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The affect structure revisited 1

The affect structure revisited

Véronique Elefant-Yanni and Maria-Pia Victoria-Feser1

University of Geneva

1 Both author acknowledge the support of the Swiss national Science Foudation, grant no PP001—106465.




Abstract

In affective psychology, there is a persistent controversy about the number, the nature and the

definition of the affect structure dimensions. Responding to the methodological criticisms

addressed to the preceding studies, we conciliated the principal theories regarding the affect

structure with the same experimental setting. In particular, using the semantic items all

around the circumplex we found three bipolar independent dimensions and using only the

PANAS semantic items, we found two unipolar dimensions. Finally, we propose a heuristic

theorization of affect based on a current firmly established in social sciences, coherent from

semantics to sociology, but largely ignored by researchers in affective psychology , that

allows to postulate that affect is all at once cognition, motivation and behaviour.




Introduction

Over the last years a long debate took place regarding the affect structure. The affect

is the momentary feeling a person has at any time that is induced by the situation as a whole,

including internal and external stimuli. It has to be distinguished from mood and emotion

which are affective phenomena of another nature. The affect structure is commonly described

by means of different dimensions such as valence or evaluation, activation, tension or

potency. These dimensions are either evaluated on a continuum (bipolar dimension) or

separated into a positive and negative directions (unipolar dimension). There is however a

current controversy about the number, the nature and the definition of the affect structure

dimensions. If a consensus was recently established (Feldman-Barrett & Russell 1998,

Watson & Tellegen 1999) to recognize a two-dimensional circumplex affect structure

between the two principal currents of research carried out on the one hand by Russell

(Russell 1980) and on the other hand by Watson (Watson & Tellegen 1985), they still

disagree on the uni- or bipolarity and the nature of the two dimensions. Since several authors

claim that the underlying reason for the existence of this controversy lies in the

methodological aspects of the research plans, the aim will then be to highlight the various

difficulties in implementing research on affect structure, and provide a complete study that

will show that depending on the experimental plan, the analysis results will support with the

same statistical method one or another of the leading theories. In addition, a persisting

alternative current of research postulates an affect structure with three correlated dimensions

(Sjösberg, Svensson & Persson 1979). Lastly, a current firmly established in social sciences,

coherent from semantics to sociology, supports an affect structure with three independent and

bipolar dimensions. The results of the present research are perfectly integrated in this current,

generally ignored by researchers in affective psychology, and allow to postulate that affect is

all at once cognition, motivation and behavior.




The first studies regarding the affect structure took place by means of introspections

and were made by Wundt, Stumpf and Titchener (see Reisenzein 1992, Reisenzein &

Schonpflug 1992). They focused on the bipolar dimension of valence (pleasure/displeasure)

that they thought to be the base of the conscience. On the other hand, Cannon (1927)

emphasizes the activation dimension (see also Lindsley 1951, Hebb 1955, Duffy 1957,

Berlyne 1960, Schachter & Singer 1962, Zillman 1983, Mandler 1984, Thayer 1989, 1996).

From these two first currents a third approach was born that includes two independent,

bipolar and of same magnitude dimensions of valence and activation (Russell 1978, 1980,

Lang 1978, 1994, Larsen & Diener 1992, Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1992, Bradley 1994).

According to these authors, the valence and activation dimensions define a circumplex on

which all affects can be represented (see also Schlosberg 1952). This representation takes

over the circumplex semantic representation for two of the three dimensions of connotative

meaning (i.e. evaluation and activity) found by Osgood to underlie language (Osgood & Suci

1955, Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957, Osgood 1966, Osgood, May and Miron 1975).

Nevertheless the bipolarity hypothesis of the valence was disputed by the hypothesis of

unipolarity (Nowlis & Nowlis 1956, Bradburn 1969, Bradburn & Caplovitz 1965).

Researches on mood scales seem to confirm this unipolarity hypothesis (Borgatta 1961,

McNair & Lorr 1964, Thayer 1967, Warr, Barter & Brownridge 1983, Watson & Tellegen

1985). However, Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) pointed out that an important part of the

literature regarding the unipolarity had developed because experiments were based on the

PANAS (Positive And Negative Affect Schedule, Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988). PANAS

is a questionnaire that measures the affective experiences by means of 20 semantic items

chosen to correspond to a high degree of activation and pleasure, and to a high degree of

activation and displeasure (Watson & Tellengen 1985). Actually, the resulting circumplex

model based on the PANAS has the two orthogonal dimensions of Positive Affect (PA) and




Negative Affect (NA), and it should be specified that for the authors “these two factors have

been characterized as “descriptively bipolar but affectively unipolar dimensions” (Zevon &

Tellegen 1982, p. 112) to emphasize that only the high end of each dimension represents a

state of emotional arousal (or high affect), whereas the low end of each factor is most clearly

and strongly defined by terms reflecting a relative absence of affective involvement…”

(Watson & Tellegen 1985, p. 221). However, while some authors accumulate evidence in

favour of unipolarity (Tellengen 1985, Mayer & Gaschke 1988, Meyer & Shack 1989, Morris

1989, Watson & Clark 1997), others defend the bipolarity (Russell & Mehrabian 1977, Lorr

& Wunderlich 1980, Lorr & McNair 1982, Russell & Steiger 1982, Diener & Emmons 1984,

Larsen & Diener 1992, Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988, Russell 1989, Lang, Greenwald,

Bradley & Hamm 1993, Reisenzein 1994, Feldman 1995). As when rotated of 45° the PA

and NA factors correspond to the valence and activation dimensions of Russell’s circumplex

model, Watson and Tellegen “suggest a simpler explanation, namely that the extent of their

relations varies with the terms used to construct the Positive and Negative Affect measures”

(1985, p. 233). If their “parsimonious” model corresponded to the true affect structure than

the choice of more indicators representing more affects facets by the use of the entire

semantic circumplex should lead to the same dimensional affect structure. In the present case,

it will be showed however that the too restrictive choice of semantic items consists of a

methodological bias. Watson and Clark (1994) have more recently proposed the PANAS-X

which expanded the first version of PANAS and used 60 semantic terms to assess specific

emotions or enduring affective states.

On the other hand, some researchers in the psychology of personality domain proposed

an affect model with three slightly correlated dimensions (Sjösberg, Svensson & Persson

1979, Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain 1990, Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz & Eid 1994,

Schimmak & Grob 2000). For example, Matthews, Jones and Chamberlain found the three




dimensions as being pleasant-unpleasant (valence), energetic arousal and tense arousal.

Energetic arousal contrasts feelings of vigour and energy with tiredness and fatigue and can

be considered as an activation dimension, whereas tense arousal contrasts tension and

nervousness with relaxation and calmness and can be associated to a tension or potency

dimension. The resulting model is different from Russell’s model not only because one

dimension has been added, but also because the valence is correlated with the activation

dimension. Wundt (1896) already postulated an affect model with three dimensions pleasant-

unpleasant, low-high activated and tense-relaxed and Thayer (1978) showed that participants

were able to subjectively discriminate energetic arousal and tense arousal. It should be noted

that the research on affect structure in the psychology of personality is relatively recent and

needs to be distinguished from the numerous studies on the structure of personality,

personality trait and mood which concerns the enduring dispositions of the participants. For

long the “Gigantic three” dimensions of Eysenck’s model of personality (1991, neuroticism,

extraversion, psychoticism) dominated, but recently a consensus has been achieved about a

five independent dimensions model of which most known is Costa and McCrae’s “Big Five”

model of personality (1992, neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness,

conscientiousness). In both theoretical frameworks, the associations between neuroticism,

extraversion, and bad mood, good mood are highlighted by various authors (Watson & Clark

1992, Tellegen 1985, Emmons & Diener 1986, Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988, Thayer

1989, Williams 1989, Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain 1990, Costa & McCrae 1992) and

tend to accredit that for mood the negative and positive dimensions are indeed unipolar and

independent.

In another domain, the three dimensions of valence, activation and tension have been

considered for a long time now. In linguistics, Osgood and colleagues (Osgood & Suci 1955,

Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957) have developed “semantic differential” bipolar scales




based on semantic opposites such as good/bad, strong/week, active/passive and so on, in

order to measure the attitude of participants regarding symbolic concepts represented by

words. These authors were interested in the connotative meanings of words as apposed to

their denotative meanings. The denotative usage gives to things represented by words their

essential and objective meanings as in dictionaries. On the other hand, the connotative usage

presents things enriched by their affective associations which, though intangible, are

nonetheless real. These authors highlight a semantic structure based on the three dimensions

of Evaluation, Potency and Activity, known as EPA. Osgood has presented convincing

evidence that this simple structure is a universal characteristic of human thinking and is

exhibited by all of the cultural groups and languages (Osgood 1960, Osgood, May & Miron

1975). It should be noted that semantic differential scales actually measure the connotative

meaning of symbolic concepts by examining how people "feel" about, that is by measuring

their induced affects.

Largely inspired by Osgood's cross-cultural research, Heise (1979) created his Affect

Control Theory (ACT). The ACT postulates that all individuals evolving in any situation

evaluate the situation according to the affective meanings of all its elements, which,

combined, produce a global impression that gives a meaning to the situation. This last

meaning is transient since the affective meanings of the situation elements change while the

situation progresses. The meaning of the situation is compared by the individual to the

expected sentiment that his social group attributes to that situation (Heise 1966). Usual

situations produce transient impressions that match expected sentiments, whereas situations

that generate impressions deviating widely from those sentiments seem abnormal (Heise &

MacKinnon 1987). According to the ACT, people manage situations so as to match transient

impressions with their expected sentiments and to maintain normality in their experiences.

For Heise (1979), since affects reflect the impressions that the situation in progress generates,




they are a way of directly sensing the kinds of social identities people are taking, the

operative social structure in the situation and also a way of sensing in which direction the

situation is evolving according to its expected sentiment. Given the central importance of

affect in his theory, it was quite naturally that Heise got interested in the controversy about

the affect structure (Morgan & Heise 1988), but none of his results conformed to a

circumplex model of affect structure. On the contrary, his results highlighted that the affects

"array themselves naturally in a three-dimensional space involving evaluation, activation and

potency" (p. 27). He concluded that "the affective dimensions correspond to basic mental

processes […] and that much of people's cognitive information concerning emotions is

generated within the dimensional framework" (p. 29).

Therefore, since the different models of affect structure disagree on the number of

dimensions, their bipolar or unipolar nature, their definitions, and since the methodology to

unveil them differ sometimes substantially, we investigate the different experimental plans

used until now and analyze in this paper the important aspects on which they differ, their

potential influence on the empirical construction of the affect structure which has led to the

present controversy.

Important aspects of the experimental plan

Type of affective phenomena

Many authors view the distinction pleasant-unpleasant (i.e. valence dimension) as the

primary criteria that discriminates affective states in self-reported affective experiences

(Wundt 1896, 1906, Ortony & al. 1988, Schimmack & Reizenzein 1997, Shaver & al. 1987).

When we ask people to answer about their mood or more globally about how they feel on a




relatively long period of time, they aggregate momentary feelings in their minds (Thomas &

Diener 1990, Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds & Totterdell 1995, Schimmack & Reisenzein

1997, Reisenzein & Schimmack 1999). As valence is the salient criteria of discrimination,

they differentiate the global amount of “pleasant state” from the global amount of

“unpleasant state”, and evaluate simultaneously how good they felt as well as how bad they

felt at the precise moment when they are asked. If time is given to recall information from the

episodic memory, participants are surely able to remember a bad or good feeling at a “special

moment” in which they were globally in a good or bad mood. The contrast with our mood in

background is precisely why those moments are specially remembered. This pattern of

outcome has led to the view that affective states are supported by two orthogonal unipolar

dimensions, namely positive affect and negative affect (Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988).

However a participant will deny being able to be at the same time cheerful and sad, because

in that case, no confusion is made about the moment at which the feeling occurs, i.e. at

exactly the same point in time (Diener & Emmons 1984, Zautra, Potter & Reich 1997,

Russell 2003). Since by definition affective experiences are temporary states that change

from moment to moment, the main problem in determining these states resides in the

definition of “moment”. There is an agreement to differentiate trait affect and state affect, in

that a distinction is made between mood and emotion as in common language (Diener & Iran-

Nejad 1986, Reisenzein & Schönpflug 1992, Fridja 1993, Clore & al. 1994). However for the

valence dimension in affect structure, we must first address the questions of the duration and

definition of the different affective states. No consensual taxonomy has been reached until

now, and a good share of the debate is due to the difficulty in distinguishing clearly between

various types of affective phenomena (Scherer 2000). We propose here to consider three of

them, namely emotion, mood, and affect.




The emotion consists of a relatively short episode of synchronized response by several

or all subsystems of the organism at a time of evaluation of an external or internal event

having a major importance for the participant. Emotions are, for example, anger, sadness, joy,

fear, shame, pride, exaltation, despair. Regarding emotion, the principal discussion between

researchers is about the changes in different modalities that are necessary and sufficient

components of an emotional episode. There is a consensus on the "reactional triad" of the

emotion that is supposed to be composed at least of physiological activation, motor

expression (vocal, facial and body) and participative feeling. Some authors also include

motivation and cognitive evaluation (Buck 1985, 1993, Frijda 1986, 1987, Scherer 1984 a &

b, 1993). Although we still often speak about "emotional state" suggesting a relative stability

in time, the authors seem to consider an emotion as a process implying fast changes in the

duration of an episode.

The affect consists of an elementary process accessible to conscience in terms of

valence, activation and tension (Wundt 1896, Thayer 1978). It corresponds, for a part, to the

component of the subjective experience of emotion (Scherer 1993, Russell 2003), but it is not

necessarily directed by a precise event and in course of time it is always present, fluctuating

for reasons we are not always aware of, like for instance weather, circadian cycle (Thayer

1989, Watson, Wiese, Vaidya & Tellegen 1999). The affect varies in intensity throughout the

day, it is particularly salient when its degree of activation is rather low or high into positive or

negative, but with an average degree of activation it has tendency to disappear in the back of

our consciousness. Perhaps also it remains generally unconscious because it exists first and

mainly at the present time to which we do not have access. And it is only by a work of self-

listening that we get aware of what we just felt. For example, it is this affective phenomenon

that is in question when with the alarm clock one feels depressed, tired, or merry. The affect

is also called activation by Thayer (1986), felt, feeling, sentiments or emotions by other




authors. It is difficult to be consistent in the denomination because the various authors use the

same terms to indicate affective phenomena of different nature.

Although sometimes also mistaken as affect, the mood is distinguished from affect by

its duration and the fact that it can be without apparent cause (Russell & Feldman Barrett

1999). It consists of an affective diffuse state of relatively low intensity that acts as a

background on which are played the fluctuations of affect. Thus a participant can be basically

happy but for example feels temporarily sad with the listening of a melancholic melody. It is

this affective phenomenon that is in question in mood disorder, for example dysthymia,

characterised by a lack of enjoyment/pleasure in life that continues for at least six months

(APA, DSM-IV 1994).

Hence, in experimental plans, when studying affect structure, it is crucial that the

participants receive clear instructions about what type of affective phenomena they should

describe. Indeed, we observed that the participants use the semantic scales in ways suggesting

they have frames of reference based upon a lifetime of making such judgments about what

they feel. However, mood has undoubtedly an impact on the coloration and intensity of

affects, and therefore they are difficult to discriminate. If the period during which the

participant has to evaluate what he/she feels is long, the participant could be tempted to retain

only what showed invariant over this period and to answer according to his mood rather than

according to his affect. On the other hand, the participant could answer according to his

different affects that followed one another by melting them together. Diener and Emmons

(1984) thus concluded that the valence dimension was bipolar when it was examined in a

short period of time, but that positive and negative affects seemed independent when they

were examined over an extended time period (Warr & al. 1983, Gotlib & Meyer 1986).

Therefore, a suitable way to distinguish between mood, emotion and affect, is to create a




situation in which the participant is placed and his affective experience is immediately

recorded. This is what we will do in our experimental plan.

Choice of semantic items

The hypothesis of bipolarity comes mainly from the semantic representation of items

relating to affect. The concepts of joy and sadness appear to us like bipolar opposites

primarily because merry and sad are regarded as antonyms. The semantic differentiation

studies of Osgood (1969) as well as the interlinguistic comparisons (Russell, Lewicka & Niit

1989, Russell 1991) support the hypothesis of bipolarity. To test this assumption empirically,

it is thus initially necessary to specify a model that is bipolar, i.e. selected semantic items

must be antonyms or at least be semantically interpreted as bipolar opposites. However, all

terms related to positive affects are not bipolar opposites of each term related to negative

affects. Thus we regard sad as opposite to merry rather than tense, and tense as opposed to

relax rather than sad. The terms can have between them more complex degrees of relation

than only antonym, synonym or independent. The operationalization of affect bipolarity has

to go through the selection of terms that are bipolar opposites on valence but also on

activation as we now have a consensus that it constitutes a second independent dimension

(Bush 1973, Averill 1975, Neufeld 1975, 1976, Russell 1978, Whissell 1981, Thayer 1989).

It is also necessary to ensure that the selected terms adequately come from the entire range of

pleasant or unpleasant affects descriptors. Otherwise, the retained semantic items would not

be representative of the entire affect structure, and consequently bipolarity could artificially

not be represented. Currently, a majority of authors recognize a semantic representation of

items related to affect under the form of a circular structure (circumplex structure) in which

the horizontal diameter corresponds to the bipolar dimension of valence and the vertical




diameter corresponds to the bipolar dimension of activation. The semantic items are placed

on the circle according to theirs scores in valence and activation obtained on the basis of

empirical research (Russell & Feldman Barrett 1999). The antonyms are then diametrically

opposite. More generally, bipolar opposites are theoretically separated by angles of 180°,

whereas synonyms are angularly very close. The number of clusters of semantic items that

we can define is arbitrary, but it is important to note that choosing to work with items from

some sections rather than the whole circumference can lead to an affect structure that is

specific to the selected items.

By selecting a cluster of items without selecting items that are diametrically opposed

on the circumplex structure, we exclude the semantic items that are the bipolar opposites. By

doing so, the bipolarity we seek to test is excluded. Therefore several authors questioned the

use of the PANAS as able to adequately measure affects (Morris 1989, Larsen & Diener

1992, Green & Al. 1993, Nemanick & Munz 1994, Carver 1996). Indeed, Watson and his

colleagues chose their positive semantic items according to a theoretical dimension defined

by high degree of activation and pleasure, and their negative semantic items according to a

theoretical dimension defined by high degree of activation and displeasure. Since the

semantic items are not opposed on activation, the resulting model excludes in fact bipolarity.

Watson’s clusters correspond to two adjacent quadrants in the circumplex where positive

items are mirrored into their negative counterparts compared to valence dimension. Therefore

it is not surprising that Watson found correlations close to zero between what he had named

"positive affect" and "negative affect". In our research we will supplement the PANAS

semantic items to include all the bipolar opposites so as to cover the entire range of activation

of positive and negative affects.




The affect space

The choice of semantic items is not the unique issue in setting an experiment plan that

is able to uncover the affect structure. But, it may give an idea of the hierarchical bond

between affect space and semantic space in which participants draw to formulate their

answers based on introspection of what they felt. Indeed, the semantic items are used by

participants to describe what they just felt but are not pure inner feelings states in that they

only reflect some particular aspects of an affective experience (Feldman 1995). Therefore, in

order to unveil the affect structure, one must have a substantial number of different situations

inducing different affects (observations) from the entire affect space. In the literature,

experiments on self-reported affect experiences often ignore to take into account the

variability of the situations inducing the different affects, by for example asking the

participants to remember a personal situation. Although in these situations one could expect

to have a large enough spectrum of different affects, it is well know that the experimental

condition itself will influence the participant in his choice of affect (Tulving & Thomson

1973, Golden & Baddeley 1975, Tulving 1979, Baddeley 1982, Tulving 1983), and since the

experimental condition is the same for all participants, there is a doubt that all the reported

affects reflect the entire affect space. The consequence is that the unveiled affect structure

can be biased in the direction of fewer dimensions. To ensure that the observations reflect the

entire affect space, the participants must be put into a given situation and the set of all

situations must potentially produce all kinds of affects. This can be done using for example

the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1995) as we will

develop it later.




The response format

To measure each semantic item one can use different scales, bipolar and unipolar

ones. In the first case, the graduated scale has at its ends one semantic item of the bipolar

opposites pair and in its medium the neutral point (zero). In the second case, the two semantic

items of the bipolar opposites pair are measured separately on two graduated scales having

each one a neutral point (zero) for the situations where the participants consider the

corresponding item not relevant to qualify their affects. Between these two formats, there is a

whole range of rather bipolar or rather unipolar ambiguous scales. Since Russell and Carroll

(1999) showed that in these ambiguous cases participants subjectively rebuild unipolar scales

in bipolar scales, it is essential to measure semantic items in strictly unipolar scales in order

not to force bipolarity artificially.

Measurement errors

Another potential source of bias in the evaluation of affect structure is the

measurement error due to the participant’s response styles on likert scales, a longstanding

methodological concern (Bentler 1969). Using multitrait-multimethod analyses on repeated

measurements, several authors concluded that there is little if not no difference in the

estimated affect structure compared to the one unveiled when using single measurement per

participant (see e.g. Green & al. 1999). Watson and Clark (1997) and Russell and Carroll

(1999) reached the same conclusion in a different manner. Moreover, it can be argued that

even if there exists a source of variability due to the participant’s response style, there is also

a confounded variability due to the type of affect induced by the situation (for example a

picture). The participants will especially respond differently according to the unicity of their




own background, i.e. describe different affects when presented with the same situation.

Judgment of a particular stimulus on a series of semantic scales is really a comparative

judgment against a multitude of previous stumuli scales allocations. Although it is not easily

measurable, it is reasonable to suppose that this second source of variability is much larger

than the one induced by response style, and since it is confounded with the variability of the

affect itself, i.e. the observation, it shouldn’t bias the results.

In summary, the experimental plan has to pay a detailed attention so that the

investigated affective phenomenon is clearly definite for the participants, their affective

experiences are immediately recorded, the indicators represent the whole circumference of

the semantic circumplex and include the semantic bipolar opposites to allow to test the

bipolarity of affect dimensions, the variability of the induced affects is sufficient to highlight

the affect structure, and finally the graduated scales are strictly unipolar not to force

bipolarity artificially. Those important methodological aspects taken care of, we can now

operationalize the question about the number, nature and definition of the affect structure

dimensions.

Method

Population

A total population of 162 women (age 18-56, mean 24.3) participated in this research.

Most of them (128) were second year students in the section of psychology enrolled for

course credit. The remaining women responded to an advertisement and participated on a

voluntary basis. We did not retain male participants to avoid an increase of variability due to

the difference in response between gender when the affect is induced by pictures (Lang,




Bradley & Cuthbert 1995). The front page of the questionnaire collected various information

on the participants that was also used to form a code and identify participants while

preserving their anonymity (more details on the sample upon request to the authors).

Material

We use a series of 604 pictures elaborated and digitized by the Center for the Study of

Emotion and Attention of the University of Florida (1995). This series of pictures is known

under the name of International Affective Picture System (IAPS) and was already largely

used in studies on affect (see e.g. Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm 1993, Spence, Shapiro

& Zaidel 1996, Vanman, Boehmelt, Dawson & Schell 1996). The various pictures were

subjectively evaluated in term of valence, activation and of control by the participants of

Lang (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1995). We chose 162 pairs of pictures that are close on their

rating on valence as well as on activation. The chosen pairs are distributed on the whole

space so that affects induced by the pictures are varied., i.e. spread over the entire latent

space. We also chose one pair and a picture that are used respectively as trial pictures and as

final picture after the experimental pictures.

Experimental plan

Each participant was submitted to the experiment twice, at a week of interval. One of

the time chosen randomly, the participant had to respond on strictly unipolar likert scales, the

other time on strictly unipolar continuous scales. The aim was to investigate if the type of

scale (likert or continuous) had an influence in the estimation of the affect structure. Each

time, the participant had to describe her affects induced by 4 pictures (scenes): the trial




picture, two experimental pictures and the final picture. The two experimental pictures (2nd

and 3rd

scenes) were different between the two times, but belong to the same pairs, i.e. they

are matched on valence and activation as given in the IAPS. The choice of the pairs and the

order of the pictures within the pair and between the times were chosen randomly. We chose

to use two experimental pairs of pictures in order to control for the possible variability due to

the style of response and/or the interaction between the participant and the induced affect. In

order to have enough pairs, we “roled them over” the participants, in that the second

experimental pair of the ith participant was used as the first experimental pair for the (i+1)th

participant. Soon after the participant has seen a picture for 10 seconds (time calibrated on the

basis of a preliminary study), she was asked to evaluate her affect using a questionnaire

containing various semantic items presented in the following paragraph.

Semantic indicators

As there is not a consensual list of semantic items, we constructed one by taking care

that the entire circumplex structure is represented and that each item has its bipolar opposite.

We started with semantic items that have been used in similar studies. We also included the

semantic items of the PANAS and for each one we added, if necessary, its bipolar opposite

on valence and on activation. Once the list of the semantic items in English was built, it was

translated by four researchers using this time the antonyms and synonyms in French

according to the method of back-translation (see Appendix). The French translation of the

PANAS items used in our research were mainly taken from Lapierre, Gaudreau & Cableway

(1999). The resulting list includes twenty semantic pairs of bipolar opposites terms that we

presented on a circumplex structure on Figure 1. In the questionnaire, the two semantic items

of the same pair of bipolar opposites were presented on the same line side-by-side in order to




prevent the participants to rebuild subjectively unipolar scales in bipolar scales (Russell &

Carroll, 1999). The presentation of the items was controlled to avoid a positive or a negative

coloration of the questionnaire.

Results

Data analysis method

With the data collected on the likert scales, we estimated polychoric correlations

matrices (Olsson 1979) as input for an exploratory factor analysis. We used two different

software and methods that are in some sense equivalent (see Jöreskog 2003) to estimate the

factor loadings. In LISREL 8.54 (Jöreskog & Sörbom 2003), more specifically in PRELIS

2.54, we carried out exploratory factor analysis using the estimation method MINRES

(MINinmum RESiduals) that was first introduced by Harman (1960) and is based on the

direct minimization of least squares to fit a matrix of factor loadings to the correlation matrix.

The MINRES method can be used with small samples even when the number of variables is

large and when the correlation matrix is not positive definite as it might be the case with

polychoric correlation matrix. In M plus 3.0 (Muthén & Muthén 1998-2004), we used the

ULS method (Unweighted Least Squares) of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1977) which is based on

eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the reduced correlation matrix. Again, the ULS method is

known to work well with relatively small samples even when the number of variables is

large. We note that we used exploratory factor analysis since not only our aim is to determine

the number of dimensions, but also because structure theory postulates that all the manifest

variables saturate on all the latent factors and therefore constrained loadings to a value of

zero has no theoretical support.




To determine the number of dimensions, we used the eigenvalues of the estimated

correlations matrices. Again the difference in the affect structure models could be due to

methodological preferences, as most researchers use the eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion

to determine the number of factors while at the same time others found that this criterion can

underestimate or overestimate the number of factors (Horn 1965, Cattell & Jaspers 1967,

Browne 1968, Linn 1968, Lee & Comrey 1979, Revell & Rocklin 1979, Yeomans & Golder

1982). In our analysis, we considered both the percentage of explained variance (at least

60%) and also the criteria provided by parallel analysis (Horn 1965). The later method

compares the eigenvalues obtained from uncorrelated variables by simulation to the ones

obtained with the sample, so that one can find eigenvalues “significantly” higher than one

found randomly with uncorrelated variables. Zwick and Velicer (1986) showed in a

comparison study that parallel analysis provided always the best solution.

It should be noted that we didn’t use the data collected on the continuous scales to

estimated the affect structure since preliminary descriptive analyses showed that for all

scenes, the distributions of all the variables (semantic items) were far from the necessary

normality assumption and could not be corrected neither by a robust method, nor by a

transformation. The possible explanation concerns the structural problem of a use of

continuous scale. Indeed, since participants are used to likert scales, they seem to use

continuous scales as likert ones, with the important consequence that most responses were set

to the minimal value (zero). The responses can be seen as dichotomized between a value of

zero and another positive value. Since the hypothesis of normality was not respected, we

could neither carry out a factor analysis, nor calculate correlation coefficients.




Affect structure

Our analyses are consistent across software, methods and datasets (different experimental

scenes), so that from now on we report the analyses made using M plus on the 2nd

scene. First

we retained three factors, i.e. three dimensions, on the basis of the parallel analysis and

contrasted eigenvalues. It should be noted that this criterion is known to be more accurate

than the criterion “eigenvalues greater than one” used by most authors (Russel 1980, Watson

& Tellegen 1985). These three factors explain 67.28% of the total variance (2 factors explain

only 57.74%).

The exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) lead to three (independent)

factors that can be interpreted as activation-tension (Factor 1), valence (Factor 2) and

activation-energy (Factor 3). In Table 1 are presented the factor loadings given by pairs of

opposites for the three factors, as well as the uniqueness that can be used to evaluate how

well the factorial structure explains the different semantic items. Some socially stigmatized

negative semantic items show a relatively bigger uniqueness (guilty, bored, resigned,

inattentive, ashamed, hostile), and generally negative semantic items have a slightly bigger

uniqueness than their positive counterparts. This could be explained by the “Pollyanna

effect”, which consists of a human tendency, showed stronger among women, to use positive

semantic items in an evaluative context, as for personal judgments, more frequently, easily

and diversely than negative semantic items (Boucher & Osgood 1969, Warr 1971, Matlin &

Gawron, 1979, Osgood & Hoosain 1983). Consequently, the tendency to avoid brain

processing for the negative semantic items (Matlin & Stang, 1978) results in a part of

variance that cannot be explained by the three factors and could artificially make believe to

the necessity of more explanatory variables, particularly for those that have strongly marked

taboo value in French as in English (Armstrong & Hogg 2002). In addition, some semantic




items resulting correctly from the back-translation seemed to have a different usage in French

than in English. Thus the French terms corresponding to strong, determined, inspired and

resigned were objects of question from the participants, who, while seeming to know the

adjectives, appeared perplexed when asked to use them to qualify what they just felt, with

again for consequence relatively important uniqueness and loadings deviating from what

could be expected. However, without those particular cases, the uniqueness of the semantic

items are quite satisfactory (from pleased .104 to dull .449 with an average of .292)

highlighting that the variables are globally well explained by the three-dimensional structure.

For the loadings also there are some exceptions that primarily correspond to cases in which

the loadings are very small and could be considered as not significantly different from zero,

but most of the semantic items have loadings of opposite signs that their bipolar opposites on

the three dimensions.

Although the results of the factor analysis already show that the hypothesis of

bipolarity can not be rejected, we nevertheless examine the polychoric correlations of the

opposite semantic items in Table 2. Except for the pair determined/scared and very low

correlations for inspired/worried and resigned/hopeful, which indicate again that the usage of

those semantic items is culturally marked, all correlations are negative from medium to high

(from -.315 to -.674, with an average of -.534) accrediting the bipolarity.

To summarize this first stage, responding to the criticisms addressed to the precedent

studies, the innovation of this research lies in the particular care taken to the experimental

plan and the statistical analysis method which allows us to unveil three independent and

bipolar dimensions, namely activation-tension, valence and activation-energy. In what

follows, we will strengthen this finding with the choice of the semantic items.




Bipolarity

As argued in the introduction, Watson’s analyses showed that the affect structure is

two-dimensional with a positive affect (PA) and a negative affect (NA) dimensions because

the items were chosen without their opposites. We reproduce here the experiment by

performing the same factor analysis as before, but with only the items of the PANAS. The

parallel analysis lead us to two dimensions (64.80% of explained variance) and the

exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) indicates that these factors can indeed be

interpreted as NA (Factor 1) and PA (Factor 2). As expected, the items with a rather negative

connotation (like afraid, scared, ashamed, guilty, distressed, etc.) have high loadings on the

NA factor and the others have high loading on the PA factor. There is a cultural exception,

which could not be avoided by a correct back-translation, with the semantic item excited (in

French “agité”) because it has a negative connotation in French whereas excited has a

positive connotation in English. The factor loadings along with the uniqueness are presented

in Table 5. Our results thus confirm that the unipolarity found by Watson can be attributed to

an artefact of the experimental plan.

Since one could argue that the unipolarity found by Watson can be only due to the

smaller number of items (20 instead of 40), we performed the following analysis. We retain

as semantic indicators only every second pair along the circumference of the circumplex and

thus obtain 2 groups A and B of 10 pairs of bipolar opposites with which we replicate the

same statistical analysis. For both the parallel analysis retained three factors, i.e. three

dimensions. These three factors explain 64.98% for group A and 75.52% for group B of the

total variance (2 factors explain only 55.31% and 64.99% respectively). The exploratory

factor analysis (with varimax rotation) lead to three (independent) factors that can be

interpreted as activation-tension (Factor 2 or 1), valence (Factor 1 or 2) and activation-energy




(Factor 3). In Tables 3 and 4 are presented the factor loadings given by pairs of opposites for

the three factors, as well as the uniqueness to evaluate how well the factorial structure

explains the different semantic items of the groups A and B. As previously, we observe

bigger uniqueness for negative semantic items due to the “Pollyanna effect” and for the same

socially stigmatized terms, but again most variables are well explained by the three

dimensional structure (from pleased .072 to dull .507 with an average of .294). With the same

exceptions that we saw before, the majority of the semantic items have again loadings of

opposite signs that their bipolar opposites on the three dimensions. Thus, with twenty or ten

pairs of bipolar opposites chosen from the whole circumference of the semantic circumplex,

the results highlight the same affect structure based on three independent and bipolar

dimensions. This was not the case when the items were chosen without their bipolar

opposites.

Interpretation and theoretical extensions

It is interesting to note that the three independent and bipolar dimensional affect

structure model was already highlighted by Russell and Mehrabian (1974, 1977) using an

exploratory approach. They postulated “that the three dimensions of pleasure-displeasure,

arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness are both necessary and sufficient to

describe a large variety of emotional states” (p. 291). Although they qualified the affective

phenomena as emotional states, we believe that they correspond to affects as we have defined

them, since they described the affective phenomena through “a person is viewed as being in

some emotional state at all times, a state that can be described as a region within a three

dimensional space” and ““emotion” does not merely include occasional passionate states” (p.

274). They recognized (see also Mehrabian 1972a & b, Mehrabian & Ksionzky 1974) that the






view is that the independent bipolar three dimensional model of affect structure is more

consistent because it results from an exploratory step, is conceived without theoretical a

priori, and while being parsimonious it takes into account the three necessary and sufficient

dimensions on which we are able to subjectively evaluate any temporary affective state.

The three-dimensional structure has also been defended by Sjösberg, Swensson &

Persson (1979), Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain (1990), Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz &

Eid (1994) and Schimmack & Grob (2000), but with correlated dimensions (oblique rotation).

However, in our analyses the correlations between valence and activation-tension is relatively

small (-.228) as well as the one between valence and activation-energy (-.110). The

possibility of correlation between dimensions was mainly introduced for goodness-of-fit

reasons rather than for theoretical reasons (Schimmack & Grob 2000). From a psychometric

point of view, a model with orthogonal dimensions seems preferable. For example diurnal

rhythms studies demonstrate that activation-energy follows a circadian rhythm but not

activation-tension or valence (Thayer 1989, Watson & al. 1999).

In fact, the affect model we estimate is in agreement with Heise's affect model (1988)

based on the three dimensions of Evaluation, Potency and Activation. This last model was

developed upon Osgood semantic model and one may legitimately wonder if the three

dimensional model is not simply the semantic structure model inducted by the semantic

items. If this were the case, then all studies using most of the semantic items (not only those

of the PANAS), should always find a three dimensional structure. This is not the case, since

we have seen that when the affective phenomenon is the mood, the structure is two-

dimensional (Bradburn 1969, Warr 1978, Lorr & Shea 1979, Zevon & Tellegen 1982, Warr,

Barter & Brownbridge 1983, Diener & Emmons 1984, Diener & Iran-Nejad 1986, Diener

1994).






The affective dimensions and the psychological processes associated with those

dimensions provide an extremely efficient way of people to assimilate knowledge

about social life. After learning basic social categories, distributional constraints on

categories, and sentiments associated with each category, people can generate

automatically a wide range of social expectations. Only the core of social knowledge is

learned piecemeal; the rest is assembled as needed in various circumstances. Thus the

affective dimensions are central in the social psychological sense. (Morgan & Heise,

1988, p. 30)

Affective meaning can be seen as a metalanguage that translates the social status, power and

expressivity in more fundamental psychological dimensions of evaluation, potency and

activity (Parsons & Shils 1951, Kemper 1978, 1987). "Classifications of places, peoples,

objects and behaviours get transformed into a domain of feelings, where they lose their

qualitative uniqueness, become comparable to one another, and begin obeying quantitative

principles" (Heise 1987, p. 6). The relation between social structure and psychological

processes isolates something basic to the structuring of human judgments.

Whether it refers to affective, subjective or connotative meaning, essentially the same

phenomenon is being considered, which from the psychological point of view can be

formulated within the general framework of perception and learning. Affects are the primary

mode of apprehending the environment, of appraisal of the present situation in regard of the

coping resources at hand (Frijda, 1993, p. 384), that could correspond to the Evaluation

dimension. As affective dimensions correspond to basic mental processes that account for our

knowledge of the world, people's cognitive information is generated within the three-

dimensional framework which can then be found in all the domains (Mehrabian 1980).

Affects account for availability or unavailability of coping resources in a given situation

(Morris 1992) or the individual's trust in them (Moms, 1992), that could correspond to the




Potency dimension. But in the process, they are also at the origin of increased readiness or

lowered thresholds for consonant responses vis-à-vis the situation in progress or in the

eventuality of an expected event in this situation, that could correspond to the Activation

dimension. Viewed in this way, the three affective dimensions allow to postulate that affect is

all at once cognition, motivation and behavior.

Conclusion

In this paper, through the analysis of real data issued from an appropriate

experimental plan and data analysis method, we show that the affect structure has three

independent dimensions, namely activation-tension, valence and activation-energy. This

three-dimensional structure was already uncovered by several researchers (Bush 1973,

Averill 1975, Russell & Mehrabian 1977, Morgan & Heise 1988). In order to give validity to

our results, we paid special attention to the experimental plan which across studies on this

subject, can vary quite substantially. First, it was important to specify what is really intended

by affect, especially its difference from mood which, as several studies have shown, has not

the same structure as affect. Second, the choice of the semantic items is crucial, since we

have shown that choosing the ones in the PANAS only, lead to a two-dimensional structure

with a PA and a NA dimensions. Third, the statistical criteria chosen to determine the number

of dimensions can also play an important role, in that when it is based on the number of

eigenvalues greater than one, two dimensions are found (Russell 1980, Watson & Tellegen

1985) while when using parallel analysis, three dimensions are suitable.

We postulate that these three independent and bipolar dimensions of the affect

structure model highlighted by our results correspond to the human primary modalities to

apprehend our material and social environment. We believe that these dimensions correspond




to the Evaluation, Potency and Activation dimensions of Osgood’s mediation theory of

meaning where they play the role of a common logical structure of all human beings, prior

and independent of the language, in the cognitive processes. Those same dimensions are also

at the basis of Heise’s Affect Control Theory in which as a metalanguage they translate

everything in our environment: objects, persons, behaviors in comparable affective quanta

used by a on-going monitoring judgment process which makes us assimilate knowledge about

our social and material environment, directs our response and makes us behave accordingly.

That expression of the three affective dimensions allows to postulate that affect is all at once

cognition, motivation and behavior.

Admittedly more than a consensual taxonomy, it still remains much to conceptualize,

the particular nature of affects and their place relatively to other concepts, the type of

connection between affect and mood, affect and emotion, emotion and mood, mood and

personality, but the theorization that we propose in this article based on affect takes into

account a large panel of domains and offers a promising structural framework to affect

psychology.




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Appendix

The following table shows the correspondence between the English and French semantic

items, by opposite pairs and according to their orientation on valence and activation

dimensions.

English French

valence+ valence - valence+ valence -

activation+ activation- activation+ activation-

alert* sleepy alerte somnolent

active* dull éveillé engourdi

elated depressed exalté déprimé

enthusiastic* lethargic enthousiaste léthargique

hopeful resigned optimiste résigné

cheerful sad joyeux triste

proud* guilty* fier coupable

inspired* worried inspiré soucieux

attentive* inattentive attentif distrait

interested* bored intéressé ennuyé

activation- activation+ activation- activation+

strong* afraid* impassible craintif

determined* scared* déterminé effrayé

confident ashamed* confiant honteux

pleased distressed* content désespéré

friendly hostile* amical hostile

peaceful irritable* paisible irritable

relaxed nervous* détendu nerveux

satisfied upset* satisfait fâché

calm excited* calme agité

serene jittery* serein anxieux

*indicates semantic items of the PANAS




Authors Note

This research is supported by grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation

(FNRS 610-057883.99 and PP001-106465). We would like to thank Susanne Kaiser, Michael

Eid and Grazia Ceschi for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Véronique Elefant-

Yanni, Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve 40, 1205

Geneva, Switzerland, or Rue de Monthoux 38, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. E-mail:

[email protected]




Footnotes

1The denotative usage gives to the thing represented by the word its essential and objective

meaning.2

The connotative usage presents the thing enriched by affective associations which, though

intangible, are nonetheless real.3Wilhelm von Humboldt 1767-1835

4Edward Sapir 1884-1936 & Benjamin Lee Whorf 1897-1941




Table 1

Mplus: Varimax factor loadings estimated with ULS

Mplus EFA 3F LP2bis: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS(RMSR=0.0663)

Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness

interested 0.126 0.665 -0.378 0.399

bored 0.144 -0.278 0.476 0.676

afraid 0.856 -0.068 -0.231 0.209

strong -0.346 -0.186 0.525 0.570

inattentive -0.208 0.081 0.599 0.592

attentive 0.600 0.367 -0.383 0.359

determined 0.585 0.504 -0.121 0.389

scared 0.886 -0.173 -0.206 0.142

inspired 0.108 0.750 -0.192 0.389

worried 0.889 -0.145 -0.080 0.182

ashamed 0.549 -0.372 -0.062 0.557

confident -0.268 0.735 0.270 0.314

guilty 0.400 -0.241 -0.225 0.731

proud 0.030 0.769 0.018 0.407

pleased -0.380 0.864 -0.065 0.104

distressed 0.799 -0.357 -0.001 0.234

cheerful -0.378 0.852 -0.016 0.131

sad 0.748 -0.286 0.026 0.358

hostile 0.606 -0.358 -0.003 0.504




friendly -0.269 0.744 0.001 0.375

resigned 0.577 0.031 0.179 0.634

hopeful -0.176 0.829 0.045 0.280

peaceful -0.455 0.539 0.424 0.323

irritable 0.727 -0.335 0.131 0.341

enthusiastic -0.231 0.868 -0.112 0.180

lethargic 0.262 -0.100 0.790 0.297

nervous 0.815 -0.111 -0.225 0.273

relaxed -0.465 0.666 0.265 0.270

depressed 0.713 -0.225 0.218 0.393

elated -0.096 0.759 -0.214 0.369

satisfied -0.362 0.863 -0.001 0.124

upset 0.792 -0.423 0.014 0.193

active 0.343 0.584 -0.408 0.375

dull -0.080 0.031 0.737 0.449

excited 0.708 0.084 -0.311 0.395

calm -0.447 0.389 0.491 0.407

sleepy -0.078 0.039 0.868 0.239

alert 0.541 0.380 -0.393 0.408

serene -0.327 0.715 0.356 0.255

jittery 0.778 -0.179 -0.294 0.276




Table 2

Polychoric correlations for the opposite semantic items

LP2bis

Items Polychoric

interested, bored -0.519

afraid, strong -0.435

inattentive, attentive -0.538

determined, scared 0.408

inspired, worried -0.025

ashamed, confident -0.564

guilty, proud -0.177

pleased, distressed -0.663

cheerful, sad -0.606

hostile, friendly -0.67

resigned, hopeful -0.042

peaceful, irritable -0.523

enthousiastic, lethargic -0.22

nervous, relaxed -0.591

depressed, elated -0.315

satisfied, upset -0.674

active, dull -0.394

excited, calm -0.616

sleepy, alert -0.429

serene, jittery -0.591




Table 3


Mplus EFA 3F LP2bisVA: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS

(RMSR=0.0739) Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness

afraid 0.179 0.785 -0.343 0.234

strong 0.075 -0.217 0.590 0.599

inattentive -0.127 -0.050 0.635 0.578

attentive -0.230 0.483 -0.507 0.457

ashamed 0.519 0.496 -0.129 0.467

confident -0.843 -0.152 0.228 0.214

guilty 0.336 0.356 -0.267 0.689

proud -0.789 0.081 -0.116 0.358

hostile 0.430 0.550 -0.080 0.506

friendly -0.786 -0.158 0.010 0.357

resigned 0.024 0.598 0.100 0.632

hopeful -0.849 -0.068 0.016 0.274

nervous 0.184 0.806 -0.325 0.210

relaxed -0.710 -0.354 0.273 0.295

depressed 0.264 0.665 0.073 0.482

elated -0.722 -0.063 -0.292 0.390

excited 0.017 0.721 -0.371 0.343

calm -0.448 -0.358 0.486 0.434

sleepy -0.069 0.041 0.848 0.275

alert -0.308 0.509 -0.504 0.393




Table4


Mplus EFA 3F LP2bisVB: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS

(RMSR=0.0529) Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness

interested 0.017 0.778 -0.305 0.301

bored 0.148 -0.326 0.449 0.670

determined 0.469 0.629 0.016 0.385

scared 0.926 0.047 -0.062 0.137

inspired -0.037 0.810 -0.116 0.329

worried 0.918 0.064 0.031 0.153

pleased -0.582 0.767 -0.031 0.072

distressed 0.858 -0.172 0.062 0.231

cheerful -0.575 0.742 0.008 0.119

sad 0.788 -0.117 0.076 0.360

peaceful -0.634 0.350 0.346 0.355

irritable 0.728 -0.176 0.207 0.396

enthusiastic -0.440 0.793 -0.051 0.176

lethargic 0.167 -0.117 0.839 0.255

satisfied -0.573 0.745 0.023 0.116

upset 0.844 -0.244 0.106 0.217

active 0.243 0.655 -0.302 0.420

dull -0.134 -0.050 0.687 0.507

serene -0.520 0.568 0.351 0.284

jittery 0.806 0.010 -0.195 0.312




Table 5


Mplus EFA 2F LP2W: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS

(RMSR=0.0777). Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness

interested -0.131 0.803 0.338

afraid 0.829 0.371 0.175

strong -0.286 -0.465 0.702

attentive 0.397 0.704 0.347

determined 0.297 0.647 0.493

scared 0.875 0.292 0.149

inspired -0.201 0.728 0.430

ashamed 0.654 -0.102 0.562

guilty 0.510 -0.012 0.740

proud -0.307 0.600 0.546

distressed 0.812 0.007 0.340

hostile 0.731 -0.093 0.457

irritable 0.801 -0.114 0.346

enthousiastic -0.555 0.679 0.231

nervous 0.829 0.269 0.241

upset 0.897 -0.099 0.185

active 0.122 0.770 0.392

excited 0.657 0.404 0.405

alert 0.385 0.673 0.398

jittery 0.804 0.271 0.280




Figure Captions

Figure 1. Circumplex of semantic items according to valence and activation




Figure 1

activation+alertactive

elatedenthousiastic

hopeful

cheerful

proud

inspired

attentive

interested

valence+

strong

determined

confident

pleased

friendly

peaceful

relaxedsatisfied

calmsereneactivation-

sleepydulldepressed

lethargic

resigned

sad

guilty

worried

inattentive

bored

valence -

afraid

scared

ashamed

distressed

hostile

irritable

nervousupset

excitedjittery

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