Completion Report

Project Number: 39603 Grant Numbers: 0034/0035-CAM June 2012

Cambodia: Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS At Appraisal At Project Completion As of 16 November 2005 As of 31 December 2010 KR1.00 = $0.00024 0.0002465483 $1.00 = KR 4,118 4,056.00

ABBREVIATIONS ADB – Asian Development Bank C/SF – commune/sangkat fund CARD – Council for Agricultural and Rural Development CLF – community livelihood fund CLFT – community livelihood facilitation team CSP – country strategy and program DOF – Department of Fisheries FIA – Fisheries Administration JFPR – Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction MAFF – Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries MOE – Ministry of Environment MOI – Ministry of Interior MRD – Ministry of Rural Development MOWA – Ministry of Women's Affairs NGO – nongovernment organization PIM – project implementation manual PIU – project implementation unit POG – project owner group SLA – sustainable livelihoods approach TA – technical assistance TSBR – Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve TSBS – Tonle Sap Basin Strategy TSEMP – Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project TSI – Tonle Sap Initiative

NOTE In this report, "$" refers to US dollars.

Vice-President S. Groff, Operation 2 Director General K. Senga, Southeast Asia Department (SERD) Country Director P. Kamayana, Cambodia Resident Mission (CARM) Team leader C. Hem, Senior Project Officer, CARM Team members C. Chea, Gender Specialist, CARM

P. Song, Operations Assistant, CARM S. San, Project Analyst, CARM S. Sok, Senior Procurement Officer, CARM

In preparing any country program or strategy, financing any project, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, the Asian Development Bank does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.  

Currency Unit – riel(s) (KR)

CONTENTS

Page

BASIC DATA i I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1 II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 3

A. Relevance of Design and Formulation 3 B. Project Outputs 4 C. Project Costs 6 D. Disbursements 7 E. Project Schedule 7 F. Implementation Arrangements 7 G. Conditions and Covenants 8 H. Related Technical Assistance 8 I. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 8 J. Performance of Consultants, Contractors, and Suppliers 9 K. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency 10 L. Performance of the Asian Development Bank 10

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 10

A. Relevance 10 B. Effectiveness in Achieving Outcome 11 C. Efficiency in Achieving Outcome and Outputs 12 D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 12 E. Impact 13

IV. OVERAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENTDATIONS 14

A. Overall Assessment 14 B. Lessons Learned 14 C. Recommendations 15

APPENDIXES

1. Project Framework (original) 16 2. Community Livelihood Fund - Physical Achievements Summary 18 3. Summary of Achievements in Building Skills and Awaresness for Sustainable

Livelihoods 21 4. Administering the Community Livelihood Fund - Summary of Process and

Experience 23 5. Project Organization 26 6. Status of Compliance with Covenants 27 7. Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihood Project, Tonle Sap Inititative, and Tonle Sap

Basin Stragety 31 8. Assessemt of Project Economic Performance 35 9. Summary of Gender Issues and Impacts 40

BASIC DATA

A. Grant Identification

1. Country Kingdom of Cambodia 2. Grant Number 0034/0035-CAM(SF) 3. Project Title Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project 4. Recipient Government of Cambodia 5. Executing Agency Ministry of Interior 6. Amount of Grant a. $15,000,000 ADF (G0034) b. $4,738,000 Finland (G0035) 7. Project Completion Report No. PCR: CAM 1327

B. Grant Data

1. Appraisal – Date Started 22 August 2005 – Date Completed 26 August 2005

2. Grant Negotiations

– Date Started 9 November 2005 – Date Completed 10 November 2005

3. Date of Board Approval 21 December 2005

4. Date of Grant Agreement 9 March 2006

5. Date of Grant Effectiveness

– In Grant Agreement 6 June 2006 – Actual 19 June 2006 – Number of Extensions 0

6. Closing Date

– In Grant Agreement 31 December 2010 – Actual 20 July 2011 – Number of Extensions 1

7. Terms of Grant

– Interest Rate N/A – Maturity (number of years) N/A – Grace Period (number of years) N/A

8. Terms of Relending (if any) N/A 9. Disbursements

a. Dates Initial Disbursement Final Disbursement Time Interval 25 October 2006 29 June 2011 57 Months Effective Date Original Closing Date Time Interval 19 June 2006 30 June 2010 49 Months

ii

b. Amount ($ million)

Category a Original Allocation b

Last Revised Allocation

Net Amount Available

Amount Disbursed

Undisbursed Balance c

01. Civil Works 0.13 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.10 02A. Vehicles and Boats 0.41 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.10 02B. Equipment 0.09 0.47 0.47 0.56 (0.09) 03. Training and Workshops 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.54 (0.04) 04. Livelihood Grants 11.88 12.22 12.22 12.31 (0.09) 05. Project Management and Operating Costs 1,74 1.30 1.30 1.01 0.29

06. Unallocated 0.15 Total 15.00 15.00 15.00 14.74 0.27 ( ) = negative. a All expenditure categories are net of tax. b Original allocation based on the Grant Financing Agreement signed on 9 March 2006 c The undisbursed grant amount of $0.26 million has been cancelled on 20 July 2011.

10. Local Costs (Financed)

- Amount ($ million) 14.74 - Percent of Local Costs 91.8%- Percent of Total Cost 73.8%

C. Project Data

1. Project Cost ($ million)

Cost Appraisal Estimate Actual1

Foreign Exchange Cost 6.90 3.93Local Currency Cost 13.40 16.05

Total 20.30 19.98

2. Financing Plan ($ million)

Appraisal Estimate Actual Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total Implementation Costs Asian Development Bank 4.00 11.00 15.00 14.74 14.74 Government of Finland 2.80 1.90 4.70 3.93 0.78 4.71 Government of Cambodia 0.10 0.50 0.60 0.53 0.53

Total 6.90 13.40 20.30 3.93 16.05 19.98 Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.

1 All contracts are made in US Dollar in Cambodia

iii

3. Cost Breakdown by Project Component ($ million)

Supporting Community-

Driven Development

Safe-guarding

Core Areas

Building Skills and Awareness for Sustainable

Livelihoods Total Cost 1

Total Actual

A. Investment Costs 1. Civil works 0.17 0.0 0.00 0.17 0.18 2. Vehicles 0.13 a. Vehicles 0.29 0.04 0.09 0.42 b. Boats 0.02 0.02 Subtotal (item 2) 0.31 0.04 0.09 0.43 0.31 3. Equipment and furniture 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.56 4. Consulting services a. International 1.96 0.47 0.36 2.79 4.15 b. Domestic 1.37 0.12 0.16 1.64 0.56 Subtotal (item 4) 3.33 0.59 0.51 4.42 4.71 5. Training and workshops a. Training 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.39 b. Workshops 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.25 Subtotal (item 5) 0.10 0.02 0.52 0.64 0.54 6. Field expenses 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.12 7. Livelihood grants a. Social infrastructure 5.87 0.00 0.00 5.87 b. Income-generating 3.37 0.00 0.00 3.37 c. Community fisheries 2.35 0.00 0.00 2.35 Subtotal (item 7) 11.59 0.00 0.00 11.59 12.31 Total investment costs 15.59 0.69 1.20 17.48 18.43B. Recurrent Costs 1. Project administration a. International consulting 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 b. Domestic consulting 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 c. Administration costs 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.53 d. Staff costs a 1.03 0.06 0.00 1.09 1.01 Subtotal 1.35 0.07 0.03 1.45 1.54 2. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) a. Building O&M 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 b. Vehicles and boats 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.26 Subtotal 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.27 3. Social infrastructure O&M 0.31 0.00 0.0 0.31 Total recurrent costs 1.92 0.08 0.03 2.02 1.54 Total baseline costs 17.50 0.77 1.23 19.51 19.98 Physical Contingencies 0.11 0.08 0.06 176 Price Contingencies Inflation Local 0.46 0.02 0.05 0.53 Foreign 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.20 Subtotal Inflation 0.63 0.03 0.07 0.73 Devaluation (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07)

Subtotal Price Contingencies 0.68 0.04 0.12 0.83

Total project costs 18,178 810 1,349 20,337 19.98 Taxes 2.05 0.03 0.13 2.21 Foreign Exchange 5.86 0.50 0.54 6.90

iv

a Includes all payments to government staff assigned to the project, and any other local staff recruited by the project.

Physical contingencies are computed at 10% of base costs. 1Totals may not tally due to rounding.

4. Project Schedule Item Appraisal Estimate Actual Civil works components First transfer of Block grants 1 Jan 2007 1 Jan 2008 Start of construction 1 Jan 2007 17 Sep 2007 Completion of construction 30 Jun 2010 31 Dec 2010 Consultancy services Consultants mobilized

1 Jun 2006 18 Dec 2007

Other Milestones: 1. 30 December 2009: Approval for minor change in scope and reallocation of grant proceeds. 2. 17 November 2009: Approval of extension of grant closing date, minor change in implementation arrangements, and reallocation of grant proceeds. 3. 13 August 2009: Approval of minor change in scope and reallocation of grant proceeds. 4. 20 July 2009: Approval of minor change in scope and reallocation of grant proceeds. 5. 20 July 2011: Closing of grant accounts.

5. Project Performance Report Ratings

Implementation Period *

Ratings Development

Objectives Implementation

Progress From 19 June 2006 to 31 December 2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory From 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2007 Satisfactory SatisfactoryFrom 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008 Satisfactory Partly Satisfactory From 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory From 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory* Project approved on 21 December 2005, Agreement signed on 9 March 2006, and declared effective on 19 June 2006. Project transferred to the Cambodia Resident Mission for administration on 1 March 2009.

v

D. Data on Asian Development Bank Missions Name of Mission

Date

No. of Persons

No. of Person-

Days

Specialization of Members

Fact-finding mission 4–27 May 2005 9 90 a, c, h, i, m, n,

o (3) Appraisal mission 22–26 Aug 2005 7 35 a, c, f (2),

h (2), o Country consultation mission 4–5 May 2006 2 4 a, n Inception mission 11–12 Sep 2006 2 4 a, n Review mission 1 15–23 Jan 2007 2 18 b, n Review mission 2 25 Jan–1 Feb 2007 1 3 B Follow-up mission 14–16 Feb 2007 1 3 B Review mission 3 29 Apr–5 May 2007 1 5 B Review mission 4 2–4 May 2007 2 6 b, l Follow-up mission 25–27 Jul 2007 1 3 I Special administration mission 28 Aug–5 Sep 2007 2 10 b, n Follow-up mission 20–21 Nov 2007 2 4 i, b Review mission 5 6–8 Dec 2007 1 3 B Review mission 6 25 Jan–1 Feb 2008 1 5 B Joint review mission (Finland) 29 Feb–7 Mar 2008 3 15 b, n (2) Review mission 7 29 May–6 Jun 2008 3 27 b, k, m Joint midterm review mission 2–13 Mar 2009 4 20 k, f, l, n, Review mission 8 22–24 Jul 2009 1 3 N Joint review mission (Finland) 17 Nov–4 Dec 2009 3 15 n, l, r Joint review mission (Finland) 24 May–4 Jun 2010 3 15 n, l, r Special review mission 7–9 Sept 2010 3 9 n, l (2), Final review mission 29 Nov–16 Dec 2010 5 20 n, l (2), r, q Project completion review mission

19–25 Oct 2011 6 30 n, q, l, p, o, s

a = project economist/specialist/engineer (team leader), b = senior agricultural economist, c = principal project specialist, d = project implementation officer, e = transport specialist, f = counsel, g = program officer, h = social development officer, i = regional director, j = gender specialist, k = environment specialist; l = project analyst, m = rural development economist, n = national project officer; o = project consultant, p = senior. procurement officer, q = operations assistant, r = Gender Specialist (consultant); and s = project completion consultant.

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1. The Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project was designed to be supported by grants of $15 million from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to finance investment activities and $4.7 million from the Government of Finland to finance consulting services, plus a $0.6 million contribution from the Government of Cambodia. ADB grant became effective on 19 June 2006, and project completion was on 20 July 2011. 2. The investment rationale derived from an attempt to tackle poverty in the Tonle Sap region, where indicators of poverty were more negative than for the country as a whole and where rural populations’ livelihood assets were affected by a number of worsening trends.1 3. The project’s expected impact was to improve livelihoods.2 Its expected outcome was to increase access to assets in the five provinces—Battambang, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Siem Reap—that adjoin the Tonle Sap. The project encompassed the core areas3 and buffer zone4 within the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR). It covered 37 communes5 that qualified for inclusion in scope because they pursued livelihood activities in the buffer zone.6 The project had three components:

(i) Supporting Community-Driven Development a. Establish a Community Livelihood Fund 4. The project was to establish a community livelihood fund (CLF) in each commune, to be managed by the commune council, to finance small-scale community-driven activities planned and agreed by villages and communes.7 The project would make allocations from the CLF to 37 individual communal funds for three types of subprojects: (i) social infrastructure; (ii) income generation; and (iii) support for community fisheries. b. Design and Implement Livelihood Investment Packages 5. The project was to support established processes of village and commune development planning, particularly in income-generating and community fisheries activities.8 It was to assist demand-based organizations (e.g., community fisheries and special interest

1 Human and social capital had been seriously weakened by the loss (through conflict) of a generation of leaders, women shouldered heavy responsibilities as a consequence of male deaths, levels of health and education were low, natural capital (especially forests and fish) were facing intensifying exploitation, there was a very low stock of physical capital, and access to financial capital was restricted. The structures and processes that affected these assets (i.e., institutions, policies, legislation, culture, and power relations) were all weak.

2 See the Design And Monitoring Framework in Appendix 1. 3 The core areas comprise securely protected sites for conserving biodiversity, monitoring minimally disturbed ecosystems, and undertaking research and other low-impact uses such as education. In the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR), core areas are in Prek Toal, Battambang, (213 square kilometers (km2); Boeng Tonle Chhmar (Moat Kla), Kompong Thom (145.6 km2); and Stung Sen, Kompong Thom (63.5 km2). They are characterized by flooded forest, streams and water bodies, and rich biodiversity. Nearly 100 water bird species are found there (12 being of global significance). The core areas are known for their fish, mammals, and reptiles, and are reservoirs of natural capital strengthening. Tonle Sap's resilience in the face of increasing pressures. Protecting core area functions, products, and attributes contributes to sustainable livelihoods.

4 The buffer zone surrounds or adjoins core areas. It is used for cooperative activities compatible with sound ecological practices, including environmental education, recreation, ecotourism, and research. In the TSBR, a buffer zone of 5,400 km2 surrounds the core areas up to the outer limit of the flooded forest.

5 Comprising 316 villages with a population of 287,430 in 54,857 families. 6 57 communes had some land in the buffer zone in 2006. The 37 target communes were of two types: 21 had villages in the buffer zone and 16 had community fisheries and some land area, but no villages, inside the buffer zone. The 20 excluded communes had land but neither villages nor community fisheries in the buffer zone.

7 This supported decentralization and deconcentration policies to devolve responsibilities more equitably, efficiently, and effectively by direct transfer of capital from central government to the commune/sangkat.

8 The project also was to ensure greater participation in this of women and more disadvantaged households.

2

groups) in formulating proposals for funding under the CLF,9 and set guidelines to which all activity proposals to be funded through the CLF would conform.10

(ii) Safeguarding Core Areas a. Establish an Information Base on Core Areas 6. The project would: (i) review and describe the operations of fishing lots in the core areas, (ii) establish a database of biological and socioeconomic information,11 and (iii) build the capacity of the TSBR Secretariat in the Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC). b. Institute a Management System for Core Areas 7. The project was to: (i) establish the position of core areas coordinator in the TSBR Secretariat; (ii) help the secretariat develop, conclude, and implement a management and protection agreement for the core areas;12 (iii) detail a plan and schedule for the removal of the fishing lots; (iv) select the best way to maximize the conservation of natural resources in the core areas; (v) define all classes of direct users of the core areas and prepare a livelihoods development and support plan to specify priority interventions in support of livelihoods for poorer groups that might be affected by the removal of the fishing lots, and activities to embed the protection and management of the core areas in the livelihoods of neighboring communities; (vi) determine and recommend alternative livelihoods for the population of Boeng Tonle Chhmar; (vii) assess operations of the fishing lots and recommend mitigation measures to the Department of Fisheries (DOF) for immediate action; (viii) plan and propose a new management system (including monitoring and evaluation) for core areas; (ix) specify—jointly with DOF, the Inland Fisheries Research and Development Institute at DOF, the Ministry of Environment (MOE), and management—mechanisms to ensure compliance; and (x) propose the incorporation of other potential core areas.13 c. Institute an Improved Network of Fish Sanctuaries 8. The project would: (i) assess the function of fish sanctuaries in relation to fish productivity in the Tonle Sap; (ii) determine the optimum number, location, and size of fish sanctuaries; and (iii) formulate recommendations for their use and management.

(iii) Building Skills and Awareness for Sustainable Livelihoods a. Improve Coordination for Community-Driven Development 9. In support of strengthening institutions to implement decentralization policies, the project was to: (i) recommend the institutional arrangements such as role, functions, terms of reference, structure, budget, and staff complement that would enable the Council for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) to better coordinate with ministries, facilitate policy formulation, and harmonize external assistance for agricultural and rural development; (ii) draw up a work plan and train staff of CARD to update it; and (iii) build the capacity of CARD to complete critical tasks effectively, efficiently, and more inclusively. 9 Following the rolling 3-year commune development planning period, community fisheries then being organized

under the Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project would be able to formulate plans for funding. 10 Such guidelines were to indicate the technical support needed to ensure that activities were properly

implemented, and this support was to be contracted to government agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), or the private sector. The project would also contract independent auditors to verify project accounts. Additionally, the provincial offices of economy and finance would audit the CLF each year.

11 This was to be a subset of the TSBR environmental information database. 12 Between the CNMC, the Department of Fisheries (DOF), the Inland Fisheries Research and Development

Institute at DOF, and the Ministry of Environment (MOE). 13 Several of these activities were linked to Component 3 of the TSEMP.

3

b. Enhance the Skills Base for Community-Driven Development

10. The project was to familiarize central, provincial, and local government institutions with the CLF by: (i) preparing a range of materials for awareness raising on the objective, scope, and access processes of the CLF; (ii) setting up provincial project information centers; (iii) training staff of various provincial departments and commune councils in participatory development facilitation and planning and performance management, specific auditing requirements, and financial accountability; and (iv) preparing training modules for conducting inclusive, community-driven development planning. c. Educate for Protection of Natural Resources 11. The project would: (i) assemble natural resource management educational material; (ii) hold environmental awareness forums for staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), MOE, Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA), their provincial departments, and commune leaders; (iii) prioritize villages according to their potential impact on resource extraction; (iv) assemble, train, and equip a mobile training team to extend environmental awareness in priority villages; (v) deliver the environmental awareness program; and (vi) conduct monitoring and evaluation.14

II. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Relevance of Design and Formulation 12. Regarding the project design and its consistency with ADB and government priorities, at the time the project was designed (2005), the country strategy and program (CSP), 2005–2009) 15 focused on the three pillars of: (i) broad-based economic growth (including investment in physical infrastructure, agriculture and irrigation); (ii) inclusive social development (including education, support for vulnerable groups, and communal natural resource management); and (iii) good governance (including support for decentralization efforts to strengthen public service delivery and local participation in government). All these elements were obviously well reflected in the project's design, both very directly in the range of interventions supported within output 1 (and the CLF), and more widely (in terms of resource management approaches and community capacity and skills development). 13. There was a very clear and specific geographic focus on the Tonle Sap in the CSP, justified by the desire to enable greater synergies between different interventions, and to focus support for poverty reduction and environmental management on one of the poorest and environmentally most sensitive regions of Cambodia.16 This focus had arisen from ADB’s contemporaneous development of the Tonle Sap Basin Strategy (TSBS).17 Central to the TSBS thinking was the description of an environment–poverty nexus in the Tonle Sap, and the application of the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA)18 to problem identification and intervention design, with its focus on asset types and underlying structures and

14 These activities were to build upon achievements of the TSEMP, component 1. 15 ADB. 2005. Country Strategy and Program: Cambodia, 2005–2009. Manila. 16 As the CSP itself put it (p. 9): “Despite the natural and ecological wealth of the Tonle Sap basin, it is one of the

poorest regions of Cambodia. The population growth rate is rapid, the population young, and social indicators low. The competing pressures on natural resources have put the entire basin at risk of overexploitation.” This analysis had also drawn on ADB’s earlier Cambodia Poverty Review (2003) work.

17 The Tonle Sap Initiative (TSI) had been announced jointly by the Government of Cambodia and ADB in 2002. The Tonle Sap Basin Strategy was published in April 2005, and From Strategy To Practice – The Tonle Sap Initiative was published the following year (August 2006). The latter explained more fully how the strategy was to be delivered in terms of operations and investments.

18 For an explanation of the livelihoods approach as originally developed by the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom see: www.livelihoods.org

4

processes. This analysis is clearly reflected in the objectives hierarchy design of TSSLP (i.e., impact and outcome statements, referring to livelihood improvement and asset access) and activity composition (e.g., supporting public and communal processes). 14. Project design was consistent with government priorities, as reflected in the 2004 Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia;19 at its core was good governance, increased decentralization and improved public administration20 15. The application of problem-based analysis to the causes of “above-average levels of poverty” was thorough, although the problem tree itself was not directly translated into an “objectives tree” for the project21. Equally comprehensive (again drawing on the broader SLAs in the TSBS), was the description of circumstances in the project area under “asset types,” “vulnerability context”, and “policies, institutions and processes.”22 What gave this circumstantial and causal description authenticity in terms of its relevance to project design, however, was the fact that recognition of problems and issues arose directly from project-preparatory survey work in 67 villages in the transition area, buffer zone, and core areas. 16. Project design was (just) sufficient to define the objectives, but the design and monitoring framework was unclear and highly generalized.23 Risk analysis was modest—some major risks (e.g., changes in output prices) were not mentioned at all, but other risks were included that could have been (and were) mitigated in project design.24 The late decision to make the Ministry of Interior (MOI) the executing agency compromised original design relevance to some extent, given that the expectations for CLF arrangements and for the number of livelihood projects to be supported were determined during implementation largely by MOI’s own operational practices, i.e., the use of commune block grants and CLF guidelines based on project implementation manual (PIM) 25procedures. 17. Project design was relatively participatory in nature. There was a systematic attempt to capture lessons learned from other ADB and donor interventions, as well as from the World Bank’s experience with community-driven development. 26 The need to reform governance conditions to achieve and sustain impacts was well captured in project logic. The 4-year period planned for implementation seems short, given the support required for community processes to plan and administer the numerous CLF subprojects. B. Project Outputs 18. Supporting community-driven development. Commune councils' planning and budgeting committees managed bidding and procurement processes, and provincial line-

19 Originally presented to the first cabinet meeting of the third legislature of the National Assembly at the Office of

the Council of Ministers by the Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen. 20 More specific elements of direct relevance of the strategy to project design included (i) improved productivity

and diversification, fisheries and forestry reform (from rectangle 1); (ii) strengthened private sector and creation of jobs (rectangle 2); and (iii) improved health services and greater gender equity (rectangle 4).

21 See Supplementary Appendix A of ADB. 2005. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Asian Development Fund Grant. Kingdom of Cambodia: Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project. Manila.

22 See footnote 19, Supplementary Appendixes B, D, E, and F. 23 This generalization of objectives (arguably inevitable, given the lack of prescription about purposes to which

the CLF would be put) and the (directly related) absence of performance indicators make it impossible to measure project success in strictly formal terms (e.g., what livelihood dimensions were to be improved, and to what extent? By how much were “assets” access’ to be increased?).

24 See Appendix 1 of this document. Risk statements should be restricted to those not in the control of the project, and could also have included mention of extreme flood events—which have in fact occurred in 2011. See ADB. 2006. Guidelines For Preparing A Design And Monitoring Framework. Manila.

25 CLF guidelines were initially based on the project implementation manual (PIM) developed by the National Council for Democratic Development Secretariat in support of the commune/sangkat funds.

26 See footnote 19, Supplementary Appendix H.

5

department staff provided technical support to Community Livelihood Fund Teams (CLFTs). Establishing offices, developing CLF guidelines, training CLFTs, commune facilitators, and commune councils, were all part of this process. Subproject management committees were responsible for managing implementation. A summary of the CLF subprojects by type (and number and gender composition of claimed beneficiaries)27 is shown in Table 1, below.28

Table 1: Summary of Community Livelihood Fund Subprojects

Subprojects

No. of contract awards

Total Cost ($ million)29 %

No. of beneficiaries

Total % women Social infrastructure 285 6.49 54 828,734 54 Income generation 843 4.39 37 135,106 52 Community fisheries 284 1.02 9 506,982 53 Total 1,412 11.90 100 1,470,822 54

Source: MOI (2010) Project Completion Report 19. Almost 50% of the social infrastructure subprojects built roads (239 kilometers[km]).30 Irrigation subprojects constructed a small dam, 13 water gates and 27 km of canals.31In all, 54 school classrooms, 17 commune council offices, 31 community fisheries offices, community meeting halls, health centers, solar installations, and a rural electrification scheme were financed. The average subproject cost was just under $23,000. The main focus of the income-generating subprojects was on livestock husbandry (nearly 60% of all IG subprojects—mostly pigs, but also cattle, poultry, and fish). Fish processing and sauce production were popular, but also vocational training and equipment (e.g., for tailoring, hairdressing, motorcycle repairs). Credit also supported purchases of small boats and handicrafts, and production of noodles, fruit, and vegetables. The income-generating subprojects benefited 135,106 poor people, about 80% of whom were the poorest.32 The average income-generating subproject cost was just over $5,000. The community fisheries subprojects (average cost about $3,600) provided equipment (153 boats, 9 sets of gear to enable community patrolling, plus assistance for operational costs).33 Subprojects included the rehabilitation of fish sanctuaries (22), replanting of flooded forest areas (20 hectares), installation of observation towers (4), and renovation of 33 community fisheries offices. The average investment cost per CLF subproject overall (across the three types) was $8,427. 20. Safeguarding core areas. The main purpose of output 2 was to develop and implement a management system to safeguard core areas after the anticipated removal of the commercial fishing lots beyond the license expiration date of May 2009. The joint midterm review mission (March 2009) found that the Fisheries Administration (FIA) had already renewed the commercial fishing lot licenses for another 5 years. The mission also learned that the Wildlife Conservation Society, in collaboration with FIA, was conducting a similar study to co-management approaches. The original rationale for this output had therefore been invalidated and it was cancelled after the midterm review.34

27 Beneficiary estimates were taken from MOI's project completion report (December, 2010). Sums exceed the

project area population because many CLF subprojects (e.g., construction of commune council offices) are assumed to benefit all commune members; many households also benefit from more than one subproject.

28 More details of CLF subprojects (including provincial breakdowns) are in Appendix 2 of this document, and a summary of the CLF administration process and lessons learned from implementation are in Appendix 4.

29 This does not include commune project management costs of 3-4%. 30 143 km laterite roads, 96 km of earth roads, and 87 culverts and 11 bridges (total length: 145 meters). 31 Others provided 16 water filtration stations, nearly 5,400 household water filters, and 3 community ponds. 32 The poorest are landless, do not own productive assets, and are food insecure for about 8 months per year. 33 There was support to all community fisheries organizations for capacity building. Each organization was also

enabled to establish a small credit facility for on-lending to members to generate income to support patrolling. 34 This was after discussions between the executing agency, implementing agencies, Government of Finland,

and ADB, and as an alternative to a redesign of the output (e.g., to include accommodation of commercial licenses). A minor change in scope and implementing arrangements to reflect this was approved in July 2009.

6

21. Building skills and awareness for sustainable livelihoods. CARD’s institutional arrangements were strengthened by: (i) developing new terms of reference for CARD departments consistent with its new mandate (2009); (ii) promoting the roles of technical assistance groups and the policy support oversight committee; and (iii) incorporating CARD’s mandate into the National Socioeconomic Development Plan (NSDP)35 2006–2010). Training needs assessments resulted in 21 courses in project management, report writing, and facilitation skills for 485 participants (including 127 women), i.e., CLFTs, commune facilitators, commune councils, line departments, and local nongovernment organizations (NGOs).36 A central library and resource center was constructed, following a 2009 minor change in scope. Output 3c (educate for protection of natural resources) contained: (i) new management materials (including fisheries conservation); 37 (ii) environmental training to communes by mobile training teams;38 and (iii) teaching materials that were distributed to over 100 schools in the Tonle Sap and Tonle Sap information that was integrated into national textbooks (grades 3 and 7).39 C. Project Costs 22. Estimated project costs, including contingencies, taxes, and duties, totaled $20.3 million. Actual project costs were $19.98 million, with a residual balance of $0.32 million.40 The local costs were increased from an estimated $13.4 million to $16.05 million because all activities at the community level were procured locally. The cancellation of output 2 resulted in savings of $0.8 million, and there were smaller savings under output 3 and in overall project management ($0.73 million) that were used to support: (i) an increase of the CLF (from $11.88 million to $12.31 million):41 construction of 17 commune council offices; (ii) provision of computers, printers, and other office equipment to 37 commune council offices, and of solar power to 34 council offices; 42 (iii) completion of the civil registration processes under the Commune Council Development Project;43 and (iv) library and resource center construction and equipment.

Table 2: Project Cost Summary by Output ($ million) Output Foreign

Exchange Local

Currency Total Cost

Actual Cost

A. Base Costs 1. Supporting community-driven development 5.67 11.83 17.50 19.442. Safeguarding core areas 0.48 0.29 0.77 3. Building skills and awareness for sustainable livelihoods

0.51 0.72 1.23 0.54

Subtotal (A) B. Contingencies 1. Physical contingenciesa 2. Price contingenciesb

6.670.03 0.20

12.84 0.14 0.46

19.51 0.18 0.66

19.98

Total Subtotal (B) 0.23

6.900.60

13.44 0.83

20.34 19.98a Based on 5% for all costs except for civil works (10%). b based on annual escalation factors. 35 Royal Government Of Cambodia (2006) National Socioeconomic Development Plan 2006-2010 36 Capacity building under output 3b for commune councils was cancelled; many activities were completed under

JFPR 9114. TA for Capacity Building for Poverty Reduction 37 Including flipcharts for community training and a video documentary distributed through national media outlets. 38 Comprised of staff from the departments of Environment, Fisheries, Rural Development, and Women’s Affairs. 39 A list of activities and achievements under output 3 is shown at Appendix 4 40 The ADB grant was 98.3% disbursed, the Government of Finland grant was 99.4% disbursed, the Government

of Cambodia contribution was 88% achieved (the shortfall being due to stoppage of salary supplements, pending Priority Operating Costs introduction in 2010).

41$11.9 million was investment costs, $0.4 million administration/operating costs incurred by the 37 communes. 42 Three commune councils already had access to regular electricity grids. 43 After a minor change in scope in December 2009. See: ADB. 2002. Report and Recommendation of the

President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan and Technical Assistance Grant to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Commune Council Development Project. Manila.

7

D. Disbursements 23. Despite some issues (see Appendix 4) with CLF operations, financial processes were relatively smooth. First- and second-generation imprest accounts were operated by MOI.44 24 Implementation delays in 2006–2007 caused disbursement rates to be extremely low—only 5% over the first 2 years—and in 2006 there was no disbursement at all for outputs 2 and 3. The disbursement rates rose thereafter, to 22% in 2008, 66% in 2009, and 98% in 2010. At the time of the midterm review, in March 2009, it was estimated that the total disbursement by planned project completion in June 2010 would be only 69%; this provided the main justification for the decision to extend the project schedule by 6 months to the end of 2010 so as to enable the commune councils to implement the second round of CLF subprojects utilizing all of the CLF.45 The disbursement of the Government of Finland grant and the Government of Cambodia counterpart funds were timely. E. Project Schedule 25. The project suffered significant start-up delays, due mainly to delays in project management consultant recruitment. Given an implementation period of 4 years, the intention had been to get the CLF disbursements as quickly as possible, but this hinged on early and concentrated efforts to build skills and awareness (e.g., through dissemination workshops) of CLFTs and communities. Although provincial offices were established and CLFT members selected, office equipment and vehicles procured, and commune facilitators recruited, the opportunity for early capacity building training was lost in the absence of consultants. The result of this initial delay was that the period for the disbursement of the CLF was in effect reduced from 3.5 years to 2 years (prior to the 6-month extension). 26. The capacity building program did not get underway until mid-2009, when a package of training was delivered over a 6-month period to all 37 communes.46 The contract award for output 3c (concerned with raising environmental awareness) was also delayed (not awarded until June 2008), although the impact of this on the overall project schedule was not as severe as in the case of the other contract awards. F. Implementation Arrangements 27. MOI was the executing agency for the project. It established a working group based in Phnom Penh.47 The project had four implementing agencies: (i) MOI for outputs 1 and 3b; (ii) the TSBR Secretariat for output 2;48 (iii) CARD for output 3a; and (iv) MOE for output 3c. 28. MOI was chosen as the executing agency just before loan negotiation, whereas project preparatory TA had been implemented through MRD. The technical and administrative logic arose from: (i) its ongoing implementation of the Seila program;49 (ii) its

44 In accordance with (i) Ministry of Economy and Finance regulations, (ii) ADB’s Loan Disbursement Handbook,

and (iii) Guidelines on Imprest Funds and Statement of Expenditure Procedures. Statement of expenditure procedures were allowed for contracts of less than $50,000. Implementing agencies did not have individual imprest accounts.

45 The project was determined to be “at risk” in 2009 because of its disbursement performance. 46 Through JFPR-9114: TA for Capacity Building for Poverty Reduction, and by a local organization, Community-

Based Natural Resource Management Learning Institute. 47 The working group was supported by the consulting team. An office was established within the Department of

Local Administration at MOI, and office equipment and two vehicles were provided. 48 Output 2 was placed with the TSBR Secretariat on the basis of the Royal Decree regarding the core area and

biosphere reserve legislation, although functionally the technical issues were mainly to do with fisheries. 49 Seila is a major program for rural development, supported by agencies such as the United Nations

Development Programme and the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, and thus being congruent with Paris Declaration principles.

8

successful implementation of the (albeit relatively small) Commune Council Development Project; (iii) a desire to avoid the rather top-down approach of MRD and MAFF—which was already implementing the Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project (TSEMP)—to the provision of rural infrastructure and collective agriculture investments; and (iv) the fact that one of the World Bank-financed projects implemented by MRD was sanctioned for corrupt practices at the time. It was also expected that, through its involvement with CARD, the project would interact with MOE, MOWA, MAFF, and MRD, and —through the CLFTs—with the provincial departments of these agencies. MOI’s so-called “provincial local administration units”—with consultant support—would work with the commune councils via the CLFTs, who in turn would work with specific activity and interest groups (including for community fisheries subprojects). Overall, project implementation arrangements were complex, involving various agencies (horizontally) and several layers of government (vertically) – see Appendix 5 29. As a result of these implementation arrangements, the project faced issues such as: (i) the absence of a line agency (e.g., MAFF) to support the CLF income-generating livestock activities (e.g., poultry, pigs); (ii) problems with CARD’s role and mandate due both to a lack of enthusiasm among CARD staff and some wariness on the part of other agencies, (which felt that their own rural development role was being undermined); and (iii) difficulty in making the steering committee an effective body for implementation guidance. 30. In the communes, much time was spent on (i) building capacity of commune councils for revising the guidelines governing access to the CLF—they were rewritten or significantly changed both in 2008 and 2009, mainly to accommodate the PIM-based approach to income-generating projects; (ii) involving commune development experts, community development specialists, and rural infrastructure engineers in more robust procurement processes (e.g., advertising, documentation preparation, bidding management) and contract monitoring (i.e., design compliance, progress payments approval); and (iii) including intensive but not widely replicable household-based planning practices. 31. The absence throughout the project implementation period of an effective basin-wide management institution (as anticipated by the Tonle Sap Initiative) also somewhat frustrated achievement of higher-level objectives. (See Appendix 7). G. Conditions and Covenants 32. Eleven of 14 covenants were satisfactorily complied with. Three covenants—the gender action plan; the setting up and functioning of the project steering committee; and project benefit monitoring and evaluation—were only partially complied with. (See Appendix 6) The project had no resettlement impact. CLF subprojects followed the government's environmental laws and regulations (and were consistent with ADB environment policy). H. Related Technical Assistance 33. No TA was piggy-backed to the Project at design, but in 2009 TA for capacity building financed by the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR 9114) was applied satisfactorily to output 3b.50 I. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 34. The fund from the Government of Finland was used to finance the consulting service for project implementation. This was divided into five contract packages: (i) nos. 1 and 2 for implementation support to output 1 and output 3a;51 (ii) no. 3 for support to output 2;52 (iii) no. 50 See footnote 46. 51 Awarded to the NIRAS/CADTIS consortium, following quality and cost-based procedures. Contract completed.

9

4 for support to output 3b;53 and (iv) no. 5 for support to output 3c.54 The most significant delay (18 months) encountered in consultant recruitment concerned the recruitment and contract award for packages 1 and 2 (managed by MOI and the Ministry of Economy and Finance).55 The lack of urgency in this matter was due to a combination of: (i) inexperience in procurement matters of the consulting team leader, (ii) MOI's underestimation of time and complexity of consultant recruitment issues, and (iii) change of ADB project officer. 35. Procurement arrangements followed standard procedures with thresholds for international competitive bidding at $1 million for works and $500,000 for goods. All procurement was done through national competitive bidding. For the implementation TA, contract quality-cost based selection was used with a quality–cost ratio of 80:20. Individual consultant selection was applied to all TA contract packages of less than $200,000. The main goods and works contracts awarded by MOI were for the procurement of (in decreasing order of magnitude): (i) office furniture and equipment, (ii) solar panels for commune offices, (iii) 138 motorcycles, (iv) the National Committee for Sub-national Democratic Development Library building, and (v) six vehicles. A total of $12.3m was disbursed for the CLF through the individual communal accounts. Procurement was managed by the commune councils to acquire goods and services from NGOs and private companies; local competitive bidding was used for all CLF subprojects. J. Performance of Consultants, Contractors, and Suppliers 36. Performance of consulting services was mixed. The driving force behind implementation at the national level was with the consultants and not with the MOI working group. This also prevailed at provincial level, where CLFT members were rarely available full-time. 56 Consultant composition changed from being relatively general in nature (supporting community development) to becoming more technical over time.57 There was a relatively high level of turnover of national consultants,58 and some technical experts did not have on-the-job and/or formal training skills. The community development specialists were reported to have been very effective. Incorporation of the consultant team leader position into contract packages 1 and 259 created some management problems, as the leader was expected to also provide supervision for outputs 3b and 3c (i.e., outside MOI). The level of skills transfer from consultants to project participants remains uncertain. In addition, CLFT members had to return to their line departments after project completion, which limited the opportunities for provinces to retain acquired knowledge and skills. 37. Commune councils sometimes struggled to find service providers for the income-generating subprojects, and some service providers would have benefited from being included in project-supported training to familiarize themselves with PIM procedures (and with business management more generally). 60 Practices such as under-bidding, where eventual quality is compromised, and/or bid collusion, where costs are unnecessarily high might have been significantly reduced if this had been the case. (See Appendix 4).

52 Awarded to World Fish by direct selection, but subsequently withdrawn when output 2 was cancelled. 53 Awarded to the Community-Based Natural Resource Management Learning Institute by direct selection, but

later cancelled due to award of a similar contract to support commune training under JFPR 9114. 54 Awarded to Live and Learn by direct selection, in cooperation with MOE. 55 The TA contract for support to outputs 1 and 3a was advertised in May 2006 and awarded in November 2007. 56 And where the central government's salary supplement scheme was withdrawn in 2010 (pending formalization

of the priority operating costs scheme). 57 With the recruitment of specialized experts, e.g., in agronomy, livestock, fish processing, household-based

planning. 58 Remuneration packages were perceived as unattractive by many national consultants. 59 After the resignation of the original (independently contracted) team leader in late 2007. 60 See: ‘MOI (2010) ‘Internal Assessment Of Social, Economic And Environmental Impacts’.

10

K. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency 38. The performance of the borrower and the executing agency was satisfactory; the government and MOI remained committed to the project throughout implementation. Despite some initial unfamiliarity with the technical content of the project, MOI’s role over the implementation period was supportive of decentralization objectives; this was helped by the application of a commune-based procurement process with which it was familiar. Initial management of funds flow by the Ministry of Economy and Finance was sometimes slow, although counterpart fund availability picked up as CLF turnover intensified. More significant was the lack of coordination by CARD in its role as chair of the project steering committee; until 2008 it was essentially ineffective. Partly as a result of this (prior to output 2 cancellation), there was little coordination between the TSBR Secretariat, FIA, and MOE. L. Performance of the Asian Development Bank 39. Overall, ADB’s performance was satisfactory. Review missions were frequent and timely.61 However, staff changes just as the project started tended to undermine MOI's familiarity with project objectives. ADB missions recognized coordination and management problems, the absence of CLF monitoring, and various procurement-related issues (e.g., poor quality of service), and ADB's day-to-day administration improved with the delegation of responsibility to the Cambodia Resident Mission (in 2009).62 Processing of minor changes in scope (e.g., cancellation of output 2, increases in ceilings for imprest accounts, 63 construction of the library) was prompt, as was agreement to extend the project schedule.

III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

A. Relevance 40. The project is rated relevant. Ex ante design relevance, especially the expected outcome of “increased access to assets” was high, particularly in relation to the project’s contribution to national, basin-specific, and ADB objectives as manifest in the Tonle Sap Initiative (TSI) and TSBS. It is notable that the project: (i) worked in all 5 provinces adjoining the Tonle Sap; (i) was one of a suite of geographically ordered and temporally sequenced interventions covering the whole of the Tonle Sap; (iii) had an executing agency that did not implement other ADB-supported and TSI-related projects, but which had its own capacity built by implementing the project; (iv) did adopt a largely environment-based understanding of the fundamental causes of poverty; (v) applied the SLA to design; and (vi) was specifically poverty-oriented. Relevance was maintained throughout, but did decline a bit over the implementation period, mainly—but not entirely—due to the project's placement within the wider TSI–TSBS context (See Appendix 6). 41. Firstly, the basin-wide planning systems to which the project was meant to contribute did not materialize. As part of its objectives regarding changing institutional incentives (while also supporting community participation in vertical planning), the project had been designed

61 Except for the period leading up to the midterm review in March 2009, when there had not been a review

mission since mid-2008. A list of missions and their composition is in the Basic Data. 62 This had been recommended by the inception mission in 2006. 63 A relatively low ceiling ($0.5 million) had been placed on MOI's second-generation imprest account; this limited

the size of withdrawal applications and meant that they had to be submitted every month. In November 2008, this ceiling was increased to $1 million, and raised again in July 2009 to $1.5 million, to ensure sufficient cash flow to meet the demands of the CLF. The first-generation imprest account operated by MOI began with a higher ceiling of $800,000, but this too was increased in line with the second-generation imprest account.

11

to promote horizontal coordination between agencies.64 However, as lack of government ownership of the concept prevented the establishment of basin-wide planning during project implementation, the project’s relevance in this regard was eroded. 42. Secondly, the relatively small size of projects (e.g., $20 million for this project), implementation delays, and use of multiple implementing agencies diluted the temporal and geographic phasing of interventions envisaged in the original TSI–TSBS logic—for instance, of the community fisheries organizations set up under the TSEMP, only a small proportion received any support under this project. In terms of scale, the project covers 37 communes and affects less than a quarter of the population within the biosphere.65 43. Thirdly, better understanding of poverty in Cambodia over the life of the project somewhat diminished the strength of the original case for intervention. The project had been predicated in large part on the nature and depth of poverty in the Tonle Sap, yet the information base for this at the time was not very robust.66 By 2006, a fuller picture was emerging: poverty in Cambodia was deepest in the plateau and mountain areas, whereas poverty in the Tonle Sap was comparable to that in the plains. 44. Lastly, (unrelated to TSI–TSBS), the failure to develop a management system compatible with biodiversity conservation 67 tended to diminish relevance, although the application of output 2 funds to the CLF arguably more than offset this by supporting wider decentralization objectives (in pursuing community-driven development).68 B. Effectiveness in Achieving Outcome 45. The project is rated less effective in achieving its outcome. This is arguably the only assessment possible given that the DMF provided no quantifiable targets against which to measure performance, and that the delay in delivering some outputs (e.g., the CLF subprojects), plus the cancellation of others (e.g., safeguarding core areas), tend to suggest that the level of outcomes achieved was lower than intended.69 The stated objectives of “supporting community development”, “safeguarding core areas”, and “building skills and awareness” may have helped improve access to assets, but the DMF did not indicate any ways to measure such access improvement, nor did it specify achievement targets. Further, project implementation performance monitoring did not measure the extent of any changes in access to assets in the project area. MOI’s assessment survey at project completion investigated CLF participants’ views of the impacts on households’ livelihoods, on social capital, and on natural and environmental conditions. (Please refer to footnote 64). While respondents’ views of outcomes were positive, the assessment itself afforded no measurable evidence of how the project performed against expectations. 64 The placement of livelihood operations within MOI and the support to CARD to fulfill its coordination role were

key features of this approach, and as such met the requirements for the project to contribute to TSI–TSBS. See Supplementary Appendix G (p. 54) of the report and recommendation of the President (footnote 19).

65 Where possible, the concept of “lessons learned” and sharing of experiences was applied to maintain relevance—by extending the project’s loan period or by applying funds for purposes not previously included in project scope (e.g., the civil registration processes or construction of commune council offices).

66 Features of poverty in the basin were described, but neither the TSBS nor the project commented on the geographical distribution of poverty within Cambodia as a whole; the CSP 2005–2009 suggested only that the highest proportions of people below the poverty line are “in parts of some of the provinces around Tonle Sap”.

67 This refers to the cancellation of output 2. The RRP had described the importance of these areas in the following terms: “Core areas are reservoirs of natural capital that strengthen the Tonle Sap's resilience in the face of ever-increasing pressures and contribute directly to fisheries productivity. Protecting their functions, products, and attributes will contribute appreciably to sustainable livelihoods.” They were thus fundamental to improving the natural capital base of local livelihoods, and the extension by FIA of the fishing license for Lot No. 2 in Prek Toal likely perpetuated private economic rent-seeking and non-sustainable harvest practices.

68 The use of the block grant disbursement method itself also increased relevance. 69 On the premise that what had been designed was what was most needed and effective in achieving outcome.

12

46. The mix of project outputs at completion was also somewhat different to that described at design, not just because of delays and cancellations. While it was never intended to be prescriptive about what social infrastructure or income-generating subprojects the CLF could be used for, actual CLF disbursement was for 1,412 subprojects at an average cost of nearly $8,500—as compared with the implied design expectation of some 40,500 subprojects at an average cost of under $400 each.70 It is also the case that some of the income-generating subprojects were not as anticipated at design (e.g., cattle, poultry). While such a mix was: (i) appropriate to communal needs, (ii) resulted from genuinely participatory processes, (iii) had an overall proportional application of CLF funds to different purposes broadly similar to design, and (iii) included a total number of households at an average cost per household for the income-generating subprojects not so different from original expectations,71 these differences (again in the absence of any direct evidence of impact) tend to undermine the envisaged high level of effectiveness. C. Efficiency in Achieving Outcome and Outputs 47. The project is rated less efficient in achieving outcome and outputs. It should be noted that this assessment of the use of project resources is severely constrained by: (i) the absence of baseline data, (ii) the lack of impact monitoring of the CLF subprojects, and (iii) the lack of a quantitative impact study (and an economic internal rate of return estimate) at completion. A robust comparison of actual returns with economic design expectations is therefore not possible. 48. Some factors suggest that the project is likely to have used its resources relatively efficiently: (i) project management costs were eventually about half of what had been planned; (ii) management costs for the CLF were only about 3-4% of the total disbursed amount; 72 and (iii) a greater level of funds than anticipated was delivered to the 37 communes through flexible implementation mechanisms. However, while commune ownership was undoubtedly strengthened and structures and processes were put in place, numerous recorded incidents of compliance issues with procurement management at some communes, and complaints of attempted influencing of some CLFT members to deliver preferential outcomes in a communal bidding process tend to undermine overall project efficiency. In addition, the greatly reduced implementation period (in effect only the 2-year period of 2009–2010, including a 6-month extension) forced commune councils and community members to absorb relatively large amounts of funds (through the block grant process)73 in situations where it was difficult to consider and design alternative investment opportunities. It was also reported that suspension of salary supplements to government staff in 2010 reduced implementation efficiency to some extent.74 D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 49. The project is likely to be sustainable. Despite the reported incidences of livestock disease outbreaks and major flood damage to social infrastructure and income-generating subprojects (in 2011, 1 year after project completion), both commune interviews and MOI’s assessment survey confirm that many project participants: (i) intend to continue activities for which they were trained (e.g., livestock, sewing); (ii) have often made sufficient savings from

70 The design expectation was that a “typical village investment fund of about $25,000” would accommodate

around 90 subprojects at an implied average cost of less than $300 each. With an initial CLF allocation of around $11.6 million, this would have resulted in about 40,500 CLF subprojects.

71 In fact, many more subprojects were funded on a group basis than described at design. 72 Effectively, the block grant approach and formation of owner groups promoted economies of scale in delivery. 73 An average of $170,000 per commune council, in addition to their annual government allocation of $10,000. 74 As recorded in the June 2010 grant review mission's aide-mémoire, “the project has experienced hardship

during the first half of 2010 due to the fact that the salary supplements to the government seconded staff had been suspended, resulting in reported low motivation in performing their duty.”

13

CLF subprojects (especially when investing in large ruminants) to allow reinvestment after damage and losses; and (iii) frequently participate in revolving credit funds, owner groups, and/or other self-help groups that boost aggregate community resilience. The heightened visibility and technical capacity of some service providers also suggests that impact will be sustained. The activities undertaken under output 3c (e.g., awareness-raising, education) should underpin the sustainability of human and natural capital. 50. A major part of the project’s rationale was to strengthen commune structures and processes, and this was undoubtedly achieved by the intensive and (relatively) large-scale CLF operations; such an increase in human and social capacity is not diminished in the short term. Likewise, although some physical infrastructure might have been damaged in recent floods (especially earth and laterite roads), other items such as school accommodation or commune council offices are relatively unscathed. The inclusion of the new physical infrastructure items in future commune operation and maintenance plans also allows optimism on sustainability. More generally, government policies (e.g., decentralization, rural development) continue to remain supportive of the wider objectives of the project, as do the interventions of ADB and other donor projects in the Tonle Sap (notably the Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project). E. Impact 51. The project has had several positive impacts, notably on communal institutions and their members' behavioral norms (as well as some aspects of rules and regulations, e.g., in procurement) in managing small-scale social infrastructure and income-generating activities. Greater transparency, predictability, accountability, and enforceability than before surround procurement in project communes, enabling better alignment of commune councils' service delivery with their decentralization mandates. More efficient use of resources, stronger skill levels, and greater motivation all characterize project-supported outputs.75 There have been positive institutional impacts on the executing and implementing agencies, such as encouragement of provincial interagency work through CLFT operations. 52. Socioeconomic impacts on households have also been positive, if not well quantified. In direct economic terms, many household income-generating enterprises have undoubtedly been profitable, as well as profoundly catalytic in that some activities have begun to be copied more widely without project support, e.g., women’s sewing groups. (For gender impacts see Appendix 9) Numerous social infrastructure subprojects have produced obvious economic impacts on communities in general, even if these have not been captured in private returns (the impacts on local education from having teachers staying at the communes as a result of accommodation being available is an obvious example of this, as are the cases of health centers and rural electrification). What quantified evidence there is of the project's socioeconomic impact— a wealth-ranking exercise undertaken in early 2008 (pre-CLF subprojects) and late 2010 and cited in MOI's impact assessment report—attests to a 24% reduction in the proportion of poor households in project communes, although how much of this is specifically attributable to project activities is not clear. (See Appendix 8). 53. As for environmental impacts, again there is no directly quantifiable evidence, but anecdotal evidence suggests that impacts from community fisheries subprojects are already observable in fish stocks (e.g., returning species, increasing average size of fish). The impact of the project on Cambodia’s environmental institutions is likely to be positive, although the cancellation of output 2 may be regarded as a limiting factor in this respect.

75 This is reflected in the JFPR-supported Commune Capacity and Readiness Survey (Cambodia Development

Resource Institute, 2011), which found that the project positively affected communal planning and management, environmental and climate change awareness, and commune members.

14

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Assessment 54. Overall, the project is rated partly successful. 76 Evidence suggests that positive livelihood impacts have occurred in the project area and that the outcome has generally increased the target population’s access to assets. Reported physical infrastructure quality exceeds that delivered under pre-project methods, and the evidence for institutional changes in communal structures and processes is also positive (communes and families essentially now see themselves as owners rather than recipients), as it is for reduced vulnerability (especially given the worst flooding for 50 years in 2011). 55. The project's non-prescriptive approach to service delivery was in profound accord with the central government's decentralization policies and objectives. The project suffered major delays at start-up, and was classed “at risk” at midterm, but disbursement was completed with only a modest extension to the implementation schedule. Procurement practices in the communes were sometimes less than desirable, and there seemed to be insufficient time to build the capacity of commune council procurement review committees, but this did not compromise the eventual viability of the project. Revisions to CLF guidelines demonstrated a willingness to learn and adapt. 56. The project was not implemented as designed in many ways (largely due to the late selection of the executing agency), but overall, that agency's performance was more than adequate. The block grant and other project-related practices and experiences have fed into later ADB interventions, and the project thus fulfilled the “inform and prepare” imperative inherent in TSI design. 57. Project effectiveness may have been compromised by a change to the mix of expected outputs (as well as late delivery), but the inherent monitoring and evaluation deficiencies make a robust assessment of project effectiveness and efficiency problematic. B. Lessons Learned 58. Project experience demonstrates that it is possible to improve natural-resource-based livelihoods in a decentralization context, but that doing so is institutionally complex. More in-depth institutional analysis at all levels (e.g., regarding ownership by executing and implementing agencies, the commitment to basin-wide planning, the role of coordinating institutions, and the capacity development needs of communal service providers) could have overcome some of the problems encountered during implementation, and this is an essential design requirement for any future development interventions of this kind in the Tonle Sap. Use of the SLA may be insightful, but alone does not guarantee design rigor. 59. Although the project appears relatively efficient against its own delivery expectations, the extent to which such institutional complexity potentially adds to overall investment delivery costs remains unknown in the absence of reliable quantified benefits data from the project itself that would allow a comparison of different approaches. 77 In institutionally complex projects such as this, implementation and eventual output delivery are especially likely to be affected (both positively and negatively) by circumstances not always

76 The basis for this rating is a weighted average of four criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,

sustainability) as detailed in ADB. 2006. Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports for Public Sector Operations. Manila.

77 As compared to more traditional and relatively simple single-sector investments, and as implied by the findings of the ADB (2009) Sector Assistance Program Evaluation For The Agriculture And Rural Development Sector, for example.

15

foreseeable at design. Allowing for flexibility in implementation within such project designs is likely to be essential for later performance success.78 60. More specifically, the project's design: (i) did not anticipate the scale and nature of change in implementation arrangements that would arise from choosing MOI as the executing agency; (ii) underestimated coordination difficulties between government agencies—notably between the executing agency and CARD (in its role as chair of the project steering committee)79 and between the TSBR Secretariat, FIA, and MOE for output 2; and (iii) overestimated the appetite for change in fisheries management. Lack of advance action to recruit implementing consultants severely reduced the effective implementation period. C. Recommendations

1. Project Related 61. The fundamental question about project design and implementation performance is to what extent the institutional change observed to date in the communes, plus the impacts on assets of different types that have undoubtedly occurred, can be sustained in the face of shocks, most notably the floods of 2011. Thus, the primary project-related recommendation is that detailed evaluation work be carried out via a project performance evaluation report after another year or two (perhaps after more flooding and certainly other seasonal events and trends have been experienced).80

2. General 62. The formal requirements of linear intervention logic in a design and monitoring framework may not always be able to capture relatively complex livelihood investments (where non-prescriptive approaches may apply and impacts occur in numerous dimensions); such behavioral change may better be conceptualized using other evaluation techniques.81 However, when design frameworks are used without specification of quantifiable targets, it is impossible to assess investment performance robustly, 82 and without monitoring and evaluation being undertaken during implementation, actual impacts on livelihoods will inevitably be uncertain. Likewise, the application of “typical models” of economic returns at design as a formal processing requirement is somewhat unrealistic, especially where an investment has significant institutional strengthening objectives. If quantitative economic analysis is to be employed for sustainable livelihoods projects, however, it should include distribution, poverty, and risk analyses to gauge impacts on households and communities.

78 Ability to respond to arising needs in order to cope with evolving decentralization and deconcentration process. 79 Despite the committee being designed as a policy-guidance body, rather than having implementation

responsibility. 80 Analysis in this exercise may perhaps best be framed by comparing project communes with non-project ones

(although non-project communes will have a number of other investments that project communes may or may not have had, which would imply methodological complexities) and also in the broader context of TSI–TSBS evaluation as a whole. Cost data from individual investment models held at MOI may be combined with quite specific benefits estimation to generate activity-specific financial and economic internal rates of return.

81 See, for example, International Development Research Center (2011) ‘Outcome Mapping’ 82 Including the performance of livelihoods-related projects versus more sector-based projects.

16 Appendix 1

DESIGN AND MONITORING FRAMEWORK

Design Summary

Performance

Targets and/or Indicators

Data Sourcesand/or

Reporting Mechanisms

Assumptions

and Risks

Achievements Impact Livelihoods improved

Poverty reduced (compared with baseline survey)

Biodiversity conserved (compared with baseline survey)

Government's annual income and poverty surveys Project performance monitoring surveys and project performance audit report

Assumption The government sustains the decentralization and deconcentration process Risk The cumulative impact of built structures in the Mekong River basin could disrupt the Tonle Sap basin ecosystem

Informal evidence of (i) changed behavior toward and greater efficiency of community investments both locally and centrally, (ii) more profitable and sustainable livelihood activities, and (iii) improving fish stocks (in quantities and species composition)

Outcome Access to assets increased in the five provinces that adjoin the Tonle Sap

Community-driven development supported, based on the eligibility criteria specified, by the end of year 4 Core areas safeguarded by the end of year 4 Skills and awareness for sustainable livelihoods built by the end of year 4

Design and monitoring framework Project completion report Socioeconomic indicators in the five provinces

Assumptions Commune councils function increasingly efficiently, especially with regard to management and protection of natural resources The government maintains its commitment to biosphere reserve zoning principles Risks The removal of the fishing lots precipitates uncontrolled exploitation in the core areas Corrupt practices divert funds from the community livelihood fund

Livelihood assets increased and improved: Human – increased technical and management skills of commune officials and households Social – better networks and processes within communes and between communes and service providers Financial – increased earnings from activities, e.g., livestock, fisheries, handicraft Physical – roads, water filter stations, household water filters, classrooms, commune offices Natural – returning and expanding fish species

Appendix 1 17

Design Summary

Performance

Targets and/or Indicators

Data Sourcesand/or

Reporting Mechanisms

Assumptions

and Risks

Achievements Outputs 1. Community-driven development is supported 2. Core areas are safeguarded 3. Skills and awareness for sustainable livelihoods are built

A community livelihood fund is established by the middle of year 1 Livelihood investment packages are designed and implemented from the end of year 1 An information base on core areas is established by the end of year 1 A management system for core areas is instituted by the middle of year 2 An improved network of fish sanctuaries is instituted by the end of year 2 Coordination for community-driven development is improved from the middle of year 1 The skills base for community-driven development is enhanced from the middle of year 1 Education for protection of natural resources is delivered from mid-year 2

Design and monitoring framework Grant review mission reports Semiannual progress reports Quarterly progress reports Audit reports Commune accounts Number of proposals successfully implemented in each category Number of proposals successfully implemented Number of proposals put forward to commune councils each year Village prioritization exercises Removal of the fishing lots from the core areas Gender action plan End-of-assignment reports Monthly progress notes Training reports Training and awareness building materials developed

AssumptionsThe proposals put forward to the commune councils reflect community desires Removal of the fishing lots from the core areas and the new management system provides sufficient safeguards for the core areas Staff of national, provincial, district, and commune institutions and villagers are receptive to the training and messages imparted Risks Access to the community livelihood fund is dominated by better-off interest groups The new management system is not sustained Target groups cannot spare the time to attend training courses

1412 community livelihood subprojects (285 social infrastructure, 843 income-generating, 284 community fisheries) Output cancelled Terms of reference for CARD produced; CARD mandate incorporated into NSDP; 21 training courses delivered; library and resource center; fisheries management materials, environmental training to communes; educational materials for schools

ADB = Asian Development Bank, CARD = Council for Agricultural and Rural Development, National Socioeconomic Development Plan - Update 2009-2013 (RGC) Source(s): RRP, and MOI (2010) Project Completion Report

18 Appendix 2

COMMUNITY LIVELIHOOD FUND – PHYSICAL ACHIEVEMENTS SUMMARY 1. Social Infrastructure Subprojects 1. The main focus of the social infrastructure subprojects was on rural infrastructure; 48% of all subprojects across the five provinces involved the construction of laterite or earth roads, culverts and bridges. The total physical achievement from these subprojects was the construction of 143 kilometers (km) of laterite roads, 96 km of earth roads, the placement of 87 culverts, and the construction of 11 bridges (for a total length of 145 meters). 2. Subprojects to provide potable water supplies involved 16 water filter stations (with a total capacity of 28,500 liters), three community ponds with filters, and a total of 5,384 household water filters. To improve irrigation facilities, 10 subprojects together contributed 60 meters of dam construction, 13 irrigation water gates, and 27 km of irrigation canals. 3. Other subprojects delivered school improvements (constructing 54 classrooms and five teacher’s accommodations). Support was also provided for the construction of 17 commune council offices, for 13 boats in communes with floating villages, and for 31 community fisheries offices. 4. There were subprojects concerned with the construction of four floating platforms, two community meeting halls, and two markets (one of which floating), and with two solar installations, two health centers, and a rural electrification scheme. 2. Income-Generating Subprojects 5. The main focus of the income-generating subprojects was on livestock (58% of all subprojects of this kind). The most popular form of livestock raising was pig raising (a total of 5,787 pigs were provided; other subprojects delivered 34,444 chickens; 1,810 cows or buffaloes; and 800 ducks. 6. Fish raising was popular, with a total of 31 tons of fingerlings provided. Other subprojects concerned fish processing and fish sauce production (involving 317 households). 7. There were also various forms of vocational training programs, primarily for sewing and tailoring, but also for hairdressing, motorcycle repair, wedding preparation, and beauty care; in all, 386 sets of different types of equipment were provided. 8. There were subprojects concerned with micro-business support, many of which provided small boats in floating villages, and credit subprojects that benefited over 1,600 households. 9. Other subprojects helped with music production and provided 120 musical instruments. 10. A smaller number of subprojects assisted handicraft production and weaving, noodle production, vegetable and fruit production, mushroom growing, and various forms of training. 3. Community Fisheries Subprojects 11. The support for community fisheries initially concerned the provision of equipment for the community fishery organizations (CFOs) to enable them to patrol their area more effectively, and later assistance for their administrative or operation and maintenance costs, and finally measures to ensure sustainability of the activities.

Appendix 2 19

12. In the first year, 37 patrolling boats and 50 sets of patrolling equipment were provided. 13. A smaller number of community fisheries subprojects assisted in rehabilitating fish sanctuaries, replanting flooded forest areas, and installing observation towers. 14. There was also support to all CFOs for capacity building. During the last year of project operations each CFO was enabled to establish a small credit facility for onlending to members; this helped generate income that allowed to support ongoing patrolling activities.

Table A2.1: Community Livelihood Fund Subprojects by Type and Province Province

Social Infrastructure

IncomeGeneration

Community Fisheries

Total

Kampong Chhang 30 39 12 81 Pursat 113 377 81 581 Battambang 43 99 85 227 Siem Reap 80 270 77 427 Kampong Thom 19 58 29 106 Total 285 843 284 1,412

Table A2.2: Kampong Chhang – Project Costs and Beneficiaries Summary

Cost and

Beneficiaries Social

Infrastructure Income

Generation Community Fisheries

Total

CLF expenditure ($ million)

0.42 0.21 0.03 0.66

No. of beneficiaries

59,000 5,000 6,000 70,000

No. of women 31,000 4,000 3,600 38,500 No. of households 13,000 1,400 1,000 15,400

Table A2.3: Pursat – Project Costs and Beneficiaries Summary

Cost and

Beneficiaries Social

Infrastructure Income

Generation Community Fisheries

Total

CLF expenditure ($ million)

2.84 2.25 0.33 5,42

No. of beneficiaries

237,000 37,200 59,200 333,400

No. of women 113,400 18,700 32,300 164,400 No. of households 48,300 7,800 15,200 71,300

Table A2.4 Battambang – Project Costs And Beneficiaries Summary

Cost and

Beneficiaries Social

Infrastructure Income

GenerationCommunity Fisheries

Total

CLF expenditure ($ million)

0.94 0.45 0.28 1.67

No. of beneficiaries

223,300 41,300 149,800 414,400

No. of women 157,300 21,700 76,000 255,000 No. of households 46,000 9,000 34,500 89,500

20 Appendix 2

Table A2.5: Siem Reap – Project Costs And Beneficiaries Summary

Cost and

Beneficiaries Social

Infrastructure Income

Generation Community Fisheries

Total

CLF expenditure ($ million)

1,80 1.21 0.39 3.4

No. of beneficiaries

157,000 36,400 270,000 463,400

No. of women 82,000 22,500 147,000 251,500 No. of households 38,292 8,878 65,853 113,023

Table A2.6: Kampong Thom – Project Costs And Beneficiaries Summary

Cost and

Beneficiaries Social

Infrastructure Income

Generation Community Fisheries

Total

CLF expenditure ($ million)

0.47 0.28 0.95 1.7

No. of beneficiaries

48,800 5,900 9,000 63,700

No. of women 23,900 3,000 3,700 30,600 No. of households 9,400 1,000 6,400 16,800 CLF = community livelihood fund. Source: MOI (2010) Project Completion Report

Appendix 3 21

SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING SKILLS AND AWARENESS FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

Table A3.1: Summary Of Achievements In Building Skills And Awareness For

Sustainable Livelihoods Activity Achievements Summary Year

Recommend institutional arrangements to strengthen CARD.

The CARD mandate and structure were amended and the Royal Decree was endorsed. The CARD Institutional Strategy was developed in consultation with technical working groups, line ministries, development partners, and civil society. The Information and Knowledge Management Scoping Study was completed and the Cambodian Agriculture and Rural Development Information Gateway (CARDiG) website established.

2009-2010 2010 2010

Formulate a work plan and operating guidelines for CARD.

Annual work plans and the log frame were formulated. A scoping study on social safety nets in Cambodia was produced under the leadership of CARD, and CARD organized the National Forum on Social Safety Nets in Cambodia. A provisional road map with milestones was formulated.

2009-2010 2009 2009

Build the capacity of CARD to carry out its functions.

Internal assessment was conducted and discussed in CARD workshops or retreats and seven departmental workshops. CARD leadership and council composition were amended and staff numbers increased. Provincial forums were conducted in each province to provide policy and strategy guidance on agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and natural resource management to stakeholders.

2008-2009 2009 2010

Raise the awareness of national, provincial, district, and commune agencies

Awareness-raising seminars were conducted in each province to introduce the project to local stakeholders. Further awareness training was completed in three provinces.

2007 2008-2009

Train provincial, commune, and village staff in project implementation

Capacity building training that focused mainly on CLF guidelines was given to all CLFTs and commune facilitators to improve project implementation, and was then extended to POG members and commune councils. Community organizing and savings training has now been extended to all communes. CLFTs and facilitators attended the training on facilitation skill, project report writing, and management skills conducted by CBNRM-LI under a JFPR project. A capacity building plan for project staff and commune councils was developed focusing on the community organizing and savings concept, marketing information, and gender sensitization; all this was initially delivered as training of trainers and then extended to commune councils and POGs.

2008-2009 2009 2009 2010

Train commune facilitators in participatory project implementation

Commune facilitators have participated in all capacity building activities. 2009-2010

22 Appendix 3

Assemble educational materials on natural resource management

A wide range of documentation in Khmer and English on natural resources and their management was assembled. Awareness-raising visits were conducted and information collected on the economic and social resources in selected communes of each provinces. Training on natural resource management, conflict resolution, and good governance was conducted.

2008 2008 2008-2009

Hold environmental awareness forums

Meetings were conducted with commune councils and village development committees to raise awareness on management and use of natural resources. Environment days were held in Kampong Chhnang and Kampong Thom in cooperation with provincial departments of environment.

2009 2010

Prioritize villages on the basis of their potential impact on resource extraction

Organization of “Green Flag” contests in the floating villages raised awareness and encouraged the implementation of waste and water pollution management strategies.

2010

Assemble, train, and equip a mobile training team

Mobile training teams were established in each province, and training posters and lessons plans provided for their training activities, as well as follow-up refresher courses.

2008-2009

Deliver the environmental awareness program

Training courses were provided to CLFTs and commune facilitators, pedagogic students and teachers, community leaders, and community fisheries on environmental management. In collaboration with the Department of Education a video was produced on the achievements of the project, as well as books on environmental awareness and a calendar. In collaboration with Kampong Thom province, the National and World Environment Forum was organized, and the Environment Forum in Kampong Chhnang province. Three environmental awareness-raising posters were developed.

2008 2009 2009 2009

CARD = Council for Agricultural and Rural Development, CBNRM-LI = Community-Based Natural Resource Management Learning Institute, CLF = community livelihood fund, CLFT = community livelihood facilitation team, JFPR = Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, POG = project owner group. Source(s): ADB Review Missions, MOI (2010) Project Completion Report

Appendix 4 23

ADMINISTERING THE COMMUNITY LIVELIHOOD FUND – SUMMARY OF PROCESS AND EXPERIENCE

1. Introduction 1. This appendix briefly summarizes the experience of the community livelihood fund (CLF) administration and operation. It begins with an overview of the mechanics of the system, followed by consideration of some of the issues that arose during implementation—all of which affected project performance and thus offer lessons. 2. Summary of Fund Administration and Operation 2. The main purpose of the CLF was to support community-driven and project-based needs by providing funds to support the preparation and implementation of community activities that had been prioritized in commune development plans and commune investment programs. 3. The total CLF was allocated to the targeted communes based on two key criteria: (i) regular commune allocation (91% of the CLF); and (ii) the number of community fisheries in each commune (9% of the CLF)1. The regular commune allocation was based on three criteria: (i) 35% allocated equally to all communes; (ii) 30% allocated based on the poverty index of each commune; and (iii) 35% allocated based on communes’ population. 4. The CLF could be used to support the following types of activities: (i) small-scale social infrastructure subprojects; (ii) income-generating subprojects; and (iii) community fisheries subprojects. The CLF also included support funds for commune councils' administrative efforts in CLF subproject identification, preparation, and implementation. 5. The commune councils were responsible for and accountable to their constituencies in the utilization of the CLF, and all expenditures from the CLF were subject to independent audits by agencies under authorization of the project. Each commune council used the CLF in accordance with conditions set out in a memorandum of understanding between it and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and followed guidance set out in the CLF guidelines. After signing the memorandum, the allocated CLF was transferred from the MOI's second-generation imprest account (SGIA)2 to the commune's bank account established at the commercial bank ACLEDA in the form of a block grant. A commune block grant allows the executing agency and the commune to use the request form from the commune council to liquidate an advance with the record of the bank transfer (from the project's SGIA to the commune councils' bank account) for validation of payment. This method for CLF allocation and transfer is consistent with the central government's decentralization and deconcentration policy in that it enables communes to perform their delegated functions and also strengthens the councils' financial management skills. 6. The steps involved in CLF subproject preparation and implementation are as follows:

(i) Subproject preparation and design. Identification and organization of the beneficiaries, i.e., project owner groups (POGs), selection of the subproject management committee, and assignment of technical assistance, technical

1 Each Community Fishery received an equal amount of assistance. See table 1: Summary of Community

Livelihood Fund Subprojects 2 MOI operated one first-generation imprest account (FGIA) and one SGIA. Funds were disbursed from the Asian

Development Bank (ADB) to MOI’s FGIA, and then from the FGIA to the SGIA.

24 Appendix 4

information collection, feasibility study, environmental impact assessment, land acquisition study, and detailed design.

(ii) Subproject approval. The commune council calls a meeting to approve the designed subproject.

(iii) Technical clearance. Prior to progress to the next stage, the approved subprojects are sent to the provincial Community Livelihood Facilitation Team for coordination in provision of technical clearance to ensure that all projects are in line with Cambodian law, government policy, and CLF guidelines.

(iv) Procurement. After receipt of a notice of technical clearance from the CLFT, the commune council conducts procurement to select a contractor or service provider3 to implement works contracts or service contracts. Procurement by the commune council is overseen by the commune procurement committee and monitored by the assigned CLFT and the community development specialist.

(v) Contract implementation. After signing a contract with a contractor or service provider, the commune council monitors the implementation by contractor or service provider with the assistance of a technical supervisor, POG representative, and the CLFT. In the case of social infrastructure subprojects, rural infrastructure engineers will need to certify the quantity and quality of works produced by the contractors before any progressive payments can be made and final handover can take place.

(vi) Operation and maintenance. The commune council hands over operation and maintenance responsibilities to POGs or concerned agencies.

3. Issues Arising From Fund Operations 7. Several issues arose from the CLF implementation experience:

(i) The implementation of the project with MOI as the executing agency was a relatively late decision, and had the implication that MOI wished to use communal investment selection and procurement based on approaches specified in the central government's project implementation manual (PIM). The mechanics of livelihood support via the PIM and the use of block grants were not anticipated in the project design; the project administration manual mentions neither.

(ii) This use of existing processes was probably the only practical method for project delivery, but probably also contributed directly to the very different composition and scale of CLF subprojects than envisaged at design.

(iii) MOI revised the CLF guidelines three times, assisted by consultants, to provide clearer instructions for the management of CLF-related procurement and implementation. Initial development of the guidelines (based on the PIM) only took place after the deployment of the technical assistance (TA) team in late 2007. The first revision occurred after the initial cycle of CLF subprojects (after establishing the need to increase the involvement of service providers in subproject design and development). In 2009 the guidelines were substantially revised, based on feedback received from the provincial CLF workshops and from the joint Asian Development Bank–Government of Finland midterm review—essentially to modify the procurement procedures, to provide more clarification on each step of the CLF process, to strengthen service provider, environmental, and resettlement management processes, and to tighten up procurement and technical monitoring processes. Further adjustments were made in 2010, after another cycle of CLF subprojects, to strengthen bidding procedures and oversight. This iterative experience with the CLF guidelines was a genuine attempt to ensure efficiency, transparency, and accountability within communes, where numerous capacity and technical problems persisted throughout implementation, and provided significant insight on which the

3 The service providers were nongovernment organizations, community-based organizations, and private

companies.

Appendix 4 25

designs of later projects within the Tonle Sap Initiative were built (e.g., Tonle Sap Lowlands Rural Development Project and Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project).

(iv) Despite the revisions of the guidelines, various procurement issues persisted. Firstly, the guidelines still could not provide conclusive procedures for preparing bid documents, especially in the areas of service provider selection criteria. Also, the project appeared not to have sufficient time to build capacity of commune councils' procurement review committees on how to evaluate technical proposals for the income-generating and community fisheries subprojects. Secondly, although MOI officials believe that the CLF guidelines are essentially complementary to the PIM, there is in fact still a degree of duplication between the guidelines and the PIM that can be confusing (and makes procurement less efficient). Thirdly, there was some direct contracting without prior approval by the provincial governor, as stipulated in the CLF guidelines, which the project completion review mission detected in one of a commune's CLF–community fisheries contracts from 2009. The commune councilors and the POG clarified that they had not been clear about the CLF guidelines at that time. While the guidelines suggest the use of local competitive bidding, the council and POG used community participation in procurement by involving community members in buying raw materials and constructing the boats for the community fisheries. They further informed the project completion review mission that the CLFT and the commune council had immediately detected the issue, and that POG promised not to repeat the process. Lastly, the fiduciary risk is rated fairly high, due to the fact that there were too many small contracts to be handled in a short period of time, and also because the internal control on compliance with the procurement procedures was not fully functioning; there have been some indicators of collusion between bidders.4

8. Based on the above findings, and to mitigate future risks, the following actions may be considered: (i) CLF guidelines should provide clear procedures for preparing bidding documents, especially in the areas of service provider selection criteria; (ii) capacity building of procurement review committees should be strengthened, especially on how to evaluate the technical proposal for income-generating subprojects, and training on the guidelines should start before the implementation of the cycle; (iii) internal control should be fully functioning so as to improve the quality of the procurement process; and (iv) a governance action plan should be in place to mitigate the risk. 9. As a final observation on the realities of project and CLF implementation at the communal level, and in the wider context of promoting inclusion and participation through the sustainable livelihoods approach, it may be noted that various project processes did generally support wide participation and inclusion (e.g., through household-based planning), but the physical disparities within communes (e.g., some households are inevitably more remote, more prone to flooding) and between communes (e.g., some are located on main highways, on the edge of Tonle Sap, have better communications with executing and implementing agencies, and more local service providers) remain significant determinants of the ability to participate in the CLF, no matter what project interventions may have occurred.

4 An observed indicator of collusion: Estimated cost of one procurement package: $4,995.41. Bid price of bidder A: $4,993; bid price of bidder B: $4,995; bid price of bidder C: $4,990; bid price of bidder D: $5,000; and bid price of bidder E: $4,995. It is likely that bidders B, D, and E, whose bid prices equal or exceed the estimated cost, are not willing to win the bid even if they are aware that some bidder will offer a bid price below the estimated cost.

26 Appendix 5

PROJECT ORGANIZATION

Appendix 6 27

STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANTS

ENVIRONMENT

The Recipient, through MOI, shall ensure that (i) each of the commune implementing activities funded under the CLF adhere to the Recipient's environmental laws and regulations, ADB's Environment Policy (2002), (ii) best environmental practices, acceptable to ADB, are incorporated into all activities and their implementation, and (ii) each of the communes meets the environmental assessment review procedures described in the initial environmental examination prepared for the Project. (GA, Sched. 5, para. 8)

The CLF guidelines required environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for all subprojects at the commune level. Review missions found that EIAs were conducted in all subprojects at the commune level.

Complied With S

SOCIAL

The Recipient shall ensure that prior to the award of civil works contracts, MOI screens such works for involuntary resettlement effects to make certain that there are no losses of land, income, housing, community facilities, and resources that would require compensation to be paid in accordance with ADB's Policy on Involuntary Resettlement (1995). In the event land acquisition and resettlement is required for any activities or (sub)projects funded under the CLF, such land acquisition and resettlement shall be carried out in accordance with the agreed Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework prepared for the Project. (GA, Sched. 5, para. 9) There were no resettlement issues during project implementation.

Complied With S The Recipient shall ensure that the village and commune level special interest groups established under the Project in each of the Project Provinces will include women's groups and ethnic minorities. There shall be no ethnic discrimination and equal opportunities shall be provided to all minorities. (GA, Sched. 5, para 10) Project owner groups were established, and women and ethnic minorities participated without discrimination.

Complied With S The Recipient shall ensure that the Project is implemented in accordance with ADB's Policy on Gender and Development (1998) and the Gender Action Plan, prepared for the Project, as agreed between the Recipient and the ADB. (GA, Sched. 5, para. 11) The gender action plan was only fully followed after the midterm review. This resulted in gender-related training being delivered only during the last 2 years of the project.

Partly Complied With PS

28 Appendix 6

FINANCIAL

The recipient shall (i) maintain, or cause to be maintained, separate project accounts, for the project; (ii) have such accounts and related financial statements audited annually, in accordance with appropriate auditing standards consistently applied, by independent auditors whose qualifications, experience and terms of reference are acceptable to ADB; (iii) furnished to ADB, as soon as available but in any event not latter than 6 months after the end of each related fiscal year, certified of such audited accounts ... (GA, Article 4, Para. 4.02(a))

Separate accounts for the project were maintained and these accounts were regularly audited by the independent auditors. These annual audit reports were shared with ADB in a timely manner.

Complied With S The recipient shall enable ADB's representatives to inspect the Project, the goods financed out of the proceeds of the Grant, and any relevant records and documents (GA, Article 4, Para. 4.02(b)). ADB’s representatives were allowed to inspect all goods financed out of the proceeds of the grant and any relevant records and documents.

Complied With S

Others

MOI shall be the Project Executing Agency and shall (i) set overall project direction, (ii) resolve implementation problems, (iii) review Project progress and performance against milestones (with 6-monthly reporting), (iv) ensure flow of funds to the communes, (v) ensure the timely and adequate provision of counterpart funding and (vi) undertake procurement for contract supply and civil works under Components 1 and 3. In addition, MOI shall implement Components 1 and 3B of the Project. (GA, Sched. 5, para. 2) TSBR Secretariat shall be the IA for Component 2 of the Project and shall carry out day to day activities in close consultation and coordination with DOF, IFREDI and MOE. (GA, Sched. 5, para 2 (a) CARD shall be the IA for Component 3A.(GA, Sched. 5, para 2 (b) MOE shall be the IA for Component 3C. (GA, Sched. 5, para 2 (c) The EA provided overall direction to the project activities. ADB was provided with timely quarterly and annual progress reports. All IAs were established as planned. TSBR Secretariat was dropped from being the IA as the output it was in charge of was canceled.

Complied With S The Consultants shall be selected and engaged as a firm or firms or individuals by the Recipient. The selection and engagement of a firm shall use quality-and-cost-based selection (QCBS). (GA, Sched 3, para 5) This was strictly followed.

Complied With S Project Steering Committee. A PSC shall be established prior to the effective date and shall consist of representatives from MAFF, MEF, MOE, MOI, MRD, MOWA, CNMC and CARD. CARD, through its Secretary General, shall head the PSC, which shall provide policy and strategy guidance. The PSC shall communicate Project outcomes to the Council of Ministers. The PSC shall meet at least twice a year. CARD shall be assisted, on an intermittent basis, by an international consultant. (GA, Sched. 5, para 1) The PSC was established but only on a few occasions did it initiate meetings. An international consultant was provided on an intermittent basis, and one international and one national consultant on knowledge and information management were provided to assist CARD.

Complied With PS

Appendix 6 29

OTHERS

Community Livelihood Facilitation Team. A CLFT, headed by the Chief of PLAU, shall be established in each of the Project Provinces and shall be responsible for overseeing the implementation of livelihood support at commune and village levels, The CLFTs shall also be responsible for approving the activities, monitoring the procurement carried out by the Commune Councils and report on CLF-related activities to MOI through PLAU. Each CLFT shall have a permanent administration and a representative from each of the provincial Departments of Rural Development, Environment, Women's Affairs, the provincial Office of Fisheries and PLAU. It shall also include commune facilitators, posted in each commune, to assist communities in carrying out the respective commune's responsibilities under the Project. PLAU will have the responsibility of overseeing the CLFTs. (GA, Sched. 5, para. 3) A CLFT was established in all provinces and was headed by the chief of PLAU. Representatives from line ministries as indicated above participated in the CLFTs.

Complied With S Commune Council. The Commune Council shall receive support from the commune facilitators organized under the CLFT and shall be responsible for (i) identifying activities suitable for funding under the CLF, and (ii) preparing the proposals for submission to the Planning and Budgeting Committee. A commune bank account shall be set up in each of the communes as the vehicle to transfer funds to the commune level. (GA, Sched. 5, para. 4) Commune facilitators were recruited to assist all CCs. Commune bank accounts were set up at the ACLEDA Bank, and were operated smoothly to receive funds from the project.

Complied With S Community Livelihood Fund and Eligibility Criteria. The Recipient, through MOI, shall ensure that the CLF is established within 3 months following the effective date. The CLF shall only be used to finance small-scale community-driven activities that are planned and agreed at village and commune levels relating to (i) social infrastructure, (ii) income generation, and (iii) community fisheries that meet the following eligibility criteria: (a) To be funded by the CLF the community-driven activity shall have: high priority accorded by community in the village development plan; been included in the commune development plan; been expected not to have adverse environmental impacts; complied with applicable environmental, legal and other requirements of the Recipient and ADB's environmental assessment requirements; not disadvantaged any part of the community; had demonstrated benefits to the poor, women, ethnic minorities or other vulnerable groups; entailed only legal activities; and The Consultants shall be selected and engaged as a firm or firms or individuals by the Recipient. The selection and engagement of a firm shall use quality-and-cost-based selection (QCBS). (GA, (b) In addition to the criteria set out in item (a) above, social infrastructure activities shall also meet the following criteria: total cost limit per village shall not exceed $20,000 per annum; meets technical, financial and economic feasibility; and special clearance from MOE is obtained for road construction. (c) In addition to the criteria set out in item (a) above, income generation activities shall also meet the following criteria: each grant shall not exceed $5,000; -the business plan shall be financially feasible; enterprise shall employ a significant number of persons; and improved technology shall have successfully demonstrated and found to be financially feasible. (e) In addition to the criteria set out in item (a) above, community fisheries activities shall also meet the following criteria: each grant shall not exceed $5,000; and - shall be supported by a majority of the members of the community fisheries (GA, Sched 5, para 7) The CLF guidelines were established, but not within 3 months of the effective date. This was due to the late recruitment of the TA consultation team. The CLF guidelines were revised twice during implementation to provide clearer instructions for the implementation. QCBS was used to recruit TA firms and individual consultants. The amount for each subproject was applied in accordance with the CLF guidelines.

Complied With S Project Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. The recipient shall ensure that monitoring is undertaken by MOI and reported to ADB through the 6 monthly and annual reporting mechanisms. The basis for project performance monitoring and evaluation shall be the design and monitoring framework and the baseline surveys, as prepared and agreed between the Recipient and ADB. (GA, Sched 5, para 7).

30 Appendix 6

The EA provided regular quarterly and annual progress reports to ADB. No baseline surveys were carried out and monitoring activities carried out by MOI were not based on a systematic procedure, but rather ad hoc (being determined by issues arising from the field). However, the TA team monitored field activities and reported to the EA through monthly reports and meetings.

Partly Complied With PS Project Review. The Recipient shall conduct a comprehensive joint midterm review of the Project implementation with ADB. Semi-annual reviews shall also be conducted by ADB with the support of CARD. The semi-annual reviews shall (i) examine the appropriateness of implementation arrangements and schedules of activities, (ii) assess the procedures for village and commune development plans, (iii) review compliance with agreed procurement procedures, (iv) analyze the outcomes of the capacity building and training programs, and (v) monitor the effectiveness of safeguard procedures.(GA, Sched 5, para 7) The EA and IAs participated in the midterm and semi-annual review missions. CARD also joined and facilitated the mission.

Complied With S

Overall Rating S (–) No rating available. FY = fiscal year, HS = Highly Satisfactory, PS = Partly Satisfactory, S = Satisfactory, U = Unsatisfactory.

Appendix 7 31

TONLE SAP SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT, TONLE SAP INITIATIVE,

AND TONLE SAP BASIN STRATEGY 1. Introduction 1. To a large extent, the project’s relevance (and to some degree any assessment of its impacts and sustainability) must be seen in the wider context of Asian Development Bank (ADB) support for development in the Tonle Sap since 1995. This wider context is provided by the Tonle Sap Initiative (TSI) and its operationalization through the Tonle Sap Basin Strategy (TSBS). 2. The Tonle Sap Strategic Background: Characteristics and Implications for

Project Relevance 2. The Tonle Sap Initiative was jointly announced by the Government of Cambodia and ADB in 2002, i.e., the year before technical assistance (TA) to design the project began. The Tonle Sap Basin Strategy was published in April 2005, and From Strategy To Practice – The Tonle Sap Initiative was published the following year (August 2006). 3. Some of the fundamental concepts on which the TSI was designed included (i) the adoption of a basin-wide planning approach; (ii) the definition of poverty as being intrinsically linked to natural resource environmental conditions (i.e., the “poverty–environment nexus”); (iii) the use of the sustainable livelihoods analytical framework, and (iv) the justification for a geographical focus on the Tonle Sap in ADB operations and its country strategy. These considerations have both (i) determined the nature of the interventions, including this project, that the TSI has so far comprised (especially regarding the technical and institutional composition of investment projects,1 and the mix of intervention types that the TSI itself contained); and (ii) provided some of the measures against which project performance should be assessed. 4. As a concept, TSI–TSBS was profoundly relevant to the long-term future of livelihoods within the Tonle Sap itself and also for Cambodia as a whole. In general, the mix of ADB intervention types within TSI–TSBS has been appropriate to the stated objectives, with investment projects such as this one, sector projects, and advisory TA for policy work and institutional strengthening. Particularly relevant was the attempt to institutionalize basin-wide planning in some form (through both advisory TA and in the form of the TSI Coordination Unit). In terms of ADB’s country strategy, the consistency of TSI–TSBS with overall country objectives (i.e., poverty reduction founded on broad-based economic growth, inclusive social development, and good governance) is clear. Likewise, the high-level objectives of the TSBS fit broadly with those of the Government of Cambodia, as articulated at roughly the time of its preparation (and as reflected in the Rectangular Strategy For Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency, 2004, which among others mentions improving resource productivity, improving rural infrastructure, and supporting land, fisheries, and forestry reform), and also with the later Strategy for Agriculture and Water, 2006. 5. Against this background, the current project can be seen as a highly relevant investment, given its contribution to explicit national, basin, and ADB objectives. As an individual investment project, it: (i) worked in all five provinces bordering the Tonle Sap;

1 The major investment projects in the TSI are (i) the Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project, (ii) the Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project, (iii) the Tonle Sap Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project, (iv) the Tonle Sap Lowlands Rural Development Project, and (vi) the Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project.

32 Appendix 7

(i) was one of a suite of geographically ordered and temporally sequenced interventions covering the whole of the Tonle Sap; (iii) had an executing agency that built its own capacity by implementing the project; (iv) adopted a largely environment-based understanding of the fundamental causes of poverty; (v) used the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) to problem definition, objectives formulation, and project design; and (vi) was specifically poverty-oriented. In short, the project reflected wider strategic objectives and ADB's operational principles very closely. 3. Tonle Sap Initiative, Strategy, and Project Design Implications 6. However, the fact that the project closely followed the TSI–TSBS logic and scope also meant that it suffered from some of the same drawbacks that have affected the overall performance of TSI–TSBS. 7. First, the multi-faceted view of poverty reduction inherent in the SLA inevitably implies project designs of a multisector and multi-institutional nature—as is fundamentally apparent in this project. Such projects are bound to be difficult to implement in circumstances where not only is technical capacity at all levels extremely weak (and it may be noted that the SLA typically envisages working simultaneously locally, provincially, and nationally), but executing and implementing agencies may be headed by different political groups and can be in direct competition and conflict with one another. I t may also be felt that the whole concept of “transforming structures and processes” is somewhat understated in the TSI–TSBS analysis; while the post-conflict politicization of public institutions, the paucity of development policy, the effects of decentralization and deconcentration, among others, are all mentioned in project documents, the real-life implications for project outcomes may not—in the light of implementation experience—have been sufficiently considered. 8. Application of the SLA to project design thus tends to clash with one of the main lessons and conclusions in the country strategy and program 2005–20092 about the “need to adopt a realistic and pragmatic set of expectations in relation to project implementation…given capacity constraints within government agencies…” The project design also seems to have ignored the view that “increased complexity of projects causes deterioration in quality” (CSP 2005–2009). Specific interagency rivalries and antagonisms—e.g., between the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) Secretariat and the Fisheries Administration (FIA) at the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF)—have not helped implementation of TSI–TSBS projects (including this one), even where the project design—e.g., for the Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project (TSEMP)—was relatively simple. Some of these situations could have reasonably been anticipated if stakeholder analysis at design had been more thorough. 9. The eventual cumulative effectiveness of TSI–TSBS interventions is also likely to be constrained by their scale and limited overlap. Although temporal and geographic phasing of interventions was envisaged within the original TSI–TSBS, relatively small project sizes, slow implementation, and multiple implementing agencies have all tended to dilute this approach—e.g., of the community fisheries organizations set up under the TSEMP, only a small proportion receive any support under this project, and none under the Tonle Sap Lowlands Rural Development Project (TSLRDP). As for scale, this project, for example, covers only 37 communes and affects less than a quarter of the population within the biosphere. Lesson-learning and experience-sharing goals have been achieved by extending loan periods (as in this project) so that implementation periods overlap, and later projects do specifically employ delivery methods successfully used by earlier ones—e.g., the use of block grants under the TSLRDP is based on this project's positive experience, and the Tonle

2 ADB. 2005. Country Strategy and Program: Cambodia, 2005–2009. Manila.

Appendix 7 33

Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project builds on this project's positive experience with service provider mobilization. 10. Given these observations and experiences, the question arises whether a more pragmatic, focused, and less “livelihood-oriented” approach should have been taken to poverty reduction in the Tonle Sap, where interventions are more sector-based, e.g., organized around water resources through the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM), or rural infrastructure through MOWRAM and/or the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD), or environment through the Ministry of Environment (MOE).3 4. The project and the Tonle Sap Basin Institutional Framework 11. This project was intended to support the basin-wide planning objectives of TSI–TSBS. As part of its objectives aimed at changing institutional incentives, and while also supporting vertical planning dimensions by strengthening community processes, it was designed to promote horizontal coordination between agencies. The placement of livelihood operations within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the support to the Council for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) to fulfill its coordination role were key features of this approach, and as such met the requirements for the project to contribute to TSI–TSBS.4 However, as difficulties with establishing basin-wide planning for Tonle Sap persisted over the years of project design and implementation, the project’s relevance in this regard was also diminished. 12. A basin-wide approach is one of the three strategic principles of TSI–TSBS, and the original intention (in 2005–2006) was to support the formation of a basin-wide coordination committee (to be established under the Cambodia National Mekong Committee).5 What does not seem to have been fully appreciated at the time of TSI–TSBS design, and which also continued into design and implementation of this project, was the relative importance in national terms of the Tonle Sap land area (about 44% of Cambodia) and population (around one-third of the nationwide population), and the implications that this would have for institutional arrangements regarding its management.6 By this is meant, for example, that in 3 Where the SLA seems to have been more successful is on a smaller scale, e.g., under the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) project “Improving the Access of Poor Floating Communities on the Tonle Sap to Social Infrastructure and Livelihood Activities”. This was a $1 million grant, implemented by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and executed by FIA, whose goal was to define and support sustainable livelihood solutions capable of replication under the present ADB project. Despite some delays and discontinuities in implementation (requiring a 1-year extension) livelihood outcomes were positive. However, it can also be argued that the JFPR project was relatively successful precisely because it involved only one central government agency, rather than several. 4 See Supplementary Appendix G (p. 54) of ADB. 2005. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Asian Development Fund Grant. Kingdom of Cambodia: Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project. Manila. 5 This was supposed to be a “thoroughly Cambodian” solution, as it assisted face-to-face and non-divisive interaction in a small and homogeneous country setting. Various TA projects under TSI–TSBS promoted basin-wide management, through capacity building, policy advice, and support for interagency coordination (i.e., Tonle Sap Initiative Coordination Unit at ADB, and at CARD under this project). Following a national forum in 2007, however, the government established the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA) in 2008 as a separate body with a remit for land and water planning, and monitoring and evaluation in the Tonle Sap (it was to embody most of the characteristics of a basin-wide approach and would develop policy, strategy, and a planning framework, with monitorable indicators for different sectors), as well as for reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating the projects and activities of various ministries. ADB began work in mid-2008 to see how best to operationalize the TSBA, but the entity was then replaced by the Tonle Sap Authority (TSA) under MOWRAM before this project was completed. The potentially conflicting roles of the TSBA (both to do with planning and with project and investment reviews) with those of the implementing ministries was inherent and (in retrospect, at least) obvious. (It seems to be the case that MOWRAM, MAFF, MRD, and MOE were all unhappy with the TSBA’s proposed monitoring function). 6 By the time the TSI–TSBS was prepared, the extent of Cambodia's institutional problems was apparent, so it is perhaps surprising that not more was done (beyond describing “Factor and Players in Development Decisions”) in the way of a formal stakeholder analysis for TSI–TSBS, especially since the range of institutions available to implement projects was quite modest.

34 Appendix 7

a country where a particular river basin may be of national importance but only represents 10% of the national area or population, the willingness of line ministries to cede authority for planning or implementing projects therein will be much more likely than in a situation where this same loss of authority and mandate may apply to nearly half the country (and thus half that agency’s operation). This national reality is a major structural factor in Cambodia and explains in large measure the difficulty observed to date in initiating any kind of basin-wide management for the Tonle Sap, yet does not seem to have been fully articulated during TSI–TSBS development or in its various constituent investments, including this project.7 13. Besides the difficulties inherent to planning coordination in the Tonle Sap, the paucity of institutional capacity itself creates design issues. By the time the project was beginning to be prepared (in late 2003), there were already major institutional issues that had to be accommodated in project design. The original TA8 had been conceived with MRD as the executing agency (MAFF was already executing the TSEMP), yet anticipated problems with governance in MRD suggested that an alternative would need to be found. The role for MOI as executing agency for the project had a technical logic, in that it was implementing the government's decentralization and deconcentration policies, but it had no experience with livelihoods projects and little involvement in any basin-wide planning initiatives, although it was obvious (and desirable) that other line agencies should be involved (i.e., CARD, Department of Fisheries, MAFF, and MOE). In other cases such as the TSEMP, inter-agency rivalries and antagonisms have not helped the implementation of projects (para. 8). 14. The outcome of this institutional situation in policy and planning terms has been that government ownership of the basin-wide management concept, to which this project was meant to contribute, has remained weak, as evidenced by both the content of its Strategy for Agriculture and Water9 and (more obviously) the ongoing inability or unwillingness of the government to actually establish an institution to embody and implement principles of basin-wide management. 15. Inevitably, this has had consequential impacts on the project’s original design relevance.

7 In this regard, Cambodia contrasts with the neighboring Lao People's Democratic Republic, where river basin planning may be easier to initiate because significant river basins (e.g., Nam Ngum) cover only small proportions of the national land area. 8 ADB (2003) TAR:CAM 36608: Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia For Preparing the Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project. 9 Neither the Rectangular Strategy nor the Strategy for Agriculture and Water mentions the TSI–TSBS

specifically, and the latter, a more sector-specific document, essentially mentions only the constraints to formal Integrated Water Resources Management and the costs associated with river-basin planning as a context to how river-basin planning will be (modestly) approached in Cambodia.

Appendix 8 35

ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE I. Introduction 1. This appendix reviews the financial and economic analysis of the Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project. It starts with an overview of the analysis contained in the report and recommendation of the President (RRP), then summarizes beneficiaries' perceptions of project impacts (from an impact assessment survey conducted by the Ministry of Interior [MOI] in late 2010). 2. Based on field and documentary evidence from late 2011 (i.e., nearly 1 year after formal project completion), it then reviews the evidence for impacts using the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) framework (i.e., it considers available evidence by asset type and in terms of e.g., reduced vulnerability, and structures and processes), and reconsiders the project’s economic performance. 2. Economic Analysis at Design 3. The economic analysis1 begins with a description of the poverty gap and poverty severity in the project area (and in the national context) and links this—and the implied vulnerability of households—to underlying asset and process conditions, mainly over-use and degradation of natural resources. The economic rationale (e.g., in terms of market or government failure) for investment is not made directly at this point, although it is discussed later and (in more detail) elsewhere in the institutional and sector analyses. There is no formal analysis of possible alternatives to the proposed investment. 4. Project costs are summarized from COSTAB output, and benefits are then described. Benefits are essentially of two types: (i) quantified benefits from a range of indicative income-generating models (pigs, micro-irrigation, fish smoking and drying) and social infrastructure models (domestic water supply, fish marketing center); and (ii) unquantified benefits from better institutional performance and SLA institutionalization (e.g., through support for rights establishment and protection, for collective action, for building communities’ social capital by strengthening local planning, by improving institutional incentives, e.g., for MOI and the Council for Agriculture and Rural Development [CARD]). The discussion of the nature of unquantified benefits is comprehensive and rigorous. 5. Based on the income-generating and social infrastructure models, the financial analysis estimates that about 250,000 beneficiaries will be involved in the project. The income-generating and social infrastructure subprojects are described briefly, although actual budgets are not shown. The financial analysis also describes the composition of labor returns and its differentiation within the project area, although this would have been better contained in the economic analysis and used to justify and explain the choice of the shadow wage rate factor. Financial sustainability of enterprise-specific investments is not discussed. 6. The economic analysis uses these same income-generating and social infrastructure models as the basis for the derivation of the expected benefits stream. A few points may be noted about the specific methodology employed for economic pricing:

(i) The application of a world price numeraire is reasonable in Cambodia’s circumstances (i.e., being a relatively small and de facto dollarized, open economy)

1 The economic analysis at design was contained in the RRP's Supplementary Appendix G and summarized in

the RRP itself, although background analysis was also contained in various other appended documents, e.g., Sector Analysis, Problem Tree, Sustainable Livelihood Approach.

36 Appendix 8

and the appropriate conversion factors are applied, although the terminology of “unit of account” as US dollar ($) is sometimes incorrect.2

(ii) “Border parity pricing” is quoted as having been applied, although later discussion acknowledges that few items are in fact traded (Cambodia was likely exporting fish at the time, but on a relatively small scale).

(iii) It is not clear whether import-substituting or export prices have been used, or what adjustments (if any) may have been made to the values at project sites (i.e., the border price equivalent valuation).

(iv) Similarly, the earlier models described some of their outputs (i.e., pigs) as being “incremental” while others (e.g., vegetables, fish) may not be; so it is not clear whether supply-based or demand-based economic prices were applied.

7. Based on a package of investments for a typical village—i.e., 17 social infrastructure and 73 income-generating subprojects per village, ranging in cost each from $35 for pigs to $2000 for markets, which have relatively high economic internal rates of return (EIRRs) of between 39% and 281%, and which collectively cost about $25,000 per village—economic benefit streams are estimated to cover some 250,000 beneficiaries3 from 31,500 households (about 60% of the project area population) and generate a base-case EIRR for the project of 24% (in the RRP main text) or 27% (in Supplementary Appendix G).4 8. Although net benefit streams are shown for the described models, the absence of the models’ technical parameters and of financial and economic budgets themselves makes any assessment of underlying technical, financial, and economic design assumptions impossible, and thus any judgment about the realism of the estimated project EIRR is problematic. 9. The base-case project EIRR is subject to fairly typical sensitivity testing (and estimation of switching values), although recourse to probabilistic risk analysis techniques did not occur at design, despite the existence at the time of available software (e.g., @Risk) and formal ADB guidance.5 10. What is somewhat more serious given: (i) the poverty orientation of the project, (ii) the use of the SLA; and (iii) the earlier-quoted poverty headcount and depth figures in the RRP—no use at all is made of distributional analysis nor is any calculation of a poverty impact ratio done, and again, this is despite specific formal guidance being available in the ADB Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of Projects (1997). 11. The lack of clarity in economic pricing, the repetitive references to the economic conversion factors in text, differences in quoted EIRR base-case estimates, and the more serious issues with risk and distribution analyses, collectively give the overall impression of fairly cursory quantitative economic analysis; this is somewhat unfortunate given the fullness of the qualitative impacts’ description and analysis that complements it. 3. Project Impact: Beneficiary Perceptions 12. In late 2010, just before project completion, MOI carried out an assessment of on the project's impact.6 It interviewed 448 respondents (50% of them women) from all 37 project

2 “Unit of account” is both the selected currency and the chosen price level, world or domestic. 3 Para. 52 of Appendix G in the RRP wrongly says “250,000 households”. 4 While not explicit in the text, the project design expectation is therefore that about 450 villages would have such packages (based on output 1's budget of $11.59 million divided by $25,000 per village), and there could be a total of 90 activities*450 villages (= 40,500) model investments. The average expected subproject cost would be about $277. Of the total community livelihood fund, about 60% might be for social infrastructure subprojects on the basis of the typical village investment package. 5 ADB. 2002. Handbook for Integrating Risk Analysis in the Economic Analysis of Projects. Manila. 6 MOI. 2010.Internal Assessment Of Social, Economic And Environmental Impacts. Phnom Penh.

Appendix 8 37

communes to ask their views about the different dimensions of project impact—economic, social, and natural and environmental. 13. The study did not collect original information about the actual benefits of individual CLF subprojects (e.g., based on activity budgets or infrastructure usage surveys) nor did it compare such activities with the types and composition of income-generating and social infrastructure activities envisaged at project design. 14. Nevertheless, the assessment provides useful insight into people's perceptions of project impacts. They are summarized as follows: (i) About 93% of respondents across all provinces felt that their livelihoods were better

than before the CLF subprojects, and nearly 75% of these thought that this was due to the income-generating subprojects, while fewer respondents attributed it to the social infrastructure and community fisheries subprojects.

(ii) There seems to have been a higher level of satisfaction (just under 50% of respondents) with the technology dissemination subprojects (animal husbandry, vegetable production, food processing) than with the infrastructure projects (less than 20%), although this may simply be because technology dissemination benefits are more directly delivered and privately appropriated.

(iii) Nearly all (95%) respondents reported better access to markets, services, technology, and information, and 89% of all respondents reported higher family incomes as a result of this access, while 95% simultaneously reported reduced vulnerability (and reduced outmigration).7

(iv) 87% of respondents felt that the social infrastructure projects had improved health. (v) 95% of respondents reported that female participation in the subprojects had risen

(and over 50% of all participants were reported to be women), and about two-thirds of all respondents said that ethnic and vulnerable groups’ participation in CLF processes had risen.

(vi) Virtually all respondents agreed that the project owner groups (POGs) were a better way of organizing and managing this kind of (income-generating) service delivery than had been the case under previous processes.

(vii) The impact on governance and public service delivery was reported as very positive by the majority of respondents—measures of technical capacity (of commune facilitators) and accountability and compliance (of commune councils) had risen, although less than half (45%) thought that POGs' skills and ability to manage projects had increased.

(viii) Nearly three-quarters of respondents thought that natural resource management had improved (although this varied across provinces more than other reported impacts, with nearly 90% of the sample agreeing in Kampong Thom compared with only 56% in Battambang).

(ix) Nearly half of all respondents thought that the improvement in natural resource management was attributable to better awareness. 90% of respondents felt that CLF subprojects had reduced environmental pressures—and even more (93%) felt that community attitudes and behavior toward the environment had improved—while nearly 50% of respondents overall felt that the reduced pressure was largely due to greater opportunities in animal husbandry and vegetable production, and better awareness of fisheries and forestry laws and regulations.

15. Overall, these survey results clearly indicate very positive perceptions of economic, social, and environmental impacts. Income-generating subprojects were generally reported as having a more immediate and memorable impact on families’ lives; the cattle-raising subprojects in particular were largely successful. 7 Closure of garment factories and border problems with Thailand may also have affected the migration outcome.

38 Appendix 8

16. Perceptions of poor, vulnerable, and ethnic groups’ participation in POGs are notable, as are the perceived improvements in the commune councils' service delivery (and compliance with CFL guidelines) and the “grassroots-level” performance of the commune facilitators. However, while the POGs' capacity had increased to some extent, less than 50% of respondents were confident about their sustainability, and most felt that more strengthening was needed. 17. The interaction of commune councils with central government institutions in managing fisheries resources seems to have been particularly significant. 4. Project Impact at Completion 18. In the absence of any CLF impact monitoring (e.g., enterprise budgets, household returns from various income-generating activities, user surveys of social infrastructure) during project implementation or at project completion (i.e., beyond the beneficiary assessment survey) it is impossible to reasonably re-estimate the project's EIRR. This obviously constrains discussion of project efficiency and impact. 19. However, fieldwork undertaken in late 2011 as part of the project completion report exercise generated partial or anecdotal socioeconomic information about CLF impacts on households and communes from which a qualitative assessment of project economic performance can be inferred. Key points are:

(i) The increase in various types of physical capital assets (e.g., roads, bridges, culverts, drinking water facilities, school rooms, communal offices) is widely reported as substantial, and at least some benefits accrue to all commune members, irrespective of poverty or other socioeconomic status. The benefits of these physical investments are diverse, ranging from direct impacts such as shorter travel times and/or lower expenses to reach produce markets and district or provincial services, to the provision of safety for animals in times of floods. Physical capital stock is also reported as being of generally better quality than under historic Commune Investment Planning processes.

(ii) Social capital has been very positively affected, most directly at individual and household levels, e.g., through the formation of POGs and the self-help approach to enterprise service delivery (including, and perhaps most notably, with respect to the revolving credit funds), but also through improvements in procurement procedures (e.g., greater transparency and better technical monitoring of enterprises and commune councils). More generally, the sheer scale effect of the project has had a profound effect on communal social capital—compared with typical communal investment funds each year, the project's CLF disbursements increased the magnitude of funding by a factor of around 7.8 The availability of this size of funds provides credible incentive to participate in communal planning, because priority projects will actually be funded rather than simply deferred to later years in the absence of that year's Commune Investment Plan funds.

(iii) The financial capital assets of households have profited from numerous income-generating subprojects, but perhaps most successfully from those involving larger ruminants (especially cattle), poultry, and vegetables (including mushrooms). Various group-oriented enterprises have increased their capital base substantially since inception, and have become model enterprises.

(iv) Human capital has been increased in technical terms (e.g., through enterprise-specific or project-based training, and by greater technical monitoring of service provision in social infrastructure and income-generating activities.

8 From around $15,000 a year to about (on average) $100,000 per year per project commune.

Appendix 8 39

(v) The impact on natural capital has been positive, most obviously (to date) in reported increases of fisheries resources as a direct result of the patrolling support to community fisheries. The patrolling (through the supply of boats and equipment, and support for operating costs) has resulted in fewer incidences of artificial habitat creation, use of small-mesh nets, electrification, tree-cutting, poaching, and rearing of illegal species, among others; and Siem Reap and Battambang have reported the return of previously vanished fish species, as well as greater number of birds nesting.

20. Just before project completion, a poverty-ranking exercise conducted in villages from the five project provinces showed that there had been a reduction of the very poor households by 24%, while the percentage of medium well-off and “rich” 9 families had increased by 21% and 49%, respectively. Clearly these findings capture the collective impacts on livelihoods described above.

Table A8.1: Results from Ministry of Interior's Poverty-Ranking Exercise

Province

Before CLF (2008)

After CLF (December 2010)

Poverty Change

Very Poor Poor Med. Rich

Very Poor Poor Med. Rich

Very Poor Poor Med. Rich

KCG: 1 commune, 6 villages 371 320 94 43 252 185 268 126 (119) (135) 174 83PST: 5 communes, 5 villages 211 215 236 20 93 121 439 29 (118) (94) 203 9BTB: 4 communes, 28 villages 1905 3596 2770 306 1506 3799 3041 394 (399) 203 271 88SRP: 1 commune, 1 village 226 226 195 268 (31) 42 0 0KTM: 1 commune 1 village 38 21 11 34 11 25 (4) (10) 14 0

Total 2751 4378 3111 369 2080 4384 3773 549 (671) 6 662 180

Participants in the assessment: 5 provinces, 12 communes, 41 villages (24%) 0% 21% 49%( ) = negative, BTB = Battambang, CLF = community livelihood fund, KCG = Kampong Chhnang, KTM = Kampong Thom, med. = medium, PST: Pursat, SRP = Siem Reap. Source: Ministry of Interior, Government of Cambodia. 21. Various factors have affected the sustainability of returns from social infrastructure and income-generating subprojects to date, most notably the “blue ear disease” that affected pig enterprises (apparent mortality incidence in 2009: about 40%) and more generally the flooding in 2011, which inundated many communes, affecting not only various items of social infrastructure such as laterite roads and bridges, but also destroying numerous household livestock and vegetable enterprises. On the other hand, some enterprises (including certain fisheries) will not have been badly affected. Despite loss of animals to disease and flooding, it is also apparent that many households have acquired the expertise and resilience to continue these activities by reinvesting. There is thus already an implicit reduction in the overall vulnerability of households in project communes. 22. While it is not possible to quantify the project’s role in transforming structures and processes (and project design did not attempt to do so), various features of project implementation have undoubtedly had positive impacts in this regard—e.g., greater rigor and transparency in communal procurement, greater scale and intensity of communal project investment, and physical support to communal operations (e.g., through improvements to commune council offices).

9 The “very poor” are those who are landless, do not own productive assets, and are food-insecure for about

8 months of the year, while the “rich” category includes those who have land of more than 1 hectare, have productive assets, and are fully food-secure.

40 Appendix 9

SUMMARY OF GENDER ISSUES AND IMPACTS

1. Introduction. Women constitute more than half of Cambodia's total population, and many of them are likely to be in marginalized and vulnerable situations, particularly in more remote areas. The Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihoods Project covered 316 rural villages of 37 communes in 5 provinces (Battambang, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Siem Reap), with a population of approximately 287,430 in 54,857 households. Using the official rural poverty incidence of 35% in 2007, about 19,200 households in the project area are likely to be poor. At least 13,500 households are likely to be headed by women. 2. Gender action plan. A gender action plan (GAP) was prepared during project design, including guidance to ensure that women’s needs and the constraints to women’s participation were dealt with. However, the design of the GAP itself was quite generic: no specific targets were set and it was difficult to see the link between the GAP and the project’s DMF. 3. Gender action plan achievements. Table A9.1 presents the GAP achievements in all five provinces. The community livelihood fund (CLF) subproject included 1,412 subprojects with nearly 1.5 million beneficiaries,106 of whom 54% were women. Women participated in subproject activities and their voices were heard at meetings. Husbands allowed their wives to join in the meetings and subproject activities, as demonstrated by one participant in Kampong Chhnang: “My husband and I were very excited when the commune councilor asked us to join this project because we are very poor. My husband allowed me to come to meetings all the time because he always travels far from home to earn money to support the family.”107 4. The assessment of women’s roles and the impact on women’s access to assets is limited by the absence of sex-disaggregated data on households participating in CLF activities. However, discussions with commune councils and community members108 revealed that women were very actively involved in the social infrastructure activities; their participation was in fact higher than that of their male counterparts. The beneficiaries of the income-generating subproject are mostly reported to be women, although actual participation in acquiring new livelihood skills depended largely on location. Those in floating-village areas were more challenged in this regard.

Table A9.1: Gender Action Plan Achievements

Type of Activity

No. of contract awards

Total Cost ($ million) a

No. of beneficiaries b Total Women

Social infrastructure 285 6.49 828,734 54 % Income-generating 843 4.39 135,106 52 % Community fisheries 284 1.02 506,982 53 %Total 1,412 11.90 1,470,822 54 %

a This does not include Commune project management costs of 3-4%. b Some beneficiaries benefitted from more than one activity, thus the total number of beneficiaries are seen well over

the total population of the target areas. Source(s): Ministry of Interior, Government of Cambodia. 5. Women’s participation. The project set up project owner group (POG) committees, and developed regulations to promote women's participation. This was coordinated by the commune

106 Some beneficiaries received benefits from more than one CLF subproject. 107 Focus group discussion in Traperng Chan, Borbo district, Kampong Chhnang province during the project completion

review field mission. 108 Discussion in O’taporng commune, Pursat province during the project completion review field mission.

Appendix 9 41

councilors and the commune facilitators during the group formation stage. Members elected the POG committee chief, deputy chief, and treasurer. Each POG committee consisted of 3–10 people. Of the total of 4,235 POG committee members in the five target provinces, 1,081 were women; of these, 313 were chiefs, 451 deputy chiefs, and 317 treasurers. Women make up 15% of commune council members in the 37 target communes. 6. In delivering services to their local citizens as well as developing their respective localities, commune/sangkat councils are required to prepare a development plan and an annual investment program. Each commune has a planning and budgeting committee (CPBC), which is responsible for organizing the village planning meeting. The CPBCs have a 5-year mandate and could serve as an entry point for gender analysis in various sectors and for gender-responsive budgeting in the commune/sangkat development plan. In theory, two members of the CPCB are villagers, one male and one female. In practice, not all communes have active CPBCs, nor is there always a female member. There is considerable geographic variation in this regard—e.g., in Battambang province, of 11 female commune councilors across 8 communes, 8 are members of the CPBC; whereas in Pursat province, of 52 CPBC members overall, only 4 are female. 7. Women’s participation in project management was better at the provincial level than at the national level. Nationally, 2 out of 8 staff were women. In the provinces, within the project implementing units (PIUs) or Community Livelihood Facilitation Teams (CLFTs), 10 out of 33 staff were women. In each PIU or CLFT, one female staff from the provincial Department of Women’s Affairs was assigned to coordinate gender issues in communes and villages. Of a total of 72 commune facilitators, 22 were women. Commune facilitators are required to cover fairly large areas and very often travel to remote areas, even staying overnight sometimes, so it is difficult for women to do this job effectively for security and safety reasons, or because their families and family duties may not allow it. Therefore, relatively few women applied for this job during project implementation. 8. In 2008–2010, the project consultants, coordinated and assisted by the executing agency, provided a series of trainings, including gender training, to the CLFTs, commune facilitators, and commune councilors as well as POG leaders or representatives. By the end of the project, about 14,600 persons had attended the training sessions, of which 4,500 were women. Gender training was provided to 2,216 persons (1,136 of them women).

Table A9.2: Women’s Participation in Project Activities

Item

Total Trainees

No. of Women

Percentage of Women

Commune Facilitators 72 22 31% Community Livelihood Facilitation Team

33 10 30%

National Project staff 8 2 25% Project Owner Group Committee member

4,235 1,081 26% Chief Deputy

Chief Treasury

313 451 317 All Project Training 14,600 4,500 39% Gender Training 2,216 1,136 51% Source: Ministry of Interior, Government of Cambodia.

42 Appendix 9

9. Project impact. Gender impact analysis is limited by the absence of sex-disaggregated data and baseline information for each output. The CLF subprojects provided substantial benefits to villagers in all five provinces by improving their livelihoods and giving them better access to social services, and also contributed to a better social status. Women had opportunities to directly benefit from the project, such as receiving income from community asset creation, attending vocational training sessions, and receiving financial support for income-generating activities. The project made a large contribution to the poor and disadvantaged groups in the communities, women heads of households, women from families with disabled members, and specific types of households headed by men.109 However, it seems that many women beneficiaries faced difficulty in acquiring and applying new technical skills because their education is limited.110 A discussion of results by output follows below. Output 1: Supporting Community-Driven Development 10. Social infrastructure subprojects. There were 285 CLF–social infrastructure subprojects with about 0.83 million beneficiaries, 54% of them women. Community road construction, and new school buildings and teacher dormitories have made it easier for children to go to school (and teachers to be assigned). The project has thus contributed to reducing school dropout rates for both boys and girls.111 The rural road construction subprojects have contributed to, or at the very least diversified household income, especially for female headed households through wages from their participation in construction work as laborers. The construction of commune healthcare buildings in floating and remote communes such as Peam Bang in Kampong Thom province provided villagers with better access to healthcare services and reduced their expenditure on transportation. Informal market construction subprojects helped the villagers from the surrounding communes to sell their vegetables or handicrafts.112 11. Income-generating subprojects. There were 843 CLF–income-generating subprojects with about 0.14 million beneficiaries, 52% of whom were women. The skills transferred by these subprojects have helped villagers produce such items as prahok (fish paste), fish sauce, scarf (krama), baskets and other handicrafts, a good means of diversifying women’s livelihoods. Women also have better knowledge of how to manage savings groups and credit, grow vegetables, run small businesses, and raise livestock. As one of the beneficiaries indicated, “after learning the skill of making fish paste (prahok), we can earn income from selling our products. We know how to make a nice package for our product in order to attract buyers and we can sell at a better price than before.”113 The savings groups were established in all villages in all the 37 target communes by beneficiaries of the income-generating activities, which built community resilience and sustainability of these activities. Being members of savings groups allows women to borrow money for their household purposes and their livelihood development needs at a very low interest rate compared with that charged by conventional moneylenders. Boats were provided to members of floating villages to help them sell vegetables or process food. One boat recipient said: “The new boat that I received from the project has greatly reduced my family burden because I can use it to transport the fish and prahok for selling. Sometimes my neighbors ask us for a ride when we go to buy fish for processing or go to the upland.”114 109 Discussion with Provincial Women’s Affairs in Kampong Chhnang. 110 Focus group discussion with 15 women beneficiaries where only 5 women had basic literacy skills (Trapang Chan,

Borabo district, Kampong Chhnang province.) 111 Information provided by the chief of Pralay Meas commune, Kampong Chhnang province. 112 Market construction to help sell the villagers' products was informal. There are no records of either a committee or of

the number of participants and the share of women. 113 From a focus group discussion during the final review mission in Chung Khneas commune, Siem Reap province. 114 A walk-in interview with Ms. Seng Sery, Kompong Loung commune, Battambang province.

Appendix 9 43

12. Community fisheries subprojects. There were 284 CLF–community fisheries subproject benefiting about 0.51 million people, 53% of them women. The subproject provided boats to community fisheries committees to assist in transportation for committee purposes. The boats also helped villagers transport their children free of charge to distant schools. In the case of Prai Chas commune in Battambang province, children have to travel about 8 kilometers by boat to their school in Bakprea village. Before the project-funded supply of boats, few children had gone to school because of the distance and lack of transportation. Output 3: Building Skills and Awareness for Sustainable Livelihoods 13. A series of training sessions, including gender training, for project staff, CLFTs, commune councils, and POGs improved their facilitation skills. The training included, but was not limited to, report writing skills; project management skills, including planning and facilitation; training of trainers; household selection methods; self-help groups; marketing information; and gender sensitization. The CLFTs, commune councils, and POGs then conducted provincial and communal training sessions on topics such as market information, the concept of community organizing and savings, and gender sensitization. The CLFTs (gender focal points) and commune facilitators asserted that gender training helped improve their understanding of concepts and issues related to gender and livelihoods. However, this training was provided rather late115 because in recent years there had been extensive training on gender awareness and gender equity concerns for national and provincial government staff,116 and the project management team attempted to avoid potential replication (until requested to do by the review mission). Had such training been provided earlier, however, it might have improved implementation and monitoring of the gender action plan, and therefore monitoring of the gender impact. Implementation Challenges and Lessons Learned 14. Implementation challenges. In each of the five project provinces, staff from the respective provincial departments of women’s affairs were assigned as CLFTs and gender focal points. Their role was to assess gender issues and achievements (including formulating subproposals to be included in the CLF, ensuring that these proposals met needs, but that no extra burden was imposed, such as having to coordinate and monitor women’s community meetings).117 However, these staff members were not fully responsible for gender mainstreaming.118 A similar concern was raised during a 2009 review of selected GAPs in Cambodia—that staff did not fully understand their roles and responsibilities as the “gender person” within their official CLFT role. These people had attended some training provided by their Ministry, and so were aware of gender issues, but had very little time or knowledge to actually apply their skills to developing a gender awareness cascade or training for others (their CLFT role took up all their time). At the national level, the project did not assign a gender focal point. The 2009 GAP review also found that GAPs and gender issues were not seen as a priority by the majority of project staff at all levels: Asian Development Bank, consultant teams, implementing nongovernment organizations, and concerned ministries. Overall, GAP implementation was partially satisfactory. 16. Lessons learned. Earlier and more comprehensive training for the CLFTs and commune facilitators (especially on gender sensitization), and for POGs (especially project management skills) would have brought better gender results. Recommendations for the future include: 115 Discussion during the project completion review field mission: Gender training was provided nationally in October

2010 and followed by cascade training in the provinces and (through commune facilitators) in the communes. 116 As part of the work of National Committee for Sub-national Democratic Development. 117 B. Chrishna, 2009. Assessing the implementation of three Project Gender Action Plans. Manila: Asian Development

Bank. 118 Meeting with Provincial Women’s Affairs, Pursat province, during the project completion review field visit.

44 Appendix 9

(i) Institutional arrangements should clearly assign gender focal points at various levels:

from project management down to those actually implementing the project in the field, with specific tasks and roles adequately defined to ensure implementation of the GAP.

(ii) Sex-disaggregated beneficiary data needs to be an integral part of all project monitoring and evaluation. Better monitoring and evaluation training and support should be considered for qualitative data on changes in behavior, traditional practices, and perceptions related to gender roles.

(i) Orientation on gender issues related to livelihoods should be given as early as possible, i.e., when projects start, with methodologies that are appropriate for the targeted attendants. Moreover, training inventory lists need to be developed and updated every quarter.

(ii) GAPs should be developed in a simple format, and targets and indicators need to be proposed in line with the project’s design and monitoring framework.

(iii) The GAP implementation status should be regularly updated through quarterly and annual project monitoring reports.

(iv) Basic-literacy training must be provided to the female beneficiaries so that they are able to acquire and apply new technical skills effectively. Moreover, Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials with a simple text and picture are the most appropriate tool for illiterate people to understand new concepts and technical skills. Also, a peer educator is considered the most effective person to work with marginalized and vulnerable beneficiaries, because they are inclined to listen to their community people more closely than to those who look senior to them.

(v) Project documents and records that attest to the achievement of women's empowerment and other gender action goals (including contribution to inclusive growth and poverty reduction) during project implementation need to be strengthened and improved.