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Perceiving Empirical Objects DirectlyAuthor(s): Robert G. HudsonSource: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 52, No. 3 (2000), pp. 357-371Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012993 .

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358

ROBERT G. HUDSON

it's

true

that

what

an

empirical

object

is

is

determined

by

what

theory

one

believes. The claim that

empirical objects

are

theory-laden

I shall take as

synonymous

with the

following

claim: that

empirical objects

are

conceptu?

ally

shaped

by

our

minds.

So,

let

me now

explain

why

the

theory-ladenness

of

empirical

objects,

their

conceptual shaping,

renders the

simplistic

em?

piricist philosophy,

stated

above,

controversial.

It

follows

that,

in

testing

theories

through

the

examination

of

empirical

objects,

one

is in

fact

testing

theories

on

the basis of

other

theories. Or:

put

in

terms

of

concepts,

it

fol?

lows that

in

testing

the

applicability

of

concepts

to

empirical objects,

one

already

assumes

the

applicability

of other

concepts.

For

empirical

objects

come to us

preformed

by theories/concepts.

This

situation,

I

believe,

is

problematic

for

empiricist philosophy,

as

defined

above.

For

we are now

at

a

loss

in

understanding

the characteristic

epistemic

value of

empirical

objects,

in

so

far

as

they

have

an

epistemic

value distinct from the

epistemic

value

possessed by

theoretical

objects

(or:

from

conceptual objects).

This

is because

empirical objects,

as

understood

here,

are

theoretical

objects

(or:

are

conceptual

objects).

2.

IS THERE

A

NEED TO ESCAPE

THE

HERMENEUTIC

CIRCLE?

I shall call

the

problem

I

have

just

described

'the

problem

of the hermen

eutic

circle',

following

van

Fraassen

(1980).

Here is how

van

Fraassen

expresses

this

problem:

to

accept

[a]

theory

involves

no

more

belief

...

than that what

it

says

about observable

phenomena

is

correct. To

delineate

what

is

observable, however,

we

must look

to

science

...

and

possibly

to

the

same

theory.

(1980,

57)

Van Fraassen denies that there is a serious problem here; this is because he

regards

"what is observable

as a

theory-independent question"

(1980, 57),

a

question

that

is

answered

in

terms

of "facts about

us

qua

organisms

in

the

world"

(1980,

58).

For

instance,

ultra-high frequencies

are

audible

to

dogs,

and

not

to

us;

infra-red

radiation

is visible

to

some

insects,

and

not

to

us.

These

facts,

van

Fraassen

says,

are

empirical

facts,

and

so

they

are.

But

that doesn't

answer

the

deeper question

of whether

as

empirical

facts

they

contain

an

ineliminable

theoretical

component.

They

are

independent

of

some

theories,

but

not

all,

and

it is this residual

theory-ladenness

that

I believe

poses

a

problem

for

empiricist

philosophy.

It is such residual

theory-ladenness

that is

the

source

of the

hermeneutic

circle. One

can

describe

my

task

in this

paper

as

showing

how

one

can

escape

the hermen?

eutic

circle.

Before

proceeding

to

this

task,

let

me

remark

that the

problem

posed

by

the

hermeneutic

circle

is

not

a

logical problem,

as van

Fraassen







PERCEIVINGEMPIRICALOBJECTS

DIRECTLY

359

describes it

(1980,

58).

It

is

an

epistemological

problem,

a

problem

for

those who advocate what I am

calling

an

empiricist

philosophy.

As

it

happens,

there

are some

theorists in

science studies who do

not

feel the need

to

escape

the hermeneutic

circle.

Many

of these

are

the

more

radical social

constructivists.

Empirical objects

for them

are

constructed,

socially

constructed,

and

theory-testing

for

them

is

circular.

As

an

example

of this

perspective,

let

me

cite

Steve

Woolgar

who

recommends the fol?

lowing

methodological

policy

in

understanding

scientific

practice,

called

'the

policy

of

inversion'

:

according

to

inversion,

"we

[should]

consider

representation

as

preceding

the

represented

object"

(Woolgar

1988, 36;

his

italics).

How

is inversion

applied

in

an

actual

scientific

episode?

Woolgar

considers

Anthony

Hewish's

discovery

of

pulsars

in

1967. On

Woolgar's

view,

a

discovered

object

is "constituted

through,

rather

than

revealed

by

[its]

discovery"

(1988,

36).

In

effect,

Hewish and his

co-workers invented

pulsars,

and

then

put

them

in the

sky.

As

Woolgar

comments,

"the char?

acter

of the

object,

and whether

or

not

there

was an

object, changed

with

changes

in

the social

context"

(1988,

64).

Woolgar,

I should

emphasize,

is

deadly

serious.

And,

for the

sake

of

argument,

imagine

that he's

right.

It

follows

that,

in

allegedly objective

scientific

work,

there's

a

fair

amount

of

'bad faith'

going

on.

Scientists

are

'discovering'

objects

that,

in

fact,

they

invented.

Accordingly,

they

need

to

resort to

rhetorical

subterfuge

in

presenting

their

work

in order

to

conceal

their

bad faith.

Despite

having

created their

results,

they

have

to

present

their

results

in

such

a

way

as

to

make it

appear

that

they

are

being objective.

Thus,

as

Woolgar

notes,

scientists

in

publicising

their

work

deploy

various

textual

devices that

serve

the

purpose

of

conveying

to

an

audience the

'impression'

that

they

have

passively

encountered

their

results.

For

example,

they

write

up

reports

util?

izing

rhetorical tools

that

Woolgar

calls

'externalizing

devices'

-

phrases,

such

as,

"I

was

led

to

believe

...

",

"Unexpectedly,

it

turned

out...

",

and

"Much

to

our

surprise

..."

-

that

falsely

convey

the

image

that scientists

have

passively

acquired empirical

data.

I'm

going

to

take

it for

granted

that

social constructivism

of this

ilk

is

repulsive

to

the reader.

Few

authors,

even

of

the social

constructivist kind

(such

as

David

Bloor,

Barry

Barnes and

Harry

Collins),

advocate

such

a

radical

departure

from

objectivity.

Let

us

then

look for

ways

to

escape

the

hermeneutic

circle.

3.

THE

'INDEPENDENCE

OF

ROUTE'

STRATEGY

The

first

way

I'll

consider

is,

ultimately,

not

a

successful

one.

It

involves

an

approach

which

I

call

'independence

of

route'.

According

to

independ







360

ROBERT

G.

HUDSON

ence

of

route,

claims

made about

an

empirical

object

are more

objective,

are more valuable

epistemically,

if the claims are

produced by

different,

although relevantly

similar

observational

or

experimental

procedures.

So,

for

example,

take the

empirical

claim,

"This is fire".

And

suppose

that

I

see

that "This

is

fire".

However,

suppose

further

that

I'm

concerned about

whether what

I

see

is

simply

constructed

by

me.

Maybe

I'm

hallucinating

a

fire.

How

can

I

check this fact?

I

could,

I

suppose,

look

again

-

but

wouldn't

it

be

better

to

try

something

different?

Perhaps

it

would be better

to

reach

out

my

hand and feel

whether

"This is fire". This

is the

recom?

mendation

of

independence

of

route:

wherever

possible,

check

empirical

claims

by using

a

variety

of

observational,

empirical

routes.

Such

an

approach

to

ensuring

the

objectivity

of

empirical

data has been

labelled

'triangulation'. Triangulation,

it

seems,

provides

a

way

out

of the

hermeneutic circle

by eliminating

the

dependence

of

empirical

claims

on

specific

theoretical

presuppositions.

For if

a

datum is

produced

whether

or

not

a

theoretical

presupposition

is

made,

then this

presupposition

can't

be

guilty

of

ensuring

its

production.

Yet

things

aren't

quite

this

simple.

Consider

comments

that Steve

Woolgar

makes

regarding triangulation:

...

the essence of triangulation

...

is that knowledge arises from different representations

of the

same

thing

....

However,

...

'sameness'

or

'difference' is

not

an

inherent

property

of

(sets of)

phenomena.

(Woolgar

1988, 80;

italics

in

original)

That

is,

our

judgement

that

we

have

found

different

routes

or

procedures

that

produce

the

same

datum

is

what I shall

call

a

considered

judgment;

what

I

mean

here

is that in

many

cases

it

is

not

obvious that

we are

using

different

observational

routes,

and

so

the work of

establishing

this dif?

ference becomes

a

theoretical,

or

if

you

want,

a

conceptual

matter. For

instance,

suppose

I

see

that

"This

is

fire"

at

10:00

am,

and

since

I'm

un?

certain whether what I see is constructed

by

me, I check to see whether

I

see

that

"This

is fire"

at

10:01

am,

and

then

at

10:02

am,

and

so on.

These

subsequent

checks

doubtfully

add much

epistemic

weight

to

my

claim,

"This is

fire";

for few

would

consider

checking

at

10:00

am,

and

at

10:01

am,

and 10:02

am,

and

so

on,

to

be different

routes.

Nonetheless,

isn't

our

judgement

here

-

that

we

have the

same

observational

route

-

a

considered

judgement?

That

is,

if

one

were

queried,

"Why

are

these

routes

the

same?",

one

couldn't

respond by

pointing

to

the

routes

themselves

as

though

this 'sameness'

were

observable.

Rather,

one

needs

to

provide

an

account that defends this sameness, one

perhaps asserting

the

constancy

of

a

visual

system

over

small

periods

of time. This is

why,

on

my

view,

establishing

this

sameness

is

a

theoretical

(or

conceptual)

issue.

But if

this

is

the

case,

then we're back

to

where

we

started,

for

now our

observational

judgements

are,

in

addition,

theoretical

judgments,

which

means

we've

lost







PERCEIVINGEMPIRICAL

OBJECTSDIRECTLY

361

the

special

feature

of

empirical

data that makes them

invaluable in

testing

theories.

There

are

a

number

of

other

criticisms of

independence

of

route

that

one can

make.

For

example,

the

use

of such

a

strategy

requires

a

prior

evaluation

of

the

reliability

of the

various

routes.

Clearly,

it's of

no use

to

confirm

an

empirical

datum

using

alternative

procedures

that

are

unreli?

able.

In

checking

whether I'm

correct

in

seeing

that

"This

is

fire",

what

value is there

in

flipping

a

coin

on

the matter?

But

surely

this is

an

altern?

ative route

So,

to

get

the

triangulation

strategy

off the

ground,

we'll need

prior

assessments

about what constitutes

a

reliable

observational

or

exper?

imental

procedure.

And,

without a

doubt,

judgements

about the

reliability

of

a

procedure

are

going

to

engage

theoretical issues.

Another

problem

is

this:

suppose

that the

reliability

of

various

routes

is

ascertained.

Of what

value then is

multiplying

such routes? If

procedure

A

is

reliable,

and

one

believes

this,

then

rely

on

procedure

A.

Why

bother with

an

alternative

procedure

B? The

only

reason

I

can

think of

why

one

would

so

bother

is

if she

thought

that

A

wasn't

reliable,

after all.

And

finally,

I

have found

in

my

own

historical

work that

scientists,

for the

most

part,

don't

rely

on

independence

of

route

in

establishing experimental

conclusions. But

that's

a

much

longer

story

that

Imust

leave aside here.

(See

Hudson

1999 where

I

recount

an

interesting episode

in

the

history

of

experimental

microbio?

logy

with the

purpose

of

showing

that

independence

of

route

was

not

the

argumentative

strategy

used

by experimentalists, contrary

to

Culp

1994.)

So let

me

summarize

my

criticism of

independence

of

route

in the fol?

lowing

way.

Independence

of

route,

I

submit,

is

an

inescapably

interpretive

procedure.

Judgements

that

alternative

routes

are

different

(although

relev?

antly

similar in

that

they

are

investigating

the

same

aspect

of

nature)

are,

of

necessity,

'theory

framed'. And

so,

even

admitting

the

epistemic

merit

of

independence

of

route,

it

provides

no

way

out of

what

we are

calling

the

hermeneutic circle.

4.

AN

ALTERNATIVE

APPROACH

Here,

then,

is

an

alternative

approach

to

'breaking

out

of

the

hermeneutic

circle',

the

one

I

shall

be

defending.

According

to

this

alternative,

empir?

ical

objects

are,

fundamentally,

directly perceived

objects,

where

by

'dir?

ectly perceived

object'

Imean an

object

perceived

without the mediation

of

any

descriptive

beliefs.

That

is,

a

directly

perceived

object

is

an

undes

cribed

object, although,

let

me

quickly

add,

it's

not

an

indescribable

object.

It's

not

a

conceptually

shaped

object,

although

it's

conceptually shapeable.

It's

a

theory-free

object,

although

it

can

be the

target

of

theoretical

inquiry.







362

ROBERT

G.

HUDSON

Now,

if there

is

such

a

thing

as

direct

perception

in

the above

sense,

then we're on our

way

to

escaping

the hermeneutic circle since the

objects

of

empirical

claims,

as

directly

perceived,

are

not

conceptually

shaped,

are

not

theory-laden,

and

so

in

an

important

sense

by

examining

them

one

is

not

'testing

theories

on

the basis of other theories'.

Nevertheless,

the full

story

of

how

the hermeneutic

circle

can

be broken

by

this

means

is

not

an

easy story

to

tell.

For

one

thing,

we

shall need

to

affirm

that

empirical objects

can

persist

in

being non-interpreted,

to

an

extent,

even

in

the

context of

being

interpreted.

I

return to

this

point

below.

But

to

begin

with,

let

me

discuss

some

anticipations

to

my

approach.

4.1.

The

analytic philosophy

of perception

A

number of

philosophers

have

asserted the

occurrence

of

direct

percep?

tion,

as

I've defined

it. For

instance,

Warnock

(1965)

argued

many

years

ago

that for it

to

be 'true

that

A

saw

X,

...

it

is

in

no case

necessary

that

A

should have

identified

X,

or

made

a

correct

judgment

of

X's character

or

qualities,

or

even

that he

should

have

known

how

X

appeared

to

him"

(1965,

58).

He continues

by

calling

this notion of

seeing

"a

physical

ca?

pacity,

in

which

to

be able

to

see

better than others

is

not to

enjoy

any

superiority

of

wits";

seeing,

in

this

case,

"does

not

involve the

acquired

ability

to

...

name,

describe,

and

so

on"

(1965,

65).

Clearly

Warnock

is

as?

serting

the

presence

of direct

perception

(qua

direct

seeing),

as

I

am

using

this

phrase.

Fred

Dretske also

defends the

possibility

of such

perception,

for

example

in

his 1969

book

Seeing

and

Knowing

and

periodically

thereon

in various

publications.

The first

section of his 1993

paper,

'Conscious

Experience',

is

one

of the

best

defenses of direct

perception

I've

seen.

Now, it isworthwhile to

emphasize

that, for both Warnock and Dretske,

direct

perception

is

not

the

only

kind of

perception

there is.

As

each

would

put

it,

in

contrast

to

(directly)

perceiving

things,

one can

also

(indirectly)

perceive

facts;

that

is,

in

contrast with

simply

perceiving

something

there

is

perceiving

that

something

is

the

case

(perceiving

a

fact).

These

two

forms

of

perception

Dretske calls

'thing-awareness'

vs.

'fact-awareness';

Warnock

describes

the

contrast

as

simply 'seeing

things'

vs.

'seeing

facts'

(or

'seeing

relations'

or

'states'

or

'conditions'

-

see

Warnock

1965,

60).

The distinction

Dretske

and

Warnock

are

making

here is

a

useful

one,

and I

adopt

it,

uncontroversially.

As I would

put

the distinction, there is

a

difference

between

direct

(non-conceptual,

theory-less)

perception

and

indirect

(conceptually-shaped,

theory-laden) perception.

To

be

sure,

Dretske and Warnock

have their

critics.

But it is

not

these

critics that

I

want

to

consider

here.

Rather,

I

wish

to

examine another

anti







PERCEIVINGEMPIRICALOBJECTSDIRECTLY

363

cipation

of

my

view

reaching

into

the

philosophy

of

science: Ian

Hacking's

entity

realism. It is

Hacking's

critics to whom I will

respond.

4.2.

Ian

Hacking's entity

realism

According

to

Hacking

(1983),

the

reality

of

objects

of

experiments

is

es?

tablished

by

our

ability

to

use

them

in

investigating,

or

intervening

with,

other

physical

phenomena.

For

instance,

according

to

Hacking,

electrons

are

real

since

one can

use

a

polarizing

electron

gun,

the

so-called PEGGY

II,

in

studying

parity

violation

in

weak

neutral

current

interactions. It's

Hacking's

further

point

about the

reality

of such

manipulated

objects

that's

of

interest

to

us

here: he

comments,

"one

can

believe

in

[such]

entities

without

believing

in

any

particular theory

in

which

they

are

embedded"

(1983,

29).

Again,

he

says,

"the

way

in

which

experimenters

are

scientific

realists about entities is

entirely

different

from

ways

in

which

they

might

be realists about theories"

(1983,

263).

Hacking's point,

to

put

it

starkly,

is

that

experimental

entities

are

'theory-free';

that

is,

the

reality

of

exper?

imental entities

can

be established in

a

theory-free

manner

-

to

wit,

by

manipulating

them in

the

investigation

of other

physical phenomena.

It is this claim of

'theory-freeness'

which has

prompted

of late a

flurry

of

criticism

-

e.g.,

by

Reiner and

Pierson

(1995),

Elsamahi

(1994),

Resnik

(1994)

and

Morrison

(1990).

All

these

critical

papers

share

a common

thread

-

that

Hacking's

claim

to

have

a

theory-free

method for

manipu?

lating experimental

entities

is,

simply,

false.

Their

reasons

for

maintaining

the

falsity

of

Hacking's

claim

adopt roughly

the

same

perspective:

in

par?

ticular,

that

moving

beyond

the observable

interactions of

an

apparatus

to

the real entities

causing

these

interactions

requires

a

certain

degree

of

the?

oretical

sophistication

(Reiner

and

Pierson),

that,

for

example,

Hacking's

PEGGY II

experiment

relies

heavily

on the theoretical

concept

of electron

spin

in

both

its

design

and

in

the

interpretation

of

its

results

(Elsamahi),

that

again,

e.g.,

using

an

apparatus

such

as a

cloud chamber in

picking

out

electrons

requires

a

'scaffolding'

of

theory

in

designing

and

operating

the

cloud

chamber,

in

differentiating

negatively charged

electrons

from other

negatively charged

particles

like

the

pion

(Morrison),

and

so on.

In

short,

these

authors

are

complaining

that

Hacking

hasn't

succeeded

in

showing

that

the

theory-free

manipulation

of

experimental

entities in

fact

occurs.

And to

an

extent

we

can

agree.

The

problem

here is

not

so

much that Hack?

ing

provides

a bad

argument

for the

theory-free

experimental

manipulation

of

objects;

the

problem

is that he

doesn't

seem

to

provide

any

argument

whatsoever

for

the

occurrence

of

such

a

thing.

He

seems

simply

to assert

that in

actual

experimental

practice

objects

are

manipulated

theory-lessly

with

no

identifiable

support

for this

claim

other

than that

this

is

what







364

ROBERT

G. HUDSON

scientists do.

Philosophers

will

doubtfully

be convinced

by

such

a

bold

approach,

and his

entity

realism has become an

easy

target

for them. It all

depends,

I

guess,

on

whether

we

agree

with

Hacking

when

he

says:

"the

arbitrator

in

philosophy

is

not

how

we

think but

what

we

do"

(1983, 31).

But

surely

we're

no

further

here

if

what

we

do is

evaluate

how

we

think

Should

we

then

agree

with Reiner

and

Pierson

et

al

in their

claim,

pace

Hacking,

that

the observation

of

experimental

entities

is

inescap?

ably

theory-laden

and

conceptually-structured?

Not

at

all.

For

there

is

no

reason

why

the

arguments they

have

provided

for this conclusion

cannot

be made

perfectly general.

Theoretical

sophistication

in

the observation

of

empirical

objects

would

not

only

be needed

in

the

laboratory;

it

would be

needed

even

in

mundane

circumstances.

If

seeing

an

electron

in

a

cloud

chamber

requires

a

scaffolding

of

theory,

for

example,

theoretical

con?

ceptions concerning

the difference

between electrons and other

negatively

charged particles,

surely

it follows

by

analogy

that

seeing

a

table

requires

a

scaffolding

of

theory,

for

example,

theoretical

conceptions

concerning

the differences between

tables

and

desks,

between tables

and

benches,

and

so

on.

Again,

if

using

PEGGY

II

to

observe electrons

requires

some

theoretical

background

concerning

the

design

and

operation

of PEGGY

II,

doesn't it

follow,

by

analogy,

that the

use

of

one's

eyes

in

seeing

a

table

requires

some

theoretical

background

concerning

the

design

and

operation

of one's

eyes

-

e.g.,

background

dealing

with

the

physics

of

photons,

the

laws

of

optics,

perceptual physiology,

and

so

on?

I

believe

we

have

a

real

problem

here.

For it then

turns

out

that

the

mundane

observer

of

tables

and

chairs,

ignorant

of

the

relevant scientific

laws

and

truths

governing

the

observation

of tables and

chairs,

could

not

be

said

to

observe

these

things

It's

easy

enough

to

say

that

one

needs

theory

to

observe

objects

-

after

all,

people

often

do

invoke

theories

in

observing objects.

But

how much

theory

is

needed?

What theories

are

needed? What

degree

of

conceptual

sophistication

is needed

to

observe

something

like

a

chair?

Until

mean?

ingful

answers are

provided

here,

there

is

no

reason

to

consider

Hacking's

entity

realism

to

be

a

bankrupt

program.

So,

let

me

arrive

at

the

following

tentative

position. Despite

Hacking's

lack

of

success

in

defending

what

I

am

calling

direct

perception

-

percep?

tion unmediated

by

descriptive

beliefs

-1

believe

he is

on

the

right

track

in

recognizing

the

need

for

a

philosophic

account

of

such

a

thing.

For direct

perception,

if

feasible,

can

lead

us

out

of

entrapment

in the

hermeneutic

circle.

If

feasible,

direct

perception

can

stand

as an

effective

foil

to

the

constructivist

view

of observable

reality.

In

short,

we

would

find

a

way

to

ensure

the

viability

of

empiricist

philosophy

in its

already

weakened

form,

stated above.







PERCEIVING

EMPIRICALOBJECTSDIRECTLY

365

4.3.

Making

the

concept

of

direct

perception

reasonable

My

task

now

is

to

say

some

things

which,

I

hope,

will make the

concept

of

direct

perception

reasonable.

My approach

in

making

this

concept

reason?

able

will

be

to

rebut

two

arguments

that

purport

to

show that

this

concept

is unreasonable. Such

arguments,

I

believe,

underlie the resistance

many

philosophers

have

to

Hacking's

entity

realism.

Here

is

the

first

argument:

The

perceptual

identification of

an

object

is

inexplicable

if the

perceiver

does

not

possess

a

descriptive

belief that

mediates

its

perception

of

this

object.

Therefore,

for

every

perception,

there

is

a

descriptive

belief that

mediates the

perception.

Note the conclusion:

"for

every

perception,

there is

a

descriptive

belief

that

mediates the

perception".

This

statement I

take

to

be

synonymous

with

"perceptions

are

theory-laden",

or

"empirical objects

are

theory-laden",

or

"empirical

objects

are

conceptually

structured". So let's

proceed

to

exam?

ine

this

argument.

What

can we

say

in

support

of the

premise? Suppose

I say that I see my watch. And suppose further that, when asked what

my

watch looks

like,

I

am

unable

to

describe it

in

any

way.

For

example,

when

asked,

"Is it

a

gold

watch?",

I

respond,

"I

don't

know".

When

asked,

"Where is the

watch?",

I

respond,

"No idea". When

asked,

"What

are

watches

forT,

I

grunt

in

ignorance.

In

such

a

case,

we're

clearly

at

a

loss

in

explaining

how

it is

that

I

succeed

at

identifying

this

object.

How could

I

be

identifying

it

if

I

don't

know

where,

what

or

what colour

it

is?

And,

from

the

fact

that

my

identification of the watch

is

inexplicable,

the conclusion

the

above

argument

is

asking

us

to

draw is

that

I

am

not

seeing

my

watch,

after all. How could I be seeing the watch if, say, the only feature that

distinguishes

it

from

other

nearby

objects

is

its

'goldness',

and

goldness

is

not

a

property

that

I

recognize

the

object

as

possessing?

So

let's

turn to

examining

the

logical

link

between

the

premise

of

our

argument

and

the

conclusion.

What

we

have here is

a

sort

of

'argument

from

no

explanation',

which

schematically

runs as

follows:

Given

hypothesis

h

(I directly perceive my watch, i.e,

without

the

mediation

of

concepts),

one

can't

explain

phenomenon

p

(my ability

to

successfully

identify

my watch).

Therefore,

hypothesis

h

is

false.









PERCEIVING

EMPIRICAL

OBJECTS

DIRECTLY

367

dilemma: either

the

argument

from

no

explanation

that

underlies this first

argument

is effective or not. If

not,

we need not consider the

argument

fur?

ther;

if

it is

successful,

the

argument

can

be

used

to

support

the

occurrence

of

direct

perception.

So

the

argument

poses

no

threat

to

the

occurrence

of

direct

perception.

Let

me now

consider

a

second

argument

against

direct

perception:

Without

descriptive

beliefs,

perceptions

do

not

possess

the

con?

tent

with

which

to

bear

confirmationally

or

disconfirmationally

on

other

beliefs.

Therefore,

for

every

(epistemically

valuable)

perception,

there

is

a

descriptive

belief

that

mediates

the

perception.

Put

another

way,

descriptionless

perceptions,

even

if

they

occur,

are

in?

effectual for

theory-testing.

In

my

appraisal

of this

argument,

I

want to

affirm

what

is

correct

in

it:

that

claims

made

about

directly perceived

objects

require conceptual

or

theoretical

supplementation

in

order

to

be

useful for

theory-testing.

Nonetheless,

as

supplemented,

such

claims

are

still

about,

and

indeed

must

be

about,

directly perceived

objects,

if

they

are

to be valuable for

theory-testing

(recall

here

my

earlier comment about the

need

to

affirm that

empirical

objects

can

persist

in

being

non-interpreted,

to

an

extent,

even

in

the

context

of

being

interpreted).

To

see

this,

let

me

once

again dispel

a

possible misconception

regarding directly

perceived

objects

-

that

it is

not

possible

to

conceptualize

them,

to

describe

them

or

to

interpret

them.

Directly perceived

objects, again,

are

undescribed

objects,

but

they're

not

indescribable;

they're

unconceptualized

objects,

but

they're

not

unconceptualizable.

Leaving

this

point

aside,

then,

I

wish

now

to

show that

a

theory-laden, empirical

claim,

one

that is

valuable

in

the

testing

of

theories,

should have as

part

of its content an

unconceptualized,

theory-less

object

(in

addition

to

the

supplemented

theoretical/conceptual

part

of

this

content).

For

consider

what

such

a

claim

is about

-

it is

either

about

a

conceptually-shaped

object,

one

constituted,

say,

by

the

theory

ladenning

the

claim,

or

about

an

object

that's

not

conceptually

shaped,

one

that's

directly perceived.

So,

to

make the

situation here

more

concrete,

let's

consider the

claim,

"That's

a

green

lamp",

which,

for

the

utterer

of

this

claim,

is

about

an

object

that,

if

conceptually shaped,

is

at

least

shaped

by

the

conception

(or

description)

"green

lamp".

In

addition,

suppose

the

object

about which the claim is

made,

and which the

perceiver

sees

through

the

conception

or

description,

"green

lamp",

is

not

in

fact

a

green

lamp,

although

it

appears

as

such.

What

then in

this

case

does

the

perceiver

see? A

green

lamp,

or

something

that's

not

a

green

lamp?

In

order

to

preserve

the

sense

in

which

empirical

claims

can

be accurate

descriptions







368

ROBERT G. HUDSON

of

the

world,

surely

one

must

say

here

that

the

perceiver

is

not

seeing

a

green

lamp.

For if we

say

that the

perceiver

is

seeing

a

green

lamp,

then

the

claim,

"That's

a

green

lamp",

is true

In

other

words,

if

it's the

case

that "how

objects

are" is determined

by

how

we

conceptualize

them

-

as

would be

true

if

we were

to

say

here that the

perceiver

sees a

green

lamp

-

then

it's

not

clear how

one

could be

wrong

through perception

about "how

objects

are",

even

in

a case

where

one

is

wrong.

Now,

I'm

going

to

take

it

for

granted

here

that

theory-laden,

empirical

claims

are

epistemically

valuable

only

if their truth

or

falsity depends

on

the

way

the

world

is,

and,

in the

case

we're

considering,

the

perceiver

can

have

perceptual

beliefs

whose

truth or

falsity

are

dependent

on the state of the world

only

if we

suppose

that

the

perceiver

is

seeing something

that,

from its

perspective,

is

unconceptualized

-

although,

to

be

sure,

the

perceiver

has

a

conceptually

structured

thought

about

this

object.

Thus,

generalizing

from this

case,

I

believe

we can

conclude

that,

in order for

theory-laden, empirical

claims

to

be

valuable

for

the

testing

of

theories,

they

need

to

have,

as

part

of their

content,

unconceptualized,

theory-less

objects.

Nevertheless,

the

descriptivist

might

resist this conclusion

in the fol?

lowing

way.

Given

that

perceived

objects

are

inescapably

conceptually

shaped

or

theory-laden,

it does

not

follow

that "how

objects

are"

is

exclus?

ively

determined

by

how

we

conceive of

them,

for

one can

limit the

extent

to

which

empirical objects

are

conceptualized

to

certain

'core

concepts',

where

such

concepts

structure

perceived

objects

to

a

certain

extent,

but

not

entirely.

Further

conceptualizations

would

occur,

then,

not

through

percep?

tion but

through

thought,

with

the result

that

the

dependence

on

the

state

of the world

of

the

truth

or

falsity

of

empirical

claims is

restored,

at

least

as

regards

those

concepts

that

aren't

'core'

-

i.e.,

that aren't

constitutive

of

empirical

objects.

Thus,

for

example,

perceived objects might

inevitably

be

conceptualized

as

extended

objects

- as

such,

the

empirical

claim

that

a

perceived

object

is extended

could

never

be

false;

nonetheless,

that

a

perceived

object

has

a

particular

value

for its

degree

of extendedness

may

not

be fixed

by

perception,

and

so

the

value

one comes

up

with

for this

variable

might,

for

its

part,

turn out

to

be

true

or

false,

depending

on

the

nature

of the world.

This

sort

of

approach,

which

I

shall call the 'core

concept'

approach,

is

favoured

by

a

number

of

philosophers

-

not,

mind

you,

specifically

for the

purpose

of

defending

descriptivism,

or

rebutting

those

in

favour of

direct

perception,

but

rather

with

the

goal

of

circumventing

the

problem

of

Kuh

nian

incommensurability.

One

wonders:

how is it

possible

for

proponents

of different

theoretical

paradigms

to

communicate with

each

other about

the

same

empirical

objects,

given

that

the

content

of claims about

these







PERCEIVING

EMPIRICALOBJECTS

DIRECTLY

369

objects

is

theoretically

informed?

How

can

they

be said

to

be

observing

the same

objects?

The answer is thatmembers of these alternate

paradigms

all

view

the

world

similarly,

as

structured

by

the

same

core

concepts.

The

possibility

of

inter-theoretic

communication

is thus

grounded

in

such

con?

cepts.

As

some

examples

of

philosophers

adopting

this

approach,

we

can

cite the

cases

of

Stegmuller

(1976),

who

considered

mereology

to

be the

source

of

such

concepts,

and

Fodor

(1984),

who locates

core

concepts

in

perceptual

modules.

Now,

the

core

concept

approach

as

I

see

it

is

an

aban?

donment of

empiricist philosophy,

as

I

defined this

philosophy

above.

For

the

presumed,

characteristic

epistemic

value

of

empirical objects

is

then

determined

by

whatever value inheres in the 'core

concepts';

and

whether

these

core

concepts

are

innately imposed

or

socially negotiated,

there is

no

particular

reason

to

expect

that such

concepts

support

accurate

representa?

tions of the

world.

They might,

or

might

not

-

who

can

tell in advance?

On

the other

hand,

if

it's

not

the

case

that

empirical

objects

are

conceptually

structured,

our

epistemic

prospects

as

regards

our

ability

to

understand

these

objects

is

significantly

improved,

since

we are

now

less

constrained

in terms

of the

concepts

we can use

in

categorizing

them. The

concepts

a

scientist

uses

in

describing

a

perceived

object

can

be those

which,

ideally,

a

scientist

should

prefer

-

i.e.,

those that

accurately

represent

perceived

objects,

as

opposed

to

those

which,

say,

a

scientist

must

deploy

because

of

some

innate

inheritance,

or

which,

perhaps,

ensure

the

possibility

of

inter-theoretic

communication. Direct

perception,

accordingly,

freed

from

the

impediment

of

prior

conceptualization,

is

thus in

the

best

position

to

support

a

philosophic

commitment

to

the

characteristic

epistemic

value

of

empirical

claims.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

My

argument

in

defense

of direct

perception

can

now

be

summarized

as

follows.

We

need

some

account

of

perception

that

underwrites what

I

have

called

'empiricist

philosophy'.

And

empiricist

philosophy,

I have

claimed,

is

in

danger

because

of

the hermeneutic

circle:

there is

no

special

epi?

stemic value

attaching

to

empirical

claims,

one

that

makes them

effective

foils

to

theoretical

claims,

if

empirical

claims,

at

bottom,

are

theoretical

claims.

Now,

the

strategy

I

called

'independence

of

route'

doesn't

succeed

in

freeing

us from the hermeneutic

circle,

or so I've

argued.

So I con?

sidered

an

alternative

way

of

escaping

the

hermeneutic

circle,

one

which

I

believe

does

succeed

-

the 'direct

perception' approach.

According

to

this

approach,

the

objects

of

empirical

claims

are

theory-free,

are

conceptually

unstructured.

And

my

strategy

in

defending

this

approach

has

been

to

rebut









Documents

Perceiving Empirical Objects Directly (Robert Hudson).pdf