Participation of Actors in Land Consolidation Activities

in Bulgaria

Violeta DirimanovaBulgariaIDARI

Structure of proposal

• Purpose of the study

• Background information for the problem

• Theoretical background

• Theoretical framework

• Possible propositions

• Methodology

The problem

• Agricultural reform in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation

• Fragmentation in ownership and land use

• The government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to solve the problem

Purpose of the study

To propose institutional options for land consolidation on the basis of analyses of land transactions, the actors’ behavior and institutional settings

• Current situation and formal legislation

• Actors’ behavior

• Land transactions

• Institutional options

• Evaluation of the effects

Objectives of study

Background of the problem

1. Agrarian reform and land fragmentation

2. Land fragmentation and farm’s structure

3. Discussed solution to the problem

Agrarian reform and land fragmentation

• Land reform started in the beginning of 1990

• Liquidation of the old cooperatives

• Reallocation of the land to original owners or their inheritors

• 1.8 million landowners

• Half of farms are less then 2 ha

Farm’s structure and land fragmentation

Fragmentation in ownership• Many inheritors on a single plot • Equal shares to all of them• Land to landless families

Fragmentation in land use• Many small and self-sufficient farms (73% of

the total number and 7.5% of the land)• Large farms (0.2% of the total number, 66.7%

of the land)

Solutions to the land fragmentation problem in the literature

Fragmentation in ownership• Land market (buy/sell)

• Land tax

• Land credit market

Fragmentation in land use• Land market (lease/rent)

• Voluntary/Compulsory land consolidation

• Establishment a State Land Bank

Theoretical backgroundThe importance of institutions

• Institutions are humanly devised formal (law, property rights, etc) and informal (custom, traditions, etc) constraints that regulates political, economic and social interactions. (North, 1991 and 1994)

• Four levels of social analysis: social embeddedness level, institutional environment, institutions of governance and marginal analysis. (Williamson, 1998)

Theoretical backgroundThe importance of institutions

• Theoretical framework for analyzing the institution related to natural resources. This framework conceptualize the relationship between the properties of transactions, characteristics of actors, property rights and governance structure. (Hagedorn, 2001)

Theoretical framework

TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO NATURE

COMPONENTS

BASICFACTORS

LOCAL SOCIAL ARENA

INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

TRANSITION PROCESS

RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS

FRAME CONDITIONS

ACTORS

PROPERTY RIGHT SYSTEM

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

TRANSACTIONS OTHER FACTORS

EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM

INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS -

INNOVATION

OTHER OPTIONS

Modified from: (Hagedorn 2002); (Sikor and Hagedorn 2000); CEESA project

Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case

•Basic factorsFrame conditions: low income level, high

unemployment

Transition process: land reform, unpredictability

Resource characteristics: spatial location, multiple use, different quality

Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case

•Local social arenaLandownersSmall farmersNew cooperatives Large farmersLocal state authoritiesGovernment

Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case

Governance structure Market - Buy/Sell; Rent/Lease

Hierarchy (governmental agencies) - land conversion,

environmental control

Cooperation - voluntary actions for land consolidation

Property rights

Private property rights on land

Inheritance law

Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case

Land transactions

Buying/Selling land

Renting

Leasing

Division of the land between users

Interchange of land between landowners

•Effects on production and ecosystemLow productivity

Land degradation

Land abandonment

Proposition and research hypotheses

Main proposition: Agricultural reform has led to land fragmentation and the land transactions further deepened the problem.

Sub-proposition 1: Agricultural reform, low income level, and the specific land characteristic form actors’ behavior.

Sub-proposition 2: The actors’ behavior has created the existing institutional settings.

Sub-proposition 3: The established institutional settings determinate the nature of transaction among the actors.

Sub-proposition 4: Land transactions cause deeper land fragmentation

What Institutional Options?

• Land Market

• Land Tax

• Compulsory/Voluntary consolidation

• Cooperation

Methodology of analysis

• Legislation and literature• Qualitative method - semi-structural

interviews with actors

• Social network method

• Quantitative method

Proposed survey’s region

Thank you very much for your attention!