with one another and set up a jointbody to arrest spill-over effects.

South Asians have to realise that language, religion andcultural heritage are human properties divided between andamong natons on a permanent basis. The French do notregard the French-speaking Belgians as their kith and kin,nor intewene on their behalf in Belgium's internal turmoils.The Arabs with the same religion and language and culturalheritage are divided into many nation-states. Pakistan's"concern" for the Muslims of India is an indirect interventionin the latter's internal affairs. India has far more Muslimsthan Pakistan. There is hardly a day or a month whenMuslims are not killing Muslims in Islamic countries or anIslamic state is not flghting another Islamic state.

Empirical research shows that communal riots do notbreak out but are provoked and created by interested andmotivated political or bigoted religious people. These riotsare easy to prevent and easier to bring under control providedthe government and communities act with will anddetermination. Creation of inter -communal bodies insensitive areas to act as watchdogs of communal peace,building volunteer groups who will be mobilised for immediateintervention as soon as there is a sign of a bushfire,settlement of disputes by arbitration, mediation andcompromise outside courts of law, permanent lines of

6l

62 Perspectiues on South Asia

communication and dialogue between unfriendlycommunifies, and civilized, humane behaviour on the partof the police are some of the measures that should be butare not taken because politicians often believe that communalriots are politically gainful: they divert people's minds frommajor social and economic issues, and they are electorallyprofitable.

Dialogue at offfcial and unofflcial levels is of gpeat value toreduce tensions and promote mutual and multilateralunderstanding. In South Asia there are several streams ofdialogues between India and Pakistan, each seMng a usefuland desirable end. These dialogues contribute towardsconfidence-building measures being adopted by the twogovernments. We must realise that there will be a lot ofpublic posturing together with negotiations at summits,between officials and in tl.e corridors of power for a longtlme before India-Paldstan relations can be brought to a

However, the South Asian Dialogue has its own distinctivecontribudon to make to improve the overall climate of humanminds in this region of massive humanities. llee SouthAsian Dialogue does not speak from country positlons, itssearch is for the region's true and abiding interests. Itbrings regional ouflooks to bear upon individual issues,but, more importantly, seeks to set directions in which therulers as well as the elites must project their minds in thepost-Cold War period if they really wish to improve the lot ofover a billion people. It will be a long hard slog, but thatmust not daunt the pathbreakers to peace, regionalunderstanding and cooperation.

Along with the South Asian Dialogue, the time has cometo set up bilateral dialogues between India and its smallerneig;hbours. We must now take up seriously the task ofsetdng up regular perlodical dialogues between India andSri Lanka, India and Bangladesh and India and Nepal.

Conflict Resolution rn South Asra 63

Our persistent efforts must induce the governments ofSouth Asia to commit themselves to a set of inviolableprinciples governing bilateral and regional relations. Theseven essential principles to be adopted are:

l. There shall be no military conflict or war betweencountries of South Asia. The region should proceed towardstJle conclusion of a regional no-war pact.

2. No South Asian countr5r must allow its territory to beused against the internal and external interests of another.

3. No South Asian country must intervene in the internalaffairs of another.

4. Issues affecting overflowing groups or illegal migrationswill be solved bilaterally or multilaterally through peacefulgood-neigfrbourly negotiations. Each South Asian count4rmust display maximum understandinA of the other,sdifficulties and problems

5. The South Asian countries must set up in the nearfuture a Regional Security Consultative Council which wllldiscuss and resolve all conflictual issues, determine agreedlevel of arms and military expenditures and mechanisms tosettle territorial and other disputes as and when they arise.The prime ministers and executive presidents will attendthe meetings of the Council which should meet twice a vear.with their foreign and defence ministers.

6. The South Asian countries must abhor and reject allkinds of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear.chemical, bacteriological weapons, and meticuloislv avoidrunning arms races.

7. There should be set up as soon as possible a SouthAsian Environmental Council to take care of environmentalneeds of the region.

64 Perspecttues on South Asta

END NOTES

I . The polifical history of the Sotrth Asian countries mirrors the

region's diversitles. India has remained a parliamentary

democracy except for a short period of 18 months from

lg75-77 when civil liberties were suspended and an

Emergency regime was proclaimed. Pakistan has been under

direct military or bureaucratic-military rule for the better

part of its history. It has had three constituflons and three

democratic parliamentary governments, the first, after the

1972 elections, for three years, and the second, after the

1988 elections and the third from l99l to July 1993' The

first democratic government followed the defeat of the

Pakistani army in Bangladesh and the resignation of General

Yahya Khan as President; the second followed the death of

General Ziaul Haq in a plane crash in 1987' Srt Lanka

changed from a parliamentary democratic model to a

presidential one in 1977. Eangiadesh, started in 7972 as a

parliamentary democracy, came under a single-partypresidential regime, and then under military rule in 1975'

iollowed by a presidential form of military rule, and recently'

after the fall of General Ershad, decided to revert to

parliamentary democracy. Nepal changed to constitutionalmonarchY after an uprising.

2. The 1948 war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir; the

1962 border war between India and China; the 1965 India-

Pakistan war over Kashmir; and the 1971 war between

Pakistan, the Bangladesh Mukti Vahini (liberation force)

and India in East Pakistan' The small war was fought

between India and Pakistan in early 1965 in the Rann of

Kutch, on the west coast of the subcontinent'

3. IndiaDeJence Reuieu) makes the interesting claim that "there

is a neat arrangement worked out between China' Pakistan

and India in the matter of guided weapons (GW) development

and thereafter deployment as and when a given system

fructifies... -The arrangement works thus: China develops a

comprehensive range of GW system of the first generauon

wittr- some help from outside. To partially make up for the

large amount of funds spent and also to earn prestge and

influence, it sells some missiles to Pakistan together with

Coqflict Resoltttion in South Asia

designs, know-how and components. India does not makemore than cosmetic noises of protest. It develops its ownGW systems. There are no protests from China, See, ,.More

Missiles," Indian DeJence Reuieu. 1989. pp. 2O7 -2Og.lndiahas test-ffred three ballistic missiles of which one, Agni, is ofan intermediate range (IRBM). An American specialist wrotein 1991, 'A single test, or even a few, of India,s Agni IRJiMprovides an insufficient database for both assessing reliabilityand for developing methods of evaluation that couldpotentially substitute for subsequent operational flights.New t5pes of US ICBMs typically undergo some two dozen ormore deployment.' Susan M. Burns, .,Arms Limitations," inStephen P. Cohen, (ed.l, Nuclear prolikration in South Asra:The Prospects Jor Arms Control, lnndon: Westview press,f991, p. L42. lndian arrd pakistani nuclear capability hasimparted a new dimension to the two countries' fledgingmissiles arsenal. At the same time, the persian Gulf war hasmade ultramodern features of weapon system the goal ofmost countries." S. Adhikari, "Missiles proliferation in ThirdWorld," Indian Journol oJ Strategic Studies, vol. xvi, specialissue on Gulf Crisis, 1991, pp. ISS-144.

4. For a detailed analysis of cross-border ethnic flows, andeach South Asian country's ability to create domesticproblems for at least one other regional country, see BhabaniSen Cupta, SottlhAsiant Perspectiues: SeuenNattons in Conlictand Cooperation, New Delhi: B.R, publishing Corporation,1988, Chapter l. For more comprehensive studies, see,Partha Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, NewDelhi: Manohar, 1989; Urmila Phadnis, EthnicitA and. NcrtionBuilding tn South Asta, New Delhi: Sage publications, lggo;Bhabani Sen Gupta, (ed.), Regionol Cooperation rr SouthAsra, Vol. I & II, New Delhi: South Asia publishers, 198g.

5. For a comprehensive critique of the IpKF operations, see,S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna. New Delhi: 1992.The author says that the force was poorly conceived and ithad to operate entirely without experience offighting guerillaforces. See also, Bhabani Sen Gupta, op. cit., Chapter 6, K.Subramanyam, "The IPKF Expedition Not All in Vain," TheTimes oJ India, l3 June 1989.

65

66 Perspectiues on South Asin

6. The Indian hegemonic posture is the subject of continuingcriticism and attack in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh andNepal. It is conceded and criticised by some Indian analysts,but denied or defended by others. As samples of Pakistaniperceptions, See Mushahid Flussain, "India's Bully-on-the-block Mentality," The Natton, 23 April l99O and AkhtarMaJeed, "India's Security Perspectives in the l99Os," AstanSurueg, November 1990. For a sample of Nepali perspectives,Dhurba Kumar, Soui€t Arms to Indkr and lmplications onRegional Seatritg, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and AsianStudies, March 1985. A Sri Lankan analyst wrote in 1989*Time and again the smaller nations of South Asia have hadit drilled into them that they must not cease to rememberthe geopolitical realities of having to peacefully co-exist withtheir giant Indian neighbour...Sri l,anka is at present in thethores of the agony of being gradually swallowed up ...Considering what is happeniqg today and India's hegemonicambitions, if a dismembered India is brought into being,then only could her smaller neighbours live without fear."Swtdag Times,23 April 1989. For the Indian side, see SaeedNaqvi, 'superpowers have endorsed Indiana in South Asia,"The Telegraph. l9 August 1987; Sunanda K. Datta Ray,"South Asia Under an Indian Version of the Monroe Doctrine,"lnternational Herald Tribune reproduced ln Nrrlua-i-WoLqt,

l,ahore (in English), 2l April 1989; Bhabani Sen Gupta, "AnIndian Security Doctrine," IndiaTodog. l5 September 1984'

7. World Military Expenditures qnd Arms Transfers 1989,Washington D.C. pp. 3-4. "Sputh Asian armed forces grewat arr overall rate of 1.7 per cent during the decade. However,after the peak in 1985, growth declined to 0.5 per cent.Armed forces in India, the trargest in South Asia, begandecreasing during the second half of the decade and inf 988, fell 9,3 per cent. Simllariy, Pakistani armed forces,which have been in a state of decline since 1984, experienceda sharp decrease of I5.4 pet cent in 1988. Despite suchcutbacks in the two largest armed forces of South Asia, it isuncertain if these changes reflect a lessenlng oftensions andconflicts within the region." Ibid., p. 4, At the end of thedecade, India became the largest single arms importer in thethirld world after Iraq, p. 1O.

Conflict Resolution in South Asra

8. Ieonard Spector, Going Nuclear, Cambridge: Mass, BallingerPubllshing Company, f987, pp. 73-rOO. There is now aconsiderable quanuty of literature on Indian and Pakistaninuclear progFtrmmes written in India and the United States(with fewer than half a dozen publications in Pakistan). SeeStephen P. Cohen, (ed.), Nuclear ProliJeration in South Asrc:The Prospects Jor Arms Control, London: WesMew Press,l99l; Rodney Jones, Smcll Nuclear Potuers, WashingtonPapers No. lO3, Washington D.C. 1984; K Subramanyam,(ed.l, Nuclear MAtts and Realities, New Delhi: 1984; RobertaWohlstetter, The Buddha Smiles: Absent-Minded Peacejtl Aid.and the Indinn Bon7b, Monograph I, Energr Research andDevelopment Administration, Contract No. (49-l)-1747, f O

April f977; RaJa Ramanna, Years oJ Pilgrimage, PenguinIndia, l99l; Ravi Rikhye, Militarization oJ Mother India, NewDelhi: 1990, S. Rashid Naim, Asra's Day Ajter: Ntrclear WarBetLoeen India and Pakistan, Office of Arms Control,Disarmament and International Securitv, Universitv ofIllinois, 1985.

9. Spector, Ibid., pp. 1Ol-119. For Indian perceptions of thePaklstani bomb, see Maj.Gen. D.K. Palit and P.K.SNamboodiri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb, New Delhi: VikasPublications 1979.

tO. R.R. Subramanian, Indio, Paktstdn, Chino: DeJence andNuclear Tnangle in South Asia, New Delhi: ABC PublishingHouse, 1989, pp. 49-5O.

I 1. Shireen Mazari, "Nuclear Issues: Options for Pakistan,"Strdtegic Perspectiues, Islamabad: Institute of StrategicStudies, Vol. I, Summer 1991, pp. 4f -49.

12. The Netus,l,ahore edition, 9 November 1991.

13. A policy case against India going nuclear is made in BhabaniSen Gupta, Nuclear Weapons? Policg Options Jor India, NewDelhi: Sage Publications for Centre for Policy Research,r985.

14. See interview with General K. Sundarii. Indirt Todau. 15January 1992.

67

South Asia: PoliticisedEthnicity; Problems of Human

Rights ; and EnvironmentalIssues

K.M. de Silua, G.H. Peiris andRadhika Coomnrasusamg

Sectron I

POLITICISED ETI"INICITY

K.M. de Silua

Introduction

This paper deals with three related and vitally importantissues in South Asia. This region has some of the mostintractable political conflicts of any part of the world, and atthree levels: international, national and subnational. Theissues we deal with are politicised ethnicity and conflictresolution; problems of human rights; and environmenta,lissues. The sources of conflict are as much social and

Etfuiicitg: Human Rights: and Enuironment 69

economic as they are political. They are as much internal astJrey are cross-national. The inevitable result of these conflictsis as Radhika Coomaraswamy shows in section II of thischapter, a widespread violation of human rights bygovernment forces and separatist and other opposition forcesas well. G.H. Peiris's review of environmental issues insection III shows how massive increases in population inmost parts of South Asia, among other problems, haveresulted in a persistent pressure on resources. This in turnraises the political temperature both within the countries ofthe region and often, in their relations with each other.

Confllct Resolution

The reality of internal struggle, the potential for externalconflict and the prospect of bloodshed on an enormousscale are greater in South Asia than in most other parts ofAsia with the possible exception of the Middle East. We needto remind ourselves that no ethnic or religious conflict inrecent times has resulted in greater carnage and destructionthan the Hindu-Muslim rivalry that led to the partition ofIndia in 1947, It caused between 5OO,OOO .rrd t *illio.,deaths and resulted in nearly lb million refugees, enormousnumbers given the population of the rq of about 42O millionat that time.

Some of tJle problems we confront are unique. No regionin any part of the developing world is dominated by a sin$estate, in population, in armed might and in the size of theeconomy, as India dominates South Asia. Thus the veryvastness of India is a central feature of any study of conflictsituations and conllict resolution in South Asia. To complicatematters even further, each of India,s neighbours has minoriffgroups with linguisuc, religious or cultural ties with gro.rp"in India, or aspire to establish such ties with them. Indiahas been, and is, in a positon to exploit ttrese links to itsadvantage or the disadvantage of its neighbours wherever itwants to. r In one instance, however, India's neiAhbour

70 Perspecttues on South Asia

Pakistan has been able to exploit such ethnic or religiousties with Kashmiris to her (India's) discomfiture.

South Asia ls a geographical oddity not only due to theoverwhelming dominance of India, but also because it isvirtually impossible to demarcate a distinct boundary on

two of the four sides of this large sub-continental landmass.

To the north lies the Himalayan frontier and beyond itChina and, up to very recently, the Soviet Union but now

ttre various 'istans', including the Islamic states of CentralAsia. To the north and north-west lies the Islamic worid. To

the north-east and east is Myanmar (Burma)-in part abuffer and in part a link between South and South-EastAsia. Myanmar was part of the British rq, and many of itscurrent problems are rooted in its colonial past, just as

some of India's problems in the north-east stem from theconquest and absorption of Burma. OnIy in the south where

the sub-continental landmass tapers down into a triangularform do we find a distinct and undisputed boundary-thesea around South Asia. The Himalayas are geographically

an unmistakable boundary, but politically they are in dispute'

The Legacy of Colonialism

The origins of many conflicts in South Asia-international,national and subnational-either go back to the region's

colonial past or are rooted in the manner independence was

attained such as the problems between India and Pakistanflowing from the partition of the rcg. India, Pakistan,Ban$adesh and Burma (now Myanmar) were all part of therq. Of the ottrer lbur SAARC countries two were peripherallylinked to the rq: Nepal and Bhutan. Sri Lanka, Iike theMaldives, was independent of the rqi and was controlled bythe Colonial Office. The Maldives had a tutelary relatlonshipwith Whttehall through the Governor of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

All the successor 6tates of the rq have inherited borderproblems from ttre rq, which bring them into conflict withneighbourtng states (India and China' for instance and, to a

ELhnlci!: Human Rrghts: and Enuironment

lesser extent in terms of the violence it has generated,Pakistan and Afghanistan) or with each other (lndia andPakistan, and Ban$adesh and Myanmar). Post-Independencedefinition or re-definition of boundaries also brings thesestates into disputes with neighbours (India and China) orover resources such as irrigation works (India and Pakistan)and river waters (india and Bangladesh not to mentionIndia and Paldstan).

The fact tllat the hosfllity between India and Pakistanlooms so large in the South Asian political landscape shouldnot divert attention from the domestic tensions which are.in fact, more sigpilicant as threats to ttre political stability ofmany countries in the region. All too often these domesflctensions spill over borders into neighbouring states andtrigg;er inter-state conflicts: the conflict between India andPakistan which led to the creation of Bangladesh; theKashmir imbroglio which has resulted in three wars betweenPahistan and India; and the problems of Sri Lanka's northand east which attracted Indian intervention. In the midand late 194Os these internal tensions had resulted in thepartition of the rq and the establishment of Pakistan-thetriumph of naflonalism linked with religion; less than twentyfour years later, there was the creation of Bangladesh, thetriumph of linguistic nationalism. With the current salienceof Hindu fundamentalism in India, with its insistence thatbeing a Hindu is the dellning principle of being an Indian,the interplay of religion and nationalism has come fullcircle. Hindu 'fundamentalism' is now a mass movement inIndia, and given the size of Hindu India-Hind.ufua-itsdemands and claims have provoked in turn, similar reactionsfrom Muslims. Sikhs. and to a lesser extent from Buddhistsand Christians.2 As the recent events in Ayodhyademonstrate, the communal violence they set in motion inso many parts of the country poses a grave threat to thestability of the Indian polity, both through further rounds ofviolence between Hindu and Muslim. and in ttre alienation

7l

Perspectiues on Soufh Asia

of Indian Muslims.

The recrudescence of politicised religion in thecontemporary public life of India is an appropriate point ofdeparture for a brief reference to an aspect of religion whichdeserves more attenUon from South Asian scholars andpoliticians than it has received so far-the threat to thesurvival of Buddhism in the Himalayan region. The parlousstate of Buddhism in Tibet is, of course, the core of theproblem. Many Buddhist monasteries, and other sites ofreligious significance to Buddhlsts, have been destroyed bythe Chinese, and even those that survive do so under severerestrictions. The Chinese see Tibetan Buddhist monasteriesas centres of resistance to their control over Tibet. Tibet'sproblems are beyond the scope of South Asian conflictresoluton, but many aspects of the survival of HimalayanBuddhism are very much within its scope, beginning withthe threats to the survival of Buddhism in Ladakh, and thedecline of Buddhism in Sikkim under Indian rule. Bhutan,of course, remains a Buddhist kingdom, but one aspect ofthe present conJlict between the Bhutanese and Nepaliminority is the perceived threat to Bhutan's Buddhist societyfrom an inflr-rx of Hindus. Beyond the Himalayas and on tothe Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh we confront thethreatened position of that country's Buddhist minority.3

Polltlcs and EthnicityThe political establishments in all of South Asia are

embroiled in protracted conflicts with ethnic and religiousminori es who seek to resist the expanding powers anddemands of the state, Often tl-e pluralist reality of ethnicand cultural conffgurations is overshadowed by assertionsof a homogenetic identity within the boundaries of thesepost-colonial states. The post-Independence states of theregion bear the marks of their colonial origins through theprocesses of pre-colonial consolidation and expansion, andof state building which they have inherited. The new rulers

EthnicitA: Human Rights; and Enuironrnent

as legal heirs of their colonialist predecessors often disregardindigenous forces such as language, culture, religion andethnicity with the same insouciance. As a result conflictsover identity are a major, if not the principal, source ofinternal tensions in India, Sri Lanka, and pakistan, in thatorder.

The current reality in South Asia is that language, culture,religion and ethnicity stemming from pre-colonial times,and acting separately or in combination, have assumed theproportions of explosive forces threatening the stability ofthe post-Independence political settlement. The successorstates which are intent on preserving their inheritanceunchanged confront separatist forces immanent in thesepowerful but contradictory processes of state building onthe foundation of colonial and pre-colonial structures. Theminority ethnic resistance takes the form, more often thannot, of separatist movements seeking the creation of newstates in which the minorit5z could convert itself into amajority. Thus separatism is as much the result of theprocesses of imposing colonial rule in these regions, as it isa result of the re-emergence of powerful pre-colonial forcesseeking a political identity coincident with language, andculture, and/or with religion.

While separatism appears to be endemic in South Asiaand could be and is a powerful destabilizing force, it hasgenerally been held at bay by an even more powerful force:Asian natonalism embodied in the post-colonial state systemof Asia. It would be true to say that, up to very recently, thegreat obstacle that separatist movements in re third worldfaced was a general hostility to disturbing the srarus quo.Because practically everyone is vulnerable to the pull ofindigenous and often external forces it was seen to be ineveryone's interest to help edsting post-colonial nation-states to resist tlrreats to their integiity from indigenousand external separatist forces.

73

Persoectiues on South Asra

A general reluctance to disturb the stahrs quo embodiedin the boundaries of the post-colonial state system however,

did not prwent or even inhibit involvements in ethnic conflictstn neighbouring states. India's intervention in Sri Lanka'sethnic conflict, Pakistan:s covert involvement in the affairsof tJle Punjab, or India's in Sind are examples. And of coursethere was the classic case of a regional power's successfulexploitation of ethnic conflict [n a neighbouring state to itsown strategic advantage, the events that led to thedismemberment of Pakistan-in its original politicalmanifestation in I97 1.4

In the current international environment of the end of theCold War, this tolerance of the sanctity of boundaries, evenwhen they are seen to be manifestly disputed boundaries islikely to fade away and so too the general reluctance tocountenance separatlsm, or to treat it as a legitimate force.

A world which accepts the dismemberment of the formerYugoslavia-a balkanization of the Balkans-is hardly likelyto give as much thought as in the past to the politicalconsequences of changes in international boundaries in thepost-colonial world. The rulers of most post-colonial stateswill have to learn to live with that.

Mlgratlons: Colonial and Po$t-Colonial

Migration of population from the rq1 and within it, someof it voluntary and some of it involuntary, has contributedto tensions among and within the states of South Asia, andamong their neigfrbours. Ttre voluntary demographic shiftscould be divided into two chronologically distinct categories;some go back to colonial times and others are post-Independence. The r4F was treated as a vast reservoir oflabour which ttre British tapped for despatch to colonies as

far away as Guyana in the Caribbean, Piji in the Paciflc,Natal in South Africa, and to Mauritius in the Indian Oceanregion, and closer home, to Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Malayawherever there was a shortage of labour, an early form of

Ethnicifu; Human Rights: and Environment

transnational transfer of population.6 Indian communitiesthat emerged from these voluntary migraUons have remainedbehind in the receiving colonies. Questions relating to ttreirpolitical status have led to prolonged and acrimoniousdisputes between the successor governments to the rq andthe host territories, with Sri Lanka and Myanmar being themost prominent examples in South Asia.

Presently, voluntary population shifts within India are farmore siginificant, for ttre tensions they generate, than issuesrelating to the political status of the Indian community inneighbouring states.T In India's north-east for instance,Hindu and Muslim, Bengali-speaking groups, have movedfrom densely populated parts of Eastern India and fromBangladesh (former East Pakistan) into the relatively under-populated Assam and the neighbouring region. Thesemovements have continued after Independence in the formof illicit or illegal migration and have contributed to anupsurge of separatist agitations provoked by opposition tooutsiders from Pakistan before 1971, and thereafter fromBang;ladesh in Assam. In one of the most densely populatedparts of the world, it is natural for people to move out oftheir own regions or countries in search of living space if nota better life. Thus some of the comparatively underpopulatedparts of South Asia have acted as a magnet for illegalmiggants. Bhutan which is host to a large migrant populationfrom Nepal is one example, and the other was the illicitimmigration to Sri Lanka from the coasts of Tamil Nadu andAndhra Pradesh. The latter has recently stopped only becausethe conditions of virtual civil war in the north of the islandmake migrailon there a singularly dangerous proposition.

The involuntary movements of population-refugees ordisplaced persons are associated with cataclysmic politicalevents such as the partition of the rqi in 1947; the Chinesegovernment clamping down on Tibet's autonomy andBuddhist culture in the late 194Os and early l95os; and thecrea on of Bangladesh in 1971, or ethnic conflict as in the

75

76 Perspectiues on South Asra

case of Tamils from Sri Lanka after l9B3; and the civil warin Afghanistan. The consequences that flow from thesemovements of refugees are familar to students of the subject,but tlie point is that in the South Asian context, they arehistorically-conditioned.s In most instances the response ofthe host society is ambivalent at best and in some instancessuch as with the Biharis in Bangladesh they are treated as aburden on the host society while they themselves yearn fora home in Pakistan. The governtrnents of pakistan have beenreluctant, up to now, to bring the Biharis stranded inBangladesh back into the country. In contrast pakistan hasprovided a haven for nearly 5 million Afghan refugees, abouta third of the population of Afghanistan, one of the largestrefugee flows into a single country in recent times. Theserefugees unlike those displaced by the partition of the rq in1947 and accommodated in both India and pakistan, regardthemselves as temporary sojourners who have every intentionof going back to Afghanistan whenever the situation therepermits them to do so.s

The current political reality with several major troublespots in South Asia associated with separatist agitation,makes the situation even more dangerous for regional andglobal political stability. The principal separatist troublespots in India-Kashmir, Punjab, Assam-are all borderstates which adds to the volatility of the situailon. The northand east of Sri l,anka, Sind, Baluchistan and the NorthWest Frontier province of pakistan are also border regions,if not states. Many among these have the potential for cross_border tensions.

How does one resolve these conflicts, distil and developproposals that can help to ameliorate them, and promotepolitical, economic and social conditions that enhance theprospects of regional and global stability? If we are todevelop appropriate conflict resolution policies, we need tounderstand the complex nature of most of these conflictsand to analyse them in their multiple contexts. The flrst

EtlnicitA: Human Rights; and Enuironment 77

necessit5r is to understand the underlying factors thatproduce ethnic conflict and, above all, armed separatistmovements in general, which is hard enough. But thesituafion is rendered all ttre more difficult because SouthAsian separatism now draws inspiration and, on occasion,support from similar movements elsewhere in the world.The crumbling of the former yugoslavia and the break_up ofthe former Soviet Union, gave fresh hope to South Asianseparatist groups operating in other parts of the world,especially some diaspora associations of dissident SouthAsian ethnic minorities living in western countries.

END NOTES* This part of the present paper is a revised and shortened

version of a paper on Conflict Resolution in South Asiapresented at the Second South Asia Dialogue held in Kandy,Sri Lanka, in November 19g2. The article was subsequenflvpublished in Journal oJ Group Rrghts, Vol.l, tSS+. pp. Z+i_267 and in Luc Van de Goor et al., (ed,l, Bettoeen Deuelopmentand Destruction: An Enquiry into ttre Causes of Conflict inPost Colonial Sfales, London: Macmillarl, f 996, pp. 2gb-32}.

l. See, Partha, S. Ghosh, Cooperotion and Conjict in SouthAsrla, New Delhi: Manohar, 1989. Urmila phadnis, EthnicitAand Natton Building rn South Asta, New Delhi: SagePublications, 1989.

2, For discussion of this important theme, see prasenjit Duara,"The New Politics of Hinduism,', ?he Wilson euarterly, lb:3,1991, pp. 42.52; Ainslee T. Embree, Iltopios in Conltict:Religinn and Nationali.smin Modern India, Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 199O, R.E, Frykenberg, .The Emergenceof Modern Hinduism as a Concepl and as Institution,.f n D.Gunther Sonttreimer and Kulke Herman, (eds.), HrnduismReconsidered, New Delhi; Manohar publishers, l9gg, pp.29-49; Bruce D. Graham, Hindu Ncrtionatism and" IndianPolit[cs: The Origin and- Deuelopment af tLe Bharatiga JanaSangh, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, Ig90, RomilaThapar, "lmagined Religious Communities? Ancient Indiaand the Modern Search for Hindu Identitie s" , Modern Asian

7a Perspectiues on South Asi,a

studiras, 23:2' $a9' pp' 209-31 and "S1'ndicated Moksha'"Seminal September 1985, pp. 14-22.

See B. Chaudhuri, "Ethnic Conflict in the Chittagong HillTracts of Bangladesh", in S'W.R' de A. Samarasinghe' and

R. Coughlan, Economic Dinensions oJfEthnic Coryflict, london:Frances Pinter, 1991, PP. 135-f55.

See, Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secessiron:

India, Pakistan and the Credtion oJ Bangladesh. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1990.

For a recent discussion of this theme see, Christopher Z'Guilmoto, 'The Tamil Migration Cycle, 1830-1950"' Economic

and"PoliticolWeeklg, 16-23 January 1993, pp. I r l-l l9 Thisarticle has a very comprehensive bibliography.

6. The other source of supply was, of course, Chinese labourfrom southern China.

7. In both countries this problem is now a minor issue. The

Burmese took a much tougher stand against their Indianminority than Sri Lanka where a settlement was reached

after long drawn out negotiations.

8. For a perceptive analysis of some of these problems see

Myron Weiner, "Rejected People and Unwanted Migrants inSouth Asia", Economic and Polttical Weeklg' 2l August -1993,

pp. 1737-1746.

9. On the effects of the Afghan conflict on Pakistan' see M.

Isaphani, "Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity," AdelphiPapers 246, london: Brasse/s for the International Instltutefor Strategic Studies, 1990; Tom Rogers, "HarbouringInstability: Pakistan and the Displacement of Afghans" inK.M. de Silva & R.J. May, (eds.), The Intenatinndlizotion oJ

Etttnic ConJlict, London; Frances Pinter, 1991, pp.58-75'

3.

4.

5.

Ethnici!: Human Righls: and Enuironment

Section II

HUMAN RIGHTS

Radhika CoomarasutamA

The 198Os and the 1990s were exciting decades with regardto human rights development in the South Asian region. Onthe one hand these decades saw the rise of electoral politicsand the election of parliamentary heads of governments inPakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. In India innovations withregard to the Judiciary saw the rise of social ac on litigationwhere economic and social issues were brought to theportals of the Supreme Court by activists on behalf ofvictims who had been denied their fundamental rights. Thedemonstration effect of the Indian judiciary appeared toinfluence Sri l,anka where in the famous Boosa case thecourt recognised the practice of social action litigation.

The decades were full of promise but certain otherdevelopments showed a darker side. The growth ofsecessionist movements which fundamentally challengedthe state with the use of violence led to a great deal ofhuman rights abuses by state and non-state actors. Theviolence began to dominate life in Sri Lanka which remainsin the throes of a civil war. The same movements in Kashmir,Assam, Mizoram and PunJab threatened the security of theIndian state. These violent confrontations between stateand non-state actors led to a complete breakdown of civiladministration when human rights violations becamecommon place. A citizenry caught in the middle were deniedall access to courts, subject to arbitrary arrest and detentionas well as disappearances. Loyalty to a cause was valued asbeing more important than the process of civil and political

79

Persoectiue s on South Asia

vindication of human rights. While there was much tocelebrate in Paldstan, Bangladesh and Nepal, the traditionaldemocracies of South Asia, India and Sri Lanka were facinginsurrecfions in parts of their countries threatenirrg thesocial fabric and leading to cycles of violence and counter-violence. In addition, in Sri Lanka traditional democraticrights were also under threat by elected governmentsdetermined to keep their parliamentary majority.

At the World Congress on Human Rights held in June1993 at Vienna, some of the Asian governments put forwardthe argument that in Asia-

(a) economic and social rights are as important as civiland political rights;

(b) collective rights are more important than individualrights.

This information was challenged by human rights groupswho stressed the indivisibility of the human rigfits documentsof international law.

This formulation supported in part by the governments ofSouth Asia displayed a distrust of essential human rightsvalues in the contet of Asian developments. There is aconcerted attempt to downplay civil and political rightswhich the government feels are the concern of westernstates and which have in recent times dominated discourseabout the granting of aid to Asian regimes. However,regardless of the theory, in practice human rights havebecome an important part of political tensions in SoutiAsia.

The countries of South Asia have increasingly becomemarket oriented and aid dependent. This poses a fundamentaldilemma. On the one hand they wish to assert nationalsovereignty. On the other hand, they do not have the completeindependence to dictate terms to the West. With the Aiddonors becoming increasingly sensitive to the human rights

EtfnicitV: Hwutl Righfs: and. Entsironment

Iobby and humanitarian groups, especially after the fall ofEastern Europe, the Asian countries are concerned thateconomic development in their societies will be adverselyaffected by human rights reporting. This has led to aconfrontation position when it comes to civil and politicalhuman rights.

The link between Aid and human rights will be one of themain issues that will be debated at the international level.For human rights groups working in South Asia, this posesa major challenge. Many of the groups are opposed to thelinkage between Aid and human rights, while others feelthat the Aid linkage is an important weapon in the impositionof international human rights standards on Asiangovernments. The Aid linkage would be less suspect if thereis an obJective judicial body which evaluates the performanceof governments. At the moment the evaluation is ad. hoc andbased on donor selectivity leading to certain arbitrary actionsby the donor community. The need for an objective processsuch as a tribunal may be one way to resolve the debatebetween those human rights groups which oppose the Aidlinkage and those that do not.

Regardless of the debate at the international level, thereare those who believe that the next decade will witness adifferent type of human rights debate within South Asiannation-states. Holding the state accountable for humanr'ights problems will only be one aspect of a far greaterproblem. The real threat to human rights in the l99Oscomes from movements in civil society which are nationalist,or fundamentalist in their approach to political issues.Ttrese movements which value loyalty to an ethnic group orreligious formation as the most important political valuewill increasingly clash with movements which base theirconviction on human rights. This contestation between theforces of democracy, human rights and secularism on theone hand, and the forces of ethnic bonding and religiousfundamentalism on the other will be the primary debate of

8r

82 Persoectiues on South Asla

the year 2OOO. The incident at Ayodhya captures the essence

of this new South Asian phenomenon and is a harbinger ofthe type of issues which will be debated in the next decade.

In battling the state while engaging in the contest in civilsociety, human rights groups appear to be losing ground toother ideologies. Ttre traditional model for human rights isttre individual pitted against the state before the judiciary.On the other hand, groups which advocate nation andreligion are capable of mass mobilisation along the lines oftraditional political parties based on an emotive call. Unlesshuman rights groups think of innovative ways to mobilisecivil society in favour of their cause, the battle in civilsociety for the hearts and minds of the citizenry will be lost.

NGOs working in the field have become the maincustodians of the different types of human rights whetherpolitical or civil or economic and social. However, these aresmall units usually centring around a few individuals. Theneed to build institutions in civil society which will promotehuman rights is another aspect which will emerge in theyear 20OO. The human rigfrts community is usually issueoriented. In the next phase of consolidation it is importantto go beyond raising issues to ensure systematic campaignson many fronts. This ability to consolidate gains in the NGOsector will determine the future effectiveness of the humanrights community, especially in the present political climate.

In addition to strengthening the NGO sector in civil society,especially those NGOs working for peace, secularism anddemocracy, the institutions of the State, such as parliamentand the judiciary must also be strengthened in terms ofconventions and processes which will make them moresensitive to human rights impulses. In India and Sri Lanka,the t99os witnessed the growth of a vigilant Supreme Courtdetermined to protect fundamental rights. In ttre end, thesuccess of these two institutions will determine the qualityof democracy enjoyed by a glven society. Human rights

Ethnic@: Human Rights; and Enuironment

groups should actvely work with democratic politicians andjudges to ensure protection of their rights in the countries ofSouth Asia.

At present, there is a certain cynicism which prevails atall levels of society about politicians and judges. This qmicismhas its costs. Unless active steps are taken to remedy thesituation by making the system more effective, theinstitutions of democracy will be further undermined. Theneed for institutional reform and institutional conventionswhich will protect human rights is another aspect whichmerits full consideration.

Another problem that has emerged in recent years hasbeen "government lawlessness". The use of thuggery andextralegal force by governments in all the South Asiancountries has led to cynical comments that this is a SouthAsian variet5r of parliamentary democracy. The practicesbecome especially acute during times of elections. India hasresponded by strengthening the powers of the ElectionsCommissioner. In Sri Lanka, the problem still remains withincreasing accusations about the veracity of the electoralprocess. Human rights groups are often powerless to dealwith this type of violence. However, media exposure andpoliUcal mobilisation around these human rights issuesmay help contain them in the near future.

As mentioned earlier, ethnic and religious conflicts ofSouth Asia will, to a great extent, determine the future ofhuman rights in our region. Ironically, the human rightscommunit5r with its basis in individual rights and statefocus does not have any formula for the resolution of humanrights issues in ethnic conflicts. Since human rights requiresthe vindication of rights before ajudicial process, the overtlypolitical nature of ethnic conflict has kept most humanrights activists sceptical of the process required to resolveethnic conflict. The process of conflict resolution to allowefeater devolution and federalism to areas fighting for

83

84 Perspectiues on South Asia

autonomy is not seen as part of the human rights legacy.However, recent developments ih Europe and at the UnitedNations seem to be moving in that direction. Recentdocuments on human rights point to a human rightsparadigm on resolving ethnic conJlict. The paradigm requires:

(a) a recognition of the cultural identity of minority groupsliving within naUon-states;

(b) a recognition of the right to political autonomy orpower-sharing with regard to mlnorities that are territoriallyplaced within a natlon state;

(c) a process of conflict resolution of negotiation andcompromlse to ensure that disputes are resolved withoutviolence and if possible on a consensus.

In the years to come, this paradigm wiII probably developand refine itself witl- regard to normatve human rightsstandards. None of the states of South Asia have acceptedthe ethnic issues in their couniries as an aspect of humanrlglrts. Recent thinking on human rights, specially withregard to groups rtghts and ethnic minorities appear to bemerging the two concerns so that a human rights paradigmcan assist activists to think about these intractable problems.

The violence of non-state actors has been an increasingdtlemma for human rights activists. Increasingly theinternational paradigm has recognised violence by non-state actors as accountable with regard to internationalhumanitarlan standards. Ttre need to refine these conceptsat the regional and national level is also necessary. Theviolence of tl.e LTTE and the Kashmir militants for example,has led international human rights groups such as Amnest5rInternational to expand their mandates so as to bring theactors of these groups under a human rights paradigm.

One aspect which has become an increasing problem inSrf Lanka, as well as India has been the problem of internallydisplaced people. Whenever there is civil strife, the resulting

EtfuricitA; Human Rights: and Enoironment

refugee crisis is an aspect which is of increasing concern,where over a million people are displaced (such as in Sril,anka), these raise humanitarian issues which to someextent go beyond human rights as classically detailed. Theneed for human rights groups to be fully aware ofinternational humanitarian law-a different area in thestudy of international law-is an aspect which has beenhighlighted in recent years.

The issue of human rights in the South Asian region isdiverse and complicated. Since NGOs have been spearheadingthis approach, it is important to assess their capacity foraction in the next few years. There appear to be two types ofNGOs working in the field. The first are those who focus onthe law. They wish to ensure that legislation is passed andstandards set along with trying to secure implementation ofthese laws in courts of law. Where parliament and thejudiciary are effective there is some recourse.

The second type of NGO is concerned with grassrootsmobilisation on specific issues. Their primdry aim is tolobby, take civic action, engage in consciousness raisingand are sometimes linked to political parties. They engagein fact-finding missibns and publish reports on htrmanrights violations by state and non-state actors. They wereextremely active in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal in thedemocracy movement and in Sri Lanka and India withregard to mobilisation in the face of violence anddisappearances. These are the movements which are in theforefront of the struggle for human rights with regard tovalues in civil society.

In many ways, years of martial law in Pakistan, and inIndia and Sri Lanka years of having been governed byEmergency, have created an awareness of civil and politicalrights and make them relevant and meaningful in the SouthAsian context. Though Asian governments may downplaythis aspect of human rights, the election turnouts indicate

85

86 Perspecthtes on South Asia

that the rtght to vote and the rlght to a fair trial are rightsthat have speclal value for the citizenry because of thehistory of the last few decades. It is the experience ofviolence and emergency that have made these rightsimportant in every day political discourse. The next decademust therefore be an era of consolidaton. Human rightsvalues exist today in civil society by political c5micism,ethnic loyalty, and inefficient implementation preventeffectlve enforcement. These are the issues that must concernhuman rights activists in the near future.

EtfuticW: Human Rights; and EnDironnrent

Sectian III

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENITHE SOUTH ASIAN CFIALLENGE{'

G.H. Peiris

Introduction

From macro-regional perspectives environmentalists oftenidentiff South Asia, as an area of "crisis" where certain on-going ecoiogical changes are approaching "entrophication"-the passing of the threshold beyond which the disruptivepositive feedbacks ofthe ecosystem become irreversible. Themagnitude of the crisis tends to be explained not only withreference to such karmic causes as the intensive use of thenatural environment by man over several millennia, colonialexploitation, the massive size of the South Asian populationand the rapidrty of its growth, and the priority that mustnecessarily be placed on the immediate minimum survivalneeds of the people regardless of long-term environmentalconsequences; but also in terms of mismanagement of theenvironment through myopia, ignorance, apathy,parochialism and cormption. Moreover averting the crisisthrough measures such as controlling population growth,regulating migration, preventing deforestation, andinculcating conservationist attitudes among the people, isbelieved to be less feasible in the South Asian socio-politicalmilieu than it appears to be under more authoritarian

*This is a revised version of a paper submitted to the SouthRegtonal Dialogue held in Lahore in November 1993. The revisionhas entailed the incorporation of material extracted from morerecent research. Yet, the paper remains what it was originallyintended to be-an impressionistic overview.

a7

88 Perspectiues on South Asra

systems of government and with populations that are moreamenable to mass mobilisafion.

In contemporary discussions on disequilibria of theplanetary ecosystem, there is some consensus that SouthAsia's contribution to the general degradation of theenvironment is relatively slight. Recent (1989) estimatesshow, for instance, that the release of carbon dioxide to theatmosphere-one of the main forms of atmospheric pollutionand, possibly, the main cause of global warming-fromNorth America and Europe is l7 times more, and from EastAsia almost 6 times more, than from South Asia (Table l). Ithas also been pointed out that the primary pattern of airmass circulation in the atmosphere is such that what goesup in South Asia invariably comes down in South Asia.Thus, as it stands at present, $outh Asia's environmentalcrisis is, by and large, its own crisis, with only meagre extra-regional ramifications in a purely physical sense.

TABLE IRelease oJ Carbon Diaxide to tte Atmosphere

(1989 estimates)

Region Population19A9

(mtllions]

Amount oJ CarbonDtoxide Releosed

(tons / gear)

USA, Canada & Europe

East Asia

Sout-h Asia

I,O50

I,350

I, 130

r3,580

+,._i JJ

7ao

Source.' UN Population Reports, May 1992.

In the relative significance of the different processes ofman-nature interaction from ecological perspectives, thereis much diversity within South Asia. There are, of course,the obvious commonalities such as those concerningrepercussions of rapid population grortrth, urban expansion,

Mhnicitg; Humut Rights; and Erwironment

and persistence of poverty. Yet, specially from the viewpointof priorities for intervention, there are diversities both amongand within the countries of South Asia. For example, it isunderstandable if the possible rise of sea{evel throughglobal n'arming causes less alarm in'Bhutan than in theMaldives. Reforestation and forest conservation is likely torank lower in the ecologist's agenda in Nepal than it does inSri Lanka. Similarly, the loss of arable land throughsalinization under hi-tech agriculture is a matter of seriousconcern mainiy in the irrigated semi-arid areas of the sub-continent.

Populatlon Change

Since increasing population pressure on the physicalenvironment is the most pronounced process of overallecological change in South Asia, our discussion onenvironmental issues should commence with a briefrecapitulaUon of the main elements of recent demographicchange in the region. South Asia in 1951 had a populationof 44O million which, by 1990, had increased to l,lOOmillion. It is expected that by 2OO0 the population of theregion will reach 1,320 million, an almost exact three,foldincrease over the second half of the twentieth century,compared to an increase of 54 per cent (from 285 to 44Omillion) during the first half.

Although in general, the rural populations in South Asiancounbles have increased at a slower rate than their respectiveurban populations, within rural areas, there has been muchspatial diversity in the rates of change recorded during thepast few decades. In India, for example, between 196l and1981, rural population growth rates have ranged from over2.5 per cent per annum in most of the north-eastern sraressuch as Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland andArunachal Pradesh, to about 1.5 per cent in the southernstates of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh. The main

89

90 Perspectiues on South Asia

TABLE 2

Population Chutge in tlrc Countrtes o;fSouth Asia

Popul'.tionir7 1990(million)

ProJectedPopulation

(mjllion)

%tAnnuo,lGrouth('92 Arsl

DottblingTtne

2A25

106.7 rza 176

1.423

4,7

240

1965-80 1980-90

2.6 2.3 29Bangladesh

Bhutan

2000

l.o

2.3

2.r

2.1 34India 849.5 I,006 1,348

Maldives O.2

Nepal 18.9 24

Pakistan 112.4 147

2.4 2.6 28

3.1 3.1 23

r.8 t.4 46Sri Lanka 17 .O l9 24

Sources: World Development Report, 1992; and PopulationCouncil, Report No.l0, 1992.

agricultural areas of Pakistan have had rates ttlat arecomparable to those of tl.e upper end of the Indian range.Likewise, while rural Bangladesh ftnds parallels in WestBengal and the Hindi states ol lndia (close to 2olo), the ratesin Sri Lanka have been similar to those of South India' Asone could expect, the highest rates have been recorded inthose parts of South Asia where the frontiers of agriculturehave been extended towards sub-humid areas throughirrigation or into the mountain terrain of the Himalayanbelt.

Ethnici!; Human Rights: and Enuironmerrt

IABLE 3

RwaJ Population and- Area Under AgricuLtwe in South Asirl

91

Rural Populatinn(million)

Extent oJ Agricultural Iand(million)

1965 1990 % Chtnge 1964-66 1989-90 %CLnnge

Bangladesh 55

India 395

Nepal lO

Pakistan 43

Sri l.anka IS'outh Asia* 5 12

90

621

t7

IO

l3at7

63.6

57.2

70.o

76.2

44.4

b9. t)

9.O 9.2

t62.4 169.5

1.8 2.6

t9.2 20.4

1.8 2.O

194.2 204.1

2.2

4.4

44.4

8.3

1 1.1

c.r

*excluding Bhutan and the Maldives

Note: The figures for Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistanare based on data from the World Deuelopment Reports (!V'orld

Bank), which are likely to contain errors. For example, the UNreported the extent under agriculture in Sri Lanka in 1989 and1990 was 1,885,OOO ha, while the local data sources indicate ahigher figure (used here) of 1,998,0OO ha.

As an on-going change that has environmentalrepercussions, rapid urban growth or, more specifically, theformation of excessively high population densities in andaround the large urban areas, and the resulting accumulationof poverty and squalor, are considered as important inSouth Asia as overall population growth. Despite the wellknown lack of clarity in the urban-rural dichotomy, therelated data show clearly enough that in most parts ofSouth Asia urban population has grown more rapidly thanrural population.

Within the urban sectors of the South Asian countries,the growth trends of cities and towns have been so varied,spatially and temporally, that it is difficult to make

92 Perspectiues on South Asia

generalisations on covariance between size of urban placesand their rates of growth. Frorn a view point that does nottake into account changes in urban boundaries anddistinctions between cities and their satellite towns, it appearsthat the long-term trend has been one of cities growingmore rapidly than the smaller towns. Closer scrutiny,however, makes it evident that this has not been a persistentpattern throughout the region. During the 1970s (unlike inthe preceding intercensul period when the smaller townswere stagpant) India's fastest growing urban places werethose wtth populations of less than 50O,OOO in l97l , manyof which were state capitals, mining towns and centres oftfie ilanufacturing industry. Over the same period, in thelarger cities such as Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad,Lucknow and Kanpur there were signs of out-migrationsand deconcentration of population. To this latterphenomenon, there have been the conspicuous exceptionsof Delhi and Bangalore in India, Pakistan's Karachi, andBangladesh's Dhaka. In Sri Lanka, the urban clusters thatconstitute the suburbs of Colombo have grown far morerapidly than the city. Regardless of these diversities, however,it is expected that the swing of the population pendulumtoward the larger population agglomerations will continueinto ttre early decades of the 2lst century, at which timesome among them will rank among the largest cities in theworld (Table 4).

Environmetrtal Issues ln Rural Areas

The effects of agrarian pressures on the ecosystem, ashighlighted in many wrifings, revolve around the twin themesof rapid depletion ofthe resource base at rates that exceedtheir natural rejuvenation and replenishment, and pollutionof the en'ironment. In the various elaboraticns of the formertheme, the focus has mainly been on forests, soil and water.The rapid increase in the extent of land harnessed foragriculture and settlement inf,rastructure along with the

EthnicitA; Human Rights; and" Enuironment

TABLE 4

Rates oJ Urban Grouth rn South Asia; Past and projected

Percentage per annum

Soufh Asia Si Lo'nka

93

r950-59

r960-69

1970-79

1980-89

1990-99

2000-09

20ro-19

2020-25

2.95

3.56

3.95

4.06

4.O2

3.76

3.r2

2.64

2.53

3.23

a "71

3.71

3.80

J.D /

2.91

2.57

4.72

z+,.tc

1.56

1.41

2.45

3.40

3.23

2.74

Note: The definition of 'urban' varies from one country toanother. From the present perspectives, the Indian definition-allareas under urban local authorities, and all places having 5,O0Oor more inhabitants, a density of more than I,O00 per sq. mile,and at least 3/4 of the adult male population employed in pursuitsother than agriculture-is the most meaningful. The Sri Lankadefinition, in contrast, is highly arbitrary.

excessive extraction of timber and fuelwood from the naturalvegetation, and tlle attendant chain of ecological reactionsin the form of accelerated soil erosion, duricrust formationand lowering of groundwater infiItration, loss of subtemaneanaquifers, and reduction of bio-diversity, are tJre specificprocesses associated wittr the exponential human onslaughton forests. Similarly, in water, there are the a qgravatingproblems of mismanagement and of inadequate availabilityand access in relation to demand. The latter theme-that of

94 Perspectiues on Soutlt Asi.a

pollution-in rura! areas tends to be associated mainly withchanges in the chemical composition of soil and water

through salinisation as well as accumulation of the toxic

residue of agro-chernicals on lll-drained irrigated land. Inrecent studies of rural environments attention has also

been devoted to excessive air poliution within dwellings-aconsequence mainly of the use of biomass as domestic fuelunder ill-ventilated conditions which is being considered a

serious health hazard, especially for women'

The extent to which the effects of these disrt.pfive processes

are exemplified in South Asia is, of course, not known withany degree of certainty and precision. Systemailcally recorded

measurements, even on the most basic among the relatedprocesses are scarce; and when available, cDnfusing in themessages t-lley convey. What is perhaps one of the foremostconsiderations in this context is that, as Table 3 suggests,in South Asia as a whole, the extent of land under agriculturehas expanded at a very slow rate. It is, indeed, remarkablethat during the twenty-five year period from the mid-l96osto the early I99Os, over which the rural population of theregion increased by almost 60 per cent, the overall expansionof farm land has been a mere 5 per cent, with a large part ofthis latter expansion probably being accounted for by theconversion of land under shifting cultivation to sedentaryforms of use. On India, as certain critics believe, there isIittie evidence of extensive deforestation attributable to t]eexpansion of area :under permanent agriculture [Chapman& Baker, 1992).

Thus, by way of preliminary clarification, it is necessaryto note tJlat on some of the main issues concerning on-goingewironmental change in rural South Asia, their prominencein discussion and debate notwithstanding, even the basicinformation available lacks quantitative precision. Consider,for instance. the various sets of data available on recentchanges in the forest cover. According to an official estimatecited by Biswas (1992: 255), in South Asia as a whole, an

EthnicitA; Humar, Rights; and Enuironment

average of about 4OO,0OO hectares of forest have beenremoved annually over the decade lg8l-9o. However, anestimate based on the well known Citizens' Reports of theDelhi-based Centre for Science and Environment (CSE,f982, 1985 and l99l), has placed the "recent" (period notspecified) rate of forest removal in India at an alarming onemillion hectares each year (Vyas & Reddy, lg98). The latterestimate does not correspond either with the Indiangovernment estimates or with those on Sout_h Asia furnishedby international agencies (World Resources Institute, lg86).Similarly, in Sri Lanka (where the rate of forest removalprobably ranks the highest among the countries of theregion) the percentage extent ofland under 'high forest' wasofficially reported to have declined from 44 per cent h 1956to about 24 per cent in 1984. Certain ecologists reject thislatter figure, and claim that the actual forest cover in themid- 1980s was no more than lO per cent of the island(Fernando & Samarasinghe, 1988; Gunatilleke, f 988). Thesame absence of exactitude is seen in the available data onafforestation. The related official estimates on India, forinstance, point to a net gain in the forest cover attributed tothe establishment of new forests at a rate exceeding that ofdeforestation. This, once again, stands refuted by estimatesfound in certain reports compiled by non-governmentinstitutions according to which the annual net loss offorestsin India during the past two decades could have been weII inexcess of SOO,OOO hectares.

A measure of uncertaint5r exists even in respect of theecological impact of deforestation. It is, of course, wellknown that the exposure of bare soils to torrential rainsconsequent upon tlre removal ofvegetation causes excessiveerosion and, eventually, as witnessed in several parts ofSouth Asia's sub-humid zone, the loss of arable land. Butwhether this has been an inevitable outcome of the extensionof ag5iculture into forested mountain slopes has not, by alymeans, been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Certain

95

96 Persoecttrses on Sotfi]t Asia

detailed studies conducted in the Himalayan foot-hllls' forexample, suggest that terraced hill slopes under ca'refully

tended crops are more water retentive and less suseepUble

to loss of soil through erosiol'l than similar slopes undernatural vegetation (Chapman & Baker, 1992:29l.It has also

been demonstrated that, especially in the humid tropicswhere vegetative gSowth is rapid, ensembles of flora developed

by man could simulate natur"rl forest ecologr while generating

substantial economic returns. Ttrese findings, still tentative,if substantiated with further research, could well mean thatthere is considerable scope for expanding the extent of farmland in South Asia without necessarily entailing ecologicaldegradation of Sahelian magniitude.

The arecognition of the fact that uncertainties exist inregard to the nature of environmental processes is notmeant to constitute a denial of the ecological disruptionscaused by both clearing of forests for agriculture and otherforms of land use as well as the extraction of timber andfuelwood from forests. In most parts of South Asia, thedisruptive processes have been in operation for manycenturies. As Pouchepadass (1995) has argued "it would beerroneous to present the pre-colonial relationship betweensocieties and their environment as a golden age of equilibriumwhich colonial conquest disturbed and destroyed." He hasalso pointed out that "the first oflicial measures for protectingnature, whatever their motive and effectiveness, arose inthese countries on the initiative of colonial government. "

Nevertheless, the weight of evidence points to thegeneralisaflon that changes under colonial dominance hadthe effect of accelerating the processes of ecologicaldegradation.

For instance, ttrere was the impact of plantation agpiculturein certain highland areas of Sonth Asia-those of tl-e easternHimalayas, the Western Ghats and Sri Lanka-in the formof extensive deforestation ovetr terrain more vulnerable todenudation than the lowlands; AccordinA to an esfimate on

EthntcitA: Humart Ri.ghts; and Enuironment

Sri Lanka (NARESA, l99l:fo8), since the beginning ofplantation tea in the l88Os, some 3O0 mm of top soil hasbeen washed away from 'upland' tea areas, an amountequivalent to an average rate of 4O tons of soil per hectareper annum. This estimate needs to be placed against thebackdrop of the fact that the average rate of soil formationfrom consolidated metamorphic rocks in the tropics underundisturbed forests is estimated to be a mere 46 mm perone-thousand years (NARESA, l99f : lO8).

Changes that occurred in traditional agriculture underthe impact of colonial rule also had profound ecologicalramification. There was the large-scale conversion of landunder subsistence agriculture to commercial crops which,in turn meant, re increasing dependence of the peasantryon 'marginal' (forested) land for the production of food, oftenin the form of 'shifting cultivation'. The exact environmentalimpact of 'shifting cultivation' is, of course, a controversialissue. For instant, the conventional view that 'slash-and-burn' (an integral aspect of this form of land use) is theprincipal cause for deforestation in the tropics, has beenreJected by certain recent researchers who prefer insteadthe view that this type of farming, since the cycle of fallowpermits the regeneration offorest flora, represents a delicates)rmbiosis between consumption and conservation needs.As a generalisation on shifting cultivation in South Asia,this contention also appears somewhat shaky. The possibilitythat it is an environmentally sustainable form of agriculturewhere the farming communities ar-e small enough and theforests are large enough to permit long cycles of fallowcannot be discounted. But, it appears that, more generally,shifting cultivation with prolonged fallow is usually the firststep in the process of forest removal-one which is followedby the gradual shortening of the cycle of fallow, eventuallyleading to sedentary and perennial forms of land use asfarm populations increase. There is fragmentary evidencefrom studies conducted in Sri Lanka (cited in peiris. lg96:gg-

97

98 Perspectiues on SoLtth Asirr

90) which suggests that, from an environmental perspective,

the period of transition from the long fallow phase tosedentary farming, which also tends to be featured by anincrease in the pace of fuelwood and timber extraction (aconsequence, once again, of increasing population), is more

destructive in its effects than most forms of long establishedsedenta4r farming. It is this transition which took place inmany parts of Sri Lanka during the colonial regime' Moregenerally, the impression conveyed by the recent writingson 'shifting cultivation' in South Asia is that, at present' inalmost all areas, the cycles of fallow are of short durationand, in many situations, rain-fed agriculture carried out inforest clearings, which continues to be referred to by termssuch asjhum anrd chena. does not involve the rotational use

of the land.

Despite the absence of related statistical data as evidence,

there is reason to generalise that, in areas where forestremoval is not accompanied by 5afeguards against erosionsuch as terracing and the establishment of a substitutecover of flora, the ecological damage is invariably profound,and often extends well beyond the actual venues ofdeforestation. One of the most significant forms of suchdamage is excessive siltafion tvhich, while contributing tofloods in the lower parts of river catchments, also hasdisruptive effects on irrigation. The area which is moreadversely affected than any other by the former process is

the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta where the dischargeof river water into the sea is irnpeded not only by the flatterrain but also by tides and cyclone-induced tidal waves.

This results in massive loads of debris being regularlydeposited along the river channels, bringing about a reductionof channel capacity, and thus increasing the incidence andintensity of floods. To illustrate its effects on irrigation:Mang;la and Tarabela reservoins-the two most importantwater storage structures in Fakistan-were losing theirstorage capacity at annual rates of 48'27 and 167.75

Ethdcitg; Human Rtghts: and Enuironment

million cubic metres, respectively, owing to the accumulationof sediments. Similarly, recent studies of eight Indianreservoirs constructed in the early years of Independence-Bhakra, Gandhinagar, Hirakud, Maithon, Mayurakshi,Nlzamsagar, Panchet and Thngabhadra-Indicated that theiraverage sedimentation rate is "slightly more than twice theestimated value that was used for designing purposes" (both

sets of information have been extracted from Biswas, 1992:

253). The Polgolla reservoir-one of the hydraulic structuresof the Mahaveli Programme of Sri Lanka-was silted up to45 per cent of its capacity within l2 years of its construction(MEPA, l99r).

From a resource perspective, the environmental issuewhich has assumed greater prominence than all else relatesto water-its availability in relation to increaslng demand,and problems concerning its management in the face ofvarious obstacles that stem from mutually conflictingdemands. These problems are, of course, not confined torural areas.

Calculations of 'replenishment' (worked out with rougftestimates available on the different components of thehydrological cycle) and of 'current use' [also based on equallyimprecise estimates on the different forms of consumption)convey the impression that water is not a scarce resource inmost parts of South Asia. The related data suggest, forinstance, that in the region as a whole, the rate of use is nomore than about 1O per cent of the rate of replenishment.Yet, despite the intensifoing demand for water, the scope forincreasing this ratio remains restricted both by the on-goingecological disruptions of the type referred to above and byvarious economic and political constraints.

There is an emerging body of opinion according to whichone of the principal methods of harnessing surface water forirrigadon employed in the subcontinent for well over onehundred years-construcfion of large reservoirs and channel

99

roo Perspecttves on South Asra

systems-has failed to fulfil expectations, and will continueto fail with greater disruptive fallouts than in earlier times.The failure has been explained mainly with reference todefective planning, overambitious designing, and the neglectof catchment conservaton (see, for example, Bottrall, l9g2;ttre series of 'special reports' published in Indin Todag ofSeptember 15, 1995; Ruitenbeek & Cartier, 1995; and Swain,1998). Although the related claims are not uniformlypersuasive, and have not remained unchallenged, particular$from the viewpoint of comparative advantages of scale ingravity irrigation fVerghese, 1992:197: Peiris, 1996: 2OO-203), it is becoming evident that, in the prevailing techno-economic milieu, and given the pattern of geographicaldistribution of the surface water resource base among thenational units of the region, there is little scope in mostparts of the sub-continent for expanding this form ofirrigation to meet the rapidly increasing irrigation demands.Moreover, recent experiences also indicate that irrigationsystems planned to extend over large areas, and causeecological and socio-economic changes in such areas arelikely to meet increasing conservationist resistance, whileintensit/ing conflicting interests. The latter, in certainsituations, has been associated with aggravatinginternational and sub-national disputes fVerghese, 1990:358-360; Islam, 1992; Swain, 1998).

The shortfall of supply in relation to demand is alsoassociated with the current trends of availability andutilisation of sub-surface water in many parts of SouthAsia. Traditionally, groundwater irrigation-widespreadthroughout the region-involved the extraction of waterfrom shallow dug wells using labour-intensive techniques.The water yield of these wells varied widely, depending onrainfall as well as sub-surface structure. It was substantiallyhlgher in the alluvial flood-plains than in the inter-catchmenthardrock areas. Even the largest among these wells seldomhad a daily yield of more than a thousand gallons. The

Etlnlcity; Human Rights; and Enuironment lor

advent of 'green revolution' technology in the mid_ 1960sbrought about a gradual shift towards deeper wells andmechanised extraction. Among tJle causes for this were thehigher levels of agricultural productivity (and higher netprofits) facflitated by lift irrigation, and the incentivesprovided by tJ-e government in the form of loans and lowcost (or free) electricity. Thus, by the mid-lg8Os, deep bore-wells penetrating to depths of over 2OO feet, yielding severalthousands of gallons per day, were quite common in thelarger riverine plains of the sub-continent, in parts of the"black-soil" area of north-west Deccan, and in a few otherlocalities where geological formations permit higfi rates ofsub-surface percolation and storage of water. In many suchareas, the effects of over-extraction were beginning to be feltat this time (Nagaraj & Chandrakanth, 1997). On ttre onehand, the extraction of water through deep bore-wells oftenresulted in the drying up of the shallow wells in the vicinity.On the other, the increasing density of bore,wells alsomeant, in some areas, the extraustion of the subterraneanaquifers, the replenishment of which is a slow process.

Ttre increase of soil salinity is yet another ecologicalproblem in those parts of South Asia that depend on largescale irrigation systems. The damage mechanisms asunderstood from world-wide experiences is that irrigation offlat, Iow-lying terrain, especially in areas that are exposed todrought over a greater part of the year, unless accompaniedby adequate facilities for drainage, causes the accumulationof residual salts in the soil which, beyond a particularthreshold, makes the soil uncultivable. In coastal areassuch as those of Gujarat and Sind, excessive groundwaterextraction which permits subterranean sea water infiltrationhas also contributed to thts process. Additionally, in mostparts of the region, irrigated agriculture also involves theregular administration of heavy doses of agro-chemicals tothe soil, which not only enhances the rate of salinisationbut also brings about other adverse changes in the chemical

r02 Persoecttues on South Asia

composition of ttre soil. According to Agrawal ( I 989) ' althoughthe use of pesflcides in agriculture has increased rapidly inthe past four decades, its environmental and morbidityeffects are yet to be studied in detail. He refers, however' tostudies which indicate that "the levels of contaminationmay be higher than those in many other parts of the world".

The extent of land affected (or in danger of being affected)

by salinisation, however, is not known. Corrective measures

are costly, and could also be ineffective. The scale of therequired intervention is illustrated by Pakistan's trft-bankOutfall Drain ProJect which, when completed, is expected to

be a river almost the size of the lower Indus' carrying saline

water from PunJab and Sind to the Arabian Sea.

The various issues to which reference has been made

above figure prominently in discussions on the theme ofsustainability of 'green revolution' agricultural technologrin South Asia. Studies done on this subject since about theearly 197Os have indicated that, in contrast to traditionalfarming techniques, the new techniques often cause criticalimbalances in the ecosystem which, under certain condi ons

set in motion processes of 'desertification'. Several recent

studies (Paroda, Woodhead and Singh 1993; Chand &Haquet, 1997; Nellithanam, 1997) have also highlighted thepossibility tJlat the productiorr increase ushered in by thepackage of new technologr is unlikely to be sustained and

that in certain areas, it is likely to be reserved.

Environmentnl Problems in Urban and Industrlal Settings

Certain controversies felating to processes andconsequences ofrapid city growth in South Asia have a directbearing on the analysis of environmental issues . Briefly stated,

until about the mid-l960s, ttre phenomenon of rapid citygrowth in the region was explained mainly with reference tothe large-scale migration of destitute people from rural areas

to the cities (see, for example, Spate, 1957). It was perceived

Etful;.cffqy: funnalt R@hts: and Enuironment 103

as a process that has alarming environmental, economic and

social consequences. The specific formulations of these

notions, however, have been challenged, initially, by Asish

Bose (1967, 1973) and Sovani (f966) who questioned the

validity of the statistical interpretations on which theperception of an on-going urban "population explosion" inSouth Asia was based. More recently, others Iike Lipton (1977)

have argued that'disaster treks" from rural areas have

contributed substantially less to urban population growth inSouth Asia than is often believed. From an economic point ofview, it has also been asserted that attempts need not be

made to stall rapid city growth ". . . because urban areas are

seen to be more efficient at providing rising incomes, withbetter external economies and hence better local income

multipliers for each unit of capital invested" (Chapman &Baker, 1992:14). From environmental perspectives, the

relevance of this dispute lies more on the issue of whether a

large proportion of migrants into urban areas have been , and

will continue to be, 'economic refugees" from the rural sector'

rather than on the past and projected rates of overall inter-sectoral migratlon.

The environmental problems ttrat are currently associated

with over-crowding in many urban areas of South Asia have

been fairly well documented. Features such as excessively

high residential densities alongside substandard housing'presence of sprawling squatter settlements and large vagrantpopulations, problems associated with the provision of even

the barest minimum requirements in public health and

sanitation, excessive chemical and excretal poilution, and

the high incidence of pollution-related diseases, have allbeen sensationalised in such vivid detail that they hardlybear repetition.

Unfortunately, the details are seldom available in theform of systematic measurements of the comparativeerlvironmental impact of these phenomena. Indeed, itsometimes seems that to describe the congestion of a shanty

r04 PerspectiDes on South Asia

town or the stench of a contaminated river is no more thanto express dismay and pass censure at what is believed to beignorance and apathy regarding mass poverty anddeprivation. Similarly, to say that some 5O per cent of thepopulation of Dhaka inhabit slums and squatter setflements,or that the holy river is polluted with the sins of 7g urbanareas each with populations over 5OO,OOO is merely a cry ofdespair. It is, therefore, of some interest to see what the fewmeasurements that are available on a few random locationsin South Asia actually portray.

The measurements presented in Tatrle 5 relate to waterquality, and have been extracted from published tabulationof the Canada-based Global Environment Monitoring System(GEMS). The two criteria that have been measured--dissolvedoxygen and fecal coliform cont€nt in a sample of riverwater-are regarded as basic indicators of water quality.The former is a critical factor in the health of aquaticorganisms; and, in general, for the survival of aquatic life,values must exceed 5.5 mg/lt in warm water habitats, and6.5m9/lt in cold water habitats, The fecal coliform contentis a sentinel indicator for the presence (or potential presence,of many otJrer pathogenic organisms. Drinking water shouldnot contain fecal coliforms, and water for bathing shouldhave less than I,OOO per IOO ml sample.

TABLE 5

Spot Measurements oJ Water eualifu in Some South AsranRiuers

Riuer & Place Dissolued Oxggen Colifurm (per l)Omg sampte)oJ monitoring

1979 1983 1987 1979 1983 1ga7-82 -86 -90 -82 -86 _90

(7)(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)tt)

Cauveri, downstream KRS res. 68r7.2 /.o 7.3 JI 445

ELhnicity: Human Rights: and Enuironment r05

(2) (31 (4) (5) (6) (7)

Cauveri(Satyagalam) 7 .O 7 .3 7 .S l0 684 g2O

Godavari(Dhalegaon) 6.5 6.6 6.7

Godavari(Mancherial) 8.O 8.O Z .S S S IGodavari{Polawarm) 7.2 7.2 6.9 4 2 4Sabarmati(Dharoi) 9.4 9.I 8.9 248 224 22O

Subharnareka(Jamshedpur) 8.O 7.9 T .S 659 4,5 rB 2,8OO

Subharnareka(Ranchi) 6.7 4.O 5.3 1,239 7,988 3, rOO

Tapti(Burhanpur) 7.5 6.9 6.1 IfO fgoTapti(Nepanagar) 7.2 7.O 7.O r9 163

Chenab(Gujarat Branch) 6.2 6.8 7 .t 456 463 446

Indus(Kotri) 7 .6 7.2 2.6 ro5 rzt 78

Ravt (d ownstream)from Lahore) 6.8 5.7 6.9 STa 746 S55

Ravi (upstreamfrom Lahore) 7.2 6.7 Z.O 2ZS Sg2 24g

Meghna@angladesh) 6.5 7.O 3,193 ZOO

(1)

Note: According to the data source, .,. .the frequency andphysical accuracy of measurements vary among stations. Averagesof4-year periods are used in order to minimize seasonal and vear-to-year variability, and to emphasize general trends..

106 Perspectftses on South Asta

To begin with some comparisons of South Asian riverswith those in other parts of the world in respect of the two

criteria, the most noteworthy feature is that the SouthAsian measurements da rl,r,t fall into the extremes of theglobal range. For example, in the 'dissolved oxygen'

measurements, on which the data source contains a total of111 recordings from tropical and sub-tropical rivers, 85 fallwithin a range of 5 to 8 mg/lt. More or less the same

dispersal is seen in the recordings from South Asia. On'fecal coliform content', the readings from the majority ofthe reglon's rlvers are similar in absolute and comparativelevels to those recorded elsewhere, and fall into a distinctlylower range than those of certain European, Mexican and

Japanese rivers (in some of which coliform levels of over

IO,OOO per 1OO ml have been recorded' with the all timehigh among the GEMS recordings standing at 916'667).Thus. in so far as these sets of data could be considered

reliable enougfi, it is possible to suggest that the real problems(of the South Asian rivers that have been monitored) is notso much the prevalence of high levels of pollution and

contamination, but rather the widespread humanconsumption of river water in untreated form.

Regarding the variations arnong the rivers listed in Table

5, two features are worth taking note of. The first is theexceptionally high readings of coliform in Subharnareka atJamshedpur and Ranchi, and, the somewhat less distinct,but expected, relationship between variations in populationdensities of the areas in which the recording stations are

located, and the levels of pollution. The temporal trends, on

the ottrer hand, are far from clear, except in the sets of dataon fecal contaminatlon in the Subharnareka and Cauveririvers.

It is of course risky to draw firm conclusions from thethinly scattered recordings of data made available by world-wide monitoring systems, except to say that they fall shortof conlirming the "cess-pit" image of South Asian rivers.

Ethnic@: Human Rights; artd Erusironment t07

(Note, however, that the tabulation does not contain anyrecordings from Ganga-Yamuna rivers, which are believed

to be among the most polluted rivers of the region). Detailed

studies seem to indicate that, in proximity to sources ofdomestic and industrial effluence, the levels of river water

contamination are very high. Synthesizing conclusions drawn

fi'om several studies on water pollution in India, Paliwal(f989:54) states: (a) that there appears to be a general

deterioration of water quallty in the country as a whole; (b)

that in most rivers, there is an upsurge of pollution levels

with the onset of the summer monsoon, and a decline

during winter; and (c) that there are sudden temporal

oscillations and micro-spatial variations in the levels of

contamination.

The available GEMS recordings of air pollution in South

Asia are even more restricted in coverage than those on

river water, being confined to the cities of Calcutta, Bombay,

Delhi and Lahore. The measurements relate to concentrafion

of sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate matter' The

data on the former indicate a faint trace of an increasing

trend, but the directions of change reflected in the latter are

indistinct. Since air pollution is a phenomenon in which one

can expect a great deal of localized diversity, no generalization

can be drawn from these sets of data.

Despite the paucity of measurements on pollution of the

atmosphere, the phenomenon itself is widely regarded as an

environmental hazard which is assuming crisis proportions

in urban South Asia and in semi-urbanised industrial beltsof tJle region. Indeed, it has recently been claimed that inrespect of air pollution the main metropolitan centres of theregion rank among ttre worst cities of the world. This

condition is caused mainly by excessive gaseous emissions

from vehicles and factories. On the one hand' there has

been a spectacular upsurge of motor traffic-in Deihi'

according to a recent report (Rajalakshmi' 1998)' the number

of vehicles increased by 51 times between 196I and f 99l-

r08 Perspectiues on South Asia

with no corresponding road improvements, and no effectivecontrols on the quality of the vehicles used. On the other,there has been (until about the mid- lg8os when certainpartially successful measures were initiated in some of tJleIndian cities to impose legal controls) an almost uncheckedagglomeration of relatively small scale but high pollutingmanufacturing ventures in the cities. In addition to these,there has been an increase in the frequency of accidentalleakages of poisonous gases which, as pointed out by Vyas& Reddy (1998:51), have gone almost unnoticed, exceptwhen their death toll was large, a6 it was at Bhopal. Ecologistsalso assert that South Asia's nuclear reactors are featuredby substandard safeguards concerning workers' health, andare also among the least protected in the world againstaccidental leakages of radioactive substances. Some amongthem present the spectre of another Chernobyl.

Apart from what the measurements relating to water andair pollution convey, there are several sets of informationwhich could be used for the purpose of furnishing otherinsights on problems associated with South Asia's urbanenvironment. There is, for example, a link between theformation of "dust domes" and the high temperatures (,.heatislands") recorded in the cities. The ramified effects of thisare believed to extend even into political unrest and crime.Yet another form of environmental degradation is illustratedby Hyderabad (Ramachandraiah, l997:229g)_'reputed inthe past for its scenic splendour-the explosive growth ofwhich since the early lgTos has been accompanied by thedisappearance of most of its green belts and over fort5r of itslakes. Of greater immediate concern is the fact that evenpolluted water is scarce in many urban areas-Delhi figuringprominently among those that suffer most from this scarcitlr.

Possibilltles of Interventlon

'Ensuring that the environment of South Asia is fullyprotected in the process of achieving economic growth" is

EthnicitA: Human Rights: artd Enuironment 109

one of the thematic concerns of this paper. In this, it wouldbe meaningful to identi$ tJ.e possibilities and limitations ofthe available options, while recognising the fact that, inmany ways, given the persistence of the on-going trends ofdevelopment-related change in the region, furtherenvironmental degradation is inevitable, and that ,.protecting

the environment fully" could only be an unattainable ideal.

There are certain measures that could be adopted in aconcerted effort towards environmental protection that arerelntilselg easy to implement and are likely to be free ofcontroversy. The most obvious among them is that ofgenerating systematic and mutually compatible sets ofinformation on the components of the ecosystem. It is ofinterest that the only element of the natural environment onwhich there is a fairly detailed and comprehensive body ofinformation extending over a long period of time in SouthAsia is climate-especially rainfall, which, in Sri Lankaalone, has been monitored at more than B0O stations forwell over one hundred years. Regarding information oncertain other environmental parameters, the situation couldbe expected to improve with increasing availability of datafrom remote sensing and satellite imagery. yet, in respect ofmany vital aspects of change, there is no substitute formonitoring thror-rgh regular field measurement. And, forsuch measurement to be practically useful in policyformulation, some degree of coordination (especially by wayof standardised methodologies and facilities for exchange ofinformation) is essential. Researchers working over shortspells, individually or in groups, sporadically, on issues ofrestricted scope idenflfied and financed by external fundingagencies, cannot be expected to fill the prevailing lacunae ofinformation. This should be a well coordinated function ofgovernment.

One of the principal justifications for a vastly enhancedeffort towards quantifted monitoring and evaluation ofenvlronmental processes stems from the fact that. in the

llo Perspecttues on South Asia

absence of hard data, related cliiscussion and debate would

remain largely at a polemical plane, making only a meagre

contribuUon to educating the public, leave alone planning

and policy formulation. Quite often, even on vitally importantbut controversial issues, the weight of one or another of the

conflicting views tends to depend on elegance of presentation

rather than on the substance upon which it is based' One

recalls here the recent Medha Patkar -Tavleen Singh

confrontation on the subject of priorities in harnessing

India's water resources (lndiaTodaA, July 27 and August 3'

f998) both duellists displaying remarkable skills of verbal

combat, but the confrontation itself, useful only for itsentertalnment value. It is seldom realised that this feature

is not conlined to information flows in mass communication,but that it pervades much of what purports to be scientific

discourse althouglr it is invariably embellished with technicaljargon.

Indeed, much of the technical planning on environmentalconcerns has tended to be based on statistical manipulationsof empirical data of restricted coverage and precision' This

can be observed in many South Asian planning documents

on subjects such as afforestation, catchment conservation,protection of endangered fauna, or improvement' of urban

environments. The TAMS report (1980) which focused on

environmental aspects of Mahaveli Programme, or the

Forestrg Master Plan produced by Jaakko Pory International(1986), both for Sri Lanka, could be referred to as

monumental illustrations of this feature. But most of all, itis evident in the planning for hydraulic works in which, inthe absence of an adequate body of recorded observational

data, the planners usually rely on simulated or proJected

guesstimates. This, of course, did not cause much trarm inthe past when the values so derived were used merely as

rough indicators of the extreme limits of a range withinwhich the key ingredients of the plan were designed' Butwhere planning calls for precision-as it has in the recent

Ethnicita: Human Rights: and Enuironment lll

past in matters such as the determination of dam heights,areas of inundaUon, command areas of channel networks,or allocation of water between competing riparians-ttreabsence of reliable and precise measurements invariablyhas serious repercussions. The periodic upward revisions ofestimates on the total volume of water in some of the Indianriver systems that has been a feature of worldng out inter-state water quotas {Swain, 1998), for no apparent reasonother than that of maldng a pacificatory response to agitationby some among the riparians for larger quotas, provide aglimpse of the empirical haziness of many of the planningprocesses.

The fact that there is a growing mass consciousness onenvironmental issues also calls for greater attention than inthe past to the precise monitoring of ecological processes.Over the past few decades, public concern on environmentaldegradation has sometimes found expression in spontaneousand endogenic movements ofgrassroots protest, as witnessedin the early stages of the Chipko Movement of the upperGangetic valley (Mishra & Tripathi, 1978). There is no doubtttrat this type of activism could resonate beneficially at thelevel of policy-making. However, some of these movementsare known to be driven by parochial considerations orinstigated by vested interests, which makes it essential thatpolicy responses be solidly based on objective and preciseinformation. Almost twenty-five years ago, Vohra (1973)

urged the central government to "obtain a commandingposition for itself in the field of land and soil management"in India. From the various experiences gained from conflictsof parochial interests in environmental issues since thattime, there appears to be a strong case for a high degree ofcentralized direction and control of matters relating to theenvironment within each country of South Asia, along withmechanisms for supra-national collaboration among theagencies involved.

The monitoring of ecological processes, though an essential

tt2 Perspectives on Souih Asra

requirement for a conservation strategy, is obviously not anend in itself. In tJ e first place, it should be accompanied byexchanges of the technical data so generated among thosewho share ecosystems, and, more generally, modalities forttre effective public dissemination of the related informa on.Secondly, the interpretation and use of such data in mattersconcerning planning and policy formulation should takeplace in conformity with clearly postulated economic andpolitcal paradigms concerning economic growth, equity,state intervention, citizens' rights, national securitSr, andresource use. This would, apart from aII else, enable theavoidance of ambiguity that has always been a feature ofdecision-making on environmental issues.

In approaching tJle problem of environmental degradationin South Asia, it is also useful to make, at least implicitly, adistinction between those processes that cannot be reversedor stalled without bringing about fundamental changes inliving standards and of stances in international relations,and those that are more amenable to environment-focusedcorrective or preventive action. This distinction is, ofcourse,not always easy to make because many forms ofenvironmental degradation are mutually connected.Nevertheless, from a practical viewpoint, it would bereasonable to place certain forms of feasible intervention ona different plane from the more intractable and contentiousmicro-regional problems that are linked inextricably eitherto mass poverty or to diversities of perception on nationalinterests. In many situations it would be possible to place inthe former category the adoption of safeguards againstprocesses such as the disappearance of nature reserves;haphazard urban expansion and industrial agglomeration;excessive air pollution through gaseous emissions;contamination of water by industrial effluence or release ofmunicipa-l sewage into natural waterways; and the increasingtoxlcity of food, incidence of water-borne and vector-bornediseases and health hazards at work places. Similarlv. several

EtfuricitA: Human Rights: and Erusironmerrt rr3

recent experiences (Shah, 1998) point to the feasibility ofcommunity-based interventions in afforestation andwatershed development.

REFERENCES

Aggrawal, H.C., "Pesticide Pollution and Water", in C.K. Varshney,(ed.l, Water Polllltion qnd Monagement, New Delhi: Wiley, 1989,pp. 61-73.

Basavaiah, M. Channa, "People's Action to Protect Water Sources",Economic and Politlcal Weeklg, )oodi, 1996, pp. 1572-1574.

Biswas, Asit K, "Forest Management, Environment andDevelopment in South Asia", Contemporary Sorl/,h Asia, l:2,1992, pp. 249-259.

Bose, Asish, (ed.), Patterns Chonge in India, 1951-1961, Bombay:Allied Publishers, 1967.

Bose, Asish, (ed.), Studtes in lndia's Urbanisation, 1901-1971,Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973.

Chand, Ramesh, and Haquet, "Sustainability of Rice-Wheat CropSystem in Indo-Gangetic Region", Economic and PolitbalweeklA,32:l3r 1997, pp.26-30.

Chapman, Graham P., & Baker, Kathlene M., the CtnngtngGeogrophg oJ Asin, London: Routledge, 1992.

CSE (Centre for Science and Environment) 1982, f985, f991, TheState oJ India's Enuironment, First, Second and Third Citizens'Reports, New Delhi,

Fernando, R. & Samarasinghe, S.W.R. de A. (eds.), ForestConseruation and tte Forestry Master PlanJor Sri Lanka, Kandy:Wildlife and Nature Protection Society, 1988.

Gunatilleke, C.V.S., "Forestry Master Plan and the Conservationof Plant Genetic Resources", in Fernando & Samarasinghe,S.WR. de A. (eds.), Forest C onseruation ond tle Forestry MasterPlanJor Srilanka, Kandy: Wildlife and Nature Protection Society,1988.

tt4 Perspectiues on South Asia

Harris, N., "Some Trends in the Evolution of Big Cities", HabifatInternatianaL 8: l. 1984.

Islam, Nahid, "Indo,Bangladesh Common Rivers; the Impact onBangladesh"', Contenporary South Asicr, l:2, lgg2, pp. 2OS-226.

Jalko, Pory, International, Forestry Master plan Jor Srt Lankc;r985-2OOO. Helsinki. 1986.

Lipton, Michael, Whg Poor People Stag poor-A Stttdg oJ llrbonBias in WorA DeuelopfiEnt, Bath: pitman press, 1977.

MEPA (Ministry of Environment and parliamentary Affairs), NoLtiDnatEnvirorunentrrl Actian Plan, 1992-1996, Colombo: 1991.

Mishra, and Tfipathy, S., Chipko Mouement, New Delhi: GandhiPeace Foundation, 1978.

NARESA (Natural Resources, Energ/ and Science Authority in SriLanka), Nofiral Resources oJ Sri lnnko: Cortditions andTrend.s,United States Agency for International Development, 1991.

Nagaraj, N., & Chandrakanth, M.G., 'Inter-Generational EquityEffects of Irrigation \Vell Failure$: Farmers of Hard Rock Areasof India', Ecot@mir and Political Weeklg, 32:13, 1997, pp. 4l-44.

Nellithanam, Jacob, 'Green Revolution and SubsistenceAgriculture', E)conomic qnd polifical Weelcly, 32: 1g, 1997, pp.930-932.

Paliwal, K.V., 'Pollution of Surface arrd Ground Water., in Varshney,C.K., (ed.), Water Polhttion and Manogement, New Delhi; Wiley,1989.

Paroda, R.S., Woodhead T. & Singh, R.E}., (eds.), Sustoinabilitg oJRice-Wtrcat Production Sustem nAsra, New Delhi: Oxford & IBHPublishers, 1993.

Peiris, G.H., Deuelopment and Cttange in Sri Lanka-4eographical' Perspectives, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1996.

Pouchepadass, Jacques, 'Colonialism and Endronment in India:Comparauve Perspective", Economic and political Weetctg, SO:35.1995, pp.2059-2067.

EthnicitA: Human Rights: and Ertuironment rr5

Rajalakshmi, T'K', "Capital Misery", Ftontline,22 May f 998' pp'

120-121.

Ramachandriah, C ' ' "Weather and Water in Urban Areas" ' Econorm'c

and Political Weekty, 32. 43, 1997, pp' 2797 -2AOO'

Ruitenbeek, H' Jack., & Cartier, Cynthia, M', "Evaluation ofNarmada Projects: An Ecological Economics Perspective"'

Economic and PoliticatWeektg,3O: 34, 1995, pp' 2138-2145'

Shah, Amita, "Watershed Development Programmes in India"'

Economlc and Po\iticat Weektg' 33:26, 1998, pp' 6l-79

Sovani, N. V', "The Analysis of "Over-Urbanisation"' (ed')'

Liberatisation ln Nertlu DeueLoping Countri'es", New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall in Gerald Breese, 1966'

Swain, Ashok, 'Fight for the Last Drop: Inter-State Fjver Disputes

in India", Contemporary SouthAsia, 7:2' 7998, pp' 167-f8O'

TAMS, Tippets-Abbet-McOarthy-Stratter' EnDironmentalAssessnrcnt oJ tle Acceterated Mottoueli Prograrry New York:

1980.

Verghese, B. G.' Waters oJ Hope' New Delhi: Centre for Policy

Research, 199O.

Verghese, B.G., "Wealth, Welfare, Water-Developing the Eastern

Himalayan Rivers", Contemporory South Aslo, I:2' 1992' pp'

193-202.

Vohra. B. 8., "A Charter for the Land", Economic and Political

Weeklg, viii, 1973, PP. I l-16.

Vyas, V. S., & Reddy, V. Ratna, "Assessment of EnvironmentalPolicies and Poliry Implementation in India", Economic ond'Potitical Weeklg,33: l-2, 1998' pp. 48-54.

World Bank, World Deuelopment Report, 1992: Deuelopment a,nd

Enuironn:r:nt, Oxford, I 992,

World Resources Institute, World Resources, New York: Basic

Books, 1986.

Need to Save the Process

KhaledAhmed

SAARC has no substance but it embodies a process whichmust be saved. This actually constitutes a thought processmilitating against the postures adopted by the nation-statesthat have emerged in South Asia. This process is at riskbecause its exponents remaln marginal to the opinion-forming environment of the region. SAARC threatens over5O years of nation-building and subverts natlonalism simplybecause it posits a regional construct that is increasinglysupranaflonal.

Normally nation-states abeindon their tradiuonal nation-buflding ideaswhen propelled by common economic interests.In Europe, the supranational process began with economicinterests related to the production of coat and steel. Itsurvived tense bilateral contradictions and subsumed otherareas till the very existence of the nation-state began to bethreatened. In South Asia, economic cornmonall es havenot yet been perceived. Most of the trade here is extra-rqgional and there ls little complementadty to even encouragetoo much intra-regional trade. Eecause this nexus has notyet emerged, the process of SAARC needs to be kept alive as

Need to Sa:se tle Process TL7

an intellectual exercise benignly offering alternatve strategiesto states that are undoubtedly progressing towards acollective crisis.

SAARC increasingly attracts individuals of a certainintellectual identity. They probably enter as nationals of astate intent upon defending the interests of their governmentbut are increasingly challenged to think of the region. Asyears have progressed, the number of indil'iduals involvedin the process of SAARC has increased. So has the numberof those who initially brought to its forums minds formedunder a particular kind of nation-building, but then graduallyallowed the national indoctrination to loosen its grip. This isthe SAARC process and it is seeping quietly into the mindsof more and more thinking people as time passes.

Thinking of the region doesn't only mean what othersmay do wrong to damage South Asia as a whole but,significantly, what 'my' country may do wrong to damageSouth Asia. The interacUon at SAARC forums has a pattern.You go in feeling defensive about some obviously wrongthings you know your country is doing, but you are shockedto see some of the discussants frankly dismissive of thepolicies pursued by their governments. After the first trip,you return enveloped in a bogus triumphalism; but by thetime you have seen two or three forums, you realise that it isquite all right to break out of the national mould and thinkof the region.

The process of SAARC has to be saved because it subvertsthe various nation-building processes invented to keep thestates of South Asia apart if not locked in hostilerelationships. Pakistan and India form the centre of thispoisonous grid. Their ideologies are mutually exclusive andposit these that are mutually destructive: if India lives as asecular state then the ideological state of Pakistan loses itsro"ison d'etre: if Pakistan lives, then India's secularism isfake. To survive, one has to conspire the end of the other.

118 Perspectiues on South Asia

Nation-building in India and Pakistan is also mutuallydestructive. India interprets the British colonial period insuch a manner that the creation of Pakistan looks like aBritish conspiracy against Indian nationalism. The doctrineof divide-and-rule is central to history-writing in India. Onthe other hand, history in Pakistan means the story ofHindu betrayal and treachery against the Muslims, andtextbooks are free to describe other religions pejorativelybecause Pakistan is overwhelmingly Muslim.

It is often sald that the condition of alienation in SouthAsia attracts foreign intervention. Because Pakistan andIndia keep on quarrelling and conspiring against each other,big powers outside South Asia are able to push throughtheir political agendas without any difficulty. SAARC scholarsbelieve that South Asian states should have their ownproblem-solving systems so that foreign intervenfion on oneside or the other is avoided, The truth of the matter is thatthe world outside South Asia doesn't look at it with anyimperialist greed. In fact, South Asia has gradually droppedout of the radar-screen of international politics. It is SouthAsta that looks at the outside world with a conspiratorialeye. For a Paldstani, the world is divided into two camps:those who favour India for whatever reasons and those whofavour Paldstan's position. The same is true about theworld-view of the Indians, specially after the demise of theUSSR in whose camp once India naturally felt a partisan.The next step is that both India and Pakistan 'use' theoutside world against each other. Such is the relentlessnessof their mutual animus that the world today seems to be aninnocent being in the manip'r-rlating hands of the SouthAsian man.

If there was no SAARC and no incipient trend inside it tothink in regional terms, Sortth Asia would be expectedsooner or later to succumb to war and famine in the sameway as Africa has. Already sorne populations have startedmoving in the north and southeast, and food is now short in

Need to Saue the Process r19

almost all the states. Pakistan and India have been ready togo to war for a long time, but specially after 1990, after thetrouble in Kashmir. There are other signs why South Asiawill not move onwards but backwards to the condition ofAfrica. Solutions are no longer available inside the region.More and more states outside South Asia are inclined tobelieve that South Asians have lost the capacity to thinkstraight about their problems and tieir polittcal will has tobe stiffened with incentives from outside. Many Pakistanistake offence at the idea that India and Pakistan would haveto be given the 'Oslo therapy' that brought PLO and Israel toagreement over tie issue of the Palestinians. But the truthof the matter is that South Asia is no longer able to thinkabout its problems objectively. The region seems to aspire tothe condition of Afghanistan where all solutions, evenceasefires, have to be concocted outside Afghanistan anhthen transported to Kabul as the Peshawar Accord andIslamabad Accord etc. South Asia is also confronted withthe strange example of unchanging hatreds in formerYugoslavia; one may dismiss the possibility, but the truth isthat and the India-Pakistan conflict may give rise to the sortof savagery that is in evidence today in Bosnia.

The SAARC process is attractive for many other reasons.It is an intellectual construct that supersedes the lndefensiblemythologl of the nation-state. Bad governance in India andPakistan, persistent over decades, has squeezed all convictionfrom their nationalisms. Indian leaders singing praises ofsecularism and condemning Pakistan's fundamentalism lookjust as ridiculous as Pakistani leaders praising Islamlsatlonand condemning Indian secularism. It is no longerintellectually challenging to cleave to the self-image of thetwo states. The SAARC-minded Indian will find the Indiandoctrine of national security, as based on external threat,totally ridiculous because he can see easily that India'ssecurity is threatened from within and irot without' TheSAARC-minded Pakistani will find it frightening that the

t20 Perspectfises on South Asia

state doctrines are increasin$y predicated on extra-regionalfactors and that Pakistan can become a cockpit of intrigueharmful to other countries in other continents.

SAARC has not taken off for many reasons. No state isrich in South Asia. No one has surplus capital that couldspread around in benign big power deals. The region is notthreatened from any power outside the region forcing it tocome together from a sense of insecurity. South Asianstates don't trade witl one another, their exchanges recordedat over 95 per cent with regions outside South Asia. TheSouth Asian states have fought with one another. pakistanand India have fought wars; Pakistan has once been brokenas a result of these wars. India and Sri Lanka have gonethrough periods of intense hostility; so have Nepal andIndia. Disputes between India and Bangladesh havesimmered on without solution and there is an anti-Hinduwave in Bangladesh that might damage tlle bilateral equationfurther. India can respond to the hostile nations surroundingher with hegemonic assertion of power, but most of theeconomic aspects of this assertion are missing. SAARCtherefore lacks substance; in fact, there is danger that itmight collapse altogether in the face of anti,region forceswithin South Asia.

What SAARC provides is an alternafive view of SouthAsia, a view that today finds no takers. But it is important tokeep this alternative view alive for the Ume when nationalistvisions are no longer viable without war. When themythologies of nation-building in South Asia suddenly witheraway, and we have nothing to take their place, then it wouldbe time for South Asia to convert itself into an Africanwasteland with populations walking across it looking forfood and avoiding religious and ethnic massacres. The SAARCmind thinks of human rights because tomorrow's massacresand migration will emerge from South Asia's nationalisticinterpretation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.The SAARC mind thinks of a regional sovereignty rather

Need to Saue the Process t2r

than a cluster of conflicting sovereignties invented tosafeguard the various nation-building processes adopted bythe South Asian states. The SAARC mind miniaturises theglobal need to downplay national sovereignty so that a moreuniversal sense of sovereignty can take hold of theinternational system.

If the SAARC mind has to be safeguarded against furthermarginalisation and probable final annihilation, it has alsoto be safeguarded against the viruses that have startedinfecting the regional mind as a whole. Democracy andhuman rights will hurt the South Asian states if they do notpay heed to two warnings: save the masses from the grind ofunrelieved poverty, and rescue the state from the clutchesof bad governance. This means that economies have to berun efficiently without being lumbered with big militaryexpenditures. This means that tJle plight of the commonman must impinge on our ambitious but unrealistic dreamsof power. If the SAARC mind starts looking at the outsideworld with suspicion it will not build a good alternativevision of South Asia. It will have to acknowledge its alliesoutside the region and it will have to accommodate externalviews of how South Asian states observed human rights. InPakistan, it is the law that violates human rights. The victimhas no recourse inside the country. All his friends areoutside, not in the Islamic world where human rights havenot yet attained any importance, but in the Christian Westwhich is supposed to be an enemy of Islam. Similarly, themessage in favour of democracy comes, not from our thirdworld friends, but from the 'unfriendly' G7 states who try toarm-twist us into giving democracy a chance. In India, thelaw is not the culprit; therefore, anyone fighting for humanrights has the law on his right side. Why should the SAARCmind be distracted by the fact that Washington is nowspeaking his language? The SAARC mind must learn tointerpret 'intervention' in a benign manner; otherwise, thefear is that it would succumb to the malignancies of the verynationalisms it is fighting against.

122 Perspectives on South Asia

The SAARC mind talks in terms of the South Asiancivilisation, This construct is essentially secular but can bemade to work for both secular India and Islamic Paklstanwithin certain sociological and linguistic frameworks. Oncethe malignancy of opposed nationalisms has either beendefeated through a great regional misfortune or sheereconomic extraustion, the emphasis on civilisation will haveto be carefully calibrated. Scholars fear that the cominginternational order will be characterised by a clash ofcivilisations. The way civilisation is being emphasised inIndia and Pakistan these days, it is possible that one clashunder the new world order will be between the Islamic andthe Hindu civilisafions. SAARC must predicate, as it alreadydoes, a civilisation of regional familiarity rather than regionaldifferentiation. And as quickly as possible, SAARC mustmove towards an economic reason for the stbtes of SouttrAsia to cleave to one another. TilI then, thg process ofSAARC must be saved from the realiW of tl'.e nationalismsthat threaten the region.

Political Process andInstitutions in South Asia

l.A. Rehman

Introduction

In all South Asian countries the system of representativegovernment was introduced bythe British. The ConstituUonsdrafted by the colonial power have largely shaped theirpolitical institutions, The essential premises of the systemwere: directly elected legislatures based on a progressivelyenlarged franchise, leading to adult suffrage, parliamentaryform of government, and safeguards for minorities. Thecolonial power decided that awestminster q4)e of constitutionbest suited these countries and their respective dominantpolitical parties, at the tirne of Independence, agreed. Duringthe four decades of independence most of the South Asianstates have had trouble while working this system and theirsearch for partial remedies as well as alternative modelscontinue to this day. The process has been less marked inIndia than in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.However, even India has not been able to avoid some seriousproblems. As a consequence political institutions in these

t24 Per spectiues on South Asta

countrles, except to a great extent in India, have acquiredneither stability nor maturity. The political structurescontinue to be vulnerable to pulls and pressures of variouskinds. In most countries, constitutions had to replaced oramended.

Bangladesh shared constitutional problems with Pakistanbetween 1947 and 1971. It$ first constitution (1952)envisaged a parliamentar5r system. It was soon amendedand later on, twice suspended by military rulers. AlthoughBangladesh was ruled by the rnilitary from 1975 to 199O,elections were held in 1979, f98f , 1986 and 1991. Adultsuffrage had come to Bangladesh in 1954, the siggrificantchanges made in the constitution have been: switch-over tothe presidential system in 1972, introduction of single-party system in 1975, revival of multi-party systern in 1977,and restoraUon of the parliamentary system in 1991.

India has been able, by and large, to function within thesystem established by the 1950 Constitution, and also toconsolidate the conventions of a parliamenta4r democracyunder a constitutional chief executive. No President hasserved for, nor sought, more than two terms. There havebeen divergences of views between tl-e President and theFrime Minister but invariably matters have ended the waythe latter willed. Elections have been held regularly andthere has been no attempt to subvert the verdict of theelectorate. The system of separation of powers between theprincipa-l organs of the state has worked fairly well. Thelegislature has been active, though legislation is stilldetermined by the cabinet. The system ofjudicial review hasbeen enlarged. The press has mosfly been free and thefundamental rights largely respected. The deviation fromthe democratic norms and the spirit of the constitution-during the Emergency in the seventies-was temporary.

The Indian political structure has come under pressurefrom states (demands for greater autonomy), linguisfic and

Polittcal Process and.Instihttions tn South Asia

communal/ethnic entities (demands for recognltion,safeguards, autonomy), but of that later.

In Nepal, democratic experiments began with the interimconstitution of l95l but political institutions remained weak.A new constitution was promulgated in lgbg but it collapsedsoon. There was a long period of .guided democrary, (1962_f 99f). Finally the latest constitution was enforced in 1991.

Pakistan was governed under the Government of IndiaAct of 1935 as amended by the Indian Independence Act of1947 for the first nine years of its existence. The firstindigenous constitution adopted in 1956 was abrogated twoyears later. The second constitution lasted seven vears(1962-69). ln 1972 the country acquired an inierimconsfltuton, and a regular one in 1g73. This constitutionwas held in abeyance from lgTT to l9g5 and revived on tirelast day of 1985 with drastic changes. Adult suffrage wasintroduced in lg5l. The country was ruled by the militarydirectly for long periods-I958-1962, 1969-t}ZI. tgZZ_1985, and indirectly from tg62-1969, tgZI-tgT2, r98S_1988. Signiftcant changes in the constitution include:adopfion of presidential form ofgovernment in 1962, revivalof parliamentary system in l9Z3; separate electorates l95l _

1955; joint electorates 1962-13TZ; reintroduction of separateelectorates 1978; multi-party elections I95l_f9b5; f962,1964, 1970, 1977, 1988, 1990; party-less elections lg6o,1985.

In Sri l-anka t]le British,drafted constitution survived tiII1972. it provided for a parliamentary system and bicamerallegislature. The constitution adopted in l9Z2 retained theparliamentary system but abolished the senate. A newconsutuuon was adopted in I97g which introduced thepresidential system, and provided for proportionalrepresentation.

The multi-party system has surr"ived throughout andelections were held regularly during tg4B-TO (19b2, 1956,

t26 Perspecfwes on Soufh Asta

1960. 1960, 1965, 1970) and less regularly during 1970-90

(1977, 1989).

kessures on Politlcal Systems

l. Controlled DenacracA: Pre-lndependence elecuons in

the region were held on the basis of restricted franchise but

betwein 1948 and 1959 the principle ofadult suffrage had

been accepted in all the five states' However' there was

considerable debate in two of them on the suitability of fully

democratic systems to their people and Pal'iistan and Nepal

experimented with what was described as 'controlled' or

'guiaea democracy'. At the beginning of the sidies the

iitit ry di"tutot in Palidstan and the King in Nepal introduced

electoral colleges to elect legislatures' In Paliistan the system

("Basic Democracy') collapsed in 1969 while in Nepal

{Panchayats) contlnued Ull f991. In both these countries

the resioration of democracy followed widespread mass

upheaval.

2 . CenIre us Linguistic / Ethnir Units: In three of the SAARC

countties political structures have had to face serious

challenges from linguistic,/ethnic/provincial/state units' and

tensions Persist.

In India the demand for redemarcation of units of the

Union on a linguistic basis emerged soon after Independence'

The leadership responded to the public pressure quite early

and a division of the pre-lndependence provinces on a

linguistic basis was carried out. Special prol'isions were

also made for several territorial and ethnic units in the

Constitution. However, a number of communities had toagitate for years before their demands for recognition as

separate administrative units or for greater autonomy were

conceded-for example, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Assam'

The troubles in Punjab and Kashmir also stem from lack of

success in resolving centre-state issues'

In Pakistan also linguistic and regional challenges emerged

Political Process and. htstitutions in South Asra r27

soon after Independence, and the response was both slowand undemocratic. Resistance to the principle of majorityrule delayed the llnalisation of the constitltion lbr nineyears, tiil a strange formula of parity between the two wingsof the country had been hammered out. But the questionsof provincial autonomy were never resolved and even alterthe principle of majority rule had been conceded (lg7o) ihesearch for a durable polifical framework did not bear fruit.Ultimately, East Bengal was driven to break away andbecame the independent Republic of Bangladesh. The 1973Constitution was based on a consensus among the federatingunits but the provisions in regard to provincial rights werinot fully respected. This caused conflicts between the centreand units. Some of the differences persist. The demand for anew linguistic province (Seraikee) continues though it is stillquite weak. During the eighties the migrants 1etfled inSindh started agitating for their rights, leading to seriousconflicts in the province.

In Sri Lanka, the adoption of the lg72 Constitutionwidened the differences between the Sinhalese and theTamils which were further aggravated by the introduction ofan oath in favour of united nationhood and citizenship. TheTamil demand for a separate state led to armed conflictwhich has continued for I I years. Although an autonomyformula has been introduced, the conflict has not vet beenresolved.

3. Religious Pressures: All countries of the region havebeen under pressure from religious lobbies that have souphtspecial privileges wittrin the democratic set_up or trieJtosupplant it.

Pakistan's record on this score is discussed in the sectionon ideological challenges to democracy. Bangladesh startedwith a secular ideal. Although the military rulers did notconcede the religious lobby's demand for a drastic change inthe Constitution, Gen. Ershad,s policies of ritualistic

r28 Perspect )es on South Asia

concessions to the religious factions and closer alignment

with Muslim states strengthened the religious pressures' In

India the government's surrender in the Shah Bano case'

the Sikh demand for'Khalistan', the uprising in Kashmir'

and the rise of the BJP and its call for India to be declared a

Hindu state have seriously strained the secular polity' In Sri

t anka the dropping of the cl,ause in the Constitution of

1947 guaranteeing non-discrimination against minorities

and the introduction of a clause granilng Buddhism the

foremost place added a religious dimension to the issue of

ethnicity.

4. Efrect oJ Potitical Culhte: The functioning of democratic

institutions in the region has been greatly affected by apolitical culture rooted in pre-democracy values' Feudals'

e[te castes and the socially privileged have shaped elected

bodies in accordance with their own interests' values and

preJudices. As a result the representative character ofparliamentary insfltutions ha$ been eroded and, where the

privileged groups can form alliances, the standards of

accountability and the state's interest in the welfare of the

masses has declined. The area where anti-democratic

elements have caused the heaviest damage is the electoral

process. Several factors have undermined the sanctity of

the election process, such as resort to rigging of poll by

unrepresentative regimes, use of administrative agencies

and the police to garner votes, coercion and violence by local

musclemen employed by candidates. Besides, the risingcosts of electlon campaigns and purchasing of votes reduces

the possibility of free and falr elections. Candidates from

less affluent groups find it increasingly difficult to winelection to the legislatures. Public opinion in Pakistan is

worried about the hold that drug barons or others possessing

ill-gotten wealth are acquiring over the election process and

in india the swelling of the ranks of criminals among the

candidates is a matter of concern.

The predomlnant political culture of politicians' distinction

Political Process and- htstitutians in South Asia t29

being based on inheritance, on their ability to mobiliseeffective 'contractors' of the electorate, on the role moneycan play in buying power and privileges-has subverted alldemocratic institutions to an extent that no model ofrepresentative rule-method of election, presidential andparliamentary forms-today commands the confidence ofthe have-nots.

5. Alienation Jrom Politics: Almost all countries of theregion have experienced governments of more than onepolifical party. Several ofthem have suffered long periods ofauthoritarian rule. But apart from some cosmetic changes,the nature of the rule and the priorities of governments donot change with shift in power from one group or party toanother to the extent the ordinary citizens can feel thedifference. Besides, election manifestos are generallyforgotten once the electoral battle has been won. This hasweakened the people's faith in the political process itself asmanifested in two trends. One, interest in national affairs orln seeking redress of local or regional grievances within anational framework, is receding. Politics is gettingfragmented. Second, the people tend to give less importanceto party programmes than to connections with politicians. Aclnical attitude is growing according to which the voter doesnot care how he gets some benefit out of the politicalprocess so long as he can get it. Naturally he is becomingmore interested in securing his limited interests than in thenature of the system of governance. It could be said thatdemocratic institutions have been'feudalised'.

Ideological Challenges to Democracy

Democracy is an evolving concept. Its central idea, ttratsovereign power in a state is exercised by the representativesof the people, elected through a system based on equality ofvote, has remained unaltered over centuries. However. theauthority of democratically elected regimes has been madesubject to constraints derived from concepts of rights, people

r30 Perspectives on South Asia

do not or cannot surrender to the collective. To the extentthat these constraints are derived from sources other thanwidely acknowledged norms of democratic governance, ordefinitions of the state's responsibility and citizens' rightsfreely evolved by the people thernselves, or universal rightsof human beings, they constitute deviations from democracy.When these deviations are justified with reference to a set ofbeliefs in a particular theory of suzerainty, equity andjustice they can be considered ideologically motivated.

Ideologr has been defined differently by a number ofauthorities. For the purposes of this paper, ideologr may bedefined as a set of beliefs, codified or vague, derived fromdogma or a moral theory of human needs and behaviour,which is used to project a political structure, or someaspects of it, as immutable and above democratic discourse,if propositions based on this ideology have the potential tosupersede democratic conventions they assume the form ofchallenges to democracy. In South Asia ideological challengesto democracy have stemmed from both religious faith andpolitical doctrine.

The Chsllcnge to Democracy i]n Pakistan

The most serious ideological challenge to democracy inSouth Asia is posed by Pakistan's Islamic revivalists.Pakistan's founding fatherS visuaiised the state as ademocracy on the western pattern. However, they had tomake concessions to the theory of nationhood based onreligion that they had employed to demand a separate state.The compromise they made was a democratic polity inspiredby Islamic principles of social Justice, assuming generallythat there was no conflict between democracy and Islam.However, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's attempt onthe eve of Independence to replace the theory of nationhoodbased on religion with one based on political equality of allcitizens failed to find firm support among his successors.The leadership gradually yielded ground to the religio-political

Political Process and Inshfuhons in South Asia 13r

lobby. Encouraged by the demographic changes in the newstate produced by exchange of population, especially inwhat was then the western wing of the country (and whichnow constitutes Pakistan), this lobby not only resuscitatedthe theory of religion forming the sole basis of nationhood, italso invented a political ideology which it claimed hadinspired the struggle for Pakistan and which dictatedorganisations of the state-polity in accordance with theinjunctions of Islam. Over the past four decades this ideologrhas been invoked to effect deviations from democracy. Nowa state has been reached where this ideological challengethreatens the very essentials of a democratic order.

There are several signilicant developments in the growthof this challenge.

l. One was the adoption by the Constituent Assembly in1949 of an Objectives Resolution, which laid the basis of atheocratic state clearly distinguishable from a democracy. Itaffirmed that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongsto God Almighty alone, and the authority which He hasdelegated to the State of Pakistan through its people forbeing exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is asacred trust". The Resolution was made a preamble to theIirst Constitution (1956) and has been retained as such,with minor changes, in the succeeding constitutions.Although the Resolution incorporated the salient conceptsof democratic rule, the opening clause gradually acquiredan overriding effect.

2. In 1956, Pakistan assumed the title of an IslamicRepublic and adopted as a directive principle of state policythe taking of steps "to enable the Muslims of Pakistanindividually and collectively to order their lives in accordancewith the Holy Quran and Sunnah". The Constitution laidthe basis of Islamisation of law by deciaring: "No law shallbe enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islamas laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter

132 Perspecttues on South Asra

referred to as InJunctions of Islarn and existing laws shall bebrought into conformity with such lnjunctlons." Idenffficationof laws that needed to be harmmrised with Islam was to bedone by a commission.

3. The 1962 Constitution provlded for a Council of IslamicIdeologr to advise the chief executive on bringing edstinglaws into conformity with the inlunctions of Islam.

4. The 1973 Constitution incorporated a provision, Article2, whtch declared that'Islam shall be the state lsllgion ofPakistan".

5. The system of separate electorates, that is, Muslimsvoting only for Muslim candidates on an exclusive electorallist, introduced ln the sub-continent by the British, wasdefended by the early rulers as an integral part of theIslamic ideology of Paldstan. However, the framers of the1956 Constltution failed to agree on this question. They leftthe matter to be decided by the National Assembly afterascertaining the views of the provlncial assemblies (of easternand western wings). Eventually, the eastern wing (nowBangladesh) rejected separate electorates while the westernwing (present Pakistan) opted fbr their Continuation. The1962 Constitution did away with the separate electoratesand the 1973 Constitution followed suit. In lg85 GeneralZiaul Haq amended the Constitution to revive the system ofseparate electorates.

6. In 1974, the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government declaredthe Ahmediya community to be outside the pale of Islam,thus changing its status to a religious minority. The samegovernment in 1977 changed the weekly holiday from Sundayto Friday, and prohibited drinking and gambling-allmeasures offered as proof of the State accepting its Islarnicobligations.

7. General Ziaul Haq took a series of steps to Islamise thepolity. He added Article 2-A to the Constitution whereby the

Politicol Process and b.stthtttans in South Asia r33

ObJectives Resolution was made a substantive part of thebasic law. The system of separate electorares wasreintroduced. In 1979, he introduced a law empowering thestate to collect religious levies on wealth (zakat) and iand(ushr), and promulaeted Islamic laws (Hudood Ordinances)for the offences of theft (providing for amputation of limbs),illicit sex (providing for stoning to death), use of intoxicants,and false allegation of adultery. I_ater the law of evidencewas changed to incorporate a provision, claimed to be Islamic,whereby a woman's testimony in some cases is equal to halfthat of a man's. In lg80 he amended the Constitution toprovide for a Federal Shariat Court with power to examinelaws with a view to bringing them into conformit5r withIslamic injunctions, and to strike down laws, except tJ.eConstitution and Muslim Family laws, and fiscal, bankinglaws for a specified period, on the ground of repugnancy toIslam. Through a series of changes in the penal Code hemade the use of Islamic expressions or offering of prayers inIslamic st5rle, or description of places of worship as mosquesetc. by the Ahmediyas Penal offences, and strengthened theblasphemy law to provide for capital punishment. He alsoproposed an amendment to the Constitution (the gthAmendment) which did not materialise as the NationalAssembly was dissolved by him in l9gg. It was only afterthe creation of ttle Federal Shariat Court that the process ofchanging laws with a view to bringing them into conformit5rwith Islam began.

8. Since the exit of General Zia in lggg, tJre governmenthas offered more concessions to the religious lobby. In lgggthe Penal Code was changed to provide for Islamicpunishments for offences involving physical hurt, mademurder compoundable and extinguished the president,spower to commute the death sentences. In 19g l , the ShariatAct was enforced to provide for Islamisation of the judiciary,the economy and the education system. The governmentannounced plans to amend the Constitution to make Islamic

134 Perspectisses on South Asia

Shariah ttre supreme law of the land.

The prolonged Islamisation process in Pakistan has either

already subverted the democratic principles or threatens to

do so on the following counts:

l. the people's right to exercise sovereigR authority has

been compromised;

2. Parliamenfs authority to legislate has been made subJect

to endorsement by courts which have become supra-

legislative organs of the state;

3. the system of separate eledtorates creates an apartheid-like situation, no member of a minority community can

become head of state;

4. tJle constitution may soon become vulnerable to courtedicts, thus losing its character as a basic law embodying

the people's choices;

5. the state's ability to maintain fundamental rights'especially the rtgfrts of women, minorities and economicallydisadvantaged sections of the society' or to respectinternational human rights standards has been seriously

eroded:

6. the principles of justice in a democracy have been

eroded by the creation of a parallel judiciary and collapse ofsafeguards for right to equality before law:

7. the system of election on the basis of adult franchlse'by secret ballot, the institutlons of assemblies, politicalparties (especially those in opposition) are threatened;

8. since Shariah is defined as the Quran and precedentsset by ttre Proptret, both as interpreted by schools of thoughtthat finaltsed their opinions 5OO years ago, the people's

right to evolve laws, economic policies and egalitarianmeasures. in response to changin$ socio-econordc situaflons,could be practicallY denied.

Political Process and Insfrfutions in South Asra 135

This somewhat detailed view of the theocraflc challengeto democrary in Pakistan has been attempted to underlinenot only the inherent incompatibility of any ideolog/ withdemocracy but also the form such a challenge assumes inits various phases. It can disguise its ultimate objective byaffirming allegiance to the democratic means to capturepower.

Bangladesh

Although Bangladesh, while part of Pakistan (1947-71)resisted the theocratic tendencies that developed in theother half of the country and consciously adopted a seculardemocratic model of state on gaining independence, it hasnot been able to escape entirely the consequences of thetheory underlying its accession to Pakistan in L947. Politicalforces exist in the country which pursue the ideal of anIslamic state. Under dictatorial regimes, the state tookseveral steps to demonstrate its commitment to religiousideals, such as declaration of Friday as the weekly holiday,prohibition of drinking and gambling on religious groundsand a general display of state interest in rituals. However,the essential features of a democratic dispensation havesurvived. The Islamic ideological challenge to democracy isstill weak but its existence cannot be denied. Unstablepolitical leaderships could fall back on religious sloganswhen threatened by popular rejec on.

India

India, too, faces a challenge to democracy from the ideoloryof Hindutva adopted by communal parties, though they areless explicit than their Pakistani counterparts and theirtactics are different. Since the early fifties, several politicalparties (Hindu Mahasabha, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh,Jan Sangh, Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party) have invarious ways demanded that India should abandon its secularideal and become a Hindu state. What is generally meant by

r36 Perspectfues on South Asia

these demands is the establishment of a polity based onRamrqjga, adopted by the state of Hindu culture andlanguage. Instead of seeking special political rights forHindus, the measures offering safeguards to the minoritiesare attacked. This theory of state does not envisage separateconstitutional and legal provisions for minorities, it demandsthat they make their religious, ethnic, social valuessubservient to the Hindu Code. Although there have beenoccasions when some militant communalists have askedthe government to change the polity by executive action,there has been no serious attenrpt to repudiate the essentialdemocratic process and concepts, such as elections basedon adult franchise, political institutions of assemblies,political parties and opposition. A breach in this tradition isbeing made by the assertion, in cases of places of worship,that where law or constitution conflicts with a tenet ofRatrvqjga or Hindutva the latter shall prevail. To the extentthe Indian government yields to the communal demands ofthe majority, or goes out if its way to placate a minorit5r, thethreat to democracy will grow.

External Factors Contrtbuting to Religious Challenges

The religious challenges to democracy in South Asia arerooted in indigenous factors, such as the history of religio-political conflicts in the region, religion's extraordinary holdover the people and their tendency to extend its jurisdictionbeyond matters of personal falth. However, a number ofexternal factors have contributed to the phenomena. Themessy partition of India carried out by the British and theinternationalisation of India-Pakistan disputes during theCold War perpetuated the communal politics of the pre-Independence period. The Indian people's fear of the lg47Partition becoming a model for similar developments on thebasis of religion or ethnicit5r, and the Pakistani people'stendency to attribute any problem faced by their state tohostility to their faith prompted people in both the countries

Political Process ond lttstitutians rn South Asia L37

to fall back on religion as the last barrier to disintegration.In its long war against communalism western powers tookextraordinary interest in emphasising the role of religionand traditional culture as the anchor of stable polity andfound numerous ways of strengthening religio-politicalformations in the region. Finally, the rise of oil rich Muslimstates as aid givers and markets for labour gave thempossibihties of tying their generosity with their being acceptedas role models for Muslim countries. In countries benefitingfrom. {heir bounty, sympathetic religious forces grew andwhere such beneffts were not visibly available or were seento be available to particular sections on the basis of religiousaflinity, those left out sometimes articulated their grievancesin religious terms.

A pattern of linkages among the national religiousmovements of the South Asian region is evident. Theconcessions Pakistan offers to its religious lobby encouragesits couterpart in India to press for a similar advance, andvice versa. The impact of the fundamentalist upsurge inPaldstan on Bangladesh is even more marked. The interestgovernments in the region take in the affairs of ttre minoritiesin neighbouring countries, with some of whom theirmajorities share a religious faith, produces strong backlashes.

There are sharp differences of opinion on the strengttr ofthe religious movements' challenge to democracy in SouthAsia. At one extreme are the scholars who maintain thatreligious revivalism is a bogey created by weak politicalleaderships and that they impose their perceptions on themasses who are not necessarily interested in a religiouspolity. At the other extreme are theorists who argue that thedesire for a religious state is deep-rooted in the South Asianpeople's psyche and therefore it cannot be resisted. Therealitlr lies somewhere between these two viewpoints. Allcountries of the region have witnessed, in varying degrees,effective exploitauon of religious sentiment for political ends.The fact that the masses can be mobilised for political

138 Persaectiues on South Asta

action by religious slogans cannot be denied. But equallymanifest is the incapacity of religious ideologies to answerthe demands of a modern state and to meet the aspirationsof the people, sharpened as they have been by whateverexposure to democratic management they may have had. Inparticular, religious ideclogies have no answer to ethnic andregional pulls on South Asian states. If anything theyexacerbate such crisis. It is also likely that the need of theglobal polarisation will relieve the Big Powers of the need topander to the religious proclivities of their camp followers,unless the United States obsession with Islamicfundamentalism produces a new polarisation and thusbolsters this very fundamentalism. Thus, hopes that theideological challenge to democracy presented by religiousrevivalists should peter out in the long run do not seemunrealistic. However, in the irnmediate future the strains ondemocratic structures will be hear,y and dangerous and thedamage they will cause to the people's interest, thatdemocracy alone can serve, cannot easily be assessed.

A decade ago, democracy in South Asia faced aconsiderable challenge from the contemporary model of thesocialist state. Without going into a discussion on the meritsor otherwise of this model, it$ rejection of the multi-partysystem and lack of safeguards against the will of theproletariat being supplanted by the whims of an entrenchedparty bureaucracy conflicted with the commonly understoodessentials of democratic organisation. The collapse of tl.eSoviet Union has considerably weakened the socialistchallenge to liberal democracy in South Asia but it survivesin several states. Its accession to strength in proportion tothe perceived failures of the present democratic regimes toaddress the people's pressing material needs cannot beruled out. For the present, however, mainstream socialistforces have setfled for democratic means of change, and thisshould give democracy considerable breathing space.

Any suggestons regarding the ways and means of meeting

Political Process and Inshfuhons in Soufh Asia 139

ideological challenges to democracy, particular$ in the SouthAsian context, are outside the scope of this paper. Butperhaps one point can legitimately be made here. Some ofthe most severe strains on the democratic experiments inthe region have been generated by national leaderships'tendency to be selective in their acceptance of democraticnorms. Unless their conduct is characterised by a willingnessto accept democracy as a dynamic movement towards higherforms of people's participation in self-governance, they willrender their people increasingly susceptible to alternativemodels of rule.

Instltutlond Structures of Democracy

Most political theorists accept both presidential andparliamentary forms of government as democratic so long

as they are accompanied by adequate and fair systems ofchecks and balances. All the South Asian states unreservedly

accepted the colonial legacy of the parliamentary system'

but all of them except India have been shalry in theircommitment to it.

Pakistan has had the longest periods of deviation fromthe parliamentary system it inherited at Independence.

Indeed, it started with less than the respect due to theparliamentary system as the first Governor -Generalfunctioned as the head of both the State and the Governmentwithout being answerable to parliament' a task assigned tothe Prime Minister. The aberration was justified in view ofthe extraordinary privileges accruing to the Governor-Generalby virtue of his pre-Independence stature. His death afterbarely 13 months in offlce made it possible to correct thedeviaflon and the precedent came handy to the third and

ttre fourth Governor-Generals who made serious inroadsinto the parliamentary system. The facade was totallydemolished by the army commander-in-chief when he

established dtrect military rule in 1958. When the countryreturned to constitutional rule in 1962 it was under the

140 Perspecttues on South Asia

presidential form of governmertt which continued till August1973. Horvever, the 1973 Cou:rstitution as drafted underZulflqar Ali Bhutto's guidance, did not clearly opt for theparliamentary system. It is known that he was personally infavour of the presidential system and had to give up hispreference in the face of strong opposition. Only four yearsearlier ttre advocates of the parliamentar5r form of governmenthad forced Ayub Khan, the architect of the presidentialsystem in Pal<istan, to give up his cherished creation. Thecompromise Bhutto made was to make the Prime Ministerstronger than normal in a parliamentary system by makingthe constitutional head of state even more of a figureheadthan usual and making him answerable to t)le prime Minister.During the four years that this Constitution remained inforce the Prime Minister also wielded the authority theparliamentary system assigns to a constitutional head ofstate. Under General Ziaul Haq (lgZ7.8B) pakistan wasruled by an all powerful chief executive. More important, herevived the 1973 Constitution only after drastically changingits character. The Constitution as it stands today gives suchextraordinary powers to the President that in the opinion ofmost scholars it makes the functioning of the parliamentarysystem impossible.

Bangladesh, too, has had a long experience of thepresidential form of government. The first step in thisdirection was taken by Bangabandhu Sheikh MujiburRahman himself who switched over from the parliamentar5rto tJre presidential system, which was retained by the militaryrulers till 1991. Sri Lanka persisted with the parliamentaryform of government till lg78 when Mr. Jayewardeneintroduced a new constitution providing for the presidentialsystem. In Nepal, the central issue till the upheavals of l99Owas not the choice of the form of government but t}le degreeof power the monarch was prepared to concede to theelected representatives. Althougft the latest constitutionenforced in November l99O envisages a parliamentary form

Political Process ottd.Instittttiorns n South Asra l4l

of government the constitutional monarch retalns substantialpowers, including the right to nominate ten members of tJle .

sixt5r member Upper House.

The South Asian states' vacillation between the presidentialand parliamentary systems of government has given rise toconsiderable literature in support of both. The debate isinconclusive because, among other things, the proponenmof each system J ustl$r themselves with reference to successfulexternal models while their opponents base their rejectionof a particular system on its practical malfunctioning intheir particular context.

The principal arguments given by the advocates of theparliamentary system in South Asia are: that it is thesystem with which the people became familiar during thecolonial period; that in pluralist societies, which most of thestates in the region are, an executive accountable toparliament offers the best possible safeguards to differentinterests; that parliamentar5r rule consolidates people's senseof sovereign power to a better degree than an executivesubJect to a written code. The denigrators of this systempoint out to its inability to guarantee stability over periodsconsidered necessary for national development plans tocomplete. The presidential system, they contend, relievesthe state of uncertainty caused by parliamentary factions'fluctuating loyalties. However, in almost all South Asianstates the switchover to the presidential system has beenbased less on clearV argued national imperatives than on astrong personality's personal ambition or a ruling group'sparusan interests.

In the case of Pakistan, Ayub Khan's preference for thepresidential system was determined by thlss factors-hispersonal ambition to be the sole arbiter of his country'sdestiny, backed by a military man's peculiar 'concept of ateam captain's absolutist prerogatives; his belief that anunderdeveloped societ5r was incapable of properly working

r42 Perspectiues on South Asia

self government apparatuses; and his preJudice againstpoliticians who seemed to be fighting all tJle time for loaves

and fishes. He failed to realise that the political squabbles inhis country during f948-58 were not an essentialcomcomitant of parliamentary rule but resulted from thestudied attempts by the custodians of power to circumventthe principle of majority rule. He also failed to appreciatethat just as the parliamentary system needed for its efficientfunctioning an institutional under-carriage, the presidentialsystem also needed accountability devices and safeguardsagainst its degenerating into absolutist rule. These flaws inhis thinking resulted in his presidential system causingPakistan more grievous harm than was done by the brittleparliamentary system he had $uperseded.

The Bangladesh military rulers' fondness for thepresidential system hardly needs discussion. For one thing,it is in tie nature of military rule to follow the authoritarianmodel and, for another, these rulers barely concealed theirdebt to Ayub Khan. What is intriguing in Bangladesh'spolitical history is Sheikh Mujiibur Rahman's decision to go

in for the presidential system. It is possible that he foundthe parliamentary system, with its emphasis on collectivedecision-making by the Cabinet, slow or inadequate inresponding to the enormous task of nation-building after atraumatic war of liberation which had also thrown up radicalchallenges of different hues. But one suspects that he fell aprey to a common disease afflicting political leaderstlrroughout the region that they tend to prefer the counsel ofbureaucratic expert to the views of elected colleagues.

The Sri Lankan transition from the parliamentary systemto the presidential differs from the Pakistani or Bangladeshexperiments in two material respects. First, the military didnot figure among the forces pressing for the changeover.Second, the change was not sudden; it followed a fairlyprolonged campaign during which the issue was debated atlength not only by party ideologues but also by the public at

Political Process and Instifufrons in South Asra 143

large. Nevertheless, in practical working, the presidentialsystem in Sri lanka has not come up to the model presentedin these debates. It has operated as a partisan instrument ofthe ruling party and the tendency to its degeneration intopersonal rule is clearly visible.

The unavoidable conclusion from South Asian history isthat what have been adopted here in most cases are spuriousverslons of both parliamentary and presidential forms ofgovernment. Practically, all countries of the region havefound it impossible to breakaway from the tradition ofviceregal rule embedded in the political structures inheriredfrom the colonial masters. No political system developed inone country can be transplanted in another. Adjustmentand adaptation are necessary in accordance with the historyand level of the population's socio-economic development.Thus, there was nothing wrong in attempts to adapt theparliamentary and presidential systems to local conditionsand requirements but, more often than not, such adaptationstook the form of compromises on essentials and excessivefidelity to the incidentals of the chosen formula. If India hashad to face fewer setbacks to the democratic functioning ofthe state, the reason lies in its minimum attempt atadaptation. When it made a major attempt to indigenise theparliamentary system, the departure from the normalpractice was too glaring to be tolerated by the electorate.

A common tendency to accommodate regional and ethnic-cultural entities within the national framework is anotherfactor that has adversely affected the institutions ofdemocratic rule in South Asia. All countries have seriousproblems related to ethnic minorities. Every country, withthe possible exception of Bangladesh, is a multi-ethnicstate. Yet the strong tendency among ruling groups toestablish unitary forms of government, even when theconstitution envisages a federal structure, has undermineddemocrary. Pakistan has always professed to be a federation,but has consistently acted in breach of the federal principles.

t44 Perspechves on South Astc

Ttre framers of the Indian constitution betrayed an inclinationtowards centralism when they preferred a union to afederation. And in Sri Lanka, ttre attempts to hold unitarygovernment qmonlrmous with unity have landed the countryin costly strife. Had the South A.sian states adopted rationalpolitical methods to grant the federal units, regional entites,and ethnic groups the means of participatlon in governance,regardless of the system of government being parliamentaryor presidential, the shtp of democracy might have had asmoother sailing.

Failures mentioned in the preceding paragraphs haveexposed the unworkability of the classical theory of nation-state in South Asia, and of the futility of forcibly fusingconscious national entities into A bigger nation , with emphasison unilication rattrer than respect for well-formed diversi-ties. TWo essential pillars of a democratic natlon state havecrumbled in the process. First, all state political parties havebeenyieldingground to regionaly'ethnic formations. Examplescan be found from Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. Second, theJudiciary's power to protectthe democratic system from beingsubverted has been gravely eroded. The trend to put execu veactions and legislative enactments outside the scope ofjudicialreview, as evident in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in particular,betrays a deliberate attempt to place partisan interests abovethe dictates of democratic dispensation.

It is a moot point whether South Asian democracies cansave ttreir essential institutions from further revision. Perhapsit will be more rewarding to adopt more genuine models ofpluralist democracy, redesign the apparatuses of state witha bias in favour of decentralised authority, and restructurethe institutions of representative government (including theadministra on, justice, economic and welfare services).

Decllne of Leglslatures

In most Souttr Asian countries, legislative organs have

Political Process and Inshfufions in South Asta 145

not played their due role in consolidating democratic norms.Large legislative majori es have often gone beyond ttredemocratic principles to protect party interests. TheAssemblies in Pakistan have persistently violated thedemands of a fair dispensation for the pluralist society andignored the lnterests of the minorities. In India the legislaturecould prevent neither the imposition of the Emergency northe abuses perpetrated under it. The battle against theEmergency was fought.outside the legislature-in the Pressand atJudicial forums, In Sri Lanka some of the amendmentsto the Constitution, whereby the government can controldissent in all parties, do not stand an objective test. Thus,legislatures have generally failed to keep the governments

within the spirit of their constitutions. Another criticism oflegislatures is that they have not assumed control oflegtslation. Not only are they subject to government initiative,in some cases, such as Pakistan, most of the legislation isdone by the executive authority and legislatures only rubberstamp it.

The Ctvtl Soclety

The civil societ5r has been receiving a raw deal in all statesof South Asia.

The foremost cause of the civil society's predicament isthe security syndrome visible in all these countries. Thetendency to seek national security exclusively throughacquisiflon of military power is common. Pakistan spendsover 30 per cent of its total government expenditure ondefence and India around 17 per cent, while the figures foreducation and health are I.2 per cent and 2.4 per cent inthe case of Pakistan and,2.7 per cent and l.Tpercentinthecase of India. Sri Lanka has the highest allocation foreducation and health but over the past many years theallocations as percentages of the total governmentexpenditure have been falling. For decades the civil societyhas been deprived of its basic rights to life, work, food,

146 Perspectiues on South Asra

shelter, health, educa on and the enjoyment of culturebecause disproportionately high porUons of the resourcesare being diverted to military machines under the misleadinglabel ofdefence. This trend has not strengthened security; it.has bred a greater sense of insecurity, leading to suicidalarms races and a dangerous imbalance between the civilsociety and the military.

Apart from being fleeced to pay for the militaryestablishments, the civil society in South Asia is required topayfor, and suffer the consequences of, military's involvementin purely civil matters. The military operation in Sind inPakistan, the mtlitary's involvement in Kashmir, PunJab andthe north-east in India, the grirn civil war in Sri Lanka and themilitary campaign against the tribal populations in Ban$adeshare all instances of grave encroachments on ttre civil society.

The state's fondness for military power and its use toresolve political lssues or meet ethnic pressures have led tomilitarisation of societies, increased civil violence, and aweakened tradition of peaceful coexistence among diversegroups that is the hallmark of a civil societ5r.

The civil society has been deprived of the possibilities ofcollective and individual self-realisation by the failure ofstates to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of belief,gender and economic status, and to realise one of theprimary obJectives of democracy-guarantees of equality ofopportunity to all their citizens.

Grinding poverty, slow and uneven industrialisation,reluctance to adopt informal approaches to developmentand a general blas in favour of the e;dsfing social relationsprevent the disadvantaged secUons of the civil society in allSouth Asian states from breaking tJle bondage of tribalism,casteism and debilitating prejudices and inhibitions ofdifferent varieUes.

The task before conscious and enlightened sections of the

Polttical Process and Instrtutricns in South Asia t47

population in South Asian countries is not merely to securea larger share of resources for the benefit of the civil societybut the creation of orders which guarantee the fullest possibleregeneration of the creative faculties of the civil population.This will necessitate liquidation of praetorian tendencies,drastic cuts in military expenditures, wholesale revision ofeconomic priorities and the raising of the common ciflzensfrom the status of state subjects to that of participants inself-governance.

The Shared Imagination andCooperation in South Asia:

Nepalese Perspective

DurgaPrasad Bhnndori

Exploring the shared values captured in the creativeimagination of South Asia is a challenging task. There tssuch a commonality of vision and voice in the South Asiancreative imagination, that it is very hard to tell theBangladeshi imaginatlon from the lndian imagination, Indianfrom the Nepali and vlce versa. Yet it is worthwhile to findout the nauve uniqueness and peculiadty if there is any.What overwhelms one at the very thought of such anendeavour is to embark on ttre adventure of going throughthe famillar and unfamiliar creative genres. Human rightsand social justice, posiflon of women and secularism,communalism and sectarianism are in their character verymuch common to all the SAARC countries. Nevertheless it isstimulating to take a look at the difference of perceptions.

Nepal is a country with a political identity and historicalconsclousness like all the SAARC countries and with

The Shared. Imoghntion and, Cooperation: Nepal t49

comparatively greater and longer isolation like a few of itsmembers. The imaginative and tfie intellectual, the intuifiveand the logical faculty of any countr5r or society is determinedby the course of its cultural history right up to ttre presentmoment. The 'challenge and response" theory of ArnoldToynbee, a great thinker and historian of this century isworth recalllng while contemplating the texture and qualityofa culture. If the response matches the challenge a greatculture can be born, if the matching is unequal then ittends to slide towards a masculine or feminine way, exkovertor introvert. We can classiSr the societies as introvert andextrovert as we classiff individuals. SAARC is a conglomerateof introvert societies barring the few episodes of racialinvasion and assertiveness in the past. But they are allunitedly and individually trying to be more outward looking,more assertive than they were half a century ago. They seemto be determined to face up to the situation that their ownhistory has presented to them. They share many thingssuch as common heritage, common aspirations for thefuture and common ambitions to work for a fellowship of thefree nations of the world.

The creative ime qination of India, Pakistan, Bangladeshand Nepal is essentially lyrical. A lyrical imagination ispulled more powerfully by the past than by the future. Evenin our most prosaic moments we tend to be lyrical. By lyricalI mean the South Asian mindset is sentimental and nostalgic;it talks more often than not of the golden past that has leftus and of t}re golden future that is yet to come. When wetalk of the present reality, it is not interesdng. Yet we arecondemned to talk because we have to live in the present.

Nepal has enough reason to be proud of having producedsome creative arHsts in the twentieth century who can beranked with the important artists of other South Asiancountries and beyond. They have seen the position of women,the human rights and social justice, communalism,secularism and sectarianism with the vision of a creative

150 Perspect rcs on South Asra

mind, not with the loud perspective of a politician, a socialreformer and a policy maker. What is true about one genuineartist is usually true about the other artist. I cannot thinkthat any literary artist, any painter or sculptor can beostensible and declarative in his objective. He is for the mostpart subfle and impressive in his creations. Any creationwith a manifesto to redress the social ills has the inherentdanger of falling into vulgar sloganeering and pamphleteeringwhich is unfortunately called by a certain set of people asthe real aim of art. The artistes I have in mind are theartistes who are free from the preJudice of any reformist anddidactic zeal. At the moment I am inspired to recall-rightlyor wiongly-Rabindranath Tagore, La:<rni Prasad Devkota,Saadat Hasan Manto, Kazi Nazrul Islam. Manto and Islam,in spite of their obsession with social r€alism, did transcendit in some of thelr writings. In fact a great artist is one whosecreation combines both time and timelessness. I have inmind great painters and sculptors, great producers anddirectors of tfieatrical art, great classical and folk artists,with my limited understanding of the classical art in itsdifferent expressions. My attempt to deal with art formsottrer than literature might sound gratuitous, irrelevant andsuperficial. I will try to discover how all the three issues arereflected in the best known dramatic poem of MahakaviLa:rrni Prasad Devkota and will also take a passing look atsome of the representative Nepali literary artists. Devkota'smagnum opus, Mwwrmdan, serves as my master narrative.

Mutanndrnls thoroughly rooted in Nepali soil; the theme,the rhythm, the metre, the. conception and execution,everything about tJ:e poem is unaffectedly Nepali, the firstand last of Devkota's great poerns without the impress ofany external influence. Most of his works bear out the director subtle influence of classical Qanskrit poetry and Englishromantic poetry. Munamadan in its idiom, energy,naturalness and flowing cadence stands out unique in Nepaliliterature, perhaps in Souttr Asian literature.

Ttre Shared Imaginatian and Cooperation: Nepal 151

The sublime emotion is expressed with meticulous artisticmaturity in the speech of the most common man.Munanndan is a folk tale refined into a beautiful lyricalpoem of love, separation and death. It is presented indifferent forms-ballet, dance drama, painting and specialpoetic recitation since it appeared in print in 1935. And thepoem which is very small in size-forty pages-has made animmense impact upon Nepali Iiterature and the Nepalipsyche. In those days, issues of human rights, women,communalism and secularism did not trouble the Asianmind wittr a few exceptions. It was inconceivable to imaginettrat Nepali artists under the family autocracy could overtlyor covertly plead for human rights, women's rights andsecularism. In fact the formal recognition of human rightscame much later even in the west. Devkota was a rebel as allgreat artistes are in some sense, but he was a rebel not attle cost of art. He was not happy with the state of affairs inhis country but could not openly demonstrate hisunhappiness through his writings lest it was detected bythe autocratic rulers and their minions. He very subtlyconveyed his message in all those poems, for his own timeand for future generaflons.

Muna is the wife, Madan the husband who have retainedthe fervour and heat oflovers who can sacrifice and surrenderwhatever they have on earth and heaven for each other.Madan, a high caste Kshetri decides to go to Bhot' Tibet, tomake a living. Muna stays back at home to attend to his oldailing mother, but her mind is occupied with the thought ofMadan and gets nearly wild in her imaginings. Madan issuddenly taken ill and is looked after by the alien Bhote, thelowborn tribal of high Tibet. The human quality of the poorBhote touched Madan's heart. In return Madan touches hisfeet trying to convince him with these words:

A son of high Kshetri touches these

feet with love unbounded

r52 Perspectiues on South Asia

Any man is great not becauge of his caste

but because of his heart.

The strong caste barrier and communal division widelyprevalent in those days is ridiculed by Devkota tn Mnrnrwdanand other works.

Madan makes a significant comment on the state orposition of women not in any particular society but in thewhole scheme of creation. Madan tells Muna: "Woman isholding the whole responsibility of creating the present andfuture and she has been giving delight and fragrance tohuman existence since time immemorial." Devkota couldnot be so crude to say that ]ret women are being discriminatedagainst by every society'. Detrkota in Munatrwdan Shaklutalc-and other poems and dramas is always upholding the caseof women and the downtrodden with his characteristicartistic delicacy. Devkota is clearly a humanist who (if hewere alive today) would have vigorously defended humanrights, including the rights of women, and would havesincerely and powerfully conveyed his message that religious,communal, and ethnic harmony is essential for the healthygrowth of any societ5r. He questioned the rationale oforthodoxy and obscurantism it'r his poems without fearingthe ruler's whip. Mahakavi Devkota is a poet of the higheststature in Nepali literature. Under the dictatorial regimepanegryic writing was more or less customary for creative aswell as non-creative writers. Ddvkota deliberately refrainedfrom dedicating his poems to the rulers and praising theirrepressive rule. He was completely given to his muse to theend of his life. His casual eccentricity and indifference to thepractical aspects of life is a mark of a man who is creativelyand spritually above the common men. This is to say that henot only created great poetry, he also lived it in a veryuncongenial age. Some of his shorter poems along withMunamadan and Shakuntala will live for all times. lf anv one

The Shared Imagination and. Cooperation: Nepal r53

ever tries to discover a message in his poetry he will lindthat Devkota is above evelything else a humanist whohappened to be born about a hundred years before his time.Devkota is the guiding spirit for most of the poets of modernNepali literature. Clearly, Munamadan has made a seminalimpact upon the Nepalese psyche.

Next to Devkota, because of my limited knowledge ofNepali literature, I feel compelled to recall B.p. Koirala forhis obvious relevance for tJle given issues of the dialogue. Hehas earned a considerable reputation as a short story writerand a novelist who has mostly written on human societ5rand the human mind. Curiously enough politics which hasbeen his lifelong vocation has never for a moment restrainedhis literary output. His creative writings are neafly detachedfrom his political ideolog5r. Sumnima is the title of his mostimportant novel he wrote in prison (1970), (almost all hisnovels were written in prison). He gives a very balanced andpenetraung insight into the questions of ethnicity andcommunalism in Nepal.

Som Dutta, a Brahmin who takes a vow to lead a life ofcelibacy and austerit5r as is prescribed by the Shastras andhis immediate ancestors, falls in love with Sumnima, a girlfrom the putative lowborn Kirati community who is relativelyfree in matters of sexual and social behaviour. Som Duttadoes everythlng externally impressive towards the fulfilmentof ascetic destiny. But he cannot adhere to the asceticdiscipline for very long. He falls into the embrace of Sumnimaand finds his fulfilment. He is traditionally married to pulmos,a woman of his caste who is also internally drawn toanother man. Sumnima is much more drawn to Som Dutta.The pairs are not comfortable with the conventional rolesthey are supposed to play. The women break the age oldsocial respectability and look for greater freedom. The mutualgravitation of Sumnima and Som Dutta is an embodiment ofcommunal harmony and of longing for psychological and

154 Perspectlues on South Asia

social freedom. B.P. Koirala by making the high caste Puloma

attach himself to the low caste man is sending an obvious

message to his audience that the concept of high and low

caste and community is irrational. The theme of ethnicity is

deftly dramatized in this novel. The kind of social scenario

and ethnic problem reflected in the novel is a chbracteristicSouttr Asian reality. The portrayal of women in B.P. Koirala's

wridngs is more unorthodox than other Nepali writers'There are, of course, a few tradition-bound women who

stand in contrast to those quesfioning tradition. Koirala's

men do not look so important as his women. His stories and

novels together fascinate readers for ttrree reasons: his deep

psychological insight. his insinuation of social, psychological

and moral message, artistic balance, and the mild thrustupon the liberation of humans from the irrelevant dogmas'rituals, and superstition. Above all' Koirala is a writer forharmony-communal, social, psychological, biological and

religious. Yet this great politician never ta-lks of politics inhis creative writings. Women are at the centre of his works'

Gopal Prasad Rimal, a playwright and a poet makespoverty, social injustice and the liberation of women ttre

leitmotif of his writings. Both in thought and technique, hebreaks the convention of moving around the old religiousand social stereotypes. In his play Masan he frees theprincipal woman from the tyranny of her husband and therepressive domestic atmosphete in the same wa). as Ibsenfrees Nora in Doll's House. Masattwas written about fiftyyears ago.

Govinda Bahadur Gothale wrote Pallo Ghnrko JhAaL (thewindow of the other house). The window is a s5,'rnbol lookingout for a woman who has been confined in the room forcenturies. She leaves home to start a new life with the manshe sees outside the window. A s1'rnbolic representation ofwoman's desire to be free and discover herself is the burdenof tlre novel. Similarly the play Bhoosko Ago (fire in thehusk) dramatizes tl.e feelings and problems of women.

Tte Shrtred Imaghatian and. Cooperation: Nepal r55

Parijat, a powerful woman novelist in her most popularnovel Shirlsko Phool (1965) wrote about woman's predicamentand her position in a male dominated societ5r. In her novel.men were frightened by free spirited women, no matter howphysically frail and delicate they were. Parijat's women wereindependent or on the road to independence; they werebecoming more and more resolute not to be men's shadows.

Bhoopi Sherchana, a popular modern poet is satiricaland epigrammatic in these lines which are among the mostquoted from the anthology of his poems:

When I constantly see young Sitas

in the streets, the alleys, the markets,

in my country and in foreign lands,

stripped bare like eucal54)tus trees,

when I see countless Bhimsen Thapas,

standing still and silent, .. ...

I really feel like mocklng my blood.

Bhoopi here laments tJre degeneration of the ideal forwhich we have.been living and dying for ages. The old valuesare juxtaposed with modern reality.

More recent poets in Nepali literature have also discoveredissues relating to society, politics and the eternal thirst forIove in their poetry. They were particularly articulate in theI99O movement for democracy. It provided them anopportunity and an excuse to express themselves uninhibited.During the Panchayat rule, several literary artists wereexcited at times to articulate their feelings at a considerablerisk. The ardstc mind generally revolts against repressionand injustice. Most of them talk and assert for humanrights denied under a ruthless dispensation. I believecircumstances, both political and social and the desire to

156 Perspectiues on South Asia

improve or tolerate them in the artistes are very common tothe SAARC countries.

Drama and theatre have undergone changes in the lastIifteen years. The street theatre is a new phenomenon in thesubcontinent. The emergence of Saruanacm, a street theatregroup in 1981 is an important event. A perceptive critic inNepali literature, Abhi Subedi says, "The Sarvanaam StreetTheatre started at a tlme when it was not posslble todramatize even within the four walls, the desire of free

expression. What could not be said within the four wallswas, however said openly by the Sarvanaam in the Street."And the Sarvanaam mosfly spoke in favour of human rights,social justice, improving the condition of women and infavour of ethnic integration, harmony, and ethnicparticipation in the affairs of the country. They said it with agreat deal of seriousness and intensity. About five yearsago, well known groups from rnost countries of South Asiastaged their performances in Kathmandu. It was anextraordinary experience. The dramas showed that theproblems and aspirations of the region are similar. Issueslike human rights, women's position, poverty, exploitation,democracy were the principal themes. Ashesh Malla, thedramatist, was ttre main organizer. Banal Searcher, generallycalled the father of street theatre in India also participatedand shared his experiences. If Safdar Hasmi were alive hewould also have taken part in the Kathmandu drama festival.All important participants talked nostalgically of him.

Television serials and non commercial and commercialcinemas to some extent, reflect the suffering of women, andthe new awakening in therr to revolt against unJustdomination by men and society. Some movies like Ujeli andChelibeti demonstrate the suffering of women who cannotcomplain and articulate their feelings and accept sufferingas an inevitable part of their destiny. But tJ.e response inthe sensitive audience is the sense of disgust and protest.

The Shcved Imagirtatian ond Cooperatian: Nepal r57

Nepal T.V. is, I hear, planning to make more films oncommunal harmony, on the evils of poverty, illiteracy; onsocialJustice and on women and their right to be equal withmen. At present the serials and Iilrns made on these issuesare few and far between. Nepal radio is doing a fairly goodjob on this score.

Contemporary Nepali paintings in the artistes'compassionate moments, also reflect the issues of humanrights, women's condition, communal discord and harmonywith considerable poignance and sharpness. Like modernpoetry, paintings too embody the themes of freedom. Manymodern paintings done under tJ.e tifle of .Democrary" presenta new scenario. The brush strokes, the prominent use ofprimar5r colors and ttre mobility of images in the paintings ofLainsingh Bangdel, Kiran Ma-nandhar and other youngartists, the vision ofthe apocalypse in the Kalkiauatar seriesof Shashi Shah dramatise in the visual form tfie ttrirst forfreedom and change.

Women artistes are also coming up with amaaing brilliance.Ragini Upadhyaya's recent paintings present verysuccessfully the themes of women, their posi on in thetraditional society. She shows them by the use of familiarthemes, archetSpes and the use of familiar colours, ,,Ragini'spolitical paintings do not project the grim and violent postmodernist images of the political myth of the recent times',says Abhi Subedi. Shashikala Tiwari links women andenvironment, and the predicament of women, There isprofusion of blue and green in her art.

There has been occasional o<change and interaction amongthe creative minds of South Asia. Almost every year anextribiUon of Nepali paintings is organized in Ohaia. EarlierNepali and Bangladeshi artists had Joinfly exhibited theirworks in Kattrmandu.

Writers of the region, officially or privately, visit eachother's countries. Whenever there is political change in the

r58 Perspectrues on Sottth Asia

subcontinent the writers want to come closer and share

each others' hearts and minds. This sharing may promPt

them to work in unison. Further sharing might be stimulated

by the South Asian Dialogue. I believe it holds a great

piomise. Ttre awareness of making a dialogue about the

creative imagination of live cortntries is in itself a remarkable

step towards moving closer to the real understanding of

each others' problems. In reality the outer manifestation in

any form-war, peace, human rights, social justice' woman's

agony, communal harmony or conflict' religious or political

dogmausm, fundamentalism-is an indicator of what we

have been inwardly feeling and thinking and how we have

been expressing ourselves through the medium of art for

many generations. South Asia or for that matter any part of

the world is what it is on the strengile of its inner €irowth or

inward journey in the creative imagination. lord Buddha is

creative in the ultimate Supreme sense' Shakespeare is

creative in the sense we usually understand creativit5r and

creative imaglnation. There is, I repeat, an overwhelming

commonality of creative imaginatlon in South Asia, because

ttrere is some commonality of sources and roots that has

been shaping the South Asian mind for many centuries' The

tangible is drawing upon the intangible, upon thesubterranean. Besides, the geography and history of the

reg;ion has been passing through more or less similarvicissitudes. We have been holding dialogue with each other

for centuries, but the dialogue of this time is going to be of a

unique character. Certainly this will "break a new ground"'

A major factor determinin$ social peace and prosperity inthe reg;ion is culture-a sense of common identity' traditionsand values. This South Asian Dialogue is presumably a

search in that direction. Culture is created by artists, seers

and thinkers. Folk culture also has its roots and branches

in the artistic thinking and behaviour of every society' Each

of these five countries has its own cultural identity' If all

countries merge together they create a greater whole and

The Stnred Imagination a nd" Cooperation: Nepal r59

greater responsibility to keep individual identity on the onehand and to develop a resilience and openness for theregional, subconunental, continental and intercontinentalcommunlon and oneness on the other which should be themark of a great cultural undertaking. This is essentia_l toliberate ourselves from the religious bigotry and pettiness,from nationalist egotism and from much of the hypocrisy ofthe present day world whose staple of dialogue andconversation is politics and economics more than an5rthingelse. The fffth South Asian Dialogue will hopefully provJthat talking of culture which encompasses among otherthings literature, painUng, theatre, cinema, folklore can bemore fascinating and equally profitable.

To give a picture of tJle regional creative imagination onthese much talked about issues is nearly imposJble withinthe limited space of time and the paper; to give a cogentpicture of what the creative artists of my counfir haveimagined, referred to, alluded or directly dealt with is verydifftcult. And despite my dissatisfaction with myself I amobliged to take it as a pious task to put before thisdistinguished gathering whatever I have discovered with mydesultory effort. Most of the artists in South Asia havedisplayed their sense of revolt against tyranny, injusfice,fundamentalism, dogmatism, excessive nationalism,repression of men and women and any kind of superstition.La:ani Prasad Devkota, completely uncormpted by anyobvious political opinion or ideology, or any obviousenthusiasm for the improvement of his society has vervartistically-if we want to find-expressed about the positionof woman and what it ought to be, about the dignity of manand woman in an undignilied world, about ttre oneness andharmony of all communities and castes, about the god whodwells in everybody's hearts irrespective of colour, caste,birth and gender. In his short poem ..Temple" and To aBeautiful Prostitute', he is an uncompromising humanist,unparalleled in Nepal literature. I know very litfle about the

160 Perspectiues on South Asta

most renowned poet of Ban$adesh, Kazi Nazrul Islam'

However, on the basis of what I read long ago of Islam I

venture to say that he was an iconoclast and a hurianist of

great understanding. His ,Rebel ls a work which comprehends

ill ttr" i"".r"" of our Dialogue and at the same time transcends

tleem. He was a great artist and very egalitarian' I know very

little of Pakistani literature. And I do not know where to put

Ghalib and Meer and othr-r pre-Independence writers: in

India or in Paliistan' Iqbal was Pakistani by choice and by

temperament. I love Ghalib, Meer, Fa? and Ahmad Faraz'

Iqbal was a great poet but not equally lovable for the

secular-mtnded readers. His lines such as Allehoke steronlco

aati nahtt rubahi (The lions of God know no cowardice)

smacks of something less than the humanistic abandon

and poetic amplitude of Ghalib, Meer, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and

Ahmad Faraz, Saadat Hassan Manto, a remarkable story

writer wrltes about the poor, the down-trodden and the

iowliest in the society with an extraordinary boldness of

treatment. Manto the story teller in the recent past and

Faraz the poet in contemporary Pakistan have carried tJ:e

flre of revolt against injustice and brutality in the society'

Marrto, for example, writes in his story '"Thanda Gost" '.A

prostitute is a helpless and friendless woman' Every day

hundreds of men come to her carrSring a single desire' Buteven in the midst those who desire her she is alone"'

Devkota s prosfltute is also apparently a vic m of social

injustice, but spiritually she is higher than the so-called

high caste women. Manto presents his helplessness as it is'

Devkota ideallses it. Both are compassionate and wish her

to come out of the mire. Devkota is oblique in castigating the

society, Manto is straight.

Whatever the similarity and difference in the artisticexpression of the subcontinent, the creative imaginauon on

the whole is multi-dimensional. It seems moving from the"foul rag and bone shop of the heart" to the splendid heights

of metaphysics and spiritualism. The most known and the

Tle Shared" Imaginatinn and. Cooperation: Nepal l6r

best example of multidimensional creative imagination isRabindra Nath Tagore who is simultaneously moved by thesmell of the earth and the fragrance of heaven. Here hesings of the mystic ecstasy, there he shudders at the colossalpoverty, widespread social injustice and expanding religiousand communal insularity in the Indian society. His heart isfilled with "awe and wonder" at the celestial glory above and"the uncontrollable mystery of the bestial floor" below. Tagoreprays to the Almighty to free his countrymen from all kindsof pettiness, injustice, inhumanity, repression and narrowmindedness, and prays that India be a land "where theheart is without fear and the head is held high, chittajethabhag a shung a ucctn j e tha math-"

Muslims and I

Vljag Tendulkar

I was born in 1928 in Mumbai in a Maharashtrian middleclass family.

Mumbai was known and spoken of, except in Marathispeakingfamilies of Maharashtra, as Bombay.

Even those Marathi spealdng gentlemen who had highereducation-which had its accent on English-and wished toshow their proficiency in the language of ttre rulers, wouldfondly call the city Bombay.

Bombay was fashionable w.ith us; Mumbai was natural.And of course the original. Itwas turned into Bombay by thewhite sahibs first and then by the brown sahibs as was thepractlce.

Mumbai of that time was not as sprawling and overcrowdedas it is today. The city was limited to its core areawhich wassparsely populated. You could walk on the road at any timeof the day without being bumped off by a speeding vehicle orcolliding wlth another pedestrian rushing to reach

Muslims and.I r63

somewhere. Life wen with clocks and watches was longenough to be enJoyed with its simple comforts and to belived without the persistent feeling of anxiety.

We still had to learn by heart and recite a poem eulogisingGeorge the Fifth, the then emperor of the British Empire, onwhich tlle sun never set. This poem was a part ofour schoolcurriculum. At the same time the air outside was chargedwith Mahatma Gandhi's movements of non-violence and thememories of Lokamanya Tilak and Shahid Bhagat Singhwhich were sflll very fresh in the minds of the elders. Mymother, who was a housewife and was bard educated asmost women of that time used to be, talked fondly of themeeilngs she had attended of Tilak and his powerful oratoryand the terrible nig$t on.which Bhagat Singfr was hanged.*Bhagat Singhl Hail Hail" She would tell us how ttresemuffled slogans of ttre mourners echoed on the roads ofMumbai throug;h that night. My college going elder brotherwas already in the freedom movement and had pledgedhimself to sroadeshi and the charkha, the spinning wheelthat Gandhi had turned into a household item.

Once in a while the atmosphere would suddenly gettense. Everyone looked concerned, I was urgently broughthome from the nearby school and my elder brother who hadgrown a beard was pressurised to shave it off for the timebeing. This meant that a communal riot had begun in thecity.

Hindus shed any resemblance to a Muslim and took extracare to look thorougf,r Hindus and made it a point to avoidMuslim localiUes till things got normalised again. They intheir routine existence had very little to do in these localitiesexcept passing through them in a tram or a bus towardsanother destination. It was an alien part of the city for them;segregated in their psyche like the prostitutes' area. Oneavoided even passing through this Muslim area for safety'ssake till the end of the tensions between the two communities

164 Perspectiues on South Asra

(names were meticulously avoided in the media) were officiallyover. Withdrawal of the curfew was a sure sign of thesituauon returning to normal.

Ttrere was no way to know what happened to the Muslimsin the city during the riot situation; but even I, a child,would hear about incidents in which a Muslim hawker or abeggar who strayed into the F{indu locality was promptlystabbed in the back or in ttre belly. A similar incident of alone Hindu straying into the Muslim locality and gettingstabbed was as a rule mentioned after such an incident inthe Hindu locality was narrated. Maybe to convince thelisteners-and the narrator hirnself--that it was only in thefitness of things; a case of squaring of the account or a caseof tit for tat which was perfectly Justified.

But I clearly remember; there would be a short or longhush in the conversation before this topic was resumed orchanged.

The hush was not out of a feeling of doubt about thewisdom of such a Justilication but probably tl:e white-collared clerics and their families felt uncomfortable witheven the verbal feel of bloody violence. They had got so usedto the smooth working of the [,aw and Order machinery ofthe BriUsh Raj and the peaceful existence of the politicallyuninvolved middle class under it.

Ttuly life then was paradise for my family and for familieslike mine as compared to the routine gang wars and themurders and the dacoities committed in the white-collaredmiddle class localities of Mumbai now. And the muchpublicised complicity of the police in such terriblehappenings. One would not even dream of such complicitythen. Not only the police but the government machinery asa whole was taken to be above board in its functioning.Whether it was, is anybody's guess.

Going back to the topic of my paper, I did not get an

Mrslims and.I r65

opportunity to meet my first Muslim or even to see one-a realone-from near till I was well over twelve years old. Not manyof my class, the white-collared middle class-even in theiradult age-got this opportunitSr of meeting a real Muslim inperson in their normal life in a so-called cosmopolitan city ofMumbai. One was only aware of a Muslim existence in anotherpart of the city and inherited some stray ideas about themwhile he or she grew into an adult.

What were the ideas like?

Let me recount from mv exDerience.

A Muslim meant someone with a beard. It also meant anunclean appearance; even an uncouth behaviour lackingeducation and culture. Someone you better stay away from.Contact in any form was supposed to be dangerous. I stillremember a common expression very frequently heard incasual conversations of the white-collared adults.(T|-ful{T 3lfeq 6'I gqFrlfl?T ?; Are you a human being or aMuslim? It was never said seriously; the tone would be light;half-joking; even frivolous. Casual. Once it was said in myclass by my teacher to one of the troublesome students. Thestudent did not mind it. He grinned sheepishly as it wassaid. No one seemed to mind in fact. It was a way of sayingyour behaviour is most unseemly.

My first education on the Muslims began with tristoricalplays of the time. Those plays invariably dealt with theascendance of Shivaji the Maratha king who freed theHindus of Maharashtra from Mughal rule and establishedhis own rule which came to be known as tbe Hindu-pada-pad"shahi, the empire of ttre Hindus. The ffrst such play Isaw had Shivaji's son Sambhaji as the hero, who accordingto the history of that time was a passionate womaniser andan alcoholic and a generally irresponsible young man wtropreferred a martJrr's death in Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb'sprison to getting converted to Islam. It was staged in our

166 Perspectiues on South Asia

school as part of the annual day function. All the actorswere school children (older than me) and they were directedby one of our teachers. The play had been originally writtenfor adults and had earned acclaim on the commercial stage.Like any Marathi historical play of those days this too hadthe Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, Shivaji's arch-rival in hisflght against t]le tjrrannies of the Muslim religious fanaticsagainst the Hindus, as ttre bad man of the play. He waspainted in loud colours; a religious fanatic, a ruthless tyrant,a despicable figure with a long white beard on a crookedface wearing garish costumes and shouting swearwordssupposedly from Urdu and Farsi (I did not understand thembut felt very piqued by them:) directed at Shivaji's son andthe ruling Maratha Emperor Sambhaji and his men. Inshort he was like the villain in any commercial Hindi masalafilm of to-day. Alternately comic and repulsive. The rest ofthe Mughal characters in the play were drunkards, lechers,capable of any dastardly act and big-mouthed cowards whoalways lost in a ffght with Sambhaji's brave litfle men.(maulas, the Maratha soldiers were small in stature).

Ttre Maratha Mavlas stood in contrast to these Mughalruflians and buffoons. All the applause-winning dialoguewas given to Sambhaji and his men by t]le play'r!'right andthe 'enemy camp' spouted only hatred toward the kq;ftrMarathas, toward their'holy' cows and contempt toward theHindu religion on the whole.

As children we were made to participate in and watchmany such baffling (baffling for us children) specimens ofadult theatre; this was only one of them. The very first Iwatched and brooded over for days.

You can imagine my reactio:r at that age to this mind-blowing ttreatre experience.

Being a school production the audience, in addition tome, was mainly of children of the age-group between six andsixteen.

Muslims and I r67

Apart from this our school textbooks carried excerptsfrom Marathi historical plays which shaped our ideas of ourpast and also the present to a large extent. Access toauthentlc history at that age was out of the question. Even ifone found access at a later age the ideas-some of themwierd and tvdsted-were already formed at an early age andthough they can change over Ume I doubt whether theydisappeared entirely from one's psyche. Our attitudes havea lot to do with what we internalise in our early formatlveyears.

The first real Muslim in my life was a boy in my class.This was after we left Mumbai for Kolhapur, a small town atthat time. My new school had boys from lower castes whowere the sons of lorry-drivers, tailors, carpenters and wehad a girl in our class who was the daughter of a 'keptwoman'or a concubine of a rich man-a novelt5r even for ttremore knowledgeable among us. I met Sheikh here in theschool. On the first day of the school we were made to standup one by one and say 'present sir' as our class teacher readout the roll-call. When a tall, gaunt boy with high cheekbones and small peering eyes answered to the name ofHussein Ali lzaz AIi Sheikh (the first and the second name ismy imagination; since I do not remember the original ones)I looked tqdce, with utter disbelief at that boy wearinghorne-washed pajamas, a neat cotton coat fully buttoned ona clean white home-washed shirt and a black shapeless capproperly placed on his head through which his unruly halrsprouted from all sides.

I simply could not believe my eyes. He did not fit into theconcept of a Muslim in my mind at all. He was like any boy.He was so gentle and shy and soft-spoken in spite of lookingbigger than usl And he did not utter any swear-words. Asttre days passed I also found that Sheikh was a studiousboy, he spoke my language, i.e., Marathi-though later Ifound that it had a natural mix of Urdu (not of the Aurangzebldnd) when he was away from the school especially at his

168 Perspectiues on South Asra

home and with his family-and this mix of Urdu and Marathisounded even sweeter than my chaste Marathi. And Sheikhwas very sociable. Warm in his general behaviour. Eager tomake friends. Very co-operative. When I was unwell and hadto stay away from the class, Sheikh would help me incatching up with the back{og by offering me his note-books. We became friends despite my deep-rootedreservatlons about his being a Muslim. He lived in a localitywhich was in the same direction as mine. He had to walkfarther on. So we left school together every evening. Chattedon the way. For days I could not make up my mind onwhether I should invite him horne or not. He was a Muslimafter all. Besides my own reser'r'ations about Muslims I hadapprehensions about horv Sheikh would be received byothers at home. I had even avoided mentioning our friendshipto my parents. One day during the lunch break he offeredme somethlng from his lunch box. I had not thought ofdoing so. I ate from my box and he from his though we atesitting on the same school bench. That day when he tookout something from his lunch box and held it in front of meI dithered. I did not know whether I should eat from aMuslims's lunch box. I did since I could not say no to Sheikhbut my conscience troubled me that night for doing what Ihad done. I even imagined in my sleep that I had turned intoa Muslim and my family was blaming me for eafing from aMuslim's lunch box. 'Good for you!' They were saying in achorus. Want to eat from a Muslim, eh?' And my motherwas crying her heart out for my becoming a Muslim.

But soon this feeling of guilt disappeared and I eveninvited Sheikh to my house one day to see my collection ofkites. I did not inform my family about the religion of myschool frtend but they discovered it while Sheikh was at ourhouse. Probably by Sheikh's way of speaking or hisappearance. I do not know how. To my surprise they did notobject. My mother took care to tell me that night not to go tohis house and not to be 'very friendly'with him. 'He seems to

Muslims and I 169

be a good boy' she said, 'but these people (she meant theMuslims) are not our kind. It is better to stay awav fromthern'.

If I remember correctly, he was uncomfortable and tensefor a while in his ffrst visit to my house but liked the houseand my family and then frequently came to my house toplay with me.

His father was a butcher by profession. I did not knowthis for months. Nor did my family with their vegetarianhabits; otherwise I would have been forbidden from mixingwith Sheikh. I myself came to know it when I was compelledto go to his house for the first time when I learned thatSheikh was not well and would not be able to come to theschool for some Ume, After knowing this I wanted to helphim in his back-log of studies. Sc I decided after some innerresistance that I would. go to his house. I remember tleshock I felt after meefing his father. He was a typical villageMuslim in appearance as in his manners; warm, natural,robust yet gentle and in a coloured lurEi and white kurta Hewas curious about me and my upper-caste Hindu family. Hehad seen and even met Hindus but only as clients who cameto his shop to buy mutton. He had no qualms about hisprofession. He talked about it as casually as my fattrer didabout his clerical profession. My father talked of files andpaper; Sheikh's father talked of the quality of the mutton hesold and the intestines and brain and the liver of the sheephe killed. His gentle nature never matched with his Violent'profession in my mind. How can he kill the poor animalsand be so genfle? I used to ask myself in those days. Yearsafter ttrat I became a flesh eater and never cared to askmyself how I relished eating animals \illed by someone,with the gentle, non-violent nature I have.

Sheikh's mother and sister kept themselves to the kitchenwhen men-even l-were around. They wore burkhas andIooked mysterious and even sinister to my eyes because of

t70 Perspectiues on South Asra

that. I had not seen anyone in a burkhattll then. Not even ina Marathi historical play. I could not imagine my mother ormy sister moving in our house in a burkha.

Sheikh's mother called me beta and gave me some sweetdish to eat. I had not eaten anything as tasty as that in mylife or I so thought while I ate the 'special' dish.

Sheikh was not keen to show me his father's shop. Iinslsted out of curiosity that he should take me there onlyonce. I went with him and could not take in the gory sight ofraw headless cadavers hanging upside down. It upset mystomach and I even felt that I would throw up but managednot to. That first sight of raw flesh and blood was soirresistible to me in spite of the revulsion I experienced thatI wanted to visit that shop again and see a sheep being killedby Sheikh's father. For some reason Sheikh avoided it.Perhaps he himself did not like his father's profession. Or hedtd not relish killing.

My frlendship with Sheikh was my first genuine educationon tJle subject of Muslims. Sheikh remained behind whenwe left Kolhapur for Pune, a predominantly Brahmin city atthat time. It was nearly impossible to get an accommodationin a Brahmin locality of Pune fyou were-no, not a Muslim-a non-Brahmin. You would be asked to state your castebefore anything else was di$cussed and we were non-Brahmins. Which meant that we were 'flesh-eaters'. In factmy family was strictly vegetarian but it took a lot of effort formy father to get a place for us in a decent 'no-flesh' localit5r.

The next crucial influence in my life uis-a-uis the Muslimswas tfre experience of the partition of the country. We wereglven to understand-and we readily believed-thatMohammad Ali Jinnah was the villain of the piece in tllisgory drama that unfolded before us mosfly through themedia and all kinds of hearsay. Even the most authenticaccounts of the massacres that took place in this period onboth sldes of the dividing line read like cheap pulp liction

Musltms ond I t7l

consisting of unlimited violence and the most pervert kindof sex. For us Jinnah was the cause of it all. And his MuslimLeague of course. The word Muslim had a familiarconnotation for us. lt meant uncultured, illiterate,undeveloped minds full of perversities and a violent drivealways ready to go berserk. And Hindus though culturedand civilised had no option but to retaliate with the samepervert violence.

I was in my late teens then.

When we heard on the radio that Gandhi had beenassassinated everyone around me knew for certain-andmade no bones of it-that the assassin had to be a Muslim.When we were told that he was not a Muslim but a Hinduour minds in spite of their benumbed state refused tobelieve it. But then we knew why a Hindu had to kill theMahatma. Because of the pro-Muslim politics of tl-e otherwisegreat man. Politics which pampered the wicked Muslims atthe cos'i of the interests of the well-behaved; gentle Hindus.

Those were the days of a rabid anti-Muslim feeling aroundme.

This is when I heard a new Marathi word for the firsttime. It was not new in that sense. I had heard and evenused it before. The word was ftiWr;. Its literal meaning was'an animal whose tail has been cut'. Generally a dog. WhenI heard it for the first tlme in a new context-to suggest aMuslim-I could not catch its new meaning. Then I wasenlightened on this subject by friends. And soon I tried touse it in my speech and felt very self-conscious; evenembarrassed. But that word became a household wordduring those days even among boys of my age. The biaswhich had been intentionally and unintentionally sown inour minds when we were children now grew into a confirmedopinion. Muslims were an aggressive rowdy savage rabidminority: dogs with a cut tail; their leaders used them fortheir gains; and the secular Hindu leaders like fools were

t72 Perspecttues on Souih Asia

playing into their hands at the cost of the interests of usHindus who were a majority but suffered at the hands of amere rninority.

I too held this view thougfi not with the fanatic anger ofttre typical white-collared Hindu of that time.

In this very period another Muslim entered my life. Hewas leading the cultural squad of the undivided CommunistParty in my state. He was Amar Sheikh. Shnleer (the bard)Amar Sheikh as he was widely known. He came from a poorrural Muslim family and sang songs with a political message.

His volce was a musical but strong booming voice whichthrilled an audience of thousands by its thunder. It was notnecessarJr to be a communist to feel charged by its magic.The 'revolutionary' message did not mar the lilt and the roarof the sing;ing. I came under the irresistible charm of thisvoice so much so that the fact that the singer was a Muslimdid not bother me even in that climate full of anti-Muslimfeelings. The songs moved me as if they came straight fromthe heart. Once in a while I did wonder how a Sheikh. aMuslim, could put so much pa.ssion in some of the patrioticsongs he sang. But his style of singing them was irresistible.I began singing those songs imitating his style. I wouldstand like him. Upright and with my chest thrown out; thensing imagining myself to be him. (My fair complexion couldnot match his tan black and he was too manly in looks ascompared to my vegetarian adolescent looks-which gaveme a terrible complex.) I was in my late teens now and sflllwith the bias against Muslims in general and an ardent fanof a Muslim: Shaheer Amar Sheikh.

We became friends after many years and remained friendstill he died in an accldent.

Incidentally I came to know about his mother after hedied. Munerbi Amar Sheikh's mother, was an illiterate Muslimwoman married to a small farmer and a poetess of unusual

Muslims and" I t73

strength. The poems she had composed had a natural mix-a captivaUng intermingling-of both, the Muslim and theHindu cult. The imagery came straight from the Bhaktipoets and tJre poems flowed from Urdu into Marathi andback to Urdu like a child frolicking between two secUons of ahouse divided by a recently erected wall. At times the metrewas traditional Marattri, used by the Bhakti saints and tJ'.eIanguage Urdu as spoken by the rural Muslims inMaharashtra. In one of her poems she sees Krishna, theHindu God, in her Muslim son.

In 1967 her Muslim son, the bard Amar Sheikh, posus aquesflon to his readers in an article: How am I a traitor? Hen€urates a happening: 'l cannot forget that day. I hadreturned from an election meeting in which I had performedas usual and was taking a nap when I was awakened bysome commotion. Then a kick on tJle door of my apartmentin the chawl. Then anotleer kick. The door gave way with it.It opened wide. Someone rushed in. Lunged at me. I sprangto my feet and grabbed him. A battle royal ensued. Myattacker was in his early thirties. I had completed fifty. I didnot spare him. Nor did he while letting himself go at me. It isnot the beating I had to take that hurts; but ttre wordswhich shouted at me. The mind behind those words. 'AmarSheikh is a Muslim' he yelled. He deserves to be \mched. Hehas married a Hindu woman. Haul me before a court andput me in a jail but I shall come out and lynch this man. Ishall become a martyr for killing a Muslim.'

Amar Sheikh writes further in this article: 'l have beenliving in this locality for the last seven years. My attackergrew up watching me. My daughter grew up with him. Andto-day he barges into my house after beating up threeMuslims on his way. Why'7 Because I am a Muslim. And aMuslim is a traitor; an arch-enemy of this country. I withmy record of service to this country and to my people amcalled a traitor and he who has never shown any concern forthis country is a patriot because he is born a Hindu! We

174 Perspectiues on South Asia

were born as Muslims and that puts a stamp on our foreheadin this country: TRAITORI Whf/

This excerpt says everything,

I came across Munerbi's poetry and this article of her sonin a book which was given to me during the post Babri-Masjid days, namely, when the communal passions wererunning high once more in the country and a spate ofcommunal riots was already on. The climate around me wasonce agaln ripe with Muslim*hating and the word I hadheard again for years after I had heard it first during thepar[ition of the country:Fiwn The human dog with a cuttail.

The answer to Amar Sheikh's question immediately cameto my mind.

Because we were brought up that way. -We, the Hinduchildren; with casual remarks like Fff${ effdq sT gseqfd)?Are you a human being or a Muslim? Because of ourgrooming which prohibited and taught us to shun anycontact wittr Muslims. Because of the biases knowingly andunknowingly sown in our minds by displaying and teachingour history {in my case the Muglal and Maratha period of it)in a wrong light. Because of the experience of the partitionof the country as felt through thre media and of the precedingyears of Hindu-Muslim relations as they percolated to usthrough the attitudes of the elders. But most of all becauseof the total lack oJ contacl there was a wide chasm betweenus and the Muslims among us, as people.

Yes, I am aware of the games the politicians playedamong both the communities from time to time and thecommunal passlons whipped up by them to suit their politicsof self-interest based on hatred, But those games would nothave succeeded to tJle extent they did if we Hindus andMuslims had known each other better; if we had growntogether from our childhood as one community tian two

Mustims ctttd. I t75

separate worlds within one nation.

After Amar Shiekh I had the good fortune of havingHameed Dalvai the Muslim reformer of the sixties in my life.We became friends much before he plunged into the Muslimreform movement. He was a creative writer. He wrote shortstories. I was the editor of the monthly magazine and one ofthe lirst readers of his writlng. He wrote about his community.His childhood. He wrote with anguish about his mother whowas the third wife of his father. About communal riots. Hewrote with a searing insight about his communit5r, theMuslims.

Those were my real lessons in understanding the Muslimsin my society. My days wlth Hameed. The worklng of theminds of the Muslims, their upbringing, what they weretaught about us, the Hindus, in their early formative yearsand the biases they were injected with at an early age. Allthis realization came through Hameed. Through our longevenings and nights of inflmate conversations.

Hameed had come to learn about my Hindu world moreor less in the same way as I came to learn about his:through whatever little contact we could make witl. the'other' world, the other side of the communal divide, bygoing out of our way in our adolescent years to know thingsby ourselves. His father was a Muslim I-eaguer. A localleader of the League and a Hindu-hater. Hameed had grownup as a boy in this political climate. He grew out of it in lateryears. In his young age.

When he worked for a better understanding between thetwo communities and progressive social reforms in his owncommunity particularly concerning the state of Muslimwomen, he was branded a traitor and a heretic by themajority of his people-especially the diehard conservativemen of his communif; and was simultaneously looked atas an exception and a freak within his Muslim communityby the Hindu intelligentsia.

176 Persoecttues on South Asia

One of our writers who proudly proclaimed himself as aHindu revivalist once advised Hameed-and with genuineconcern-You will always be an outsider among the Muslims.Why don't you become a Hindu? After all your forefatherswere Hindu. You have Hindu blood in your veins. Come, Ishall arrange for your conversion to Hindudom.'

Hameed laughed heartily every Ume he heard this. But hedid say to me once in his introspective mood: .We IndianMuslims are a peculiar lot. Our forefathers did not comefrom across the borders of the country. They were not theinvaders but the invaded like the Hindus. They were Hindus.They were converted to Islam mostly under pressure; evenby force. If this is true, then we belong here. We have Hindugenes in our system and a Muslim upbringing, a Muslimbias. We are a product of a mixed or hybrid culture whichmakes us an isolated lot; rernoved from the general reality,the general ethos. We belong nowhere. Not to the Muslimworld outside nor to the predominantly Hindu world of thiscountr5r. We have no roots to claim. And our loyalties willalways remain questionable in this country. Not necessarilybecause ofwhat we do but because of what we are expectedto do-as an alien race whose interests lie outside of thiscountry. It will be presumed that we do it, that we have doneit though we may have not. And we must not. Whateverhappens to this country happens to us. Our fate is tied up tothe fate of this society which may never accept us as itsnatural integral part.'

Hameed died prematurely of kidney failure.

After him I have had many Muslim friends. Some of themmean much more than friends to me. But when I look backat our friendship I find a sutrtle difference between themand my other-I mean Hindu*friends.

I meet a Hindu friend and am never conscious of hisreliglon. He is just a friend. But when I meet a Muslim friendI never forget, never can forget, that he is a Muslim. If I

Muslims and.I

forget this for a brief Ume my upbringing reminds me thathe is Muslim. I am proud of his friendship. I love him morefor that.

Ideally it should be no less, no more.

A friendship is beyond all considerations. Is it not?

177

PART 2

COUNTRY REPORTS

The Indian Polity in "Crisis"

Pran Chapra

The dictionary defines "crisis" as "arry marked or suddenchange of symptoms", and pathologr adds that it is a pointat which 'change takes place which is decisive of recovery ordeath." In that sense of the word, India's democratic politystands at a crossroads as the current millennium turns intothe next. Either the polity will move toward a future thatmay be even better than the past, which has been good; ortoward disaster.

But as important as the crossroads is the indisputablefact that it is entirely in India's own hands to decide whichway it will turn. In that sense this crisis is diflerent from theothers which surround India, because the resolution ofsome of the latter might depend upon factors over whichIndia has little control. The remedies the polity needs arewltl.in tl.e political system we have. We can use themwhenever we decide we must.

Not only is this a crisis of our own maftlng. It is alSo a partof the customary dynamics of socio-political systems, thatevery phase of advance produces new challenges, and they

r82 Perspecttues on South Asia

call for new methods of meeting them. This is not just aproposition out of political science. It stands out in our ownexperience of our polity. Each generation of achievementleaves a legacy of problems which have to be resolved by thenext generauon. But their resolution moves the system tothe next phase of its evolution. At no time in the past hastJ.is process been of more crucial importance to India'sdemocratic polity than it is at the end of this century. Onthe one hand the late 1990s have thrown up more urgentproblems. On the other hand the polity is closer now thanever before to some urgently needed reforms. The lessonsare clear, and so are signs that India is learning them,because experience is proving to be a stern headmaster.

The life of our polity began with a "sudden change ofs5rmptoms." India not only became independent after a verylong time, lt also became a full democracy for the first timeever, and the world's largest at that, and one which adopteduniversal adult franchise at one go, unlike most of the morefamous democracies, which came to that level ofenfranchisement only sfage by stage. There were voicesagainst such speed even within the Constituent Assembly.This is not suprising, because the Assembly itself had beenelected by a Iimited franchise, which by some estimates hadcovered only eleven per cent of the population which wouldhave had the vote under universal adult suffrage.

But to jump to universal franchise is only one of thechallenges which the polity accepted at that time. There waslittle doubt that the Assembly would opt for democracy,even though a more authoritarian form of government mighthave been expected to be more effective and manageable ina country which had three hundred million people even inthose far off days, was so new to self-governance, so steepedin poverty and illiteracy. But India's huge and intenselyparticipatory movement for independence had involved somany millions of people in its active politics, and hadbroug;ht the leaders of the day into such intimate contact

The Indian Polity in "Crisis" 183

with such vast numbers of people, that an authoritariangovernment was unimaginable either for the leaders, that isthe future government, or the people, that is the futureelectorate.

More interestingly the Constituent Assembly opted forthe parliamentary system. Again, there had been advocatesof the presidential form, who thought a president would bea better manager than a cabinet responsible to a parliament.But those in favour of more democracy prevailed. theyargued that only a parliament consisting of a few hundredmembers would fully reflect at the apex of political authoritya country which was such a vast, complex and variedmosaic, while an apex consisting of only one person, whowould necessarily belong to one or another piece of themosaic, would be excessively identified with that piece,either in its own eyes or in the eyes of the other pieces. Astill greater act of faith was that the Assembly opted for afederal rather than a unitary form of government. India wasstill struggling with the trauma of Partition, and secessionistvoices were also being heard from some corners of thecountry. The bulk of the rest of the country was alsosusceptible to linguistic sub-nationalism. A large part ofIndia consists of very sizeable and well defined territories,each inhabited by tens of millions of people spealdng thesame rich, well developed, distinctive and centuries oldlanguage. Therefore each would be capable of thinking ofitself as an "imagined nation". Once given some autonomywithin a federation, it would seek independence.

But India responded to this challenge with anaccommodative philosophy, summed up in Nehru's famousphrase, "unity in diversit5r", andwitha matching federal politywhich, although weighed in favor.rr of the federal centre, alsogave to the federating units considerable and well definedspace and powers, guaranteed by the Ccnstitution againstany unacceptable major encroachments by the federalgovernment (except with the approval of the apex court, which

I

184 Perspectiues on South Asra

is the keeper of all maJor provisions of the Constitution.) Thisbalance between unity and diversity met what could havebeen history's largest challenge of linguistic nationalism inany democratic polity,

It was in this orderly and peaceful first phase that Indiabecame the world's largest democratic polity, defined andcertified by one of the most detailed and enlightenedconsfltuflons, which was backed by a nearly universal andnation-wide consensus. India also began to be acceptedincreasingly as a signiflcant player in internationaldiplomacy, with a unique philosophy of foreign relations: asan economic player with an equally unique and promisingphilosophy of development; and endowed with such stabilitythat the same party and prime minister remained in officefor more than a decade and a half.

But before thls phase ended, it threw up some disturbingchallenges to the future growth of the polity as a democracy.First, India began to look like a one-party state, stable butfrozen, devoid of active interaction between the polity and thesociety, and lacking significant competition between partieswit-Lr significantly differing points of view or programmes.Second, the reason for this stability. Despite three adultfranchise general elections with a good turn out ofvoters, in1952, 1957 and 1962, the electorate remained, by and large,an undifferentiated mass, as yet incapable of throwlng upcompeting parties and agendas. As a consequence or as acause, the Congress also remained content with amorphousand ill-defined programmes, which the party could interpretwhichever way it wanted while addressing its electoralaudience for tJle day. Again as a cause or as a consequence,most other parties also remained ill,defined and vague.Therefore, thirdly, while the voter had many parties to choosefrom, he had very little choice of programmes and visions, letalone competing ideologies. The result was that electionsbecame contests between personalities and group allegiance s,not between alternative national agendas.

>i

The Indian PoLitg in "Crisis" 185

This situation suited the Congress very well, and that,not its popularity, is the main reason why it was able toremain in power for so long that India began to look Iike aone part5r state. In fact the Congress rarely polled more thanabout 4O per cent of the total votes cast in elections to LokSabha, the lower House of Parliament, which has the powerto vote the government in or out of office. Since the leadersof the Congress had been the leaders of the freedommovement, they were also the country's best knownpersonalities, and between them they gave the party afoothold in all classes, castes, religions, Ianguage groups.Its electoral appeal was also vague and wide enough to havepockets of support among most parts of the electorate. Evenif it was outnumbered in some segment by a party moreidentified with that segment, the aggregate of the pocketsoutnumbered all parties in the ultimate aggregate whichmattered most: the number of seats won in Parliament.

The Congress was also helped by the shortcomings ofIndia's flrst past the post electoral system. The party couldwin a seat by polling only a minority of the votes if no otherparty had won even those many, and so many of its seatswere won that vray that even with only a fort5r per cent shareof the votes it could win around sixty per cent of the seats,while another party, if more thinly spread out, might getonly ten per cent of the seats despite a twenty per cent shareof the vote.

This had several unfortunate consequences for the polity.First, it made Parliament much less representative of theelectorate since so many of its members were elected by aminority share of the vote. Second, it made the governmenteven less representative, and therefore less able to commandthe conftdence and allegiance of the majority of the people,because not only had it been rejected by sixty per cent ofthose who voted, but fort5l per cent of those who wereelected were also against it. Third, it made the Congresslook more invincible, and India more of a one-party state,

186 Perspectiues on South Asia

tfian in fact either was. Fourth, it also made the Indianpolity look more like a monarchy than it was, as one afteranother member of the Nehru family became the primeminister {or aspired to become one, as in the latest episodeof the Nehru saga.)

But this began to change from about the mid-l96os, asdemocracy began to do what democracy characteristicallydoes: it gives voice to different groups and segments of theelectorate, assisting them thus to define themselves, andgives them the opportunity and incentive to mobilise theirrespective constituencies. In the course of time, competingparties and agendas develop, the choice before the electoratebecomes more wide and real, and politics and society beginto reshape each other through dynamic interaction.

As the largest party, the Congress was naturally the firstto feel the change. As different segments of the electoratebegan to define themselves more sharply, they also began touse tieir votes more purposefully for their own segments,and the very amorphousness which had been so useful forthe Congress for so long in identifliing itself with conflictingsegments turned into a disadvantage. The more sharply asegment demarcated itself the keener it became to move outof a generalized party like the Congress and into a partywhich more clearly reflected the interests of that segment.Thus the higher castes drifted into the BJP, the lowest intothe Bahujan Samaj Party, the Muslims into parties or forumsof their own, and so on. But the two biggest changes werenew phenomena in the polity, and each was to prove to be afar reaching one.

The first change was that as the Congress shrank in size,it also becarrre less tolerant of diversity, which had been itsbiggest asset in its best years, that is under the leadershipof Nehru. His daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, centralised,personalised, and tightened her control over the party tosuch an extent that top leaders of the regions and states,

Tte IndintPoliu in "Crlsis" t87

who had been a source of strength to Nehru as they stoodbeside him in the collegial leadership which he practised,began to feel ignored, denied, suffocated. Therefore insteadof seeking to advance their political careers within andthrough the Congress, they moved back to their regions andstates to organise new parties, which were therefore moreregional in their outlook and horizons. This had three majorconsequences: the Congress lost more and more ground as

it was defeahd by the regional parties in one state afteranotfrer; regionalism became a stronger ldiom even innational level politics when national level parties becameincreasin$y dependent upon the support of state level partiesfor making up and sustaining majorities in Parliament; anda vertical integraton occurred between state and regionallevel politics on the one and national level politics on theother, making each level much more aware of the realities atthe other level than ever before.

The second major change began in the late l96os, at thehands of Mr Ram Manohar Lohia, one of the clevereststrategists among Indian politicians, whettrer of those orlater days. He had taken over the leadership of one of themain branches of the much splintered Socialist Party in thenorthern Indian state of Bihar, which is the second mostpopulous in the country. But he had not been able to makemuch headway because of the grip of social and economicconservatism on Bihari society. He was blocked out of thehigher caste vote by the Congress and the BJP, and out ofthe lowest caste vote by the Congress and by what was laterto become the Bahujan Samaj Party, better known as BSP.

But he discovered the greenest of all political pastures inthe large group of "intermediate" castes, so-called becauseon the caste ladder they were spread out between the highcastes above them, who were large landowners in much ofBihar, and the lowest castes below them, who were mostlylandless labourers. On the other hand the "intermediates"were hardy and enterprising cultivating and dairying castes,

188 Perspectiues on South Asra

who either owned some land or were comparatively moresecure in their tenancies. They had been the mainbeneficiaries of the Congress programme of putting ceilingson landholdings and selling the surplus to those who hadbeen traditionally cultivating it. While elsewhere theprogramme had been pursued well, ip Bihar it had not beenbecause of the strong influence of the high caste biglandowners on the Congress, and the resentments of ttteBiharl intermediates had made them a ready audience forthe wit and skills of Mr Lohia's rhetoric.

His success in the state elections in Bihar in the late1960s was not only phenomenal. It also became a persuasiveprecedent. Within a decade he consolidated the bulk ofBihar's intermediate Castes, who form the majority of theelectorate, into a powerful constituency, cutfing across thesub-caste barriers which had hitherto divided ttrem despitettre interests they shared as an economic sub-class. He soIoosened the grip of the (mostly Congress-minded) highcastes on the politics of the state that his successors wereable to take away much of the electoral support of thatparty. Gradually this new constituency began to use itsincreasing poliflcal power for making inroads into the citadelsstill held by the high castes in the land ownership structureof ttre state.

Not a great deal of this structure has changed in Bihar asyet, but the precedent proved to be very attractive to thecorresponding farming castes in other states as weII in theGangedc'plains of northern India, greatly to the discomfortand resentment of the bigger landowners on the one handand urban middle classes on the other. The small andmedium "farmer" became the presiding deity of all politics inthis "Hindi belt", which constitutes the bulk of northernIndia and accounts for close upon a third of India'spopulation. Parallel processes wer6 also taking place, and atabout the same time, in such maior states of South India asKarnataka and Andhra.

The IndianPolitA in "Crisis" 189

Of course ttrese were not the first examples of the invasionof politics by caste. Ever since the start of India's adultfranchise polity, matching the caste of the candidate withthe caste profile of the constituency has been a majorpreoccupaUon ofthe election managers of all parties. Outsidethe electoral arena, and several decades earlier, socialmovements had overthrown the dominance of the highcastes in other large areas of South India. The leadershtp ofthe Congress, even when held by the higher castes, wasalways concerned about preserving its base among thelowliest, the HariJans. But the case of the intermediatecastes has some interesting differences, which ln turn haveproduced some far reaching consequences, and also goodillustrations of the theme of this paper, the cycle of challengeand response in the polity.

The HariJans had been co-opted into politics under thepolitical patronage of higher castes, and being unassertiveat that time they did not hurry into forming parties of theirown, preferring to fit themselves into the folds of biggerparties, like (and mostly) the Congress. Their intrusion didnot cause much uneasiness among the higher castes, onlysome raillery at their expense, and the general thinkingabout them was that they could be managed, as indeed theywere until the coming of the BSP. On the other hand thecultivating castes burst into politics under their own steam,which was partly fueled by their numbers, much biggerthan those of ttre HariJans, and partly by the sturdiness ofthe peasantry and the rumbustuousness of the moreassertive among them. This itself led to some psychologicalchanges ln the polity. A reflection of this change lies in someterms popularised in the urban owned and inlluenced media.

The term *intermediate castes", or more briefly'intermediates", is purely descriptive. But this graduallychanged to'backward castes", and more popularly "thebackwards", which carries a stigma, while the term in ruralHindi discourse continued to be 'pichhare htrc uara". that is

190 Perspectiues on South Asia

people who have been defeated and thus left behind. Infurther disparagement, whether intentional or not, theyalso came to be called the 'other backward castes", in briefas "OBCs", that is those who could be classed t'ith butsomewhat distinguished from the very lowest segments, likethe Hariians.

Despite the disparagement, however, the new intruderswere seen as a threat, evoked more viclous reactions,particularly among the urban upper middle classes which,being the 'haves" of the day, felt apprehensive about thishuge crowd of vociferous "have-nots" hammering at thegate. A case in point is afflrmative action. The reactionwithtn the gate was mild when government jobs and seats ineducation began to be 'reserved" for Harijans. But thereaction was furious when the intermediates also began todemand reservations, and gradually to get them, and for thesame reasons as the Harijans did, that they too had sufferedsocial oppression for centuries at the hands of the highcastes,

This loud and exclusively rural presence of theintermediates, and the urban response to it, created abigger urban-rural divide in politics than had existed before,and as the power of rural numbers began to be felt inpolitics the urban middle classes began to lose some of theiraffection for politics in the lirst place, then for parliamentarydemocracy, and gradually for democracy itself. On theirpart the intermediates, much more familiar and concernedwith the local realities, a stranger to higher level (readnational) concerns, became a natural ally and recruitingground of regional parties, mostly consisting of and led bytheir oivn kind. This added further to pessimism aboutdemocrary among the urban rniddle and upper middleclasses, whose perspectives are more nation-wide if notnecessarily more " national", while the emereing "backwards"discovered a new enthusiasm for democracy because it gavemore power to their larger numbers.

The Indian Polttv rn "Crisis" 191

The assertlveness of the peasant castes also intensifiedand inflamed a divide within the rural society. The relationsbetween the high caste oumers of large land holdings andtheir lower caste labour had gradually become more relaxed,pardy because the owners were more or less like absenteelandlords and were content to leave their landless workers.who had rlo claims on ownership, to eke out what existencethey could. But the new self-cultivating peasant was moredemanding, drove himself and his labour hard, and wasalways close at hand to do so. Therefore the competitivepoliUcal empowerment of both, that is the peasant and thelandless, and the economic empowerment of only one, thepeasant, led to furious friction and often to cruel clashesbetween them. While the intensity of these clashes hassubsided in most places, with both sides tqdng to come toterms with realties, it persists in Bihar, where the recentlyradicalised landless and others. combined under the name"Dalits" (meaning ground down to pieces), now engage theprivate arrrdes of the landlords and other higher casteowners gun for gun and are giving as good as they get.

Unfortunately for both, the Dalits as well as the backwardshave also become the victims of the same socio-politicalprocess of which each is a product as polidcal force. Bothhad been segmented away from the higher and moreprosperous castes by the deftning processes of democracy.But the same segmentatton began to deflne their ownrespective worlds as well. In distinction from the relativelybetter off "bacla*rard" castes, a further term also came intovogue, 'the most backward castes", who continue to becounted, however , as still a cut above the 'Dalits". At thesame Ume the Dalits have got segmented into those whohave been jround down relatively less, but sufficiently lessfor an august body like the Supreme Court of India todescribe them as ttre 'creamy layer" among t-hose for whomjobs have been reserved under the government's afftrmativeaction programme.

tsz PerspectiDes on South Asia

Unfortunately for the future of the democratic polity, thispeeltng of the onion of Indian society has not remained asociological process. It has heavily intruded upon the partysystem, which is one of the important wheels of democracy.Whereas at one time the electorate was too amorphous tothrow up alternatives for tJle voter to choose from, now ithas become so minutely fragmented that even the largestparty is too small to form a viable government, either on itsown or in coalition with other partles. Sometimes no partyhas much more ttran a third of the seats. So many of theother parties are so busy fighting for the marginal interestsof such small constituencies that they behave like collegesof theologians fighting over fragments of dogma, not aspractical parties trying to build a broad enough consensusfor ruling a country as large and varied as India is. Themosaics of parties which have constituted ruling coalitionsduring most of the last decade of the new millennium-andthere were four during the second half of that decade, eachrvith about a dozen partiest- might be more representativeof the mosaic of Indian society as a whole. That is as itshould be in a parliamentary system. But governmentshave become so unstable as to be almost transitory; the lifespan of offfcial policies has come to be measured in months,not years; and far more frequently than ever before, lnkSabhas and state legislatures die unnatural deaths in themidst of their terms, inflicting rnid-term elections on votersfar too often.

A side-effect of the fragmentation of parties in legislatureshas been that the process of forming the next governmenthas changed, to the detriment of the role of the legislatureconcerned and advantage of the role of the President at thefederal centre in New Delhi or the governor in tJle concernedstate capital, The Constitutiorr intended them to be onlyconstitutional heads, and their only duty to be to invite thatperson to form the government who in their judgementwould be best able to form a reasonablv stable one. So long

The Indian Polifu in "Crisis" r93

as an election threw up a party with a clear majority and theparty had a clear leader, tie job of the constitutional head

was only to iwite that leader to form the government and to

leave it to the legislature to accept or reject the government'

But with no majority party, and coalitions between minorityparties proving to be unstable, the President or the governor

got much more discretion to decide who he should invite to

iorm the government and in what manner the invitee should

prove that he has the confidence of the legislature'

Not all Presidents and governors have refrained from

playing a bit of party politics in using their widened discretion'

But even the few who have done so have fouled the air in the

minds of those who are left out in a given situation' There

might be good reasons for not invifing them' But they tend

to see a partisan motivation' This can create a very awkward

political equation, and sometimes it has. If a party that has

been left out in the first round manages to gain a majority

later on and is then invited to form the government, the

relations between the government and ttre constitutionalhead can get soured, and sometimes they have been' This

can seriously come in the way of the constitutional head

exercising what is his most valuable function, that is to be

an objective and trusted counsellor to the government when

the latter faces a sensitive situation.

There is much to support the expectation that in the

course of time Indian societ5r will so rearrange itself around

a few themes that stable coalitions, built around the

competing themes, will alternate with each ottrer in and outof power, and over longer swings of time than they do atpresent. But in the meantime the country might descend

irretrievably into non-governance.

But while this is a deeply distressing side of the currentcrisis, another is equally encouraging. Responding to the

serious warning signals, the polity has moved closer tomajor and far reaching remedies, and should they come to

194 Perspectiaes on South Asta

be implemented, as now seems increasingly likely, the politycould become far healthier than it has ever been. It wouldretain the vigorous interac on it has developed betweensociety and politics, at and between all levels. It wouldcoR nue and strengthen decentralisation of power, movingit outwards from Delhi to the state capitals and from thereto the districts, and downwards into the socio-economicpyramid. At the same time it would be freed of the five mainweaknesses which it has developed over the past decade orso, as has been explained on earlier pages : that governmentshave become unstable, forcing dissolutions and mid-termpolls; their electoral support base has shrunk, making themmuch less representative than they should be in a democracy;the role of the legislature in the formation of the governmenthas diminished; elections have had a very divisive effectupon India's pluralistic society; and the party system hasbeen fragmented.

Political scientists, analysts, academics and practitionershave pondered over these problems for long and from timeto time have come up with very convincing remedies, allwithin the powers and procedures available to the polity,and all of them likely to make it more rather than lessdemocratic. For example, tJley have argued that a governmentformed by someone who clear\r has the prior approval of thelegislature would be less likely to be voted out soon than oneformed by someone who has been hand picked by theconstitutional head acting in his own discretion. Mid_termelections would also become less frequent then. On thisground they have been suggesting that as soon as a newhouse is elected, its first duty after electiirg the Speakershould be to elect a leader of the house by a clear majorit5r ofhalf the votes plus one. This could be ensured by having tworounds of elections. While the first round should be open toanyone who v,'ishes to contest, the second should be openonly to two candidates: the ones who have polled the highestand the second highest number of votes in the first round. If

The Indian PolitA in "Crlsis" r95

votng were made compulsory in the second round, thewinner would have a proven majority in tJle house, andwould merit the first invitation from the constitutional head.

The same advantage would be ensured by tJre samemethod whenever a new government has to be formed ontlee defeat of the incumbent on the floor of the house. But inthis case an additional or an alternative reform has alsobeen recommended. A motion expressing lack of confidencein the incumbent government should be admitted fordiscussion only if it is accompanied by a parallel motionexpressing confidence in an alternative. That way the defeatof a government would not become a cause for dissoluflonbecause it would simultaneously install an alternative. Inthe interregnum the incumbent would continue as acaretaker, and that would be a strong incentive for theopponents of the incumbent to agree quickly on thealternative instead of bickering about it endlessly, as tJeey

do at present. There is nothing in the Consttution whichbars these changes, and probably not much in the lawseither. Mos y they would call for changes in certainprocedures and practices.

They have also suggested changes in electoral laws forprescribing a two-round procedure for electing the membersof legislatures, to give each member, and thus each legislatureas a whole, a wider and more stable base of approval by theelectorate. Polling held in any constituency should berecognised only if voter turnout is above, say, 2O per cent.The first round should be open to all, and if it does not give5O per cent plus one vote to anyone, there should be asecond round, open only to the leader and runner up of thefirst round.

The complexity of both ttrese reforms is self-limiting. Ifcandidates and parties know that an election will not beheld to be valid if the voter turnout is below the prescribedlevel, they will campaign harder to reach that figure, to the

196 Persoectiues on South Asia

benefit of the electoral process as a whole. Besides, even thenormal turn out is so high-the nation-wide average isabove 6O per cent and the state-wide average is higher inmany states- that a 20 per cent level can be easily countedupon. Regarding the second reform, even as it is manycandidates win wittr an absolute majority, and if that becomesa requirement ln the second round the proportion of thosewho reach this level in the first round is bound to go upgradually.

But apart from making legislatures and their membersmore representative of their electorates, the absolute majorityrequirement would have the merit of making elections lessdivisive. When a candidate knows he will need 5O per cent ofthe votes in the second round if he does not get them in thefirst, he will not run a campaign in the first round either inany way which might alienate those whose votes he willneed in the second round in any case. This will reduce theuse of caste based and religion based appeals, lift thesalience ofclass in general and eoonomic issues in particular.

Party systems would beneflt in the same way as therepresentativeness of legislatures and of their members. Aparty flourishes as its members win more seats inlegislatures. But if seats can be won only by polling anabsolute majority of the votes, then like its members, theparty too must broaden its appeal and agenda, cuttingacross the confines ofthe narrow allegiances which presenflyenable it to win a few seats with an intensified appeal to aparticular segment of the constituency. Instead of trying tomake or join a coalition among the elected members afterthe election, which can involve doubtful and secretiveenticements for individuals, with slippery results, the partywould have the incentive to broaden its constituency in theelectorate before the election and by more open means, thusacquiring a more stable base for the future.

The IndianPolitg in "Crisis" t97

After doing the rounds for some years in academic circles,these suggestions have started attracting some notice at thehighest lwels of active politics, where the power to implementthem also lies. At the end of April, 1999, Mr Atal BihariVajpayee became the lirst Prime Minister to advocate theidea that a motion of no confidence must be accompanied bya motion of confidence in an alternative. On the same dayanother major proposal, that a candidate must poll arr

absolute majority of the votes cast, also received the powerfuladvocacy of Mr M.S. Gill, who has filled the very relevantpost of the Chief Electlon Commissioner with greaterdistinction than many an earlier incumbent. He alsosupported the need for a positive vote of confidence inaddition to a negative vote of no-conlidence for a legislatureto change the government. Earlier, one of the more dynamicand reform minded chief minister, Mr Chandrababu Naiduof Andhra Pradesh, had also endorsed it.

In the days which followed, the B.JP annouhced anintenilon which, if fully implemented by it, could go a longway in reforming coalitional politics. It announced that theruling coalition at tJle federal centre, which is headed by it'would go into the impending parliamentary election as acoalition, with an agreed agenda, and that the BJP itself atany rate, if not other members as well, would not issue anyseparate manifesto of its own. Its leadership also announcedthat, to help in the formation of this coalition before theelection rather than after, it had suspended three of its mostcontroversial electoral planks. These had been the distinctionof its political agenda for several years but were unpopularwith many, particularly with non-Hindu voters. What thismight do to tJre support for BJP from the more conseryativeminded Hindus is a different matter, but forming a coalitionbefore rather than after the electlon is a good example forother parties to follow. The constitutional head can prod

198 Pers pectiue s on South Asia

them to follow it by making it.known that, until the timecomes when the legislature itself may designate its leader,he will recognise only ttrat coalition as a single group whichhad gone before the people as a declared coalition.

As interesting as this spreading support for these reformsare some of the reasons for it, which also go to the heart ofttre 'crisis". In the midst of the worst phase of governmentalinstability during the past half a decade, the economy hasbeen doing quite reasonably well in spite of many adversefactors which are wholly out of India's own power to control.An optimisflc quesfion has arisen from that: how muchbetter it would be if the polity were also put on its feetsimultaneously? This feeling has reactivated the interest ofthe urban middle classes in the fate of the democratic polity,because its interest ln the economy is much closer than of.those who have hardly any place in the economic arena.Confronting this feeling on the other side is the fear of acollapse of the polity if nothing is done very soon about it.They also have to cope with the near certainty that the nextpush behind the polity will come from those who have wonpolitical but not economic empowerment yet, and will nowuse the former to reach the latter as well.

An equally interesting reason why support for these criticalreforms has increased is that aII of them are clearly somuch more "do-able" than sorne other ideas which havebeen talked about for longer but are more difficult to carryout or are otherwise of doubtful value. Among the latter istJ'.e proposition that we should switch to the presidentialsystem. But apart from the disadvantages of ttris alternative,which have been discussed earlier, the change would requiresuch drasflc changes in the Con$titution that the SupremeCourt ls not likely to allow-it might use its power to blockchanges in the "basic structuren of the Constitution-norcan a sufficient political consensu$ be built behind it, becausemost of the lesser parties will count for much less in the

The IndinnPoliQ rn "Crisis"

presidential system than in the parliamentary system.Therefore it seems very likely now that fateful changes willtake place in the polity, whether for better or worse. Thechances of changes for ttre better are good.

199

Country Report on Pakistan*

Pakistani Detegatian

Introductlon

The winds of change are blowing strong all over the world.The arrangemerrts made by the Big-Powers to protect theirmaterial interests, and the ideological theses evolved toJustify them, are being abandoned. Consequently, ttre tacticsemployed hitherto by the smaller nations to suryive havebecome irrelwant. These states are under pressure not onlyto review their policies and tactical priorities but also theirbasic ideals. Happily, release from the mix of strategicopportunities and the constfaints they entailed has offeredthe developing countries opportunifies to find new strategiesof progress better suited to their circumstances and needs.A number of states are, therefore, taking a critical look attheir recent past and exploring possibilities of fruitfulcooperation with their neighbours.

Nowhere ls the need for such a reappraisal felt moreacutely than in South Asia where one-fourth of the world's

rThis chapter ls the original verslon of the regional conhlbutionwdtten for the Flrst South Asira Regional Dialogue held in NewDelhn. India in 1991.

Countrg Report on Pakisto:n 20r

population lives and which has sadly lagged behind in themovement for regional understanding. While a widely shareddesire for opening a new chapter in the history of South Asiais to be welcomed, it is obviously necessary to examine thefactors that inhibit the stat-es of the region from realisingtJ.e obJective of progress through mutual cooperation. Theseconstraints are found in the different experiences thecountries of the region have had in their search for democraticpolicies in their management of the economies, and in thepeculiar dynamics of social change.

The purpose of this paper is to present before theparflcipants of the South Asian Regional Dialogue, thePakistani delegates' perception of the current scene inPakistan witleout a correct appreciation of which it may beimpossible to assess Pakistan's ability to Join a regionaleffort towards individual and collective advancement of theSouth Asian states. It is not a consensus paper; it is rathera compilaUon of views of some of the delegates in ttreirindividual capacides.

Political Developments

Pakistan's political system is characterized bydiscontinuity, intermittent breakdown of constitutionalmachinery, prolonged absence of a permanent constitution,and a rapid expansion of the role of the military-bureaucraticelite. The military ruled the country under the cover ofmartial law for 15 years (October l958June 1962, March1969-December 1971, andJuly l977-December 1985), whenits top brass exercised supreme political power without anyconstltutional restraint. TWo interim cons tutions remainedin operation for approdmately ten years (August L947-March 1956, April 1972-August lg73). The {irst'permanent'constitution enforced in March 1956, was abolished inOctober 1958 by the military. The second constitution lastedfor six and three-fourth years (June 1962-March 1969); itwas also abolished by the military. The third constitution,

202 Perspectiues on South Asia

adopted by a direcfly elected assernbly in 1973, was firnctionalfrom August 1973 to July 1977, when the military suspendedit. This consfltufion was revived in 1985, after the militaryrulers had changed it to t]le extent that its original characterwas diluted. These developments adversely affected thegrowth of viable political institl'tions and processes capableof coping with ever-increasing parucipatory and distributivepressures.

TWo conflicting politcal strands are quite conspicuous.The common man, enterprising and hardworking in economicendeavours, deslres participation in the decision-makingprocess. The well-established participatory norms, i.e., theelectoral process, accountability of the rulers, the rule oflaw, and economlc justice, enjoy widespread acceptabilityamong the people as the foundations of a national, democraticpolitical order.

T?re other strand pertains to the operational norms ofgovernance. The ruling elite has often violated ttre democraticand participatory norms and with a few exceptions, theirsupport base has generally been narrow. Their authoritarianand dictatorial rule is coupled with an elitist and eqtloitativesocio-economic system. However, despite the sharp contrastbetween the two strands, neittrer is able to overwhelm theother except for briefperiods. If a viable participatory systemfinds it difftcult to take root, authoritarian and personalizedrule also suffers from the crisis of legidmacy. The conflictbetween the two has been the norm of the Pakistan politicalscene.

Pakistan inherited an institutional imba-lance at the timeof Independence. The state apparatus, especially thebureaucracy, the military and the secret services, was moreorganized and developed than the political and democraticinstitutions. The administrative $ystem inherited from thecolonial period was marked by centralisation of power withemphasis on the regulative, punitive and ortractive functions.

Cotuthy Report on Pakistan

The problems of setting up the new state in a mixed feudaland tribal society with little experience of trade a.nd industryand the security problems it confronted in the early years ofindependence reinforced the position of the statc apparatus.The over-developed bureaucracy and the military began toplay an important political role by ttre mid-fifties. In October1958, the military swept aside ths flagile political institutionsand established its direct rule. This was the beginning of theera of direct and indirect rule by the military elite whoenjoyed the support of the bureaucracy. The judiciaryinvariably concurred. With the exception of 1972-77 , themilitary has maintained its pre-eminent position in thebody-politic.

The political arrangements tailored by the military elitereflected their professional experience which emphasizeddiscipline, obedience, secrecy and surprise, and assigned ahigh premium to authoritarian rather than participatoryvalues. Again and again, they favoured a non or partiallyrepresentative system and advocated the idea of a guideddemocracy witJ restricted franchise. These arrangementswere designed to preserve the political status-quo.establishedduring the period of military rule rather than encouragepolitical accommodation and participation.

The military rulers of Pakistan co-opted a section of thecivilian elite who were prepared to play the game of politicswithin the limits set out by them. The dissenting voices wereexcluded. TWo such experiments were made in 1962 and1985 by Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Zia-uI-Haqrespectvely. The former civilianised his military rule byintroductng the 1962 presidential constitution which reflectedhis notion of "guided democracy," and concentrated powerin ttre office of the President which he occupied. A section ofthe civilian elite was coopted to create a semblance of aparticipatory system. However, the political stability providedunder the Ayub system proved personalised rather thaninstitutionalised. It collapsed in the wake of the massive

204 Perspectiues on South Asra

street agitations in 1969,

Zia-ul-Haq's civilianisa orl of military rule involved fiveinter'-related nleasures. First, he sought a vote of confidencethrough a referendum (December 1984) in which he was theonly candidate. Second, the 1973 Constitution was amended(8th Amendment) to strengthBn the position of the President(Zia-ul-Haq) vis-a-vis the Prime Minister and Parliament'Third, martial law orders and policy decisions wereincorporated in the legal-cons tutional structure whichplaced a check on the powers of the civilian courts andreinforced the position of the President. Fourth, theConstitution was amended to enable Zia-ul-Haqto combinethe offices of the President and the Chief of Army Staff afterthe withdrawal of martial law. Fifth, a section of the civilianelite was coopted through a closely regulated non-partyelection tn 1985.

The coopted leaders faced a paradox. On the one hand,they strove to establish their credentials as a political entityindependent of the military. On the other, they could notafford to alienate the rnilitary commanders.because the lossof their support made it difflcult for the former to withstandthe pressures mounted by their political adversaries.

In t]le tradition of the British rulers, the authoritarianrulers cultivated the feudals who were willing to supportany government that did not attack their privileged positionin the rural setting. But unlike the British, ttrey alsopampered a section of the onthod ox ulema who invoked aconservafive interpretation of Islam to legitimise authoritarianrule and restrictlons on popular participauon in decision-making. The ulama supporting the rulers were projected inthe state-owned media, and ttre government extended liberalflnancial assistance to them. A large number of new schoolsfor the propagation of orthodoxy sprang up and severaleldsting ones adopted a high profile after Zia-ul-Haq'sgovernment began to dole out to them billions of rupees

Countrg Report on Pakistan 205

from the zakatfund deducted compulsorily from the savingsof Muslim citzens. They did help to deflect the participatorypressures, at least for the time being. But they could notbring forward a leadership that could replace the dissidentpolitical forces. The maJor reason being the denominationaldifferences and mutual jealousies which made it difficult forthem to put up a coherent leadership, not to speak of themoderate ulema who did not share their conservativeinterpretation of Islarri.

The leaders of Pakistan endeavoured to impose a politicalsystem-presidential or parliamentary-on a socio-economicstructure which was ex-colonial and semi-feudal with strongbureaucratic traditions. Such an archaic system could notbe supportive of any participatory process. As no seriousattempt was made to reformulate the socio-economic system'the principles of participation., equality, rule of law andaccountability could not be articulated in a manner that thepolitical system could accommodate the diverse pressuresgenerated by the polity.

The low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor traditionof open debate on important national issues that pervade

the polity hindered the growth of a widely shared consensuson the framework of political action. Several basicconstitutional issues, namely the Islamic state, centre-province relations, decentralisation, representation and theelectorate, and the national language, are not yet settled. Attimes, the ruling elite endeavoured to actrieve consensuswithout cohesion by relying on the coercive machinery ofthe state or by excluding those who did not share theirperspective.

The absence of a framework of political action thatcommands widespread acceptability together with politicaldiscontinuity has led to the decay of the already weakpolitical institutions and processes. Language, ethnicity,religious-sects, and regional considerations substituted the

206 Perspectisses on South Asta

nadon-wide issues and organisations as the symbols ofpolitical identity and mobillsation. These particularisticconsiderations have given rise to strong movements in partsof the countr5r. The political leaders are so divided and lack asense of direcfion that they cannot assert their primacy inthe political system. This fragmented the political process,thereby making it difficult for any institution other than themilitary and the bureaucracy to function effectively on anation-wide scale.

Several political processes are functioning simultaneously.Though they have their points of pos.itive and negativecontact with one another, each maintains a distinct politicalidentity and style. These movements neither cut across theregional or group boundaries nor adopt a joint stratesr forthe realisation of their demarrds for political particlpationand economic justice. The state apparatus continues to besuccessful in isolating them and dealing with themindividually, thereby further tilting the balance in favour ofthe military and the bureaucracy.

However, circumstances are becoming increasingly non-conducive to smooth functioning of authoritarian rule. Ifparticularisdc orientations have fragmented the politicalprocess, these also serve as constraints on the ability ofthestate apparatus to ride high all the time. The linguistic,ethnic and sectarian forces have created entrenched enclavesof their support and they resist the adversaries and thestate authority if they perceive threats to their interests.The easy availability of deadly weapons in the undergroundarms market has given them a new sense of power and theydo not hesitate to resort to agitation and rioting, and useautomatic weapons to achieve their goals. Rampantcormption and the flow of drug and smuggling money intothe political arena has also adversely affected theperformance of the state institutions. At times, theirdisposition is tainted with ethnic, linguistic, and religious-sectarian considerations. These particularistic forces resist

Cowttry Report on Pakistan 207

the development of an all-powerful establishment but theirresistance is neither organised nor designed to promoteparticipatory and democratic values. It is more anarchicand rebellious in st5rle, creating lawlessness, disorder andchaos that causes serious problems of political managementfor any government, not to speak of an authoritarian regime.

A sense of frustraUon prevails among tJre political forces,especially those who perceive themselves to be at theperiphery of the political system. Despite such an experience,their commitment to the participatory norms has notwavered. They refuse to acknowledge an authoritarian andnon-responsive style of rule as legi mate, and continue tobuild demands on the political system to make it moreresponsive to their needs and aspirations. Some of themresort to violence to express their resentment or to maketheir voices heard. The political system thus operates underconflicting pressures-the demands for participation andan authoritarian st5rle of rule-and does not move steadilyin tJle direction of a responsible and participatory politicalorder.

Pressures for Change

The struggle for the realisation of participatory democracyin Pakistan cannot be viewed in isolation from the dynamicsof social change.

The growing demands for an end to the politics ofconfrontation and its replacement with rule by consensus,for a legitimate federal arrangement, and for decentralisationof authorit5r all indicate a search for a more equitable polity.There is an increasing realisation that respect for humanrights alone can rid the country of the various societalconflicts. All human rights groups are, therefore, receivingincreasingly encouraging responses from the population.There is every reason to hope that not only the attitudes ofthe people but of the government also will be determined bv

204 Perspectiues on South Asia

better practical standards of human rights.

As could be expected, the process of Islamisation has

sharpened awareness among minorities and women of theirrights. Both these sections, along with the economically

disadvantaged elements, are moving towards greater

organised assertion of their rights to social, gender, and

economic equalitY.

The tensions generated by socio-political conflicts have

brought the judicial system under severe strain and the

need for considerable reform of the judicial order and

procedures is being felt.

It is obvious that without an environment of free debate

and total respect for freedom of expression neither the extent

of dissatisfaction with the traditional models of organisation

can be gauged nor wiII an open discussion on alternatives be

possible. The conflicts between authoritarian tendencies and

democratic forces, between theocrats and secularists, and

between conservatives and modernists have obviously brought

new challenges before writers, journalists and artists' New

attempts are being made to control not only the Press but also

the entire thought process' The attacks on newspaper offices

and individualjournalists provide a measure ofthe seriousness

of the battle of ideas going on in Pakistan.

However weak or disorganised the forces favouringdemocracy, secularism, women's emancipation and rationalexchange of ideas may at the moment appear, it can be said

with confidence that the defenders of the traditionalestablishments are on the retreat. The oresent state of flttxis being viewed by many as a good opportunity to divert thepeople towards a fresh interpretation of their regional identlty

and a new view of the world.

The EconomY

During the decade of the eighties, Pakistan's economy

CotnW Report on Pakistan

merrily moved along the way of consumerism. Theexpenditure on private consumption in Pakistan increasedby 59 per cent and the level of current consumption try thegoverhment went up by 136 per cent. The gross domesticfixed capital formation increased by 6l per cent. The valueof export of goods and non-factor services increased by 1f3per cent whereas import of goods and non-factor servicesincreased by 18 per cent. The net factor income from therest of the world decline d by 44 per cent. There was 83 percent increase in the GDP and 73 per cent in GNP. On percaptta basis, the latter increased by 24 per cent against thepopulation increase of 3.5 per cent. The per capita GNP

stood at Rs.2966 for the financial year f 989-90 and Rs.4O33

for the year 1990-91 (Economic Surueg, p. 35). During thefinancial year 199O-91, the share of agriculture was 26 percent, of industry 3l per cent and of services 43 per cent(Economic Surueg, P. 33).

The ofllcial figures do not take into account the flourishinginformal sector of the economy. Large sums earned byPakistan through export of drugs and the level of the earningsby Pakistanis abroad remitted through unofficial channelscan only be conjectured. Nor does the official data reflect thedistortions in the figures of exports and imports due to thepractice of under and over-invoicing or rampant smugglingacross the international borders with India, Afghanistan,Iran and along the Arabian coast. The National TaxationReforms Commission estimated for the year 1984-85, "thetotal black wealth in Pakistan at Rs. I8O,OOO million . . . inthe form of unaccounted-for bank deposits, currency notes,gold and other valuables, black capital in business,undisclosed real estate, foreign deposits and assets andhousehold effects and luxury cars." (p. 104).

Directlon of the Economy

The main thrusts of the government of Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif were towards privatisation and deregulation.

209

2to Pe r s p e ctiu e s on South Asia

In the sphere of privatisation, one scheduled bank has beensold to the private sector. The number of corporations ownedor sponsored by the federal government as of 3O June 1987were:

1. Scheduled Commercial Baiks 5

2. Finance Institutions and Specialised Banks 14

Insurance Companies

Commercial Corporations

Manufacturing Corporations

Construction Companies

Oil and Gas Corporations

Mining C orporations

Transport Corporations

Printing and Publication Corporations

Power generation (not including the giantWater and Power Development Authority)

Mass Media Corporations

Consultancy Corporations

174

In the early 1990s, the Government was in the process ofselling them.

In the sphere ofderegulation, progress has been rela velysubstantial. Government's sanction for private investmentis no longer required and no questions are to be asked aboutthe source of investment funds until the end of the financialyear 1991-92. The maximum possible debt-equity ratio forindustrial ventures was from 60-40 to 70,30. Liberal taxholidays for new industqr were granted. Plant and machineryfor less developed areas has been exempted from custom

3

4

99

3

16

4

I4

I3

3

tl

lo.

I t.

3.

J.

o.

7

8.

9.

12.

13.

r4.

Countrg Report on Palcistan 2tl

duties. For other areas, it has been reduced by half.

Foreign currency accounts for Pakistanis as well asforeigners are now permitted. It is now possible to bring inand take out foreign exchange without any questions beingasked. Restrictions on investments by foreigners and ontaking out profits on the investments have been lifted. Wayshave been opened to convert black money into white as wellas for its use for certain investments without any need todeclare ownership. The International Monetary Fund andthe World Bank are happy with the measures taken by theGovernment in this direction.

Internatlonal Ttade

Pakistan has finally complied with the demands of theIMF and the World Bank to throw open its doors for foreignimports. For the four-year period ending 3O June 1990, theaverage negauve trade balance of Pakistan was U.S.$I,9999million, whereas, the average negative balance for theprevious five-year period, 1980-81 to Ig85-86, has beenU.S.$2,943 million (Econnmic Surueg, p. f 62). For the year1989-90, the exports comprised: primary commodities 20per cent, semi-manufacturers 24 per cent and manufacturedgoods 56 per cent. For the same year, imports comprised:capital goods 33 per cent, industrial raw materials forcapital goods 7 per cent, consumer goods 19 per cent(Economic Surteg, pp. 164-65). For the year lgBT-88 to1989-90, Pakistan has had a favourable balance of tradewith the SAARC countries by nearll' Rs.1,50O million(Ecorpmic Surueg, p. 185).

Balance of Payments

Despite a reduction in the value of imports during the lastfew years, the pressure on the balance of payments hadcontinued to mount. Table I summarises the oosition.

212 Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

TABLE I

BaJa nce oJ Pagment in Million US Dollars

Year Current Account Long-term capital Basic BalanceInJloto (net) Balance

r986-87

r987-88

1988,89

r989-90

-7r9

-1,642

-1,934

- 1,891

793

I too

t,952

7,671

-383

l8-20

Econonuc Surueg, p. l6l.

In ttre past the deficit was met through inflow of loansand by short-term borrowings. Today, Pakistan's externaldebt poses difficult choices for servicing. As of October l,199O, the flow of loans from the'United States has been cutoff. Table 2 summarises the position of the externaldisbursements and debt.

TABLD 2

Anrulnl Commitments, Disburs ements, Seruice Pagment,and- Outsturdlng Debt oJ Pakistan

(inmillionUS $)

Year Debt Outstandingend oJ period

Disbursed Undisbwsed

Commtt- Disburse- Seruicernents nEnts paAnents

1988-89 14,190

r989-90 r5,O94

1990,9r 15.961

7,372

Q n70

10.480

,J.OIO

3,424

3,221

2,619 I, r25

2,342 1,232

2,105 r342

konomic Surueg, p. 2OO.

Country Report on Pakistan 213

Public Finance

Table 3 summarises tJre position of Pakistan's publicfinances.

It is a serious situation. The IMF and the World Bank arereported to be unhappy with the recurring huge deficits inthe budget. In order to continue their support, they wouldlike to see the complete elimination of the subsidies, reductionin the current expenditure and containing the deficit withinthe limits recommended by them. In recent years, no

. government in Pakistan has been in a position to reduce thecurrent expenditure. Also, determined to take the unbridledcapitalist road, the past two governments, following in thefootsteps of Reagan and Thatcher, have been eager to cuttax rates. Income tax rates have been reduced. Super Taxhas been partially retained as surcharge. Wealth Tax, GiftTax, some forms of Capital Gains Tax and Estate Dutystand abolished.

TABLE 3

Cor tsolidated Federal and. Prouincial Gooernments Budget

(in millbn Rs.J

Year 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92

(Budgeted)

Expenditure 20l.\76 21a.733

Total Revenues 144.297 159.816

Overall Deficit 56.879 58.9 17

Finajlcing (External) 18. f 95 24.529

Financing (lnternal) 38.684 34.253

234.64a 258.309

r50.479 r53.389

84.169 104.920

37.706 44.037

46.353 56.883

Economic Surueg, p. 134 and Budget in Brief, l99l-92.

2t4 Perspectiues on South Asia

Nobody knows better tJlan gome of the big businessmenwho ran the previous government how easy it was in Pakistanto avoid and evade payment to the tax collector. In anattempt to bolster revenues, stubbornly unresponsive tonormal laws, the government resorted to collecting tax onincome as proportion of the volume of business conducted.Under the laws effective from I Julylggl, all commercialimports are subject to 2 per cent income tax. All suppliershave to pay 25 per cent income tax on the value of suppliesmade by them. All contractors must pay S per cent incometax on their gross receipts. Businessmen have to pay O.5 percent income tax on the proceeds of their sales etc. Accordingto tax consultants, these measures might double the amountof tax collected from the business community.

Polltlcs and Profit

Cooperative societies had become unable to pay back anamount between 17 billion and 24 billion rupees collectedfrom an estimated 4.5 million depositors, during thePML (N) rule. Five giants held 9O per cent of the deposits. Ofthese ffve, four were owned by thnee members of ttre provincialassembly belonging to the PML (N) and one by a member ofthe national assembly belonging to the opposition, who wasalso in-charge of the portfolio o[ finance in Ms.Bhutto's lastcabinet.

It was revealed that among tFre beneficiaries of the loansfrom the cooperatives were undertakings owned by the thenPrime Minister and his family {the Ittefaq Group) and by hisinterior minister and his family (Chaudhri Brothers). Majordevelopment financial institutions, including Bankers EquityLimited (BEL), the National Investment Trust (NIT), and theInvestment Corporation of Pakistan [ICp), trad agreed toprovide credit of approximately one and a half billion rupeesto companies belonging to t1.e Ittefaq Group and the ChaudhriBrothers. The loans from the cooperatives were thus quicklyreturned. Defending their loans from the cooperatives, the

Colutry Report on Pakistan 2t5

then Punjab Chief Minister accused Ms. Bhutto's governmentwhich would not allow the leaders of opposing parties loansfrom the scheduled banks.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has named four familles ofPakistan who have used political influence to secure anextraordinarily disproportionate amount of loans forthemselves. Specific allegations might be true or false. It isundeniable, however, that business profits and politicalinfluence got mixed up in Pakistan today to a degree explosivefor business as well as politics.

External Pollcy Faetors

Kashmir has been the central issue around whichPakistan's foreign policy has always revolved. The belief thatPakistan was cheated out of its right to Kashmir is respectedby the people and the governments alike, though there haveoften been differences of opinion on the methods employedto pursue Patrristan's case. No government has been able toexclude this question from tJle national agenda. The degreeof interest successive governments have shown in it hasdepended partly on the postures of the Big-Powers andpartly on the situation in Kashmir. During the periods thatIndia was able to find effective allies in Kashmir, Pakistanwas constrained to put the issue on the back burner butevery time there has been trouble in Kashmir the governmentin Islamabad has found it impossible not to react' TheShimla Accord, coming as it did after three fruitless wars,laid down that the issue had to be decided by India andPakistan through peaceful means. Unfortunately, no sucheffort was made mainly because India considered itselfsatisfied with the status quo.

T?re present trouble in Kashmir has rudely remindedboth countries of the opportunities of an amicable settlementmissed over the years. Both countries face an extremelydifficutt situafion. Pakistan cannot give up what it has

216 Perspectiues on South Asia

viewed as a stand based on principles and India cannot giveup the argument it has applied for three decades. There areelements in both countries that are recklessly pleading for amilltary solution, which could destroy or at least criticallywound both India and Pakistan. It is now for the saneropinion makers in both countries to silence the war-mongersand prepare public opinion in their respective countries fora settlement that could avoid loss of face on either side andsecure the objective of satis$ring the aspirations of t]leKashmiri people.

Pakistan's involvement with the Afghanistan conflict alsohas affected its relations with the South Asian neighbours.Not only ttre region but the wider world has had reason toview with concern the prospect of Afghanisthan passinginto the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. pakistan's effortsto convince India that its policies along the northern borderneed not affect its goodwill wlth the neighbour along thesouthern border cannot obviously be wholly convincing. Acount4r cannot have different policies along its differentborders. Likewise, India's problems with Bangladesh, Nepaland Sri Lanka cannot but affect Islamabad's thinking notonly in relation to India but also about the whole region.From Pakistan's point of view, therefore, it is necessary todiscover a common interest in the intra-regional issues. Solong as this does not happen, it will not be possible toremove the contradictions in the foreign policies of theSouth Asian states.

All countries of ttre region have serious security problemsas a result of which they have been diverting huge resourcesto defence. A barren debate is going on, principally betweenIndia and Pakistan on their nuclear options. Although thereare many in Pakistan-from hard-headed economists tounquestioning pacifists-who consider pakistan,s insistenceon its freedom to pursue the nuclear option as a folly, themajority of the people and the military establishment stoutlydefend the countr5r's nuclear programme as an essential

Country Report on Pakistart 2t7

security shield. Unfortunately, India's refusal to sign thenuclear non-proliferation treaty prevents Pakistan frompublicly admitting to a change of heart.

There is an urgent need for the countries of the region toreduce their expenditure on conventional arms and standlngarmies. So far as Pakistan is concerned, public opinion isnow realising more and more that the country cannot developwith the present levels of defence expenditure. The conceptof a regional security arrangement which enables all SouthAsian States to divert their scarce resources away fromdefence must, therefore, be high on the agenda of all trrosewho wish to secure the peoples' common future.

Pakistan has always considered itself more as an extensionof the Muslim Middle-East than a South Asian entity. Itslinks with the Muslim states, especially its role in theOrganisation of Islamic Countries, have often led tornisunderstandings, even estrangement, with the South Asianneighbours. The process has been aggravated by the drifttowards what is called Islamisation. The role Pakistan'sestablishment sees for itself in the Middle-East,/Gulf defencearrangements and the revival of Pan-lslamic dreams causedby development in Central Asia could affect this country'sforeign policy perceptions to the extent of persuading it toturn its back on South Asia. The dangers inherent in such adevelopment are obvious. Concrete steps will need to betaken by the South Asian states, collectively and severally,to evolve a commonality of strategic and economic intereststo deal with these issues so as to ensure that South Asiaand a potential Muslim bloc do not run on a collisioncourse.

Conclusion

What emerges from the foregoing appreciation of Pakistan'ssituation in ttre nineties is that t]le climate has becomeconducive to new initiatives over a wide range and these

2ta Perspecttues on South Asia

include regional and international openings

The domestic pressure for democratisation coupled witha global trend against authoritarian state strrr-ctures shouldhelp Pakistan, 'sooner or later, to revamp the state on theprinciples of democratic pluralism and respect for humanrights. This should give strength to the logic of regionalunderstanding and cooperation.

The imperatives of economic survival must persuadePakistan, like other South Asian states, to increase its faithin regional cooperation, especially in view ofthe shifts in thepriorities of the traditional aid-givers.

The old concepts of foreign policy priorities have rustedbeyond repair. As the world moves from military demarcatedpower blocs and spheres of influence and states derive theirstrength from their econornic viability and popularcontentment, the concept of achieving security throughpeace and understanding with neighbours will acquire greaterstrength.

However, it is plain that Paldstan, or any other country oftJle region for that matter, will not be able to take a meaningfulstep towards the shared goal of progress regional concord,unless all countries of the region coordinate their outlookand display equally strong commitment, in practice as wellas ln theory, to their common good.

Country Report on Bangladesh*

Rehman Sobltan

This paper spells out tJ:e dlmamics of the Bangladesh polity.This is important in providing some understanding of thecompulsions which underline its external and regionalrelations. The presentation is somewhat stylised since it isdesigned to provoke discussion rather than serve as adissertation on our history. This perspective is obviouslyselective and omits marry areas of importance and complexitywhich others may have addressed. The paper's provlslonalnature must thus be underlined.

Political Inheritance

The history of Bangladesh has been determined by thestruggle of its peoples to realise their democraflc right toself-rule. It was this vision which took them into the Paldstanmovement where an economically deprived community lnBengal sought to improve its condition through a process ofdemocratic assertion. It was the denial of this inheritance

* This chapter is the original version of the regional contributionwritten for the Fast South Asia Regional Dialogue held in NewDelhi, India in 1991.

220 PerspectiDes on South Asia

by the Pakistani ruling elite which sustained the strugglefor self-rule in the period of our association with Pakistan. Itwas the military aggression tO undo the democratic will ofthe people of Bangladesh which precipitated the liberationwar and led to the emergence of an independent Bangladesh.

Tragically the struggle for democratic assertion did notend with the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. Thebuilding and consolidation of a democratic culture has beenexposed to repeated setbacks. The initial phase ofour historywas filled with hope for building a state founded onrepresentative insfitu ons and democratic opportunity. Thephase of nation-building was constrained by the traumaticbirth of the new nation, the unrelenting assaults of nature,the vicissitudes of a global economic crisis and themalevolence of global politics.

Our own effort to build a democratic infrastructuredesigned to cope with the hostiile environment was flawed bythe virtual absence of a parliamentary opposition whichseriously compromised the efficacy of the legislature as avehicle to register the concerns of its citizens.

This perpetuated the tradition of the all-powerfulbureaucracy-bound executive, institutionalised during theperiod of military autocracy under President Ayub Khan inthe Pakistan ofthe l96os.

The weakening of democratlc institutions in post-liberationBangladesh was preJudicial to the task of building anegalitarian and secular polity. The privileged classes andthe communal political forces who were marginalised by theoutcome of the liberation war could reassert themselvesbehind disaffected elements in the armed forces. Ttreassassination of tlle founding-father of the Bangladesh state,his family and political lieutenants laid the basis for a longphase of ascendance of the cantonment in the Bangladeshpolity, which exercised its influence initially through theinstrument of Martial Law and then through civilianisation

Country Report on Bangladesh 221

of the military leadership. This phase of militar5r-cum-civilianrule was characterised by the ascendancy of the executivePresident and the progressive erosion in the authority ofParliament. A strong executive lent itself to building anautocratic political culture closely tied to the power andinfluence of a strong leader rather than the strength andvitatity of the nation's institutions for sustaining democracy.

Poltttcal Culture

The Ershad regime was a logical outcome of tJris processof degeneration in our political institutions and theascendancy of an autocratic executive. Centralised powerlends itself to unconstltutional and violent interventions tochallenge this power and the prospect of those with thenecessary backing of arms to slrstain them to capture theall-powerful executive and build it in their personal image.Ershad learnt his lessons from an earlier generation ofmilitary rulers going back to the regime of Ayub Khan inPakistan. His own point of difference was his largely personalmotvation. Whilst he preserved the socio-political coalitionwhich had been put together by his predecessor regime, hisdominant motives remained personal and centred aroundhis private political and material aggrandisement. This ledBangladesh into a phase of political anarchy and institutionaldegeneration where the state appeared to privatise itselfinto a series of discrete enterprises each driven by thepersonal or parochial goals of the executive.

The concept of a societal vision became eroded. Alldecisions became executive decisions motivated by personalinterest or sirnple whims with little scope for building aninstitutional memory which could guide the decisions of thestate by law and precedent. Transparency and accountabilityin statecraft became virtually extinct and most decisionsfrom the local to the cabinet level derived from personalaccess to the relevant repository of power and resources.

222 Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

The instituflonal consequences of this degeneration ofthelpolity was the ascendancy of the executive and thedevaluation of the legislature: In this process, successiveparliaments whose representative credentials wereprogressively more flawed owing to the deterioration in thefairness of the electoral process, found that within theprwailing systems of governance, they had little role to playbut rubber stamp the decisions of the executive.

Again the apotheosis of this process was the lastparliament under Ershad which was elected in a voter-lesselection boycotted by the rnain democratic parties. Aparliamentary opposition had to be manufactured by thegovernment, its campaign paid for by the government, itsleadership patronised by the state to ensure that it plays itsrole in ttre parliamentary charade. The fact that the oppositionparty has its offices in the building of the ruling party wasgratuitous excess which compounded public contempt forthem at the absurdity of ttreir situation.

Clvll Society

The irony of Bangladesh's contemporary history lies inthe fact that a country born out of a half,century of politicalstruggle where so much of blood was invested in its creationcould have, for most of its tortured history, lived with theattenuated erosion of its democratic rights. There have beensix regime changes between l97l and 1g90. Not one hastaken place through the constitutional process.

The present change of government is the first to takeplace through a free election. The tragic political inheritanceof a whole decade demands deeper analysis. It is easier toexplain the s5rmptoms rather than the source of ttre politicalmalaise.

What we see is the withdrawal of citizens from societ5rand their preoccupation with t1le pursuit of a private agenda.Sectional actions where they emerged either as a grouping

Country Report on Bungladesh

at the work place or as local or social coalitions are motivatedentirely by expectation of sectional gains. Civil society hadeffectively disenfranchised itself and left politics to thosewith money and muscle to assert themselves. In this way,the Ershad regime could survive for nearly a decade, tradingon the self-interest and opportunism of its opponents asmuch as the awareness that the leaders of civil societ5r couldbe kept preoccupied with their private agendas whilstgovernment and politics was usurped by those with theappetite and capacity to capture and retain state power.

The Democratlc Renewal

The weakening of civil society to resist arbitrary governancedid not mean that opposition was non-existent. Throughoutthe period of autocratic rule by Ershad in the 1980s, politicalmobilisation in the streets challenged his usurpation ofpower.

Many leaders of the opposition and workers earned theirpolitical diplomas in the j ails of Bangladesh. A notinbignificant number of people paid with ttreir lives for therealisation of our democratic rights. In the second half of1987, the regime was almost toppled but the movement lostits momentum. T?rus the upsurge again in the autumn ofl99O was part of a continuing of resistance to autocraticrule. This time, they could sustain the momentum of themovement which brought down the regime in December199O. However, the end of Ershad Rq owed in no smallmeasure to its inner weaknesses. Poor economicperformance, eroding credibility with its aid-patrons and,flnally, the unwillingness of the military to underwrite thesurvival of the regime at any cost weakened its capacity tosuppress the popular mobilization.

The fall of the Ershad regime and its replacement by aninterim-government under the Presidency of the Chief Justiceof Bangladesh was seen as a second birth for democracy in

223

224 Perspectiues on South Asia

Bangladesh and generated emotions which were reminiscentof the heady days of liberation. The interim-governmentmanaged, notwithstanding many moments of self-doubt, tohold a free and fair election of quite exceptional legitimacy.The interim-government could do so because its memberssaw ttreir role as non-partisan and could thus communicateto the administration their conmitment towards an electionwhose credentials were unchallenged.

In spite of a legary of vioience and corruption in theelectoral process and the proliferation of arms in privatehands, the election was violence-free and the outcomeinvested a representative status and legitimary on thoseelected, which remains beyond debate.

The results were a surprise. The front running AwamiLeague{ed alliance won the most votes, around 38 per cent,but only a third of the seats. The BNP won 3 I per cent of ttrevotes but emerged as the largest party in Parliament, andnow with tlle 3O nominated seats for women. holds a slimmajority in the House. A measure of the even-handedness ofthe election lay in the fact that President Ershad won 5seats in his home district of Raingpur and his party 35 seats.The elecUons proved that the people retained their faith inthe democratic process and if given the right to exercrsetheir franchise will do so with zeal and commonsense.

The signillcance of this Parliament is its legitimacy derivedfrom a free election and the strength of the opposition. Thisis the first Parliament in Bangladesh's history which has astrong and vocal opposition. The repeal of provisions of the4tJl amendment which had vested supreme powers in theExecuUve and the restorabon of the authority of Parliamentat least. integrate the letter of the original 1972 Constitutionwith the political reality on the ground and holds hope for avlable political order.

Countrg Reqort on Batagladesh 225

Prospects for DemocracY

However, the legacy of our misbegotten past hangs heavy

over our renewed democratic order' The acts of continuingviolence, the arming of students for partisan purpose' the

degeneration ofthe administration and its culture of arbitrary

"o""", lack of transparency and cormption have undermined

the euphoria of the democratic renewal. With many of our

universities and colleges closed due to violence, the perception

that law and order is breaking down, the debilitatingrecession in the economy and a growing awareness that our

economic agendas are made by our principal aid-donors has

compelled everyone to realise that a democratic awakening

is only a means to an end.

This end is to consolidate a democratic culture whictr can

ensure that in five years, another free and fair election can

bring to power a parliament with equally impeccable

reprisentative credentials. To do so will demand the

institutionalisation of a strong parliamentary system' the

capacit5r to make the executive responsible to both parliament

and public opinion and the capacity of the government to

build a vision for the future which guarantees a better life

for the people. The prevailing stagnation of the economy, the

prevalence of massive poverty, the growing externaldependence on aid and the resultant loss of sovereignty to

our donors in the direction of the economy demand a

poliilcal consensus to build a viable democratic and sovereign

polity.

Crlsis of Economic DeveloPment

To build a stable democratic order demands that the long

deprived masses of Bangladesh must be given a stake in the

new order. This demands both a more efficient and a more

self-reliant economy which puts the concerns of the

democratic majority of the poor at its centre. To redirect ourenergies to these goals poses lbrmidable problems because

226 Perspectiue s on South Asra

of the degeneration in the economy. The lggos was a periodof stagnant economic growth, declining investments bothpublic and private and the collapse of the rate of domesticsavings to below one per cent by the beginning of the l99os.The failure to register sustained economic growth contributedto tJle structural atrophy ofthe economy where the share ofmanufactures in GDp remained virtually unchanged overtwo decades.

Whilst the public sector stagnated both ow.inA to acts ofpolicy and the crisis of governance, the attempt Io privatisethe economy did little more than breed a class of rentiersmasquerading as capitalists. Arr attempt to build the privatesector by a masslve infusion of public loans culminated in asituation where today nearly 9O per cent ofthe loanees frompublic financial insiltuflons are in default and the rate ofrecovery from these loanees is around lO per cent of thetotal recoverable amount of their debt.

Bangladesh has privaflsed over 600 public enterprises inthe last 15 years-more than Chile under pinochet_perhapsa record in the world. A recent study in lggl, commissionedby the interim-government, the first-ever attempt by thegovernment in 15 years to physically look at the outcome ofits privatisation pollcies, found that around 6O per cent ofthese enterprises were closed. privatisation has thus becomea vehicle for extracting resources from the State and fromthe people without contributing either to growth, investmentor productive efficiency. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh around5O per cent of its households live in conditilns of poverty,deprived of their basic needs.

This stagnating economy could only survive as long as itdid because of the largesse of its external benefactors. Aidtoday accounts for nearly l0O per cent of our developmentbudget and perhaps some of our revenue expenditure aswell slnce items of current expenditure are deliberatelysmuggled into the development budget to draw upon aid

Countrg Report on Barglnd.esh 227

resources. The available evidence suggests that this aid has,if anything, discouraged domestic savings and reduced thepressure for generating domestic revenues. It has becometJle soft option for our development and is doing little tocreate a capacity for sustained and self-reliant development.

A decade ofsponsored structural adjustment has broughtlittle more than stagnation, with mass poverty remainingpervasive.

The failure of donor-sponsored adjustment policies hasdone litfle to persuade donors to rethink their policy. Ratherit has driven them to paroxysms of frustration at the failuresof the government to deliver the expected gains from donor-sponsored adjustment policies. The donor's irritation withthe government is reflected in the growing influence insetting policy directions and in the proliferation ofconditionalities attached to most aid agreements which aredesigned to realise macro and micro economic reforms.Successive governments have accepted this growingparamountcy of the donors in our affairs which first inviteddonor approbation but finally led to their disillusionmentwith the government.

The newly elected government has accepted the donor'spolicy prescriptions negouated with the erstwhile regime intoto. However, as an elected government, it now faces seriousproblems in reconciling these donor-driven policy conditionsnot Just with the frustrations of their domesfic businesssupporters whose faith in a market economy remains lessthan categorical but also from their mass electorate whohave to pay the price of the donor-sponsored de-subsidisationpolicies.

A Consensus for Development

What Bangladesh needs is to soberly rethink its economicagenda, free of old and more contemporary dogmas. Duringthe tenure of the interim-government, 2O Task Forces were

Perspectiues on South Asirt

set up which mobilised over 25O of our best talents whovolunteered their servlces te define the problems andpossibilities facing a new democratic order. The work wascompleted in eight weeks for presentation to the electedgovernment and members of Parliament.

This exercise was designed to strengthen the capacity ofthe new democratic order and to promote public debate aroundwhich a political consensus could be built to design adevelopment agenda for the 1990s which derives from ourown compulsions rather than the dictates of donors. But totake on the orthododes of the donors will require bothdemocratic support at home and a capacity to deliver goodgovernance which delivers the goods rather than evadesproblems. This will be no easy task in a societ5r where everyoneperceives the state as a milch-cow but few are willing to workto raise productivity and mobilise domestic resources forpromoting a strategJr of more self-reliant and sustained growth.A failure both of credibility and in drawing upon our owrrcapacity to design our own agenda could continue tocompromise the sovereignty of the Bangladesh state.

In redefining our relations with our donors, we will haveto look to our external relations vrithin the South Asianregion and beyond it with the world. Oul aid obsessedperspec ve renders all our el.ternal relations aid-driven.Our attempts to build links with the West and then with theIslamic bloc are all derived from the belief that their aidwould sustain our polity and economy. In practice, however,in recent years the US contribution to cur developmentderi'"'es much more from the fact that they are the largestbuyers of our garments which constitutes our largestcommodity export. Bangladesh's relations with Middle-Eastoil exporters is driven much less by their declining aidcommitments and much more so by their acceptance oflarge numbers of our migrant workers whose remittanceslast year accounted for the largest single source of ourexchange earnings. Whilst such specific bilateral compulsions

Countrg Report on Banglarlesh 229

influence our external policies, no attempt has yet beenmade to deftne a meaningful external policy derived fromour domestic problems and a vision for the future.

Redefi nlng Reglonal Relations

Since South Asia today counts for little in the way of aidor markets for Bangladesh, our relations within the regionremaln at a low ebb. However, a large volume of informalcross-border trade with India raises the volume of oureconomic transactions whilst a massive migration of migrantworkers from Bangladesh to both Pakistan and India hasprovided an important but undefined source of externalearnings. No attempt has been made to take officialcognisance of this informal trade or to find ways to legitimiseit. Within the South Asian region, Bangladesh's dominantconcern remains its relationship with India. The tragedy forBangladesh and indeed all the South Asian countries hasbeen that they have treated this vital relationship with themajor regional power as a part of their domestic politicaldebate rather than as an issue of external policy builtaround a domestic political consensus. Relations with Indiahave constltuted one of the major fault lines in the domesticpolitics ofnot only Bangladesh but Pakistan and Nepal too,and presence of this large neighbour on their borders hasnot only prevented these countries from making a seriousobjective assessment of the nature of this relationship buthas inhibited the building of a domestic political consensusto assess and define this sensitive relationship.

Obviously, India has contributed to feeding this obsessionof its neighbours which defines its relationships with itsimmediate nelghbours. In the Bangladesh context, theperslstence of unresolved disputes, some of real insignificance,feeds these domestic compulsions. It is incredible that l7years after President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took the boldstep of entering into the border demarcation agreements withIndira Gandhi, a great regional power such as India could not

230 Perspectiues on South Asra

fullil its own part of the agreement and hand over a smallparcel of land of Teen Bigha connecting the enclave ofDahagram with Ban$adesh. There may, no doubt, be localproblems which have constrained this hand-over. But thepolitical as well as the technological resources of the Indianstate could have been deployed to solve this trivial problem soas not to compromise the international credibility of tl.e Indianstate for these l7 years.

Other problems such as the Chakma refugees, themaritme boundaries and even the issue of the Gangeswaters are hardly beyond the realm of both human ingenuityand the spirit of compromise needed to build a durablerelationship. In such negotiations, it is obviously sensible todiscuss these problems within a broad holistic frameworkdefining the relationship rather than to bilateralise eachissue so that there is always a w.inner and a loser. It is evenmore sensible to multilateralise some negotiations withinthe region so as to widen the scope for trade-offs. In mostsuch negotiations, ab rnitb, it is India which has the morecriilcal and giving role to play. India must decide the price itis willing to pay to have harmony on its borders which canprovide the basis for building a regional consensus.

In the Bangladesh context, this would suggesraccommodation by India particularly on the issue of therivers. The Ganges waters in the context of the Indian stateare a marginal problem. For Bangladesh it is a touchstoneof its relations with India and a matter of maior concern tohalf the country. A standstill agreement with a generousshare of the waters pledged to Ban$adesh should be followedby a Jotnt rwiew not just by clvil servants but by an Indo_Bang;ladesh-Nepal Commission discussing afresh a strates/for sharing our water resources.

Structural AdJustment

In the area of economic relations, the core of this

Cortnhy Report on B arElade sh 23r

relatlonship lies in the attraction of the large Indian market.Access to this market is inhibited both by the protectivepolicies of India and the structural limitations of theneighbouring South Asian economies to exploit this market.This suggests the need for restructuring ofour economies toexpand and diversi8r the manufacturing and export base ofthe smaller economies to service this large market andadJustments within India to accommodate these regionalimports.

This restructuring provides the most credible basis forbuilding economic cooperation within South Asia.

To this end, India should as a token of its goodwill, beginby offering a two-year non-reciprocal access to its market toall the countries of South Asia. where neither tariffs nornon-restrictions would apply to inhibit imports from itsneighbours. Within these two years, a longer term plan forbuilding industries which strengfhen the export capacity ofthe smaller countries and policies which create the basis forliberalising the movement of goods, capital and people withinthe region must be worked out. This will again have to takeinto account the apprehensions of the smaller countries ofbeing swamped by hidian goods, capital and technologr.

The planned structural adjustment of the regionaleconomies must thus create conditions for balanced tradeboth in volume and structure and for a truly participatoryprocess of planning and decision making.

Such framework for cooperation will demand theparHcipafion of the regiorr's quite considerable professionaltalents working with their governments to design an agendafor durable cooperaflon. But above all, it will demand politicalcourage and statesmanshlp to emanclpate ourselves fromthe confines of domestic political opportunism so as toreach out to build a vision for the future of our region. Thisvision must recognise that our destinies are shared andthat to fulfil thts destiny and build a better life for a region

Perspectiues on South Asia

where the majority of the world's poor live, we have to dreamand work together.

If we can do so more effectively, two decades from now,even earlier, South Asia can become another centre fordemocratic opportunity and economic dynamism in thedynamic Asia of the 2 I st century.

The State of Governance inPost- 1990 Nepal-

DeuendraRqj Pandag

The world is changing rapidly. And it will keep on changingas no given international order is permanent. Hopefully,South Asia s "regional order", too, would brace itself up toenable the countries of the region to cope with the newchallenges and harness the opportunities for peace,cooperation and development in the next century and beyond.Meanwhile, the countries of the region as those elsewhereneed to develop and consolidate a domestic order that isresponsive to the changing world as well as to their owninternal conditions and compulsions. Nepal took a big stridein thls respect eight years ago through the reintroduction ofparliamentary democrary after a gap of 30 years. How Nepalhas progressed in the past eight years in this direction is thesubject ofthis paper.

*This chapter is an updated version of the regional r:ontributionwritten for the Second South Asia llegional Dialogre hekl inKandy, Sri l,anka in 1992. The stn:cturr: alcl the stlrle of theoriginal paper remain unr:halgecl,

234 Perspect )es on South Asla

Nepal's e.xperience should be of interest to the Dialoguebecause all countries of the region face similar problemsand prospects even though sorne of them are democraciesmuch older than Nepal. More than a billion people of flvecountries represented in the Dialogue are strug€iling withthe values, principles and practices of democracy as theytry to find a coherent and functional basis for organisingthemselves towards their nation-building goals. They aresimilarly challenging the notion that the parliamentar5rprocess, as the Marxists would say in theory, or as the lawand order school of development would allege, in practice, isinherently inimical to economic development including theobjective of poverty eradication and remedying injusilcesand inequities in the society. t'he con{lict and competitionthat is a part of competifive politics called democracy islikewlse considered suspect by the votades of economicliberalisatlon who wish to see a uniform commltment of allparties and interests to the paradigm and its sustainedpursuit.

Democracy itself appears like a new-found element of thenew world order. In the days of the Cold War, it did not reallymatter to Western powers whether any of our countries wasa democracy. The only qualification necessary to be a freemember of ttre 'free world" was arrti-communism in domesticand international political postures and, if possible, acapitalistic mode in the organisation of the economy, Nowthat these powers do not need the support of authoritarianstates to serve this agenda and interest, democratic statescan hopefully benefit from tltls propitious internationalenvironment.

As a system of governance and a medium of articulatinginterests, resolving conflicts and deploying material andnon-material resources for sustainable development ofpeoples and groups deseMng equal rights and opportunities,democracy has enJoyed wide reoognition for a long time. Ofthe five countries of the region t'epresented in the Dialogue,

The State oJ Gouentance inPost-1990 Nepal 235

Sri Lanka has been engaged tJ.e longest, together withIndia, in this journey towards the establishment of ademocratic society. In India, the "key", in the words ofJunius Richard Jayewardene, to the realisation of SouthAsian aspirations, tJre people are successfully demonstratingthat despite many frustrafions arising from confinuinginadequacies in the mechanisms of resolving complex, socialand economic conflicts they have the resilience andperseverance required to sustain the process. As for tJleother ttrree countries, they too share many problems andpromises with the two oldest and relatively uninterrupteddemocracles of South Asia. But they are very much behind.In the aftermath of the.most recent wave of democracy, thepeoples of Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan face theformidable task of establishing confidence in the politicalprocess and consolidating democratic institutions even whilethey cope with the burden of traditions and demands thatmay mn counter to the norms and values of democracy.Even as each of these countries has to struggle with tJlechallenges themselves, what happens in the region as awhole may matter more. In particular, what happens to theolder democracies of South Asia including their ability tocope with the forces of fundamentalism and theircommitment to regional and ethnic harmony will have aneffect in other countries also. It is therefore pertinent thatwe discuss the issue of governance as a part of the regionaldialogue.

In Nepal, where the country's future may depend largelyon the course of the evolving political process, there isalready a sense of despair with the inadequacies andperversions of the system that the people brought into forcein l99O after a struggle lasting three decades. The experiencelooks like an illustration of a case where the political leaderswho appeared vislonary when they led the struggle fordemocracy suddenly metamorphose into ordinaqr mortalswith all the frailties and none of the vision needed to lead

236 'Persoectiues on South Asia

the country along the democratic path towards prosperity.Nepal's in case, democracy appears very much on track,and there is some satisfaction to that account. But then,when it comes to the values that guide it and the outcomesit has produced, the process falls far short of the people'sexpectations and its own potential. A common perception isthat the political process is de.void of political culture thatshould match the structures envisaged by the Constitution.When a set of modern structures comes under the spell of apolitical culture suited more to the ancien regime th.an ademocracy, the pathologies manifest in a more sinisterform. Ttre international community that Nepal is extremelydependent upon has sensed this and thus insists on improvedgovernance so that the agreed policies and programmes, theeconomic reform measures in particular, are implementedwith greater certainty and effectiveness. But then, one alsosenses ttrat in this insistence, the stress is more on efficiencyin economic management than political accountability. Whereaccountability ls emphasised, its scope is limited to theissue of linancial accountability. Hence tJle new-found allergzagainst corruption, among other things. In Nepal wherecorruption is corroding the very fabric of democracy, not tomention the society, this emphasis cannot be disputed. Butfinancial accountability cannot be divorced conceptuallyand in practice from political accountability. Governance isnot only about who manages and how, but also about whodecides what is to be managed and how.

In this paper I look at governance in the context ofdemocracy which to my mind is the foundation of anydiscourse on the subject. I will therefore concentrate hereon Nepal's experience with democracy and see how thepolitical process is evolving tD serve the cause of goodgovernance in that context. The implications for economicmanagement as experienced so far will also be presented inthe same context. A brief account of the state of foreign

The State oJ Gouernance in Post- 199O Nepal 237

relations as they affect governance and problems andchallenges ahead will be outlined at the end.

Status of Political Evolution

Nepal in a structural sense is now a full-fledged democracy.Since the First Dialogue in lg9l, in Delhi, Nepal has gonethrough significant experiences, pleasant as well asunpleasant in governance under a parliamentary system. Ina country about which scepticism on the viability ofdemocracy abounds, one can take note of many developmentsthat point to the positve aspects of the ongoing politicalevolution. As I do so in the following paragraphs, thecontradictions that inhere in the process will also be pointedout together with their implications for democraticgovernance as relevant.

First, as I edit these lines. the l4th session of theparliament is in progress. This is the second parliamentsince the Constittttion oJ the Kingdom oJ Nepal, I99O waspromulgated. TWo parliamentary elections have been heldand power has been transferred between competing politicalparties peacefully and democratically. In seven years, twoparliaments, following two general elections, have producedseven governments with five prime ministers. The adverseimplications for political stability and the ability of agovernment to design policies and to steer development isapparent enough. Political stability is a serious issue in acountry which is one of the poorest in the world and wherethe ordinary people look for not only political freedom butalso committed leadership of the government in amelioratingtheir social and economic hardships. Developmentprogrammes and policies do suffer when the government isunstable and the bureaucracy is not strong enough toprovide the initiative and continuity as needed. On the otherhand, seven governments mean that all major parties havehad a share in power in coalitions with one another whichmay eventually contribute to the development of a culture of

234 Perspectisse s on South Asia

consensual politics which the country needs as much ascompetitlve politics inherent in a democracy. Furthermore,the political parties that have been leading the communistmovement and the leaders of the erstwhile reglme who forthirty years opposed democracy, have joined the democraticmainstream and participated in the parliamentary processwith some exceptions at the orthodox fringes to the rightand the left. Nepal has the largest proportion of communistmembers of parliament anJrwhere in the world, wittr thepossible exception of Gennady Zyuganov's communists inthe Russian Duma. In addition, the principal communistparty has headed a minority government and alsoparticipated in coalition governments.

Second, two local elections have been held for local bodiesat the district and village levels. The first was held within ashort period since the promulgation of the new constitutionand the next, too, without any delay, which must be arecord in the South Asian region. About two hundredthousand elected representatives belonging to differentpolitical parties are now functioning at village andmunicipality levels performing functions as delegated underthe law. A principal feature of a recent legislation in thisrespect is the mandatory requirement of women'srepresentation by creating separate electorates for womenat the ward level, the lowest political unit. As a result, out oftfre above number of elected officials, at least 350O0 wouldbe women. Between the Village and the Centre, there isanother tier of elected local bodies, the District DevelopmentCommittees, that represent more prominent loci ofdecentralised power. Though the standard of fairness inboth local elections was far below the level observed in thegeneral elections, the existence of elected local bodies in allparts of the country may mean that vested interests infavour of democracy may now develop at the grassroots.This may depend upon the extent to which the powers at theCentre are willing to surrender some of their privileges to

The State oJGouernance inpost-1990 Nepal 239

tJle leaders and people at the local levels, namely tlre erstwhileperiphery. The evident reluctance of all major parties inenacting the Local Autonomy Bill, pending with parliamentfor some time, which promises greater degree of devolutionof power to the local bodies that is historically the case isnot a good augury. On the other hand, with democracy, tJlepolitically aware and active citizens at the local level will notforever be passive receivers of what is offered from theCentre. They have begun to assert themselves in such a waythat they will most likely succeed in not only obtaining thestatutory authority they need to function as a unit ofautonomous local-self government, but may also serve as asource ofan effective rearguard action for democracv, shouldsuch a need arise.

Third, the political parties despite being full of problemsand shortcomings have shown a measure of understandingand tolerance necessary in a democracy. The unholy alliancesthey enter into and the threshold of plausible compromisethey cross as they enter into coalitions with one another hasbecome a matter of considerable disappointment morerecently. In addition, the political leaders do not have theimage they once had on account of their unethical andirresponsible conduct in and out of parliament. yet, nopolitical party represented in parliament seems ready to doanything that jeopardises the parliamentary process andnegates the achievements since April 199O. Speciallynoteworthy is the attitude and stance of the two mainstreamcommunist parties, the Communist party of Nepal: theUnited Mandst-Leninist (UML) and the Communist party ofNepal: Marxist-l,eninist (ML), the latter being a breakawaygroup liom the UML. As communists, their commitment tothe parliamentary process or multi-party democracyguaranteeing civil and political liberties and related valuesand institutions can be questioned, and the principaldemocratic party, the Nepali Congress (NC), does question itoften for its own political purposes. But so far, despite their

240 Perspectiues on South Asia

obvious internal contradictions, there is no manifest desire

in tJle leadership of these parties to deviate from the

democratic process beyond the unbecoming compromises

and cadre-focused theatrics they indulge in from trme to

time. In the latter sphere' too, they are no dilTerent from the

NC. The UML fi:om the beginrring' and more so since the

split with the ML, has had difficulty in coming to terms withthe changing reality in the world and the contradictions

that will continue until it discards the symbols and

nomenclature of its communist heritage' Now with the

breakaway party, the ML, trying to project a more radical or

orthodox image than its rival, UML, this proposition will be

even more difficult for both of them to execute' The enigma

in Nepal politics reached its climax in August 1998 when

the more orthodox communist par[r undcr the banner of

ML joined the government under the leadership of itserstwhile principal political adversary, the NC led by erstwhile

avid anti-Communist leader G'P. Koirala. The ML' came into

being only a few months ago when its leaders broke away

from the UML because of, among other things, the alleged

subservience of UML leadership to the "anti-national" policies

of the NC. The bone of contention was the disagreement on

the interpretation of the provision for the sharing of

downstream benefits of the proposed Mahakali Project and

related issues concerning Nepal-India relations to be

discussed shorllY.

Fourth, the Rashtriya Praj atantra Party (RPP) of the

erstwhile rulers, the panchas' is engaged in projecting itsimage as a democratic group' Wtrile this can be interpreted

as a simple political ploy, it is also possible that the politicised

wing, as opposed to the bureaucratic-technocratic and

feudalistic wing of the Panchayat camp does not see anything

advantageous for itself in carrying the image of t}re ancient

regine arrd. being associated with any rumours about the

possible reversal of the ongoing evolution' As theparliamentary process matures, they must' see the

Tfe State of Gouerncarce in Post- 199O Nepal 241

advantages for them of a system which gives them power togo with the responsibility as opposed to the conditions inthe defunct Panchayat system where to some extent theywere exposed to public scrutiny while the real power residedwith the Royal Palace and its appendages. This anomalyonly fuelled personal greed. Yet, the internal contradictionsthat this party too faces led to a split in the RPP also. As inthe case of the UML split, the ideological or political factorsthat might have made the split inevitable are not clear.What is clear is that the leaders of both factions (now

heading the two parties after the split) have led coalitiongovernments in a political dispensation they tried to suppressfor decades. What is more, both of them were supported inthe coalition by parties suppressed by them in the old order(the UML and the NC in turn), and larger than them byvirtue of elections held in the new regime. This illustratesthe nature of politics in Nepal and the need for indepthresearch on the subject that is necessary to adequatelyunderstand the underlying forces that govern such a stateof affairs.

Fifth, the Nepali people are showing awareness thathowever limited its functional merit to the poor people in apoor country with gross inequities and growing economicdifficulties, lieedom has its virtue and can be addictive' Thepeople who seem to be groping in the dark to find thedifference between the present system of governance andthe old from the standpoint of material benefits and a senseof general well-being do acknowledge that the freedom theyenjoy as citizens is unprecedented. A general impression isthat they would not want to lose this too easily. Clearly, ifthe grievances of the people against the government haveincreased significantly in the post-199o dispensation, it isnot all result of an actual adverse change in the objectiveconCitions. Much of it may be because the people can nowexpress themselves with greater fieedom and greater intensitythan before. An alert and active civil society is emerging

242 Perspectiues on South Asia

which takes up issues that would not even surface earlier.For the first tlme, Nepal truly has a free press. Obviously,one wishes that the press would match the freedom itenjoys with requisite fairness. But ttrat is not happeningbecause of the fterce compefiUon among maJor politicalparties to proJect their points of view through the printmedia they love to own. The truth gets compromised tonobody's surprise and everybody's chagrin. Nevertheless,the interest and concern of alert civic groups in assertingthe truth and establistring justce is demonstrated by thegrowing numbers of public litigaUon suits handled by theSupreme Court. The subject of litigation has ranged fromthe constitutional auttrority of the King to the need forratiftcation of a water resources agreement with India byParliament under Article 126 of the Constitution, theauthority of the anti-corruption agency to prosecutegovernment rnlnisters, riglrt to information, women's propert5rrights and many ottrer important matters.

On balance, ttre state of political evolution is now at astage where democratic forces can take some satisfactionthat democracy has survived for more than eight years.They cannot however, gloss over the fact, thht whatever hasbeen accomplished is too fragile, and far from beingproductive to the benefit of the people. Underneath thescenario that does not look too discouraging for an emergingdemocracy in South Asia, the political culture, the style ofgovernnnce, the tendency to abuse authority, and the veryobjecflve of ttre state do not seem to have changed muchfrom the Panchayat period. On the other hand, theaspiraflons of tJre people have risen and those, in particular,of the ethnic minorities and other groups inhabiting themore depressed parts of the country are being revitalised.

The interest group that should be most concerned withthe challenges that lie on the path of democratic consolidationdo not seem to be adequately aware of them. A fundamentalproblem lies with ttre leadership of the principal politcal

The State oJ Couernnnce in Post- 799O Nepa| 243

parHes. At the moment tJle state of affairs in the rulingparty is especially in disarray. Earlier, after the first generalelection in 1991, tJre prime minister, despite holding acomfortable majority in Parliament, was constrained tosuggest a mid-term poll partly because of the challengesand non-cooperation he faced within the party which, inturn, was partly the result of his own undemocratc conduct.This opened the door for the minority government of theUML and many other patch-up coalitions after tl.e secondelecflons in 1994. The seed of instability that was sownwith, as many people in Nepal believe, the managed defeatof K.P. Bhattarai, the popular prime minister in the interimgovernment, in l99l germinated fully in 1994. Since thattime, in particular, Nepal's politics has started going downhillwith accompanying instability in government and erosion inwhat had barely begun to crystallise in the name of politicalculture and democratic values.

The problems facing the political system are of threecategories. One, the changes in the political structure havemade little impact on the feudalistic character of tJle societyand the politico-bureaucratic culture inherited from thePanchayat era. As a result while established parties andleaders lose their aura and credibility, ttre forces of regressionget their morale boosted from the growing feeling that thenew regirne is only the old wine in the new botfle. Second,the principle democratic force, the Nepali Congress, has sofar been unable to establish and follow a set of principlesand norms governing tlee relationship between the partyand the government. This has adversely affected theperformance of the government when in power, and thecredibility of the party when out of it. Third, the economiccondition of the count4r and general deprivation of thepeople is a problem for the nascent political democracywhich is unable to resolve, among other things, the conflictbetween the expectations of the people from the governmentand the latter's imperaUve to accept and pursue structural

244 Perspectiues on Soulh Asia

adjustment and economic liberalisation, especially becauseof the country's over-dependence upon foreign aid. That thegovernment, regardless of the character and substance ofits policy framework, has yet to prove its competence orshow commitment to a set of principles or priorities is anadditional burden. If the social implications of the liberaleconomic regime were the only problem, the complaintsfrom ttre concerned quarters should have been compensatedfor by the satisfaction in the private sector and the all-important donor community. But that is not the case. Forthe first time, responsible sections of the private sector havetaken to the street, much like the students do in Nepal,protesting the introduction of the Value Added Tax [VAI),thus challenging the very legitimacy of the government.Similarly, for the first time, important donors have taken offtheir diplomatic gloves and started airing complaints againstthe non-performing government without pulling theirpunches. Seen in this perspective, Nepal may be at theprecipice of a crisis of governance.

Ncw Challengcs

Governance is not simply an issue about the structureand functions of the government or even of the polity. It is alarger concept that has yet to fi-llly crystallise and incorporatein it the elements of the state, the contribution of thepolicies and the role of market and the civil society ascomposite parts of the process, At the mornent the differentelements or relationships embedded in a possible theory ofgovern€rnce are emphasised differently by different interests,not only in Nepal but also in other parts of the world.Accordingly, there are views, for example, that in East Asia,the "miracle" was produced by good governance; and thatnow the'miracle" has disappeared because of deficiency ingovernance. The Russian Federation is about to collapsebecause of the economic crisis, this, too, is attributed to theproblems of governance. This may ail be true, but such

The State oJ Gouernance in Post- 199O Nepal

casual approaches do not help us to understand the conceptor to devise policies that aridress the country's reality. Theonly message that corRes through liom this type of argumentis the dubious verdict that for good governance tl-e countriesconcerned should economically liberalise, and liberalise fast.

In Nepal, too, wit}- its all-important donors taking keeninterest in governance, emphasis may have shifted to theeconomic managerial dimension of the governanceproblematic from the political, as initially was the case

when countries all over the world were riding the "thirdwave" of democracy and when democracy, human rightsand people's participation were emphasised. For sure, thelatter is stressed by the donors, too, but their conception ofparticipation may have more to do with participation fordelivering local development as envisaged in their aidstrategies than the exercise of citizenship rights at thepolitical plane. The former is an important considerationbut it cannot be propagated in lieu of the measures forstrengthening the constitutional system, building democraticinstitutions, enforcing accountability, serving social justiceand protecting human rights. Nepal is thus caught in a

situation where it has to address the issue of governance forimpro!'ing its delivery as the donors wish (which may or maynot coincide with what the people wish or need) while at thesame time exercising requisite autonomy to steer democracyalong the path where the multifarious needs-economic,social and cultural-of the diverse interests in the societyare met.

The difficulty is rendered more complex by the fact thatdespite the seeming convergence of priorities with regard topoverty alleviation, for example, the policies that the donorswish to pursue may not be consistent with what the 1O

million and more people that fall in the "absolute poor"

category need urgently. The proclivities of the donors tofollow tieir own agenda and strategies which they cannotharmonise even among themselves have not sewed their

245

246 Perspect ses on South Asra

wlsh to contribute to poverty alleviation in any case. Inaddition, it is certain that as the "external constituency" ofthe government also demands a better performance in macro-economic management, policy reforms to reduce disincentivesto producers and exporters, and generally the privatisationof the economy, the expectations of the domestic constituencywould require the government to follow a more welfare-statist line in economic policies and development priorities.The issue here is indeed about governance, not the need orotherwiSe of a "welfare state" which stands discredited as aconcept and as a social policy in the eyes of the powerfulsectlons of the global communit5r. The deprived and thedisadvantaged are bound to create a law and order problemsooner or later, throwing all the calculations of the economicreformers haywire and making them unmanageable.Unemployment and underemployment are increasing withthe problem being more severe among the youth, not sparingthe educated ones among them" The Maoist insurgency thatis growing is a political problern only in parh the other partis the manifestation of people's frustrations with unjustpolicies and attitudes of the government, irrespective of theparty heading or parficipating in it, and the unharnessedener€y of the youth tJlat seeks an avenue for its release.

A fundamental dilemma facing the governance project inNepal is the fact that from the Lreginning of the second dawnof democracy the count4r is constrained to pursue thepolicy of economic liberalisation in the name of economicreform. In the process, the political parties have not beenable to address the reality of the country in their wisdomand in the light of their historical understanding of thecountry's economic structure and social formations. TheNepali Congress has surrendered its 'democratic socialist,'ideologr, history and image bringing it closer to and makingit often indistinguishable from the parties to the right and tothe left who are also required to toe the same line. In Nepal'sdemocracy, governments change too fast, and the policies

The State oJ Gouen'ance in Post- 199O Nepal 247

do not change at all. On the other hand, this is not acomfort even for those who wish to see a contiunity inpolicies-because the continuity basically means themaintenarice of a directionless state and accompanyingconfusion. Even as we may assign some blame for thecurrent predlcament to the economic liberalisation frametJle country is supposed to be pursuing, the reality is thatthe government has done precious little on that front also. Ifit was, at least, the private sector and the potential investorsabroad would be happier with the situation which is not thecase. The bottom line, I am trying to stress, is tJlat in Nepal's

condition, when there is no challenge for any party to come

up with a new vision or a set of policies, the continuity thepeople get is the contlnuity of a vacuum in the policyenvironment that no political forces are willing or able to fill,and pathologies in political and bureaucratic behaviour

against which they seem to be just as helpless.

The economy is not growing with any speed even wittrliberalisation. The growth rate of GDP since the mid- l98osis higher than the historically low rate of around 3 per cent.

But one can hardly claim tJlat the higher rate of 5 per cent ayear ls adequate, especially to generate the necessary spreadeffects that can serve the all important objective of poverty

alleviation across regions, castes, gender and ethnicity' Inaddition, there is no guarantee that even this rate issustainable with the political instability on one hand, anduncertaint5r in policy outlook, on ttre other. The ominousscenario can be observed in the declining growth rates sincef995-96, with the lowest rate recorded last year at 1.9 percent. In the meantime, there is no evidence that povert5r at45 per cent of population is declining or that the distributionof beneflts of whatever development that has occurred is

spreading more widely. Only 12 per cent of population inNepal resides in urban and semi-urban areas' It is widelyknown that most of the development and its benefits are

concentrated here. What may not be known as widely is

248 Perspectiues on South Asra

that even within the urban population, the top l0 per centof the households enjoy 7l per cent of income while thebottom 4O per cent has only 2 per cent.

In the meantime the resource position is becomingprecarious with stagnating government revenue and thedonors threatening to reduce their aid unless performanceimproves markedly. It is a sad commentary on Nepal,sdevelopment efforts that in nearly 5O years of endeavour,the country's dependence on foreign assistance has notslackened. In the 1998-99 budget government revenue is tofinance only 57 per cent of public expenditure. Of thedevelopment expenditure, 68 per cent is to be met by foreignloans and grants. In addition, there is a big inflow of notfully accounted money for disbursement via domestic andforeign non-governmental organisations. The latter activities,whether well-meaning or not, have added to the confusionin policies, ownership of programme and their directionwhich should also be an issue for the governance agenda.

The above conflict in itself is not as serious as thegovernment's inability to perform in general. The anxiety ofthe donor communit5r-which I am stressing here, becauseof the very vocal and overt manner many important'donorsare airing out their complaints-is limited not to the tardyand slow implementation of the liberalisation agenda. Theyare also concerned about the general inefficiency, corruptionand delays in the implementation of prograrnmes and projectsin the public sector. Though the positive as well as negativeoutcomes in development and governance in Nepal are theproduct of the consummation of interests and intentions ofthe government and the donor communit5r, it is the latterthat will decide eventually whether and for how long thebusiness as usual can continue.

One principal reason for the deterioration in government'sperformance is that the political parties have not observedthe need to maintain the sanctity of the civil service. The

The State oJ Gouernanrce in Post-1990 Nepal 249

politicians in power sometimes give an impression that theyreally do not know what a "state" is. They cannot differentiatebetween their role and responsibility as a governmentminister and as a party leader or worker. But it is more thana case of individual aberration. The political parties, as amatter of policy, have taken a position that when in power,they need their own "civil servants" who will do their bidding.The transfers of officials in important positions at the centreand the districts and in projects and public undertakingshave become a major threat to governance and ultimately todevelopment of the country. The civil service has become so

demoralised that civil servants from the top level to lov'erranks are available to play the servile roles as expected bythe political bosses of the day. In the process the civilservants claim their own "pounds of flesh" at public cost.

Against this background, the frustrations and pent-upfeelings and grievances of the people accumulated over

many decades have been surfacing. The ruled as well as therulers are in no mood to wait until the utopia of a globalisedeconomy is harvested to provide opportunities for them totransform their reality. The ruling elites are constrained toexpress their faith and commitment to policy reforms andsound management. But they are not willing or prepared toimbibe the requisite values and norms of behaviour. It islargely their behaviour which has contributed to the generalperception ofa breakdown in the law and order and a senseof social responsibility all around. The obscurantistPanchayat regime was thrown out, and righfly so. But thefeudal values with associated authoritarian culture persist.In addition, there is a breakdown in social disciplineaccompanied by the politicisation of various civic groupsthat, however, have not been required to go through apolitical socialisation process conducive to a democraticculture. Whether and how, this condition will be remediedwill depend upon, among others, the responsible institutionsofthe civil society. The steady growth ofthe civil society is in

250 Perspectives on Soufh Asra

fact a silver lining ln the cloud in a count4r with litfle or notradition of truly independent social organisations and civicactivities until recently. If it can establish its credibility bywinning the trust of ordinary people who, at the moment,see litfle difference in the rapacity of the political societyand the influencial agents of the civil society for example,the professionals, NGOs and other consultant-intellectuals,there should be some hope that Nepal \Mill be able to engineera reversal in the dismal trends sooner than later.

The rise of ethnic-national sentiments among regionsand groups that have long suffered callous ne$igence or,worse, outright discrimination from Kathmandu's rulingelite is another issue engendering a possible crisis ingovernance. Many political parties and groups have emergeddemanding institutional remedies for deprivation based onethnicity, regionalism and various forms of ascriptiveconsiderations. Some of them want the creation of afederation, in place of the current unitary state, withautonomous provinces based on ethnic and geographicconsiderations. A less radical initiative can probably yieldttre desired results if the Centre were to be more receptive tothe inevitable change. The problem is that the major partiesthat are also nominally the most secular have not shownthe sensitivity and consideration in this respect as neededat this juncture.

By and large, however, the present problems are notaltogether unique or unexpected. The possibility of setbackshas in fact been long recorded in relevant literature onpolitical development of "traditional societies". They are alsoa part of the experiences that simtlar or better-placedcountries have undergone in the past as well as ttre present.There is a reasonable degree of hope and expectations nowthat the present problems only reflect the growing pains of aprocess where the new rules of the game take time toassume and project a more concrete vision. As the processof institutionalisation of democracy proceeds through trial

The State oJ Gouerrut'rce in Post- 199O Nepal 25r

and error, Nepal can be expected to sustain a stabledemocracy eventually.

Developments in Forelgn Poltcy

For a countr5r that is geographically handicapped, land-Iocked and highly dependent upon foreign assistance, Nepal'sgovernance is intimately related with the successful.management of its international relations. It is something ofan irony that the country's foreign policy environment hasremained static in a rapidly changing world order. Thehopeful signs of some improvement in the country's all-important relations with India have not materialised in theeight years of Nepal's "second democracy''. Nevertheless,there are two critical elements in recent developments thatneed need to pointed out.

Firstly, as a part of the global interest in democracy andhuman rights, whatever may be the motive behind it, a largenumber of countries including such "strategically neutral"ones such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland or Swedenand Switzerland are taking grea,ter interest in Nepal's political,social and economic development. Nepal has done well toharness such goodwill, but it may have begun to lose someof that interest already for reasons just pointed out. Secondly,sooner or later, there has to be a fundamental breakthroughin Nepal's relations witlt India. The conduct of Nepal's IndiaPolicy will be nothing short of a test of democracy in Nepaland India's willingness to support it. Every time India isseen to be acting large-hearted towards Nepal, it will besupporting Nepal's democracy, because it is the democraticregime that would have elicited that magnanimity. On theother hand, a reasonable assumption would be that, inIndia, even if its people were to perceive that Nepal is thebeneficiary partner in a relationship, there would be littleresentment among the people and no political price to bepaid for this crime by the government of the day. At themoment. however. it is not even clear whether the Indian

252 PerspectiDes on South Asi.L

establishment views the re-advent of democracy in Nepal.

It is not surprising if India prefers in its own wisdom aregime in Nepal that produces stable, predictable policiesand a parliament that does not "politicise" the relationsbetween the two countries and the treaties and agreementsthat flow from it. The vagaries ofelections and the intricaciesof the parliamentary process cannot always ensure that thiswill be the case. This concern is illustrated in a recentarticle by Parmanand, a hardliner in India in respect ofthat country's relations with Nepal. He says, "Many in Indiahad thought that the policy of Nepal was more unfriendlytowards India during the Panchayat days (1962-90) and there-establishment of multi-party democracy in the kingdomwould bring them much closer. But multi-party democracyhas shown that it has its own compulsions vis-a-vis India,and rarely does a political party wish to lose in the game ofone-upmanship vis-a-vis India" {The Statesman, Delhl:October 8: 98). In this view, the test of the success ofdemocracy in Nepal is the speed and smoothness withwhich India's Nepal policy can be executed. In Nepal, on theother hand, there is a perception that democracy has abetter chance to be successlul and to be productive in theinterest of its economic development, if India were to bemore sensitive to the problems and the agenda of thedemocratically elected governments.

In both countries, however, the potential contribution ofthe enlightened leadership in these matters is oftenoverwhelmed by the ill-advised prejudices and bureaucraticinterference stemming from a mindset carried over from thepast. The agreement on the Tanakpur project reachedbetween India and Nepal's first elected government after199O, which could have heralded the beginning of a newage, became an embarrassment to both sides because of theusual bureaucratic myopia in India and the ignorance,incompetence and lack of homework in Nepal. This was

Ttre State of Gouernance in Post-199o Neoal

salvaged with a package agreement to build a larger hydro-electricity project on the same river flowing between the twocountries along the western border. But, again, the expectedDetailed Project Report (DPR) has not been finalised becauseof the usual lack of agreement on the interpretation ofdownstream benefits. In addition, the disagreement onsharing of water from the Mahakali river has now graduatedto a full blown border dispute (related to the source of theriver) upstream in the Kalapani area where the Indian armyhas been stationed in Nepali territory for at least threedecades. Similarly, the question of revising the 195O Treatyof Peace and Friendship-a demand made by Nepal underthe present political reality-is hanging in a balance betweenIndia's covert reluctance to do so arrd Nepal's overt inabilityto spell out what it really wants as an alternative. Thereluctance of India to mediate in Nepal's dispute with Bhutanregarding the repatriation of 100,0O0 or so refugees at therefugee camps in Nepal for the iast seven years or so hasalso been a subject of disagreement between the twocountries. The is:,ue has cast doubts, in particular, on theinterest of India, which is the largest democracy in theworld and the oldest one in the region, in playing its role ofa l'regional power" in a constructive frame of mind. These

are genuine problems that should not defir a solution withboth sides being honest with each other and to themselves.India's generally dismissive attitude on such matters wiIInot be helpful. Similarly, how blatantly a sensitive issue likea border dispute with a very important neighbour can beused for domestic political purpose is illustrated in Nepal bythe ttreatrics and deception of the Marxist Leninist party(ML) which is now a partner in the government of the NepalCongress. It broke away liom its parent party on thisground, among others, engineered a "march" to Kalapani as

if to hoist the Nepali flag over the Indian military camp, andblamed the Nepali Congress, the traditional bait for anyanti-lndian, anti-democratic campaign in Nepal, for sellingout Nepal's interests. Now it is, politically, in bed with the

253

254 PerspectiDes on South Asia

same, forces it did not mind maligning in a proxy waragainst its parent party, the UML.

Meanwhile, on the positive side, Nepal-India relationshave made unprecedented gains in the area of trade andtransit thanks, perhaps, to the tenure, albeit short, of the"GuJraI Doctrine". Nepal now has full access to the Indianmarket without the burden of the traditional non-tariffbarrier expressed in the form of ttre minimum labour andraw material content required in the Nepali manufactureditems to be eligible for export to India on a preferential basis.As a result, in 1997-98, Nepal's export to India increased by72 per cent, which is a sutlstantial development givenNepal's traditional grievances against the growing tradedeffcit vrith that countr5r. The increased Indian investmentin Nepal in the manufacturing of products, such as soapgeared for the Indian market has also contributed to thegrowth in exports. There is still a danger that, unlesspolitical wisdom and sagacity prevails, tJle old attitude inIndla may raise its head again to block the export of anyitem that shows some potentital for growth. For example,because Nepal was able to er.port \tgetable ghee in bigquantties in 1997-98, Nepal was obliged this year to levy anexport tax on that item under the threat that it mightotherwise be put in the "negative list" together with ltquorand cosmetics. In transit, the existing treaty will expire inDecember this year. A new treaty is being negotiated atpresent. A positive outcome is indicated by the fact that,changing its past policies recently, India made a big gesturein allowing Nepal to use the Bangladesh route for accessinga convenient port in Bangladesh for its trade with the "thlrdcountries". This development has been received well inNepal though it might take some time for the traders to takefull advantage of the alternative route where it is moreeflicient for them to use it.

The relations with China remain important though at alow key for some time. China has always been meticulous in

The State oJ Gouerrlarrce in Post- 199O Nepal 255

recent decades to make sure that it does not raiseexpectations in Nepal to an unrealistic level, Whether aid ortrade, there are no peaks and valleys in the relationship andno steep curves either. The historically good and valuablerelationship, which is demonstrated by the fact that evennow every new Prime Minister feels obliged to visit Chinasoon after the visit to India is completed, is made somewhatuneasy at present by the Tibet issue and the activities ofFree Tibet groups and individuals in Nepal. A democraticgovernment, wedded to the protection of human rights,faces greater difficulty than an authoritarian regime. incontrolling such activities which, understandably, can be asource of an:dety and concern to the Chinese government.On its part, every government has pledged that, honouringNepal's long recognition of Tibet as an autonomous region ofChina, no and-China activities would be allowed on Nepalisoil. Nepal's foreign policy regime can take a decisive andmore constructive turn once relations between India andChina improve further, making way for intensive economiccollaboration between the two, or even among the threecountries, China, India and Nepal. Nepal's desire to nurturegood relations and expand economic cooperation with Chinaand all other countries in the region including, mostimportantly, the SAARC region should also be a non-issuewhen the process of liberalisation and globalisation ofrespective economies makes more substantive progress.

Concludtng Re marks

The threat to democratic governance is inherent in thepolitical tradition of a country that has its source in thefeudal culture, economic backwardness, increasinglyrapacious middle classes, and extant court intrigues. Theconstitutional government can get strengthened ascommitments get manifested from all parties concerned tohelp match the change in the political structures withchanges in the larger cuitural system to ensure the

256 PersoectiDes on South Asta

sustainabihty of political democracy. A little help from friends

in the neighbourhood and in th,e region can also be critical.

Governance has become an important issue today thatseems to bridge the domestic and international concerns forgood government. Movement towards "globalisation ofdemocracy" may be one factor contributing to the 'riderinterest in governance, if indeed such movement isdiscernible. It is likely that the gl,obal concern with democraryor good governance may be related to the interest of externalpowers that may be out of step with what is directly reievantfor the welfare of the people of Nepal. It is also possible thatit is not the globalisation of democracy, but of the economythat moves the forces behind the governance agenda.

Governance comes under further stress if the two are notenUrely complementary in Nepal's short to medium-termscenario. It is to be hoped that instead of surrendering theinitlative to extra regional interests, the South Asiancommunity (states as well as the civil societies) will takegreater interest in the subject, Given the similarity of theproblems and the common destiny that they might share,

the countries in South Asia can make good governance apart of their collective agenda and contribute to democraticdevelopment in,the region.

Sri Lanka-Country Paper 1992-

K.M. de Srluaand S.W:R. de A. SamarasirEhe

INTRODUCTION

The year under review saw President R Premadasaconsolidate his position in the Sri l,ankan political system.On I September 1992 the Supreme Court, after a lengthyhearing lastng over two and a half years, rejected theelection pettion instituted against him by Mrs Bandaranaike(Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the SLFP), thusconfirming the validity of his election as President inDecember 1988. One year earlier his position seemedsomewhat shaky when-in August-September 1991-opposition groups supported by a section ofthe UNP beganproceedings for his impeachment, an initiative whichappeared to herald a signiffcant challenge to his authority.Although the impeachment motion was rejected by theSpeaker ofthe Parhament, M.H. Mohammed, in early October

*This paper was presented at the First Dtalogue in 199 I . It wasrevised before the assassinations of President R Premadasa onlst May 1993 and Mr Lalit Athulathmudali a week earlier,

25a Perspectfircs on South Asia

1991, and ttre dissident group was expelled from the party,these events provide evidence of a major split in the UNP.The dissident group is now organized as the DemocraticUnited National Front (DUNF). The SLFP, in the meantime,continues to suffer the effects of a leadership conflict. Itremains in a state of unresolved crisis over the successionto ttre ageing Mrs. Bandaranaike who has been the head ofthe party since 1960. The war of attrition between thearmed services and the LTTE continues in the north andeast of the island. The securiQr forces were gaining theupper hand, steadily making inroads into the LTTE heldareas in the east and north of the island including thedensely populated Jaffna peninsula, when they suffered aserious setback in early August 1992. Ten senior officials,including the general offtcer Commanding in the northernregion and his deputy, were killed when the vehicle in whichtJrey were travelling set off a ptressure mine in an area nearJaffna in early August 1992. The campaign against theLTTE continues under a new leadership.

The LTTE retains its hold on the Jaffna peninsula andremalns strong enough to launch surprise attacks againstthe securit5r forces in the north and east of the island. Theyare also engaged in a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansingdirected against the Muslims living in the north, and to alesser extent in the east, ofthe island. On 15 October lgg2a glroup of LTTE raiders killed over 16O persons, mainlyMuslims including a large number of women and children,in three villages on the border between the north-centraland northern provinces.

The continuation of this ethnic conflict has resulted insome uncertainty in the economic sphere, but as regardsthe adverse effects on ttre economy this was overshadowed,in the early part of 1992, by an unprecedented drought. Onthe whole, however, the country's economy has recoveredfrom the bleak position lt was in, in 1988-89.

Sri Lanka--Qoutttg Poper 1 992 259

THE ECONOMY

Policy

ln 1977 , Sri lanka was one of the first developing countrlesto adopt a programme of economic liberalization cumstructural adjustment, abandoning a two decade old d@isteeconomic poliry. The tnternational donor communit5r, led bythe World Bank and the IMF, supported the new poliry withsubstantial aid. The reform package adopted therr includedthe liberalization of imports, reductions in exchange controls,elimination of price controls and rationing of food (in effect,a weekly rice ration) the virtual abolition of the state'smonopoly in the import of certain key goods, theestablishment of a unifled (and floatin$ exchange rate, thetransfer to private-sector ownership of selected stateenterprises, and lowering of corporate and personal taxes.What is remarkable is that despite political difliculfies suchas the ongoing ethnic war, these reforms have been sustalnedover fifteen years. Indeed they have been further strengthenedin the last two years vrith an accelerated programme ofprivatization, reform of the public service and furtherliberalization of current and capital account transac ons inttre balance of pa5rment.

Recent Performance

Following three years (1987-89) of virtual economicstagna on, in l99O the Sri Lankan economy recorded a realgrowttr rate of 6.2 per cent (Table l). In 1991, however, theGDP growth rate slipped back to a modest 4.8 per cent. Thiswas caused mainly by a sharp decrease in the rate of growthof agricultural output from 8.8 per cent to 2.2 per cenrprimarily owing to contractions in the output of paddy andcoconut. Howwer, tea yielded a record hawest in lg9l. Thegrowth rate ln tJ:e manrfacturing sector was a reasonable6.9 per cent but it was one-quarter less than the previousyear's rate. Both the trade balance and the current account

2qo Perspecttues on South Asra

balance in the international balance of payment (BOP)

deteriorated sharply in 1991. Ttre adverse trade balancewas primarily caused by a 1.9 per cent deterioration in SriLa.nka's international commodity terms of trade, largelyattributable to a drop in tea prices. In 1991, the debt serviceratio increased marginally to l8.l per cent. On the fiscalfront, the budget deficit as a percentage of the GDP increasedto 11.6 per cent from 9.9 per cent in 1990. In 1991, theshare of Sri Lanka's investment financed with foreign fundsalso rose. The only real bright spot in this otherwisediscouraging economic performance was a substantialreduction in the annual rate of inflation from 21.5 per centin l99O to 12,2 per cent in 1991. Improvement in domesticfood supplies was partly responsible for this. The otherirnportant contributory factor was a tight monetary policythat caused a slow down in the expansion of bank creditgiven to the private sector.

The proJected economic growth rate in 1992 was about3.5 per cent to 4.0 per cent which is less than the rateachieved in 1991. The drought in the first half of 1992 thataffected agpicultural output ls the primary reason for slowgrourth. Sri lanka's tea output is expected to be down byabout 2O per cent. Rice and coconut crops will also besubstantially lower. The disruption to hydro power suppliescaused by the drought also adversely affected industrialoutput in the second quarter of the year. However, garmentptroduction, Sri Lanka's principal manufactured export, isexpected to increase substantially. Tourism, with arrivalsexpected to exceed 3OO,OOO for the year, has enjoyed its bestever year since 1982.

Macroeconomic Management

The above account would make it evident that Sri Lanka'smacroeconomic management in 1992-93 would be a difficultexercise for several reasons. Firstly, the trade deficit and thecurrent account deficit in the BOP have moved in the wronA

Srt l-onka-Cotnt41 Paper 1 992 261

TABLE I

Srt I-anka: Basic Ecorwmic Indicators, 1990-1991

1990 1991

Population (million) 17 .O

Population growth rate (o/o) I . I

GDP real gFowth rate (o/o) 6.2

Per capita GDP growth rate (%) 5.1

Per capita income (US$) 417

Agriculture:gtowth rate (o/ol 8'8

Manufactufrng:growth rate (0z6) 9'4

Investment/GDP raflo (o/o) 22.2

Domestic savings/GDP ratlo (o/o) 14.3

Foreign savings/GDP ratio (0z6) 7 .9

Rate of consumer price inflation (o/o) 21.5

Exchange rate Rs/US$ 40.6

Trade balance Gdeflcit) SDR -5fB

Current account balance -192

Current account balance/GDP ratio (o/ol 9.7 l2.I

Debt service ratio (%o) 17 .A

Government budget deficit/GDP ratio 9.9

17.2

1.5

4.8

3.3

465

2.2

6.9

23.4

12.a

to.2

t2.2

4t.37

-724

-372

l8.lI 1.6

Sourcer Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Anntnl Report 1991,Colombo, 1992.

direction. The current account de{icit to GDP ratio of 12.1

per cent is greatly in excess of what is normally consideredto be tolerable (say 8 per cent or less) in a healthy growingeconomy that is in need of foreign capital. Second, the same

262 Perspectiues on South Asia,

observation ts true for tlee budget deficit to GDP ratio thatalso deteriorated from 9.9 per cent in I99O to ll.6percentln 1991. Third, it is true that the rate of inflation declined.Howwer, it was still in the double digits and needs to bereduced much further to achieve reasonable domestic pricestabflfty. Fourth, by mid- 1991 Sri Lanka's rupee was seriouslyovervalued in the international currency exchange markets.It ts true that the nominal exchange rate has been depreciatedfrom the beginning of Ig88 (US$l = Rs.3O.76) to end l99t(US$l = Rs.42.58). This nominal depreciation noturithstan-dfng, the real effective exchange rate (REER) ttrat influencesthe competitiveness of Sri Lanka's tradeables appreciatedby about 25 per cent between the first quarter of 1988 andthe second quarter of 199 l. From June 199 I the REER hasbeen depreciating. However, the rate of depreciation has notbeen adequate to fully offset the appreciafion that tookplace over the preceding three years.

Problems and Prospects

In broad terms, the po st-1977 export-oriented and liberaleconomic stratesr has led to a revival of economic activity.Between the late l97os and the mid- 1980s total expenditureon lnvestment more than doubled in real terms. Roughestlmates Juggest that, during the same period, about 1.7millton newjobs were created, making a substantial impacton the level of unemplo5rment, which fell from around 25 percent of the labour force in 1976-ZZ to around lS per centtoday. The agricultural sector registered an annual overallreal growth of 3 per cent durir,rg the period 1978-86, andoutput of paddy rice alone increased by 55 per cent between1977 and 1986. Manufacturing output increased, in realterrns, by about 6 per cent per year over 1978-gl, and thevalue of annual exports of manufacturers (excludingpetroleum products and cut-diamonds, both of which havea low value-added) increased by more than 2b flmes, fromSDR 3l m to SDR 788 m between lgZZ and 1991. More

Srt Innka-Cowrtrg Paper 1 99 2

importantly, the country's export structure has undergonea substantial transformation. In 1960 the three primaryexports, tea, rubber and coconut products, accounted forabout 6O per cent of exports and industrial products forabout 33 per cent. In l99I the shares were 27 per cent and60 per cent respectively.

The programme of economic liberalization has generallybenefitted the manufacturing sector. Factory industries, aswell as small and cottage industries, recorded satisfactorygrowth rates after 1977. Import liberalization has helped toease the shortage of raw materials and spare parts, whilethe reduction of bureaucratic controls has encouragedinvestors, both foreign and local. It has also helped torationalize industry by removing inefficient units. However,import liberalization has adversely affected certajn industries,such as fabricated metal products, machinery and transportequipment producflon and handloom textiles. There is awidely shared belief that some of these industries with goodfuture potential should be protected from cheap imports fora further period of Ume.

The pronounced bias in the Industrial Promotion Zones(IPZs) towards the textile and garments industry has alsoinvited criticism, chiefly because of a concern that textilemanufacturers from the Far East are using the IPZ to'corner' a part ofttre export quotas which have been allocatedto Sri Lanka by the EC and the USA. At present, moreover,the textile and garments industry in the IPZ has a relativelylow rate (about 25 per cent) of domestic value-added andnormally does not bring new technology into the countr5r. In1991, 66 per cent of the gross export earnings of the IPZwere from textile, garment and leather products, comparedwith 75 per cent in 1989. The decline in the relativeimportance of this sector is the result of the Greater ColomboEconomic Commisslon's (GCEC) policy of discouraging newinvestment in this ffeld. The current emphasis is on industriessuch as electronics, electrical goods, plastic, rubber and

263

264 Perspectitns on Soufh Asia

wood products, in which domestic value-added is generallyhigher and linkages to tle domesfic economy stronger.Furthermore, 28 factories in Sri lanka's second IPZ complex,constructed to accommodate 'heavy' industry, were inproduction at ttre end of 199I. A third IPZ, close to thesouthern port city of Galle, also came into operation during199r.

There have been considerable lmprovements in theeconomic infrastructure, notably in the expansion ofhydnoelectric power and in the development of the Colomboharbour and alrport. The internal telephone system hasbeen lmproved, but its capacity has not been sufficientlyaugmented to meet the demand for new telephones. Theadnrinistration of tlle system, which was hitherto under agovernment department, was vested in a state-sponsoredcorporatlon in 1991. International telecommunlcationfacllities are also inadequate to meet growing buslnessrequirements. The rail and road network leaves much to bedeslred, although, in the case of the latter, a majorrehabilitaflon progrErmme is under way.

Ttre long-term problems of economic growth assume acertain lmmediate urgency because policies of dwelopmentpursued since Independence or even earlier have now reachedcrucial stages of ossification. To take one important example,the distributton of state-owned land-and the state was thebiggest landholder in colonial Sri Lanka in the sense that ithad at its disposal very large extents of undeveloped land-whtch has been pursued since the early l93Os as a matterof priority in economic and social poliry alike, has nowreached lt natural limits. There is very little state land leftfor dtstribution. In ttre pursuit of equity the size of the unitsof land thus distributed have become smaller. These havebeen reduced to the point-0.5 hectares or less wheresubsistence agpiculture become$ the only real option availableto the cultivators and with it a perpetdation of the povertyfrom whlch this programme was originally desigyred in the

Sri Inrka-Cotntrg Paper 1 992 265

l92os and 193Os to save them.

Yet one of the results of this policy has been very beneficial.Sri lanka's dependence on imported rice, a feature of theperiod of colonial ruIe under the British, has been eliminated,and ttre country has reached a very high level of food-

security. This achievement is one of the success stories ' ofthe post-independence period, and the principal agent ofprogress has been ttre peasant culflvator. Ironically' butperhaps understandably, one of the results of ttre search forfood security has been a neglect of the plantations. Decliningyields in the plantations are due to a combination of several

factors : the plantation stock-the tree crops as well as themachinery used in productlon-is old and needs urgentrenewal; second, it is the inevitable result of nationalizationof the plantations and bureaucratization of mEtnagement.

Yields are lower than in most other plantation economies'

and living standards of workers on the plantations remainlower than that of ttreir counterparts in many other countries.

And this despite all the efforts made since 1977 to bring thewage structure and welfare facilities up to the level of therest of the country.

In the long-term, the coconut industry is threatened bythe loss of land to alternative uses, especially urbanconstruction. Government policy measures designed toincrease yields in coconut plantations have not produced

the expected results. Coconut product exports are a steadilydeclining residual after meeting domestic requirements,which increased by 13 per cent between 198O and 199O' Inthe tea sector, the fall in production in the early 198Os has

been arrested with the help of a $212 m five-year rehabilftation programme, World tea prices dropped in l99l' Owing

to sharp increases in production costs (on account of wage

increases introduced in 1988 and the unchecked expansion

of management cadres), producer margins have narrowed'

In tJle rubber industry, however, the performance has been

even more discouraging. Notwithstanding the fact that the

266 Perspect ses on South Asra

total area under rubber cultivation is reported to have beenreplanted under a state-subsidiZed programme, output hasshown a declining trend since 1984. In response to thissituaton, in mid 1992, the government decided to privatizethe rnanagement of state-owned plantations in ttre hopethat productivity and profitability could be improved.

Sri Lanka's rural areas are free of the worst features oflandlordism prevalent in many parts of South Asia, and tJlecaste oppression seen in many parts of India. Land reformhas been a greater success in Sri Lanka than elsewhere inSouth Asia. In addition there has been an equitabledistrlbution of state-owned land to the peasantry. yet SriLanka's rural areas have spawned some of the most ferociousradical movements in any part of the world-ttre JVpledinsurrections of 1971 and 1987-89. It is easier to focusattention on thts paradodcal situation than to provide acredlble explanation for it. No doubt the high literacy andunemplo5rment rates in combination with modest economlcgrowth that have retarded the upward social mobility whichthe young people from the rural areas have come to expectas something society owes thern, are important factors ofany satisfactory explanation. But while these thwartedexpectafions have given a {illip to radical and violent politicalmovements, the reductionist assumption that these are duemainly if not entirely to unemployment or underemploSrmentis as naive as it is misleading. It fails to take into accounttlle importance of ideological fervour, the commitment toclass warfare, and the political initiatives and ambitjons ofthe leadership of ttre JVP, in organizing and sustaining thisinsurrection,

The rate of unemployment reached 25 per cent of thework force by 1976-77. Although this dropped to around 15per cent in the early and mid 1980s the siuation deterioratedin 1988-89 largely as a result ofa steep decline in econornicactivlty and in industrial output in tJle wake of the JVpinsurrectlon. In mid Ig89 when the JVp seemed on the

Sri. Lattka-Cotrttrg Paper 1 I 92 267

verge of toppling the government, more ttran I millionpersons (2O per cent of the total labour force) wereunemployed, Despite an immediate improvement in thesituaflon with the crushing of the JVP insurrection, thesituation deteriorated once again with the return ofthousands of Sri Lankan workers from the Middle East(where about 25O,OOO Sri Lankans were estimated to beworkin$ during the Gulf crisis. By 199f -92, the situationhad improved once more and the level of unemployment haddropped to around 15 per cent of the work force. However, tofind a lasting solution to the unemployment problem, SriLanka must have a sustained GDP growth of at least 7 percent per year for the remainder of the decade.

The environmental sustainability of Sri Lankan'sdevelopment effort is becoming an increasingly importanttheme in public discourse. The protecton of the alreadydepleted forest cover-an estimated 2O per cent of total landarea-is one issue. The potential damage caused to theenvironment by development schemes ranging fromagriculture and irrigauon to industry and tourism is another.

Macroeconomlc AdJustment

The Sri Lankan case clearly illustrates the need to make asharp conceptual and operational distinction betweeneconomic liberalization and adjustment. Sri Lanka hasliberalized its economy to a considerable extent. However,its persistent balance of pa5rments (BOP) deficit coupledwittr the appreciation of the exchange rate from 1979 and1984 and again from mid- 1988 to 1991 is evidence ofmacroeconomic maladJustment. The country's import billrose nineteen-fold over 1977-9I. Nevertheless, exportearnings increased only thirteen-fold over the same period.This persistent and growing trade delicit is partly attributableto tlle adverse movements in the international commodityterms of trade. The terms of trade showed a substantiallmprovement in 1982-84 but have deteriorated ever since.

268 Perspectiues on South Asra

FYorn a short term point of view, the unfavourable movementis attributable to external factors, primartly a decline in theprices of Sri Lanka's commodity export. However, from thelong term viewpoint, adverse terrns of trade and the chronicand growing trade deficit are indicative of the inadequacy ofadJustment. The appreciation of the real exchange rateskewed the incentive structure against exports and domesticproduction and in favour of imports. The high level ofdomestic eJ<penditure, especially budget deflcits, sustainedhigh levels of imports. Moreover, investments, especiallysome of tJle large public sector projeits, failed to provide anadequate yteld. In such a situation the generous foreignassistance provided since 1977*in 1991, Rs.7,87O m wasreceived as grant and Rs.2l,O88 m as loans (net ofrepayments) that together financed 33.0 per cent of totaldomesfic investment-had the unintended effect of helpingto maintain an unrealistically high exchange rate-1sriLanka's version of the "Dutch Disease". This situation stillpersists. Given the probable short term adverse politicalrepefcussion of adjustment, Sri Lanka can try to postponeadjusfing its macroeconomy if the donors are willlng toprovlde tJle funds. However, in recent years the governmenthas come under considerable pressure from the Washingtontwins-the World Bank and IMF-to introduce measures tocorrect the balance of payments deficit, through adepreciation of the rupee and further restraints on publicspending. Since June 199I, the rupee has been allowed todepreciate, and stood at Rs.44 against the dollar in midSeptember 1992. Government expenditure has been curbedby reducing major new projects to a minimum; tiroughefforts to rationalize the activities of state enterprises; andby means of the selective transfers of state-owned industriesto the private sector. However, even with such measures Sril,anka failed to fulftIl tl.e macro-economic objectives forI98E-9O imposed by the IMF and World Bank. Consequently,in l99O-91 the government was forced to take additionalmeasures including a reduction in the size of ttre state

Sn l-anka-lotuttrg Paper 1 992 269

bureaucracy and further liberalization of external pa5rments,

in order to make the IMF agree to a fresh structuraladJustment loan worth $5OO m.

A SOUTH ASIAN WELFARE STATE

Almost alone among the states of South Asia, Sri Lankadeveloped a comparaflvely advanced welfare system. Theroots of ttre system go back to the 1930s and l94os. Allpost-independence governments have contributed in theirown way to its growth. The results have been remarkable.Using GNP per head as the criterion, the World Bank classifies

Sri L,anka among the poorest 36 countries in the world witha per capita GNP of around $4OO. However, when Sri I-anka s

national output is measured in US prices to calculate GNP

in terms of internationally comparable (real) purchasingpower, GNP per capita is about $2,40O. Even moresigniftcantly, the Human Development Index (HDI) for 1990'

computed by the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), using life expectancy, educational attainment and

real GDP per capita as indices, ranks Sri Lanka 76th fromtl,e top on a list of 160 countries (which is much higher thanthe position that it occupies in the GNP per capita onlyranldn$.

There is a lively debate on the effects of recent economicpolicies on ttre welfare net that had evolved since the late193Os. Critics of ttre dirigiste policies of tJ:e past haveargued that without rapid economic growth to sustain it, SriLanka's welfare system would impose additional strains onSri Lanka's deeply divided societ5r, and its volatile politicalsystem. On the other hand critics of the new policies chargethat these-and especially the abolition of food subsidiesand the rationing system, and the substitution of a systemof food stamps in their place, undermined tJle effectivenessof Sri Lanka's welfare system, and reduced the monetaryvalue of the benefits that the poor enjoyed in the past.

270 Perspectiaes on Soufh Asra

President Premadasa, who has continued the liberaleconomic policies of his predecessor with even greater vigourresponded to the criilcism by introducing a poverty AlleviationProgramme (PAP or'Janasaviya") for the tbod stamp holders.These numbered 7.5 m (I.4 m families) or about one-half ofthe total population in 1989. Under the pAp each qualifringfamily receives a monthly consumption grant of Rs 145g($32) for two years and, if the recipient qualifies, a loan toestablish a self-employment enterprise at the end of tJ.esecond year. In return, during the two year period, eachgrantee family must provide 26 man-days of labour permonth to a public works proJect. The World Bank is providinga grant of US $lOOm to create a trust fund to linance pApwork programmes. The consurnption grant is provided bythe Sri Lankan budget. In response to criticism from severalquarters, including aid donors, the government has scaleddown the PAP to make it flscally more manageable. Underthe revised progfamme, the PAP will be implemented in l lannual rounds. In the first round, which commenced inOctober 1989, 156,245 families were selected for benefits.and in 1990 a further 77,260 were selected. However, thereare several remaining problems that pAp must overcome.The PAP consumption grant is distorting the incentivestructure in the economy. It has exerted at least in its initialstate, a strong upward pressure on wages, with seriousinflaUonary implicaUons. The administrative and logisticalproblems that the implementation of the pAp involves arealso immense. Many critics of the system are skeptical ofthe ability of the government and beneficiaries to generateproductive employment for the grantees at the end of thetwo year grant period. Never-theless, there is generalagreement that the PAP in some form, perhaps one thatessentially provides 'food for work'is necessary to help theunderprivileged 2O per cent of the populaflon, who arevictitns of serious malnutrition, unemplo5rment and poverty.Thts explains the support extended by the World Bank.

Sri Lanka-Counfu Paper 1992 271

From 1978 the UNP government embarked on the mostambitious housing programme in Sri Lanka's modern historythrough a comprehensive island-wide scheme of houseconstruction for the poor. This is now in its third phase(f 990-95) with a target of 1.5 million houses, The ultimateobjective is to provide every Sri Lankan family with adequateshelter by the year 2OOO. Unlike in the earlier phases, directconstruction by the state is now minimal, and the emphasisis on private effort, with some government assistance.Although the programme has tended to fall behind schedule,overall, it has made a substantial improvement in Sri Lanka'shousing stock.

One other theme needs discussion at this point, thepopulation problem. Its present rate of growttr of l.B percent is less than half the rate at independence and is one ofthe lowest in Asia. Yet with its present population of 17million Sri Lanka has one of the highest population densitiesin the world. Demographers project a population of 24million In 2O25, with the island's population levelling off bythe mid 2lst century at 28 million. Given the fact tJlat SriLanka's population was a mere 4 million at the beginning ofthe 2oth century and only 6 million at independence, itsdemographic history provides a classic case study on howpopulation growth has outstripped resources and the capacityof its governments and its economy to respond adequatelyto the aspirations of its people. The projected addition ofanother I I million to its population over the next 5O yearswould suggest even greater stress on the economy andsocial structure than today's population places on thecount4r's resources.

There is hope for optimism, however, in the remarkablelong-term and consistent improvement in Sri Lanka'sphysical quality of life, despite the persistence of povert5rand the high rate of unemplognent. At around gO percentthe literacy rate is by far the highest in South Asia, andranks with the best in South and South-East Asia. Since

272 Perspectitses on South Aslrr

education is provided free of charge at every level, and thereis vtrtually no difference in the education of males andfemales there is reason for optimism in further reductions ofthe rate of population growth. Life expectancy has reached7l years, wittr females having a life span that is generally 6percent higher than that of males. The contemporary female-male ratio is around l.O5 very close to the values obtatningin most of Western Europe or North Arnerica (l.Oa) andtotally different from that of the rest of South Asia (with theexception of the state of Kerala in India) and most otherparts of Asia. The irrfant mortality rate has dropped toaround 25 per cent of lO0O live births. No other low incomecountry has achieved this level of social dwelopment. Allgovernments since independence have built upon andconsolidated past achievements, a record that is all themore remarkable given ttre turmoil of the last decade andthe diversion of resources to build up the countr5r's verymeagre defence system. In the areas directly affected by theethnic civil war, especially the north, social welfare hasprobably deteriorated in the past ten years.

ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

How to keep the country together and manage its ethniccorrllict is one of the major tasks for Sri Lankan politicians.Given the tensions and passions of the recent past andconllicting percepfions of vulnerability this will not be veryeasy, but the reassertion of Sri Lanka's pluralist nature,and the embodiment of that fundamental assump on in itsconstitutional framework ha$ been achieved through the13th. amendment to the Constitution in 1987, and that is amaJor change for the better. Nevertheless, much more needsto be done to strengthen democratic institutions, and tomake these the natural fora where disputes are articulatedand setfled.

The Sri l,ankan experience provides a classic case studyof the stresses and strains a democratlc svstem faces from

Sri Lanka--Cotuttrg Paper 7 992 273

prolonged periods ofacute ethnic strife. First of all, economicgrowth is retarded as resources are diverted from socialwelfare and investment in infrastructure to the building ofttre security services and the purchase of arms. Investmentin productive enterprises declines, and with it the rate ofgrowth of the economy. The damage caused by six years ofviolence (1983-1988) to the economic infrastructure andoutput lost has been estimated at Rs. 145,000 m, This wasequivalent to about 13 per cent of total GDP over the sameperiod, which, if saved, would have doubled Sri l,anka'snational savings rate. Considering the violent events since1988, the total cost must be much higher today. Defenceexpenditure totalled an estimated Rs I5,663m (4.6 per centof GDP) in 1991, compared with Rs 325m (O.8 per cent ofGDP) in 1978.

Secondly, civil liberties and political riglrts are at a discountwhen the state musters its strength to resist challenges toits authority from minority groups-the Tamils in thisinstance-and deploys state power in a variety of ways,including the use of the armed services, to meet suchchallenges. Tamil activists for their part, began with peacefulprotests in support of their claims, and then these campaignsmoved imperceptibly into riots, temorism and rebellions andeventually a separatist movement and a civil war. Thirdly,ethnic conflicts can no longer be confined to the country oftheir origin. Driven by factors such as cross-border linksbetween ethnic groups, quick global disseminafion of news,international concern for human rights, internationalterrodsm, and easy access to the international arms market,ethnic conflicts are, increasingly, getUng internationalized.Once a conflict breaks out, sooner or later, indeed soonerrather ttran later in this era of instant communictions, itwill be internationalized. The Sri Lankan experience of anIndian intervention illustrates the ramifications andconsequences of the internationalization of an ethnic conflict.

Fourthly, the Sri Lankan experience also illustrates

274 Perspectiaes on Soufit Asia

another crucially important point, namely that minoritiesseeking redress of grievances, and guarantees of theprotecton of their indentities are by no means alwaysagemts of democratic change or adherents of the veryliberblism they advocate for thernselves. Minorities could be

Just as harsh as anybody else within the.territorial limitsover which they have dominance, as the current conllictbetween the LTTE and ttre Musltms in the north and east ofSri Lanka illustrates so vividly. The LTTE has indulged inbbuts of 'ethnic cleansing" Iong before the Serbs earned awell deserved notoriety for similar practices tn Bosnia.

As the world ts learning so painfully today ethnic conflictwill be one of the major points of tension over the nextdecade or more. There are no easy solutions to such conlllcts.One. can only hope for careful management of these, andurge a constant awareness of the price to be paid if vigilancein management is relaxed.

FOREIGN POLICY

The government of President Fremadasa was under toomucb pressure from extra parliamentary domestic challengesto its authodt5r in its first two years (from the JVP, and lateron from ttre renewed struggle with the LTTE) to have muchtime for reflection on ttre revolutions of f gSg in Central andEastern Europe-the simultaneous collapse of communistreglmes there and the dramatic shift in tJle world's powerbalances they heralded. The external environment of SouthAsia had changed dramatically with the collapse of the SovietUnion : it meant the collapse also ofthe pivot of India s defenceand foreign policies of the recent past, its alliance with theSoviet Union. India was making agonizing adJustments inforeign policy. Sri lanka, in contrastwas still inward-looking,and her foreign pollcy was determined to an even greaterextent than in tJle past by domestic compulsions. Of theselatter, ttrree facts are clearlv identifiable.

Srt l-art/r;a--4oluttrg Paper 1 992 275

First of these was the question of relations vrith India.Under President Premadasa these had been remarkablyfrost5r even after the departure of the India Peace-KeepingForce, the presence of which on Sri t ankan soil had beenregarded and treated by President Premadasa as anintolerable affront to Sri Lanka's independence. In the earlystages of Premadasa's tenure of office as President, he hadmade a concerted attempt to reach an understanding withthe LTTE, at the expense of India. Eventually, even whenthe LTTE had turned its guns on the government's secudtyforces again after June 1991 , there was no effort to improverelations with India.

In January l99l, the LTTE suffered an apparent setbackwhen hime Minister Chandrasekhar's minority governmentin India, respondlng to pressure from Congress(I) dismissedthe state government of Tamil Nadu on account of thelatter's alleged support for the Tamil separatists of SriLanka. This is believed to be one of the principal reasonsbehind the LTTE s assassination of the former Indian FrimeMinister, Rajiv Gandhi, on 2l May near Madras, thusproviding evidence of the LTTE s contlnued freedom ofmovement in Tamil Nadu. As a result of the assassinationthere has been a strong reaction against the LTTE in TamilNadu no less than in the rest of India which now seriouslyimpedes the LTTE s campaign in Sri Lanka. The Indianauthorities are prosecuting many prominent LTTE memberson charges of complicity in the assassination, whilePrabhakaran himself is accused of planning it from Jaffna.In early 1992 the Indian government decided to proscribetJle LTTE in India, and to place a ban on its activities onIndian soil. The LTTE's access to Tamil Nadu bases andother resources has been sharply curtailed while rigorouspatrolling of the seas by the Indian navy has cut off theLTTE's traditional sources of supply of arms.

Even at tJeis stage there was no anxiety on the part of SriIanka government to pursue a co-ordinated anfl-LTTE poliry

276 Perspecttues on South Asrla

along with India, despite the fact that India's change ofattitude to the LTTE made it easier for the Sri l,ankangovernment to meet the challenge posed by tJle LTTE'sbattle-hardened guerilla forces. But a change in Sri Lanka'sattitude to India did come eventually. President Premadasa'svisit to India in September 1992-his first to that countryalter he came to power-as the Chairman of SAARCdramatised the improvement of relations, by his officialstatements there and in the course of his discussions withthe Indian hme Minister and other Indian politicians.

The changed world situation has seen India make asignificant shift in its relationships in the Middle East. Itbegan with India's vote at the UN in favour of revoking theUN resolution equating Zionism with racism. Sri Lankavoted against on this occasion thus demonstratjng afreshthe powerful influence Sri l,anka's Muslim minority has onthe governmenfs policies on the Middle East. Then cameIndia's decislon to re-establish formal relations with Israel,and indeed to establish a defence relationship with thatcountry. Sri Lanka continues to hold out against a renewalof links with lsrael, one of the few non-Islamic nations inSouttr and South East Asia to do so. Sri Lanka's traditionalfi:lendship with Pakistan, of course, goes well beyond thecompulsions of the domestic base of Muslim voters, into themaintenance of links with a countervailing power againstIndia.

The third of tJ:e domestic compulsions on Sri Lanka'sforeign policy is the need to maintain close ties with thedonor agencies whose support is essential to sustain hereconomy. In effect this means good relations with twocountries; the US and Japan. The latter in fact has emergedas the main source of aid for Sri Lanka, a continuation ofthe special relationship established ln 1977 when PresidentJayewardene became head of government. Despite the factthat Sri Lanka has not yielded to US pressure to soften itsattitude to Israel, the relations between Sri Lanka and the

Sri Innka-Cotntrg Paper 1 992 277

US have remained cordial. The US backs Sri Lanka'seconomic programmes through its influence at the IMF andWorld Bank. The quantum of direct economic assitancegranted by the US is substantially less than the Japanesecontribution.

In sum, as with the Jayewardene regime, Sri Lanka'sforeign policy plays a rather peripheral role in PresidentPremadasa's poliUcal agenda.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Polltlcs

The ethnic conflict apart, there were two principal issuesin Sri Lankan politics that had to be addressed at that time,One relates to the further evolution of Sri Lanka's democraticsystem of government. The opposition is almost unanimousin rejecting the present Presidential system as belng tooauthoritarian. However, it is far from clear that the public isparticularly anxious to return to tl.e Westminster modelthat Sri Lanka had prior to 1978. There is considerablepublic concern, especially among the intelligentsia, that SriLanka's democratic political process does not function aswell as it once did-in the first decade after independence,for example limitations on press freedom, total goverhmentcontrol of the electronic media, a certain lack of publicaccountability on the part of those in authority may be citedas examples in support of this assertion.

The second principal political question that needsresolution concerns Sri Lanka's political parties. At thepresent time, Sri Lanka's two party system appears to be onthe brink of a long period of change and realignment. In thetwo main parties factionalism has reached the point wherethe parties themselves need to embark on systematicreconstruction to accommodate this or, as is more likely, towatch factions break awav from them and seek an

278 Perspectiues on Sc uth Asia

independent role either on ttreir own or as Part of a newcoallfion. With the continuing decline and marginalizadonof the Mardst left, and with the JVP unlikely to recoveranytlme soon from the crushing defeat it suffered at thehands of the army and the police, there is space on the leftof ttre polttical spectrum for a faction of the SLFP to flll. Butglven the decline ln the appeal of Marxism with the collapseof the communist state system in Central and EasternEurope, a left of centre party will need to develop a morepragmadc approach to social and economic issues in orderto wtden its appeal to an electorate that is now moreskeptical of tdeological fervour, if it is to make any seriousbid for poliflcal power.

One of the central issues in Sri Lankan politics of thel99os will be ttre fate of the UNP. By the end of 1994 theUNP would have governed the country on its own (mosfly) orln a coalitton of convenience with others, for 32 of the 48years of its edstence. Between 1977 ard 1991 it had achiweda lorel of public support-measured by its electoral success-comparable to that of the Indian National Congress underNehru, rvith ttre difference that unlike the Indian NationalCongress, it has secured a clear majority of the popular voteat wery election since July 1977. ^f"be UNP controls thepresldency, the parliament, the provincial councils, and thevast majority of the local government bodies. After a longspell in power the party suffered a major split in August-Se1*ember 199 l. One has to go back to I 95 I to the defectionof S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike-which led to the formation ofthe SLFP-for a parallel to the defection which occurred inAugust and September 1991.

Like all parties which remain in power for a long period oftlme the UNP itself began to generate factional and personaltensions which undermined the cohesiveness that was oneof its great strengths during the fifteen years (1973- 1988) ofPresldent J.R. Jayewardene's leadership. One of the crucialweaknesses of the Sri l,ankan party system-and this is as

Srl Lanka-Cowttrg Paper I 992

true of the UNP as it is of its opponents-has been thereluctance if not refusal of the leadership to accept dissentas a necessary factor in tlle life of a political party. SriLanka's leader-orlented political parties have generallyresponded to dissenting opinion by seeldng to drive tieprincipal dissenters to the political wilderness. In mosttnstances they have succeeded in doing so, but the level ofdissidence withln the UNP seen last year presents a fargreater challenge to the party leadership than anything thatoccurred ire the pedod 1977 to 1989. Like its principal rivalthe SLFP, tJle UNP itself has had no inner-party democracythat long established parties of the major democracies of theworld enJoy, the factionalism that erupted so unexpectedlyto the surface in the latter half of l99l will wentually tearthe UNP apart. It could lead to a realignment of politicalforces and the emergence of new parties such as occurred inIndia in the 1980s in the wake of the decline of the IndiraCongress.

The SLFP is thus presented with an opportunity forpoliflcal lnitiailves that it has not had since the l960s. TheSLFP has always been dominated by the family of its founderS.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who established the party in 1951.

From the time of hls assassination in 1959 to the presentday a perlod of 40 years, the leadership has been with hiswidow. The transitlon from Mrs Bandaranaike who is over75 years of age to a successor keeps the party divided andthe tension this leadership struggle causes places the SLFPas much ln danger of self-destruction as the UNP. Moreover,unlike the UNP, it is caught in the coils of a conflict overideology. While a section of the party realizes that the olddevelopment models are not working, and would like toadopt new ideas, they confront strong opposition of a smallerbut influential group who seem unable to abandon theattltudes, prejudices and habits of the past. While theseissues remain unresolved, and the party does not come toterms witl- the essential pluralism of Sri Lankan societ5r, it

Perspectiue s on Soulh Asra

carries a set of self-imposed handicaps which made it difllcultto exploit the cipportunities that have come its way throughthe faetional conllicts within its powerful rival.

Whhtever the outcome of these tensions within thecountry's main political padies, they will be worked out in achangpd political situation in which the pressures for greaterdemocratization will be all but irresistible. AII the seeminglylost causes of the heyday of populist nationalism-freedomof the press, a strong and independent judiciary, theautonomy of educational instit'utions, and an eflicientbureaucracy-have a renewed appeal to the intelligentsiaand the electorate ln a world that is renewing its commitmentto liberal democracy and the institutions associated with it.

Economy

To some extent Sri Lanka's neaf term economic prospectsdepend on events in the global economy. A recovery in theglobal economy and a more liberal trade regime in the westfollov/ihg a successful completion of the Uruguay Round willhelp the country's export-oriented development strategr.However, key constraints will be domestic. The absorptionof resources by the war effort as well as the politicaluncertaint5r created by the conflict will continue to hindereconorhic progress. The conflict between the need for externalpayments stability and domestic price stabilit5r on the onehand, and the need for rapid growth, job creation andmaintenance of a social welfare safety net on the otherposes A major economic policy dilemma for the government.

RecEnt government policies-e.g. slow depreciation of therupee, privatization of the state industrial enterprises,postponment of privatization of state banks, program toestablish 2OO garment factories island-wide, two free sets ofschool uniforms for over 4 million school children-suggestthat tlne government is trying to satisSr both, the donoragencies demand for stringent economic management aswell as the voting public's demand for more iobs and welfare.

PART 3

DEMOCRACYANDPOLITY

Fostering Democracy

AsmaJahangir

Introductlon

The term 'democracy" is used for several different typesof political set-ups. Nevertheless, over the years a minimurnstandard is generally expected before any society can claimto be a democracy. Regular elections, where cltizens canfreely participate and elect their rulers; rule of the maj orityand (at least theoretically) the acceptance of universalfreedom are the basic criteria of a democratic state. An idealdemocrary would guarantee basic human rights to allindividuals and groups. Democratic governments wouldrespond to the needs ofthe people and endeavour to comeup to the expectations and aspirations of the society theyrepresent. As the concept of human rights develops withinthe society, the dimensions of democracy also expand toinclude new a.reas of rights.

Version of Democracy

Ttrere are different versions of democratic societies-although there is no perfect form of democratic society sofar. On the one extreme are the mature democracies of

244 Perspectiaes on South Asia

Western Europe, where civil liberties and human rights arewell promoted and norms of cir,'ilised behaviour invariablyfollonted-at least within their own boundaries. On theother extreme are dictatorships disguised as democracies.Thesd societles maintain a thin facade of democratic normsand lnstitutions, However, beneath the thin veneer ofdemocracy lies the naked force of dictatorship. Whileinstitutions such as parliament, cot'-rts, press and electionsare maintained, they are brazenly manipulated to suit therequifements of the dictatorial force.

In between these two extremes lie many models. Thoselike lrrdia, who despite all odds, (poverty, lack of leadershipand ethnic and sectarian conflicts), continue to cling to ademocratic political order as the only means to keep thenation state together. Others, like South Korea, who arereluctantly forced by economic forces to relax dictatorialrules and adopt more tolerant pluralistic policies. Yet otherswhere the snowball effect has wisely made them realise thatttre old order must change. King Birendra of Nepal announcedin April 1990, that he was lifting the ban on political partiesas a lesult of "the international situation", and "the risingexpectations of the people".t

The continuing wave of democratisation will surely reachfar more countries in the future. "Between lg74 and lggo,at least 3O countries made transitions to democracy, justabout doubling the number of democratic governments inthe world.2lt is observed that "never in history has awarenessof popular struggles for democracy spread so rapidly andwidely across national borders."3

At the same time, political thirrkers and historians havecautioned supporters of democracy. They feel that a reversalof the system is very much possible. Larry Diamond, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy writes, "founding ademocracy and preserving it are two different things',. Hefeels "committed democrats would do well to restrain their

Fosterirg Demacracg 285

impulse to celebrate. Democracy is the most widely admiredtype of political system but also perhaps the most difftcult tomaintain."

Threats to Democracy

This is particularly true of democracies of tl.e developingworld. .Broadly speaking, democracies of the developingworld are either a recent transition, or 'old" democracies.Both barely manage to survive rather than thrive. This isparticularly true of "new-bornr" or "interrupted" democracies.The first few years of democratisation have ttreir setbacks.Expectatons are high. People expect drastic reforms. Theyhope to see some fruit at the end of a bitter and longstmggle.

The rulers of a "new born" democracy find themselveshelpless, while introducing any radical or fresh ideas. Theyare confronted by a strong vested interest groups, bothwithin and outside the government. These interest groupshave the means and power to exert pressure on the rulers tomalntain a status quo. "In the context of Pakistan thecoalition of the bureaucracy has been so strong with themilitary and their economic interests have been so common,that even an elected civilian government is not able to denyeconomic political privileges of these classes. The bureaucracyhas constanfly helped the military in methodically destroyingthe political parties. The privileged segment has dependedcompletely on the bureaucracy for the protection of itsinterests."4

In countries of recent transition to democracy, the addedproblem is a lack of political culture and activists. Genuineleaders or believers in democrary find themselves lonely.They command respect but have hardly any following. Thisoften happens where during an autocratic rule, politicalparties and human rights groups are systematically destroyedby the rulers. Prolonged struggles and a lack of faith in

246 Per spectiue s on South Asia

popular actlon to remove long-standing dictatorships, wearsout llhe political acflvists. At thi$ stage there is no attractionfor those struggling for freedom, in the cliches used by theleaders for democracy or similar ideologies. They are moremoved by populist slogans and agitational politics. Thus theleadership passes into the hands of those who are ready toexploit populist sentiments, as a short-term policy. Suchleaders are not necessarily committed to a democratic system,these leaders themselves undermine the very system whichbrought them to power. TWo such recent examples of SouthAsia are Sheikh MuJib-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh andZulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan. Both were elected as therepresentatives of East and West Pakistan respectively. Oncein power, they adopted autocratic methods to silence theiropponents.

There are some who genuinely employ the strategr ofconfrontailonist politics to promote the cause of democracy.The5l, however, fall prey to this style of politics, even when inpower.s They are soon isolated and out-manoeuwed by theforces of the old order.

Isolating such leaders is not difficult. During the years ofdictatorship, political parties learn to barely survive. Theyare not well organised. Most parties, though committed todemocracy, do not even pracfice democratic rules withintheir own parties. There is no accountability of leaders. Thezeal of the ordinary party worker diminishes once his partyis in power. Thus the leaders lose touch with their supportersand there is little resistance when power is taken out oftheir grip.

The paradox of democracy is, that once transition (fromdictatorship) takes place, democracy in its wake bringsforth a number of freedoms, including a free press. The newrulers are held accountable and subjected to criticism in thepress. A free press, if it is to perform its duty honestly, mustcomment on its own government. However, this sudden

Fosterhg Demrcracg 287

exposure of the regime, gives the impression that the newrulers are far worse than the former autocrat. Theirshortcomings are Judged, not taking into account thedi{Ilculfles they inhertt, but in comparison to the etpectafionsof the masses. The point that such criticism in the past orpublic comment on the follies of an authoritarian regimewas not possible, is often forgotten.

Pro-democratic pressure groups are virtually absent in a'new-born" democratic order. The organised groups areeither establishment-minded or brazenly anti-democratic.Where they feel helpless in reversing the political systemthey struggle to keep democracy confined to a limited sectionof societ5r-malnly the elite. The new rulers lind themselvesvirtually prisoners of a strong and powerful vested group.Soon their attention diverts to tJle pressing demands of thisgroup. The ordinar5r voter feels neglected and cheated. Eitherthey lose faith in democracy or struggle to change theirrulers. The new change often results in a hung parliament.Hence no real change, can as such, be expected or made. Iftl.is does not happen, the vicious circle of being surroundedby vested interest groups follows. Eventually, people beginto accept weak and crippled forms of democracy. The flaw inthe system is accepted in the same resigned manner astheir fate in a poverty ridden society. Thus, one often lindsrepeated and continuous abuses of human rights even in'old democracies".

A report of Asia Watch on the prison conditions of India,wondered how a democratic government could lose sight ofsuch widespread abuses of human rights.

'India is the world's largest democracy in more thanname. It has free elections, a multi-party parliamentarysystem, a diverse and outspoken free press, an independentJudiciary and the country abounds with non-governmentalorganizations that take pride in their independence andthat help to make up a lively civil society.

284 Perspectiues on South Asta

"Yet if the checks and balances of democrary aresupposed to curb government lawlessness, somethinghas gone wrong in India. At least, so it seems fromexamination that we recerltly conducted of imprisonmentand police detention in India. In some major cities of thecountry that we vislted, and probably elsewhere as well,anyone unluclry enough to be arrested faces a far greaterlikelihood of torture, or worse, at the hands of the policethan in many countries entirely lacking in the protectionof civil liberties available in India."6

Polarisatlon on account of ethnic, religious and politicalloyalties undermines even older democracies. Sri l,anka andIndia remain "troubled spots" because of such tensions.While new-born democracies have yet to grow and find ittough to avoid a reversal, old democracies of the developingworld are on the decline.

"Sri l,anka has had universal franchise since lg3l. Ithas had experience of holding a number ofgeneral electionsafter independence that were generally considered freeand fair... There was thus popular acceptability of electionresults and there was a trend ofeven the routine violenceand malpractice progressively diminishing from oneelection to another, . . The envlronment for free and fairelecUon had apparently changed in recent years in theperception of important civic and political groups in thecountry."T

Elections are hotly contested. Their impartiality is noIonger taken for granted. The election mechanics have beenfine-tuned to allow only the privileged few to contest elections.Vlolence threatens the voters. The political atmosphere ishighly charged. Indians, as well as being proud of tJreirdemocracy, believe in taking part in elections that chargethe population with an enthusiasm whose recklessness alltoo often brings violence and death. Despite this passionate

Fosterirg Democracy 289

involvement, the people expect little real changes."s

Once the election ends, the general public becomesinvisible. They return to the same life and experience thesame oppression. Their "representatives" do not "represent"anything; they are elected. Once elected they answer tonumerous pressures and constraints, including subsequentre-election, but for them actually to "represent" the wills oftheir constituents is impossible."e

The fear of early re-election coupled with the expensesinvolved during election campaigns, compels representativesto relax their values. Many get corrupt. "Corruption is theterrible and endemic sickness of the developing world.Embezzlement, fraud, bribery, payoffs, nepotism andextorfion are so common in some countries that theyconstitute a separate system of administration."ro

Temptations to power and money are offered as rewardsfor the obedient. Floor-crossing and changing party loyaltiesweakens both the treasury, and the opposition benches. Onthe other hand, to avoid floor-crossing, many countries,including Pakistan, have passed strict legislation. This inturn, makes the legislators prisoners to the dictates of theparty boss. The back-benchers lose initiative and becomemere rubber stamp parliamentarians. Because of this apathyoften parliaments cannot proceed for lack of quorum.rr

The enthusiastic parliamentarians are hampered by theconduct of business in the parliament. "Every rule ofprocedure, every technicality is now insisted upon andworked for all it is worth. This stiffening or hardening of themodes of doing business has made parliamentarydeliberatlons seem more and more of a game, and less andless a consultation by the leaders of the nation on matters ofpublic welfare. "r2

The worst threat to any dernocratic progress is the rise ofreligious fundamentalism. 13 Since religion is an explosive

294 Perspectiues on South Asia

and sensitive matter, in most of the developing world, evendictators hesitate to brutally dismember religious groups.Dufing dictatorships, these religious groups organisethefnselves. They sometimes take over the role of politicalparties. At the very least, they are one of the most powerfulorg4nised pressure groups. Democracy cannot prosper wherefundamentalism looms at the fringe of all political powers.One of the most important dspects of a democratic society isnot only to tolerate, but to protect and promote all forms ofminorities and disadvantaged sections of societ5r. Religiousfundamentalism is bound to resr.rlt in persecution of religiousmirxorities and is detrimental to the rights of women. Anotherworrying aspect of politicising religion is that such a tacticis very contagious . Pakistan turned totally theocratic andIslarnisation was revived in early 1980. As a result, theHindus of India turned to obscurantism. They felt threatenedat ttre revival of Islamic fundamentalism at its borders,particularly, as the largest religious minority of India is thatof Muslims. Politicians, both in India and Pakistan. haveexplloited the situation at the expense of eroding democraticvalues. Both India and Pakistan suffer on account of revivedreligious intolerance. Muslims and Sikhs of India feelthreatened.la Non-Muslims in Pakistan are given a separatestatus. r5

"In the recent Indian election the third most powerfulparty was a Hindu party d'edicated to advancing thecause of the Hindu majority at the expense of both therights of Muslims and the concept of the secular state. Insome parts of India many Sikhs and Muslims and membersof other groups are equally intolerant of others whosebeliefs olbackgrounds are different from their own.Pakistan's emergence as a dernocracy has been repeatedlydelayed by the claims of Muslim movements against therights of others, and these claims may again cause thecollapse of democracy in Paklstan."r6

Fostertq Democrorg 291

Solutions

Admittedly, there are no simple solutions and answers tothe problems faced by democracies of developing countries.One of the maJor hurdles is lack of resources. Dwelopmentpolicies are lopsided and not distributive in nature. Thosewho are heard louder are the first to be satisfied. The poorand the underprivileged are the last to benefit. Men, ratherthan women get priority. There is just not enough to go

around. This, by itself, is the root cause of many ethnic,sectarian and class conflicts.

The threat to democratic values thus lies within theweaknesses of the institutions and political leadersthemselves, who have been unable to accept tJle challengesdemocrary brings with it. Some problems (like poverty) aretoo complex to overcome in a short period, but certainissues can at least be addressed openly by national leadersand policy makers. In the developing world, the trend hasbeen to avoid solving or discussing the real issues whictraffect the ordinary person. Instead new issues aremanufactured to keep public attention distracted from theactual problems.

To a certain extent, one can argue that strengthening ofpolitical institutions, spreading awareness, increase ir-t

education and training of national and community leaderscould promote a democratic atmosphere. All this can help toa point.

Some institutions within the developing world have takena lead in trying to democra ze society. The judiciary in Indiaopened its doors throug;h Public Interest Liugation to theordinary citzens and deprived classes of society. Pakistan,Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are following the Indian example.Judicial activism has made a positive change, This kind ofan action at least builds sorne confidence and hope amongstthe general public. The perception that the judiciary issolely a service provided by the state to the powerful is now

292 Perspectiues on South Asta

on the decline (at least in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh).Other institutions have not made any efforts at reaching outto the ordinary cifizens.

Parliament is a key institution in the framework ofdernocrary. If it is seen as unapproachable and irraccessible,then the very purpose of democracy is defeated. Parliamentsmust respond to public demands. They must have keen earsand not simply be all-ears. Their time, while legislating,should proportionally be spent on the classes of citizensthey represent. The developing world is outnumbered by thedisadvantaged population. Parliaments in the developingworld spend far less of their business time in addressing theissures of this section of society. In almost every countr5rIegislation affecting children, women, minorities and labourremains outdated and inadequrate.

Parliamentary activism may open the doors to fresh ideas,revitalising democracy. It could encourage greaterparticipation from the people to manage their affairs.Democracy must move forward from "a say" of the people asto 'who manages their affairs", to the first universal desireof people to manage their own affairs. Parliaments mustreach out to their electorate, rather than expect a chosenhandful to converge towards the capital.

Leaders of the developing world can only raise economicstandards by cutting down on their non-developmentalexpenditure. Huge standing armies are a drain on suchexpenditure. No one dares to cut the army to size or reduceits share in the national expenditure. Often the militaryengages itself in some manner of conflict-either external orinternal-to justit/ its existence. It is in their interest tokeep tensions (both external arrd internal) alive. In order tocontrol the military, leaders must work towards gettingstrong popular support. This support will naturally comefrom the disadvanfaged sections of society, who will be theeventual beneficiaries of an equitable economic order. More

Fosterirtg Democr(rcA

time and effort must hence be spent on gaining the support,respect and credibility of this section of societ5z. Parliamentscan only be powerful in a true democratic society. Collectivelyparliamentarians should work towards democratisation ofthe society at the grassroots level.

Any action towards parliamentary activism presupposesthat elected representatives stand convinced to promotedemocrary. Without such a commitment by the privileged ofthe developing world, democracy cannot foster.

International pressure can only bring _the horse to thewater, but cannot make it drink. Spirited individuals andorganisations, or human rights groups, can only makeripples but the waves can only be whipped up by a largerconsensus of the ruling elite to democratize society. Preciselyfor this reason it has correctly been concluded that"democracy will spread to the extent that tfiose who exercisepower in the world and in individual countries want it tosoread."lT

END NOTES

The Times, (London) 27 May 1990

Samuel P. Hunfington, Democracy's Third Waue.

Larry, Diamond, Three Paradoxes oJ Democracg.

Parmanand, PolitTcal Deuelopment in SouthAsia, New Delhi:Sterling, 1988.

Many of the political commentators in Pakistan quote Ms.Benazt Bhutto as an example.

Prison Conditions in Indra: An Asin Watch Report, I April1991.

Report on Presidential Election bA Non-Gouernrment SAARCObseruer Group, 7989,

293

].

2.

3.

b.

7.

8. The Economist - Surueg oJ India, 4- I O May, 199 l

294 Perspecttues on South Asta

Paul, Q. Hirst, Iaru, Socrahlsm and DernocracA, London: Allen& Unwin, 1986.

Edgar Owans, The Futwe oJheedom in the Deueloping World.

In Pakistan, the opposition and the government agreed notto point out the lack of quorum.

Philip, Norton, led.), Legislatures.

Fundamentalism is used in a broader sense, to mean extremereligious lntolerance, where, religious beliefs are forced onpeople, where religion is politicised and a conservative andnarrow interpretation is given to its dictates,

ElecUons in l99O could not be held in East Punjab and theKashmir valley on account of tensions,

Pakistan's consttution does not allow non-Muslims to votein the general elections (where only Muslim candidates cancontest). Non-Muslims have a separate electorate system.Under certain laws the evidence of non-Muslims are notaccepted while awarding the highest sentence.

Raymond, P. Gasttl, "What Kind of Democracy", Tle AtlanticMonthIA.

Huntington, op. cit..

9.

lo.

I I.

t2.

13.

14.

15.

16.

t7.

Problems of the ElectoralProcess and Election Funding

in India

V.A. PaiParnndiker

The legiUmacy of the entire democratic system ofgovernancedepends essentially on the efficacy and effective working ofthe electoral mechanisms. If the verdict of tJre people whichforms the basis ofthe propriety and legitimacy of the politicalsystem is vitiated by unethical methods, the faith of thepeople in the people itself gets eroried and ultimately destroysthe very foundations of democracy.

In many countries of the world, democracy has lost itslegitimacy for their failure to evolve an electoral processwhich maintains this vital credibility. In recent years manyEuropean nations including France, Germany, Italy, andeven the U.K. have witnessed grave concerns about theworking of the electoral system.

In almost all the countries of South Asia, the problemsassociated with the electoral process have caused grave

Perspectiues on South Asia

concerns about the future of democracy. As it is, some ofthe South Asian countries have been plagued by militaryrule reflecting a failure of the democratic electoral process.In others, a variety of other problems have eroded thecredibility of the system.

In India, for instance, violence and corruption linked tothe electoral process have been two major concerns. Thesituation in many other South Asian countries is not enilrelydisslmilar.

The Indian Election Commission's report on the firstgeneral electon (f 951-52) mentioned that 88.6 million voterscast their vote in a perfecfly peaceful atmosphere. Therewere only minor breaches of law and order in a few pollingstations in some of the states. But by the time the fourthgeneral elections were held in 1957i the Election Commissionhad begun to sound alarm bells. It said in its report:"Regrettably the record ofpeaceful polling was broken at thelast general elections. . . Owing to serious disturbances orapprehended breach of peace, poll was adjourned at 12polling stations in 5 different Assembly constituencies ofBihar. One or two sporadic instances of violentdisturbances were reported from Assam, Andhra Pradesh,Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal."r Thesubsequent reports on the fifth general elections of lg71-72, the sidh in 1977, and seventh in 1979-80 etc. keptreporting on the alarming increase in violence, "boothcapturing", and other electoral malpractices in many partsof India, but more speciflcally in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, andJammu & Kashmir. The parliamentar5r elections in l98gand 199I only confirmed the trend..

A central issue relating to the electoral process which hasemerged in South Asia is the funding of elections. In Indiathis problem has also been one of the core issues.Ramakrishna Hegde, then the Chief Minister of Karnataka,in his book on electoral reforms released in 1984 quotes the

Electoral Process and. Election Furtdina in India 297

well known Indian political leader late Jayaprakash Narayanas follows:

"Collection of party funds, especially for elections, isperhaps the largest source of political and the other fieldsof cormption. One hears of fantastic amounts runninginto tons of crores collected by certain man-eaters of theUnion Cabinet and placed at the disposal of the PrimeMinister. These amounts are not entered into the CongressParty's open account books nor are they ever audited; noone knows except for a very few how much is collected,what part of it is pocketed by the Ministers concerned,nor how the moneys are spent. These funds are usedmainly for Parliamentary and State elections at which thedependable supporters of the leadership particularly ofthose among it, whether at the Centre or in the States,who happen to have command over the vast funds, arespecially favoured. These funds are also used for"managing" party members, buying up defactors, andtoppling not only opposition Ministers but also CongressMinisters in the course of party infighfing."'z

Election funds are clearly the biggest source of cormptionin India. And since it begins at the top, the other forms ofcorruption then become rampant at various levels of thebureaucracy, especially at the cutting edge where the citizencomes into direct contact with the official.

The experience in India of the last fifty years effectivelydemonstrates the distortions in the democratic processesgenerated by the inflow of big money into elections. The roleof big money can, to some extent, be circumscribed byputting a ceiling on electoral expenses. However, Indianexperience again shows that laws controlling electionexpenses have not worked well. As the case of Amar NathChawla convincingly shows, returns of electoral expensesby candidates invariably understate the expenses. Also

Perspectiues on South Asia

expenses incurred by the party of a candidate on campalgnactivities are not usually covered by such returns. Thissimply means that a party with greater resources can withimpunity contravene the spirit of the laws controlUng electionexpenses.

A. law on ceilings on election expenditure can take care ofonly excessive exlrenditure. It cannot remove unequal accessto resources. The persistence of this inequality will, again,Iead to the distortlon of the democratic process. Theper$istence of this phenomenon is in itself a very strongindicator of the fact that some parties find it very difftcult tomobilize enougfr resources to fight elections. This problemcannot be handled by leaving its resolution to the naturalproCess of support mobiliTation. This is a structural problemthat aggravates tJee tendency towards cumulaUve inequalityin which weaker parties get weaker because of the lack offinancial sustenance and strong parties get stronger becausethey can attract or get hold of ever larger resources. As longas structural imbalances in our society continue, the statehas to intervene to provide correctives.

ilGiven these considerations, it is desirable to separate thequestion of party funding from election ftinding. Party fundingmay be allowed through private and corporate contributionssubJect to the restrictions indicated later. One of theprerequisites for such reform is the need for public audit ofpar$r funds by agencies appointed or approved by the ElectionCommission.

On the question of election funding, the questions thatneed to be answered are: (o,) Should the state be the solefinancer of elections? (b) What should be the mechanism offinancing elections or controlli4g election finances? and (c)

What other measures should the state take to makeelectioneering corruption-free and less expensive?

Electoral Process and. Election F\tndina in Indio. 299

Insofar as the question of state financing of elections isconcerned, there is no doubt that in the existing conditions,the state has to intervene not only to impose a ceiling onelection expenses but also to ensure equal opportunity inrespect of access to resources. The nexus between bigmoney and elections has to be broken. This can be doneonly by determined state action.

Given the desirability of state intervention, the questionthen arises: should the state be the exclusive source ofelection finance? There is one very weighty argument againstthe state being the sole source of election finances. Theargument pertains to protest movements that may arisebecause of the ossification of the party system which, evenwhile there is alternation, does not respond to the interestsand aspirations of certain sections of the society. It isfrequently argued that a two party system is the bestguarantor of democratic processes. However, tl s argumenttakes into consideration the experience of only a very fewWestern democracies-namely, England and USA-that haveworked with an alternatlng two party system. OtherWesterndemocracies have successfully operated with a multi-partysystem. Even the experience of England and USA showsthat to break the rigidity induced by a duopoly of politicalpower, third party movements become inevitable.

It can, however, be recognized in the Indian context thatthe edstence of a plethora of political parties, most of whichenjoy only regional support, does vitiate the electoralmechanism in the sense that a party gets a large number ofseats even while it polls only a small fraction of total votes.As such, the reduction in the number of parties becomesessential. A law regulating election finance can certainlylnitiate a process that may, over the years, check the tendencytowards party proliferation and induce coalescence; but itcannot by itself make a two-party system possible. If despitethis, the tendency towards more than a two party systempersists, or the emergence of a third or a fourth party

300 Perspectiues on South Asia

becomes necessary, the state should not outlaw it or makeit virtually imposslble for genuine protest movements torise,

In the light of these considerations, it is worth consideringwhether, while state funding of election expenses is envisaged,indMdual contributions to especially new parHes enteringthe electoral contest for the first time be legally stopped.TWo points need to be noted in this regard. First, a newparty begins with an initial disadvantage in the sense that itmay not have yet established a stable support base forresource mobilization. It may, therefore, have to depend onindMdual contributions for financing election campaigns.Second, forbidding individual contributions may be treatedas an infringement of tle fundamental right of the individualsince such contributions are usually treated as a form ofpolitical expression and a device contributing to thedissemination of political views. In all, barring individualcontributions may prove discriminatory to minor or newparties.

As against this, it should be recognized that privatecontribufions especially to election activities may open upavenues for the infusion of wealth and monied interests intothe electoral process. One way to prevent it frorn happeningis to make a distinction between individual contributions toparties and that to candidates for electoral campaigns.While the latter can be prevented, the former should not be.

In order to check the influence of big money on theelectoral process public funding of elections seems desirable.But governmental funding must be so designed ttrat it helpsserious candidates and discourages frivolous ones. The goalof government financing of elections should be to assistserious candidates, yet retain enough flexibility to permitopportunity to challenge those in power without, at thesame Ume, supporting with signiffcant tax money candidateswho are merely seeking free publicity, and wit_hout attracfing

Electoral Process and. Etection F\rtdina in lrtdia, 301

so many candidates that the electoral process is degraded.

In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to recognisethree sets of contestants: nominees of established politicalparHes, that of new parties entering the electoral contest forthe flrst time, and non-party candidates. While in the caseof well established parties, pre-election funding is possible,this is not so in the case of either a new party or non-part5rcandidates. But before any of these categories of contestantscan be given financial assistance the criterion of eligibilitywill have to be defined.

It is not necessary to have one fixed criterion of eligibilityapplicable to all these categories. One fixed criterion. mayprove discriminatory against minor and new parties as wellas non-party candidates. If, for example, the eligibilitycriterion was defined in terms of, say, the obtaining of anational average of 4 per cent of popular votes polled, it willbe easier for national or major parties to pass this test butvery difficult for minor or new parties. It is, therefore,advisable to prescribe a stiffer criterion for national or majorparties, say 15 or 2O per cent of votes polled in theparliamentary elections and a not so stiff one in the case ofminor or new parties, say five per cent. In the case of non-party candidates, the fixing of the eligibility criterion mightbe simply the polling of one-eighth or one-tenth of all validvotes polled in a constituency.

Once the eligibility criterion has been defined, the questionof who should be given money out of the public fund for theelection campaign must be answered. Should the electionfund be allocated to parties or to candidates directly? Electionsubsidies in countries with parliamentary systems, with theexception of Canada, are made to political parties, not tocandidates. The reasons for this are not far to seek. In thefirst place, payment out of the public fund to candidatesmay directly accelerate the trend towards candidateindependence and could diminish the role of major parties.

302 Perspectirns on South Asra

In tJee second place parties will tend, in case candidates aredirectly given public funds, to put up candidates even inthose constituencies where traditionally they never did.And, lastly, it will encourage the proliferation of frivolouscandidature. In the conted of rampant defections and theneed to strengthen parties, direct pa1'rnents to candidateswill be harmful in the long run.

As against this, there is the weightier argument of a partydiscriminating against its own nominees. If the fund is givendirectly to a party which will then distribute the fund amongits nominees, there is a greater likelihood that it mayconrcentrate larger resources in some constituencies asagainst others. This will again vitiate equal access toresources. It is desirable therefore to (a) prescribe theeligtbility criterion for parties for state financial assistance;and (b) determine the basis on which a party is allocated itsshane of the state fund for election purposes. The partynominee should then receive the state fund directly.

It is beyond doubt that the purpose of election financelegislation should be to ensure equal opportunity. Thediscontinuance of individual contributions for electionpurposes will protect equal opportunity to only a limitedextent. TWo situations may work against the operation ofequal opportunity. First, parties with large resources maysupplement state subsidies to their candidates. Second,voluntary organizations, such as political committees,citiaens' groups, etc., may on their own or at the behest ofaparticular party mobilize resources for helping the electionof particular candidates. These two situations are likely tolead to inequality in access to resources. While it is easier todeal with the former, it is not so with the latter. One canmake a distinction between normal part5r functions andfunctions that bear on election campaigns. But there will betwiligfit zones where this distinction will break. For instance,it can be argued that the propagation of ideology,programmes, etc. is a part of normal party functions but the

Electoral Process and, Election F\tndt-n in India

discharge of such functions during the election campaignwill undoubtedly add to campaign efforts.

Political committees are a different matter. It is thedemocratic right of everyone to form associations andpropagate his viewpoints, even campaign for particularcandidates. To prevent such committees from participatingin the electoral process may tantamount to curtailingdemocratic rights; while such rights cannot be snatchedaway, they can certainly be regulated. The objective of suchregulation should be to balance the integrity of the electoralprocess and the preservation of democratic rights.

One way to do so would be to impose a ceiling on electionexpenses incurred by a candidate. There is already a law onthe statue books which limits election expenses. This ceilingvaries from States to Union Territories. These ceilings aretoo low and are maintained only in their breach.

It is therefore desirable to raise the ceiling from time totime keeping in view the current costs. It should be aboutRs. 25,OO,0OO in the case of Lok Sabha elections at 1999prices. Given this ceiling, party acti\dties in support of ttreelection campaign of its candidates and campaign activitiesmounted by political committees should come under thisceiling.

The regulation of such activities can be effective onlywhen parties and political committees are required by law tokeep strict accounts of their income and expenditure, andreport to appropriate authorities. Their accounts should beaudited by an approved authority desigriated by the ElectionCommission.

In the case of political committees, it can also be requiredof them, following the American practice, to registerthemselves with the Election Commission. Moreover, partiesand political committees can also be required to deposit alltheir receipts in specified banks and meet their expenses of,

303

304 Persoectiues on Souih Asra

say, more than Rs. IO,OOO ttrrough cheques. This may bemade applicable also to candidates. In the case of politicalcommittees, it might even be advisable to legally preventthem from mountlng a campaign in favour of a party nornineeor a non-partisan candidate.

One of the gravest dangers to the democratic processarises from contributions by corporations to political parties.However, it is not desirable to ban corporate contributionsto election expenses. In the case of corporate contributionsto political parties, it will be necessary to impose ceilings onsuch contributions. Such ceilings should be based both oncapital and reserves of tlle corporation and on absoluteamounts of say Rs. 25,O0,O0O per annum. In addition, theprior consent of shareholders should be made mandatorybefore a corporation makes a contribution to any politicalparty. Similarly, individual contributions to political partiesshould also be placed under a ceiling not exceeding, sayRs. IO,OO0 per annum.

R.ecognizing the necessity of public funding of elections, itis necessary to estimate the total allocation in this regardand to determine the method of election financing. Thereare two ways in which thls estimate can be made. One,assuming ibur candidates per parliamentary constituencyand given the ceiling of Rs. 25,0O,O00 per candidate, thetotal expenditure will come to about Rs. 550 crores. TWo,one can es mate the total co$t on the basis of twenty fiverupees per vote. This will mean a total outlay of about Rs.l5OO crores. However, assuming a 60 per cent turnout of6OO million voters the effectine cost will not be more thanRs. 9O0 crores. In any case, the total cost of the financing ofparliamentary elections is not expected to be more than Rs.l50O crores at 1999 prices.

This fund should be placed either with the ElectlonCommission or a specially created state funding agency formeeting election expenses.

Electoral Process and Electinn F\tndtu in tndin 305

As has been pointed out earlier, it is desirable to makepa5rments to candidates than to parties. Once a party fulfilsthe eligibility criterion, block grants can be allocated tovarious political parties on the basis of the percentage ofvotes secured by each of them. The quantum of the grant toeach party can be calculated either on the basis of itsperformance in the last election, that is, its nafionalpercentage ofvotes polled or its performance in the currentone or bottr. If the money is to be apportioned to a partybefore the elections, then the amount of the grant must bedetermined on ttre basis of the part5r,s performance in thepreceding election with a ceiling of, say, Rs. 2S,OO,OOO percandidate. For instance, a party obtaining 42 per cent ofvotes in the Lok Sabha Election will get 42 per cent of thepublic fund but with a ceiling of Rs. lSS.bO crores, i.e. 542candidates x Rs. 25,OO,OOO and the party getting only 5 percent will receive only 5 per cent. The same principle shouldapply to the disbursement of funds if the performance in thecurrent election forms the basis of this disbursement.

The criterion of the performance in the preceding electionsassures tl.e availability of funds to the candidates when it ismost needed. However, there is no reason to believe that aparty will be able to repeat its performance in the currentone.. If it obtains fewer or more votes compared to thepreceding elections, allocation of funds on the basis of partperformance may not be equitable. If, on the other hand,the performance in the current elections forms the basis offund disbursement, the funds might be available to theparties only after the elections. Unless alternativearrangements for lunds are made, the candidates, debarredfrom access to other sources of funding, may find it difficultto run their campaigns.

One of the greatest disadvantages of taking the previouselection as the base for determining the share of a parry rnthe state subsidy lies in the fact that a party trying to breakout of its regional shell and contest elections in areas where

306 Perspecttues on South Asirr

traditionally it has been weak or non-existent will find itdifficult to do so. The criterion of past performance will limitits share of state fund and will not allow it to contest moreseats tfian possible on the trasis of the criterion of pastperformance. Since other funding sources will be legallybarred, this will virtually amount to freezing the relativeelectoral strength of different parties. This situation is boundto affect adversely the possibilflty of alternation in the partysystem which is the kernel of a democratic system.

Keeping tJlis in view, it is advisable to arrange for long-term loans and subsidies for parties which propose to putup more candidates than possitrle under the proposed schemeof disbursement of election funds.

Another dysfunctional consequence of this pertains tothe possibility of party candidates contesting elecUons asindependents and later returning to the party fold after theywirt at the polls. This is bound to encourage concealeddeflection. In order to prevent this phenomenon fromrecurring, it is essential to tie up the question of electionfinancing with the anti-defection law.

In otder to avoid the demerits of these methods, it may beadvisable to combine both the pre- and post-election criteria.In this case, 5O per eent of the funds will be released on thebasis of tJ'.e performance in the preceding election and therest on the basis ofthe performance of the part5r in the currentone. This method will take care of the fund requirements ofnew parties as well as of non-part5r candidates.

Once the quantum of the block grant to a party has beendetermined, grants should be directly given to variouscandidates on the basis of party nominations. The accountsof expenditure should be maintained strictly by theindMduals and they should be audited and be made availablefor public scru ny. The authority to administer theallocations to candidates should preferably vest in theElection Commission which should also be responsible for

Electoral Process and" Electian Fltnding in India

scrutinizing the candidates' election expenses.

In order to make electioneering less costly, various othersteps need to be taken. First, equal time sharing on radioand television by different parties and/or candidates shouldbe encouraged. And, instead of separate public meetings byparties and / or candidates, joint meetings could beencouraged.

IN

Alarmed at t]le ever increasing problems associated w.iththe electoral process, in lggO the V.p. Singh Governmentappointed a higfi powered all party Committee headed bythe Law Minister of India Dinesh Goswami. Its report wasnot entirely satisfactory. In the main, ttre Goswami Committeedid not accept the principal recommendations made by V.A.Pai Panandiker and Ramashroy Roy in their paper preparedlbr the Morarji Desai Government in ISZZ in favour of statefunding of elections and audit of party funds.

Even so, the Goswami Committee Report contained manyvaluable suggestions which were accepted by all politicalparties. Amongst the main recommendations the Committeesuggested were the following:

I. Reforms in the electoral machinery and independenceof the Election Commission;

2. Steps for improving enrollment of all eligible voters;

3. Issuance of identit5r cards;

4. Restricting non-serious candidates;

5. Regulation of functioning of political parties;

6. A model code of conduct for the political parties;

7. Proper conduct of polls;

8. Steps to eradicate booth capturing, rigging, andintimidation:

308 Perspectiues on South Asra

9. Fixing a reasonable ceiling on election expenses; and

lO. Stringent penal provisions against electoral offences.

The then Chief Election Commissioner T.N- Seshan, aformer Defence Secretary and lat-er Cabinet Secretary hadstirred up a veritable hornet's nest by taking drastic stepsagainst all erring political parties and political executivesincluding Chief Ministers and Gcvernors in the recentelections. T.N. Seshan became a folk hero by single-handedlydisciplining the electoral process so much so ttrat the Stateelecdons of December 1993 had one of t"he lowest levels ofelectoral violence and electoral irregularities in recent years.Seshan's popularity with the political parties was in inverseproportion to his popularity with the intelligentsia. Anattempt was made in 1994 to bring a special bill to amendthe Indian Constitution and the People's Representation Actto curb the powers of the Chief Election Commissioner.Strong public opinion and opposition in the Parliament bysome political parties forced the Government to withdrawthe bill.

rV

Electoral reform has become a major political issue in India.Unfortunately, most political parties have not shown thede$ired degree of commitment to the central issue ofmaintaining t-he integrity and sanctity of the electoral process.Thelr concerns are more with immediate gain and since theruling party at the Centre or the States has a certain vestedinterest in 'no reforms", the fight has in effect been betweenthe concerned citizenry and the political parties. The realityis that those contesting the election are no ordinar5r offendersand include those who win and become lawmakers. Theunusual zeal for reform and campaign of former ChiefElection Commissioner T.N. Seshan against what he calledthe nexus between corruption, criminals, and politicianstherefore evoked a strong popular support which the political

Electoral Process and Electlon fr_nrding in India

parties could ill afford to ignore. The batfle for reform of theelectoral process is by no means going to be easy or certain.But it is quite clear that public opinion is stacked stronglyagainst the abuses of the electoral process and against theuse of money or muscle power. It is a process which willdetermine to a great extent whether India's democraticsystem will work for the better or for worse.

The principal issues are two. One relates to the entireelectoral process, from enrollment of eligible voters to holdingfree and fair elections, in which there are no cormpt prac cesor booth capturing, no rigging and use ofviolence to preventvoters from exercising their electoral choice or misuse ofoflicial machinery by the ruling party to inlluence the electoraloutcome. The second relates to the corruption andcriminalization perpetuated by political parties by way ofcollection of funds and use of criminal elements in elections,some of whom have also entered the electoral fray. Boththreaten the sanctity and credibility of the Indian electoralprocess and a great deal of public concern today is how toprevent the ills of the present electoral system.

END NOTES

Quoted in L.P. Singh, ELectoral ReJorm: Problems andSuggested Solufirons, New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House,1986, Cha.pter IL

Rarnakrishna H egde , Electoral Rejomt-l,ack oJ Politiccr| W\II,Bangalore: Karnataka State Janata Party, 1984, p. 7.

309

1

2.

Power to the People: A Case ofD ecentr alization in Nep al

Deu Rqj Datnl

Introductlon

Decentralization of power from the capital city to differentdistricts, towns and villages intends to empower the peopleat the local level by increasing their control over the localaffairs and removal of their powerlessness. Decentralizaflonis the best way of orgailzing local life as it links freedomwith social responsibility. Without local self-rule sanctionedby the constitution, democratic life cannot be imaglned andthe notion of civic liberty loses all meaning and purpose. InNepal, the notion of decentralization is associated with acritique of hukumi sashan, peremptory rule, statistdevelopment strategies and a necessity for engaging peoplein local governance and development. Though the policies ofdecentralization always fluctuated in tandem with the natureof polity in the country, it legitnnized a consensus thatdecentralization is a sincere response to the remoteness ofKathmandu and impersonality of the state bureaucracy atSingh Durbar, where major political and development

Pouser to tle People: Decerttralization in Nepal 3ll

decisions are made q'ithout the lceowledge of local conditions.

Genuine decentralization fosters democracy-internalparty democracy as well as democratization of state, de-concentratres information, wealth and social power throughmass mobilization and mass participation in tlee institutionsof representative bodies to achieve social Justice. A rigid,centralized government, by its very nature, attempts toundermine ttre domain of self-management of the localpeople. If people are given adequate opportunity they arecapable of maintaining social standards by themselves,formulating a vision, acquiring experience, enforcingaccountability of leaders' actions and strengthening thehabit of self-reliance. A genuine decentralization, in thissense, helps to build the access of the majority of the peopleto the means of sustainable livelihoods, individual dignityand meaningful participation in governance.

Hlstorlcal Background

The hereditary rule of the Rana family (1846-195O) canbe best characterized by an excessively rigid, bureaucraticand patrimonial style of governance which only establishedsome administrative units in the country to sustain theirrule, extract revenue, maintain law and order and protectthe count4r from external invasion. The Multtlci Ain (civilcode) of 1854, amended in l9lo, governed the social andcultural life of the Nepalese people. In the latter part of theirrule, the Ranas tried to legislate some social reforms, suchas abolition of slavery, widow burning, soti pratln andestablishment of schools, colleges and factories, buildingroads, bridges and electricity and so on. The framing of theConstitution of Nepal 1948 for the first time visualized thehorlzontal divlsion of power. But this Constitution nevercame into effect.

After the success of the political movement of 1950, theInterim Constitution of the Kingdon of Nepal l95l was

3t2 Perspectiues on South Asra.

promulgated which espoused th,e notion of popular legitimacyof democratic governance. In the I gSOs efforts were made toexpand local Panchayats through Village Development andCooperatives. Advisory Boards, District Development Boardsand Block Advisory Councils were created. yet, the statecould not retain tl.e relaUve autonomy of the dominantcastes, classes and ethnic groups of society and link itsresources to public interest. The Constitution of the Kingdomof Nepal 1959 made the government collectively responsibleto the elected legislature. Despite these efforts, the decadeof the fifties marked an upswirrg of political uncertaint5r inthe country caused by the tenacity and ferocity of powerstruggle among the political parties, interest groups andtradtitional centres of power. King Mahendra, who hadadequate power and the will to use it astutely, found thispower struggle an opportune moment and promp y venturedto dlssolve the parliamentary system in 1960 and introducea monocratic panchayat polity under the Constitution ofNepal, 1962.

The panchayat regime (1960-1990) had all the trappingsof authoritarianism which by all means was incompatiblewith the horizontal and vertical devolution of power,inndvations of several legislative and institutional measuresnotwithstanding. The "active involvement of the king inadministrative affairs means concentration of power in thehands of Royal Palace officials creating a classic mismatchbetweeri authorit5r and responsibility and distorting themost elementary principle of the line of command in favor ofinformal channel of communications and personalizeddecision rules." (Panday, 1989:3f 9)

The panchayat had formulated a framework fordecentralized planning and local governance through severalinnovative iniUatives, such as the Local Administrative Act1965, District Administrative plan 1g75, Decentra_lizationAct 1982 and Decentralization Working procedures Rules1984. The country was dir,'ided into 14 zones, 7b districts

Pouer ta ttrc People: Decentrqlization in Nepal 313

and about 4OOO villages. Still, decentralization was aherculean task because of the top-down systems of powerand authority and in the absence of freedom of speech andassociation, the state institutions had monopolized controlover the forces of civil society. As a result, electoralparticipation remained largely powerless, accountabilit5r wasenforced upward to higher authorities (mathiko aadesh)rather than downward to ttre people who elected the leaders.

As a centralized regime engaged in the promotion ofplanned economy and market diversification, the Panchayatdiscouraged the growth of "third sector" institutions andcivic groups, such as trusts, workers cooperatives, non-profit organizations and civil society with a principle ofinclusion-education, participation, employment anddevelopment. Public bureaucracy boasted most of theuniversal attributes-hierarchy, enterprise, specializationand coordination yet it suffered from a lack of motivation toserve public good and stand above patrimonial interests.Despite these weaknesses, the basic structures of the politicaleconomy, social reforms, growth of a professional middleclass of intellectuals through modern education,communication, transportation and land reforms and thesectoral differences of the planning tradition created by thepanchayat instituted the social-economic base of democraticchange in Nepal.

Ttre successful upsurge of political rrrovement restored amulti-party polity in Nepal in April l99O which dislodgedthe institutional framework of the ancien regime-NationalDistrict, Town and Village Panchayats. The interimgovernment led by premier K. P. Bhattarai carefully concludedhis government's twin-tasks of framing the new constitutionand holding timely elections for the national legislature. Inits policy statement, the first popularly elected governmentof the Nepali Congress party (NC) led by premier G. P.

Koirala in l99l promised to strengthen local governmentinstitutions (LGIs) by introducing decentralized

3I4 Perspectiues on South Asra

adrfiinistration, thus entrusting the local people to carryr outdevelopment tasks and solve their problems. Moreover, thegovernment also pledged to include citizens in the nationaldevelopment and deliver the fruits of development to thepoor; relieve the hardship of people; enlarge private sectorparticipation in the economy and expedite thedecentralization process by delegating more authority to thelocal bodies thereby maklng them capable of formulatlngand executing rural development projects.

The Emergent Issues of Decentrali zatlon

Does the discourse on decentralization of power considerthe question of sustainability of development? Will it be ableto redistribute the fruits of development across gender,caste, class and regional divisions or continue to perpetuatepolarizafion? Does it hold the potential to enthuse a sense ofnational identitStr Does it help spawn a sense of socialjustice to all the local units or create an economy of scarcit5rin one area and abundance in another? What does localself-government in Nepal mean-decentralization of power,shal"ing of power or relative autonomy of local units fromthe centre in many matters of popular concern? What areits primary units-elected institutions, party units, localoffices of HMG, NGOs, community, ethnicity, market orpopular institutions traditionally created by the peoplethemselves? The basic objectives of tJlis article are to probethe constitutional framework arrd policies of the state aboutdecentralization; examine the relationship between centraland local governments; and explore several practicalmeasures for decentralized local self-government in Nepal.

Constitutional Framework and Policies

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal lggo recognizesthat the source oJ souereign authority oJ the ind.ependent and-souereQn Nepal is inherent in the people. How is thissovereignty shared and popular wiII reflected in the

Pouser to the People: Decentralizatton in Nepal 3r5

governance? Devolution of power to the people is integral toenable them to share the sovereignty of the nation in ademocratic and legitimate manner. Accordingly,decentralization has been incorporated in Article 25 (4) ofthe Directive Princlples and Policies of the State underwhich the chief responsibility of the state is 'to maintaincondiUons suitable to the enjoyrnent of the fruits of democracy

through uider parttcipatian oJttw people in tle gouernatrce oJ

the countrg and by wag of decentralization and to promotegeneral welfare by making provisions for the protection andpromotion of human rights by maintaining tranquility and

order in the society." Though Directive Principles are notenforced under tJle law, they provide guiding principles forgood governance.

Similarly, Article 46:1(c) of the Constitution speciftes thatfifteen members of the Upper House of Parliament, threefrom each of Development Regions, would be elected based

on the system of single transferable vote by an electoral

college comprising Village Development Committee MDC)chairman, vice-chairman (mayor and deputy mayor in thecase of municipality) and the elected members of village'municipality and District Development Committees (DDCs).

The Third Amendment of the I-ocal Administration Act 1990

removed the post of zonal commissioner. District, Town and

village Panchayats were renarned as DDC, Municipality and

VDC and their rights and responsibilities, territorialjurisdiction, nature of elections and the number ofrepresentatives were redefined. The 75 DDCs' 58municipalities and 3,912 VDCs constitute the wellsprings ofdecentralized local self-government in Nepal. Each VDC issubdir4ded into nine wards. Each ward elects five membersincluding one women. The municipality wards can electmore based on their population, size, resources andcomplexities of developmental requirements.

The government s decentralization commitment is reflected

in several plans. These goals were first identified by the

3r6 Perspectiues on South Asra

Natlonal Planning Commission (NPC) in its Third Five yearPlan (1964-69) in order to create a ffnancial basis for popularparticipation. A concrete emphasis was put in the SeventhPlan for formulating, implementing and maintaining projectsand mobilization of local resources and talents. The EighthFive Year Plan (1992-1997) similarly laid stress on poverryalleviation, sustainable development, reducUon of regionalimbalance and the promotion of rural development throughIhe decentralizatian oJ'pouer and actiue participation o;f peopleat the grassroots leuel, The plan document envisaged therole of government in assisting, rather than intervening andcontrolling the process of development. Faith in stateownership to deliver socialjustice or efficienry of governancehas seriously eroded.

The provisions for decentralization seem more pronouncedin the Ninth Five Year Plan (1992-2OO2). It aims to empowerthe local units to take the responsibility of formulating andexecuting local development plans by institutionalizing localself-government, increasing people,s participation in thedistribution and mobilization of local resources, social andeconomic development of geographically disadvaniaged areas,imprnvement, expansion and development of suitable localtechnologies, socio-economic progress of the women,indigenous and backward cornmunities of rural areas,enhancing the participation of local people for sustainabledevelopment and establishing technological and humandevelopment infrastructure in rural areas.

In 1992 t)le government promulgated four Acts pertainingto \rDC, Municipalit5r, DDC and Local Bodies Election and.passed Working Procedure Rules in lgg3 and 19g4. TheseActs are vital instruments for democratic institution_buildingat the micro level for the dispersal of power and authorityand inifiafing planning from below. An Administrative ReformCommission headed by the prime Minister in 19gl toosuggested reforms in the administrative sectors so as tomake bureaucracy people-centred and attuned to the needs

Potoer to ttte People: Decentralization in Nepol 317

of democratic development. It, accordingly, suggested tomake the municipality an autonomous unit. The Civil Seryice(TWenty-ninth) Amendment Regulations that came into forceon 6 November 1992 introduced the notion of 'reinventinggovernance" by downsZing the state bureaucracy. A neo-liberal state, minimalist economic thinking took itsmomentum by means of privatization, denationalization,deregulation and globalization. The ruling Congress partyeven dropped its ideological commitment to socialism in thesecond general election of 1994 and ventured to salvage theNepalese people through foreign investment and globaleconomic integrauon.

On 13 February 1995 the Nepalese government under theCommunist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML)

introduced Build Ow Village Ourselues with the idea toaccelerate local development through the utilization oflocallyavailable labour. resources and institutions wittrout outsideintervention; make local bodies independent of the centralgovernment; promote self-reliance and rural developmentplanning; provide oflicial support in management, technicalinput and legal reforms; capacity building of the VDCs byproviding authority to utilize 40 per cent of the land revenueby the VDCs ttremselves and the central level grants ofNRs.SOO,0OO per VDC for the current year and increasingthe amount to NRs.S,OO,OOO the next year. Despite thesesteps, the creation of All Party Advisory Committee at theDDC, VDC and municipality levels by the government wasrebuked on the grounds that it weakens the autonomy ofIocal self-government, the representation process and eventries to politicize the developmental processes.

The devolution of economic power to local units was notopposed by the coalition government of the NC, RashtriyaPrajatantra Party (RPP) and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP)

led by premier Sher Bahadur Deuba because of ttre inherentpopulism in the programme. Rather, it continued the samepopulist rhetoric with a different name ViLLage Deuelopment

318 Perspectiues on South Asia

artd SelJ-Reliance Programme wilth slogans like pouer to theViilage and Deuelopment Pregramme through people, sParticipation. The difference between the two is that thelatter applied the formula of cost sharing in the developmentproject. Yet, it gave monitoring and evaluation power to theDDC, even the authority to stop project implementation incase it detects the abuse of funds by the VDC. Likewise,decentralization of economic and political power becamesub.fect to spoils and patronage with the introduction of theConstitutency Development Programme (under which anMP gets NRs 4,OO,O0O to spend in his or her constituency atwill) and the provision for VDC advisory committees toreconcile part5r Interests.

The High Level Decentralization Commission formed underthe hlme Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in 1996 prepared areport on Decentralization and Local Governance. It identiffedseveral weaknesses in past practices, such as undefinedscope and jurisdiction of local self-government, overlappinglaws, detlciency of institutional culture, lack of political will,resource scarcity, absence of mechanisms to enforce civicaccountability among the elected bodies and governmentofficlals, problems in the sustainability of developmentprojects, dearth of a planned development process, flawedelectoral and organizatonal techniques and so on. Similarproblems were identiffed in the realms of coordination,rnonltoring and evaluation of development activities. (HMG.r996:29-34)

Accordingly, a Bill was prepared by the then Congress_RPP-NSP coalition government to present in the parliament.Yet, its replacement in 1997 by the coalition government ofUML, RPP and NSP led by Lokendra Bahadur Chand left ttreBill in the lurcir. Instead it promulgated an ordinance toamend some laws relating to local bodies and local electionsthereby initiating changes in the power, composition,representation and organizational set up of the LGIs. Allthese are included in a separate Local Governance Bill

Pouser to tle People: Decentralization in Nepal 319

(Parliamentary Secretariat, 1997). Thus two separate billsare pending in parliament. Lack of consensus among theparliamentary parties defied legislative approval.

Political support for decentralization is definitelywidespread. Political manifestoes of tJle major political partiescommonly divided into the conservative, the moderate andtlle radical spectrum are pro-decentralization. The onlyquestion is how to implement it and to what extent power isdevolved to the people. The LGI federations (of DDC,VDCand municipality) are exerting their full strengf,h to achieveself-governance. Ethnic groups, minorities, women,marginalized and popular institutions of societ5r are opposedto the existlng laws and are articulating their position forlocal self-governance. MaJor donor countries, especiallyDANIDA, GTZ and UNDP and some INGOs are stronglylobbying for it.

Central-Local Government Relatlonshlp

The Local Government Acts (LGIs) underline the role ofHis Majesty's Government (HMG) or central government as

follows:

. HMG is the policy-maker with the power to classifrlocal government institutions, their functionaljurisdiction, laws, rules and procedures. The LGIfederations, however, seek to insert a separate provisionfor local self-government in the Constitution.

Under special emergency conditions, it can suspend,dissolve, even increase one additional year of tenure ofthe local government, if elections are deferred. Butthese measures have to be ratified by Parliament.

HMG appoints the secretaries at the district, municipaland village level to look after the administrative work oftheir respective areas. LGIs federations demand ttrepower to appoint office secretary, their career

320 Perspecttues on South Asto

development and.evaluatlon in order to make themaccountable to local units while HMG is willing to givethem the power to appoint additional staff and hirenecessary technical persons on contract.

o HMG's courts settle all the major disputes of localgovernment.

HMG can inspect and monitor the functions of localgovernment and issue directives to them in theformulation and execution of development projectsespecially taking into accrount the priorit5r regardingbackward communities, women, children and ecologicalbalance. It also determines the municipal plans andprojects of intra-DDC natuire and the functions of locallevel development agencies. HMG can also execurespecial programmes for the capacity-building of LGIs.

I{MG determines the areas for financial resourcemobilization, the range of fee rates to be coilectedincluding the policies on grants, areas of revenuecollection and auditing.

HMG can probe into corruption and financialirregularities by LGIs.

HMG can form a high level .DecentralizationImplementation Follow-Up Committee" to be chairedby the prime minister, with a number of ex_officiomembers mustering a political will to implementdecentralization and under this committee, anotherworking committee can be constituted.

It can constitute a "Finance Commission" to conductinvestigation and study about the taxation of LGIs andsharing of taxes between t-GIs and HMG, to updatetaxation and the accountancy system as well as otherpolicy matters.

LGIs have to maintain contact with IIMG through the

Power to tte People: Decentrqlization in Nepal 321

Local Development Ministry.

. DDC can create a Coordination Committee involving allthe related coordind.tors of service centres, mayor andchiefs ofvarious subJect units related to its secretariat.

Under these condidons how is economic, political andadministrative power devolved? Self-government can meanvery little if the bulk of ttre resources is privately owned orstate-controlled and public service is done throughgovernment-directed bureaucracies. If democrary is conllnedto shareholders what is the significance of electingrepresentatives? What is the legislative framework to makethe local people stakeholders, who have a share in the costsand benefits of local governance and development? Wideningpeople's participation in decision-making can makegovernment more directly transparent and accountable.

Attributes of Local Self-Government

The viability of local self-government in Nepal is dependenton a number of factors:

Autonomy

The Acts on local government institutions speciSr theirautonomy as "perpetually succeeding self-governingorganized entifies with separate seal, enjoying the right toacquire and sell off property and sue and be sued in its ownname in the court." LGI federations, however, argue forsubsidiarity in local bodies' decision-making and favour anautonomous self-governance involving devolution. Thisargument is becoming popular right across the politicalspectrum: RPP and NC for downsizing the state: UML for analternative to centralized planning and Mandst-Leninist(ML), radical left and ethno-regional parties for consolidatingtheir position in society by gradual federalization of thestate. In practice, however, there are three sets of limitations.First, the LGIs are legally disembodied from a genuine

322 Perspectiues on South Asia

notion of autonomy which entails three basic rights:identity,contract and property. They have certain powers to makeby-laws, raise revenue, spending, staff recruitment andadJudication of local disputes on a limited scale. The LGIs,for example, as Junior partners have to work under thelegal, administrative, financial and operational frameworkdefined by HMG, thus tahing national priorities and policiesinto account. Second, the social, economic and politicalenvironment of LGIs is s'rll hierarchical. And third, theirrellance on grzrnts from the government, INGOs and NGOsin $olving their problems has fostered a culture of paternalismand dependency.

The dominance of centralized planning continues to forcelocal leaders to conform to the plans and programmes madeby central institutions, while LGIs federations are strugglingfor more autonomy in policy initiatives. These federationsincreasingly cri cize the central government and NationalPlanning Commission {NPC) for ignoring their plans andprogrammes prepared on the basis of local needs andaspirations; stripping their power of managing primaryschools, communit5r forestry, health centres, water resources,etc. by respective national acts and the authority of districtoffiices thereby increasing a trend towards centralization.The Municipality Association of Nepal has suggested theHMG to revise a number of acts relating to transport andconstruction, health, education, sports, housing and physicalplanning, irrigation, soil erosion and river control, hydro-electricity, local development, forest and environment, labour,culture, land management and reform, industry and taxationwhich are not favourable to local self-government. LGIshave become victms of the fluctuation of central policieswith every alternation of government and have becomeunable to expand the rights to local communities.

Local institutions have been dominated by political elites,intermediaries and middle men from various political parties.They form a framework of patron,client and, therefore,

Power to the People: Decentralization in Nepal 323

LGIs'energies have been absorbed in incessant manoeuwesof patrons. A patron-client order centres on powerpersonality, the patron, who controls resources vital to thewelfare of clients, dependents and the weaker sections ofsociety. l,GIs do have adequate knowledge and experience torun local affairs but they have to rely on their respectivepolitical parHes which only fosters ideological rigidity, actaggressively and are associated with the dominant interestgroups of society. This has undermined the autonomy oflocal self-government in Nepal. There have been efforts toinsert anti-defection act stipulating that membership ofany member of LGI will be ceased if he or she defects fromthe party being elected or violates the party whip. But,because of strong opposifion in the parliament, it was notimplemented.

Peoplc's Particlpation

The Acts espouse the case of strengthening local self-government by maximtzing people's participation arrdtlstihltionaliz@ multi-patlg democracg ot tle grassrmts leueLThe promulgation of a new act in 1997, expanded the baseof people's participadon in local governance, mandating tJleelection of one woman in the ward committee (which consistsof five members) and nomination of six from among thepersons of backward communities, social workers and ethnicgroups including women in the Village Council by the VDCchairman. This applies to municipality, DDC and DistrictCouncil as well, This act has not only widened the socialbase of representation but also offered prospects for thedialectical impetus for social change of hitherto subordinatecastes and classes of societ5r.

The Ninth Plan upholds the "empowerment of local bodies"of HMG attuned to decentralization and make administrativeunits efficient, "people-oriented" and productive by meansof involving the government, NGOs, private sector and localbodies in social mobilization to enlist tJ:e marginalized,

324 Perspect ses on South Asia

deprived and disadvantaged groups in the developmentprocess. Active participation ofpeople in local governance isa means by which citlzens enter into the political system,etttrer througfr ffio manchlw (own person), or throughinterest groups, political parties, legislature, administrativebodles and even the civil society. The key consideratlons ofpeople's participation are: shaping policy decisions,enhancing sense of political elficacy, developlng capacitiesto enforce their claims, getting benefits and developingstakes and interests in governrnental affairs.

LGIs have an intrinsic stimulus for people's participationowing to their continued activities and easy access comparedto relatively far off central principal secretanat, SinghDwbarwhich is generally unresponsive to the local needs andconcerns of people. Political participation has certainlyincreased but it is not a crucial indicator of empowermentbecause social and economic order are still not compatiblewith it. Right to peoples' parHcipation should accompanyopportunities for equality, ecofromic security and propertyrights. In a hierarchic society like Nepal , however, barriersto people's participadon spri4g from the webs of powerwolren by caste system, feudalism, patron-client network ofparties, paternalistic planning process and monopolizationof wealth in ttre hands of a few.

People's participation has been severely constrained bygrowing poverty, r,nequality, isolation, social contradictionsand gender biases. Other barriers-existence of a number ofarchalc laws and low level of political consclousness amongthe citizens offer minimal support for the devolution ofpower. Given the agrarian nature of the elite support base,participaton over local development resources is, therefore,largely controlled by better off sections of the society,technocrats, party leaders and government bureaucrats.They tend to professionalize development withoutacknowledging indigenous vision, knowledge, resources,instituflons, art and a pluralistic space of the nation and

Power to tte People: DecentraLizatian in Nepal 325

consuming up all of people's spiritual and creaflve energies.Development, especially partlcipatory development, hasbecome a fundamental problem for many VDCs of the farwestern region, such as Humla, Jumla and Mugu which arecondemned to remain marginalized, dependent andimpoverished. Political choices can become meaningless ifeconomic frameworks remain fragile and vulnerable.

Accountablllty

LGIs do not directly derive legal authority from theConstitution. They derive delegated authority under thestatutory law. This means LGIS have dual accountability-upward to the line agencies, concerned departments andministries of the central government and downward to thepeople who elect them. Accountability caufions the leadersof the consequences of their decisions and actions whichthey have to satisfactorily explain to the people. How tomake MPs and DDC authorities accountable to VDCs andmunicipalities in terms of their performances, goals and theuse of public resources? DDC authorities do not have apopular base because tJrey are indirectly elected by thepeople's representatives and, therefore, are not morallysensitive to the consequences of their actions as the VDCand municipal authorities.

In the case of MPs, neither political parties which have ahistory of fusion and fission nor local institutions which aretoo weak to establish a link between authority andaccountability, control their actions other than the potentialtlrreat to their next elections . Even the nomination of advisorybodies at VDCs and municipalities consisting ofrepresentatives from NGOs, intellectuals, governmentoflicials, social workers and women; and the ward committeesfurther conline the local self-government to the principle ofdelegation of authority and undermines the devoluUonprocess. Conceived as a legislative part of local self-governance, the Advisory Council is not representafive nor

326 Perspectives on South Asra

really functional with clear power, authority andresponsibility.

The policy initiatives of the District Council spring fromthe DDC where ttre HMG exercises inordinate power andcontrol through the Local Development Officer (LDO) andChiief District Oflicer (CDO). The DDC Act speciftes that thelocal dwelopment ministry "shall execute, supervise, monitor,and coordinate" the development programmes of the districtforinulated by the District Development Project CoordinationCommittee. The panel has the DDC president and vice-preEident as chairperson and vice-chairman respectively,the LDO as member secretary, the office heads of thedistrict and the coordinator of the plan formulationcornmittee, service centre, integrated plan formulationcornmittee as members. The Act speciffes the involvement ofthe Member of Parliament (MP), the CDO and regionalrepresentafives of the NPC. This committee, after decidingthe nature and type of proJects, sends them to tJle DDC forapproval. The final recommendation is made by theconcerned ministry. Control of the process of decision-making enforces an upward accountability. Theorganizational process of coordination and control amongHMG, constituencies, DDCs, Ilakas, municipalities andVDCs, are also not well deffned. Therefore, staff posted inthe districts are not accountable to elected officials. WhenLGIs became executois of the central government's will,how can they work for the transformation of societ5r for thebenefit of people?

Irr some cases, HMG seems pro-active in promotingparticipatory planning. The scope of LGIs, especially theDDCs has been strenglhened irt local development activitiesby the use of rational planning-taking into account thepotqnttal of the plan, environmental considerations, upliftingof women, the backward and children througlr an increasein productivity, income and employment, prioritization inthe selection of proJects and their transparency. While in

Potuer to the People: Decentralization in NepoJ 327

others, it is reactive. For example, it leaves the role of CDOvague whether he or she is a development agent, promoterof law and order, controller of people's representatives orcoordinator of all district offices Plans, programmes andprojects that fall clearly under the domain of the VDC andmunicipality are controlled by central ministries anddepartments.

In the area of plan execution, the LGIs can recruit or hirerequired persons specified in the projects. They can alsoconstitute a Monitoring and Supervision Committee underthe chairperson or local MP, with DDC president, one memberofDDC to be nominated by the chairperson and concernedofficials of the disitrict as members. The Committee canhold regular meetings with the participation of donors,NGOs and private sectors, undertake studies on tl.e operationof completed projects as well as type of beneficiaries, outcome,productivity, emploSrment opportunities and environmentimpact assessment. These assessment reports have to besubmitted to the District Council and the parliament forreview.

Finaneial Resource Base

The Acts state that LGIs can mobilize resources fromthree sources: HMG grant, from its own internal resourcesand from loans, grants, etc taken from various fundingagencies and organizations including banks, INGOs andNGOs. The Acts make the DDC, VDC and municipalitymandatory to get HMG approval for receiving any foreignaid. Each VDC gets half a million annual HMG grant. As arule, sevent5r per cent of LGIs funds should come from theirown resources. In practice, however, a majority of VDCs,especially of hills and mountains, can mobilize less than tenper cent only. The eds ng polarities in wealth, affluenceand privilege among LGIs make development processinherently unfair and without the mobilization of adequaterevenue and income-generating activiues, decentralization

Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

bebomes self-defeating at best and destabilizing at worst.

Land tax based on the productivity of land, property tax,tal< on public utilities, local contracts, etc. can generatecohsiderable amount of revenue in the plains area, Taraianld valleys and can redress the balance between rich andpcior. Likewise, projects of intra-VDC or DDC nature, suchas hydro-electricity, irrigaflon, community forestry, healthfaCilities, education, etc can also generate revenue as wellas confllcts on sharing resources. Similarly, control ofcomrption, bribery, kickbacks, mismanagement of fundsand administrative inefffciency can save tJ.e scarce resources.Pr0perty disclosure of municipal and DDC representativesdufing their period in office, arrangement for detectingabfrse of authority and a system of removing DDC authorifiesby two-thirds of members are important provisions to enforcefinrrncial transparency, integrity and accountability. Thereis a provision for constitutirxg a Finance Commission tore$ularly review the revenue structure of LGIs and providesuggestions to HMG for essential reforms. HMG tried toabolish octroi, the main source of municipal revenue, but allits efforts were in vain. LGIs seek to receive grants directlyfrofn the finance ministry for their development plans ratherth4n in a complex and tortuous way which also remainsunrealized.

Municipalities are parallel to \rDCs in structure andacd-rrities except, of course, the former must have a populationof ht least twenty-thousand, one million rupees in annualincome and be able to offer minimal urban facilities such asedUcation, roads, drinking water, electricity and communi-ca$on. There are three kinds of municipalities; metropolitan-mdnicipality, sub - metropolitan municipalities andmunicipalities. A metropolitan municipality such asKathmandu, and sub-metropolitan municipalities such asLaftpur, Biratnagar and Pokhara are economically well offan{ enjoy relafive autonomy wl.rile the newly created twenty,two municipalities are no better than VDCs. For example.

Power ta the People: Decefttralization in Nepal

the municipality of Ktrandbari Chainpur has no basic urbancharacteristics, even roads and drainage. Each ward ofthese twent5r-two municipalities gets O2. million annualgFants for their development activities. There are contrasts,too between VDC and municipality. Most of themunicipalifies, owing to their industrial and commercialactivities and local taxaton rights, are financially viablewhile the VDCs of the hills face scarcit5r of resources and

are, therefore, dependent on DDC grants, plans and budgetapprovals. In a situation of highly unequal resource

endowment, how the development process can become

harmonious and sustainable remains a moot question.

Some fortunate VDCs and DDCs have Rural Self-Reliance

Schemes launched by HMG to mobilize savings from thepoor people in rural areas and invest in productive activities.

Others where ministers and MPs are articulate have INGOs'

NGOs, Participatory District Development programme'

Deprived Sector Credit (DSC), Production Credit for Rural

Women, Grameen Bikas Banks, Banking With the Poor'

Small Farmers' Development Programme, etc. Still others

have sectoral programmes, such as population education,

manpower development, indigenous people's development'

rural infrastructure building, poverty alleviation and

integrated development. A majority of these programmes

are constituency-oriented not evenly balanced among theregions and people and, additionally, suffer from patronage

politics, loss of loans, lack of management, poor motivationamong animators and over-politicization with all the potential

to polarize the development process. HMG has identified 25

districts as backward and remote ones to initlate the Remote

Area Development Program under which it is moderatelyproviding human development training, drinking water'irrigafion, suspension bridges, non-metalled roads and

electrilication, In order to make the development process

just and balanced, central government's grants should be

adequately allocated to support the development of remote

329

and backward regions where a majority. of the people arestrqggling for mere survival.

Codsrrmers'Gmup

How can the long-term benefits be combined with muchwidpr participaflon of people in the consumer group? Howcan principles of social Justice be reconciled with those ofthe allocative efficiency of the market? The DDC Act statesthat it can help create up to 17 sen'ice centres to facilitatethe people with goods and sendces. DDC can also coordinatetJ.e activities of consumer groups and NGOs in the VDCsand municipalities among the beneficiaries of the plans andprogrammes undertaken by them. But in the formation andexedutlon of the plan, the group or NGOs must act inconcert wittr DDC. The latter too can formulate and executeplarls through them by involving NGOs or launching at leastone programme once a year pertaining to women'sdevdlopment.

Irl this context, the effectiveness of consumer groups isderiVed from the association of common ownership with theproduction and distribution of wealth and power. The landlessand poor can also contribute their labour and other seryicesto gdt a share in the enterprise. If the consumer societ5r doesnot $atis$/ the needs ofthe poor, poor people's participationbecdmes a means for satis$ring the needs of the rich only. Itentalls an ability to enforce discipline among its members,forrdulate and execute plans locally, mobilize resources,maifJain a high morale and strong sense of collectiveidentity glandng all the members a stake in corporareweal[h and reforming the o\rnership, control, regulationand maintenance cost. In seeking to pursue collectiverights, first, a proper separation of efficiency and control intJre $roup must be established, and second, institutionalpoli$r measures which would encourage collective actionmust be maintained. Investment behaviour is determinedby tfansac tion costs, information and risk management.

Pouser to tte People: Decentralization in Nepal 33r

How the institutional behal'iour of members is managed,training interventions made, Ieadership chosen and penaltyis applied for non-compliance are crucial for the mechanismof improvtng accountability and transparency of consumergroup or society.

The criteria of accountability, control, rights andresponsibilities would be determined by the membersthemselves. The scope, status, composition and functionaljurisdiction defined for this group, if successfully carriedout, can really make local government accountable to thepeople, manage productive business akin to cooperafives,develop local capacity for resource mobilization-capital,labour and material and eventually can contribute for thesocio-economic and political transformation of village Nepal.Changing ownership to the benefit of people is the key torealising not only social justice but also enabling them toovercome market fallures which may result from hugeconcentration of productive assets and accountable privatepower. Profit is the buitding block of cooperation . Beneficiariesare the real agents of social change.

NGOs, Civtl Society and Self-help Organisatlons

What are the roles of non-state and non-marketinstitutions in strengthening local self-governance? In ademocracy, continuous participation of people is achievednot through the state ins tutions from above but throughvibrant "third sector" institutions from below which candevelop new forms of collective actions, both to inspiredemocratic disposition of fundamental rights and then tosustain this posiuon against attrition. The non-profit sectorsseek to mediate between people and dominant institutionsof societ5r by strengthening political space, emancipatinggrassroots ini a ves and expressing various needs of localpeople. LGI Acts encourage the formaUon of NGOs and civilsociety with the approval of VDCs and municipalities andinvolve in local development projects those who can also

332 Perspectiues on Soufh Asia

"identiff, formulate, execute, maintain and evaluate", thoseprOjects. Final approval is made by the VDC itself. DDC canprovide technical support for the projects and VDC has toablde by the instruction of NPC and DDC while formulatingand execuflng programmes. The policies and pririciples oflocal self-government stipulate to orient devolution of powertoward transparent, accountable, democratic people-orientedand participatory civil society. The Ministry of Social Welfarereveals that there are 83 INGOS and 370OO NGOs in Nepalwhich spend about 500 million rupees annually fordevelopment efforts in Nepal.

Some of the NGOs are effective in mobilising,conscientising and catalysing the rural peoples involvementin the development process and carryring out community-based relief work. INGOs and NGOs emphasise the role ofintermediary insutuuons, voluntary associations and variousforms of collective action in shaping and institutionalislngpeople's power. Their procedural flodbility and integratedapproach in functioning have enhanced efficacy andlegltimacy by:

. enlar€lrn€ the consciousness of rural people, especiallywomen, the poor and disadvantaged secfions ofsociety,

. social mobilisaton for the identification and executionof small-scale projects,

t organlzing consumers' cornmittees to facilitate servicedemands and delivery,

. accomplishing the programmes in a cost-effectivemanner both in terms of time, personnel and finance,and

. building local capacity for local self-governance

Critics, however, point out that the majority of NGOs andINGOs in Nepal are concentrated mainly in urban areas and

Potuer to the People: Decentralizatian in Nepa|

Kathmandu and they are being controlled by ex-bureaucrats,politicians and the elites. As a result, their plans are notwell adapted to national priorities nor are resources involved

in productive use. In fact, resources are being captured bydevelopment brokers and favoured clients, thus pushing

the people into dependency, debt trap and denuding thepolicy-making prerogatves of people's representatives. They,

therefore, s rggest that t]lre Social Welfare Council coordinate,monitor and evaluate INGOs and NGOs activities in Nepalthrough a One Window Policy. There are, however' twopractical limitations on the functioning of NGOs in Nepal:

the CDO retalns inordinate power over their registration'renewal and abrogation; and the Social Welfare Act 1992

makes it mandatory for every NGO to register with it' whichalso controls the flow of INGO funds to NGO. Do theseconditions help the long-term viability of NGOs in Nepal?

Alternatively, are the policies, Ieaderships and operaUon ofNGOs in Nepalese hands? Can both set of organizations

share a development vision embedded in the needs,

resources, experiences and aspirations of local people? These

questions require a separate study.

Besides NGOs, there are more than 1743 registered Sajha

Societies (cooperatives) which provide a basis for socialisticproduction, service to the rural people and for increasingthe prospects for people's empowerment. Ttrere are a numberof civil society and people's organizations in the form ofmedia, human rig;hts groups, clubs, Guthi, public libraries'literary societies and socio-cultural groupings who voluntarilymobilise capital, labour and material in grassrootsdevelopment, build networks, nurture communication andprotect the citizens from arbitrary decisions of high politicalauthorities, bureaucrats, the police and rich and powerfulpersons, and test the transparency in decision-making.Civil society is a condition of participatory democracy. Ttregreater its operaton among development actors ' the less

the cost of development processes. Yet, the capacity of the

333

334 Perspectiues on South Asr,a

state to shape vibrant civil society and to curtail the capacityof government to undermine local checks and balances ofpower have not been fully established in Nepal so as tonudge decentralization in the right direction.

Concluslon

The diversity of terrain, ethnic groups, social organizationand political networks has facilitated the scope ofdecentralization in Nepal. The inequalities of caste, class,gender and ethnic groups have substantially hindered theextent of people's participation in governance anddevelopment. In a backward economy where two-thirds ofNepalese are consigned to poverty, the strategr of devolutioninvolved the creation of a nurqber of competing sources ofautltority such as civil societf, consumer groups and NGOs,.which can represent tJle interests of diverse sections ofpeople. People in Nepal are not only disorganised but alsosuffer from a lack of knowledge, resources, institutions andleverage for empowerment. The statutory provisions,structural and political cultural factors have underlined thepos$ibiliues of traditional practices of decentrali zation,deconcentration of decision-tnaking and delegation ofauthority, not the genuine devolution of power.

What is more important, however, is granting the localgovernment the autonomous power to legislate, execute andevaluate the process of development and governance withthe HMG and donor agencies plapng only a supportive role.Development projects should also go beyond the power baseof politicians and serve as a psychological lever for theprocesses of social and political transformation. This is theway in which economic deficiency, bureaucratic inertia andpolitical resistance to democratic decentralization can besteadily overcome. Empowerment of local self-governmentcan be attained if people are involved in political decisions,have information to select the plans and projects and possessadequate resources to translate policy in to practice. Unless

Pouer to tle Peopte: Decentralization in Nepal 335

the beneficiaries are linked to the development process,decentralization can only mean that people are just a passiverecipient of goods and services. A true devolution of powerentails local autonomy in production and distribution ofresources and enhanced opportunities for the people forttreir empowerment and social justice.

REFERENCES

Dahal, Dev Raj, State, SoctetA and Deuelopment in Nepoi,Kathmandu: IIDS, f 998.

HMGN, Basic Document of Ninth Plan, 1997-2002, (in Nepali)Kathmandu: National Planning Commission, 1998.

HMGN, Report of Decentralization and Local Self-Government, (inNepali), Lalitpur: High L,evel Decentralization CoordinationCommittee, 1996.

HMGN, The Consitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, Kathmandu:Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, 1990.

Nepal South Asia Center, Humant Deuelopment Report,Kathmandu:NESAC. T988.

Panday, Devendra Raj, 'Administrative Development in a Semi-Dependency: The Experience of Nepal," htblic Administrationond Deuelopment, 9:3, June-August I 989.

Parliamentary Secretariat, Bill Pertaining to Local Self-Gover nment,(in Nepali), Kathmandu: Parliament, 1997.

Shrestha, Tulsi Narayan, "Present and Proposed local Governanceand Decentralizauon Programs in Nepal: A Comparative Analysisin Legal Perspective", paper presented at a seminar onStrengthening Local Self-Governance in Nepal: Inputs forDecentralization Bill, organized by Political Science Associationof Nepal (POLSAN) and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES), inKathmandu, 3O June 1997. Participatory Local GovernanceSystem in Nepal, a paper prepared for Local GovernanceProgramme and Participatory District Development Programme(PDDP) /UNDP, Lalitpur: November 1998.

Perspectfues on South Asia

Shrestha, Tulsi Narayan, and Tirtha Bahadur, Manandhar, Macro-Ehonomic Management and Dacentralized Planning, A StudyReport Submitted to DDSMS, New York: United Nations, 1997.

Uprdty, Hari, "Power to the People", The Rising Nepal, 22 March1996.

Decentralization andDevelopment: The Bangladesh

Experience

Atiur Rahman

The state shall encourage local Government institutionscomposed of representatives of the areas concernedand in such institutions special representation shall begiven, as far as possible, to peasants, workers andwomen.

-Article 9, The ConstttutianoJtlePeople's Reptibtic oJ Barqladesh (GOB, I 988:9).

The government is beyond the purview of Sam4j(community). So we never expected much from thestate. If we wanted something, we had to compromisewith ourfreedoms, Ifthe community becomes dependenton the state, it wlll lose its own bite. This was nevertrue for us. We survived the rules of many kings. TheSam4inever ceased to function. It never allowed outsideintervention for anything, big or small. As a result,

338 Perspectives on SouJh Asia

when the outside rulers left, the Samq continued toprovide its essential services. (Rabindranath Tagore,'Inner Strengf,h' (Bangla).

Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 628, 1993 BS).

1. Introductlon

Bangladesh ln the recent past experienced a multitude ofo(perimentadons on decentralization and rural development,often witnessing cosmetic changes in the format (i.e. numberof tiers, tenure of office, manner of election and compositionof local bodies) of the local government without touching itscontent, Most of these changes have originated from poltticalexpediencies rather than to ensure participatory localgovernance. Decentralization has always been couched as ameans for achieving 'development' and not as an end initself or as a basic human right. As a result, the localgovernment system, the maJor proxy for decentrallzation,has been characterized by:

- highly inadequate mobilization of local resources.

- totat exclusion of and lack of participation in localgovernment bodies by the rural poor.

-marginal commitment to devolution/decentralizationin pracfice. (Siddiqui, 1994: 3r4).

It was hoped that $/ith the return of parliamentarydemocracy in 1991, the scope for elected local governmentswould be increased. But in reality whatever little gains weremade earlier h thfs fteld were wiped out for a myopicpolltical interest of exclusion of the rural rich loyal to theprevlous regknes. This happened at a time when there was arenewed surge in enthusiasm about decentralization andpafrlclpadon worldwide, mainly for ttre following reasons:

D ec entr alizatian and- D eu elap me nt : B anglade sh

With the collapse of the Soviet socialist system whichepitomized centralized political and economicmanagement, the focus shifted to local organizationalstructure.

With the mounting local environmental crisis, theemphasis on decentralized management of naturalresources was gradually increasing.

With a global economic crisis, the preference for massproduction was declining and the success of relativelyIess centralized economies in Europe and East Asiabased on'flexible specialization model' (Schmitz, 1988;Banuri, l99l) was providing added support todecentralization.

However, after the change of the government in lgg6 theemphasis on local governance increased, although ttrerehas been a problem in implemenflng this desire.

2. Benelits of Decentrallzatlon

2. 7. Tlrcoretical Arguments

- Traditlonally under-development was thought to be notdue to lack of resources or technologr, but rather theend result of inability to make add implement collectivedecisions. The 'soft states' (as propounded by Myrdal) ofSouth Asia could not prove effective for development asthey could not make such collective decisions. Insteadthe successful economic performance of East Asiancountries was derived from their superior ability toimplement collective policies and decisions (Banuri,1991). But today such a state centric view is now beingincreasin$y questioned. One argument which is stillattractive is that large groups are not conducive toreaching collective decisions, rather they lead tosurrender of authority to a small number of decision

339

340 Perspectiaes on South Asirl

makers (Olson, 1965). fuain, the groups should not beso small that they cannot derive any benefit from theeconomies of scale. Hence, 'The trick then is to lind theright organizational form for a society in which thedeclsion making unit is small or decentralized enougfito enable the formaflon of legitimate collecflve decisions,and large enough to permit the exploitation of scale ofeconomies and interdependences." (Banuri, 1991, p. 3).

2.2. Empirical Arguments

Several empirical arguments can as well be made tosupport decentrali?ation. These include:

1. The centralized state apparatus is ov€rburdened withdetailed issues. Fundamental government policiescannot be effectively implemented by such anapparatus. Hence, there is a need to divest the centra-lized state's functlons.

2. With the existing drive for rapid globalization, theearlier tendency of modernization and homogenizationof the societ5r under centralized system of the statehas, in fact, further divided most post,colonial societiesinto Anglophile and Vernacular' classes. A vastmajority of the people have been marginallzed anddisenfranchised in the process. Decentralizaflon canhelp re-enfranchise local communifies so that thevcan control immediate decisions.

3. Desplte sigFs of growth in some sectors, the extent ofabsolute rural povert5r has been increasing in countrieslike Bangladesh. The on-going poverty alleviationprogrammes implemented by the centralized statestructure with an inherited bias towards regr.ilatoryfunctions has invariably been experiencingimplementation failureg. Local self-government givingpriority to social mobilization of the rural poor can go

Decentralization and. Deuelopment: Bangladesh 34r

a long way tow'ards countervailing such centralizedstate structures.

The human resource development, pursued so farmainly to achieve some quantitative indicators (e.g.literacy rates, infant mortality rates, life expectancy,emplo5rment, status of women, hospital beds, primaryhealth care facilities, nutrition), has not yet been ableto make a significant impact on the quality of life,This calls for empowerment, a qualitaUve indicator,which can not be ensured by the existing centralizedarrangements.

Concentration of power, prestige and sources of incomegeneration in the urban sector has been furtherencouraging people to migrate to the cities. Unplannedurbanization has been causing congestion and otherkinds of environmental degradation. Decentralizationcan not only reduce the flow of the people from ruralareas to the cities, but also can create an opportunityfor better management of urban problems.

The 'flodble specialization model' of new organizationalforms along with small enterprises, new informationand computer technologr has proved quite successfulin improving both growth and equity in some countries.This model presupposes existence of vibrant localcommunities with strong personalized commitmentto each other. A centralized state structure is contraryto tl-e spirit of this model.

Domestic resource mobilization remains a majorconstraint to development in the Third World countries.Taxation is always a difficult proposition. A fine balancebetween revenue generation and delivery of publicservices can be an acceptable solution to this problem.This requires decentrahzaton.

5.

6.

7.

8. Decentralization can help tailor the development

342 Perspectiue s on South Asra

project/programmes in line with people's needs.

9. The national government can acquire better legltimaryif people get better public services. through localgovernments.

However, despite so many arguments in favour ofdecentralizatlon there are strong criticisms against it aswell. These include: the fean of anarchy; the necessit5r ofcoordinating the actions ofvarious local agencies; ofenforcingcomplizrnce with rules and lhws; of ensuring responsibilityand accountability; of protection of the rights of individualsand smaller groups; and the need to establish mechanismsfor dealing with official negligence, waste, cormption andmisuse of powers. (Banuri, ap. cit.)

Without undermining these criticisms, democratizationof governance still requlres decentralization. It, of course,takes a Iong time to derive tlenefits of decentralization. Allsuccessful models of decentralization were based oncontinuity with the past. But in Bangladesh, ttris continuityhas been missing. Decentrallzation has undergone so manyups and downs, it is nearly impossible to construct a clearpicture of its evolution. Colonial rule surely disrupted thecommunit5r based local self-rrrrle. But the post-colonial rulershave not given the desired priority to this either.

3. Decentralization in Bangladesh: Hlstorical Erperience

The British Raj pursued a policy of night-watchmen andwas primarily interested in the status quo and law andofder adminlstration. Newly introduced European lawsttlough incorporating customary usages regulating theconduct and rights of the members in order to maintain thes{atus quo, did not always prove dynamic enough to suit tothe changing needs of the people. While the earlier Sam4lpfeferred consensus oriented.trudgement, the modern colonialstate tried to commoditise the legal system in re westernimpersonal way. The rural poor particularly got alienated

DecentralEatian and Deuelopment: Bangladesh 343

from the centralized legal and administrative system. Thisdichotomy had serious implications in the subsequentevolution of the local government system in Bangladesh.

Even though a variety of local bodies were established orreformed (e.g., municipal corporations, municipalcommittees. notified area committees, cantonment boards,district boards, union boards) this dichotomy persisted. Thelocal government system could never meaningfullyincorporate the local autonomy.

Although the post-colonial government in Pakistan gave

lip seruice to the issue of local autonomy but successfullymanaged to bypass local authorities while 'doingdevelopment'. Often, bureaucratic controls over theseauthorities were strengthened.

The introduction of Basic Democracies (BD) system witha hierarchy of councils with direct elections to the lowesttier (Union Councils and Committees), and indirect electionsfrom each tier to the next higher council was a signiflcantinitiative. The national parliament and President were alsoto be elected by the local councilors. Only the lowest tier hadan elected chairman. Higher lwel councils were to be chairedby bureaucrats.

The BD system was integrated into developmentadministration at the local level in the early sixties. However,this system was tainted by Ayub Ktran's desire to manipulatethe Iocal power base for his regime stabilization. Thisperception of the system made it all the more unpopularand tfre subsequent struggles for democracy in 1969 andthe liberation war in l97l made BD system an easy target ofattack.

Another tmportant initiative during the sixties was theestablishment of the Academy of Rural Development inComilla under the Ieadership of Akhtar Hamid Khan. Theexperiment, though misused by the centralized state, is still

344 Perspectiues on South Asra

considered to have spawned a number of NGO initiatives inBapgladesh and Pakistan.

After the birth of Bangladesh, the local governments weresuperseded. An attempt was made to recognize the fieldadministration through district governor's scheme in 197b,wittr wide power to the district governors to control theoflicials within t]le districts. However, the scheme could notbe implemented as the then government was brutallyoverthrown by a coup d'€tat.

Ttrough provisions of elected local governments wererevlved after the abolition of one-party system following thecoup the elections of the lowest tier of local governmentswere not held till 1977. During the period of lg75-g2 anattempt was made to organize "Swanirvar Gram Sarkar,' orSelf-sufficient Village Governments. But with theprofnulgation of Martial l,aw in 1981, the experiment forbuilding an alternative to government ended in a fiasco. InI 982 , a Committee for Administrative Reorganization/ Reformwas consfituted, The committee recommended strengtheningloc4l governments. The Upazila system based on the Comillamodel of rural development was introduced in the light ofthe trecommendations of the Committee. Under this systemthe Thana (renamed Upazila) was made the focal point of alladr4inistrative activities. Some elements of devolution werealsd introduced in the system. A clear demarcation wasmade between functions of the national government and theUpaaila Parishad headed by an elected chairman. It alsohad limited powers of raising taxes coupled with sharingcentral revenues. Though officially devolution was proclaimedas the goal of decentralization, there was no legal guaranteeto such a devolution and Upazila parishads remained to bea sulbservient agency of the government. Nor was the systemincorporated in the ConsUtution.

There was a significant increase in governmentexpenditures in the rural areas, especially in the ffeld of

Decentralizatton and Deuelopment: B anglade sh 345

infrastructure development since the introduction of thissystem. Also a administrative set up with elected chairmanof the parishads supported by services of national officerswas established. There was considerable delegation ofauthority to officers at local level, especially the placementof a Judicial office at the Thana level was a significant step.However, there were strong criticisms against the system as

well. The officials themselves did not like the idea ofdevolution and the activities of 'brokers' and touts intensified(Rahman, 1989). Notwithstanding these criticisms, thesystem could have been improved and further democratized.But as is normally the case with any experiment atdecentralization, this one too was abolished abruptly assoon as the government which introduced the system, fell.The system became a victim of partisan politics anddisgruntled field administration further fueled thecontroversy which was already plaguing the system. So yetanother experiment with decentralization experienced anearly demise well before a fair trial was given to the system.Lately, the government of Sheikh Hasina has again optedfor an elected Upazila government by incorporating a

constitutional provision for the same.

Following abolition of the U pazila system, a newcommission was set up which tried to bring back the oldertwo tier structure of district and union councils. Urbanareas, especially the big cities were to be administered by amunicipal corporation. While elections have been held inthe four metropolit-an areas and the elected mayors are nowstruggling hard (without much support from nationaladministrative departments) to function as autonomousbodies, the other Iocal bodies, particularly the rural onesare still not quite active except for the last tier. The presentsystem of local government has been summarized in ChartsI and II.

34q perspectiues on SouthAsia

ChsrtIStruchtre oJ Local Gouernment

MINISTRY OF LGRD &CO-OPERATIVE

nuner- | I URBAN

ZII,A, PARISHAD 6I CITY CORPORATION 4

I UPAZILA PARISHAD 460 I POURASFIAVA 1006CLASS-A=3Ict Ass-B=2gCI"ASS-C=46

UNION PARISTIAD 4449

Chrtrt IIoJ Local Gouernment Bodies and Composition

DISTRICT

'RNMEI{'I'JHAD.3

Decentratization and Deuelopment: Bangladesh 347

The fact remains that because of lack of continuity' step-

motherly attitude of the national bureaucracy and short-term political expediencies, the local institutions, despitesome being elected, are still far from being autonomous oreffective.

The experiences in decentralization in Bangladesh pointout clearly that this cannot be imposed from above and the

benefits of decentralization have to be earned and defended

by grassroots organizations' Decentralization invariablyrequires innovatlon, creativity and flexibility. These elements

are conspicuously lacking in bureaucratic organizafions'which always played the role of midwives in raising thedecentralized structures.

Parallel to the unsuccessful experiments indecentralization by government agencies, Bangladesh in thepast two decades or so witnessed the unfolding of numerousnon-government organizations with significant elements ofdecentralization integrated into their managementstructures. Some of them have formed successful coalitions(e.g., BRAC, Proshika and CARITAS.) with the government

agencies and are now playing useful functions in providing

essential services to the rural poor.

4. The Critlcal Issues

Given the experiences of decentralization both in thegovernment and non-government sectors, it can be safely

argued that despite their numerous benefits, there are some

serious issues which need to be taken up by policy makers

and academics. The issues, to mention a few, are:

1. The ideological issues of whether decentralization is ameans to mere economic development or an end as a politicalaspiration-a basic human need, has to be sorted out.. Ifthis issue can be sorted out, the roles of all other agencies(government organizations, non-government organizations,communlt5r based organization) can be placed accordingly.

Perspecttue s on South Asia

resoufces. So there should be a constitutional guarantee of

2. NI successful models of decentralization had conthuity.Butih Bangladesh policies were changed too frequently andlocal institutions were manipulated for creating iocal 6asesof prfwer by authoritarian regimes at the top. Suchpoliticization in turn provoked legi macy crisis in localgovet'nment systems and their very survival becamevulnqrable with every change of government. So there is aneed for constitutional guarantee for the continuity ofdeceritralized structures.

3. Decentralization is necessary but not sufficient forrural poverty alleviation. It cannot be effective unless ttrereis social mobilization of the rural poor under the banner ofthe ofganizations which can safeguard their own interests.This Dresupposes raising of consciousness of the poor andconstitutional support for such activities from the state. Thefacilitpting role of an animator or catalysts in this respectshould as well be recognized.

4. The successful implementation of decentralizationfenerlfs not only on political and administrative supportbut allso on the continuous and timely availability of

reventhe a

and also the local institutions can be givenority to raise funds through discriminatory user(for publlc sen'ices now given free) which wouldc

5.take

the richer sections of the community to bearhigher costs.

'er of power to local government officials mustsimultaneously with the transfer of powers to thejudici{ry at the local level. All successful socieues with

strong local governments have strong and independentjudici4ries. In Bangladesh this is not the case. Here theseparaltion of the executive branch of administration fromthe ju{iciary has not yet been possible and hence officialsare protected ag?inst judicial proceedings except undercriminhl charges. So a reformed judiciary with adequate

Decentrolization crnd Deuelopment : Banglade sh

power, prestige, independence and financial incenuves is aprerequisite for successful decentralization.

6. The local government should have an elected sub-committee with specilic police powers to supervise internallaw and order.

7 . Lacal self-government bodies should have the authorityto exercise a comprehensive responsibility for the provisionof services and the promotion of social and economicdwelopment areas. They should, therefore, have the authorityto make the NGO and GO activities of their areas accountable(in agreed forms) to them.

8. tocal government officials and national oflicials putunder the disposal of local governments should undergospecial training programmes which try to shape the attitudeof the officials so that they can better serve ttre needs of thelocal people.

9. The length of the tenure of the local government bodiesshould be determined on the basis of tfie size of the electoralcommunity. The smaller the community the shorter shouldbe the tenure.

g. eoasludtng Remarks

The issues raised in the above discussion are quite criticaland the recommendations made will not be easy to implement.Even in the best of circumstances decentralizaUon is a diflicultproposition. Those who traditionally hold power and havebecome accustomed to it, for example, the vast majority ofelites-politicians, administrators, technocrats are notprepared to g;ive up that power voluntarily. So decentralizationcannot simply be written in a project proposal by a well-meaning consultant and be implemented by an equally wellmeaning national government. This requires a change inmindset and sincere political commitment of those in powerat the top . Howwer complex and difficult this may appear, the

349

for a poverty free society cannot perhaps be reelizedt meaningful decentralization.

REFERENCES

Democrotic Decentralization, (mimeo), I9g I .

of Ban$adesb , Thp Constitution oJ tte people' s Repttblbr988.

Khan A.A., "Decentralization for Rural Development in", Bangladesh Journal oJ htblic Admlnistrahon, S:I,

1989.

Tagore; Rabindranath, Collected Works, Vol. II, IggO BS.

PART 4

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights and the Rule ofLaw in Bangladesh

Megfun Guhnthaktata

The situation of human rights and the rule of law inBangladesh ivill be reviewed in thi" pup.r.rnder the followingheads: l. Women's rights as human rights, 2. Ethnic andminority rights, 3. State coercion and parastatal violence,and 4. Freedom of speech.

Ulomen's Rights as Human Rigbts

Women in Bangladesh are subject to various kinds of dis-criminaU on through tie existing laws ofthe country. Alttrougfrthe Constitution gives them equalitywith men in public life,in familymatters like marriage, divorce and inheritance tJreyare ruledbypersonal law sanctified by religious codeswhichdiscriminate against them. The demand for a Uniform FamilyCode has been raised to redress this situation.

Vlolence Against Women

Violence agalnst women may be defined to include acts of

Perspectiues on South Asia

, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats ofacts, coercion and deprivation of liberty (Committee on

ofWomen, 1994). The main causes of violence againstin Bangladesh are economic marginalisation, lack ofto resources, and the dependent status of women.

Vidlence against women is also related structurally topafriarchy and patriarchal norms, structures whichpefpetuate women's subordination in a male-dominantsoQiety. Gender-based violence is perpetrated at manydifferent levels and in many different forms. While thephfsical and psychological needs and the recent trend ofissluingjfaftoas (religious decrees) by village power structuresagainst women who were seen as transgressing the bordersof morality are also important dimensions of gender abuse.There are ambiguities surrounding the questions of violencein Bangladesh. On the one hand, violence against women isheld in repugnance and may provoke outrage. On the otherhand, such violence is accepted, tolerated and in certaincoiltexts, legitimated especially in the case of family violence.Aceording to an official estimate at present there are about50 deaths per thousand women due to pregnancy-relatedcauses and 67 per thousand women due to unnaturalca{rses. On 22 November 1993, the Home Minister disclosedin Parliament that of 2I,622 reported suicides since January1992, women accounted for 12,47O. These suicides arela4gely consequences of dowry and other domestic violence(TIye Dailg Starsub-editorial report, January 1994). Anotherreport states that in 1984 otnt of the total 1993 recordedmrlrder incidents, 273 were caused to women which was 14pgr cent of the total incidents' In most cases, the incidentsare not reported to the proper authorities for one reason oranother.

Crimes against women have been increasing at anal4rming rate. According to data collected by the Ain O

Sa"[ish Kendra, (ASK) (f995,r997), the total number ofinQidents reported has more ttran doubled from 628 to 1995

Humrut Rights and the Ruie oJ Lrtw in Barqladesh 355

to 1,533 in 1997. Among the different forms of crimes, rapewas the most frequently reported. In the last three years,incidents of rape had increased from 8.2 per cent of totalreports of violence in 1995 to 49 percent in 1997. Domesticviolence persists as the largest threat to women's incecurity.Up to 5O per cent of all murders in Bangladesh have beenattributed to marital violence. Causes of marital violenceare attributed to demands for dowry, polygamy, non-paJrmentof dower, custody of children and suspicion of adultery. Yetdomestic violence is not recognised as a crime.

The existing laws which address violence against womenare the Dowry Frohibition Act of 198O, cruelty to women(Deterrent Punishment Act of I 983) , Child Marriage RestraintAct (Amendment Ordinance, 1984), the Muslim FamilyOrdinance 196l (amended n 1985), the Penal Code (2ndAmendment Ordinance ), Family Court Ordinance 1985 andAnti-Terrorism Ordinance 1992. But these laws address thequestion of violence against women in a piecemeal way andhave proved by and large ineffective. This is due to thetendency to avoid rethinking the inherently discriminatorylegal basis of each individual's personal status and theoverhauling of the procedural technicalities which obstructwomen's access to justice. Among some of the changessuggested by women's groups are: (a) legal reforms shouldbe effected only after consultation ahd dialogue with women'sorganisations; and (b) the state must enunciate a clearcommitment to securing equal rights for men and women inall spheres of life, tirough full ratification of UN CEDAWconstitutional guarantees, and the enactment of a UniformPersonal Code (Planning Commission, 1OO1, Vol. 1).

There is a strong need to provide legal aid and support toencourage women's access to justice. In recent years, humanrights organisations have started providing legal assistance,health care and training for female victims of violence.

356 Persqectiues on South Asia

Experience indicates that whatever legal rights are grantedto women, when it comes to enforcing the law, most of themed$t only in theory. Very often the victims or the membersof the vicilm's family cannot seek justice because theirmoves may be disapproved of by the Samg (community) andthey can be ostracised socially. Often they remain silent asthelr demands for Justice may lead to a violent backlash.The roles of legal and administrative agencies frequentlyfavour men and these in turrt discourage the demand forJustice. Their partisan treatrnent poses a threat to justice.However, societal conditions should be created so that crimesof violence against women can be settled properly. Alongwith this, the implementation capacity of all agenciesconcerned has to be increased to deal with gender violence.

Rellgtous Fundamentalism Affectlng Women

TWo successive Martial Law regimes in Bangladeshnecessitated a legitimization of pover. This was accomplishedby the state using Islam as a populist ideologr. Women wereamong the ffrst groups to be affected by this trend, as forexample, in the increasing trends to segregate women. Thegrowing fundamentalist fervour is supported andstrengthened by an establishment which is bent onmalntaining the status quo, both in relation to politics ingeneral and to gender relations in particular. We think thisis leading to newer, more specific forms of violence agalnstwornen: a violence which among other things takes theforms of religious leaders being in a position to order (fatruajar{ burning or whipping or stoning of a woman regardlessof the e.xisting legal institutions. While -;ratrra instigatedviolence showed an increase tiom 23 incidents in 1995 to 28in 1997, the latter amounted to only 1.83 per cent of totalincldents of violence

Trafflcktng of Women and Cllildren

Trafficldng of women and children is one of the obvious

HumrutRighfs andthe Rule oJLaw inBanglndesh 357

indicators of growing poverty. It takes place in two ways: (a)

selling a woman for prostitution both within and outside thecountry; and (b) trafficking of men, women and children forwork outside the country. Here women and children formthe vulnerable group. In most cases where women andchildren get stranded jn foreign lands, often ending up inprison, they are deprived of the minimal services allotted toa refugee by international conventions as neither the homenor the host country acknowledges their edstence. Recentcases show that there is an ever increasing number ofBangladesh women languishing in prisons or engaged inillegal activities in ottrer South Asian countries, especiallyIndia and Pakistan.

According to different sources and information it isestimated that 3OO0 to 5OOO women aged between 9 and 25to 30 years are taken out of this country each year. Itappears from the news published in newspapers, that about15 to 5O women are illegally taken out of Ban$adesh everydaythrough four or five border areas of the country. Some ofthem manage to pass through legally but often with falseiclentification. The Bangladesh Government has respondedto this situation by making it even more diflicult for womenmigrants to seek work outside Bangladesh. This had madethe situation even worse, because owing to economicnecessity, women are driven to work just as male membersof the family and the official restriction which they faceoften drives them to seek illegal means.

According to a joint study by several human rightsorganisations entttled Human Rights in Banglndesh 1997, itwas stated that in that year alone about 820 victims alongwith 195 traffickers were arrested by the police. Of thisnumber 284 were women. 4O6 were male children and inI3O cases sex was not mentioned. Ninety-five girls werebetween 6- 16 years of age. Only 57 cases were filed and theoutcome of these cases were not known, though it is oftenfound that the accused is granted bail and released for lack

358 Perspectiues on South Asia

of evidence. Among the most common reasons for traffickingin women and children were forced prostitution, drugcarrying, domestic work, construction, informal sectormanufacturing, camel racing, organ transplants. TheMinistry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs hasrecommended capital punishment for the crime of trafficking.

Ethnic Violence and Women

An ethnic woman in Bangladesh is subject to three t5pesof discrimination: {a) as a member of her family, (b) as amernber of a patriarchal society, and (c) as a member of anethnic group. One of the most significant indicators of theiroppression is their low literacy rate compared to the rest ofBan$adesh. Also, when inducted into the mainstream ofeducadon, no effort is made to include the traditions,language and culture of these ethnic groups in the curricula.Ettlnic women have special links with the environment andresources, since they tradiUonally inhabit forested tracts ofland. The role they play in the conservation of nature is thussubstantial, but this role is being eroded through theinterdiction of the modern technology and commercialfarffdng of forestry. Family planning is also one of ttrepriority areas of the Bangladesh Government, but the rateof permanent sterilization in the Hill Tracts is higher thanin the plainlands (60 per cent to 20 per cent). This is allegedto be an indication of how the government is using ethnicwofiren as vulnerable targets for ethnic cleansing.

Furthermore the blatant violation of human rigfrts in theChitttagong Hill Tracts has resulted in many incidents ofrape, molestation, harassment and abduction of women bysecurity personnel. In l99O information from one refugeecarnp in India indicated that one in every ten of the totalfemale population had been a victim of rape in the CHT.According to one report, over 94 per cent of ttre alleged casesof t'ape of Jumma women between f99l-f 993 in the CHTwere by security forces. Of these rape allegations, over 4O

Human Rights and the RuLe oJ Lant in Bangladesh 359

per cent of the victims were women under 18. (HWF leaflet'

1995). One case of abduction which drew much media

attention was the abduction of Kalpana Chakma, theOrganising Secretary of Hill Women's Federation who was

reportedly abducted by army personnel on the fateful nightof ll June 1996.

Ethnic and MlnoritY Rtghts

One of the most blatant and well publicised violations of

human rights in Ban$adesh is of course in the CHT ofsoutheast Bangladesh, a hilly area peopled with ethnicgroups like the chakmas, Tripuras, Marmas etc' The

systematic suppression of rights and cultural values ofthese ethnic minorities by the Bangladesh state has been

forcing them to flee the country in large numbers' Militaryoppression has also resulted in armed resistance in theguise of the Shanti Bahini or as formally called the Jana

Samhiti Samiti (JSS).

The maln roots of the crisis on the CHT centres around

the land issue, transfer of population from the plainlands

and the control of administration by non-inhabitants ofCHT. Besides discrimination, deprivaflon and exploitationin social, cultural, economic and political fields and theprogramme of assimilation of the indigenous hill people intothe maj ority Bengalee population are the bones of contendon'

Peace talks were held between the government and theJSS from 1985 to 1997. These talks culminated in tl:esigning of the CHT Peace Agreement between the Government

of Bangladesh and tlee Parbottyo Chattagram Jana SamhitiSamiti (PCJSS) on 2 December 1997. This accord with thesubsequent surrender of arms on lO February 1998 was

hailed by the Bangladesh Government and by many foreigngovernments as a positive step towards maintaining peace

in tlle region. However, nationally the Agreement has created

much controversy and has polarised the political as well as

360 Perspecttues on Soufh Asia

civll society. Ihe government and its supporters regard thetreaty as the best possible settlement of the CHT issue,whlle the mainstream opposition party, the BNp in alliancewitth Jamaat-e-Islam, a right Wing Islamist partjr term it asunconstituflonal, a sell out to the .terrorists'and

above all aviolation of state sovereignty (more because of India'sinvolvemerrt in the conflict as providing both refuge tofleeing civilians and arms to insurgents). In this highlypolarised debate, a faction of the Hill peoples Organisation,those who used to operate within the political boundaries ofthe Bangladesh state as the civilian w.ings of the armedPCISS, (The Phari Gono parishad, The pahario ChattroParishad, the HiIl Womens Federation) expressed theirdissatisfaction over the terms of agreement claiming thatthefr demands weye compromlsed by their leaders. It wasexpected that with the arms surrender, armed confrontationwith the PCJS.S will come to end. But no word was mentionedwithin the treaty or even in the peace process on thequestion of demilitarisation. Three cantonments edst in theareA and three Brlgade headquarters in each district capital.The mainstream opposition has resisted the withdrawal ofarrded forces from the area and the ruling party has beendefensive about it. The reality of the l{ill Tracts is that inovet two decades of virtual milltary rule in these areas, thecivil administration and civil society has been hit hard.There is no sign of this changing overnight. A ministry ofCHT has been set up with a cabinet rankinq ministerheading it. But as reports say their tasks are those ofcoofdinaflon. Stnce the Regional Council nor the recons_tituted Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board existsonly on paper, tJle Ministry is yet to figure out what and whoit must be coordinating with. More important, the power ofthe Regional Council upon which a lot of emphasis wasplaaed prior to the Ag;reement, is curtailed and supersederlby the existing local governrnent structures of DistrictCouncils.

Humart Rights and t]le Rule oJ lano in Bangladesh 361

Past atrocities on the hill people, too have been leftunaddressed. Human rights issues have been swept underthe carpet by official discourse. Crucial questions of landissue and the Bengali settlers is still disputed. Alsopreliminary steps to peace such as confldence buildingmeasures have not been taken by tJle administraton. Mental

attitudes of the dominant Bengalis towards the Hill people

need to change. One has to break out of the 'insurgency'

mode of thinking or else the democratisation process willremain weak.

Communallsm

In the backdrop of the B.JP's assault on the Babri mosque

in India, a reprisal took place against Hindu religiouscommunities in Bangladesh resulting in at least two deaths

and numerous rapes (Amnesty International Report' l99l).'flee government imposed a curfew, but there were complaints

that the police failed to intervene to protect victims from

attacks which continued in some areas during curfew hours.

Although currently the government claims thatBangfadesh serves as the epitome of communal harmony,there are alleged accusations of negative discriminationagainst minorities in government jobs and educationalinstitutions, coercion in the case of disputed properties and

sometimes outright assault, all of which is contribufing to a

high rate of invisible and illegal migration to India.

The Bangladesh Vesting of Property and Assets Ordinance1972 continues to be the prime instrument to be used

against religious minorities, particularly Hindus. Itsuperseded the Enemy Property Ordinance 1969, underwhich the government could take over charge of properties

left behlnd by Hindus, during the war bet-ween India and

Pakistan in 1965. A recent sulwey estimates that the totalarnount of land lost by Hindu households owing to this lawwould be 1.64 niillion acres which is equivalent to 53 per

362 Perspectiues on South Asra

cent of the total land owned by the Hindu community.However the State Minister for Land, Rasheed Mosharrafdisclosed in ttre Parliament on 14 March 1997 that the totalland under VPA was O.72 million acres. Only 15 cases were{Iled for recovery of property in that year.

FortJr-one incidents of violence against minorities (religrousand ethnic) were reported in the press (f997). Of these 18incidents related to grabbing, appropriating or occupyingland belonging to individuals and temples, 12 incidents todesecrations of temples or theft of idols. These acts werecommitted at different times by powerful individuals orgrorups, terrorists, poliUcal leaders and some governmentofflcials, in their private capacity. In some cases, a welcomeresult was the taking of prompt action against the allegedperlpetrators.

Stdte Cocrclon and Parastatal Violence

The failure of the democratic process to run smoothly inBangladesh has been marked by the following characteristics:failure to convert the parliament into a truly sovereign body,failure to make the executive truly accountable to the peopleand ensure people's participation in state-run institutions;and fatlure to implement the rule of law; Consequentlymany unresolved issues have to be settled by'street politcs'i.e., agitation througlr anti-government strikes (in localparlance, this is called horta\, demonstrations and massmeetings. This has led to mass arrests of opposition partyworkers. Cases of police repression and violence are alsorampant. The two legal instrurnents that help to legitlmizestate coercion are the Special Powers Act (SPA) and CurbinAof Terrorist Actlvities 1992 (CTAA).

The Special Powers Act (SPA) empowers the governmentto take special measures for the prevention of certain graveoffences, and for matters connected therew.ith and serves asthe basis for detention without charge and trial. Mere

HumrnRighls andthe Rule oJlnw inBangladesh 363

suspicion of having committed such offences is sufficient to

meet its requirement. There is no provision for representation

by legal counsel; the detained must represent himself or

herself before an Advisory Board which can renew the order

for detention indefinitely. The SPA has been criticised by

successive opposition parties in Bangladesh as the enablingprovislons for administrative detention without due process

of law. The Home Ministry confirmed that over 3,OOO people

are being currently detained under the LSA.

The Curbing of the Terrorist Activities Act promulgated

on I November 1992 intends to cope with offences such as

extortion, obstructing or diverting traffic, harassing or

abducting women and l,iidnapping children. But Amnesty

Internatlonal finds the procedures of the special courts

established under the Act not fully meeting internationalstandards for fair trial. More than 2OO cases have been filed

under this Act against the ethnic people of the Hill Tracts,

tl-e charge being either that they belong to the ShantiBahini or ttrat they sympathise with them.

Parastatal Vlolence

The most incompetent performance of successiveBangladesh governments has been their failure to establish

a rule of law. The situation has hardly differed from thepreceding autocratic rule of Ershad. Terrorism and exLortionpractised by armed gangs of mastaans (thugs) had been one

obnodous feature of the old order which has continued intothe present possibly because not a single political party has

been averse to using these forces for fulfllling their own

interests. The most obvious casualty of this state of affairs

has been campus life. Since students form a highly politicised

pressure group, the student branches of political parties are

empowered through the offering of financial incentives andprovision of arms in order to protect their interest or tleirprospecdve party 'constituencies' as the case may be.

364 Perspectiues on South Asia

Frcedom of SpeGch

Although in terms of the freedom of press, the printmedia have shown si€fis of liberalisation, radio and televisionrenrain under governmental control. Also, indirect pressureis often exerted on the print rnedia through governmentalcorltrol of advertisements. The refusal of the government toacknowledge many of the demands arising from the societyas llegitirnate (for example, the demand to hold trials for thewar criminals of 1971, some of whom are Members ofParliament and political Ieaders of the lundamentalist partyttre Jamaat-e-Islam has e ggravated tensions in the system,often leading to a virtual breakdown of{aw and order.

From the early nineties, a series of attacks on the freetlomof e6pression can be noted. A group of fundamentalists havebeen harassing progressive-minded writers, Journalists, andthose working against the recent trend of.;firtu.ras (religioussertrnons). The government, in support of this group, hadftled cases against naflonal and liberal-nrinded writers andjournalists and issued warrants for their arrest. They havebeen accused of hurting the religious senUurents of thepeople under a criminal code with a maximum punishmentup to two years.

.d warrant for the arrest of the feminist writer TaslimaNastreen was issued on 4 June. It was alleged that in anintenview with an Indian daily, The Statesmatt, she hadasked for the revision of Quranic verses thus hurting thereligious sentiments of the people. In this context, it may bemerltoned that Taslima had already given a rejoinder denyingthe statement. After some initial problem bail had beengrafited to all parties, though for Taslirna Nasreen,international pressure had to be called for in order to giveher safe custody. Currently Taslima Nasreen has returnedto Btrngladesh to visit her mother on her death-bed. But sheis still not free to move about lbeely as the threat from thefundamentalists persists. It may also be mentioned that the

Human Rights and ttle Rule oJ Law in Bangladesh 365

current government has also not withdrawn the chargesagainst her.

'ltre systematic hunt, oh the part of the govermnent totarget writers and intellectuals to hold them responsible formaking blasphemous statements could be construed as aneffort to respond to the pressure created by thefundamentalists demanding the institution of a BlasphemyLaw in the country. Human rights activists have vehementlyresisted pressures for such a Law (modelled as it is on thatenacted in Pakistan), as it would seriously hamper freedomof speech and moreover, give the fundamentalists a legal

instrument to silence any progressive voice and therebyannihilate their enemies.

REFERENCES

ASK, BLA,ST, MLAA and Odhikar, Humnn Rights tn Bonglodesh,1997, Dhaka: UPL, 1998.

Baby, Moudud , Pokistaneg Bangladesher Nari Paclwr' (Trafftcking

Bangladeshi Women in Pakistan), Dhaka: Bangladesh MohilaParishad, 1991.

Meghna Cuhathakurta , Women in Conflict Situations in South

Asia: Tlte Cttittagong HillTracts, Bangladesh, unpublished draftreDort"

Social Justice and HumanRights: Reflections in

Bangladesh Literature

Anisuzzamart

It is difficult to concetve of a period in Bengali literaturewhen the themes of social justice and human rights werenot reflected in one way or the other. These concepts haveundergone a lot of changes with time ald so have theirreflection in our literature. Some of our earliest poets, livingprobably around the tenth century, regretfully pronouncedthat 'the thief and its captor are the same person' or 'thej ackal constantly fights the lion'. The novelist BankimchandraChatte{ee (1838-94) had, under the influence ofAugusteComte and John Stuart Mill, published a pamphlet onequality in 1873 where he tatked of inequality and injusticein tf,re relationship between the rich and the poor, thelandholder and the peasant, the man and the woman.Although he later retracted the work, he did not withdrawsuch other pieces of his writings where he argued that sincethe right of conquest had been conceded by all, the right oftheft should similarly be aclaeowledged. Rabindranath Tagore

Social Jrtstice attd Human Rights : Bangladesh 367

(1861-1941) had a great deal to say, among others, aboutimperialism, aggressive nationalism, autonomy and self-

rule, and the position of women in society. In one of his

most well known Poems, he asks God.

Have I not seen secret malignance strike down thehelpless under the cover of hypocritical ni$ht?

Have I not heard the silenced voice ofjustice weepingin solitude at might's defiant outrages?...

Choked is my voice, mute are my songs to-day, and

darkly my world lies imprisoned in a dismal dream and I

ask thee, O Lord, in tears: 'Hast Thou Thyself forgiven,

hast even Thou loved those who are poisoning Thy air'and blotting out ThY light?'

Qazi Nazrul Islam (1899-1976), acclaimed as the nationalpoet of Bangladesh, had produced a whole bunch ofpoemsunder ttre titles of Samgabadi (1925) and Sarbalnra(L926)where he scrutinized the discriminations all around. kt mequote from some of these Poems:

I sing of equality,

There's nottring greater than a human being,

nothing nobler I

Cast-e, creed, religion-there's no difference

Throughout all ages, all Places,

we're all a manifestation

of our common humanity.

(Translated bg Sqied Kamo,l

I sing of equality

where through our common suffering

368 Perspectiues on South Asia

we're united as one familv.

It's a simple questlon:

We're all children of the same Earth -yet why is it that some of us are kings

while some otfrers, subJects?

A strange philosophy indeed -if I speak this simple truth, my friend,

I'll be charged with sedition.

(T ranslate d bg Kabir Chaw dtang)

My lord, raise your mace ofjustice and punish

Those wealthy and the rich who thrived

Robbing the humble poor and the deprived.

Today the greater the robber, the bigger the thief

and the cleverer the cheat

T?re more honourable, the more distinguished

and the more digniffed his seat

In the assembly of nations.

(T ranslated bg Kabir Ctawdturry)

While travelling in the traiin the other day

I saw a Baboo-Sahab, a member of the so-called gentry.

Throwing down on the ground a person

For the simple reason that he was a coolie.

Tears mshed into my eyes.

Will the poor get beaten like this

Throughout the world and for ever?

SocialJustice and.HumanRights: Banglodesh 369

Will they never conquer their tears and sighs?

The steam engines ttrey run today in terrific speed

Were bought into being by the bones of theseDadhichies',

And now the rich and the aristocrats ride on them

While tJle coolies get crushed beneath.

You answer that the coolies are paid.

Shut up your lips,

you liars and cheats.

Tell me,

How many millions have you made

For yourselves?

And how many pennies have you paid

To the coolies? . . .

But the great day is ahead

When the accumulating debts of ages

Shall have to be repaid .

(Tronslated bA Kobir CtawdhurU)

'Dadhichi sacrificed his llfe to help the gods in distress and thethunder made out of his bones helped the gods to win over thedemons,

You coveted no precious jewels

Your wants could be met

Out of a small earthen bowl.

You only desired quiet and peaceful sleep

3,70 Perspectiues on South Asra

And a litfle cottage, neat and clean,

Lit by a tiny lamp, shedding tender lig;ht.

And, instead.

You found approaching death and disease

And a cunning surreptitious i}ief.(Translated by Kabir Chowdhtug)

Nazrul Islam had somethlng to say about gender equality:

I sing ofequality.

I don't see any difference

between a man and a woman.

(T r anslnte d by S e ed Katna!

The poet, who had sufferedl imprisonment at the hands ofthe foreign ruler, had cautioned ngainst any division amongthe ruled:

You must Iead them to \rictory,

O Captain, my Captain,

The helpless nation is going under water

It does not know how to swlm.

I shall watch tonight

Your determinauon, grirn yet bright,

To free the country from slavery.

'Are thry Hindus or Muslims?,

Who asks ttris question? I say,

Tell hlm, my Captatn,

Social Justice and" Human Rights : Bangladesh 371

The children of the motherland are drowning todav.

{Translated. ba Kabir Clnu:dtury|

These are, indeed, loud and boisterous acclamations,lacking the finesse of some of his ottrer poems and l5rrics.Nonetheless, they made a deep impression on contemporaryreaders and witers and they are still very popular.

The writers of the l93Os and 1940s had carried thethemes further. They wrote about the life of the downtroddenand the lowly, showing that society has compelled them tolive a sub-human life although they have the same desiresand aspirations as any other human being. For instance,SailaJananda Mukherji (1900-76), produced short storiesdepicting, for tJle ftrst time, the life of the labourers in thecoal-ffelds; Premendra Mitra (1904-88), who claimed to be apoet of the blacksmith and the potter and the labourer,wrote on the hitherto neglected life in the slums;Achintyakumar Sengupta (1903-76) offered a picture ofrural Bengali life -marked by want and exploitation; andManik BenerJi (1908-56) gave an incisive treatment of theIife of the fishermen on the banks of the Padma, the beggarson the streets of Calcutta and ttre members of the family ofthe thief. Many of the writers of the day were, to an extent,influenced by contemporarlr European writers and by Marxand Freud as well. During the Bengal famine of 1943, poetsand writers of ftction laid bare the disaster that was broughtupon manby man, and registered their agony and protest ata social system that let it happen.

The question ofsocialj ustice has also evolved around certainissues like those of gender and communal conflict, but thediscrimination between the rich and the poor, the urban andrural people, between the high and mighty and thedowntrodden and helpless has been a recurring theme in ourliterature. Sufia Kamal (b. f 91l), the seniormost of theBan$adesh literary flgures , nearly follows Tagore in her prayer:

372 Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

Listen, O God

Listen to my entreaty for once.

Can you tell me

'ilhy in this beautiful world of yours

There is so much misery,

Why the piteous groans of tortured humanity

Fill the slqy and tfie fotests and the hills?

The paln and the sufferings

Make the world quake,

And salty tears surge in her two eyes

But you are calm, quiet, silent, and undisturbed. ...

How man showers cruel es upon man

And indulges ln tortures and injustices galorel

How passionately he tries to imprison truth

In t]le meshes of vicious falsehood.

' Sordid ugliness and horror

Bare their teeth in a horrible grin,

While your beautifi.rl mother-earth shrieks in fear,

And a dull pallor creeps all over her adgrable body.

(Translated bg Kabir Chotudhurg)

Abul Hossain h. 1922) compiles a list of misfortunes thatbefall hts hero:

The storm destroys my crops now and again,

SocintJustice andHumanRights: Bangtadesh 373

Hut after hut is submerged in floodwater'

And in cities the leaders clash,

The paddy is washed away by the river,

The pulse disappears, cloth is not available,

The winter comes with the bite of a tiger'

And the bitch of a wife gives me a child every year.

Life nevertheless goes on. I baffle my enerdes

And go on increasing the tribe.

Whether I will be mentioned in your poem

Or not is beside the point. l,et me enter the harvest-fieId

And appropriate whatever is within my grasp.

(T ransVtted bg Abu Rrtstlred

The desire to appropriate rvhat he thinks his share denied

cannot, howe-ver, be fulfilled due to the interplay of social

forces. This gives rise to social tensions and rebellions, as

Hasan Hafizur Rahman (b. 1932) notices:

A procession there was,

Of gory resistance throug;hout. -I see today just one face

In the procession, as ifAll faces of mart5rrs havc

Transformed into the quintessential form in this one

face.

Just one face is consPicuous,

With courage and sacrifice written large on it

374 Perspectiues on South Asia

This face in the procession

Is like a flag fluttertng in the air

Holding up rights sovereign,

Sovereign like the sun.

lTranslated bg Moharvnod. Alil

What is of importance here is to notice that the faceappears to represent courage, but not achievement, sacrificeand martyrdom rather than victory and fulfillment. That iswhy Hasan, in another poem, complains of his country:

What you relish is death

Nothing else flatters your palate.

In your careful chronicles

There is room

Not for men of courage,

But for mart5rrs alone.

(Transktted bg Mohf,rrulnd. Alfl

I do not think that the poet is being pessimistic here. Hiswide experience has taught him to be apprehensive, hispefception has led him to look Lreneath the surface, perhaps,deeper into the locus of power.

Zillur Rahman Siddiqui (b. 1928) notices that the men heused to meet in his childhood were hugely built, who appearedto have belonged to the clan of the dinosaurs, who movedlike the demons of fairy tales, whose thick, wrinkled, baredskin looked like that of a buffalo, whose wooden sandals,used only on special occasions, knew the weight of theirhefty trunks, and whose single weight allowed the frailpalmyra rafts to barely alloat, have disappeared.

SoctalJustlce and Human Rights : Bangladesh 375

If now-a-days, I chance to visit

My native vi[age,'I look around,

I do not see them, the dinosaur clan

Rather their progeny, poor petty souls

All cased in little shrivelled bodies,

Bent backs, walking fieldward

In small steps, eating cold rice

of yesternight. And on market days

Crossing the shalry bamboo-bridge

In steps light as a hopping bird's

And on Erd and Bakreed daYs,

As huggings and embracings start

These our men, their brittle frames

Kept hidden under gowny shirts, -Yield fearfully to the friendly hug.

These men, the progeny ofour elders.

Abu Zafar Obaidullah (b. 1934) also speaks about theelders and attempts to connect the past with the future:

I speak of a legend,

I speak of an ancestor

Who had a scar on his back

Flaming like a red hibiscus,

Because he was a slave,

'The two gpeat festivals of the Muslims, when men embraceeach other

376 Perspectiues on South Asra

Shall I be able to speak of poetry like him?

Shall I, like him, be able to speak of freedom?

He would speak of driving the plough deep into theearth,

Of soqring clean seed in the well-drenched land

Of tending the ripening corn like the milch cow,

He would speak of poetry.

Each bead of sweat of one who tills the land is a poem.

Every grain of corn of that tilted land is a poem. ...

He who has the thrill of a budding sprout

Is a poet

He who speaks dreamlike truths

Is a poet

And when men would love each other

Everybody would turn to a poet.

I speak of a legend

I speak of my ancestor

I speak of the restless present

And of the fine struggle in the future.

(Translated bg M. Harun:Lr Rashrzl)

I{afiq Azad (b. 1943) reacts to the famine condition thatappeared in Bangladesh in 1974 in a simple and directdiction and stSrle:

I am content if I get two square meals a day.

I have absolutely no other demand.

SocialJustice andHumanRights: Bangladesh 377

Many persons ask for many things,

Everyone wants a house, a car, money;

some hunger for farne

But my wants are few.

What I ask for is little. I want food.

I feel a burning fire in the pit of my stomach.

What I want is plain and sirnPle:

I want rice. I don't care if it is cold or hot,

Or if the grains are fine or red and coarse

like the rice doled out by ration shops.

I don't care as long as I get

my plateful of rice

If I get two square meals a daY,

I tell you,

I'll give up all other demands of mine. . .

But if you can't satisff this demand of mine,

things wiU go very wrong in your kingdom.

The hungry one does not know

what is right or wrong,

what is good or bad,

he does not know laws, rules or statutes.

I'll unhesitatingly devour

all ttrat I'll find in front of me.

I tell you, nothing will be sPared.

Everything will rush into my jaws.

378 Perspectlues on South Asra

And perchance if I find you before me

you will surely be transformed into a tasty morsell

(Transktted" Aa XaAtr Cfau:afurA)

Mdhadev Saha (b. 1944) believes that a way out of thissituation is to communalize the wealth of a nation:

I shall nation alize all the roses for children,

otherwise they won't get a single flower

I shall, likewise, nationalize land for the peasants

or ttrey too like the children won't be assured of food. . .

I shall nationalize moonlight and happiness,

because, like sorrow, happiness too

eannot be claimed solely by an individual.

believe in the certain victory of equality,

shall nationalize light against darkness

otherwise light vdll never get into the dreary slums.

(Translated bg M. Harunur Rashrd)

The theme of inJustice and inequality in societ5r andexploltation of the common man is more elaborately treatedin fiction. One of the best expositions of the matter is foundin SyQd Waliullah's (1922-7t) Lal SaIu (1949). Like most ofour early novels it has the countr5rside as its background.The central character, Majid, warrders into a village wherethere are more caps than crops. Fle transforrns a crumblinggrave into a shrine, draped with red fabric, a sign of itsholiness. He fully exploits the religious sentiment of thepeopld to his own benefit and cleverly destroys all attemptsto ch4llenge his authority. Khaleq, the landed farmer and

Social Justice and Human Rtghts : BangLade sh

virtual head of the village, whose influence is affected byMajid's entry into the scene, Iinds it convenient to workhand in hand with MaJid, even when the latter forces Khaleqto divorce his wife. Together they concentrate all powers intheir hands and are able to play with the lives of the others.Only Jamila, Majid's young second wife, refuses to behumbled by her husband who chastises her nonetheless. Inhis second novel, Chander Amabasga (1964), Waliullahportrays Quader, son of a well-to-do family, who has becomea dervish. Arif, a tutor in their home, follows him on amoonlit night, Ioses his track, and, after a while, discoversthe murdered body of a young woman. Later, Quader makesArif help him dispose of the body. The knowledge of thecrime weighs heavily on Arifs mind and his attempts to tellthe truth, after being arrested for a crime he did not commit,do not help him. Quader had asked him once what he wouldgain if he is hanged. The police now warn him not to try toharm Quader. And a bewildered Arif keeps on asking himself:what difference does it make to the murdered woman as towho gets punished?

Undoubtedly, Waliullah does not limit himself to thesocial issues in this novel. He focuses, in his typical fashion,on the individual and here the introspection of the individualtakes him far away from gruesome realit5r. Some othernovelists tend to emphasize the social background in whichthe individuals play their role. Abu Ishaq's (b. 1926)Suryadighat Bdn (1955), Showkat Osman's (b. 1917) Janani(f 958) and Shahidulla Kaiser's (1926-71) Sareng Bau(I962)portray the struggle of the downtrodden for existence. Theprotagonists in all the three novels are women-widowed,divorced, or deserted, even if temporarily, and are thusdoubly disadvantaged in a male-dominated world. DariyaBibi in the first mentioned novel becomes a vicfim of lust ofthe newly rich Yakub and ultimately is driven to commitsuicide. Jaigun, in tJ.e second one, is prevented from earning,even by selling eggs, because it contravenes the law of

379

380 Perspectiues on South Asia

purdala and is finally forced to leave the village for anunknown destination. Only Nabitun ln fureng Bau" succeedsin driting away ttre unwanted suitor and increasing hercharrn though she is undernourished.

Novels such as Kashltaner Kanga(1954) by ShamsuddinAbuI Kalam (1926-gn, Adigonta(L914) by Sardar Jainuddin(1918-86) or Seyana {1969) by Satyen Sen (19O7-81), bringsout the strugg,{e of the deprived section of society-be theyffshermen, peasants or thleves. Some others, like Sangsqptak( f 964) by Shahidulla Kaiser, Padma-Meghna-Jamrna. (197 4)by Abu Jafar Shamsuddin (19I1-89), and Ksudha O Astn(1965) by Alauddin Al Azad (b. 1932) deal rvith the eventsthat had swept our society in the immediate past and, in away, reflect its evolution as well as the aspirations of tJlecommon man. Often historical elements arrd legendarycharaoters have been used to reflect the present. VidrohiKdibarta- (1969) by Satyen Sen is a story of revolt in ancientBengal; Chand Bene (1984) by Selina Hossain (b. 1947) isthe story of a legendary character of the bygone days knownfor his courage to face odds; lVrl Rang Ralcta (1969) is basedon thd Blue mutiny in Bengal in the nineteenth century;Alberuni (1969) is the life story of the famous scholar. Allthese bring out the struggle for justice that man has wagedin diffdrent periods of time-a struggle which is most relevantln the contemporary situation. Anrother instance is providedby Kritadaser Hasi (1962) by Showkat Osman. It appearedat a titne when we were reeling under the lirst martial lawadminfistration in Pakistan. The message of the novel is loudand clear: you can buy a slave, bui you can't buy hislaughter; and his struggle to free himself from chains goeson, hoWever mighty you may be.

Many of the characters in our novels conslder educationas a mleans of improving one's lot. There is, however, a greatdeal o[ debate over the merits and demerits of madrasaeducation and general education, on the one hand, and thatof female education, on the other. In Inl SaIu, Majid prevents

Soctal Justice and. Human Rights: Bangladesh 381

Akkas from founding a school and makes others contributeto establish a mosque instead. It is clearly perceived thated"ucatlon cannot be easily and equally available to all invierv of the discrimination between the urban and ruralareas, between men.and women and between people withmeans and those without.

A combination of factors, of which educafion is one,

makes people leave their village for the city with (to borrow a

phrase from Hasan Azizul Huq (b. 1939) , one of our foremost

writers of fiction), 'tears in one eye and avidity in the other'.Thus the countryside is gradually replaced in our laternovels by the city which shapes out as the real centre ofpower. Several novels by Syed Shamsul Huq (b. 1935) deal

with this change and, more particularly, with the life in thecity which liberates people tn mzrny ways, binds them inrnany other ways, but which continues to be unequal. Ttre

liberation of Bangladesh makes the city even more powerfuland different.

Yet Bangladesh is predominanfly a rural land. HasantAbul Hai b. f939) notes in his novels, ?imi (1981) andMalrapurus (19S2), that the power-structure in thecountryside has not undergone any si€inificant change'despite the country's liberation. Landholders secure elective

offices-the chairmanship of the Union Council, for instance,and also the blessings of government officials. Shahed, ateacher in a rural college, who is the central character lnTuni, realizes that the villages are not as idyllic as ttrey areportrayed in literature, and life becomes quite difflcult wittrbad roads and dilapidated culverts, mosquitoes and snakes,

wild plants and bushes, and frequent natural calamities.And then he discovers that much of human misery comes

from fellow human beings, if one can call them that. Hisattempts to change the system end in his violent death'

During one of his visits to the city, Shahed is taken by afrtend, Asif, to Rebecca's posh house. On the way he had to

382 Perspectiues on South Asra

pass by a couple of boys-a shoeblack and anoiher whopicks edibles from a dustbin (this was 1974). Rebecca'shusband, Afzal, is engaged in the export-import business,and Asif suspects, in smuggling as well, which he does notmlnd because Afzal makes contributions to his party fund.Afzal is currenfly on a visit to penang, Hongkong andSingapore, where he was rathel unwilling to take along hiswife, who understands that her presence will interfere withhis pleasure. She is, however, not unhappy, because shehas got other means of enjo5rment. She shudders to think ofthe countryside where she was compelled to take refugeduriqg the liberation war. Recollecting the condition of thetoilets there, she exclaims that, it was better to have beenraped by the invading army. Rebecca and Afzal represenr anew aet of people in Bangladesh who are closer to thecorridors of power.

Shahed's death-and other acts of violence in the twonovel$-reflect the state of human rights, but these arenelther lsolated nor novel incidents. Communal disturbances.figfrts over occupafion of property, clashes among politicalworkers and such other happenings have been noted by theauthors. The worst comes when the state or its agenciesindutge in acts of violence. The rnost notable one was theshootlng of people demanding the status of a state languagefor Bengali on 2l February f 952. It has left an indeliblemark on our literature-the first ergample being tle antholosr,Ek:.ls,he Februnrg (1953), edited by Hasan Hafizur Rahman(1932-83), Arek Falgutt (1969), a novel on the subJect byZahir Raihan (1935-71), ends with t}le promise: .we shallreturn next February, twice in number'. And they have.Many times in the following years. One of the best novels ofthe klnd is Chilekotltar Sepai (l9BZ) by AkhtaruzzamanElias (1943-97), a chronicle of the mass upsurge of 1969when the police and the army cut down many lives. Thehero, Osman, an alienated young man, is confronted withso many deaths around him that he feels the compulsion of

Social Justice and Humatt Rights: Bangladesh

coming out of his shell, in violation of the curfew order. Andthe huge llterature produced in Bangladesh on the war ofllberation portrays the deplorable violation of human rightsall over the country.

The coercion of the state machinery, resultng in violationof human rights, has not, however, ended with the liberatlonof the country. To this has been added the phenomenon ofJatwa-Jtdgement handed down by the self-proclaimedcustodians of public morality and religious principles-which has been directed mostly at women. We shall learnmore about that later.

Our literature has reflected the situation obtaining athome over times. The writers have joined the people whocan claim, in the words of Shamsur Rahman h. 1927), theIeading poet of Bangladesh:

This cataclysm has not put me to flight,

On my own plot of land, defiant

I've stood my ground, and this is

My kind of pride.

(Translated bg ZiUur Rahman Siddrqufl

383

Human Rights and theRule of Law

B.G;Verghese

Human rights, though inherent in life itself, have galnedascendanry and a declaratory unlversality only as a by-product of modern democracy. hor to that the state orrulerwas all, wlth the divine right of kings marking one endof the spectrum and slavery the .other. There were staterights; but individual rlghts quite often scarcely mattered.The French and American revolutions each proclalmed aBill of Rights. Jefferson was to say, "The God that gave uslife, gave us Liberty at the same time" while Paris resoundedto the cry of"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"

T?re notion of collecflve rights progressed from the clanand tribe to the nascent nation-state. Nationalism remainedthe cement of nation-building w.ith human rights seen as agift by a benign state to its citizens. The United States issomewhat unique, but elsewhere in the West, liberaldernocrary as it ls known today did not spdng full-blown. Itemerged incrementally by slow, painful stages, throughstruggle and a long proces$ of economic, soclal and

Human Rights and" the Rule oJ Intu 385

educatonal change. This in turn w-as set in motion by theIndustrial Revolution and the Renaissance and Reformationthat preceded it.

The influence of the church and the occult were not easilyoverthrown. Feudal privilege and resignation to fate shapedcustom and tradidon which remain strong in South Asia'ssflll modernising societies. However, change is discernibleand n'ill not be denied.

Democratisation in South Asia has ushered inrepresentative government with a guarantee of fundamentalrights. The Indian Constitution has a fundamental rightschapter which elaborates on the promise made in thePreamble to secure to all citizens Justice. social. economicand political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faithand worship; Equality of status and opportunitf (and)Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the lndividual and theunity and integrity of the Nation. These rights and freedomsare, however, subject to "reasonable restrictions" in theinterest of "the sovereignty and integrity of India, the securityof the State, friendly relations with foreign states, publicorder, decency or moralit5r, or in rela on to contempt ofcourt, defamation or incitement to an offence".

The test of reasonableness precludes arbitrary restraintswhich have been successfully challenged in court. Judicialactiyism, as some Would have it, or creative rulings by theSupreme Court over the years have widened the ambit ofcivil liberties. Prime arnong these is a judgement that rendersthe basic (democratic) structure of the Constitutionunamendable. The right to life has been interpreted to meannot mere animal existence but a guarantee to life withdignity. The fact of life is therefore not to be divorced fromthe quality of life.

This seminal ruling has had the effect of making thehitherto unenforceable social and economic charter speltout in the Directive Principles of State Policv somewhat akin

386 Perspectiues on Soulh Asia

to fundamental rights. More than just the constitutionalprovisions relating to education, health, nutrition,emplo]rynent and an adequate livelihood, the "life v/ith dignity"test encompasses all these and more in an emerging right tothe fullness of life. In extension of this principle, the Courtshave ruled in favour of caring and compassionaterehabilitation of persons displaced by developmentprogrammes that entail land acquisition or submergence,protection of the environment, consumer rights and amultitude of other concerns.

This is in keeping with international trends and thesteady stream of new covenant$ and instruments that havelaid down standards for or codified best practice in relationto the right to development, education and health; housing;gender rights; the rights of the child; safeguards against thedumping of toxic wastes and so forth. India was a si€Fatoryto the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of HumanRights at their very inception and of ttre subsequentinternational Covenants on Civil and Political Rights andEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights. What has goneunnoticed, however, is that some of these covenants andinstruments have for long not been incorporated intodornestic law, thereby precluding their enforcement. In otlerinstances they prescribe higher standards than stipulatedunder national law.

The Jurisprudential enlargement of rights has disturbedcon$ervatives but has otherwise been welcomed as asignificant step towards empowering the disadvantaged andunderprivileged. The social gap is certainly narrowing.Nevdrtheless, India has not subscribed to the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on Civil and Political Rightswhich would enable any citizen to approach the appropriateUN forum for relief. Doing this may seem a somewhatradical departure in a yet nascent democracy. There is,however, less reason for not ratiliring the Convention onTorture to which India is clearlv committed but which

HumanRights ottdthe RuLe oJInw 387

certain chief ministers are reluctant to accept. Awareness-building and public opinion must be summoned to overcomethese barriers.

A major innovaUon that has translated the enlargementof rights from an aspiration to a realif is public interestlitigation. The poor lack both awareness and the means toseek Justice through esoteric; dilatory and expensive legalprocesses. Each complainant was on his own and noneother could intervene on his behalf without proving Locus

standi or being disregarded as a busybody. This changedwith Courts deciding to take cognisance of third partypefitions, a scrawled complaint on a post card, or even anewspaper report. The citizen's duty to uphold theConstitution was accepted as locus standi in the publicinterest. Having assumed jdrisdiction, the Court issuesnotice to the respondents or appoints independentcommlssioners to discover and present the facts of thematter in order to avoid frivolous acfions. Each adjudicationis thereafter deemed to be a class action applicable to allthose falling within the same broad category.

This revolutionar5r change is buttressed by a strengthenedconstitutional provision providing for free legal aid to indigentparfies to ensure that opportunities for securing justice arenot denied to any citizen try reason of economic or otherdisabilities.

Poverty and illiteracy are polluters of human rights asmuch as of the environment. Hence, even as entitlementsare enlarged and poverty alleviation programmes givengreater reach, these rnust be known to be enjoyed.Transparency has therefore increasingly come to be seen asthe enemy of corruption, privilege and exploitation and aprime means of disseminating relevant knowledge whetherthrough the state, the media or otherwise. The prevelantinformation regime, a legacy of the colonial period, isoostulated on the need to know. which inspires the Official

388 Perspectiues on South Asia

Secrets Act. The trend is to rnove away from opacity to anassertion of the right to know, backed by legislation thatordains access to information. A Right to Information Act,with safeguards for privacy, ls now on the national agenda.

Freedom of ecpression and the right to information waslong seen as a concern of the well-heeled and of littlerelevance to the poor. Nothing could be more mistaken. TheConstitution speaks of freedom of speech and expression(Artlcle 19(1)a), subJect to the .reasonable restrictionsenumerated in Article l9(2). Freedom of speech andexpression, which includes fieedom of the press and ofbroadcasting, was for long thought, even by media personswho should have known better, to be a somewhat limitednewspaper right and something akin to a proprietorial orproperty right. This old-fashioned concept probably derivedfrom t}le early days of the printing press when securitydeposits were demanded against scurillous publication.

It was during India's Emergency, when censorship wasused as the prime instrument of suppressing all rights andfreedoms, that the citizen truly discovered that the media isno more than a professional custodian of the people's rightto know. It also came home to him that without freedom ofexpression, all other freedoms are virtually drained ofsubstance as information and communication constitutettre basis of all knowledge, actrion and responses. The poor,in particular, found that, more than anything else, the lossof the right to protest (speech, association, movement, justiceand access to their chosen representatives) robbed them ofleverage to improve their condition. It is they therefore who,valuing freedom, voted massively in 1977 to disapprove oftJre Emergency and oust Indira Gandhi. Thereafter, thecitiuen more than the media has been most zealous indefending freedom of expresslon-the right to know and theright to dissent.

.Another instance is the developing movement in favour of

HumnnRights and the RuIe oJ lttw 389

legislation mandating access to public information. A groupof villagers in Rajasthan found that large sums supposedlyvoted or earmarked in plans and pronouncements for povert5r

alleviation did not appear to be reaching them. Theyaccordingly demanded access to the records of publicexpenditure and to muster rolls at the village and blocklevel. This was stonewalled until one of the claimants to thisinformation was elected a village functionary and inspectedthe books only to discover t!;rat embez.zlement, fraud andfalsification had been the order of the day, witl. moniesbeing pocketed by vested interests for work not done.

The aggregate of what is lost through "leakage" at thebottom adds up to millions, far more than the largest of"scandals" exposed by the press by several orders ofmagnitude.

The ambit of press freedom as a facet of freedom ofexpression has been steadily enlarged over the years by tJre

Courts which have seen this as a seminal right. The SupremeCourt has ruled against prior restraint or pre-censorship. Ithas also followed the American precedent in stating thatlibel shall not be upheld merely on the ground that anassertion made against an official is untrue. The petitionermust also prove malice and wilful failure to make a reasonable

effort to veriff the facts. This shield is intended to preventwhat the American Courts have called a 'chilling effect" onthe press on the premise that disclosure of malfeasance isin the larger public interest despite the risk ofthe allegationbeing shown to be unfounded on occasion.

It is noteworthy that, in the discourse on human rights,among the newly decolonised aSrd developing nations afterttre second World War, Indi!, uniquely and deliberatelyadopted democracy as it saw this as an instrument formaking an industrial and social revolution rather than asan end product of such a process. It is important to recallthis at a time when affluent nations would impose social

390 Perspectiues on Sotrth Asio.

and political condiflonalities on Third World nations as ameans of securing conformity to given standards, ignoringmuch of their own history.

Though the Human Rights Charter was adopted in 1948as a marker for the post-World War order, the Cold War soonintruded. MaCarthyism was matched by extreme toleranceof some rampant dictatorships around the world dependingon which side of the line they stood. This continued right intothe l98os and lingers on despite the end of the Cold War.

AJI human rights are equal and interdependent and thereis no hierarchy among them. Yet, in some sense, social andeconomic rights are the foundations for the enjoyment anddefence of other rights. Hunger, illiteracy, homelessnessand disease are so basic to "life udth dignity" that theystmply c€rnnot be ignored while insisting on what, for thosewithout, must be second order riglrts. It is instructive thattlre marrlfesto on which the Janata Party won the lgZZpost-Emergency election was tiiled "Both Bread and Liberty".The two go hand in hand.

One does not need to take cover behind any exaggeratedplea of 'Asian values" that has intruded into certain North-South debates; but nor can this be dismissed as whollyirrelevant. Tradition, custom and family values conflnue tounderpin certain human right$ by providing economic andsoclal safety nets in a globalising, Iiberalising world.Transitions need to be smoothened; abrupt changing ofgears can be destabilising.

Democracy as we know it today, and the fundamentalrights that go with it, are products of Western politicaltheOry that accompanied the rise of the nation-state. Territorymattered as much as people whose collective rights werlrepfesented by tlie state. Hence human rights have neverbeen entirely divorced from considerations of nationalsecudty. thls situation actually hardened during the ColdWar when the quesfion was not so much where one stood on

Human Rights and t]ue Ruie oJ Inw 39r

human rights as on whose side you were on'

The end of the Cold War and the decline of communism

saw a change. The Western agenda moved from states'

rigfrts to individual rights. But the emphasis here has been

largely on civil and political rights, important though these

undoubtedly are, to the relative neglect of social, economic

and cultural rig;hts.

Human rights, good governance and a variety of social

condiflonalities have come to the fore. Yet concepts of

nationalism and sovereignty are not obsolete despite

globalisauon, the market and the satellite. The process ofnation-building remains incomplete over much of the

developing world and even elsewhere, especially among plural

societies. Ttre demand for self-determination was justified

in the colonial era but was clearly limited by the United

Nations to colonial territories and was never extended or

intended to cover parts of sovereign states' Nevertheless'

the substance of the demand for sovereign self-determinationcan be fully met by genuine power-sharing at all levels'

India has certainly been rather innovative in regard to thisaspect of political management.

The idea of national integrity'remains strongly rooted and

"national rights' tend to be asserted in situauons of terrorism

and armed insurgency. Nonetheless, humanitarian law

cannot be disregarded and' where contravened, must be

punished. Insurgency cannot be countered solely by bulletsbut more importantly by winning the hearts and minds ofalienated sections of the population. Human rights violationsunless curbed can only aggravate rather than ameliorate

the situation.

Developing societies face yet another problem' The

established order and the vested interests do not necessarily

yreld very easily as the power of entrenched feudalism and

social conservatism is not to be underestimated. It is therefore

necessary to empower the underprivileged' including women'

Perspectiues on South Asia

tribal communities, scheduled castes and other victims ol.social and historical neglect and to organise and mobilisethem to Join together to claim their rights. NGOs can play acatabrtiC role in this task. Here again, the assertion of grouprights is often the pathway to realisation of individual rights.

Similarly, collective rights cannot be ignored in stratifiedand plural societies. Multi-layered groups and minoritiesstruggling for identity and a place in the sun are prone toprotect and promote ethnic, linguistic and other groupidentities along the fault lines. One may not theorise this,but tn many cases it would seem that individual rights arerealisable and actually realised largely within a frameworkof national and group rights. These need not be in conflictwith one another. All these rights can co-exist.

India is about the most diverse countr5r in the world andhas a tradition of tolerance and accommodation which hasenabled it to endure through the millenia as an unbrokencivili$ation. Even today, unlike the United States whichonce professed to be a melting pot, India remains a gardendisthguished by the rich variety of its blooms. Its unity ismaintained by respect for its diversity. The Constitutionsafeguards this diversity and has been flexibly used andinterpreted to meet changing cireumstances.

These safeguards extend to religious, linguistic and ethnicminodUes, scheduled castes and tribes, other backwardclasses and, of course, women. Affirmative action in publicservices and in respect of elective seats in legislaturesthrough reservations has placed these disadvantaged groupson a fast track. While this coruld be justilied and hasundoubtedly served a useful purpose, the question nowasked is how long this should be continued and how far it isprudent to enlarge preferential lists without their becominga crutch and doing injury to the principle of merit. TheCourts have ruled that reservations forJobs and admissionsto edrlcational establishments should not exceed bO per

Hqtman Rights and tte RuLe oJ Iaw

cent, which ceiling has been more or less reached byextending reservation to the "other backward class" category.Pressures to extend reservations to newer categories arebeing increasingly resisted and there is a correspondingdemand for introducing an exit policy with a cut-off dateafter which reseryations should cease.

The spread of education especially the universalisation ofprimary education, with further opportunities for skillbuilding and the growth of employment opportunities, pointto the solution. Reservations are a means and not an end.Education enables citizens to grow and compete while anexpanding job market must invariably place a premium onmerit. This is the direction in which India must move.

The education of the girl-child is crucial for the trueemancipation and empowerment of women, happier andhealthier homes and the making of a demographic transition.The reservation in 1992 of a third of the seats and electiveofftces at all levels of panchayati raj and urban governmentfor women was a revolutionary step in empowering tl.emand promoting gender equity at the base of society andgovernance. This was fully justified. The current move toextend gender reservation upwards to the state legislaturesand Parliament has got embroiled in controversy overreservations (for OBCs and minorities) within that frame-work. It would be better if girls were put to school instead. Ifthis were done, they would find their own way to Parliament.

Indian and Souttr Asian women undoubtedly face a gooddeal of discriminadon in law and life. An unfavourable sexratio and son-preference are obvious examples. Legislationis now being enacted to give women equal title to propertyand loans with their husbands so that they cannot beturned out of home at will in penury. The public outcryagainst usurious dowry, bride burning, female foeticide andrape has compelled ttre state to intervene. The heated debatethat erupts from time to time on legislating a uniform civil

393

394 Perspectirses on South Asra

code has unfortunately taken a communal turn whereas intruth it would strike a powerful blow for gender equity bygranting women equal succession and inheritance rights.

An opflonal national civil code would constitute a goodbeginning. Goa, incidentally, has a uniform civil code whichwas given to it by the Portuquese. This has been stoutlydefended by minority groups after merger against attemptsto revert to denominational personal codes.

Meanwhile, the National Commission for Women plays auseful watchdog role. Apart ftom its consultative status ithas been able to place women's concerns before the nation.

The rights of the child are increasing;ly betng asserted.Prime among these is the right to childhood itself-to acaring home, to health and nutrition, to education, protecdonagainst strenuous, exploitative and noxious work while oftender age, and freedom from abuse. Street children, beggingand child prosfitution are common. Poverf is a majorcausative flactor and where the family by itself cannot provide,the state must. Community action is equally necessarj/, asmorally and materially abandoned children grow up alienatedand criminalised.

There has been a raging debate about the constitutionallymandated promise of free and compulsory education forchlldren up to the age of 14 and the evils of child labour. Itisnot axiomafio that child labour that keeps children fromgoirng to school and that were it barred all children would beat school. Children do help at home and in the fields,tending catfle or fetching fuel and water. Others assist theirpafents in craft production, acquiring hereditary skills thatin turn equip them for life. Craft education is also educationof a kind and Gandhiji's concept of basic education soughtto use crafts as an instrument of learning and a means ofinculcating in the minds of children a sense of the dignity oflabour. Both universal schooling and an end to exploitationof child labour are surely necessary and attainable.

Hunrart R@hts and the Rule oJ Itttu

Education, craft learning and literacy are not all thesame and it should be possible to combine these in formaland informal structures. Adult literacy is important as itcan be nobody's case that a child who could not go to school

should be condemned to lifelong illiteracy. Moreover, a literateparent is more likely to value education and ensure schooling

for his or her child.

India has the largest tribal population in ttre world' some

75 million. They have been singled out for constitutionalprotection and efforts have been made to secure their lands,

forest rights, customary law, language and cultural identity.These safeguards have, however, been breached, especially

in those areas where there has been an intermingling oftribal and non-tribal populations. The Scheduled Castes

and Tribes Commission is charged with the responsibility ofoversight and making an annual report to the President'

This has so far been a somewhat weak instrument and

needs to be rendered more effective.

Tribal and other ethnic minorities have, in areas ofconcentration, been accorded self-determina on throughgrant of statehood as in Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalayaor of autonomous councils as in Tripura, tl-e Darjeeling

Hills, Jharkhand and elsewhere. Scattered tribes in non-

contiguous areas, as in parts of Assam, have also been

vested with a degree of access and participation in decision-

making through tJ'e creation of borderless apex councils.

This is in fact no more than an innovative variant ofpanchayati raj that is intended to give them a due share ofpower in local dweloPment.

Linguistic minoriues have the right to be taught in theirmother tongue at the primary level where the numbers so

warrant. Numerous backward tribal groups have in theirabsence been encouraged to evolve, adopt or adapt a script,grammar and lexicon which has enabled them to develop

their own literature. Ttris has given them a sense of pride

395

396 PerspectiDe s on South Asia.

and identity. The Imphal station ofAll-India Radio broadcastsin some 27 languages, many of them minor languages of theregion, as a cultural obligation.

India is strongly committed to the principle of secularismwith freedom ofreligion and provides constitufional protec onfor its minorities. Secularism implies separafion of churchfrom state and equal respect for all faiths, tJrere being noestablished state religion. Religious and linguistic minorifiesare, however, given the right to establish and administereducational instituflons of their choice. While there hasbeen an unfortunate legacy of communal and caste conflict,which still erupts from time to time, secularism remains thebasls of India's vibrant pluralism. Fundamentalist forceshave sought to sway opinion one way or the other andextremist elements among them have sought to preachnarrow sectarianism. There have been deviaflons from themiddle ground but these have been strongly challengedevery time.

A Minorities Commission was established some yearsago. This is not exactly a grievance mechanism but hasprovided a focal point for looking at matters of concern tothe minorities through its deliberations and annual report.Some would argue that the recognition of minorities hasresulted in minorityism and appeasement at the cost of themajority. They have urged that the Minorities Commissionbe abolished and its functions be taken over by the NationalHuman Rights Commission. The purpose of having a separateMinorities Commission is to avoid overloading the HumanRights Commission which, by the same token, couldotherwise be vested with the functions of the Commissionfor Scheduled Castes and Tritres, the Commissioner forLinguisitc Minorities, the National Commission for Women,the Press Councll and perhaps even the Consumer Council.Coordination has been effected tly making the Chairpersonsof tJre Minorities, SC & ST, and Women's Commissions ex

Human Rights and tte Rule oJ Ittttt

oflicio members of the National Human Rights Commission'

Minority communalism is not unknown and can pose

problems. Secularists, however, argue that while minoritycommunalism can be countered should it arise, majoritycommunalism is a more potent danger as it could lead tofascism. Who is a minorifl The Hindus are a majority inIndia but are a recognised minority in Jammu and Kashmir,Punjab, Nagaland and Mizoram where Muslims' Sikhs and

Christians respectively constitute the majority. But no

majority is a monolithic entity once broken down by gender

or age, rural/urban, language, income and professional

categories. Thus every majority is made up of constituentminorities and vice versa. A minority, separating out' becomes

a new majority only to find other new minorities within itasserting their identity. It requires education to create

awareness about this so that the "majority" and "minority"are not seen, antagonistically, as "the other" but merely as

"another", like oneself.

While the constitutional ethos is entirely secular, theword secularism did not originally figure in the Constitutionexcept in one Article where it was used in the sense of"worldly". It was only in 1976 that the Constitution wasamended to introduce the term "secular" in the Preamble

alongside "Fraternity", the word originally used by theFounding Fathers. Fraternity denotes a wider concept ofbrotherhood and togetherness and avoids any divide'howsoever unintended, between maj ority and minority.Political education and a conscious restoration of the termfraternity would be desirable, coupled with steps to promote

the teaching of comparative religion and cultural appreciationin schools and at the university. Ignorance breeds separatismand conjures up 'threats" which are inimical to rights.

Hindutva, defined as cultural nationalism, may be allright if "Hindu" is understood in its original sense as anyonebelonging to Hindustan or the land of the Indus, Sindhudesh.

397

39E Perspecttues on South Asia

But it becomes narrowly exclusive if defined as a religion,and an "indigenous" religion at that, as opposed to "foreign"religious categories as earlier expounded. But culturalnatlonalism too should not lead to cultural chauvinism thatexcludes little traditions and projects the dominance of a so-called "mainstream" culture, a term often innocen yemployed but not without a pejorative connotation whenused by zealots. Caste is a broader category tJ.at has acquireda new salience with Mandalisation or the extension ofreservations to listed Other Backward Classes during the199Os. Caste preferences or reser-vations were first introducedin tie South early this century. The rise of the Dravidamovement in what is norn' Tamil Nadu dates from thatperiod. The practice spread to western India in the 1960sand l97os. In both cases the process was gradual andhelped uplift certain classes through affirmative action.However, the sudden extension of reservations to wholeclasses of OBCs in 198g caused an upheaval, especially incertain northern states where the issue got communalised.Mandalisation, seen as a ploy to divide the Hindus forpolitical gain, was pitted against what was later labelledHindutva.

Caste has by and large lost its ritual significance and hasincreasingly become a socio-political category. In an economyof strortages rivalries sharpen at the competifive interfacewhere upwardly mobile groups threaten the jobs andopportunties of those who fear being displaced. Nowhere isthis more evident than on the land where feudal privilege isbeing contested and defended by force and violence, as inBihar. The underlying trend, however, is an inexorable andaccelerating transition from caFte to class, a process thatmay take another 2O years to complete.

Despite the constitudonal commitment to human rights,in practice the record is not uniformly good and, in someinstances, depressing. Reference has been made to women

Human Rights and the RuLe oJ I'aw 399

and children. The poor are obviously most disadvantaged asthey lack the social and economic base to assert their civiland political rights. The wider concern, however, comesfrom problems of governance.

The failure of development to keep pace with populationgrowth a;rd urbanisation has led to civic breakdown. Thereis shortage and unemployment. Corruption has caused vastleakages in the delivery of entitlements and services. Thecrimina-l justice system has been under severe strain, withhuge arrears to boot, resulting in the criminalisation ofsociety and politics, the politicisation of crime and electoralmalpractice. The policing system leaves much to be desired.A gulf separates the police from the people and law andorder is under pressure. Prison reform is long overdue, withundertrials overcrowding jails and often serving sentencesfar in excess of the maximum penalty to which they wouldbe subject were they found guilty.

These and many other ills of governance need to bemonitored and corrected and it is for this purpose that theNational Human Rights Commission was set up under theProtection of Human Rights Act 1993. The Commission hasa wide remit to draw attention to whatever "inhibits theenjol'rnent of human rights". It is headed by a former ChiefJustice of India and ottrer men and women of eminence andexperience who are by their charter able to act totallyindependently. While the Commission generally draws onthe resources of the State Governments it also has a Director-General of Investigation who can act independently.

There has been criticism of the fact that the Commissionlacks jurisdiction over the armed forces and para-militaryforces. It can only seek reports relating to these agenciesfrom the Union Government and make recommendationsthereon. This is a legitimate limitation as it would beinadvisable to by-pass the disciplinary processes of theuniformed fighting forces as opposed to the civil police.

400 Perspectiues on South Asia

However, the power to call for information vested in theCqmmission is not a hollow pnocedure but can be salutary.It fs doubtful if any other democratic nation permits eventhls degree of external intru$ion in its armed forces. Thefact of the matter is that the security forces and the NHRChave established a good working rapport. This has heightenedawareness of human rights among the armed forces andtheir external monitoring as an ongoing process.

A reading of successive reponts of the NHRC would suggestthat it has had a positive influence in making all limbs ofgovernment and public policy organs conscious of tieirconstitufional, legal and moral responsibility tc upholdhuman rights. The Commission has set up a reviewcornmittee and in the light of its own experience has alsoproposed several amendment$ to its statute to enhance itseffectiveness. These merit eatnest consideration and suchlegislation as may be required. Five State Human RightsCommissions have been set up and four more are on theanvil. The process of setting up designated human rightscourts to provide accelerated attention to and disposal ofhuman rights cases is also under way.

These measures are laudable. But the more basic task isto speed and improve the processes of development andgovernance so that a rash of htrman rights violations do notoccur in the first instance.

One issue that has agitated sensitive minds is the kind ofhuman rights abuses that take place in situations ofterrorism, militancy, insurgency and ethnic cleansing suchas in Jammu and Kashmir. The state made specialarrangements to ensure newsprint supplies to the srinagarpress and continued giving it official advertisements thatkept it going despite the fact that most editors functionedwith an array of militant guns pointing at them and were orhad to be virulently anti-establishment. Many newspapershad tlreir presses bombed and vans and equipment damaged

Human Rights and tle RuLe oJ lttw 401

or burnt and papers "banned". They suffered intimidationand threats in a variet5r of ways unless ttrey conformed tothe dictates of coercive power. They had little option but toobey. The same happened in Punjab where newsmen faceddire threats to themselves and their families if they failed toreproduce a stream of press notes, announcements, callsfor hartal and so forth by rival terrorist groups. A free press

was manipulated by the gun to undermine the democraticstate. Tolerance levels had to be stretched to the utmost touphold freedom of the press even in these hostilecircumstances.

If the state cannot abdicate its responsibility, neither canlaw and order be maintained or hearts and minds be won byrepressive excesses. These can only further alienate andseemin$y justiff the actions of those who take the law intotheir own hands.

Ttrere has again been criticism of "black laws" such as theDisturbed Areas Act under which the Armed Forces SpecialPowers Act can be invoked for search, seizure, arrest andeven {Iring to overpower militant elements. Under the latterenactment, members of the armed forces do not have to beaccompanied by magistrates and are empowered to open{ire at the command of designated officers even to the extentof causing death. The charge that this vests the armedforces with the right to kill with impunity is quite unfounded.An environment of terrorism and insurgency is not one inwhich normal processes can or do easily operate.Nevertheless, no uniformed force is authorised to commitany kind of wanton brutality. Even under the Armed ForcesSpecial Powers Act, offenders face disciplinary action forany excesses.

The Commission is e\amining whether certain provisionsof these two Acts cannot be modified and made less sweeping.Nonetheless, as of 3l March, 1997, 259 cases had beenregistered against members of the Border Security Force,

402 Perspectil:.es on South Asia

including 12 offtcers. In the case of the Army, provenhuman rights violations have led to 8l personnel beingpunished, including 29 officefs. There is no question ofwro[rgdoers acung with impunity.

Ia.rger issues arise. How does the State deal with thosewho would use the instruments and processes of democracyto destroy democracy. Leading international human rightsorganisaflons were for a time misled into decontextualisingthe situation in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir andunillaterally cri cising the armed forces on the false premisethat terrorists and armed militant groups are beyond thepale and therefore need not be held accountable for humanrigtrts violations. Such exculpation in a perverted senseamounts to gloriSring criminals. Likewise, sections of themedia cultivating militant souroes are sometimes, howsoeverinadvertenfly, responsible for giving currency to highlycoloured versions of events. Such "news", photo opportunitiesand sound-bytes do litfle service to human rig;hts andulflmrately prolong the tragedy of innocent suffering.

The free press and human rights organisations need toensure that they are not used by armed thugs who, inMargaret Thatcher's words, seek the "oxygen of publicity".For the armed marauder who subverts tJle ballot by thebullet, gross allegations of human rights violations are ameans ofbuttressing his cause and vdnning popular supportby painting the state as an abomination. So while the stateloses hearts and minds through human rights excesses, theterrorist seeks to portray all that the State does to maintainpeace and order as violative of human rights throughexa€lgieration and even fabrication. This must be guardedagatnst.

Ttre problem is not limited to acts or threats of violencealone but extends to preaching and promoting extremism,hatred or fundamentaltsm. Cehsorship ,is not the answerand the Indian authorities have not been well advised to

HumatrRights andthe RuIe oJlnw

prevent the distribution of books, sometimes by banning

their import, or ban theatrical performances. The answer to

a bad idea is to persuade people throu$h discussion and

education that there are better options.

Another real problem and dilemma that confrontsdeveloping sociedes such as those in South Asia is dealing

with the envfonment. Survival economics is most often the

hallmark of poverty which is of necessity an enemy of the

environment. The pressure of population and development

itself burdens the environment. Yet much activity that ispolluting or far from sustalnable stems from ignorance, lack

of awareness or from greed and arrogance. This needs

correction. Environmental impacts are most often long telm'even inter-generational, and can be global like the

consequences of greenhouse gases.

At the same time, one must bew-qLre of doomsdayprophecies. Nostalgia for the past should not erode confidence

in t)le future. Small may be beautiful but big is not necessarily

bad. Some would want to preserve tribal communi es as

they are. Surely they must be allowed to choose and helped

to escape the extreme privation that many face even whilepreserving and promoting that which is valuable and

worthwhile in their way of life. Ninety per cent of India s

minerals and the headwaters of many of its rivers are inwhat are tribal homelands. This does not mean thatindustrialisation or water resource development can or should

stop. But lt does suggest the need for new and equitable

partnerships and trade-offs that prevent injury to the affected

peoples whose rights are not expendable' But others have

rights toG*to drinking water, food security through irrigauon'emplo5rment through development and a better quality oflife. Fresenttng some of these issues as absolutes has

generated avoidable controversy and led to eco-fundamentallsm that has not served the environmentalistcause. Development with equity is needed to generate

sustainable employment and incomes.

403

404 Perspecttues on South Asra

Envlronmental rights are illustrative of a whole new classof rights that are being asserted and codifled and beingsubject to a fast evolving envirronmental jurisprudence. Theenvlronmental issue is going to sharpen with populaUongrowth and increasing pollution in the earlier stages ofdevelopment. Waste disposal is becoming a global problemand the richer naflons can no l,onger get away rv.ith dumpingtoxic wastes in or around developing nations.

One of the most sensitive development issues has beendisplacement of populations whose lands are aquired orsubmerged or somehow transformed by development. It isnow established that their resettlement and rehabilitationmust leave them as well even if not better off at the end ofthe day. Differentials in rehabilitation over time and spacehave bred discontent as people compare their lot with others.A national rehabilitation policy for India has now beenprepared after a great deal of discussion and consultationand should provtde a minimum threshold in terms ofstandards and best practice.

The picture of human rights in other parts of South Asiais not very different from that in India though this countryhas been spared the misfortune of military ruli. The countriesof the region share much in common including a not toodissimilar administrafive and legal structure. India has hada iong democratic tradition that has stood it in good stead inprorrofing human rigfrts. The entire nineteenth cenrurysoci,al reform movement and the independence struggleunder Mahatma Gandhi were closely linked to theadvancement of human rights. This institutional basegatiered strength after 1942.

The human rights movement in India has grown and alarge number of organisations are active in a variety of fieldsthrougfiout the country. They have begun to network andhave been successful in focussing attention on a wholerange of issues and have won some notable victories.

HumanRights andtte RuLe oJlaw

The democratisation of governance in the rest of SouthAsia has given a fillip to the growth of a human rightsmovement in the region. The Pakistan Human FightsCommission, a non-government organisation, is a shiningexample of dedication and courage in the face of many odds.

It has illuminated many dark areas, created awareness,mobilised public opinion, used the courts and compelled theauthorities to initiate ameliorative action.

Similar groups and movements are evident in Bangladesh,Sri Lanka and Nepal and all of these have now begun toforge wider links. The Asian Human Rights Commission,based in Hongkong, has on the occasion of the Sothanniversary of the Human Rights Charter, drafted an AsianHuman Rights Chader, a peoples' charter aimed at creatinga popular culture of human rights in Asia and counteringthe notion that human rights are alien to Asian values' Anumber of leading personalities and human rights groupsfrom South Asia participated in drafting it.

A mere listing of the contents of the Asian Human RightsCharter indicates its sweep. The universality of rights andthe duty to protect them is emphasised in sections on theright to life, peace, democracy, cultural identity, freedom ofconscience, development and social justice, conditioned onlyby sustainable development and protection of theenvironment, and the rights of vulnerable groups such as

women, children, differently abled persons, workers,students, and prisoners and political detainees" There arefurther sections on the enforcement ofrights, strengtheningthe framework for rights and a machinery for the entbrcementof rights.

The struggle for human rights is never-ending. SouthAsia is well on its way towards securing a better life for allits people. With a steady redefinition of the role of the statein a globalising world and the rise of civil society, emphasisis shifting from government to governance. The people are

405

Perspectiaes on South Asia

asserting their sovereignty. In so doing they must rememberthat rights are not absolute and are bound by the rights ofothers. Hence rights go with dufles or civil responsibility.

GandhiJi well said that rights flow from duties wellperformed. That too must be remembered.

Strengthening D emocracY inSouth Asia: The Role of Human

Rights and Rule of Law

BeenaSarwar

A rickshawalla in Lahore once told me, 'It doesn't matter

who we vote for. If we vote for Benazir, she is removed from

office, and if we vote for Nawaz, he is removed from office'

And in any case, our lot doesn't change."

He was referring to the recent removal in Paldstan of two

elected governments within three years after over a decade

of martial 1aw, witl: elections for the third about to take

place. But his comment holds tme for all South Asiart

countries, whether or not elected governments are allowed

to take power and fulfill their tenures. The lot of the poor

remains the same, not only in terms of being disadvantaged

in material aspects like food and shelter which are basic

human rights, but also ln being denied other basic rightslike education and emplol'rnent opportunities' It means not

having the protec on of law' being treated as lesser humanbeings by government officials' law enforcement agencies'

408 Perspectiues on South Asrla

and generally by anyone who is materially and sociallybetter off.

Despite the elected governrnents currenfly installed inSouttr Asian countries, the democratic system itas not struckroots. The benefits of democracy, most important of whichare equality of treatment and equality of opportunity, arenot availatle to tJle majority. Even the electoral system haslost credibilit5r. In pahlstan, the separate electorate systemdenies religious minorities their share in governance; and inmarry areas, women are not allowed to exercise their riSht tovote. Voting patterns sUll reflect biradari or comm-unityallegiances rather than political issues.

The theory of democratic governance is derived from theconcept of equality of human beings, and democracy cannotbe strengthened without guaranteeing basic human rightsthat are protected through rule of law which means theavailability and protection of law to all citizens, where lawsconform to contemporary sensibility and are equitable andapplied equally to all, regardless of race, religion, class, orgender. But in South Asia, the rule of law is selectivelyapplied, and works in favour of the rich and the powerful,the politically influential and well_connected. Indeed, mostSouth Asians live in poverty and are denied other rights likeeducation, food, shelter, and equal opportunities. Healthserv.ices are poor, inadequate, and not available to everyone.The status of women is undefmined by deep_rooted genderbiases. Child labour and child marriages are common as aredomestic violence and preferen". io.

"o.r". Women are

murd,ered by in-laws for bringing inadequate dowries. Wtrilefemale infanticide may not be as common as it was before,foetu$es are regularly aborted if they are found to be female.The right to choose spouse is also denied to most peoDle__inextreme cases, those wanung lo marry agajnst their family.swishes are killed or forcibly married off elsewhere.

Add to these, uncontrolled urbanization with its

Human Rights and Rule oflnw

accompanying problems and massive unemployment, andwe have a situation where concepts like democracy, humanrights, and rule of law seem like not a very funny joke. Forthose more concerned with where their next meal is comingfrom, and whether they'll have a roof over their heads thenext day, it's not even a joke, it simply doesn't exist as aconcept.

In South Asia, constitutional guarantees are often deffcientwith many "saving graces" that make laws inefficient, oreasily exploitable to the advantage of those in power. Theyare, for example, qualified by phrases like "in the interest ofmorality", or "in the interest of public order", which can beinterpreted in any one of several ways. In cases tiat are"injurious to the sentiments of Muslims"-what injures oneMuslim's sentiments may have absolutely no interpretation,and sometimes it is just luck that pulls you out of apotentially deadly situation.

In addition, South Asian countries have special laws liketl-e Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA)and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in India, or theSuppression of Terrorist Activities Act in Pakistan, or theMaintenance of Public Order (MPO) which provide specialpowers to the administration or law enforcement agencieson mere suspicion.

Other defects in our legal systems include the inordinatedelays with which cases are settled and the immenseexpenses involved in litigation which ordinarlr citizens cannotafford. Human rights violations often go unredressed becauseHigh Couts are located in large cities, often far away fromthe areas where violations occur. Legislation is alsosometimes circumvented by the executive. This hashappened, for example, in Pakistan with the Special Tribunalswhich themselves are contrary to the rule of law, or withpolitically motivated judicial appointments. Such steps erodethe rule of law, and undermine confidence in the iudiciarv.

409

410 Perspectiues on South Asia

This is a factor in ttre growing lawlessness in our countrieswhere increasing numbers of people are taking the law intoargument that the law is ineffecflve or unjust.

The tegal system in South Asian countries owes much toour common colonial heritage. Many of the laws in ourstatute books are the same as when they were originallyenacted by the British to perpetuate their colonial rule.Since their purpose was mainrtenance of public order andcontaining protest against the government ratJrer ttranJusflceor good governance, many of them deal with freedom ofexpression.

One such example is the Dramatic Performance Act of1857, enacted after a play staged in Calcutta which led topeople coming out lnto the streets in protest against thecolonial. masters. The Act, a sort of censor code for theatre,is generally disregarded. But its very existence means it canbe implemented by authoritarian and repressivegovernments, for example, during military rule in Paliistan,and under the Emergency irnposed by Indira Gandhi inIndia. The Act includes vague clauses relating to theincitement of hatred, creation of law and order situations,and allows the district administration to v/ithhold permissionfor staging a producton, even shutting down the performanceat any time. The Act is an exatnple of how laws can be usedto suppress protest. In contrdst, despite strict censorshiplaws in Pakistan, our {ilms are full of mindless violence andvulgarity. What is censored is meaningful theatre thatquestions the status quo.

According to the Police Act of 186l , the sight of policemenis supposed to instil a sense of fear rather than security inthe populace. The purpose was to preserve the status quorather than provide justice. And since prosecu on restswith the police, there is no independent prosecution.Similarly, the civil service was instituted less to serve andmore to oppress. The collapse of the system after Partition

HumanRights and RtrJ.e oJlttto 411

made things worse.

Laws used as an excuse to suppress people cannot be

considered equitable, and their enforcement cannot be

condoned, simply because they are the law. There are manyunequal and inequitable laws in South Asia, some stemmingfrom our colonial past, enacted to perpetuate colonial rule.They may have been seen as unjust even then, but today'changing times and norms have rendered them completelyarchaic. A hundred years ago, the world placed no moralobligation on tJle British or other colonial rulers to look afterthe interests of those that they governed. The values andstandards of contemporary times are different-or, at least,

they should be.

As Devendra Raj Panday pointed out in South Asia

Dialogue 1991, "Human rights and democracy or simply'good governance' have become a part of the 'new ideologr'toward which the West wishes to push the South, includingSouth Asia. For countries that suffered authoritarian regimes

for a long time, this attitudinal turn of the West would have

been more welcome if it had manifested earlier. Even now,there is no reason to quarrel with this development." (p.378).

Since the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War, thisdevelopment has gathered momentum. Unfortunately, mostof the governments installed in our countries have falleninto the trap of authoritarianism and centralism, so that thepromise of freedom and liberty that was made atIndependence almost 5O years ago still remains elusive.

The denial of human rights in many cases has led to theperpetuation of communal and ethnic conflicts in ourcountries, particularly in cases where people feel that theiridentity, religion or language is endangered. The rise ofcommunal forces in India and the demolition of the Babrimosque, with the devastating riots that followed, are also apart of this pattern. So are the increasingly militant religiousmovements in Pakistan and BanAladesh.

4t2 P er s p ectto e s on S outh Asia

In some cases, the denial of human rights has led toviolent separationist movements or other conflict situations-Kashmir, Assam, Sindh, Sri Lanka. As Bhabani Sen Guptanoted in his paper on Conflict Resolution in South Asia (inthis volume), collective violence movements against the statehave occurred in democracies rather than militarvdictatorships. (p. 282).

Such conflicts divert from the real issues of the people,rooted usually in economic deprivation and unequaldevelopment. The recent uprising in Malakand in northernPaldstan, for example, took place in an area long deprived ofbasics like healttt, education, and emploS,'rnent opportunities.The Afghan War across the border led to a proliferation ofarms and drugs. The region came under the grip of drugbarons and warlords, who also obtained special privilegesunder the exploitative Provincially Administered Tribal Areas(PATA). The Suprerne Court quashed the pAIA regulation asunconstitutional in February this year, leaving anadministrative vacuum, and ammunition in the area alongwith the presence of many tribesmen who had fought in tl.eAfghan war, allowed them to recruit a large armed forceunder the banner of Sharia (Islamic law).

Armed unrest surfacing in border areas also exacerbatesregional tensions, as in the case of Kashmir, Bangladesh,and Sindh. Hostilities increase and militant statements inthe press and electronic media blaming other governmentsfor the conflict divert from the fact that the unrest originallystemmed from political neglect. The other hostilities areused to justi$r unMeidy defenoe budgets. Other problemscrop up when people are displaced from their homes andforced to live in appalling conditions in refugee camps.Among the casualties in these situations are rule of law,human rights, and democracy. This a_lso happens whenpeople are displaced from their homes because of famine,drought, unemploSrment, or crop failures-all of which canbe combated if there is political vision and will.

Human Rights and. Rule oJ Ianu 413

Human rights groups are discouraged or prevented frominvesttgating or commenung on these situauons by theirhome governments who want to avoid being embarrassed inthe international community. The methods ofdiscouragement include accusations of treason, playing intoenemy hands, or falling into the trap of the Western lobby.And when human rights activists in other countries want tojoin hands with activists in the country where violations aretaking place, they are warned not to interfere in the internalmatters of the country.

But there are signs of change, particularly with the growthof education and in areas where NGOs have been workingon community development issues and awareness isincreasing. Such work has ensured that there are at leastpockets in our countries where people are working to improvettreir lives, and in the process becoming aware of theirrights; for example in Karachi, where the Orangi Pilot Project(OPP) has helped people, through small loans and technicaltraining, to improve their living conditions. Skills traininghelped to improve the economic conditions, and the level ofeducaUon increased in the area. Religious or other kinds ofextremism, bigotry, and intolerance died down. When a caseof blasphemy was instigated against OPP's director Dr.Akhtar Hameed Khan-he was accused of being disrespectfulto the Prophet Mohammad, a crime punishable by death inPaldstan-the religious leaders of the area supported himalthough the clergz all over the country was baying for hisblood.

Commurrity development work improves the human rightssituation of the people in terms of better living, housing,eafing, and education. It also raises the self-esteem andawareness levels of basic human rights, making the peopleinvolved into more tolerant human beings; and tolerance isa basic component of democracy. Higher awareness levelsabout human rights leads to greater political participationwhich can strengthen democracy.

414 Perspectives on South Asra

However, such awareness needs to be supported by thelaw itself. For this, the flaws irl our legal system need to beaddressed, along with laws discriminating against religiousminorities, women, children, and other disadvantagedgroups, including political opponents. The inadequateimplementation of Just laws also has long ranging andadverse repercussions on dernocracy, human rights, andrule of law. It is therefore only too obvious that unless thebasic human rights of the people and rule of law are ensured,any talk of democracy will continue to be futile.

Recommendations

Since human rights and the rule of law are basiccomponents of democrary, South Asian countries need tocooperate with each other in developing and fostering thesebas[c doctrines, A lot of work is needed at the national andreglonal levels. This includes:

. Bringing constitutions and laws in harmony with theinternational human rights standards:

. Developing an alternative, equitable South Asian systemof Justice that conforms to international human rigfrtsstandards;

. Forming locally empowered bodies for the redress ofhuman rights violations at the local level since theedsflng legal system is too costly and distant from themasses:

. Lobbying for reductions in defence budgets and reducingtensions between our countries, wittr a view to divertingfunds toward development for the benefit of the people;

. The formation of a South Asian human rights tribunalor court ofjustice which would envisage human rightsviolations as supranational issues wittrout politicalconsiderations:

HumanRights andRde oJIa u: 415

Developing a South Asian model for economic andsocial development, taking into consideration ourcommon problems, assets (for example, manpower),and indigeneous, traditional methods of living;

Demolition of barriers to free travel by ordinary people,free flow of literature and cultural exchanges includingtheatre, art, and lilm;

Awareness raising and sharing solufions about thecornmon nature of our problems, like poverty, illiteracy,the status ofwomen and children, religious intolerance;

Joint strategies and action plans to fight communalismand religious fanaticism;

Economic collaboration including sharing oftechnological skills.

South Asian Perspective onHuman Rights and Environment

l.A. Rehman

HunanRtghts

The debate on human rights has often been disruptedwith the help of shibboleths. Sometimes the modern humanrtghts movement is assailed as an attempt by newly civilisedsocleues to steal the glory of a great religion or an ancientculture and sometjmes as the weapon being used by thinlyveiled neo-colonialists to maintaln their hegemony overdeveloping countries. If nothing else the Western advocatesof human rights are denounced for their hypocrisy, both inthe past and in the present, or human rights priorities aredisputed by preferring development and stability to equityand advancing rhetoric about poverty alleviation as a noblercause than rule of law.

It is humbly submitted that these arguments at thenational level betray South Asian intellectuals'and opinion-makers' disinclination to break out of the pseudo-ideologicalshells within which the states of the reglon have encasedthemselves. Ttrosd in Pakistan who dismiss human ri{hts

Human Rights and Enuironment 4t7

as inferior concepts in a society guided by Islam, and henceunnecessary or irrelevant, are not faithful to Islam. They areonly concerned with the survival of a state structure basedon politicised religion, which not only condemns religiousminorities to a disadvantaged status but also keeps the doorto power open for a privileged priestly class. In India fears ofharm to an ideologised nature of the state and of theconsequences of the empowerment of the disadvantagedbreed conternpt for human rights. In Sri l,anka insistenceon a mythical national unity in the face of manifest diversityIeads to rejection of human rights. And everywhere tJee

movement for human rights is pilloried as a TroJan horseplanted by the West.

Attempts to evolve a regional view of human rights arealso sought to be stalled by raising the bogey of sovereignty.Although the principle of human rights being indivisible isgenerally conceded, ex[ra-territorial support to the victimsof unlawful acts, oppression and discrimination in any ofthe regfon's states is considered violation of its sovereignstatus. That tl.is plea is taken by regimes that acceptforeign patrons' diktat in matters ranging from long-termeconomic plans to power tariff and subsidies denotes ascandalous instance of warped thinking.

It is time that we revised our approach to human rights,took the matter out of controversies born in the period ofEast-West confrontation, and viewed it in national andregional perspectives. Human riglrts is not a matter separatefrom the supposedly more serious issues that we have beentrying to tackle, such as problems of democratlsation, inter-state conflicts, dangers of militarisation, denial of minorityrights, miscarriage of justice, rise of fundamentalist forces,and impoverishment of the under-privileged. It is a mattercentral to aII these issues. It should not be impossible torealise that acceptance of the basic human rights of allindividuals, groups, minorifies (of all definitions) and sociallyand economically disadvantaged people offers the only firm

4LA

foundations for raising orders based on democracy, justiceand equity. Is it necessary to remind ourselves that likemany other nations across the seven con nents, we owe ourindependence neither to religious belief nor culture, it wasinspired essentially by the acknowledgement of theinali,enable right of all people to live in freedom and to begwerned by persons of their choice?

There is thus urgent need for this Dialogue to throw up aconsensus that national and regional struggles for humanrights constitute a bedrock of all efforts at ameliorating thepeople's condition in all respects-political, social, economicand cultural. Instead of taking a rather narrow view ofhuman rights activity, as a means of redressing the wrongsbeing done to large masses of people, we must adopt it as apositive force capable of realislng our ideals of just anddynamic social orders.

This consensus should be supported by a clearidentiftcation of objectives and tasks the group gathered inthis Dialogue may itself pursLle or motivate likemindedbodies to do so at both national and regional levels.

At the top of the agenda is the need to redefine the humanrlghts commitments of the state, The claim of all our statesto having incorporated the provisions of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights irl their constitutions is notwholly valid. The fundamental rights in these documentsfall short in many cases of the more recent exposition ofhuman rights. In some areas where concepts and valuesneed to be refurbished, such as the right to life, the right tofreedom of expression, and the right to equality before law,some improvemepts have been made by the judiciary, butquite a few rights are still shrouded in mist. National studieson the possibilities of widening the human rights base of thepolity, Ieading to comparative analyses and the evolution ofa model enforceable in all the South Asian countries. shouldbe quite rewarding.

Human Rights and Eftuirorvrunt 419

Off and on we have been talking about a charter ofhuman rights which could be made binding on all themembers of ttle South Asian family. The discussion usuallygets lost in controversies over the desirability or effectivenessof ratifying/respecting international conventions andprotocols. We cannot go on protecting our prejudices underendless semantics. If our religions or cultural or politicalarrogance prevents adherence to international standards,whose authorship and custody we thoughtlessly attribute toalien forces with a dubious past, then let us adopt a charterwhich not only accommodates our indigenous pride but alsoguarantees our people's human rights at a higher scale thanthe international one.

Then there is need to use our national experiences ofgross violations of human rights for comparative studiesand for developing a collective response. As a Pakistani I amashamed of extra-judicial killings in my country, of thefunctioning of special courts with built-in contradictionswith the minimum requirements of justice, of the blatantdenial of basic human rights to the minorities, and of thecircumstances that have dehumanised the disadvantagedand pushed them into the abyss of despair. It is noconsolation to me that similar things are happening in othercountries ofthe region or farther away. And I am sure all thedistinguished members of this Dialogue have better,credentials and capacity to articulate their own tribulations.Is our commitment to the ideals of the dignity of humanbeings not strong enough to enable us to do some plainspeaking amongst ourselves, regardless of what ourgovernments say, and devise a plan to jointly study all laws,regulations, procedures, and customs that permit or condoneextra-judicial killings, persecution of minorities, denial ofdue processes of law, and perpetuation of social and economicbondage?

Of course, the task of implementing a South Asian visionbased on human rights, democracy, and equity is full of

Perspecttues on South Asia.

hazards. The proposal for a South Asian Court of HumanRights is very much on ouf minds. But one should notunderestimate the hurdles orrr the way. For one thing, sucha forum can only follow the adoption of an agreed set ofhuman rights standards. For another, human rig;hts issuesin several countries of the region have been polluted byinter-state disputes/disagreements. Nevertheless, ttreattempt to move towards a sirrrultaneous accord on delinkinghuman riglts issues from infer-state disputes, and settingup a regional court under a South Asian human rightscharter is worth making. However, greater reliance shouldbe put on disseminating a belief in the inviolability ofhuman rights of all peoples of South Asia and theinterdependence of their destinies.

That these tasks demand approaches to governments,collectively as well as severally, encouragement of non-gwernmental organisafions, and initiatives by the presentgroup are obviously a matter of detail. Discussion on thesepoints should follow an agreernent on a broad framework forand the direction of our effort.

Envlronment

A perceptive Indian journalist once described the peoplelivlng in our subcontinent as the children of Himalayanrahges from which we receive the life-giving waters. We mayadd the winds that bring to all our lands the tidings ofrebirth. We have not yet been able to fight over winds andclouds but we have certainly made a hash of our Himalayaninheritance, though unlike human rights, disagreementsover resources, which constitute most of what the debate onenvironment ls about, have often been communalised.Disagreements can still be treated at a sub-ideolopical level.This should facilitate quicker appreciaUon of environmentalimperatives at both national and regional pianes.

At present responses in the tegion to environmental issues

Human Rights and Enuironment 42L

present an uneven scene. In most countries (India,Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) the state is laggingbehind NGO activit5r whereas Pakistan can boast of a NatlonalConservation Stratesr without adequate backing from eitherthe state apparatus or broad-based NGOs. In aII countries ahealthy debate on environment has been dissipated by abarren controversy over West's supposed designs to keepthe Third World under-developed or over the choice betweendevelopment and environment.

This Dialogue should be seriously concerned at the factthat our region is la qging behind in benefiting not only fromttre international advances on environment but also suchregional iniuatives as envisaged in the Bamako Conventionand Arusha Declaration in Africa, the Arab Declaration onEnvironment and Development, and the Latin Americanand Caribbean Declaration. Pakistan may have ratified theConvention on the Rights of the Child but it is doubtful ifthe authorities have even taken note of its provision thateducation of children should endeavour to inculcate respectfor natural environment.

I am sure the participants of the present Dialogue do notneed to be informed of the link between environment andhuman rights, human progress and happiness. This areapresents fewer contentious points than human rights, forinstance. One may therefore proceed to identi$r some areaswhere Dialogue initiatives can bear fruit.

All of us have to strive to get the right to a healthy,natural environment, in its broadest sense, recognised innational constitutions. In a July 1992 UN study of nationalprovisions on environment, India is mentioned as the onlycountry in South Asia whose constitufion, thanks to a 1985amendment, obliges the state to "endeavour to protect andimprove the environment and to safeguard the forests andwildlife of the country" and enjoins every citizen of India "toprotect and improve the natural endronment, comprised of

422 Perspect :es on Sou1h Asia

the forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife, and to have compassionfor living creatures". One could add Sri Lanka to the list.But in Pakistan the call by the non-official Human RightsCommission to include the right to environment in the listof fundamental rights has rem4ined unheeded. The Islamistshere do not even care to look at the Iranian Constituflonwhich forbids "economic activities, and other activities whichmay pollute tJle environment or destroy it irrevocably".

It ls necessar5r not only to secure recogni on of the rightto environment as a constitutional right but also tocomprehend it adequately. The Indian definition, too, isquite narrow as it does not cdver all the natural resourcesand excludes human habitat and cultural heritage. Onemay not be as elaborate in the Constitution as Brazil orAlgeria but perhaps something can be learnt from BurkinaFaso whose Consfltution declares:

':Ihe right to a healthy environment shall be recogFised;the'protection, defence and promotion of the environmentshall be a duty for all. Every citizen shall have the right to

. initiate an action or to join a collective action under theform of a petltion against th6se acts:-harming the publicheritage; harming the intetests of social communitles;harming the environment or the cultural or artisticheritage. "

The evolution of model constitutional provisions suitedand acceptable to all countries of the region and attalnmgntof possible levels of uniformity in national legislations onenvlronment should be a fruitful exercise for the Dialogueparticipants, collectively as well as severally. One shouldalso explore the possibilities of goading the SAARCcommittees, which are concerned with some of theenvironmental issues under such heads as agriculture, intoa keener appreciafion of the consequences of environmentaldegradaUon.

Humart Rights and Enuironment 423

Our states have for long been entangled in disputes over

sharing of river waters. Perhaps joint regional committees ofnon-official experts would find hammering out of agpeements

less frustrating.

Some other points for consideration are:

1. Countries of the region could collaborate on evolvingcommon strategies and regulations to regulate theimpact of industrialisation on the environment.

2. "Ilte impact of major civil works, such as irrigation/power dams, on ecologr and people's heritage couldbe jointly studied.

3. Management and control ofdisasters caused by naturalfactors could be examined.

4. The inter-state warning system in flood seasons couldbe improved.

5. Environmental damage caused by cross-borderrdgrations could be jointly tackled.

6. Countries ofthe region could exchange data on urbanpollution, waste-disposal, river-drainage, anddeforestation and learn from one another'sachievement and setbacks.

PART 5

WOMBNAND CULTURE

Women in the ContemporaryArt World of Bangladesh:

Images and Reality

Lala Rukh Selim

The art of this region has a long and wonderful past, As partof the sub-confinent, Bengal shared various trends in artthat developed and flourished in the rest oflndia. Regionaldistinctlon also found expression in the arts of Bengal atdifferent times with the changing socio-political context.

As in the rest of the world, the changing socio-economicstatus of women has found expression in the arts of thisland. Women as bearers of life, qrmbols of fertillty, mysteriousand powerfirl beings, have from the very begfnning fascinated,perplexed and overawed men. Worship of the fertility ofnature, onwhich humanity depended, dweloped and fertilityltself has been embodled in the form of the pregnanr wofiran,the mother goddess. With the advent of civilisation andchanging cultures and values, women have always featuredin art as society, and in most cases, patriarchal society haschosen to depict ttrem, The role of women in the'high'arts

428 Perspecthses on South Asra

has always been determined try men while the folk orpopular arts have been relativelj less restricted as they havesometimes been practised by womenfolk themselves andhave shown the women's perspective in different cultures.This same pattern weaves the fabric of our ovrn art world.

The appearance of Islam in Bengal caused a break withthe past traditions. Islam frowned upon tJre ligure in art.Culture became compartmentalised into Muslim and non-Muslim culture. Things became further complicated iviththe arrival of the British, who, flaced very little value in thewealth of art teeming in ttris part of the world. They set uptheir own art institutes to train people not to be artists butto create a new group of craftsmen who would facilitatetheir work . Thus, the line arts developed, as in all cultures,from ritualistic, religious or political needs. Witl. the Britishacademic schools that were set up in different parts of thesub-continent, the artist community encountered their higlrlyformalised, rigid schooling. These academies were rarelyattended by Muslims as Islam is intolerant of art andwomen dabbling in tiis field was out of question. Thuswomen have only recently stepped into the arena of fine art.We see no women among the first generation of artists whoIaid the foundation of the modern art movement ofBangladesh. We hear of no women students studying in theGovernment School of Arts, Calcutta, parallel to ZainulAbedin, Quamrul Hassan, Shaliqddin Ahmed or S.M. Sultan,who were the pioneers of modern Bangladeshi art.

With the Partition of Bengal and the birth of Pakistan theissues of national identity and integrit5r became furtherdisjointed. Were we Muslims first or Bengalis first? Whichroots should we recognise and follov/? Religious values werestric y imposed to bind East arrd West Pakistan togetherwhere almost no other common boundaries odsted.

The Government Institute of Arts was established inDhaka in 1948 after the Partition of Bengal. Zainul Abedin

Women in tte Conlemporaty Art World: Bangladesh 429

was instrumental behind the founding of the institute. Thefirst batch of female students joined it in 1954. They wereTahera Khanam, Rawshan Ara, Zubaida Akter Khatun,Syeda Moyeena Ahsan and Hasina Ali.r They were notordinaqr girls fiom ordinary families. They had the courageto stand up to being regarded from under raised eyebrowswhich must have followed ttrem around in those conservativetimes. However, they could not go on to become successfulartists. We have examples of women getung admitted toleave the course unffnished and some who actually completedthe course never to put their training to any creative use.Somehow the bondage of marriage, family, children and arthas not proven a good combination, at least for women.Social pressure and the duties and obligations of the familycan never be conducive to the concentration. dedicationand, above all else, the constant practice that is a must forthe creative process to work. The creative process requirestJre harmony of vision, intuition and execution withoutwhich true art cannot be created. For men are allowed toearn the bread and remain in the position of a remoteoutsider from other family duties. Not so for women. Eventoday the economically independent woman is more harassedthan in the past with the effort to synttresize her differentworlds of the home, the workplace and at the same tlmetapping her creativit5r for the flow of art.

It is interesting to note that the first woman to leave hermark in the modern art movement of Bangladesh was asocial outsider, Novera Ahmed. Novera Ahmed's appearancein the art scene of Bangladesh was not the culmination ofsocial events which made the appearance of a woman artistinevitable or acceptable. She had no antecedents and left noimmediate predecessors. She created a turmoil in her timesso that whoever who was in any way connected with culturalmatters knew of her presence. Her presence was no commonpresencet ". . . I Noveral appeared as an apparition, aspectre. On closer view, it was a small, intense woman,

430 Perspecttues on South Asio-

dressed severely in black, with a bead necklace around herneck and no other ornament, penetrating eyes and amysterious mien, that reminded one of the priestess of along forgotten cult, a votaress in a temple."2 These are thewords of Abdus Salam, editor of Pokistan Obseruer writtenin the catalogue printed for the first exhibition of sculpturesin this country by Novera in 1960.

Novera was born in l93O in a culturally inclined family.She learnt to sing and dance and grew up watching her mottrermake clay models. This probably dictated the decidedly'unfeminine' calling she chose in life. As a young woman shewas married off to an eligible suitor but she rebelled againstthe marriage to go away to her elder sisterwho lived in Londonostensibly to study Sociologr. She enrolled in t]le CamberwellSchool ofArts and Crafts in London to study sculpture underSir Jacob Epstein and chose to come back to former EastPakistan after she finished her course. In Dhaka she livedalone, kept no contact with her relatives to protect herindependence and commenced her solitary battle to createsculpture in a land where it was totally new territory, andwhere itwas feared that itwould be considered irreligious andunacceptable. It was she who created the first outdoorsculpture and the first frieze orr the wall of a public edificewhich alone should have given her a place as a forerunner inthe field of art. In the words of Zainul Abedin in the catalogueof Novera's first exhibition, " In East Pakistan's art world, itwas a minor revolution, when Novera Ahmed gave the city thefirst frieze on the wall of the Central Public Library in 1957and then the first open air sculpture in 1958. We, the citizensof Dacca. have been living with this lSic.l two magnilicentwork [sic.] for lthel past few year's. But I still think, we shalltake generations to assess the impact of these two work [Sic.lin our artlife."3Alas, ZainulAbedin's words have been provenprophetic because even after almost for[r years have elapsed,we are still unable to correctly evaluate and acknowledge thehistorical and aesthetic significzince of these two works and

Women in the 9ontemporary Art World: Bangladesh 431

the body ofworks that Novera lelt behind in this cilr of Dhakawhen she left it forever, disillusioned, rejected and perhapsdishearterred. She had her dreams, the dreams of buildin! acity enlivened with sculptures and other works ofart to createcitizens enlightened by them, "We must ignite among ourpeople the spark ofcuriosity, about the innervisions, meaningsand truths of life, which can come only by bringing art withinthe horizon of our city life."4

Apart from tle challenge of establishing sculpture as anart form, creating her own language which would at thesame time spring from the roots of her own culture, thewhole process of coming to terms with her medium musthave been considerable for Novera. She was used to workingin an institute with all modern facilities of models, materialsand technicalities and came to Dhaka to find it barrenindeed in these areas. She remoulded her methods ofexecution and her forms to suit the conclitions and materialsthat she had at hand and within a very short space of timesuccessfully created her own language.

In Dhaka in those days of political f-ervour ancl activismshe must also have been part of the surging nationalisticzeal which was born after the Language Movement of \g52.Novera chose to look eastward to her orvn tradition whenshe struggled to create her Ibrms and images. Thus we findfbrms captured from the tblk dolls of our iegion simplified,exaggerated and activated by her skilful analysis and herpresence. Village dwellers were often her source of inspiration.Her work testifies to the struggle to combine her westernschooling with the spirit of national identity. Even thoughshe was a very individualistic artist and a very privateperson with her sculpture created for herself alone. she wasnot unconscious of her social obligations as a responsibleand conscious person. She was deeply involved in theplanning of the Shaheed Minar.s

432 Persoectiue s on South Asra

The fascinating part about Novera's work is the image ofwoman. We see her generation of male artists struggling tocombine the voluptuous sensrLrality of European females witha romanucising of women so ptrevalent in our country. Stilted ,

suggestive scenes of rural women bathing in clinging drapery,at their toilet with comb or mirror, sniffing a bloom, etc.Women were resolutely kept out of the world of activity. Otherthan this the image of Mcu motherhood, an eastern conceptwhich is the saving grace that gives woman an elevated statusin this part of the world, is the prevailing one. In ZainulAbedin's famous famine sketdhes we do see women as a partof the vast sea of suffering humanity devoid of sentimentalityand all other western or eastern feminine attributes.Occasionally we even gaze into the face of a pensive womanin his paintings because he was a compassionate and feelingperson with a concern for people irrespective of sex. Yet thecharacteristic womarl is definitely not one 'in action'.

Quamrul Hassan is a completely different matter, choosinghimself as the focus, all his women are his. Either hismother, wife or daughter. Derroid of individuality, they arecreated with the sole idea of pleasing others. These twomajor artists are mentioned here as examples of the femaleimage in the eyes of male artists to compare with Novera'sfemale images.

Novera Ahmed's work shows the female in a totally differentlight from the eyes of men. Her female forms are not seenthrough the idealising focus we notice in men' In her groups

men and women are seen as units coming together to form awhole, to create a compositional design. What is a distinctivefeature in Novera's work is her effort to go beyond thecreation of superficial and pleasing forms. She wanted topeel her forms of all excesses to present her vision and herstatement in meanlngf,ul, simple and original terms. This isno easy task because one has to rely on the truth of theconcept much more than on the skill of the craftsmanship.She was definitely interested in presenting certain ideals

Women in the Contemporary Aft World: Bangladesh 433

and on occasion, reality. She had the driving force of her

convictions and her total concentration on her art alone inher position as the eccentric outsider that gave her thepower to relenflessly keep at her work and explore new

territory witJl her inner gaze. Wtlen Novera created women

in sculpture she stripped the images of all sentimentality tocreate forms of real women, stubborn, determined, with afrank eroticism such as we see in "The l,ong Wait". Her

mothers are not pretty but are strong, bold and struggling'

Often they go beyond the realm of mere individual feeling tobecome symbols of mankind. As Merv)'n Marshall of En$andsaid of this piece, "The l,ong Wait" is a typical example ofNovera's work. In this basic, primitive oufline, one feels the

longing and the despair the resignation and resolution of a

whole people waiting for deliverance!'G

Unfortunately enough tJle efforts of Novera have till nowfound very little appreciation in our art world and ZainulAbedin's words echo down througlr the years as the bittertruth. One questions oneself: why was Novera forgotten?

Would she havb been allowed to sink from sight as she did ifshe had been a male? What happened to the'1OO pieces'7 ofsculpture that find mention in the 1960 catalogue of herexhibition? Why was she compelled to leave the countrywhile many other artists (and many of lesser merit) foundfame and social acclaim?

Novera's crimes were many. For a beginning she was awoman and a beautiful one at that and again she was bornin the 1930s. She chose sculpture as her calling and not thebetter accepted painting. She was delightfully bohemian'unable to conform to any social norms and could not be

judged by them. Her eccentricities were not pretensions toattract attention, they were actual demonstrations of herconcept of life, how she wanted to be and was. She was nota successful public relations person, she could not markether work wittrout which quality it is almost impossible to be

a successful artist. She was honest and she was what she

434 Perspectiues on South Asia

was. What happened was that men were fascinated by herbecause she was beautiful and extraordinarily uninhibited.As a result when one talks of Novera with her contemporarymales they speak at length on Novera as a personality buthave very little to say of her work which seimed minor tothem in comparison to her persona. Many wish to dismissher work as the useless exerci$es of a flighty female. I mayadd that this has gone to ilre advantage ofthose who wishedto be recognised as pioneers of areas which were alreadycovered by Novera years agol Thus the Novera phenomenonis resolutely a skeleton in the cupboard, an example of howfacts are ffltered through the \r'ision of those in power. Hername is not to be mentioned in the academies that teach artin our country. Some of her ,lOO pieces, stand maimed andbroken and have only very recently been collected by theNational Museum which orgahised an exhibition of herworks in April 1998. This exhibition has to a certain extentunderlined the importance of Novera. If she had been a manwould we not have eyed her eccentricitie$ with toleranceand indeed glorified them as we do those of all our greatmen? We can only say that theie is still time for us to look,analyse and record our history with reference to realit5r.With the vanishing act that No,/era performed in the lg6oswe unfortunately lost the only woman in the field of art foryears to come. Novera's generation of male artists returnedhome from abroad in the sixties armed with western aestheticvalues and relentlessly set to battle often to set their roots inthe air rather than the earth and the modern art movementin Bangladesh was underway. Women artists struggledunder-water never to quite reach the surface while theimage of woma.n found a place in the arts as the object ofromance, sentiment or fantasy of men. Only in the 1970sagain do we see women as artists emerging as a tangiblepart of the aft world, holding their own to some degree. Thisseems to be the actual fruit of social change and a change inthe srtatus of women. Such artists as Laila Monsur Nazlee,Masuma Khan, Farida Zarnan\, Naima Haque, Shamim

Women in the Contemporary Art World-: Bantgladesh 435

Shikder and Sadhana Islam are women who completed theirstudies in the institutes in the early 1970s and are active asartists to this day. The first group show of women artistswas by the "Group of Four" in 1974 which included works ofFarida Zaman, Naima Haque, Shamim Shikder and SadhanaIslam. This is a landmark in our art world. These womenstruggled on and mostly went abroad to further their studies.Farida Zaman was the first ever woman artist to receiverecognition from the government by being awarded ttre"Young Artists Award". This change in the position of ourwomen artists was the fruit of our anrvareness as a peoplewhich had sharpened from the Language Movement of 1952to climax in the War of Liberation in 1971. It was t] e

liberation of our beings as a total nation. Men and womenstruggled equally for freedom and nationalistic fervourovercame the confines of religious or social restrictions. Itwas a time when tJle nation had dreams and hopes andanything was deemed possible. To believe in the equality ofmen and women came to be considered as a basicrequirement for any progressive being.

From the 1970s onwards women have become increasinglyactive in the art scenario of Bangladesh. The number offemale students in the art institutes is increasing as are thenumber of teachers. Farida Zaman, Naima Haque, ShamimShikder, Rowshan Haq Dipa, Nasreen Begum, RokeyaSultana, Dilara Begum Jolly, Niloofar Chaman and othersare well known in the art field as serious practising artists.Our women are receiving acclaim both at home arld abroad.There is a strong participauon of women in any national orinternational exhibition held in the country and they areactive in all the different media. Group shows by women arealso a common fare. As in the rest of the world, womenartists in Bangladesh are in the limelight now.

Women artists do not have to achieve the level of intensityand solitude that Novera Ahmed needed in her time todeclare her individuality and freedom of spirit. She does not

436 Perspecttues on Souttt Asia

have to dress and make-up to look bizarre or shocking toannounce and retain her existence and her faith in it asNovera did. Things are easietr, on the whole.

With this loosening of boundaries we see certain changestransforming our art world, the emergence of new trendsand a diversilication of subject and style. In the wake of thefootsteps of our women ttre ferninine perspective and femininevalue is added to art. It is no easy task to liberate the femaleimage created by men, all our training, all the books on artand the visual materials that confront us drum it into us.Yet the female image has come out of the stereot54re intomore fluid and 'real' forms As they are created by womentltemselves who are inside the spirit of the forms. This is notto say that all the women are engaged in creating art that issocially committed and feministic. There are many womenwho are pracfising non-representational art. Those who aredoing representational art rnay be not dealing specificallywith women's issues but since they are women, theirexperience and attitudes are definitely mirrored in theirwork and this is totally different from that of men Womenhere are real beings, not figments of the imaqinafion. Thereare some women who have consciously used their art tomake social statements about the plight of women,statements aqainst religious fundamentalism and repression.On the whole when one is confronted by the work of a groupof women artists, one is made quite conscious that womenare thinking about themselves and for themselves.

To discuss a few examples we see in Laila Mansur Nazlee'swork the image of women predominating mos y a socialpanorama where the claustrophobia of a woman's existenceis the focus. Her women are active, flesh and blood personsdepicted in different gestures. Rowshan Haq Dipa has attimes painted women who are obviously in difficulties and areunhappy. Women hounded or overshadowed by men wholook threatening, almost menacing. Dilara Begum Jolly is afrank feminist in her themes. Her paintings and prints show

Women in ttle CorrtefiWora.rA Art World: BangLadesh 437

herin the role of a social critic. She has satirised and presented

violence in society and very often violence against women inher work. Religious fundamentalism was her focus for a longtime. For instance her 'Noorjahan' is the expression of herpersonal agony and her feeling of solidarity with Nooriahanwho was a village maiden buried to her waist and stoned byvillagers at the instigation of fundamentalists who hadaccused her of adultery. Noorjahan later committed suicide.

Jolly is no romantic and life is no dream in her impassionedcreations. Niloofar Chaman's paintings are a world offantasy,a gloomy, acid coloured world peopled by women, men and

animals who are immensely cerebral and intensely bored orunhappy. Her men and women are almost indistinguishableand emerge as similar forms. Her fantasies are symbolicdepictions of what is often her outrage at what is happeningaround her. The phallic forms that she uses and her eroticimagery is perhaps an expression of the female point of view.

The frank eroticism in her images of humans, animals andplant life shows her individuality and a feminine perspective

of sexuality. Rokeya Sultana who has been working on herMadonna series for quite some time shows her Madonna inan urban setting, a woman with her child struggling againstseveral adversities that afflict a working mother. Fareha Zeba's

recent exhibition entitled "Homage to Frida Kahlo" presents,through her own painungs, the life and works of this Mexicanartistwho, although lesser known in our country, has reachedalmost legendary status in the west by virtue of herextraordinary life and yet more extraordinary presentation ofthe feminine perspective and experiences in her paintings.Zeba attempts to incorporate Frida's imagery into her workto portray the bleaker aspects of life as she observes them.This basking in the glow of another woman artist'sachievements and the $orification of these achievements isan example ofthe changes transfiguring our artistic horizons.Women want to discover their own past, to find predecessorswith whom they can relate their lives to.

All in all, one is quite con$cious of the fact that womenare victims of social injustice and this comes across quttestrongly in the work of a lot of our women. It is undeniablethat the work of our women is as much overshadowed bythe identity crisis as is our total art world which is lookingfor ways to synthesising its cultural and national identitywhile at the same time being international and individualwith the overpowering influence of western art movementsgripping the very foundations of its modern art.

Considering the last 3O to 4O years, I can only say tJlatthe women have definitely changed the climate of our artworld with their presence. The female images that theycreate are charged with lived experience, strength and depthof feeling and the truth of their very existence enlivens themand gives them verity. yet women are still only on thethreshold of all that can be achieved. Just as art is not adiscrete and unique phenomenon, separated from society,neither are artists. True genius may transcend all barriersbut much strength and goodness may be lost in the process.

ENDNOTES

l. Syed Azizul Haque, Charubhikhhaye Chhatrider I,rathamBatch", Prqtham AIo (Daily Newspaper), 27 November 199g.

2. Abdus Salam, n Spirit Devoted to Art ", Inner Gaze, Sculpturesof Novera Ahmed, Dacca: 1960.

3, Ibid., Zainul Abedin, ?ostscript".

4. S.M. Ali, 'Inner Gaze", op.cit..

5. Shamsuzzaman Ktran, Nouera Ahmed Sculp/;.re Exhibitionby Novera Ahmed, Dhaka: Bangladesh National Museum,l4 April- 13 May, 1998.

6. Merryn Marshall, 'The Inng Wait',, Inner Gaze Sculptures oJNooera Ahmed, Dacca: lg6o,

7, S. M, Ali, 'lnner caze", op.ctt..

A Different Voice: WomenWriting in Bangladesh

Ronshan Jalun

Introduction

A quarter-century has passed since the emergence ofBangladesh as a sovereign country. The war of liberationwas a watershed in all the maj or areas of national life''Materializing the dreams and promises of 1971" and"upholding the spirit of the war of liberation", still remainthe most resonant emotive appeal in the socio-politlcalarena. The promise of the establishment of a seculardemocratic society based on the principles of economic andsocial justice, freedom from material want and culturalrepression is still to be fulfilled. The last two decades haveseen the launching of many orgarized efforts, initiated byconcerned citizens for realisation of the vision of preferredfuture. Some of the efforts focussed on speciflc issues andarenas of social life, some others tried to address the problemsin a holistic and integrated manner. A notable feature ofsuch efforts is the active parlicipation ofv/omen in increasingnumbers over time.

440 Perspecttue s on Sor,rth Asta

The growing number and visibility of women are oftenseen as recent phenomena but women's activism is not newin Bangladesh. That gender along with class and location,determines to a large extent, a person's access to andcontrol over developmental opportunities, social resourcesand services was a well-known, though seldom acted-upon,fact. Despite constitutional guarantee of equal rights to allcitizens, and prwision for special measures for women andother disadvantag;ed sectors, nafional statistics show glaringdisparities between the positiorl of male-female, rich-poorand rural-urban population. In addition, the disrupUve andtraglc potentials of the religious-communal and ethnic divideshave been demonstrated very clearly in recent yearsparticularly in the riots following the demolition of ttre Babrimosque in Ayodhya and the protracted unrest in theChittagong HiIl tracts. Though as a group,women have beenprimarily identified by their gender and, consequently,gender-oppression has been thelr immediate deep concern,they were also aware that men, as well as women arevictims of many types of oppression. In recent years, thisrealization has deepened as femfnist research has broughtto attention the linkage between the over-arching structuresof oppression operating at various levels and the mechanismswhich support them. The efforts, launched by womenactivists and researchers, to mobilize popular opinion andraise social awareness for social transformation throughundermining the oppressive structures have beenconsiderably strengthened by the incisive insights andpassionate protests against injustice provided by creativewomen authors.

Here I propose to discuss briefly the different dimensionsand perspectives which characterise recent writings bywomen: the themes they prefer; the difference in theirworld-view, their attitude to the prevalent gender-ideology,literary convenfions and stereotypes; their awareness of thewider context in which they are located; and the quest for

A Different Voice: Women Writing in Batglndesh 441

idenfity which may or may not inform their work. Of the

various literary forms, I would focus on poetry and fictiononly.

As this is intended to be an opening statement on the

subject in a regional dialogue, no comprehensive description

or analysis is attempted here. As the participants belong to

various disciplines, I have tried to limit the use of largon'

l['omen in Bangla Literature: Major Trends in Represen-

tation and Participation Legacy of the Past: Conven-tions and StereotJpes

Representation of women in literature and the extent oftheir participation as writers (active agents) and readers(consumers) are closely related to their situation and position

in a given society and culture. Before the colonial rule,

social and cultural values sanctioned segregation of the

sexes, imposed strict gender division of labour and fostered

a systematic bias of male supremacy. Women's biological

role, defined in terms of reproduction and social functions

associated with reproduction and nurturance was

emphasized. As the bearer ofthe seed' and the carrier oftheline women were held to be sexually vulnerable, needing to

be jealously guarded from the lust of strangers. Chastity

and modesty in women were valued at a premium and early

marriage was perceived as the best strateg/ for providing"symbolic shelter" to young girls.

Several mechanisms and institutions maintained male

dominance. The major one was the propagation of the

ideologr through sanctions by religious texts. Both Islamic

and Hindu traditions maintained clearly that men and

women were not only biologically different but that men

were superior to women. The other mechanisms and

institutions for maintaining male supremacy throughdomestication of women and strict control over their mobility,sexualitv. and labour were: sex role stereotyping during

Perspecttues on South Asr,a

childhood, socialization, gendered division of work,segregation of the sexes in space (private and public) anddifferential allocation of resources and opportunities. Formaleducation was perceived to be not relevant for women's rolein life which was to provide unpaid labour for the family andto ensure the supply (by bearipg and rearing children) offuture unpaid labour. As a cofrsequence of this denial ofeducation access to formal, very few women writers emerpedat this time in Bengal.

Poetr5r was tJre major literar5r form preferred by the Bengaliauttrors of this period. poetical works, written by (mosily)men, for a largely male audience, described the emotionsand deeds of men in love and war. The poets, both Hinduand Muslim, were deeply influenced by the aesthetic theory(Rasa Shasfra) expounded in $anskrit literature. Themeswere borrowed directly from tJle Hindu epics, the Ramayanaand the Mahabharata, which were translated in Bengaliduring this period. Even when the themes were not directlvborrowed, the character of the hero and the heroine (rnaal,and nagika) were cast in the mould prescribed by Sanskritliterary conventions.

The two types ofheroines, presented in Sanskrit literaturereflected the deep rooted male ambivalence towards womenin a patriarchal society. The ancient Hindu ml,th of Slvee(Lakshmi),the great mother goddess and Urvashithe celestialdancer, rising out of tle churning primordial ocean clearlysets the antithesis, Lakshmi, tJ e ideal wife, symbol offulfillment and plenty (female sexuality under male controland within the bounds of marriage) and Urvashi the idealcourtesan, sSrmbol of beaut5r and unrestrained gaiety (femalesexuelity beyond male control and outside marriage)_continued to be projected by Bengali poets even in thiscentury as archet5pes of women.

Their litet'ary incarnations were: (a) Sita, the heroine ofthe Rlamayana, the ideal Hindu Kulastn (woman of good

A Different Voice: Womenwri@ in Bangladesh 443

family) whose devotion to husband, chastity, modesty and

fortitude were extolled through the centuries for girls toemulate: and (b)Vasantasena' the ideal Ganika (courtesan)

the heroine of the play Mriccha Katika (the clay cart), theprototype of the 'fallen' girl with the golden heart, also

portrayed endlessly by the future authors for young girls totake heed from examPle.

At first glance ttre two types seem to typiff the two poles

of a woman's existence when facing a pre set pattern (a)

conformity to the norms set by the prevalent gender-ideology; and (b) rebellion against them. However, it is

important to remember that patriarchal society itselfrecognized the need for the existence and maintenance ofboth types of women to serve specific male needs. Even thecourtesan, for all the apparent freedom of sexual mobilityand choice, was subject to a set of rigidly defined social

customs. In fact, society seldom allowed women any space

outside the confines of these moulds. Literature, themouthpiece of the patriarchy, like the rest of ttre culturalapparatus, propagated that acceptance was tlle naturaldharma of awoman, not rebellion. The heroines, presented

by male authors of this period, thus, exhibit very litileconflict within themselves. Even Radha, the celebrated

heroine of the Vaishnau a Padabali (lyric poems written bythe poets of Vaishnava sect such as Chandi dasa etc.), whodared to love Krishna outside the bonds of marriage, is nosocial rebel While bitterly complaining about the cruelty ofthe social norms which separate her from Krishna and thecondemnation by her in- laws, she is never seen to raise any

serious questions about the validity of such norms nor does

she reject them. Similarly, the heroines of the popularM5rmensingh Gitikas (ballads on secular love written bypoets belonging to the Mymensingh region), such as Mahuaor Molua face crises quite bravely, but submit to the will oftheir lover/husband unquestioningly.

The advent of the colonial British, bearers of an alien

444 Ferspectiues on South Asrc

culture and the sweeping rekrrms in tJ.e political, economicand cultural arena introduced by them caused a crisis ofidentitj/ in both Hindu and Muslirn Bengalis. Rapid changesin the wider context resulting from macro_processes ofmodernlzation, urbaniza on, industrialization, lntroductionof technologr, exposure to the literature, culture and ideasof t]re West and other countries, introduction of universalprimary education-all these generated considerable socialanalysis and examination/assessment of the odsting socialstructures and institutions as well as cultural traditionsand customs, regarding both privaie and public life. publicdiscourse, including creative writing, in the nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries, abounded in serious quesuoningof and protest against the unequal power reiation andsystematic oppressions stemming from hierarchies basedon class, caste, gender, ethnicity, religion, and other sociopolitical divides. Women's unequal situation and position inthe farnily and in societ5r appeared as a grave social issue.Alleviation of their situation becarne a priority agenda ofsocial reform especia_lly among the educated Hindus andBrahmos. Relaxation of purdah and access to formaleducation not only increased wofnen's visibilitv but alsogave them the exposure and trainfng to analyze their ownunequal and inferior posifion and the mechanisms whichconditioned this inequality. They also had ttre opportunityto articulate their own thoughts and views, thuscomplementing the representation made by men so long.

TWo aspects of the response to the Bengali identity crisisand question of women are noteworthy. Firstly, thoug;h theHindus responded earlier and the Muslim response camemuch later, there was a remarkable Eimilarity in the patternsof response and attitude. In borth the communities aprolonged debate ensued between the traditionalist, whourged the communities to cling to traditional values an<1customs and the modernists, who urged adaptation andreforms to suit the needs of modern times. Ovir ume. the

A Different Voice : Women Writ@ in B anglade stt 445

modernists gained ground. Secondly, though the modernists

were in favour of women's participation in formal education'

the major motivafion for this education was to keep the

traditional notion of 'womanhood' intact and to enable

women to perform better as 'appropriate' wives and mothers

in a modern household.

The maj or poets of the early twentieth century'Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam were imbued

with a strong liberal humanism and protested against the

oppression unleashed by systems of inequalities based on

imperialism, class, caste and gender. Patriotism, made strong

by the political repression of the colonial rulers, along withromantic love for the beloved also appeared as dominantthemes of many of the songs written by them which inspired

the political acilvists. Despite such sensitivi es' it shouldbe noted that both these poets and those who followed themin the later decades, still clung to the time honoured image

of the beloved cast in the patriarchal mould. The few women

poets, all minor literary figures, were strongly influenced bythe dominant dicflon.

Fiction in the form of novels and short stories written inprose also appeared in the nineteenth century Bengal. Itgained popularity very rapidly' Over time, the major writershave shown an increasing awareness of the conflicts and

tensions hherent in gender relations both within and outsidemarriage. Tagore and Sharatchandra had drawn verysensitive portraits of women in transition' torn between thepressures to conform with the norms imposed by societyand rebellion against them. However, they and othercontemporary male authors seemed to have accepted thecentrality of marriage in a woman's life and motherhood as

the major avenue of fulfillment for women. Women authorsof the time such as Swarna Kumari Devi, Shailobala,Ghoshjaya and Anurupa Devi were more critical about thedouble standards of sexuality and social restrictions on

women's mobility and choice, though they tended to reflect

446 Perspectiues on fuuth Asir'

the same attitude toward marriage, love and motherhood ascrucial to women's self fulfillmerlt. Only Rokeya SakhawatHossain, the first and foremost feminisi of Vfuslm Bengal,had the heroine of her novel pad maragadeclarethat marriageis not the ultimate goal of a woman,s life.

* In !9a7 , British Bengal was divided into two provinces_

East Pakistan and West Bengal belonging to two ditferentstates, In the next two decades writers in east pakistan weregreatly influenced by their immedtiate socio_political contextand responded to that, The repressio.r" of " dictatorialregime, the crisis of democracy, the cultural impositions inthe name of national integration, the tensions between thereligious and cultural-ethnic idex-rtity_all these informedtheir writings. But gender stereotjrpes still continued tohaunt them. The face of the beloved in poetry and theheroines portrayed by tlre writers of fiction on the wholepresented the traditional stereotypes.

Contetnporary poetry and Womsn in Bangladesh

Poetry is still the most popular literary form of self_expression. The major themes are: love, patriofic struggle,protest against social and political repression and economicexploitation, dehumanization of social environment and thealienation of indi'"'iduals. The predominant voice is urban,educated middle class male.

The piiority attached to protest originates from the ,left,orientation of our major poets, most ofwhom are the productsof the 'radical' sixties and early seventies, a time of politicalactivism against repressive and non_democratic regimes.Some scholars have pointed that many effective slogansused in the anti-autocracy movement during the lggoscame from poems written by such poets as Sikandar AbuZafar, $hamsur Rahman, Nirmalef,rdu Gun.

Indeed, Iotse for persons (a woman) and the coumry asthemes made intensely personal poems accessible to a great

A DifferentVoice: WomenWritig in Bangladesh 447

number of people. The existing socio-political repressive

context also elicited instant response.

Fusion between the two muses-the beloved and themotherland-further strengthened the appeal to' thepredominantly male readers. The archetypal image shaped

by the enduring mlth of the 'good woman', a self-sacrificing,patient, devoted nurturer, is thus presented in new butfamiliar, idealized and sentimental forms.

Women poets, on the other hand, of necessity rejected theidealized arid sentimental image of the beloved. The poems

of Taslima Nasreen, Ruby Rahman and others refute thepassive stereotype of women in love. Frank expression ofwomen's sexuality, longing for shared intimacy, absence ofguilt and false modesty mark their confessions of love and

add a new tone.

Taslima Nasreen's satirical attack on patriarchal attitudesto women and gender-stereotype obviously is the mostnotable point of departure in 'protest' poetry. Earlier Bengalipoets such as Tagore, Nazrul have written poems protestingagainst gender -oppression and advocating women'sentitlement to human dignity and personhood. But nonehad demonstrated like Taslima a passionate fury born of adeeply-felt wound. Her rejection of patriarchy and gender-

discriminatory religion is direct and unhesitant. In one of' her poems, with ease and well chosen images, she reduces

the mighty male of the species to an insect, capable ofcausing only minor irritation and annoyance but nopermanent damage to a woman's self-worth. At the same

time her poems resonate with the loneliness of one who haschosen the road less travelled. It is easy to brand Taslima as

a man-hater but that would be too simplistic. She deteststhe stereotypical male chauvinist who has no saving grace

and articulates this in a telling manner in her poems.

448 PerspecLiues on South Asra

Contemporary Flctlon and Women in Bangaladesh

Themes which recur in current ficuon a_re: changlng wayof life and social institutions, namely, the family, the workplace, neighbourhood and the wider societ5r; crises in thewider context impinging on the life of individuals and ttreirstruggle to cope with such crises. Especially emphasizedare: dehumanization of social environments, break-up offamily and erosion of loint-famlly values, unemplo5rment,widespread corruption and violence which adversely affectthe quality of life in urban areas. Confusion, pessimism andnostalgia for things past (lost Eden) are the dominant moodcharacterizing present-day fiction. Those written by men,are 'male-centred', focussing on a man,s sense of alienation,lack of communicafion within marriage and family life.

Rural people and rural life are often depicted in stereoqpes:ruthless, exploitative rnoney-lenders and rich landholdersOts-a-uis simple, uncomplicgted people with limitedaspirations struggling against them. There are exceptions.For instance Hasan Azizul Haq and Akhtar Uzzaman Iliasdepict the stark reali\r and multiple complexit5r of rural andurban life.

While some argue that the urban alienation is contrivedbecause many authors still have rural roots one feels thatfor firany, a distance has set irr and the present reality ofurban life supersedes the rernembered rural past whichpartly contributes to the flat and non-realistic representationofrural life. Even less reahstic perhaps is the reiresentationof women.

The gender stereot5pe lingers on. The two faces of Eve,the benevolent and malevolent aspects of the great Goddessstll persist. A popular motif is the disruption of the conjugalroutlne by the presence of another woman or man (theeternal triangle) externalizing the Fggression and hostility,the growing apart and frequent coming together, stillreminiscent of the novels of fffty years ago. The mother is

A DifferentVoice: Womenwriting i" B:'gl"dtth 449

still idealized and recalled with nostalgia' The bad woman'

^" . .ro.t-"t ing, greedy, selfish and often empty-headed'

wife remains. In many novels, she is a shadow' not worthy

of a fully develoPed Portrait.

The obverse side of the coin is seen in novels written by

women. The protagonists are women, Iaying bare the many

layers of their selves. Even the apparent contradictions

characterizlng women depicted by male authors as

manifestations of women's "natural" irrationality' are shown

Uy ttt. women authors to be logical outcomes of the

circumstances in which women are placed' The protest

against male oppression and rejection of patriarchal values

.id .to.-. within marriage and family manifest in varlous

ways in the novels and short stories written by the women

authors, who had started writing in the fifties and sixties

and are still continuing to write' Rabeya Khatun' Razia

Khan, Dilara Hashem, Rizia Rahman' Makbula Manzoor

and other women have contributed significantly in projecung

the image of life and society through women's perspecflve'

Youngei authors such as Taslima Nasreen and Nasreen

Jahai have been notably bold in their treatment of issues

related to gender-roles and relations and women's sexuality'

Thus in Taslima's Shodh (Revenge) the hostility and

extreme desire for revenge drives an oppressed young woman

to seduce a young man and have his child-only to foist the

baby on hei husband and his family' The husband who at

oar"ii*" compelled the woman to have an abortion because

ofbaseless doubts about paternity and denied her the right

to have a child is ttrus completely tricked from ttre real

control over the wife's fertility and sexualit5r' Perverse

overdrive for male control is countered by an equally perverse

female hostility. The housewife who has neither a viable

option to end her marriage nor any normal and recognized

channel for self-assertion, nevertheless, thwarts the male

control over her sexuality and fertility, albeit in a pewerse

fashion. A grim warning, surely, to male chauvinists'

450 Perspectives on Souijh Asrb

Nasreen Jahan's Urukku (Flying, 1993) depicts thestrugg;les of a lower-middle class young woman who divorcesher husband when his lack of sensitivity and rouune sexualassaults become unbearable to her. The rejection and lackof support by her own blood kin; the haiassment at thework place, her yearning to resume painting and her refusalto €llve in to the entreaties of her husband for remarrlage__are, drawn with great insight. Her strengths andweaknesses-jealousy of her $ood_looking sister who gotmale attenhon and mother's preference; her ambivalentfeeling about motherhood, guilt and longing for the childshe had lost; her courage in chroosing noi to-terminate thepregpancy which resulted from her former husband,s takingadvantage of her are drawn with fine details. At the end oithe novel we find her divested of illusions, reaching withinherself to draw upon the inner reserves of self, getting readyto continue on tlle difhcultJourney of self_fulfillment, throughmotherhood and a career she has chosen freely. Economicself reliance and a survival network outside theclaustrophobic conjugal and natal family are shown assignlficant conditions for a woman,s liberation fromoppression.

Protest agalnst Potitlcal Repreeslon and Social r4justlce

_Yd. authors writing about the language movement of1952, the popular uprising against the repressive armyreginte in 1969, above all the war for liberation in lg7i,generally focus on middle-class .student volunteer freedomfighters and army oflicials. Though the people were the realheroes, their stories are still untold. With a few excepuons,the story line resembles classic Hollywood .Westerns... Drawnin black and white, it is rendered as a fight between the hero(freedom-fighter) and the villain (pakistani army official/Razakar).

Wornen and rural people are shadowy, stereotSpe, flat.Women are shovrn mostly wringing their hands, waittng to

A Difierent Voice: Women Wrtting in Botqladesh 45L

be rescued by the hero from a fate worse than death (rape) '

In some cases, they are victims of atrocities' waiting to be

rehabilitated and in otfrers, they are the long-suffering

Iiances of the freedom Iighters waiUng patiently for ttrereturn of ttre hero. The mothers and sisters' ministering

angels, are also present ln many novels, as inspirational

flgures.

Women writers have Just started to reject this male-

centred history by writing 'her story" Selina Hossain's Apn'a

Mase Horins Bairi written in 198O (the Plumed Peacock'

1983) for instance tells the story of Kanupada' a poor poet

who yearns to establish the dignity of the vernacular at the

royj court of medieval Bengal, where Sanskrit' the official

language is used' Hls unconventional stand draws tJle anger

of the Brahmin minister who imprisons him' TWo women'

Shaboree, the beautiful, dependent and devoted wife' whose

aim in life is to obey and please Kanu and Dombee' the

dancing-girl, who is free, lively and self-reliant' inspire

Kanu to sing and closely resemble the classical stereotj4)es

of Lakshmi and Urvashi. However the author deviates from

the stereotype in startling ways. Dombee kills the minister's

nephew who pesters her with unwelcome attentions and

bravely faces death. Shaboree, who patiently sheds tears

and waits for Kanu's return from prison very untypically

Joins the mass-uprising at the end of the story' like some

medieval IIa Mitra of the Tebhaga Movement fame' It isinteresting to note how the woman author neatly reassigns

roles and flouts tJ:e conventions about gender-stereoq4)es

in this (thinly veiled) retelling of the story of the 1952

movement for establishment of Bengali as state language by

situating it in the medieval setting.

No matter which theme is chosen, the novels and short

stories written by women authors underscore the basic

humanness and personhood of women' They demonstrate

the contrived and male- imposed nature of the exaggerated

gender-division and reJect the patriarchal notions about the

4s2 Perspectiues on South Asra

'masculine and the feminine'nature. Above all, they advocatevery convincingly the obsoleteness of the traditional termsand conditions of marrlage, the untenabiliW of socialexpectafions from women to conform to gender_norms at allcosts and the need for new ground rules for gender relationsand the basic social insUtutions and structures.

Concluslon

In 1905, Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, the first and foremostfemlnist of Muslim Bengal, dreamed of empowering womenin her feminist utopian story (Sultana's Dream) by a simplereversal of gender roles, putting men in seclusion andletting women take charge of the public sphere. For theinheritors of Rokeya's dream of wom..r'" .-po*".ment, thetask is complex and difficult. While the ,"tirri"t. have tothinl< of strategies for an alternate paradigm of developmentbased on participatory politics, egalitarian distribution ofsocial resources, free expression of pluralistic culture andnon*hierarchical gender relations in the family, communltvand state, they would depend heavily on the women writersto cqntinue a counter,discourse for raising social awareness.Reluctance of the dominant male to give up privileges whichthey have enjoyed unfairly on the g.orr.ra" of gender;increasing hostility from the fundamentalists and reactionaryforcos towards the advocates of secularism, pluralism andfreedom of expression; continued intrusion of the state tolimit the basic rights of individuals are serious cha_llenges.Fortqnately, the recent works of Bangladeshi women wntersindicate their willingness to face such challenges. They havealready rejected the restraining images and rnoulcts createdby the dominant male and are fashioning their own idiomfor self expression, informed by their own innermost feelings,desires, knowledge and world-view.

The articulation of theirvision, combined with the strugglesof the activists to realize it, has made an impact onBangaladeshi social consciousness and women's own identitv

A Dilferent Voice : Women WriW i" By'gld" !

and self-image. Intensely personal though the act of creative

writing is, it is also an act with a deep social meaning'

Hopefully, women writers would continue to remain

"o.r.r""t.i with and committed to the ideals of a holistic

development of the self and the society to which they belong'

Images of Women in HindiCinema: Post- l95os

Shabana Azmi

I begin with a quote from noted film critic Aruna Vasudev.'It is no coincidence that the first Indian film was amythological. The moral education of all but the thinnestlayer of affluent, Westernised looking Indians is derivedfrom the epics. These stories, despite liberal doses of miraclesand fantasy, a_re no fairy tales easily told and forgotten.They still have a living reality and a dominant sav in theconduct of daily life today."

Unfortunately for the women of India, the example of Sitaas the perfect wife acquiescing unquestioningly in herhusband's rejection of her has been held up as the ideal forwomen to follow. Taken in conjunction with Manu, thelawgiver, the average woman in India has had noopportunities to become anything more than the role towhickr she has been restricted as daughtef, wife and mother.In chapter 9 verse 3 of the Manu Smnh-Manu is quoted assayirrg'In childhood a female must be subject to her father,in youth to her husband, when her lord is dead to her sons.

lmages oJ Women tn Hi"g Ct* Pt* 1:5O: 455

A woman does not deserve freedom' She must not seek to

""p.t"i" tt"t"elf from her father' husband' sons' She must

JiuV" u. "ft.erful,

clear in the management of her household

;f#., careful in cleaning her utensils' economical in

l*""it,*". Him, to whom her father may give her' or her

tritt er wittt the father's permission' she' shall obey as long

."-tt. it"" and when he is dead she must not insult hls

;;;'. with these few lines women were condemned for

;;d;*" to a life of eternal subjection' Tradition required

n, Lal"V,ft" cinema enthusiastically upholds it' In fllm after

fri* *" "." these values reiterated' underlined' reinforced'

To the weight of this tradition is added a middle class

morality which makes a sharp distinction between woman

as wife and mother, and woman as mistress and lover'

Subscribing to the predominantly orthodox views of the

f"rg" ma;otit! of audiences rather than acknowledge the

..uiity of women's growing intluence and contribution to

society, film makers generally prefer perceptions of the

"t"t"J "f women which perpetuate male domination in

"o"t.ty. As such, these portrayals reflect the society not so

muctr as it is evolving as the way they wish it to remain'

Popular cinema creates instant mythologies for uncritical

"o.r"ri-ptio.t tttd not histories of credible people ' The heroine

is cast in two moulds'

(o) The all forgiving, self-sacrificing n'ife;

(b) the virtuous upholder of morality' the nurturing

mother; or

(c) the 'other'woman-vamp, titillating 'siren'; or

{dl courtesan with a heart of gold'

Hindi cinema in the l98os and 1990s has not really

p.oJr."".a beyond these cardboard stereot5pes' Like noted

{ilm-criucMaithiliRaosays,.Thetruearchetypesofpopular

456 Perspectiues on Sotth Asia-

cinema are only two_First is the Mother India,s matriarchwhd is the upholder of dharma and the lru. .moUon"lcentre of the hero's life. The second is pakeezah, theromanticised apostrophe to women as the patiretic impossibleinnocent 'o rer' to be rescued from the penumbra of socialoppfobrium. Every Tawad and her cousin is descendedfrorf Pakeezah and is a man's reflection of pale, derivedpoetic_pathos and every mother sternly castinj out her son,Is trvlother Indih's daughter,

R&dha, as portrayed by Nargis in Motter Indid. ls a trulyiconic archetS4pe in ttre sense that she is simple, strong andstern without re complexity that assails most modernindividuals. Mother Indirr,s appeal is not only emouonal anddramatic as tJre nurturing mother who stoically faces weryadvensity heaped on her. From tender bride io respectedmafuflarch, her whole identity and purpose in life is nurturingher Ohildren. She is conceived as the enforcer of dhannas.The two sons are obviously derlved from the two mythicalheroes-Rama and Krishna. The younger Birju is the darkprankster with a penchant for dispensing rough and readyJusfice. And it is the passionate Birju that the mother lovesmost. But this conflict between duty and love is not allowedto cloud her Judgement or impede the inevitability of herlction-. Mother India's path is sternly and immutably fixed.Over the years it was easy to make this potent image with allits uncomplicated simplicity and apply it to an urban.contemporary setting as in Di u(a AgrLeepallrand Khahwgqk

The mother figure has a prorninent place in the cast ofcharacters of most Hindi films, none of which ever speak ofa relationship between mother and daughter. Even with thesons, it is not so much a relationship that is explored orportrAyed as the deification of the mother. Self_sacrificing,maliglred and victimised by fatB or the husband, she isshowh as indestructible when it. comes to protec ng hersons. Since the heroine is strait_.f acketed into a chaste wifewhose suffering can only make her more virtuous, she can

Imoges oJ Women in HirLdi Cinemcc Post- l 95Os 457

never assert her sexuality. No real relationship can develop

with a wife who is a potential mother/goddess and must be

a pure and sexless creature. With whom then can a manhave a satislring relationship, physical and emotional? Thecourtesan has been a signiftcant flgure in classical Indianliterature and until the 197Os, a staple diet of the Hindifilms. Since she is forever excluded from the pale ofdomesticity, she can answer his physical needs, later to hisfantasies (unlike the wife whose purpose is to procreate). Ofcourse he may not fall in love with her, but inevitably herheart is lost to him. She provides solace, a haven when herecovers from his sorrows-he goes away or she convenientlyswallows a diamond and dies.

The cultlvated ?au:aif is not merely a pathetic victim ofmale lust. Around her is a cluster of myths and romanticyearning, of neatly labelling women as the exciting 'other'and the wife as boring in her virtue. She is the melancholicmusic of romantic poetry, the graceful arbiter of courtlymanners, the siren who lures with song and dance-shewas different from the vamp of Indian Cinema.

The vamp from Hindi Cinema, a popular figure from the195Os onwards becomes a staple diet in the film of the1960s and early 197Os. The vamp was seen as an outsider, ahome breaker who could display wanton sexuality on thescreen. This display of sexuality was restricted to certainspaces of the Hindi Screen, for example the ntght clubs, thebars, the casino etc. These were moral spaces associatedwith the West, which through our own history of colonialism,were seen as evil. The association of sexuality wittr the West

had the effect of denying Indian women their own semality.The vamp was thus contrasted with the heroine of HindiCinema, a woman who was virtuous, chaste, pure andsplritual. Helen played an extremely important role in theIilms of the 196Os as she was able to carry the Westernimage very easily,

458 Perspectiues on South Asra

In the cinema of the lgg0s, we see that vamp, who wascrucdal to the narrative of earlier cinema, has almostdisappeared from tl-e screen. This exit has been significantand is being seen with both fear and concern since thehero[ne of the l99os also carried within her t}le image of thevamp. New levels of permissiveness have obliterated ttrestrictly enforced divide between the heroine and the vamp.

The rigid dress code has disappeared. Today's heroinedances with the seductive abandon of a houri as the cameraroutlnely zooms in on one body part or the other. Hertitillating purpose done, she usually dons a demure saritowards the end as she attain$ the "highly desirable" lifestatus of a life.

The conllation of the heroine And the vamp of yesteryearsinto a single image of the heroine is disturbing many becausethe questlon of sexuality which was essentially seen aswantonness associated with the West and thus outside ofIndian culture, is no longer being seen as something to bereJected. The heroine of today seems to be questioning theimage of flxing the heroine into a slot where any display ofdesire was seen as negative and unlike the values of Indianwomen (with excepfions like Sahrb, Bibi aw Ghulam-MeenaKumari asserts her sexuality and demands that her husbandstay back with her and takes to alcohol. . . ultimately diestragically).

While the new image questions the moral codes ttratoperated on the heroine of yesteryears, it would be wrong tocelebrate this change uncritically. The business of films isto create its mythical seemingly indestructible life. The ftlmlmagle ostenstbly celebrates the heroine's eroticism, whilereducing her to a passive sex object. Much as one mightwish to argue that Karishma Kapoor seems to be an activeparticipant rather than a pas$ive recipient of Govinda'slust-the fact cannot be denied that she is being subjectedto the male gaze. The Choli ke Peeclt'rcq, while ostensibly

hqes oJ Women in Httdi Ctemcu Post- I 95Os

celebrating a woman's early sexuality is picturised in a

way-where her body is fragmented into heaving bosom,

swinging hip, bare midriff-commodifies her into an obJect

for the overwhelming male gaze and robs her of all autonomyover her body.

The change that is taking place in the women of the HindiCinema is a confused one-whereas the earlier films likeMain Cfury Rai:lutlgi (I Will Remain Silent) being considered a

virtue in itself, are giving way to a different femaleprotagonist-the avenging angel hkhmee Aurat, Sherni'hsaJtctDeuietc., inevitably show a female vigilante sworn tovengeance after the trauma of rape. Do these films offer anyinsig;hts into the complodties of what it means to be awoman?

It is only a cosmetic change. First we had Rambos, nowwe have Rambolinas-men in drag wearing figure huggingleather jeans, with a gun in one hand, purely imitatlng thecardboard one dimensional herol

Itwas left to the parallel cinema to give women their due.

The attempt of the neru t aue cinema was to situate womenin real life conditions as social beings and not as eitherobJects of display or seMle, static creatures . The agenda ofthe neru uJaue was directed against the mainstream andthus a spate of films emerged with strong women characters.Films like Arkur, Btaomrkou Nishant, Mantha n etc' became

well known for their strong women characters' While thewomen of these Anms were no doubt strong, they wereIimited in their agenda by the politics of realism ttrat was amajor influence on the neu) u)aDe cinema. In attemptingreality on tJle screen, the films makers were always restrictedby the oppressive conditions that prevented women fromattaining any kind of freedom in society. T}:e new usanse,

was tfius, marked by a series of compromises that thewomen always made and was justified in the name of

459

460 Perspectiues on South Asra

"reallty" (e.g., Maniltnl Bhoomika). The women thus neverceased to be victims of society in the ne[r, ruaue barringexceptions like Much Masalq sections of Mandi etc. Inurban situations, the dominant narrative become anexplqration of the woman's self rather than situating womenin tl.eir social context-thus turning the quest for women'sfreedom into a struggle withh the private sphere alone. Thewoman, having an affair with a man other than her husband,being seen as an ultimate act of feminist revolt eg., Ek pat,Parorna hsf. etc.

It ls, however, becoming ampily evident that society andcinema can no longer close their eyes to the changing Indianwoman. Self assured, confident women are starting to backout of ttre economlc dependence that had for so long heldthena in thrall. In a society in transition, the rigidity of partnorrls cannot be maintained.

BUt who is this new woman? How much liberty can shebe "granted" without threatening the very basis of apatriarchal order? What aspect qf her personalitJr should behighllghted? Even if a daring premise is taken, isn't it saferto stay with a resolution that is conformist?

A hero is the personiffcation of contemporary moralityand 4spirations till such time as societ5r can work out whatthis new woman is all about. The transformation ofsterebtypes lnto icons will continue to be confused.

In a situatlon where stereot54tes play such an importantrole iln defining the way we make sense of the world, it isclear that a pure space outside the stereotl4pe is difficult toimagfne. Thus the quest for wornen's representation on thescreegr should move beyond just a critique of stereot54ring toa mofe complex dialogue and debate about the plurality ofwomen's imagery-a plurality that needs to recognise thatwomen's representation cannot tre seen as only a positive ornegative image but as an arena of contesting voices and

Images oJ Women in Hindi Cinema: Post- I 95Os 461

faces. It is finally up to us to recover the resistant voice/moments within this area.

Acknowledgementsi Aruna Vasudeva-The W omen Vampor Victim- Malthili Rae-To be a Woman. Shikha Thingan vsRanJam Mazumdar.

The Image of V/omen onTV and Cinema

SaraZnker

Nayeeka is the Bengali word for a female central lead playedby the woman actor in play or a feature film. Ttre role playedby the Nageelca is essentially created by the man and thesexist connotation is deeply entrenched in the implications ofthe Nageeka There are hardly any plays on television orfeature films of the film industry of Bangladesh that do notfeature the Nageeka in the image that it connotes. ThisNageeka that the audience is continually exposed to isundoubtedly avery attractive figure and indeed to be emulated,as made obvious fiom tire endorsement by playwrights thrcughtheir continuous presence on the screen. The image that sheconjures up among the target audience however is apflysummed up in the undulating lines, the rosy cheeks andcharcoal eyed drawings of the women from showbiz on therickshaw backs plying the roads and alleys of the country.

That women are an unequal lot is accepted by all classes,colours and creeds of the world in various degrees of ire orconsent.

Tte Image oJWomen onTV artd" Cinema 463

That the media shapes human minds is also an universaltruth. In today's world the power of mass media tocommunicate and educate the huge cross section of peoplestands beyond argument. What had once been the domainof commercial marketers has now been usurped by thepoliticians. As more people are getting access to the massmedia of television and cinema, the "tube" and the "celluloid"areas becoming more and more dear to people who care tohave a good share of voice and visual presence on them.Also, in this vasfly illiterate world of ours the audio visualmedium has a far greater impact than any other medium.

That the women's unequal status uis-d-r.ris the man is asociopolitical question, is a commonly shared notion by allright thinking people of the world. Thus, if the lot of womenhas to improve, a colossal job remains to be done in therebuilding of her image through the mass media of televisionand cinema.

The Film Development Corporation was formed in 195O.

Ever since its inception, the film industry has functioned asa very good industrial enterprise. As it became more andmore important to make the film commercially viable, womenin the ftlms came to be used increasingly as a commodit5r. Inthe event where 'women' are hooks for commercial success,litfle can be expected from the role played by them tochange the status in societ5r. Thus, the participation ofwomen in a commercial venture defeats the cause of womenand we can presume that it necessitates no furtherdeliberatlon. Also, as an instrument of social change, thecinema has lost its credibility ever since its reach has beenovertaken by television. Cinema provides unadulteratedentertainment to the masses, the vast majority of whom aremale. What is seen in the celluloid world is a fantasy worldand emulation is not the driving force. T?rus cinema, as itstands today, is not so much an impediment in thereconstruction of women's image in the way television is.

464 Perspectiues on South Asra

Television's unique role in bringing social change is nowuniversally recognized. When speaking of building an image,in tJle way the stage is excluded as any mode reconstruct,cinema too may be excluded from the task of exacting thejob.

Television had been a home media and on its fringe whenit started operailng in the early sixties in Dhaka. In thebeginning it was only in the capital, but soon it reached outto all corners of the country and even across the boundariesto India by the mid seventies. This position changed furtheras more and more TV sets came into middle class households.A phenomenal change was witnessed in the nineties withthe mushroom growth of satellite dishes on rooftops and thewebs of satellite cables that crisscrossed the sk5r soon after.Now when TV has overtaken the cinema in its reach andsplendour the TV stars too now adorn the tin backs of therickshaws on the Dhaka streets which hitherto had beenexclusively dominated by the heroines of the tinsel world.

The subject of the discourse is the image of women. Theimportant role of the mass media is its power to create rolemodels. Roles that are recreated by the respective targetgroups which empathise with them. It is widely believedthat images built through the rnass media create a mirrorimage in society. Shakespeare had said that the job of theplaywright was to hold a mirror onto nature. ObviouslyShakespeare's concern was to improve the form of art. Inthe meantime, more than one or half a century from his age,we have come to a situatlon in which whether or not wereflect "Life in Art" people wiII follow art or the likeness of itas represented in the electronic art form of television.

In the light of the argument of this paper, that thecontinual presence of the IVay eekaas the female lead defeatsthe cause of status change for women, we may look closelyinto her characters.

Nageekafrorrr the days of yore till date on Television or in

The Image oJWomen onTV and. Cinema 465

Cinema, is tJle woman lead who may be defined by thefollowing attributes:

l. Young (preferably spanning the years eighteen tiroughtwenW five);

2. Beautiful and the criteria of being fair and attractivequalifo beauty;

3. Belonging to the middle class; and

4. Manoeuweable.

As in literature and poetry, so also in drama, women castin this mould re-inforces the perception about women in away that it becomes 'ideal' role to follow. This is a tall orderfor the maJoritjr of women to achieve. At an individual level itcreates stress for women to flt into the category and at thesocial level the Nageeka s position at the centre excludes allother women of society from the focus of attention. Thusany woman who cannot meet tJle standards of the Nageekais one less in her accomplishments, whatever herachievements may be otherwise. This creates a setback forthe woman, as in addition to her other efforts, more thannecessary time is spent by her to make herself as close aspossible to the Nageeka

In comparison, her counterpart man is better placed, fc(-his attention is more concentrated on accomplishment ashe himself deftnes it, and even if society defines it, it is notmerely a superficial accomplishment that is modelled by theNageeka This contribution of art and poetry towards theimage of women and mass marketed by the media is sostron$y embedded in our psyche that we are actually talkingof a homogeneous job, if are to think about changing thepractice altogether.

We cannot hope to remove the Nageeka from the centralfocus of attention of "Business". However, we can well usethis central position of the "woman" in the media to the

466 P er sp ectiu e s on S outh Asla

advantage of image reconstruction for the new woman.

Recommendations

Maturity accompanied by confidence in facing the worldis a far more attractive and comfortable position to be in forthe woman than blushing in her discomfort with tl.e world.Thus maturity could be opted in place of innocence for thereformed Nageeka

On Bangladesh television, maturity in the central leadwomen had not been uncommon in the past. In recent timesthough, it ls becoming rare. Like the fashion world of t'lleWest women's roles in.privately produced TV dramas haveonly the very young in the central lead and the story is ofcourtship prior to mardage. This has also been the norm ofclnema. The very narrow span of life and situation coveredof the woman excludes and obliterates all other experiencesin her life. In the process it reinforces the stereotypedNayeeka sltuatlon once agaln.

The activity of the woman "lead" also negaflvely contributesto the construction of her image. Apart from tJre dialogues itis lrnportant to evaluate "business" given to the woman lnthe role she plays. More often she is before the mirrorcombing her hair or doing the bed. One of our most famousplaywrighfs female leads is critlcized for persistently makingand serving tea to the family, Thus, in the middle classhousehold, it is the most common activity of the woman tokeep the rest of the family in constant supply of tea, howeverIt ls also a common phenomenon that she studies, reads thenewspaper or works on the computer. However thesebuslnesses are but very rarely depicted in the women's roleson TV. To be informed makes the posiUon of a personstrong. Our new woman of the 'media' could be shown aslnformed and actlvities could well be of readtng a book thansurdng the tea.

The plays of Bangladesh television are also stuck in the

Tte Image oJWomen onTV and Cttemn 467

groove of the middle class since middle class sentiments are

very marketable for the masses, or so it is assumed. The

rrrttdle posiuon of this class is easier to treat and gives

sc6pe for romanticism using the middle class sentiment.The lower income group is fleetingly touched upon when thesupport class of servants has to be depicted. To depictvillainy, or soclal wrongs, upper income people are depicted

in stereotyped roles as "bad people". Middle class values puta limit to the "woman lead" which may be overcome by her ifshe can take a bold step beyond this boundary adding yetanother dimension to the new Nageeka For example thevirtual absence of say, a garment worker in a central positlonis an under representation of this huge workforce, and lt isonly indicative of the narrowness of the media's range ofvision. Thus the heroine is usually a student who belongs toa middle income household whose future, other than beingthe ideal match to her partner, is never a concern for theplaywright. That women are coming into the workforce andthe ups and downs of her career, and threats thereof can beof equal interest as her affairs to the audience, seems

beyond the conception of most pla)^nrrights.

Given that tlle world of "showbiz" supported by "commerce"

will continue to place women in the centre and under themale gaze, it is well that the new Nageeka is shaped in theplace of the stereotyped Nageeka men think as ideal andcontinue to construct in their blissful ignorance.

Images of the Female inSri Lankan Art

Smma Kiribamtrte

In the words of the Convenors of the South Asia Dialoguewhat is attempted at this meeting is exploring "the sharedperceptions of our artists in the way they reflect certainvalues and attitudes of fundamental concern to oursocleues". My presentation is related to only a small part ofthis vast exploratory field and has to do with looking at howpre-modern Sri Lankan creative artists have addressed theissue of the positlon of women in soci€ty. The values andattitudes reflected in these creations need to be placed inthe wider context of South Asia so that the presenrdiscussions can lead to a combined exploratlon of the rolesand status of women in our socieues.

A point that I need to draw attention to at the very outsetof this exercise is tlrat the "shared perceptions of our artists.in the present study are almost exclusively male perceptions.So what we are basically looking at a_re perceptions of malesculptors and painters regarding the social roles and positionof women. The missing element in this is women's own

Images oJ tte Female in Srtlr:r.kan Art

perception of their roles and status i;l society. The almosttotal absence of known sculptors and painters among women

is not a particularly Sri Lankan phenomenon and neither isit an Asian occurrence. The question as to why this is so

would go beyond the parameters of a South Asian Dialogue.

Suffice it to say that one has to constantly keep in mind thatthe female in art is mosfly a male preoccupaflon. Let me'

however, hasten to add that artists, male or female, are notimmune to their environment. The attitudes and pressures

around them inform their art and its relevance to societal

analysis is not insignilicant. Therefore the artistic expressions

regarding women need not be looked upon as mere pictorialobjects. They have the potential of showing up women's role

as historical agents, and can reveal the range of constraintsand opportunities women have had over Ume.

That the different countries of South Asia belong to asingle cultur al zone is a strong percepUon among bothanthropologists and historians. While the inter-culturaldiversities among and within the countries of South Asiashould form part of the present discourse, the overarchingsimiladties across national boundaries can provide a commonplatform of understanding for "a shared vision". The language

of art transcends state boundaries and has facilitatedcommunication across diverse groups' Common myths andsymbols are expressed through sculpture and paintingdespite stylistical variations encountered in different cultures'These motifs in art provide a common language ofcommunication across South Asia.

In the case of the Sri Lankan experience, given theisland's proximity to the subcontinent, relations betweenthem have been necessarily close. While one is aware ofinstances of political tension between Sri Lanka and herSouth lndian neighbours, the harmonious pattern of culturalintercourse forms the most positive aspect of the Indianrelationship. Looking back on these historical links, it isimportant to recognise ttrat political conflict did not deter

469

470 Perspecttues on South Asia

cultural coopera on and dialogue. This model of culturalexchange resulfing in the spread ofideas, values and beliefswas the result of voluntary association and was not theresult of politlcal, social or economic pressures exerted bvthe bigger neighbour.

This is something one needs to emphasise. Much of theavailable evidence suggests that the cultural diffusionreferred to was mostly a one w&y street. But Sri l,anka didpay her debts, for a reverse flow did take place in certainareas of art and religion. It is important to recognise thatpre-colonial Aslan cultures which received extraneousimpulses selected certain cultural elements of their ownchoice and in the conted of Sri Lanka too there was thlssame selectivity. These elements were often restated in newterms and at times endowed with different meaning. One isnot unaware ofinstances ofcultural resistance when specificviews did not conform to the host country,s own ethos. Inthe evolution of any culture there is an inner dynamic atwork which gives it a certain colour and texture. Therefore itis in the context of these basic interconnections anddivergences that one has to claritr one,s own perceptionsregarding the social position of women as represented inpre-modern Sri l,ankan art.

Theoreflcal formations regarcling women's status have tobe tested against historical material and variables such astime, class and ethnicity have to be accounted for. In otherwords there is historical variability rather than uniformityin women's experience. Defining women is a shifting area inwomen's studies research and there is no single stance fromwhich femlnist scholars have viewed the e4perience of women.The patriarchal gender ldeologr which has become a bedrockof feminist scholarship has its critics and how the artistviews power relations between the sexes can lead to a morenuanced approach which views the position of women interms of the constraints and opportunities they face.

Imoges oJthe Female in Sri l-ankan Art 471

With this introduction an attempt u/ill be made to present

some of tJle basic concepts outlined above'

Inter-cultural Links

Writing on women in Indian art' Heinz Mode has said

". ..to*h"r" in the world than in India can women be

entitled to claim higher rank than men in art' whether

tft-tgtt ttt. quanUty of representations' the quality of their

o"".riion or the importance of their symbolic content'"r

This concentration on the female figure in India is not

matched by Sri Lanka and this is where the Buddhist ethos

comes to itay. Sri l,ankan art' especially its sculpture' is

dominatei Uy ttre Buddha image, and the female flgure

takes a back seat. This reticence is only true of the Buddhist

art in Sri l,anka, Hindu art follows the Indian genre' This is

also true of a few representations we have of secular art'

A point which needs to be made and which is perhaps

impoitant in terms of diffusing current ethnic tensions' is

the eclecticism of ttre Sri Lankan artists when it came to

deriving inspiration from the different schools of Indian art'

Numerous ixamples can be cited to demonstrate the fact

that there was no regional bias in this regard' A relief

"u-irtg on marble, depicting Queen Maya' the mother of the

Bod*ituahas close affiliations with the Amaravati School

of art, dated to the early centuries of the Christian era' and

later we nrove on to the Sigiriya paintings which have often

been compared to the paintngs at AJanta' The torso of a

woman from Anuradhapura can be compared with the

Ganga/Yamuna sculptures at Mathura' dated to the Gupta

p..io'a. Next we have the relief sculptures depicting heavenly

musicians at Isurumuniya of the sixth to seventtr century

period where the Pallava inspiration is unmistakable' Sri

I-ankan Parva images are not unlike similar images in the

Chola or Pandyan art tradition and the relief carvings at

Yapahuva ,"rni.td one of the sculptures at the Konark

temple in Orissa. This is avery quick overview of the l'rind of

472 Perspectiues on South Asra,

artistic exchange between Sri Lanka andsubcontinent, demonstrating a wide diffr.i;;cultural carriers being artists, religious menpilgrims and traders.

the Indianof ideas, theand women,

The Social posltion of lVomen as Deplcted ln ArtSgmbolic Worship oJMottrer Earth

. The issue of patriarchy and tlte subordination of womenlooms large in feminist discourse. St"."otype" of women asuniformly oppressed and unempower"o io "oi provide uswit]. a complete picture. on t].e positive side, mottrerhood isperhaps one of the most powerful concepts *ii"t p._.a."

SoutJr Asian culture. The worship of ttre fUottrer Goddesshas found visual expression from the earliest times in bothIndia and Sri Lanka. The reproductive rols of womenassociated with notions of fertility and good luck haveelevated women to divine status. A commoir manif,estationofthe goddess dating back to as early as ttre secona centuryB.C. at Sanchi is the GqTalakshrni image. ln Si f,anka the.image of Lakshmi as the goddess of gooJluck is representedin botJl Buddhist and Hindu art. The composition of Lakshmibathed by elephants is even emproyed in secular structuresas an auspicious s1.rnbol. This sl,rnbolic representagon isvery widespread in India too. The basic idea seems to be thepouring down of water over mother earth, making herfertile, the elephants representing rain clouds. U"ffiis.tl.Hindus and Jains, all of them

"".in to t """ irrt.."ufisJifi.

venerafion of Lakshmi within their own mythologies. It isy."ry :l.T that this symbol of fertility is a manifestation ofthe Mother Goddess concept and forms a commonsubstratum in the South Asian belief system.

The Concept oJ the Goddess and" Her Cutt WorshipThe feminist view is that all religions are patriarchal.

Religion either takes for granted male dominance or gives

Images oJ the Female in Srt lo,nkan Art 473

direct expression to it. As a general rule women occupysubordinate status in most established religions. InTterauadaBuddhism which is the dominant tradition in SriLanka, the Buddha is always male and there is no way inwhich a woman can become a Buddha. "fhe Mahagctnatradition, which has had a profound influence on Sri LankanBuddhism, is somewhat more inclusive. The Bodhis atua orthe aspiring Buddha can be either male or female, althoughaccording to some texts the female Bodhisatua becomesmale at the point of Buddhahood. Sri l,ankan Hinduismlooks upon Shiua as the supreme god while Vtshnu isaccommodated more or less as a Buddhist god. Outsidethese formal structures dominated by the male, ttrere is astrong undercurrent of goddess worship and often hermediation in human affairs has been much more powerfulthan that of the male gods.

TWo of the most powerful goddesses worshipped in SriLanka today are Pattini and Kali. Paffini is a Buddhistgoddess and is, in the popular imagination, theCompassionate Mother, warding off ill-health and otherevils. She is also a Bodhisatua or a future Buddha, a notionwhich seems to have persisted in the popular mind fromearlier times. The eighth and ninth centuries A.D. seem tohave been the heyday of Mahayana Buddhism in Sri Lankaand the worship of Tara or the female Bodhisatua seems tohave been very strong. Sometimes called Paftini, she is alsothe BodhisatuaTara- One such image is now housed in theBritish Museum. A unique image of Tara in transcendalmeditation is a clear expression of the Buddhist view thatwomen are capable of the highest spiritual attainment. Hercult worship was independent of the veneration of the maleBodhisatua.

The worship of goddess Kali has been mostly associatedwith Hinduism, but the cult has straddled the Hindu/Buddhist divide. Durga or Y'ali in the popular perception is

474 Pers pectiues on South Asla

the Great Goddess and there is rlo place for a supreme malegod in some local belief systems, for instance in some partsof India. In the Hindu tradition, Durgais the warrior goddess,the Sakfr or the counterpart of Shiva, not to be confusedwith his consort, ParuatL Her most powerful role is thedestruction of evil and in this she takes on a very aggressivestance, There are many manifestations of the goddess, onewhere she stands on the head of a buffalo and anotherwhere she tramples evil, personified as a demon. More"benevolenf' forms or "less war-like" forms of the goddessare widely seen in village temples in both India and Sril,anka. The great reliance on the Mother Goddess throughher many manifestations in both Hindu and Buddhisttraditions represents a comrnon value system whichenvelopes the whole South Asiart region.

The Unlon of the Male/Female Prlnciple in ArtThe most logical evolution of the theory of Saktr is the

depiction of the Supreme God as both male and female-theArdhanari form, half male and half female. A strikingillustration of this concept as expressed in art is the imagefound at an excavation site at the Abhayagiri temple. Onceagain both the Buddhists and Hindus seem to have beencomfortable with this idea, for numerous Indian examplescan be cited in this regard. What is exemplilled in theseimages is that the ultimate reality is both female and male.

The Representatlon of Women's Llves: Constraints andOpportunities

We have so far seen the image of woman as the source ofgood fortune, the 'Great Mother' and the Supreme Goddess.While the artist has depicted all this, he also records for usthe negative side, that women are controlled or subordinated.This is the contradiction that one faces regarding the socialposition of women as represented in art. Within the sametradition or the same belief system the two I'iewpoints seem

Images oJ tte Fennle tn Sri Lanlsn Art 475

to coerdst quite amicablY.

Sita exemplilles the Hindu wife, a perception which has

wide ramifications throug[out South Asian society' She is

the divine consort whose sexuality is controlled' In both

Buddhist and Hindu art, the goddess is most popularly

represented as the consort of either the Bodhisatua or the

main Hindu God. She is sometimes placed on a slightlylower plane as seen at the Vegiriya temple in Kandy and atthe rock temple at Buduruvagala' Numerous examples can

be cited in Hindu art, Poiruo:ti in the Chola tradition being

one of the better examPles'

The same phenomenon is seen among the lesser deities,

the most extreme example ttrat one can present are theguardian gods at the Abhayagiri temple, whose consorts are

relegated to a small niche on the sculpted slabs. However

gender stereotyping can be quite problematic. The largernumber of guardian deities found in all parts of Sri Lanka

and during all historical periods is an eye-opener to thegreat variability in social attitudes towards women. As inthe case of the principal deities, guardian deities are bothmale and female, the large number is of course male.

Independent guardian goddesses are not uncommon' as lnthe case of the guardian goddess at Pidurangala and one is

also aware of joint male/female guardians of equal statureon the Lankatilaka temple balustrade in Polonnaruwa.Therefore the relative importance of the consort in Jointcompositions varies considerably. One needs to look at thepossibility of changing attitudes over time and the perceptions

of artists, patrons and donors for the interpretation of these

artefacts. Radhika Coomaraswamy's statement that "woman

must be seen in context before she is seen in liberation"z isperhaps very pertinent.

Women's Soclal and Polltlcal Roles

The pre-modern Sri Lankan artist has presented to us a

476 Perspectiues on South Asla

wide repertolre of images .reflecting women's social rolessuch as those of the dancer, the musician and tJle religiousdevotee. There is space in Asian culture for the talents ofboth men and women in dance and rnusic without toomuch gender differentiation. Flowever, one can see anoticeable emphasis on the female dancer and very oftenthe men provide the music, although the women do notalways dance to their tune as seen among ttre yapahuvadancers. Some literary texts suggest tJrat dancing and musicwere accomplishments which cut across class divisions butwith time they appear to have been limited to the lowerrungs of society. Here, it is the class bias rather than thegender bias that we seem to be confronted with. parallelscan be drawn from most South Asian cultures in thisregard.

The religious devotee is a regular image among womenrepresented in art. This is a position of power which hasbeen assigned to women from very early times. However themediatory role of women invoh,ing the divine is a privateactivity. The more presugious role of mediation in the publicsphere is assigned to men and ttre political influence ofwomen is limited to the domestic arena.

The perception that informal networking among womenls a source of power has been grapkrically demonstrated in aKandyan temple painting of the seventeenth eentury.Exchanging news and views around the village well is afamiliar pre-occupation among wornen a scene captured bythe Kandyan painter. An instance where the woman assertshersell pushed by the village women is once again part ofthe same record where the young wif'e is encouraged to slapher aged husband.

Traditionally the political culture of South Asia did notprovide adequate space for \f,'omen to participate in theformal political arena. In Sri Lanka a few queens did reignbut as a rule it was the men who wielded institutional

lnrages oJ the Female in Sri In*an Art 477

power. Women were also completely shut out from officialgovernment positions. Although wives of kings were notpart of the formal decision making structures, they did findopportunities to assume the role of power-brokers. AJatakascene ln a temple painting where the king confers with hisministers while the queen sits by his side suckling herinfant child is to my mind a telling scene. This is not aceremonial sitting of tlle king and queen with state officials.Although her domestic role is accentuated, the queen is notdisinterested in the official decision-making process. Thatwomen have found indirect methods to gain power andinfluence demonstrate the lack of direct access to formalpolitics-a concern in most of South Asia.

It is not necessary to labour the point that painting andsculpture do not provide us with a complete picture of theposition of women in pre-modern times. However they dofurnish us with certain insights which can supplement andcomplement data derived from other sources, resulting in amuch more holistic understanding of ttre status and roles ofwomen in South Asian societies. The strengths andweaknesses regarding the condition of women seem toresonate across South Asia, bringing us back to the mainfocus of this seminar, "a shared vision".

END NOTES

Heinz Mode. Wonen in Indir;,n Art, New York: 1964.

Radhika Coomaraswamy, "The Impact of Tradition, Cultureand Religion on Women in South Asia", Ethnic Studies Report,6:2. Julv 1998.

REFERENCES

Archer, W.G., and Paranavithana, Senarat, Ceglon Pointings JromTemple, Shrine and Rock, New York: New York Graphic Society,r958.

Bandaranayake, Senaka Dias, The Rock and WaII Paintings oJ Srt

1

2.

474 Perspectiues on Sotrfh Asrcr

Lanka, Colombo: Lake House, 19g6.

Devendra, Don Titus: Classical Srnhalase Sculpturei SOO B.C. _

A.D. IOOO, London: lg58; Hetuaratchi, S.B.,.Bronze and OtherMetal Artefacts at Abhayagiri Vihara., Ancient Ceyton No. 10,1990.

Kiribamune, Sirima, and Seneviratna, Harsha, The Femnle in Art,Mimeograph, Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies.1987.

Paranavitana, Senarat, Glirnpses oJ Ceglon's past, Colombo: LakeHouse, 1972.

Schroeder, Ulrtch Von, Tfe Golden Age oJ Scrtlpture in Sri Lantco,Hong Kong.'Visual Dharma Publications Ltd., 1992.

Contemporary South AsianArt and Women

Nazrul lslam

Artists at all times and in all places have been concerned

with the nature of women (as much as, or even more than'the nature of men). The artists of the South-Asian sub-continental region have similarly found women and theirlives an absorbing subject for the expression of their creative

activities. Artists have depicted women' as women, at work,

at play, in love, in nature, as women and their ideas, women

in their conllicts and also women as goddesses. In thecontemporary situation, the last theme (women as goddesses)

is nearly irrelevant, while the other themes persist.Contempora4r modern arflsts in South Asia have alsopursued the above themes while depicting women. In very

recent times, one of the most famous of the South Astanar0sts, M.F. Hussain, landed in serious trouble for having

drawn sketches of a Hindu goddess in the nude. Had he

been an artist ofthe tenth century and sculpted a figure ofthe delty hewould probably have had no problem. However,

the artist's own religious identity would perhaps still cause

480 Perspectiues on South Asia

a problem. Art and artists, even today, seem to have casteand creed. In any case, our topiC of discussion in this paperls women in contemporary South Asian art, particularlywith reference to such lssues as (rJ women in societ5r, (ii)social justice and human rights, and (iuJ fundamentalismand communalism.

81 the term contemporary art, we will conffne ourselvesto the last five decades, meaning post_Independence orpost-colonial period. However, some references may go beyond1947. We will also confine ourselves to contemporary"modern" art rather than discuss "traditional,, or ,.folk arts".Our discussion is also limited io the arts of Bangfadesh,Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, five of the sevenSouth Asian countries participating in the South AsianDialogue. (In the latest Asian Art Biennial Bangladesh f 99S,artists of Bhutan also assumed a westernised modernisticposture and depicted women and the girl child in theirwork. But Bhutanese contemporary artisti in general like toadhere to traditional styles. The artists of ttre Maldives havenot been participating in the Asi,an Biennial for some timeand we have no clear idea about their recent artistic activities.Until the late eig[ties, they were, however, portraying womenin a realistic manner. These were women at leisurely workor women ln love).

It is not very easy to find expre$sion of all three themes ofthe Dialogue in re contemporary arts of the region. Forexample, fundamentalism and communalism have lound littleportrayal in the artistic works of major arUsts of South Asia.One may also have to search hard to find el,idence of workson social justice and human rights. However, examples ofworks under the theme of ,.women in societ5r,, may not bevery dlfficult to get, as the theme addresses a much broadersubject.

Fundamentallsm and Communallsm

Some of the Ieading South Asian contemporary modern

Contemporary South Asran Art and. Women 481

artists have held politically quite radical views and stood

against fundamentalism and communalism. In Bangladesh,

Quamrul Hasan's name is remembered with reverence in thiscontext. He participated in many agitations againstfundamentalism, but we do not {ind serious works of art byhim onthe theme. Although many brutal incidents have takenplace in Bangladesh in which women became victims offundamentalists' verdicts. Like the case of Noorjahan, whoultimatelyhad to commit suicide because of fundamentalists'persecution, ttre topic has moved few artists. Dilara BegumJolly, a young female artist, is an exception. Her painting'Noor Jahan" is a statement against fundamentalism. Jollyhas also been depicting violence against women in general ina rather surrealistic manner. She was chosen for an honourablemention in the twelfth national exhibition of art last December(f 996) for her painting "Molence-3". In this work the centralfocus of violence is a woman.

In India, as has been mentioned earlier, an eminentartist. M.F. Hussain became a victim of fundamentalist andcommunal attacks, not for standing against fundamentalismor communalism, but for depicting goddess Saraswati in arather unorthodox manner. Although he made these sketchesmany years ago, the reaction from fundamentalists cameonly recenfly. Hussain has depicted more worldly women,both celebrities and ordinary. His attitude is not so muchpolitical as it is social or simply adistic.

Although fundamentalism is an increasingly strong forcein Pakistan, there is little evidence in art, showing protestagainst these forces. None of the 26 illustrations in thecomprehensive volume on Contemporary Art in Pakistan byMarcella Nelson Sirhandi (Ferozsons, Lahore, 1992) showany such evidence, nor had the seven Asian Art shows inDhaka since 1981 provided any example of artists risingagainst fundamentalism. Although the "Women Series" ofNahid Raza and works by other artists have focussed onwomen,

Despite the fact that Sri Lanha is tormented by ethnic orracial strifes, it has not disturbed its world of art. Theartists seem to be able to maintain a distance and remaincalm.

Soclal Justice and Human RightsThe political questions of social justice and human rights,

have also attracted attention of some contemporary arustsof the sub-continent.

Zainul Abedin, the pioneer of, the modern art movementin Bangladesh, made his mark ulith the famous sketches onthe 1943 Famine in Bengal. These sketches are polgnantstatements on the cruelty of colonial exploitation and socialinjustice. Many other artists of Calcutta at that time(Ramkinkar, Somnath Hore, Chittaprasad, Sudhir Kfrastagir,Gohardhan Aash, Paritosh Sen, Gopen Roy, Bhobesh Sanyal,Sunimadhau Sen, etc.) have also depicted the famine scenesin their works and focused on the r,rrlnerability of women inparticular. But the sketches of Abedin have attained almosta symbolic status on social injurstice through famine. It isinteresfing to note that after over fifty years since thefamine sketches, how perceptively Abedin had recorded theplight of the woman, the mother. She had not only to fendfor herself, but also for the childnen, because the father, orthe man, had abandoned the family, looking after himselfalone. Quamrul Hasan, the other most powerful andinfluenUal modern artist of Barrgladesh, wis also deeplyconcerned at the lack of social Justice and human rights,particularly of women. Some of his post{iberation works,specially the large wood cut compositions of 1974, depictingthe famine on the one hand and the I,ulgarity of the urbanrich on the other, are a strong statement on social inequality.Much younger artists of Dhaka, like Shishir Bhattacharva.Rokeya Sultana, Nilufar Chaman or Dilara eegum Joly,have also satirized the predicarneht of women in an unequalsociet5r. Hundreds of thousands of women during ihe

Contemporary South Asinn Art and Women 483

Ban$adesh War of Liberation suffered violation of theirhuman dignity and rigbts, and some artists have chosensuch experiences as their subject matter.

Amrita Sher-Gil in India, Subaida fu;ha in Pakistan orNovera Ahmed in Bangladesh were some of the pioneerwomen artists of the sub-continent who paid special attentionto women. All three artists were thorouglrly modern, Novera

in sculpture and Sher-Gil and Agha in painting. Sher-Giland Novera are particularly noteworthy as they choseordinary women as the subject of their work (Lala RukhSelim has made a thorough analysis of Novera's portrayal ofwomen, in her paper in this volume).

Women ln Society

Of the three themes, 'Women in Society' is more practicallyillustratable on the basis of their greater representation inworks of modern art in South Asia.

Fioneer artists like Zainul Abedin, Quamrul Hasan orS.M. Sultan in Bangladesh, Abdur Rahman Chugtai, ShakirAli or Zubaida Agha in Pakistan, Amrita Sher-Gil, kelaMukherjee, M.F. Hussain, G. Subramanium, MeeraMukherjee, Ganesh $me, Sarbari Roy Chowdhury and manyothers in India, George Keyt, JDA Perara or StanleyAbesinghe, Madapatha Dhamasera Thera and ALD Sirisenain Sri Lanka, and artists in Nepal have seen women invarious ,strata of their respective societies. Chugtai onlyplaced women in high society, as a contrast, Zainmul,Quamrul and Sultan were more engaged in depicting the lifeof ordinary women or working women. Hussain chose bothfamous personalities like Mother Teresa, Indira Gandhi andrnore recently even film actress Madhuri Dixit to symbolizewomanhood. Amrita Sher-Gil had changed the attitudetowards women in Indian art by addressing ordinary villagewomen.

In the contemporary modern art of Bangladesh it was

484 Perspectiues on Soufh Asla

Shahabuddin who took a lead in depicting political andsocial leaders, both dead and lMng. ShahabiAiin was boldenough to portray Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahmanduring the eighties when it was indeed taboo to do so. Otherartists came forward only after Sheikh Hasina became thePrime Minister. Shahabuddin is also the pioneer in portrayinggreat women of Bangladesh on his canvases. He depicteJSufia Kamal, Jahanara Imam and Sheikh Hasina in hisrecent works. There are not many other artists who chose todo the same.

Most of the young artists of Bangladesh, includtng womenartlsts, are more down to earth in the selection of theirsubject matter, but quite surreal, post_modern and highlysatirical in style of depiction. On the other hand, some verysenior painters (like Mortuza Basheer) of Bangladesh, havefound greater interest in the portrayal of middl,e class urbanwomen in cosmetic attire in a more romantic semi_realisticstyle. Sensuality and even eroticism also pervade the worksof young artists, mostly males, but also females, whiledepicting women. Women in love, Or men and women makinglove, are also not rare scenes. At the same time the dignityof women, women as contributors to economic productivity,as s1rmbols of fertility, of motherhood, continue to be depictedin art.

We might conclude by noting that the artists of theSouth-Asian subcontinent have been fairly conscious ofthesocio-political status of women in the society but havenormally not taken a very radical stand in deiicting theirsituation in works of art. Howeven, at least in Bangladesh,modern painting has remained very secular in content allalong.

Index 489

environment and, 416-23in Bangladesh, 353-83, 4O5in India, 385-404paradigm on solving ethnic

conflicts,84-86rule of law and, 384-415social justice and, 366-83South Asian perspectives on,

476-23women's rights as, 353

Htllnlrrn Rights in Banglodesh1997,357

Hunfington, Samuel, 36Huq, Hasan Anz.ul, 381Huq, Syed Shamsul, 381Hussain, M.F., 479, 481, 483

Ibsen, 154Illias Akhtar Uzzaman, 448Imam, Jahanara, 484Imperialism, in South Asia, 3India,

election funding in, 294-307. ceiling on election ex-

penses, SO3corporate contributions,

304eligibility criteria, 30l -07performance in earlier

election criteria, 305-o6

public funding of election,304

electoral process, 295-98,307-09

electoral reform, 308-09lndirt Todog, lOOIndian Peace Keeping Force

(IPKF), in Sri Lanka, 39-40,53

Indo-Bangladesh-Nepal Com-mission, 23O

Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty, 33InsoJ Ki DeDi, 459

International Monetary Fund0MF), 2 1 1, 259, 268-69, 277

Investment Corporation ofPakistan tlCP), 214

Iqbal, 160Islam, Kazi Nazrul, l5O, 16O,

367-70. 445,479Islam, Nahid, lO0Islam, Sadhana, 435Islamabad Accord, 119

JVP, 266-67,274Jaakko Pory International, I lOJahan, Nasreen, 449-5OJahan, Roushan, 439Jahangir, Asma, 283Jainuddin, Sardar, 380Jan Sangh, 135Jana Samhiti Samiti (JSS).

Bangladesh, 359Janoni, 379Janasaviya Programme, Sri

Lanka,27OJayewardene, J. 39, l4OJayewardene, Junius Richard'

235,276-74Jefferson,384Jinnah. Mohammad Ali, 13O,

170-71Jolly, Dilara Begum, 435-37 ,

487-82Journat oJ Democrocg, 284

Kaiser, Shahidulla, 379-8OKalam, Shamsuddin Abul, 38OKamal, Sajed, 367, 37OKamal, Sufia,37l,4a4Kapoor, Karishma, 458Koshbaner Kanga, 38OKeyt, George, 483Khalnayak,456Khan, Akhtar Hameed, 413Khan, Akhtar Hamid, 343Khan, Ayub, L4O-42, 2O3, 22O'

2t.343

490 Perspecttues on South Asia

Khan, Masuma, 434Khan, Razia, 449Khan, Tahera, 429Khastagir, Sudhir, 482Khatun, Rabeya, 449Khatun, Zubaida Akter, 429Kiribamune, Sirima, 468Koirala, E}.P., 153-54Koirala, c.P., 24O, 319Kritddaser Hasi, g8OKsudFo O Asha, B8O

LaI Salu, 378, 380I€gislatures, decline of, 144-4bLiberation Tigers of Tamil

Ealam (LTTE), 39, 258, 224-76

Lipton, Michael, lOBLocal Administrative Act 196b,

Nepal, 312Local Administrative Act tggo,

315Lohia, Ram Manohar, l87-gg

Mahabub ul Haq, 23Mahakali Project, Nepal, 240Mahapurus,38lMahaveli Programme, Sri

l,anka, 99, I lOMahendra, King, 312Main Chup Rahungi, 489Malla, Ashesh, 156Manandher, Kiran, 157MandL 460Manthqn,459-60Manto, Saadat Hasan, lSO, 160ManuSmriti,4S4Manzool Makbula, 449Marshall, Merqm, 483Marx, 371Masan, 154Mazari, Shireen, 43Mazumdar, Ranjam, 461Meena Kumari, 458

Meer, 16OMill, John Stuart, 366Minorities Commission, 396Mishra, I I tMitra, Premendra, BZ IMode, Heinz, 471Mohammed, M.H.,2STMosharraf, Rashed, 362Mother India, 456Mukherjee, Leela, 48SMukherjee, Meera, 483Mukherji, Sailajananda, 3Z IMuluki Ain(Civil Code) of 1854,

Nepal,3lIMunamadan, l5O-b3Muslim Family Ordnance 1961,

Bangladesh, BSsMyrdal, c., 339

l\lGOs, human rights and, g2Nlagraj, N.. lolI\,laidu, Chandrababu, 197Narasimha Rao, lgNarayan, Jayaprakash, 297Nasreen, Taslima, 564, 442,

449Nasreen Begum, 435Nation truilding, and conflicts

in South Asia, 44-45National Commission for

Women, India, S94, 396National Human Rights

Commission, 396, 999_4OONational Investment Trust (NIT),

Pakistan,2l4Na tional Planning Commission,

Nepal, 316, 322, 3.26National Taxation Reforms

Commission, pakistan, 2O9Nationalism, 4Nazlee, Laila Monsur, 454, 436Nehru, Jawaharlal, 2g, l g3,

ra6-a7, 27aNellithanam, Jacob, lO2

I

Index 491

Nepal,Central-local government

relations, 319-21civil society, 331-34decentralization of power in,

3ro-35constitutional framework

for,314-19historical background,

311-14issues in, 314politics and,314-19

ecollomy,247foreign policy, 251-55governance in, 233-56NGOs in, 331-34new challenges , 244-51political evolution, 237 - 44self-government attributes,

32t-34accountabtlity, 325-27autonomy, 32 l -23consumers' group, 33O-3rfinancial resource base,

327-30people's participation,

323-25self-help organisations, 33I -

34Nepal Sadbhavan Party {NSP),

317-18Nepali Congress (NC), 239-41,

243, 246, 253, 313, 317, 321New Asian Order, l9Nil Rang Rakta, 38ONish@nt, 459

Obaidullah, Abu Z,afar. 375Odgsseg, 37Official Secrets Act, 387-88Olson, Mancur, 34OOrangi Pilot Proj ect [OPP) ,

Pakistan,413Organisation of Islamic coun-

tries,217Oslo therapy, I 19Osman, Showkat, 379-8O

P adma-Me ghnallamuna, 38OPadmaraga,446Pahario Padshad Chattro, 36OPai Panandiker, V.A., 295, 3O7Pokeezah. 456Pakistan,

balance of payments, 21 1-t2

challenge to democracy in,i30-35

country report in, 2OO- fgdirection of economy, 2O9-

10economy, 2O8- l4external policy, 215- 18ideological challenges to

political system in, l3O-35

international trade, 2l Ipolitical development in,

201-o7polltics and profit, 214- 15pressures for change, 2O7-

o8public finance, 213- 14

Pakistan Obseruer, 43OPaliwai, K.V., lO7Pallo Gtnrko Jhgol, 154Panday, Devendra Raj, 12,233,

372,4tlParbottyo Chattagram Jane

Samhiti Salniti (PCJSS), 359-tfU

Parijat, 155Paroda, R.S., I02Paroma,4@Patkar, Medha, lloPeiris,_G.H., 68-69, 87, 97, lOOPeople's Representation Act,

308

492 Perspectiues on South Asra

Perara, J.D.A,, 483Peshawar Accord, ll9Phari Gono Parishad, 86OPolice Act of f86 t, 4l OPolitical system, in South Asia,

alienation from polltics, 129centre us. linguistic and

ethnic units, 126-22civil society and, 145-42controlled democracy, 126ideological challenges to,

r29-39Bangladesh, l35external factors contrib-

uting to, 186-39India, 135-36Pakistan, t30-35

institutional structures ofdemocracy, 139-44

legislatures, 144-4bparliamentary system, 14I -

44Presidential system, 142-44pressures on, 126-29process, 123-45religious pressures. 127 -29,

136Pouchepadass, Jacques, 96Poverlr Alleviation programme

[PAP), Sri Lanka, 2ZOPrabhakaran, 275Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 39,

53-54, 257.270,274-77Pressler Amendment, 42Pdson conditions, in India, 287-

88Protection of Human Rights Act

r993, 399$zne, Ganesh, 483

Rahman, Attur, 345Rahman, Hasan Hafizur, S7S,

342Rahman, Rizia, 449

Rahman, Ruby, 447R.ahman, Shamsur, 388, 446Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 49,

t40, r42,229,286,4a4Raihan, Zahir, 382Rajalakshmi,'f.K., IOZRamachandraiah, C., lO8Ram Kinkar, 482Ramrajga concept, 24Rao, Maithili, 455, 461Rashid, M. Harunur, 576, SZgRashtriya Prajatantra party

(RPP), 240-4r, 317-r8. szrRashtriya Swayam Sevak

Sangh, 135Raza, Nahid, 481Rebel, 16OReddy, V. Ratna, 95, tO8Rehman, 1.A., 723, 416Fleligious and ethnic conflicts,

45-47zught of Information Act, S8gRimal, Gopal Prasad, 154Rivers of South Asia, water

quality in, 104-O8Roy, Gopen, 482Roy, Ramashroy, S07Ruitenbeek, H. Jack, IOORuler-ruled relationship, 6-7Ruler areas, environmental

issues in, 92-lOORuler Self Reliance Schemes,

329

SAFTA,28SAPTA,28SELF, Sri Lanka, 252, 27 A-75Sa"hib, Bibi aur Ghulam, 4SgSalam, Abdus, 430Samarasinghe. S.WR.de A., 95,

257Sambhaji, 165-66Samyabadi,367Sangsaptak, 38O

Index 493

Sanyal, Bhobesh,482 Singh, Tavleen, II0Sarbatara, 367 Singh, V.P., 307Sareng Bau, 379 Sirhandi, Marcella Nelson, 481Saruonaam Street Theatre, 156 Sirisena. A.L.D.,483Sarwar, Beena,4O7 Sobhan, Rehman. 219Scheduled Castes and Tribes Socio-political systems, India

Commission, India, 395 crisis in. I8l-99Schmitz, Hubert, 339 South Asia.Schumacher,28 agenda lbr new vision for,Schuman. Robert.30 I0-1ISearcher, Banal, 156 challenges to democracy in,Self determination, 4-5 129-39Selim, Lala Rukh, 483 civil society, 145-47Sen, Paritosh, 482 cold war like situation, 20Sen, Satyen, 38O colonialism legacy, TO-72Sen, Sunimadhau, 482 communal tension and riotsSengupta, Achintya Kumar, 371 in, 762-77Sengupta, Bhabani, f5,36,412 conflict resolution, 36-63,Seshan. T.N.. 3O8 69-70Segana,S8O cooperation in, 148-61Shah, Amita, 113 creative imagination in, 148-Shah. Shashi. 157 6lShah Bano case, 128 cultural unity, 25-26Shahabuddin, 484 culture and women in, 425-Shailobala, Ghoshjaya Anurupa a4

Devi, 445 democracy in, 45-5OShakespeare, 158,464 economic cooperation, 22,Si''lakuntala, 152 27-28Shamsuddin, Abu Jafar, 38O end of cold war, 54-56Sharatchandra, 445 environmental issues in ruralSher-Gil, Amrita, 483 areas. 92-102Sherchana, Bhoopi, I55 environmental problems inStrcrnt,459 urban and industrialShikder, Shamin, 434-35 setting, 102-08Shimla Agreement, 58, 215 environmental protectionShirlsko Ptaol, 155 and development, 87-113Shiv Sena, 135 ethnic conflict, 21, 46Shivaji, 165-66 ethno-political conflict, 46Shodh, 449 Hindu-Muslim, 46, 162-77Siddiqui, K.,338 history of, 12-17Siddiqui, Zillur Rahman, 374, human rights to, 79-86, 351-

383 423Singh, Bhagat, 163 imperialist governance, 5-6Singh, R.E}., lO2 imperialist legacy, 3

494 Perspecttues on South Asia

induced arms race in, 41-44inter-state conflicts, 50-52intervention possibilities for

protecting environmenl in,r08- l3

legislatures, 144-45rJllgratiorrs, 74-77military interventions, 52-53Muslims ir,, 46, 162-77nation building and conflicts

in. 44-45nationalism, 4, 24nature of conflict, 39-4Ineed for new vision, l7-22Nepali vision ot, 12-34new vision, 8- 1 Inuclear regimes, 43parliamentary system pref-

erence, 14l -44policy recommendations for

conflict control manage-ment and resolution, 56-63

political degeneration, 2lpolitical process in, 123-45politicised ethnicity, 68-77politics and elfutici\r, 72-74polity and democracy in,

281-350population change in, 89-90presidential system prefer-

ence in, I4l -44principles goveming bilateral

and regional relations, 62-63

prolile of, 37-39religion's role in, 23-24religious and ethnic conflicts

in. 45-47resurgence of democratic

values, 26-27ruler and ruled relaUons, 6-

ruler population and area

under agriculture in, 9tsecurity ill, 20-21self-determination in, 4-5shared values in imagination

in, I48-61state structure remodelling.

9-10strategies in international

economic negotiation. 29urban growth, 92-93water quality in rivers of,

104-06women and culture in, 425-

84South Asian Association for Re-

gional Cooperation (SAARC),18-20, 27, 3I, 37, 54,70,r16-22, 126, 148-49, 156,255,276, 422

South Asian Civil Society, 34South Asian Human Rights,

420Spate, 1O2Special Powers Act (SpA),

Bangladesh, 362-63Spector, Leonard, 42Sri Lanka,

economy, 259-69, 2aObasic indicator, 261IPZ-s,263-64macro economic adjust-

ment, 267-69macro economic manade-

ment, 261- 62performance, 259,61policy, 259problems and prospects,

262-67e{hnicity and ethnic conflict,

254,272-74foreign policy, 274-77politics luture prospects,

277-80welfare state, 269-72

Irdex 495

Sri Lankan art, images ofwomen in, 468-7fconcept ofgoddesses and her

cult worship, 472-74inter-cultural lilrks, 47 l -72life's constraints and oppor-

tunities. 474-75male/female union principle

in, 474social and political role. 475-

77social position of women in,

472-74symbolic worship of mother

eafih,472St4tesman, 252, 364Subedi. Abhi. 156-57Subramaniam, G., 483Sultan, S.M., 424, 4asSultana, Rokeya, 435, 437, 482Sumnima, 153Suppression of Terrorist Activi-

ties Act. Pakistan. 4O9Suryadighal Bari, 379Swain, Ashok, 1OO, 1llSwarno Kumari Devi, 445

Tagore, Rabindranath, l5O,16r, 338, 366, 37 1, 445, 447

Tanakpur Project, Nepal, 252Television, image of women on,

462-67Tendulkar, Vij ay, 162Teresa, Mother, 483Terrorist and Disruptive

Activities (Prevention) Act(TADA) India, 409

Thatcher, Margaret, 402Thera, Madapatha Dhamasera,

483Thingan, Shikha, 461Tilak, Lokamanya, 163Tirni 38 fTiwari. Shashikala. I 57

Toynbee, Arnold, 149Tripathi, S., lll

UNCEDAW 355uNP,257 -5a,27a-79UN Refugee Relief Organisation,

50Ujeli, 156United Liberation Front of

Assam (ULFA), 38United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP), 269Universal franchise, in India,

ta2Upadhyaya, Ragini, I57Upzila system, Bangladesh,

344-46Urban and industrial areas,

environmental problems in,r02-08

Untkku,45O

VHP, I28Voishn ou a P adab ali, 4 43Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 197Vasudev, Aruna, 454Verghese, Et.G., fOO, 384Vidrohi Koibarta, 38OVillage Development Committee

(VDC), Nepal, 315-19, 323,325,327-24

Violence, cuiture of, 7-8Vyas, V.S., 95, f 08

wTo,29Waliullah, Syed, 378-79Welfare slate. concept of, 246Women,

communalism and, 480-82LUr l tcll r P Lr-r ar y .

llction and, 448-50poetry and, 446-47South Asian arL, 479-84

ethnic violence and, 358-59

496 P er sp e ctiue s on South A sir:-

fundamentalism ald, 356,4ao-82

human rights and, 353, 482-83

images ofin Hindi cinema, 454-61in Sri Lankan aft, 468-77inter-cultural links of,

47t-72on'IY,462-67

in art in Bangladesh, 427-38

in Bangla literature, 441-53in Sri l.ankan ari, 468-77in society, 483-84protest against political

repression and socialinjustice, 450-52

religious fundamentalismand, 356, 480-82

rights in Bangladesh, 353

social and political roles,+tc-t I

social justice and, 482-83social position as depicted

in art, 472-7 4South Asian art and, 479-83traflicking ol 356-58violence against, 353-56writing in Bangladesh, 439-

tre

Vr'oodhead, T., 102World Bank, 217, 259, 26A,

270,277

Zafar, Sikandar Abu, 446Zaker, Sara, 462fukhmee AuraL 459Zaman, Farida, 434-35Z,eba, Fareha, 437Za-ul Haq, 45, 48, 132-33, t4O,

203-O4fruganov, Gennady, 238