arendt on politics

7/30/2019 arendt on politics

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Hannah Arendts Idea of Politics Revisited

Yi-huah JIANG

Professor

Department of Political Science

National Taiwan University

[email protected]


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I. Arendts Posthumous Work on Politics

Arendts idea of politics is usually celebrated as one of the most original in the

history of western political thought. Unlike ancient philosophers such as Plato or

Aristotle, she does not regard politics as a means for the realization of an ideal

human order or the pursuit of happiness. Unlike modern philosophers such as

Hobbes or Locke, she does not consider political life as a result of social contract

through which antagonized multitude get away of their warring state of nature. Even

among contemporary political theorists, her insistence on the human condition of

plurality and the revelatory characteristic of action also makes her concept of politics

different from that of Leo Strauss, who stresses the pursuit ofthe right, or the good,

political order, or that of John Rawls, who presupposes the neutrality of state and

the exercise ofpublic reason.

In the works published during her life time, Arendt never discusses in any

straightforward way what politics means or what significance it has for the human

world. She elaborates the human capability of action, the inescapable condition of

plurality and natality, and the division of the public and the private, etc., in The

Human Condition, but she does not talk for a moment on the concept of politics, as if

the above mentioned topics are identical with a treatise of politics itself. In Between

Past and Future, she deals with the concept of tradition, of history, of authority, of

freedom, of education, of culture, and so on; but again, there is no single chapter onpolitics. The most famous statements she writes about politics reads as follows: The

raison dtre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action. (BPF:

146)1

Yet, it is neither a definition nor an explanation of the concept of politics.

It is not until the publication ofThe Promise of Politics in 2005 that we have

direct access to Arendts understanding of politics per se. In the posthumous work

edited by Jerome Kohn, Arendts several monographs concerning politics and the

tradition of political thought are assembled together for the first time. Of particular

importance is the treatise Introduction into politics, which appears in German in

Ursula Ludzs 1993 edition of Was ist Politik? As Jerome Kohn correctly explains,

(The title) by no means indicates an introduction to the study of political science or

political theory but, on the contrary, a leading into (intro-ducere) genuine political

experience (PP: viii). Together with the others articles, the monograph provides us

with the best opportunity to understand what Arendt means by politics or the

political life.

My article is an attempt to read closely Arendts posthumous workThe Promise

of Politics. I will try to explore what Arendt means by politics, how she relates

1 For abbreviation of Arendts works, please see the bibliography.


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politics to human plurality and the public sphere, why she contends that the tradition

of political thought betrays the spirit of genuine politics, and how the modern

invention of massive destructive weapon threatens the world that politics aims to

build and preserve. In a word, I will reexamine Arendts idea of politics with the

view not only of locating its place in her political theory, but also of illuminating its

uniqueness and novelty. In the final section, however, I will offer my critical

assessment as to whether Arendts concept of politics can be of relevance for our

modern world.

II. The Meaning of Politics

Arendts usage of the world politics can be divided into two situations. First,

she uses politics to refer to the process of interest articulation and power struggle,

just like most of us do in most of the time. In Between Past and Future, she alludes

to this concept of politics as the lowest level of human affairs. Second, she also

promotes politics as the major achievement that human civilization could ever

reach if we actualize our human potential of acting in concert. This is Arendts idea

of politics, or the highest level of human affairs, if we could coin the term in

according with her spirit.

It is true that in the works published during her life, Arendt has already made

the distinction as clearly as a political theorist can. In an article discussing truth andpolitics, Arendt says: I have spoken as though the political realm were no more than

a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing counted but pleasure and

profit, partisanship, and the lust for domination (BPF: 263). The factual truth

Arendt ardently defends is always contradictory to this sense of politics because

politicians tend to struggle for power with lies, propagandas and manipulation.

Nevertheless, Arendt adds immediately that it is not the whole story. From this

perspective, we remain unaware of the actual content of political lifeof the joy and

the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting

together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word

and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning

something entirely new (BPF: 263). The later is of no doubt Arendts ideal of

genuine politics.

In The Promise of Politics, Arendt refers to the two different levels of politics

again. Politics could be defined in its usual sense, as a relationship between the

rulers and the ruled. But if it is thus defined, there is no way to prevent people from

having the prejudices against politicsthe prejudices that domestic policy is a

fabric of lies and deceptions woven by shady interests and even shadier ideologies,


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while foreign policy vacillates between vapid propaganda and the exercise of raw

power (PP: 97-98). Following this usual or narrow sense of politics, there is no

chance that public affairs can attract people who want to lead a noble, or at least

moderately decent, life.

Fortunately, politics could also mean something else. In a very succinct way,

Arendt contends: The meaning of politics is freedom. That is to say, to be political

is to be free. The definition is simple and concise, but, as Arendt explains, its

simplicity and conclusive force lie in the very fact that politics exists in the human

world (PP: 108). Freedom is the raison dtre and the essence of politics. It is the

raison dtre because human beings live together, act together, or even fight together,

with the view of enjoying the experience of being free. It is the essence of political

life because without freedom, action would deteriorate into behavior, and speech

would degenerate into rhetoric.

Almost all Arendtian scholars understand how difficult it is to distinguish

freedom from action, or action from politics in Arendts theory. Freedom

seems the reason why people have political life, while political life consists in the

interaction and communication of free and equal persons. When people do politics,

that is, when they act and speak to each other with a view of freedom, they are

beginning something anew and creating a public space that would not generate in

any other way. Arendts admiration of the phenomenon of acting freely in a public

space leads her to equate political action with a nonreligious miraclea miraclewhich is prompted by the birth of human life and comparable to the coming into

existence of the world. As she elaborates in The Promise of Politics:

Man himself evidently has a most amazing and mysterious talent for

working miracles. The normal, hackneyed word our language provides for

this talent is action. Action is unique in that it sets in motion processes that

in their automatism look very much like natural processes, and action also

marks the start of something, begins something new, seizes the initiative, or,

in Kantian terms, forges its own chain. The miracle of freedom is inherent in

this ability to make a beginning, which itself is inherent in the fact that every

human being, simply by being born into a world that was there before him

and will be there after him, is himself a new beginning (PP: 113).

If the meaning of politics is freedom, then what is the meaning of freedom?

Arendt answers this question by referring back to the experience of the Greek polis

because she maintains that the Greek is the first people who experienced and realized

freedom. Freedom originally meant nothing more than being able to go where one

please, but it was not merely the freedom of movement as we understand today. In

order to move freely, one must prove himself to be a free citizen, i.e., a person not


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subject to domination or coercion by another person. But freedom means even more

than that. A free man is also someone who need not take care of the burden of

maintaining his househe must be able to remove himself from the coercion of

household (PP: 121). The contrast between freedom and necessity is such a persistent

theme of Arendts theory that we do not need to repeat here. Arendts discussion of the

polis vs. the household in the ancient Greek, and her triple classification of the public,

the private and the social in The Human Condition has already explained clearly why

freedom cannot coexist with necessity of life.

What is important for us here is that although Arendt advocates the freedom of

movement and the liberation from lifes necessity, she emphasizes that it is not the

end purpose of politics; rather, it is the substance and meaning of all things

political. In other words, politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind

of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense (PP: 129, my

italics). Freedom itself is the essence of politics, while the means by which one can

establish such a space of freedom are not necessarily political. In the Greek

experience, lawgiving, foreign policy and war are means to establish or protect a

political space, but they themselves are definitely not political. They are

phenomena peripheral to politics and therefore not politics itself (PP: 129-130).

The identity of politics with freedom can be traced back to the pre-polis life of

Greece. For Arendt, just like for many other scholars of the history of political thought,

the very word politics is derived from the actual experience of the Greek polis. Thepre-polis life is the source of the Greek political vocabulary; while the political

vocabulary of polis, once created, becomes the standard of all European languages for

politics even though the heyday of polis has been long over. The polis is a very

specific form of human communal life, in which men in their freedom can interact

with one another without compulsion, force, and rule over one another, as equals

among equals, commanding and obeying one another only in emergencies that is, in

times of warbut otherwise managing all their affairs by speaking with and

persuading one another (PP: 45, 117). This particular form of organizational human

life determines in such an exemplary and definitive way what later westerns

understand by politics that it can almost be said to possess a kind of universal validity.

Whenever westerns talks about politics, they cannot but think of the way public

affairs were conducted in the ancient Greek polis.

According to the Greek experience, Arendt argues, what distinguishes life in the

polis from all other forms of human communal life (such as family or local

neighborhood) is freedom. It does not mean that the Greek acquire their freedom by

means of politics, but that, as said in the above, being free and living in the polis

were, in a certain sense, one and the same. Freedom is identical with the political life;


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it is not the purpose or end that political life pursuits. Conceived from this angle,

freedom can be understood negatively as not being ruled or ruling, and positively as

a space which can be created only by men (PP: 116-117).

If politics is to be bound together with freedom, and separated from the necessity

of life or the means for anything else, then it becomes clear that there must be only a

few moments in the long history of human beings that the meaning of politics is fully

realized or manifested. The few great historical moments, however, are crucial and

influential. Arendt says they set the standard, not in the sense that they can be

imitated, but that certain ideas and concepts inherent in them can determine those

epochs denied a full experience of political reality (PP: 119-120). Politics in this

higher sense becomes the criteria of judgment, by which we can evaluate the degree

or the extent that political freedom is actualized in any specific historical moment.

Whenever there is the hope of acting freely in a public space, there is the genuine

spirit of politics; whenever there is only power struggle and violent domination,

politics is in effect transformed into the lowest level of human affairs.

III. Politics and Human Plurality

The meaning of politics is freedom; while the whole realm of politics becomes

possible only on the fact of human plurality. By plurality Arendt means two

characteristics of human existence: distinctness and equality. Human being are borndistinct from one another (even twins are not identical), and they are equal in the

sense that they all have their personal distinctness. For this assertion Arendt offers two

arguments: one being biblical; the other being secular. Let us examine them in turn.

Arendt likes to quote from the Bible although she herself is neither an orthodox

Jewish nor a confessed Christian. In The Human Condition, she contends that in its

most elementary form, the human condition of action is implicit even in Genesis

(Male and female created He them). She emphasizes that the expression is different

from the other expression which also concerns the creation of man, in which God

originally created Man (Adam) and then created Eve and made them the origin of

reproduction (HC: 8). In The Promise of Politics, again, she refers to the same

statement in Genesis, and declares that the plurality of men constitutes the political

realm (PP: 61). Why should the Bible become the authority of human beings being

distinct and equal? Arendt does not offer any explanation.

The other way of argumentationthe secular argumentseems more

understandable and convincing. In The Human Condition, Arendt says: If action as

beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, . . . then speech corresponds to the fact of

distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of


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living as a distinct and unique being among equals (HC: 178). Plurality is the

condition of political action because if not for equality, men could not understand

each other and their ancestors, or anticipate the needs of their posterity; if not for

distinctness, they would lead a herd life not unlike that of animals, and need neither

action nor speech to distinguish themselves (HC: 175-176). In The Promise of Politics,

Arendt contends that, although it is possible to conceive of a human world in the

sense of a man-made artifice erected on the earth under the condition of the oneness

of man, it is impossible to conceive of an acting and speaking being existing in the

singular (PP: 61). The Nature makes human being distinct from each other. It is a fact

that we must respect rather than change. To have the idea of eradicating human

distinctness would be insane because it will lead to the cancellation of human

characteristics, changing human life into herd animal life.

Distinctness and equality are the two most important dimensions of human

plurality. Any genuine political philosophy, adds Arendt, must take this fact as its

point of departure, or it would end nowhere. As she maintains in The Promise of

Politics, If philosophers were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy, they

would have to make the plurality of man, out of which arises the whole realm of

human affairsin its grandeur and miserythe object of their thaumadzein

(wonder) (PP: 38). According to Arendt, one of the mistakes of the tradition of

political thought (be it manifested in Plato, Augustine or Hobbes) is to ignore or

underestimate the simple fact of human plurality. The great philosophers always wantto search for, or set up, a universal standard of measurement, by which they can

overcome the challenge human diversity brings forth. For this purpose, they tend to

presuppose that human beings are more or less of the same nature or behavior pattern.

Nevertheless, their attempt is doomed to failure because the presupposition itself is

erroneous.

Arendt is so fond of reminding us of the human condition of plurality that, in her

interpretation of Montesquieu, she even compares the principles of government to the

two characteristics of human plurality. First, she brings our attention to Montesquieus

classification of the principles of three different kinds of government: virtue is the

inspiring principle of a republic; honor is the principle of a monarchy; and fear guides

all actions in a tyranny. Then, she argues that virtue springs from the love of equality,

and honor arises from the love of distinctness. In other words, she thinks that two of

Montesquieus principles of government are from loving one or the other of the two

fundamental and interconnected traits of the human condition of plurality. Her

elaboration goes like the following:

The fundamental experience of monarchies, and also of aristocracies and

other hierarchical forms of government, is that by birth we are different from


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each other and therefore strive to distinguish ourselves, to manifest our

natural or social distinctness The experience upon which the body politic

of a republic rests is the being-together of those who are equal in strength,

and its virtue, which rules its public life, is the joy not to be alone in the

world (PP: 66-67).

Arendts interpretation of Montesquieu may be contestable (for instance, she

does not know how to find a place for the principle of fear in a tyranny), but her point

is clear: politics must base itself upon the simple fact of human plurality, and plurality

consists in distinctness and equality. Ignoring the fact of human plurality would only

make a political theory deficient and distortedan unfortunate situation the tradition

of political thought finds itself locked into.

One way of understanding why plurality is so important to politics is to follow

Arendt in her analysis ofdoxa (opinion). In the Greek context, opinion is the

formulation in speech of what appears to me. The concept of opinion presupposes

that the world we share opens up differently to different person according to his

position in it. Everyone, therefore, can perceive the world from his own angle, and

express his perception accordingly. Since the positions are different, the opinions

everyone holds would also be different. Yet, opinions are not necessarily subjective

fantasy or arbitrary judgment. They contain a certain degree of objectivity because

they are directing to the same common world. Insofar as we are human, the

commonness of the world we share would make sure that everyone perceiving it has asense of objectivity (PP: 14).

Now, philosophers have quite different views about the validity of opinions.

Plato, as we all understand well enough, opposes opinion to knowledge, and strongly

argues that a philosopher has to get rid of the influence of various opinions, having

truth (or ideas) in his mind only. That is, he does not trust the viewpoint of the

ordinary people, neither does he prepare to accept the reality of human plurality. On

the contrary, Arendt says, Socrates is much more friendly to opinions. Since he

believes that there must be some amount of truth in every viewpoint, he wants to

bring forth this truth which everyone potentially possesses. In other words, Socrates

wanted to make the city more truthful by delivering each of the citizens of their truths.

The method of doing this is dialegesthai, talking something through, but this dialectic

brings forth truth not by destroying doxa or opinion, but on the contrary by revealing

doxa in its own truthfulness (PP: 15). Accordingly, Platos philosopher always wants

to educate and instruct the people, while Socrates philosopher merely wishes to

improve his fellow citizens opinion by endless discussion.

What we learn from Arendts analysis of plurality and opinion is that the world

of political affairs is a world of diverse viewpoints and conflicting opinions. Freedom


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of political action becomes possible because human beings, distinct and equal as they

are, have to travel and communicate in the public space constituted by different

viewpoints. If we are of the same in thought and behavior, there is no need of freedom.

If we are constrained by some universally valid standard and denied the right of

contributing to that standard or revising it, politics would be meaningless for us. The

political sphere opens only when we acknowledge the legitimacy of plurality and

opinion.

IV. The Relation between the Public and the Political

Politics arises when different people come together to talk and act to each other,

but there seems to be a subtle difference between the public space, which opens up

wherever people gather together, and the political space, in which freedom becomes

the only legitimate concern or the primary principle. To make clear this distinction, we

may first reexamine Arendts concept of the public, and then see what she has to say

about the difference of the public and the political, if there is indeed any difference.

According to The Human Condition, Arendt contends that the public signifies two

closely related but not altogether identical phenomena. It means first of all the publicity

and the reality of everything that opens to our sense perceptions. As her famous maxim

Being and Appearing coincide implies, the reality of the public realm depends on the

simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the commonworld presents itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever

be devised (HC: 50, 57). Secondly, the term public also denotes the world itself. The

world is not the same as the earth, which is the physical space and environment for the

movement of people and organic life. Rather, the world means the mixture of the

human artifact and the human affairs occurring among people. To live together in the

world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common,

as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between,

relates and separates men at the same time (HC: 52).

In The Promise of Politics, Arendt reasserts similar points but allows a more

flexible definition of the space which opens up between human beings. She confirms

the argument that whenever people come together (be it in private or socially, be it in

public or politically), a space is generated among these gathering people. But the nature

of the space differs from each other. It could be manifested as custom in a private

context, as convention in a social context, or as laws, constitutions, statutes in a public

context. Every such space has its own structure that changes over time, but they share

the same basic characteristic of a world opening up among people (PP: 106). We do not

know what Arendt means by saying that custom is the realization of the space in a


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private context because it does not fit well with her interpretation of the private (the

space within the four walls of ones house and featuring necessity, privacy and love).

Nevertheless, her basic point is clear enough.

What really concerns us here is the question of whether the public sphere equals

to the political sphere. In the works published during her life-time, Arendt does not give

us an unambiguous answer, but her hint favors the positive reading. For example, she

maintains that The space ofappearance comes into being wherever men are together

in the manner of speech and action, that is, wherever men act in a typically political

manner (HC: 199). She also indicates, in her recommendation of the Greek

understanding ofpolitics, that whatever occurs in this space of appearances is political

by definition, even when it is not a direct product of action (BPF: 155). The public,

therefore, seems to be identical with the political in its broad sense.

Nevertheless, Arendts concept of the political is different from the conventional

understanding of the political life. As she once clearly pronounced, the public space

extends far beyond what we ordinarily mean by political life (MDT: 73). If the

so-called ordinary political life means power struggle, governmental activities, or the

management of life's necessities -- in a word, if it only designates the lower level of

human affairs as we discussed in the above, then the public is certainly not identical

with the political. The public is related to something which the ordinary political life

does not really care aboutto reveal one's irreplaceable personality with speech-act, to

manifest ones freedom in front of ones peers. It is only when politics is understood inthis way that the public is tantamount to the political.

When we come to the posthumous work ofThe Promise of Politics, however, the

relations between the public and the political becomes more complicated than what we

have just said. Here, Arendt emphasizes that, historically speaking, the public was not

necessarily a political space in the true sense. She refers to the epics of Homer, arguing

that the public space opened up by the heroes of the Greek and the Trojan is the first

example of a world entered into by stouthearted and enterprising adventurers. It

becomes public because the heroes were capable of seeing and hearing and admiring one

anothers deeds, of which the sagas of later poets and storytellers assured them lasting

fame. Yet, this public space is deceptive in that it is not an everlasting site for the heroes.

When the adventure and enterprise comes to an end (that is, when Troy was destroyed

and the kings departed for their homeland), the public space they opened up vanishes

immediately (PP: 122-123).

The real challenge, therefore, is how to rebuild a permanent public space after

the end of the adventure. According to Arendt, the answer lies in the polis:

This public space does not become political until it is secured within a city,

is bound, that is, to a concrete place that itself survives both those


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memorable deeds and the names of the memorable men who performed

them and thus can pass them on to posterity over generations. The city is

the polis; it is political and therefore different from other settlements

because it is purposefully build around its public space, the agora, where

free men could meet as peers on any occasion (PP: 123).

The transformation of the public space between heroes into the public space

between citizens is one of the most significant moments in the history of western

politics. It is as if the great adventure of the brave heroes finally finds its substitute

after the army disbands, and the experience of the Homeric epics is echoed and

perpetuated in the polis yet to come. What is even more interesting, according to

Arendt, is that the experience of freedom seems to undergo a fundamental

transformation as well: the most important activity of a free life moves from action

to speech, from free deeds to free words. It is so because the agora of a polis now

becomes the focus of a free life. The constant presence of others, the endless

dialogues between peer citizens, and the competing persuasion among rivalsall of

which features the employment of speechnow becomes the real substance of a free

and political life (PP: 124).

Arendt describes the shift as a shift from freedom of spontaneity to freedom of

opinion. By spontaneity she means the ability to initiate a sequence, to forge a new

chain. The Homeric heroes are people capable of spontaneity because they bravely

assert themselves in a great adventure, beginning something never seen or thought ofbefore, and kindling a chain of reaction and memory afterwards. The best illustration

of the experience of spontaneous action in the ancient time can be found in the Greek

words archein and prattein. The former means both to begin and to lead; while the

latter means to act and to carry out. They are testimony of the ancient Greeks

freedom of spontaneity. Also worthwhile our attention is that, when pushed to its

extreme, the activity of spontaneous action could be completed by a single person. As

Arendt maintains, A single individual can of course ultimately act alone. And it

is for this very reason that freedom of spontaneity is sometimes prepolitical (PP:

125-127).2

On the contrary, freedom of opinion differs from freedom of spontaneity in that it

is much more dependent on the presence of others and of our being confronted with

their opinions. Following our analysis in the previous section, we know that in

Arendt, freedom of opinion is never merely the modern concept of freedom of

expression, which of course constitutes an integral part of what she means to say. It

rather refers, primarily, to the fact that no one can adequately grasp the objective

2 This argument is of course contradictory to most of Arendts expression, for she always emphasizes

the action presupposes the presence of others.


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world in its full reality all on his own because the world always opens itself up and

reveals itself to different persons standing at different positions. Since everyone is

constrained by his limited standpoint, he has to enlarge his mind by sympathetically

understanding what others have to say from their standpoints if he wants to see and

experience the world as comprehensively as possible. That is, only in the freedom of

our speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak, emerge

in its objectivity and visibility from all sides (PP: 128-129). Thus, freedom of

opinion becomes the real experience of a genuine public space, while freedom of

spontaneity gradually fades away into history.

In short, Arendt does not regard the public to be completely identical with the

political. The public realm can be actualized in various forms of human gathering,

both political and nonpolitical; but the political (in the strict sense) indicates a space

in which freedom becomes the major principle. To experience this freedom, people

must act and speak in plural, that is, presenting oneself in front of others and

communicating with ones peer with the view of ascertaining the reality of world from

diverse angles. The significance of multiple viewpoints and the possibility of

objective understanding by means of mutual learning, remains the essential lesson of

Arendts political theory.

V. Politics and Political Thought

Arendts ideal of politics appeared for the first time in the ancient Greek, but it

was soon refuted by the tradition of political thought. For Arendt, the tradition of

political thought began with Plato and ended with Marx. It is part of the western

history but not identical with the history (PP: 43-44). The fact that Plato denied the

true meaning of politics and replaced it with something else is a great misfortune

because its influence upon the ensuing development of western tradition is so

tremendous that politics has never again reclaimed its dignity. To realize how much

impact the story has on the posterity, we need to go back to Plato.

Arendt thinks the tradition of political thought began when the trial and the death

of Socrates made Plato despair of the political life and doubt certain fundamentals of

Socrates teachings. Socrates himself is not hostile toward the polis. This can be seen

from the fact that he enjoys talking with people at the agora and the good record he

has as an Athenian citizen. When Socrates was sentenced to death, however, Plato

began to doubt the validity of the method Socrates used to win over his fellow citizens,

that is, the validity ofpeithein (persuasion). Plato preferred to believe that the

ordinary people are irrational, stubborn, unfit for philosophical argument, and can be

led or transformed only by brainwashing or threat of violence. Secondly, Plato also


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denounced furiously the legitimacy of doxa (opinion) in political life. Unlike Socrates,

who tries to improve the truthfulness of everyones opinion by the method of

midwifery, Plato despises opinions thoroughly and yearns for absolute standards of

truth. He opposes knowledge to opinions, and argues that only the philosophers who

possess the absolute knowledge are entitled to rule the polis. In Arednts words, Plato

was the first to introduce absolute standards into the realm of human affairs,

where, without such transcending standards, everything remains relative. Yet this

deed of Plato is surely the most anti-Socratic conclusion because Socrates never

considers that opinions are totally devoid of truth (PP: 6-8).

The result of Platos contempt for politics is that, ever since his time, the

tradition of political thought has always presupposed the superiority of the

philosophical life to the political life, and attempted to provide universal standards

and rules, yardsticks and measurements from the viewpoint of philosophers to make

judgments on the irregular, unstable and unreal world of human affairs. The dignity of

politics is deprived because all the standards political theorists have to apply upon it

are derived from philosophy, rather than from politics itself. The most telling of these

application, according to Arendt, is the idea of the law-giver, who invents an absolute

standard for constitution, renders it to the people who are to be ruled, and sets the

constrain for their behaviors. Moreover, the purpose of the law-givers conduct is to

guarantee the safety of the philosopher in a body politic, and to maintain the operation

of everyday life as smoothly as possible. Politics as a whole is obviously reduced tothat lower level whose task was to sustain life within the public space of the polis,

criticizes Arendt (PP: 37, 131-135).

If the tradition of political thought began with Platos contempt for the life of

polis (and to a lesser extent, with Aristotles request to be let alone), it was succeeded

by the Christianitys rejection and redefinition of politics. The Christian rejection

differs from the Platonic refutation in that it regards the public realm per se as

intolerable exactly because it is public. Arendt quotes Tertullians statement to

illustrate this point: Nothing is more alien to us Christians than what matters

publicly (PP: 135-136). It is as though the public is a sinful place and everything

sacred or religious must be kept in the private. For example, the goodness one does

must hide itself and be prevented from being seen in the public The left hand does

not know what the right hand is doing becomes the ideal for human ethics (Matthew

6:1). What is more important, however, is that the Christians also redefine the nature

of the political and the public, arguing that politics itself is a means to some higher

end (the salvation of soul), and that the public can be erected among the true believers

(the Christians who love ones neighbors but pay no attention to the body politic). The

faithful can thus constitute a totally new, religiously defined public space, which,


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although public, was not political (PP: 135-139).

The whole trend of regarding politics as a means for something else remains

intact even in the modern age. For Arendt, both the enlightened despotism of the

eighteenth century and the egalitarian democracy of the nineteenth century confirm

the principle that the purpose of the government is to protect the free productivity of

the society ant the security of the individual in his private life. The social sphere

keeps expanding day after day, replacing the traditional public sphere and positing

happiness as the highest goal of human life. In the end of the day, politics is defined

as the means by which individual freedom (or negative liberty, in Berlins

terminology) can be secured. It has nothing to do with the revelatory function of

speech-act, or the maintaining of a public world (PP: 141-143).

For Arendt, Karl Marx signifies the end of the tradition of political thought for

three reasons. First, Marx totally rejects the traditional view of subsuming practice to

theory. He does not accept that action in and of itself cannot reveal truth. As a matter

of fact, what he tries to do is to turn the traditional framework up side down, to

promote practice at the top of the contemplative life (PP: 76). Second, Marx envisages

a classless society after the proletarian revolution, while a classless society means that

all the traditional concepts relating to politics, such as rule and domination, will

disappear with the withering away of state. Freedom, the concept that traditional

politics puts as its end, will also become meaningless for the very reason that no one

will be oppressed any longer (PP: 77). Third, Marxs historical materialism concludesthat material production and material interest are the real force of historical changes.

He therefore links material interest to the essential humanity of man, and promotes

labor as the preeminent human activity. What this insight results in is a new definition

of man: the essence of humanity does not reside in rationality (as the classical

philosophers assume), nor in the ability of production (as implied in the concept of

homo faber), nor in mans likeness of God (creatura Dei), but rather in labor, which

the great tradition of political thought has unanimously rejected as incompatible with

a free human life. In Marx, man becomes essentially an animal laborans (PP: 78-79).

We learn from the previous sections that Arendt thinks the essence of politics is

freedom (the ability to begin something new or initiate a chain), and the political

realm becomes possible only when distinct and equal agents gather together in a

public space, that is, when human plurality is ascertained. The tradition of political

thought which begins with Plato and ends with Marx seems to Arendt never grasp this

point, and always attempt to substitute free action with contemplative rationality or

the capability of fabrication. It therefore never acknowledges the fundamental

significance of human plurality, mistakenly believes that men are universally similar

to each other. But why does the tradition make such a mistake?


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For Arendt, there are two good reasons for the misunderstanding of politics in the

tradition of political philosophy. First, traditional political philosophers tend to believe

that there is something political in man that belongs to his essence. Aristotles

famous assertion that man is by nature a political animal is a good example of this

misunderstanding. Yet Arendt contends that the assertion is not true. She prefers to say

that man is apolitical not that human being is not capable of acting or leading, but

that a single person cannot exercise (or actualize) politics by himself. Politics arises

between men, and so quite outside of man maintains Arendt. If we assume together

with the great philosophers that man is by natural capable of political life without the

presence of others, we will commit the same mistake. Secondly, the western tradition

is greatly influenced by the biblical legacy, while the monotheistic concept of God in

both Judaism and Christianity takes it for granted that man is created in the likeness of

Gods solitariness. It is as if that not men and women are created, but a single man;

and all the offspring come from the repetition and reproduction of the first single man.

Arendt thinks this is also a sad mistake (PP: 95).

So that is the reason why the tradition of political thought, ever since its

beginning, lost sight of man as an acting being and politics as an enterprise of the

many. As a result of this unfortunate development, the tradition never gets the point

that politics is identical with freedom, rather than a means to freedom; that action is

the essence of man, not contemplation, fabrication or laboring; and that politics

become possible exactly because human being are different from each other, while allthe attempt to cancel or control their diversity would result in disaster. The greatest

tragedy of the twenty centurythe rise of the totalitarian movement and the invention

of mass destruction weaponsattests Arendts concern. Let us now turn to this

question.

VI. Violence and the Destruction of Politics

Arendts posthumous work concerns not only the rise of the political, the

protection of the public, but also the threat to the survival of politics. In Introduction

into Politics, she begins with the section of What is Politics? continues with

sections bearing similar titles again and again, such as What Politics Is Today?

What is the Meaning of Politics? The Meaning of Politics, Does Politics Still

Have Any Meaning at All? But there is a section in the sequence which seems

arbitrary and out of context at the first glance. It is the section titled The Question of

War. Although the section on war appears unexpected, it is not for no reason that

Arendt decides to discuss this topic in her treatise on the meaning of politics.

For Arendt, the meaning of politics is freedom. But the classical identity of


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politics and freedom is now under serious doubt not only because of the

misunderstanding embedded in the tradition of political thought, but also because of

the emergence of two facts in the twentieth century. First, the rise and down of

totalitarian movement leaves people with the impression that totalized politics is a

terrible experience and that freedom seems possible only when we get rid of the

influence of politics. Second, the modern invention of massive destructive weapons

(as exemplified in the atomic bomb) makes people cannot but doubt if politics and the

preservation of human life are compatible, or if it is not true that we should dispense

with politics before politics destroys us all. In a word, totalitarianism and atomic

bomb ignite the question about the meaning of politics in our modern situation (PP:

108-109).

Does politics still have meaning? This is not an easy question to be answered.

For Arendt, the question actually involves three factor which, interwoven together,

causes our pessimism about the meaning of politics. The first element is our habit of

thinking public affairs in the means/end category. That is, we tend to consider politics

(or government) as a means to attain some other higher end which lies out side of

politics. Politics is always a necessary evil for something good in itself, but it never

counts as a good. Second, we also tend to think that the substance of politics is brute

force, be it manifested in power struggle, revolution, or war and invasion. If the

essence of politics is all these stuff, there seems no good reason why we should expect

politics to result in anything great or admirable. Third, our tradition of political theoryalso contributes to the popular notion that rule or domination is the central

concept of political theory. Max Webers famous equation of politics with the exercise

of power and domination is only a most recent example of how theorists reiterate the

same conviction ever since Plato (PP: 152).

Does politics necessarily relate itself to brute force and domination? Can it be

understood only in terms of means and end? Arendt obviously does not agree with this

popular impression. On the contrary, she ardently believes that it is only through

introducing brute force and the means/end category into politics that the melancholy

omen of the destruction of politics emerges on the horizon.

War is never compatible with politics, argues Arendt. Deriving her insights from

the experience of the ancient Greek, Arendt reminds us again that the Greeks formed

the polis around the agora, a place where free citizen assembled, speaking about

something with one another. In this understanding, war (and the brute force it entailed)

was entirely excluded from what was truly political. War was not the continuation

of politics, as Clausewitz tries to persuade us into belief, but the very opposite of

politics (PP: 164-165). However, the rise of totalitarianism brings with it the new

concept oftotal war, and defines the latter to be a war of annihilation. At the


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beginning, total war seems to be proclaimed by totalitarian country against

non-totalitarian country, but it soon becomes a reality of conflict even between

non-totalitarian countries themselves. The atomic bomb the United States dropped on

Japan is a proof of how terrible the effect of total war can engender between

non-totalitarian countries (PP: 159-160).

It may be worthy our attention here to compare Arendts strong objection against

the concept of total war and Carl Schmitts admiration of the same concept. Schmitt is

renowned for his definition of the political as the differentiation of enemy and friend.

He regards the conflict between rivals as something essential and indispensable for

politics, and celebrates the war of annihilation to be a mark of strong will. He says: A

world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe,

would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world

without politics (Schmitt, 1996:35). That is certainly a view with which Arendt

cannot agree.

The reason why Arendt cannot agree with Schmitt is that during a war of

annihilation, the multiple perspectives of how the world opens itself to us will be

destroyed or severely diminished. Arendt says:

The world comes into being only if there are perspectives If a people of

nation is annihilated, it is not merely that a people or a nation or a given

number of individuals perishes, but rather that a portion of our common

world is destroyed, an aspect of the world that has revealed itself to us untilnow but can never reveal again To the extent that politics becomes

destructive and causes worlds to end, it destroys and annihilates itself (PP:

175-176).

Living in the most violent and the most destructive century of human history,

Arendt is well aware of how wars and revolutions have shaped the political

experience of our times. The sad fact that both wars and revolutions use brute force to

achieve their purposes makes people easily believe that politics is always associated

with expansion and domination, and political action is nothing other than violence (PP:

191-192). The classical identity of politics and freedom is substituted with the modern

equation of politics and violence. Once the situation reached the point of no return,

there would be no possibility of reclaiming the meaning of the political.

After discussing the question of war and violence, let us now turn to the question

of means and end. To a very important extent, Arendt believes that our inability to

make a clear distinction between the end, the goal and the meaning of political action,

is one major reason why true politics is disappearing from our world. It is only when

we realize the subtle difference of these concepts can we possibly grasp the meaning

of politics again.


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Ends are associated with means. They are the results that we apply means in

order to achieve. For instance, self-preservation can be the end of defense, domination

can be the end of attack, and the overthrowing of an old political entity can be the end

of a revolution. To achieve a specific end, we usually make use of means, be it

violence, deception, alliance or persuasion. Political action pursues its end with

means (PP: 193-194).

Goals are different from ends in that they are not tangible, concrete objectives of

action. They are instead the guidelines and directives by which we orient ourselves.

Political actors must have goals in mind to guide their directions, but theses goals are

too abstract to be related to any specific means. Goals set the standards by which

everything that is done must be judged. They transcend what is done in the same

sense that every yardstick transcends what it has to measure. One of the salient

problems in modern political theory is that it cannot tell the goal from the end, and

always thinks of the public matter in terms of means/end when they should think

about the goal. Similarly, politicians introduce brute force into the political sphere as

an efficient means for their end, but confuse the later with the goal (Ibid).

Distinct from both end and goal, the meaning of political action is always

contained within the activity itself, and it can exist only as long as the activity

continues. Arendt contends that the meaning of action will reveals itself in the course

of action, but disappears immediately when the action is over. That is to say, meaning

is not like goal, which can stand out side the action as a standard and last longer thanthe activity. Meaning seems to be transient, and has nothing to do with the means or

the end of an activity (PP: 194).3

Arendt thinks that our unwillingness (and inability) to make distinctions between

end, goal and meaning, is the major reason why we cannot understand the true

meaning of politics, which is freedom. Worse still, whenever we talk about the

meaning of political action, we actually refer to its end or goal. Modern people do not

know what meaning is, nor do they believe that there is meaning for politics at all.

The loss of meaning marks the victory of brute force in the political sphere, as well as

the disappearing of genuine politics.

VII. Can Arendtian Politics Be Revived?

Arendt is certainly one of the most original political thinkers of our time. Her

idea of politics is so distinct from other contemporary philosophers that no students

who are dealing with the topic can afford neglecting its influence. On the other hand,

3

Arendt also lists the fourth element of action: principle. Principle is the fundamental conviction that agroup of people share, like honor, virtue, fear, fame, freedom, justice or equality. It does not concern us

here.


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however, Arendts concept of the political is also frequently criticized as too

idiosyncratic to be of any help for a world which is totally against her imagination.

Before concluding this article, I would like to make some comments regarding the

strength and the weakness of her concept of politics, and see if her idea is of any

insight for our understanding of politics.

Arendt should be credited for her attempt to guarantee an autonomous place for

the political. While most of us used to think of politics as a necessary tool for many

admirable purposes, such as peace of mankind, justice in distribution, economic

prosperity, etc, Arendt remind us of the independent character of political life. She is

not unaware of the fact that politics could serve something else and function as a

means to other end, but she strongly believes that it also has its own dignity and

rationality. The way she defines the meaning of politics demonstrates how serious she

wants to change peoples negative impression of the political. To a certain degree,

Arendts attempt to rescue the dignity of politics should be celebrated as a success.

Secondly, the insight Arendt derives from her interpretation of the classical

political experience is also impressive. While most contemporary political theorists

follow the power approach of politics introduced by Hobbes and reconfirmed by

Weber, Arendt displays her uniqueness in reasoning with the ancient Greek and

Roman. The unusual approach of appealing to the classical legacy sometimes results

in very interesting findings. For instance, we will not realize that political action could

have the connotation ofleading and carrying out if not for her analysis ofarcheinand prattein. Likewise, we will not comprehend the affinity of politics and courage if

not for her narration of the Homeric epic and its impact. Arendts adventure into the

ancient world uncovers many novel and invaluable treasures about political affairs.

We should also recognize this contribution.

Thirdly, as to the essence of politics, Arendts theory regarding human plurality

and the multiple perspective of the world is a brilliant and convincing argument.

There are many ways of talking about pluralism in politics. Berlins promotion of

value pluralism, for example, is as influential as stimulating. Arendts interpretation of

human plurality is different but no less remarkable. Arendt does not subsume to any

kind of monistic thinking or doctrine of uniformity. She is always championing for the

diversity of human standpoints, and asks political philosophers to take this diversity

serious. I think Arendt is right in protecting the richness of the world by appealing to

the argument of plurality.

Nevertheless, there are also some weaknesses in Arendts idea of politics. First of

all, we wonder if Arendts etymological analysis of the word action does not reflect

her own theoretical bias. Arendt traces the term action to its Greekarchein, which

means to begin, to lead, and to rule. But we are surprised to find that Arendt


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elaborates the meaning of action almost exclusively on the basis of one connotation

only to begin. The meaning ofleading and ruling disappears totally from her

interpretation of action. If we are to adopt the etymological approach as Arendt

recommends, there is no reason why the meaning, and the experience as well, of

rulership should be surgically removed from the essence of political action. It seems

fair to ask that both beginning something new and ruling be equally emphasized

in a sound and complete understanding of political action. Yet, if action means both

beginning and ruling, the meaning of politics would change quite a lot, too.

Secondly, Arendt is eager to separate politics from war and violence, lest it will

be intertwined with the means/end category. She is also extremely critical of the

association of politics with necessity of life, simply because she insists the essence of

politics should be freedom, while freedom is contradictory to necessity. Unfortunately,

if politics is totally separated from war, violence, and necessity of life, what we have

would be a completely purified concept of politicsadmirable as it may be, but

useless in practical analysis. In other words, the Arendtian idea of politics would have

nothing to say about violent confrontation, foreign policy, social welfare, national

security, or the question of family violence. Does it help our understanding of the

political world merely by declaring that violence and necessity are non-political and

walk away? I think not.

Finally, we find that Arendt is so fond of making distinctions that sometimes her

conceptual differentiation is simply too complicated to be meaningful. She contendsthat the end of an action is different from its goal, and the goal is different from the

principle. But then she confesses that what was a principle of action in one period

can in another become a goal by which the action orients itself, or even an end that it

pursues. So for example, freedom could be a principle in the Athenian polis, but

becomes a goal in a monarchy of the medieval age, and then becomes an end in a

revolutionary epoch (PP: 195). I think the shift between end, goal, meaning and

principle is too vibrant and arbitrary to be of real significance for our understanding of

political affairs.

My conclusion is that Arendts idea of politics is inspiring in three dimensions:

politics can be an autonomous activity; politics can mean something other than power

struggle and domination; politics is important for the preservation of world and its

multiple perspectives. On the other hand, Arendts idea of politics is weak on three

aspects: it is selectively interpreted in terms of its etymological origin; it is useless for

the analysis of some important human phenomena; it contains some unnecessary

internal differentiations and therefore confusions people. There is no perfect definition

of an idea, and Arendts interpretation of the political is no exception.


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Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah

1958 The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Referred

as HC)

1968 Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. (Referred as

MDT)

1977 Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. 2nd ed.

New York: Penguin Books. (Referred as BPF)

2005 The Promise of Politics. Edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken

Books. (Referred as PP)

Rawls, John

1993 Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Schmitt, Carl

1996 The Concept of the Political. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, Leo

1959 What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Villa, Dana (ed.)

2000 The Companion to Hannah Arendt. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Weber, Max

1978 Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich.

Berkeley: University of California Press.

Documents

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