Cf. Edmund Arens, "Dramatische Erlösungslehre aus der Perspektive einer theologi­schen Handlungstheorie," in Dramatische Erlösungslehre: Ein Symposion, ed. by 1.Niewiadomski and W. Palaver (Innsbruck: Tyrolia 1992), 176.

2 Cf. Helmut Dubiel, Ungewißheit und Politik (FrankfurtJM.: Suhrkamp, 1994),29-66;Ulrich Rödel, Günter Frankenberg, and Helmut Dubiel, Die demokratische Frage:Ein &say (FrankfurtJM.: Suhrkamp, 1989).

3 Like Arendt, Schmitt, however, very seldom talks about violence. According to JulienFreund, Schmitt's concept ofthe political- the distinction between friend and enemy- is linked to power, not to violence. Cf. Julien Freund, "Der Partisan oder der krie­gerische Friede," in Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt, ed. by H. Quaritsch(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 390. In Schmitt's private notes, however, wecan find an aphorism that refers to foundational violence: "Baseline of thinking: fromchaos to cosmos; from the state of nature to the state; in the transition, however, al­ways the brute, who causes the transition, Hercules, who kills the monsters und re­mains as the last monster." See Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufteichnungen der Jahre1947-1951, edited by E. v. Medern (Berlin: Duncker & Hum~lo~}~,lJ. ~9 (notefrom June 18,1949).

Mimetic theory with its emphasis on foundational violence as a structu­ring principle of human culture, politics and institutions immediatelycauses uneasiness among many thinkers in the German speaking world.Girard's theory sounds too much like Carl Schmitt's thinking.1 Is there apolitical theory that challenges the claim of mimetic theory regardingfoundational violence?

Surely no Marxist approach is currently achallenge. At least after thefall of the Berlin wall, Marxism or socialism seems to be no real optionin political theory anymore. Many political thinkers - especially on theleft - have now chosen Hannah Arendt's political theory as a startingpoint. Arendt is seen as an antithesis to Thomas Hobbes and CarlSchmitt.2 Especially her distinction between power and violence is em­phasized for this reason. Whereas Hobbes's and Schmitt's concepts ofpolitics are closely linked to violence, Arendt's theory seems to havefully separated politics from violence.3 Interpreted in this way, Arendt'stheory challenges the major assumptions of mimetic theory regardingfoundational violence. In her book On Revolution, she even explicitly re­jects all theories that maintain a crime or a violent deed like the murder

1. Hannah Arendt's Distinction between Power and Violence

167

4 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, reprint 1990), 20,38,209.

5 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brave & World, 1970),35.6 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

91974),200. Cf. idem,Revoluiton, 175; Violence, 44.7 Arendt, Violence, 46 ..

Hannah Arendt' s concept of power is opposed to the traditional identifi­cation of power and violence, wh ich is typical of political thinkers on theright and on the left. Arendt, for example, criticized both Max Weber,who defined the state as "the rule of men over men based on the means

of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate, violence," and Leon Trotsky,who said that "every state is based on violence."5

Arendt's concept of power allows no identification with violence."Power is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearancebetween acting and speaking men, in existence ... , Power springs up be­tween men when they act together and vanishes the moment they dis­perse."6 Power is rooted in a communicative action. According to Arendt,it is totally different from violence, which belongs to the realm of instru­mental action or to the realm of work. Whereas power depends on the

number of persons who act together, violence depends on tools. "Vio­lence ... is distinguished by its instrumental character. Phenomenologi­cally, it is close to strength, since the implements of violence, like allother tools, are designed and used for the purpose of multiplying naturalstrength until, in the last stage of their development, they can substitutefor it."7 According to Arendt, power and violence are not identical, butcontrasting: "Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules ab­solutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopar­dy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance. This im­plies that it is not correct to think of the opposite of violence as nonvio­lence; to speak of nonviolent power is actually redundant. Violence can

of Abel or the murder of Remus as the beginning of every political orga­nization.4

Contrary to these current interpretations, my thesis says that Arendt' stheory cannot really overcome the problem of foundational violence.Traces of foundational violence are present in Arendt's work. Arendt iscloser to Schmitt than it is generally assumed. Arendt's theory cannotreally exclude violence from politics. Politics and its relation to violenceremains a difficult problem.

W. Palaver, Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy

\

Akademie Verlag

Wolfgang Palaver

Fouodatiooal Violence andBaooab Arendt's Political Pbilosopby

paragrana 4 (1995)2,166-176

8 Ibid.,56.9 Arendt, Condition, 26.

10 Ibid., 12.11 Arendt, Revolution, 12.12 Arendt, Condition, 228. In the Gennan version ofthis book, Arendt clearly emphasi­

zed the difference between the Roman idea of foundation and modern &lorificationsof revolutionary violence. See Hannah Arendt, Vita activa oder, Vf1~~t"." Leben(München: Piper, 1981),223. Cf. idem, Revolution, 207-210. ;. '''~li!\9I'i..tbs1:':'

destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it."8 Arendt's contra­sting of power and violence leads her to the rejection of both Weber'sand Trotsky' s thesis claiming that the state is essentially characterized byviolence. It is not violence, but power that belongs to the nature of thestate.

Beside her theoretical reflection on the opposition of power and vio-lence, Arendt also refers to historical examples to prove her thesis thatpolitical power is ultimately independent of violence. In her seminalphilosophical book The Human Condition, she deals with the reality ofthe Greek polis and the philosophy of Aristotle in order to prove her the­sis. According to Arendt, "to be political, to live in a polis, meant thateverything was decided through words and persuasion and not throughforce and violence."9 In Aristotle's philosophy, politics denotes action

(praxis) and not work which is linked with violence.lO Arendt believ~sthat the nonviolent character of politics in the ancient Greek polis is al~oconfirmed "by the Athenian custom of 'persuading' those who had beencondemned to death to commit suicide by drinking the hemlock cup, thus

sparing the Athenian citizen under all circumstances the indignity ofphysical violation." 11

Arendt observed an essential difference between political power andviolence also in Roman history. She particularly focused on the Romanidea of foundation, which has nothing to do with the glorification ofviolence in many revolutions of the modem age.12 Arendt explicitly re­jects all indications that the legend of Romulus, who killed his brotherRemus, is central to the Roman idea of foundation. She instead refers toVirgil's Aeneid, according to which Rome is the resurgence of Troy. InArendt's opinion, violence is only a marginal phenomenon in Virgil'shistory of the foundation of Rome that ultimately helped to create fri­endship and peace between neighboring peoples.

Tbe American Revolution is Arendt' s most important example todemonstrate the contrast between power and violence. She emphasizesthe difference between this revolution and others in the modem age. Ac­cording to Arendt, the idea of foundation, wh ich is at the center of theAmerican Revolution, is characterized by communicative power, whe­reas the French Revolution was an unsuccessful use of violence to create

169W. Palaver, Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy

a new state.13 It is not the American Revolution, but rather the FrenchRevolution that is an example ofthe old tradition offratricide (Cain slewAbel, Romulus slew Remus), according to which every "political organi­zation ... has its origin in crime."14

Arendt's criticism of the identification of power and violence IS Im­portant. Tbe so-called velvet revolutions in Central- and Eastem Europehave clearly shown that communicative power can overwhelm violence.In the end, politics cannot rely solelyon violence and military power;politics needs the consent of the people. Nevertheless, we should not tooeasily accept Arendt's distinction between power and violence. Arendt'spolitical philosophy - like Aristotle's political philosophy and the Tho­mistic tradition of the Catholic Church - tends to the view that powerand politics are basically unproblematic and good.

An Augustinian perspective on power and politics, however, questi­ons Arendt's basic assumption. In his book De civitate Dei, Augustinecontrasted the city of God (civitas Dei), which is characterized by truepeace, unlimited justice and love, with the city of man (civitas terrena),in which peace and justice are limited and in which coercive power andviolence play an important role.15 According to Augustine, the murderersCain and Romulus are founders of the city of man.16 The foundation ofRome was a violent deed. The civitas terrena is marked by a violent po­wer over others - the libido dominandi,17

Augustine's view that every political power on earth is ultimatelyrooted in violence, which means that political power is structured byviolence, was indirectly confirmed by thinkers like Walter Benjamin18

2. Rene Girard's Foundational Violence

13 Arendt, Condition, 228; idem, Revolution, 174-176.14 Arendt, Revolution, 20. Cf. ibid., 208 f. The Gennan text of this book explicitly men­

tions the French Revolution: Hannah Arendt, Über die Revolution (München: Piper,

31986), 268.15 Cf. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford:

Basil BlackwellI990), 389-392.16 Augustine De civ. XV. I, XV.5.17 Augustine De civ. I. Preface. Cf. Milbank, Theology, 390.18 See Walter Benjamin's article "Critique ofViolence" (published in 1921) in W. Ben­

jamin, Rejlections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. by E. Jeph­cott, edited and with an Introduction by P. Demetz (New York: Schocken Books,1978), 277-300. Benjamin's criticism of lawmaking violence indirectly challengesArendt's distinction betwcen 'power and violence. According to Benjamin, "lawrna­king is power makiDa, md. to tha1 cxtent, an immediate manifestation of violence"(295).

Paragrana 4 (1995)2168

It is, therefore, not surprising that Arendt did not inc1ude this artic1e in the firstEnglish selection ofBenjamin's work, which she published in 1968. Cf. Anselm Ha­verkamp, "Kritik der Gewalt und die Möglichkeit von Gerechtigkeit: Benjamin in De­construction," in Gewalt und Gerechtigkeit: Derrida - Be'!iamin, ed. by A. Haver­kamp (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1994),30, 40f.

19 Sigmund Freud, Studienausgabe. Band IX: Fragen der Gesellschaft: Ursprünge derReligion (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 51989), 225 ("Das Unbehagen in der Kul­tur"; 1930); 276f. ("Warum Krieg"; 1932).

20 For a short introduction into Girard's theory, see Wolfgang Palaver, "A GirardianReading of Schmitt's Political Theology," Telos, No. 93 (Fall 1992): 47-51.

21 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. by P. Gregory (Baltimore: The lohnsHopkins University Press, 51986), 120, 299-306; idem, Things Hidden siru:e the Foun­dation of the World: Research undertalam in collaboration with J.-Al. Ovghourliananti G. Lefort, trans. by S. Bann and M. Metteer (Stanford: Stanford Unhersity Press,1987), SI-S7. "

and Sigmund Freud19 at the beginning of this century. Today, Rene Gi­rard's mimetic theory comes closest to Augustine's position.20

According to Girard, all human culture is rooted in the scapegoatmechanism. The scapegoat mechanism is an unconscious and collectiveviolent deed (murder or expulsion) of a group of human beings againstone of its members. It is the overcoming of a threatening crisis caused bymimetic rivalry. The scapegoat mechanism means that the crisis is sol­ved in a non-conscious and veiled way. The violent lynch mob does not

experience its own deed as the killing or expelling of a relatively in­nocent victim, but as a religious event. The expelled or killed scapegoatis seen by the lynchers in two ways. He is blamed for the crisis and, as anabsolute evil, must be expelled. Hut the sudden peace and the reconcilia­tion among the lynchers is also attributed to the scapegoat. He or she isseen as both absolutely evil and absolutely good. This strange experienceof badness and goodness at the same time is the primitive religious expe­rience. The victim is sacralized and deified. He or she becomes a god. Ac­

cording to Girard, the scapegoat mechanism is the origin of religion and,therefore, also of culture. Girard explicitly shows that the institution ofmonarchy, the idea of sovereignty, the whole idea of central authorityand political power in general are rooted in the scapegoat mechanism.21The main purpose of religion and culture is to keep direct and open vio­lence with the help of structural violence in check. Religion veils thearbitrariness of the scapegoat mechanism as the foundation of a cultureand therefore helps to prevent another outbreak of the war of all againstall.

The scapegoat mechanism transforms the violent war of all againstall into structural violence. Aeschylus's tragedy Eumenides, the third partof the Oresteia, is an interesting example of this transformation, which

The unanimous hatred of the city is directed against enemies outside tlcity and against those inside the city who do not obey the law and thel'lfore have to be expelled.24

17

helps to criticize Arendt's interpretation of ancient politics.22 The EumEnides describe the overcoming of the violent system of blood feud byless violent legal system. The revengeful and violent Erinys are transfolmed into the gentle and fruitful Eumenides. It seems that violence h~fully disappeared from the city. This, however, is only superficially trulOpen violence, in the sense of revenge, has been transformed into a fonof structural violence that helps to create peace inside the city, but can tused against foreign enemies and internal trouble-makers at any timAeschylus describes this transformation precisely. The pacified Eumendes promise that common love and unanimous hatred will overcomcivil war.23

22 Cf. Rene Girard, Job: The Victim of His People, trans. by Y. Freccero (Stanford: Staford University Press, 1987), 146-153; Christian Meier, Die Entstehung des Polischen bei den Griechen (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 144-246.

23 Aeschylus Eumenides 977-987, quoted in Girard, Job, 1;48. According to Gira(ibid., 148) this text is "a major document on foundational violence" [translaÜchanged]. Cf. ibid., 151: "Everything said by Aeschylus presupposes the selectiona scapegoat, even an arbitrary scapegoat, but neither his work nor that of the Greein general ever mentions it direct1y. A scapegoat is essential to the system's functicing, but it is a question not of the scapegoat hirnself, but of a system based on a scaIgoat."

24 Aeschylus, Eumenides in Aeschylus, The Oresteia, trans. by E. D. A. Morshead (N4York: Heritage Press, 1961), vv. 862-865: "The man who grievously doth lust for fanI War, full, immitigable, let hirn wage I Against the stranger; but of kindred birdshold the challenge hateful." - Vv. 909 f.: "And constant be the growth ofmortal Se4

I But more and motelOCit'out the impious, I For as a gardener fosters what he SOlSo foster I thit ~~~ess I Doth4'end from sorrow."

"May faction, insatiate of ill,never raise her loud voice in this city.May not the dust that drinks the black blood of citizensin its passion for vengeance,demand a bloody ransom to still the city's frenzy.May joy be exchanged for joyin a common love

and may we hate with a single soul:for this is man's great remedy."

W. Palaver, Hannah Arendt's Political PhilosophyParagrana 4 (1995) 2170

173W. Palaver, Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy

29 Ibid., 32.30 Ibid.,119.31 Cf. Maja Wicki-Vogt, "Ethik der Kommunikation und des politischen Handeins," In

Geschichte der neueren Ethik. Vol. 2: Gegenwart, ed. by A. Piper (TUbingen und Ba­sel: Francke Verlag, 1992), 132-153; Heiner Bielefeldt, Wiedergewinnung des Politi­schen: Eine Einfiihrung in Hannah Arendts politisches Denken (WUrzburg: Königs­hausen und Neumann, 1993),92; H. Dubiel, Ungewißheit, 63.

32 Cf. Cesäreo Bandera, "From Mythical Bees to Medieval Anti-Semitism," in Violenceand Truth: On the Work of Rene Girard, ed. by P. Dumouchel (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1988),221 f.; idem, The Sacred Game: The Role ofthe Sacred inthe Genesis of Modern Literary Fiction (University Park, Pennsylvania: Tbe Pennsyl­vania State University Press, 1994), 131-174.

33 Virgil Aeneid V, 815, quoted in Bandera, Game, 135.34 Cf. Michael Tb. Greven, " ,Macht in der Demokratie' - Anathema in Politikwissen­

schaft als Demokratiewissenschaft und empirischer Politikforschung," in Macht inder Demokratie: DenlronstiJße zur Wiederbelebung einer klassischen Frage in der

zeitgenössisChe,n Pof'~, ~~" ,Theorie, cd. by M. Tb. Greven (Baden-Baden: NomosVeriagsgeselllld.d, ftfl.r;.)"'~''.~<,!:+

tics belong to the polis, whereas the realm of the household is characteri­zed by "the prepolitical force ... with which the head of the householdmIed over the family and its slaves."29 Slavery and oppression ofwomenwere the necessary precondition for the political activities of free men.Arendt knows that the price for the freedom of the citizens of the polis ­slave labor - is "enormous".30 Her systematic distinction between powerand violence, however, remains untouched by such insights. She is notaware that nonviolence in ancient Greek politics results from a particulardefinition of the realm of politics and is not really a nonviolent form ofpolitics.31 Arendt does not share the insight into the nature of politicsthat we can find in Aeschylus's Eumenides.

Something similar can be said about her interpretation of the Romanidea of foundation. Arendt preferred Virgil's account of the foundationof Rome to the legend of Romulus who killed his brother Remus. Thispreference, however, does not really separate the Roman idea of founda­tion from foundational violence. Virgil's Aeneid clearly shows that thesacrifice of a victim (Turnus) lies at the foundation of Rome's mostsacred institutions.32 Turnus is the victim of a sacrificial logic that isclearly expressed in the Aeneid: "Unum pro multis dabitur caput - onehead will be given up for the sake ofmany."33

Even the American Revolution - Arendt's modern example - is notfully free of traces hinting at foundational violence.34 Arendt, however,neither deals systematically with the war of independence that made theconstitution of freedom possible, nor with the role of the military ­especially the navy - that was established to defend America from dan-

Paragrana 4 (1995)2172

2S Cf. JUrgen Habermas, Philosophisch-politische Profile (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp,21991),228-248.

26 Arendt, Violence, 42.21 Cf. Girard, Things, 24. ' ,',' ,~aAren4&. Cond/lion, 194: "Tbe lawmaker was like the buildc,r 9t~.:l_,l!OD1eOne

who bad to do an4 fmisb bis ,work bofore poljtical activit>;

Many passages in Arendt's work hint at the foundational violence thatstructures political power. This shows that she really observed politicallife very precisely. Arendt at her best had very interesting insights intothe reality of foundational violence. Systematically, however, she nevertook these insights seriously. She does not deal with foundational orstructural violence in her work at alI.25

Her most interesting insight into foundational violence can be foundin a passage where Arendt mentions the dangers of power: "A legally un­restricted majority rule, that is, a democracy without a constitution, canbe very formidable in the suppression of the rights of minorities and veryeffective in the suffocation of dissent without any use ofviolence .... Theextreme form ofpower is All against One [italics mine] ..."26 The end ofthis passage is very instructive. Arendt indirectly points to the structureof the scapegoat mechanism, that is the opposition of all against one.27From the perspective of mimetic theory it becomes clear that Arendt'sconcept of power is rooted in the scapegoat mechanism. Her example ofthe nonviolent character of ancient Greekpolitics - the sheer persuadingof those who have been condemned to death - clearly shows traces of thescapegoat mechanism. No direct or open form of violence is used, butthe condemned persons are, nevertheless, forced to death. Arendt's ex­ample is not really an example of nonviolence, it is rather an exampleshowing that collective violence needs to hide its violent nature in orderto function properly.

Arendt's other examples from history also include some elementsthat hint to foundational violence. According to Arendt, politics in theGreek polis was free of coercion and violence. However, her commentthat lawrnaking - like the building of the city wall - is not a politicalactivity shows that Greek politics presupposes a pacified space that ma­kes nonviolent politics possible.28 Foundational violence - the creationof peace inside the city - is excluded from politics by definition, in spiteof the fact that it is a necessary precondition for politics. The hiddenviolence is even more visible in the distinction between polis and house­hold (oikos) typical of the ancient Greece. Nonviolent actions like po li-

3. Hannah Arendt's Systematic Blindnessto Foundational Violence

4. The Biblical Uncovering ofFoundational Violence

Arendt's systematic blindness to foundational violence is closely relatedto her attitude toward Christianity. According to Girard, it is the Jewish­Christian Bible that helped to uncover foundational violence as the rootof human culture. Whereas mythic religions side with the lynching moband,therefore, hide the truth ofthe scapegoat mechanism, the Bible sideswith the victims and brings foundational violence to light. Girard compa­red Aeschylus's Eumenides with the Book of Job to illustrate the diffe-

175W, Palaver, Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy

rence between the mythic and the Biblical perspective. Both share "thesame insight on the topic of foundational violence but, among theGreeks, the community rather than the individual victim always wins."39According to Girard, we will find nowhere in the Bible "the idea that thecity of man should accommodate itself to foundational violence," whe­reas in the Eumenides co11ective hatred is recommended as man's geeatremedy.40 In the long run, the Bible undennines a11institutions based onthe scapegoat mechanism.

Intuitively Arendt was aware ofthe Biblical influence on the politicalworld. According to Arendt, the communal life of early Christianity,Christian goodness, the Christian beingfor other people instead of beingwith other people, Jesus's way of forgiveness that is closely connectedwith love and a true compassion, like Jesus's compassion in Dostoev­ski's legend The Grand Inquisitor, are fundamenta11y apolitica1.41 Sheuses Hennan Melville's words to express her belief that compassion is"incapable of establishing 'lasting institutions' ."42 In a brilliant remark,she summarizes this insight in the fo11owing way: "Love, by its very na­ture, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it isnot only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of a11an­tipolitical human forces." In the short run and seen from a short-tennpolitical perspective, Arendt is right. Christian truth and political useful­ness do not necessarily go hand in hand.43 In the long run, however,Christianity destroyed exactly those political structures that Arendt usedas a model for her concept of politics. Christianity overcame the ancientseparation of polis and household.44 It also strengthened and spread oUfmodem belief that a11human beings are fundamenta11y equa1.45 Politicsthat based its seemingly nonviolent character on structural violence,

39 Girard, Job, 152 [translation changed].40 Ibid., 151 [translation changed].41 Arendt, Condition, 53-55, 73-78, 180,238-243; idem, Revolution, 85-87. On Arendt's

attitude toward Christianity that comes close to Nietzsche and on her failure to reco­gnize that Christian worldlessness has changed the world in tl}e long run, see HaukeBrunkhorst, Demokratie und Differenz: Vom klassischen zum modernen Begriff desPolitischen (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1994), 111-116.

42 Arendt, Revolution, 86 and 84. Cf. Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor and OtherStories, ed. by H. Beaver (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, reprint 1985), 341.

43 Cf. Rene Girard, "Generative Scapegoating," in Violent Origins: Walter Burkert.Rene Girard, and Jonathan Z Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation, 00.by R. G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 141.

44 Cf. Milbank, Theology, 364-369, 399, 403 f.45 Cf. Wolf gang Palaver, "Gleichheit als Sprengkraft? Zum Einfluß des Christentums

auf die Entwicklung der Demokratie," in Verweigerte MUndigkeit? Politische Kulturund Kirche •. cd .. by,i.riNiewiadomski (Thaur: Österreichischer KulturVerlag, 1989),195-217. ~"1)i.Jls~IJ

Paragrana 4 (1995)2174

35 Cf. Arendt, Revolution, 141. Thomas Jefferson, The Life and Selected Writings 01Thomas Jeffirson, ed. by A. Koch and W. Peden (New York: The Modem Library,1944), 436, however, clearly hinted at foundational violence when he declared in aletter in 1787 that "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with theblood ofpatriots & tyrants." Ekkehard Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg: Die historischeLogik politischer Unvernunft (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), 97-116, claims thatthe military - especially the navy - has played an important role throughout the hi­story ofthe United States. In the end, Alexander Hamilton's position saying that onlyan intemationally powerful state with a standing army and a strong navy can givetranquillity and happiness at horne, has become to a certain extent the political realityof the U. S. In the early years of the United States, many people believed that a stan­ding army was dangerous. The necessity of a navy, however, was much lessdiscus­sed. James Madison, for instance, did not fully side with Hamilton. Nevertheless, hestrongly supported the idea to provide and maintaina navy. According to Madison, anavy protects the country against foreign enemies, but cannot be misusOO by a perfi­dious govemment against its own people. See James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by I. Kramnick (Harmondsworth: PenguinBooks, 1987), No. 11, No. 24-28, No. 41.

36 Arendt, Revolution, 19: "In so far as violence plays apredominant role in wars andrevolutions, both occur outside the political realm, strictly speaking, in spite of theircnormous role in recorded history." Cf. ibid., 12.

~7, ~ ~olutjon, 93.38 AreDdt, ~olutjon, 71. Cf. ibid., 114; Wicki-Vogt, "Ethik dpr.M •••••••.•• 144.

~ers abroad and helped to build a powerful state later on.35 Like in an­~ient Greek politics, Arendt tends to exlude these fonns of violence from

politics by definition.36 There is also the driving out ofthe native inhabi­tants with which Arendt does not rea11ydeal in her work. Where she talksIlbout violent and criminal deeds that helped to colonize the Americanoontinent, she remarks that "they remained acts of single men."37 She,nowever, recognizes the problem of slavery. According to Arendt, "theslave .., was 'who11y overlooked' ."38 Like Jefferson, she ca11s slavery"the primordial crime upon which the fabric of American society rested."Again, like in the case of the Greek polis, she does not rea11y re fleet onthese insights systematica11y. Her fundamental distinction between po­wer and violence remains untouched.

46 Cf. Arendt, Condition, 32; idem, Revolution, 19 f.47 Arendt, Condition, 215, 313-320.48 Cf. Girard, Things, 136 f., 258; idem, A Theatre of Envy: William Shalcespeare (New

York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),282; Milbank, Theology, 432-434.49 Cf. Arendt, Violence, 56.50 Areadt. Condition, 75: "No less absurd is the Christian demand to ". poet 8Ild to turn

the othcr check, when not taken mctaphorically but tried es a ....,.~_"., \'\~ll:#i;}'<'.Ml'ß~>.'ii:;:",',.

which means the exclusion of many people from politics, became, there­fore, more and more a thing of the past. Indirectly, Christianity causedviolence to come increasingly and openly to the fore. This increase of"naked" violence caused political theory in the seventeenth-century, forinstance, to assurne a chaotic and violent state of nature that had to be

kept in check by a powernd state (e. g., Thomas Hobbes ).46 The politicaltheory of the modern age is less able to exclude violence from the con­cepts of politics or power, because the long-term influence of Christia­nity makes the ancient veiling of violence nearly impossible. Arendtcalls this development amistake. Sometimes, she briefly seems to indi­cate that Christianity, because of its belief in the equality of a11human

beings before God and its belief in the immortality of individual humanlife, could have caused this development. Most ofthe time, however, she'shies away from attributing these negative elements of our modern world10 the influence of Christianity.47 For this reason she does not rea11y re­

cognize the political and social problem that the Jewish-Christian revela­tion causes in the long ron. The Biblical message forces us to make afundamental decision. Either we renounce a11forms of violence and take

the message of the Sermon on the Mount seriously, or we will cause ourapocalyptic self-destruction.48 In Hannah Arendt's opinion, nonviolenceis not an option. Just as she excludes Christian love as an antipoliticalforce, she also excludes nonviolence in her distinction between powerand violence.49 The Christian demand to nonviolence as areal way oflife remains absurd in her eyes.50

("D;K:;I~,":i:',

Akademie VerlagParagrana 4 (1995)2, 177-191

Pau/ Dumouche/

The phenomenon which interests me may be ca11ed the interdependenceof preferences. By this I mean the fact that the preferences of one agentdepend on the preferences of another agent. That is to say, what oneagent prefers, likes, values or desires is influenced by what another agentprefers and vice versa exerts an influence upon the other's preferences.At times this relation of influence may be symmetrical, two agents simi­larly influencing each other' s preferences, but it needs not be. In fact Isuspect that the relation of interdependence of preferences may takemany different forms2, nonetheless in what fo11ows I will lump a11 ofthese together. The interdependence of preferences also means that anagent comes to prefer some object X through the influence of one ormore other agents. This may lead to the formation of a consensus of pre­ferences among the agents, or it may lead to the divergence of their pre­ferences. Again, in what fo11ows, I will consider together these two pos­sible outcomes of the relation of influence.

In the first sense of the interdependence of preferences, in the senseof "influence", we take the preferences of one agent as given and inquireinto the influence they exert upon the preferences of other agents. In thesecond sense of the interdependence of preferences, in the sense of themechanism of formation of preferences, no preferences are given and weinquire into the means through which preferences arise. Clearly the twoprocesses are closely related and the choice of a single term to designateboth of them indicates that I believe they constitute two aspects of thesame phenomenon. Both processes entail that the means through which

Rationality and tbe Self-Organization of Preferences1

A preliminary version of this text was presented at the international conference "Mi­mesis - Poiesis - Autopoesis" held at the Freie Universität in Berlin from June 13 toJune 15 1994. I wish to thank J. P. Dupuy, N. Luhmann and A. McKenna for theiruseful comments and criticism on that occasion. Despite their help, this remains es­sentially a research paper which ventures into a new domain hut does not come hackwith any definitive conclusions. I also wish to thank the Fonds FCAR ofthe Provinceof Quebec and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada fortheir generous financial supp()rt.

2 In fact with Jcan-Pierre Dupuy in L 'enfer des choses (1979) we have charted sevcndifferent fonns whic;b ~,CfJDSidered as a general means of influence among&gents' prcferences, ••.•••••• ";;1<",

Paragrana 4 (1995)2176