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PAD 6109: Institutions and Society

Spring 2014, Tuesday, 5:30-8:15, Bellamy 632

Instructor: Rick Feiock

Office Hours: T 4:00-5:00?, Bellamy 642

rfeiock@fsu.edu

850-644-3525

Course Description: The objective of this course is to provide students with an understanding of institutional theories

and the formal and informal institutional contexts of democratic governance. We will investigate

how institutions emerge or are created and how they evolve and change.

Assignments and Requirements

There are no required text books but the three recommend text below are good references for

both this class and prelims. Most papers assigned are available in electronic form. “Core

readings” are read by everyone. “Individual readings” are read by one person who will present

the content, along with any criticisms to the rest of the class. The following are recommended:

Anthony Bertelli, The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance, Cambridge Press 2012

Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Cambridge Press, 1990

Murray Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration, Cambridge Press, 1997.

Individual Readings: Students will be responsible for presenting in class at least 5 times on

individually assigned readings. When assigned an individual reading, you will present to the

class 2-5 PowerPoint slides. The presentation (not including questions and answers) should take

no more than 10 minutes. Do not read any part of your presentation- practice your

presentation until you can make it without notes (handouts and slides are for the rest of us).

Make sure to tell us why the paper is important (from an explanatory and theory development

basis, not in terms of application) and be critical - tell us what is good and bad about the paper.

Core Readings: In some instances I will be leading the discussion of the core readings, but in

some instances, I will pick a student to lead the discussion. When you are the one picked, your

role will be exactly the same as it is for the individual readings except you will not be expected

to have slides. I will not be identifying the leader for the core readings ahead of time—so it is a

good idea to stay up with the assignments.

Paper: The paper assignment has two parts. The first part is a research design for an analysis

that tests hypotheses drawn from one or more theories of institutions covered in this course. It

will be submitted on or before March 16th

. The paper will carry out the design and present

empirical findings. The research paper will be submitted on or before the last class meeting and

will be approximately 25 pages in length. This will reflect your best work and suitable for

submission to a refereed journal (This means it would be sent out for review not “desk rejected”

if submitted to Public Administration Review). Late papers accepted with great prejudice.

Participation: Participation will include contributions to class discussions, exercises and

presentation of core and individual readings. Students attending class sessions but not making

constructive contributions to class discussions will get a zero for participation and fail the course.

Examination:

The final exam will be a mock prelim exam. You will choose one of two comprehensive and

integrative questions and have 2 hours to answer it.

Grading: The grade for the course will be determined as follows:

Research Design 10%

Final Paper 30%

Participation, Presentations and Other Assignments 30%

Final Exam 30%

The class page is on the Blackboard system at: http://campus.fsu.edu.

Attendance Policy:

Excused absences include documented illnesses, deaths in the immediate family and other

documented crises, call to active military or jury duty, religious holy days, and official

University activities. Accommodations for these excused absences will be made and will do so

in a way that does not penalize students who have a valid excuse. Consideration will also be

given to students whose dependent children experience serious illness.

Academic Honor Policy: The Florida State University Academic Honor Policy outlines the University’s expectations for

the integrity of students’ academic work, the procedures for resolving alleged violations of those

expectations, and the rights and responsibilities of students and faculty members throughout the

process. Students are responsible for reading the Academic Honor Policy and for living up to

their pledge to “. . . be honest and truthful and . . . [to] strive for personal and institutional

integrity at Florida State University.” (Florida State University Academic Honor Policy, found

at http://dof.fsu.edu/honorpolicy.htm.)

Americans with Disabilities Act: Students with disabilities needing academic accommodation should:

(1) register with and provide documentation to the Student Disability Resource Center; and

(2) bring a letter to the instructor indicating the need for accommodation and what type. This

should be done during the first week of class.

This syllabus and other class materials are available in alternative format upon request.

For more information about services available to FSU students with disabilities, contact the:

Student Disability Resource Center

874 Traditions Way, 108 Student Services Building

(850) 644-9566 (voice); (850) 644-8504 (TDD)

sdrc@admin.fsu.edu; http://www.disabilitycenter.fsu.edu/

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Course Outline and Readings

1. Overview of Approaches 1/7

Course overview and discussion of content and assignments

Core: (these articles are to be read in advance of the first class session- no exceptions)

Elinor Ostrom, 2007. “Challenges and Growth: the Development of the Interdisciplinary

Field of Institutional Analysis,” Journal of Institutional Economics 3: (3): 239–264.

Robert E. Goodin, “Institutions and their Design” Ch.1 in The Theory of Institutional Design.

B. Guy Peter, 2000. “Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects”

Individual

Elinor Ostrom Understanding Institutional Diversity, 2005. Ch.1.

Assignment:

Submit a paragraph that states a research question (that could potentially be the basis for your

final research paper assignment) and provides a few sentences explaining why it is an important

question. This is to be submitted to me electronically on or before 1/11.

Extra: Students are encouraged to attend the Southern Political Science Association Meeting in

New Orleans.

2. Public Choice and Property Rights 1/14

Core:

Vincent Ostrom, Elinor Ostrom 1971. “Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of

Public Administration 1971. Public Administration Review

Douglas C. North, 1993. Nobel Prize Lecture: Economic Growth Through Time.

http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html

Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice

Approach." Journal of Theoretical Politics (July): 131-49.

Peter G. Klein. “New Institutional Economics” in: Bouckaert, B. and De Geest, G.

(eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (only read pages 456-463)

Elinor Ostrom, 1986. “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions” Public Choice 48: 3-25.

Individual:

William H. Riker 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of

Institutions,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 432-446

James S. Coleman, 1991. “Constructed Organization: First Principles,” Journal of Law

Economics and Organization 7: 7-23

Robert Cooter. The Strategic Constitution, Chs. 1 and 12,

Herbert Simon. 1978. “Rationality as a Product and Process of Thought.” American Economic

Review, 68: 1‐16.

3. New Institutional Economics(NIE):Organization Transaction Costs and Governance 1/21

Core:

Peter G. Klein, “New Institutional Economics” pages 464-489

Oliver Williamson 1981. “The Economics of Organization” American Journal of Sociology 87:

548-77.

Todd R. Zenger, Sergio G. Lazzarani, Laura Poppo, “Informal and Formal Organization in New

Institutional Economics”

Oliver E. Williamson 2000, "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,"

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, No. 3, (Sep., 2000), pp. 595-613

Brown, Trevor L. Brown and Matthew Potoski, 2003. "Transaction Costs and Institutional

Explanations for Government Service Production," Journal of Public Administration Research

and Theory 13 (4): 441–68.

Individual:

Richard C.Feiock and Hee Soun Jang. 2009. “Nonprofits as Local Government Service

Contractors,” Public Administration Review, Volume 69, Number 4, July/August 2009 , pp.

668-680.

Steve Sorrell 2001, “The Economics of Energy Service Contracts,” Energy Policy 35 (2007)

507–521

Kimberly Moore and Maxwell L. Stearns, “The Law and Economics of Survivor”

Scott and Meeyong Lamothe and Richard Feiock. 2008. "Examining Local Government Service

Delivery Arrangements Over Time. Urban Affairs Review 4(1):27-56.

Yoram Barzel, 1982. "Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law

and Economics, April.

4. Social Networks and Collaborative Governance 1/28

Core: Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop F.M. Loopenjan. 2000. “Public Management and Policy Networks: Foundations of a Network Governance Approach,” Public Management 2 (2): 135-58. Richard Feiock, 2007. “Rational Choice and Regionalism,” Journal of Urban Affairs.

Manoj Shrestha and Richard C. Feiock, 2009. “Governing U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Self-

Organizing and Multiplex Service Networks,” American Politics Research, 37(5), 801-823.

Mark Lubell, John Scholz, Ramiro Berardo and Garry Robins 2012. “Testing Policy Theory with

Statistical Models of Networks” Policy Studies Journal (pages 351–374).

Shrestha, Manoj, Ramiro Berardo, and Richard C. Feiock. 2014. Institutional Collective Action

Dilemmas, Multiplex Networks, and Collaborative Governance forthcoming in International

Journal of Complex Governance Networks.

Individual:

Mark Grannovetter 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology, 78

(May): 1360-1380.

Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh. 2012. “An Integrative Framework for

Collaborative Governance Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (2012) 22 (1):

1-29

Youngmi Lee, In Won Lee and Richard C. Feiock 2012. “ Interorganizational Collaboration

Networks in Economic Development Policy: An Exponential Random Graph Model Analysis”

Policy Studies Journal (pages 547–573) DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2012.00464.x

Garry Robins, Jenny M. Lewis, and Peng Wang. 2012. “Statistical Network Analysis for

Analyzing Policy Network,” Policy Studies Journal 375-401

Minkoff, Scott L. 2013. From competition to cooperation: A dyadic approach to

interlocalgreements.” American Politics Research 41(2) 261- 297.

Rosemary O’Leary and Nidhi Vij1. 2012 “Collaborative Public Management: Where Have We

Been and Where Are We Going?” The American Review of Public Administration 42(5) 507-52.

5. New Institutionalism: Sociological and Historical Approaches 2/4 Core:

Walter W. Powell. 2007. “The New Institutionalism” The International Encyclopedia of

Organization Studies, Sage Publishers.

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen 2009. “Elaborating the “New Institutionalism” in Oxford

Handbook of Political Science.

Paul DiMaggio, and Walter Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism

and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields” American Sociological Review 48: 147-60

Paul Pierson 2000. “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change,"

Governance 13, No. 4.

Mark Grannovetter. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of

Embeddedness."American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510.

Individual:

H. George Frederickson 2001. “From Jurisdiction to Institution: The Contemporary Study of

Public Organizations”

James G. March and Johan P. Olson. 1983. “Organizing Political Life: What Administrative

Reorganization Tells Us about Government,” American Political Science Review 77: 281-96.

DiMaggio, Paul. The New Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration. Journal of Institutional

and Theoretical Economics. 1998; 154(4):697-705

6. Political Science and Political Economy Approaches 2/11

Core:

Terry Moe. 1994. "Integrating Politics and Organizations: Positive Theory and Public

Administration," Journal of Public Administration and Theory 4: 17-26

Murray Horn, 1997. The Political Economy of Public Administration, chs. 1&2

Steven Maser. 1998 “Constitutions as Relational Contracts,” Journal of Public Administration

Research and Theory 8: 527-64.

Howard Frant 1996. High-Powered and Low-Powered Incentives in the Public Sector. Journal of

Public Administration and Theory 6: 365-381.

Christopher M. Weible, Richard Feiock, David P. Carter, Cali Curley, Aaron Deslatte, and Tanya

Heikkila. 2014. “Institutional Analysis of City Charters”

Individual:

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Schwartz, Thomas. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police

Patrols versus Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28,1, 165-179. 1984.

H. George Fredrickson, and Gary A. Johnson. 2001. The Adapted American City: A Study of

Institutional Dynamics. Urban Affairs Review 26: 872-884.

Jered Carr. 2014. “Form of Government and Policy Choices: Lessons from the Empirical

Literature,” Public Administration Review, forthcoming.

Terry Moe. 1990. “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story,” Journal of Law,

Economics, and Organization 6: 213-253.

2/18 reading day

Extra: Students are encouraged to attend the International Social Network Association Meeting

in St. Pete Beach FL.

7. Institutional Analysis and Development 2/25

Core:

Michael D.McGinnis. 2011. "An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom

Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework,” Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 169-183

Elinor Ostrom, 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective

Action, chs. 1&2.

Elinor Ostrom, 1998. “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective

Action, American Political Science Review 22: 1-22.

Ronald J. Oakerson and Roger Parks. 2011. "The Study of Local Public Economies: Multi-

organizational, Multi-level Institutional Analysis and Development," Policy Studies Journal 39

(1): 147-167

Elinor Ostrom 2010. “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global

Environmental Change,” Global Environmental Change 20: 550–557.

Individual:

Michael D. McGinnis. 2011. "Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric

Governance," Policy Studies Journal 39 (1): 51-78.

Vincent and Elinor Ostrom 2004. "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice". American Journal

of Economics and Sociology. Vol. 63. No. 1

Edella Schlager, Tanya Heikkila. 2011. “Left High and Dry? Climate Change, Common-Pool

Resource Theory, and the Adaptability of Western Water Compacts,” Public Administration

Review

John M. Anderies and Marco A. Janssen, 2013. “Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems:

Implications for Public Policy,” Policy Studies Journal 41, (3): 513–536.

8. The Institutional Collective Action Framework (ICA) 3/4

Core:

Richard C. Feiock 2013. “The Institutional Collective Action Framework” Policy Studies Journal

41(3) 489-496.

Richard C. Feiock and John Scholz. 2010. "Self-organizing Governance of Institutional

Collective Action" in Self-Organizing Federalism: Collaborative Mechanisms to Mitigate

Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Ch. 13.

Antonio Tavares and Richard Feiock 2014. “Institutional Collective Action: An Application to

Regional Governance in Europe,”

Richard C. Feiock In-Won Lee and Hyung Jun Park 02012. "Administrators and Elected

Officials’ Collaboration Networks: Selecting Partners to Reduce Risk in Economic

Development," Public Administration Review 72(s1), 58–68.

Individual:

Richard Feiock, Annette Steinacker and Hyung-Jun Park, 2009. “Institutional Collective Action

and Joint Ventures for Economic Development,” Public Administration Review.

Richard C. Feiock. 2009. “Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Collective Action” Urban

Affairs Review

Simon A. Andrew and Christopher V. Hawkins 2013. “Regional Cooperation and Multilateral

Agreements in the Provision of Public Safety,” The American Review of Public Administration

Richard Feiock, Hyung Jun Park, Mssao Kikuchi, Ssu-Hsien Chen, 2014. “The Institutional

Collective Action Framework: An Application to Regional Governance in Asia.”

Kyujin Jung, Minsun Song, and Richard Feiock. 2014. “Isolated and Broken Bridges from a

Disaster: A Longitudinal Study of Interorganizational Emergency Management Networks before

and after the 2013 Seoul Floods.”

9. Spring Break/No Class Meeting: Research Design and Institutional Analysis 3/11

Review the NSF Proposals Guide http://www.nsf.gov/ and resources on grant writing at

http://www.pitt.edu/~offres/proposal/propwriting/websites.html

Anu Ramaswami et al. 2014. “Building Sustainable, Healthy and Climate-Resilient Cities

using a Social-Ecological-Infrastructural Systems (SEIS)”

Research design for final paper due 3/16

Extra: Students are encouraged to attend the annual meeting of the American Society for Public

Administration

10. The Political Market Framework 3/18

Core:

Richard Feiock and Mark Lubell and In-Won Lee. 2011. "A Political Market Explanation for

Policy Change"

Mark Lubell Richard C. Feiock and Edgar Ramirez de la Cruz. 2009. " Local Institutions and the

Politics of Urban Growth" American Journal of Political Science. Richard C. Feiock, Kent. E., Jungah Bae, & Jeffery M. Berry, 2014. “Agency Venues and Business Group Access,” Urban Affairs Review 51, Lester M. Salamon, and Michael S. Lund. 1989. The Tools Approach: Basic Analytics. In Lester Salamon (ed.) Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

Hongtao Yi and Richard C. Feiock 2012. “Policy Tool Interactions and the Adoption of State

Renewable Portfolio Standards, Review of Policy Research 29(2), 193-206. Richard Feiock, Antonio Tavares and Mark Lubell. 2008. "Policy Instrument Choices for Growth Management and Land Use Regulation" Policy Studies Journal 36: 461-80.

Individual:

Richard Feiock and Anthony Kassekert 2009. "How the Interactions between Political and

Administrative Institutions Impact Policy Outcomes: A Study of Tax Abatements Adoption by

Local Governments: Using a Bayesian Frailty Model," MPSA paper. Richard Feiock, Moon-Gi Jeong, and Jaehoon Kim 2003. “Credible Commitment and Council Manager Government: Implications for Policy Instrument Choice” Public Administration Review 63 #5 (September/October): 568-577.

Elaine B. Sharp, Dorothy M. Daley and Michael S. Lynch. 2010. “Understanding Local

Adoption and Implementation of Climate Change Mitigation Policy.” Urban Affairs Review.

Jungah Bae and Richard C. Feiock 2013. “Forms of Government and Climate Change Policies

in U.S. Cities,” with Jungah Bae. Urban Studies.

11. Service Delivery, Public Goods Markets and Contracting 4/1

Core:

Vincent Ostrom, Charles, M. and Robert Warren. 1961. The Organization of Government in

Metropolitan areas: A Theoretical Inquiry. American Political Science Review 55:831–42.

David Lowery 2000 “A transactions costs model of metropolitan governance: Allocation versus

redistribution in urban America” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 49–78.

Brinton Milward H. and Keith Provan. 2000. “Governing the Hollow State” Journal of Public

Administration Research and Theory 10:359–79.

Brown Trevor L. Matthew Potoski and David M Van Slyke. 2006. “Managing Public Service

Contracts: Aligning Values, Institutions, and Markets,” Public Administration Review (66)

323–331.

Simon A. Andrew. 2009. “Regional Integration Through Contracting Networks: An Empirical

Analysis of Institutional Collection Action” Urban Affairs Review.

Manoj Shrestha and Richard C. Feiock, 2013. “Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas in

Service Delivery: Exchange Risks and Contracting Networks among Local Governments”

Individual

Manoj Shrestha and Richard Feiock 2011. "Transaction Cost, Social Embeddedness and

Interlocal Cooperation in the Supply of Local Public Goods," Review of Political Research.

Germà Bel, Xavier Fageda, and Melania Mur. 2013. “Does Cooperation Reduce Service

Delivery Costs? Evidence from Residential Solid Waste Services,” Journal of Public

Administration Research and Theory 24: 85-107

Carr Jered B. Carr, Kelly LeRoux, and Manoj Shrestha Manoj. 2009. Institutional ties,

transaction costs, and external service production” Urban Affairs Review 44:403–27.

Jessica Terman and Richard Feiock. 2013. Third Party Federalism: Using Local Governments

and their Contractors to Implement National Policy,”

Meeyoung Lamothe and Scott Lamothe 2013. “To Trust or not to Trust? What Matters in Local

Government-Vendor Relationships? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

12. Institutional Change 4/8

Core:`

Christopher Kingston and Gonzalo Caballero 2008. “Comparing Theories of Institutional

Change” Journal of Institutional Economics 5(2): 151 - 180

Douglass C. North “Five Propositions about Institutional Change”

http://netec.mcc.ac.uk/WoPEc/data/Papers/wpawuwpeh9309001.html

Pierson, Paul. Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics. American

Political Science Review. 2000; 33, 6/7:251-67.

Thrainn Eggersson. 2009. “Knowledge and the Theory of Institutional Change,” Journal of

Institutional Economics 5 (2): 137 – 150.

M. Tina Dacin, Jerry Goodstein, and W. Richard Scott 2002. “Institutional Theory and

Institutional Change” Academy of Management Journal 43: 49-57.

Individual:

William Riker and Itai Sened “The Politics of Institutional Change in a Representative

Democracy” in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change

Douglass North and Barry R. Weingast “The Evolution of the Modern Institutions of Growth” in

Empirical Studies in Institutional Change.

Jack Knight, 1998, “Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of

Institutional Emergence and Change,” in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, Explaining Social

Institutions.

13. Presentations of Final Papers 4/15

final submission deadline for paper.

14. Final Exam 4/22

How to Read an Academic Article | Peter Klein |

1. Caveat: no single style works for everyone!

2. Klein’s basic steps for skimming, scanning, processing…

a. Read the abstract (if provided)

b. Read the introduction.

c. Read the conclusion.

d. Skim the middle, looking at section titles, tables, figures, etc.—try to get a feel for the style and flow of the

article.

i. Is it methodological, conceptual, theoretical (verbal or mathematical), empirical, or something else?

ii. Is it primarily a survey, a novel theoretical contribution, an empirical application of an existing

theory or technique, a critique, or something else?

e. Go back and read the whole thing quickly, skipping equations, most figures and tables.

f. Go back and read the whole thing carefully, focusing on the sections or areas that seem most important.

3. Once you’ve grasped the basic argument the author is trying to make, critique it!

a. Ask if the argument makes sense. Is it internally consistent? Well supported by argument or evidence? (This

skill takes some experience to develop!)

b. Compare the article to others you’ve read on the same or a closely related subject. (If this is the first paper

you’ve read in a particular subject area, find some more and skim them. Introductions and conclusions are key.) Compare and contrast. Are the arguments consistent, contradictory, orthogonal?

c. Use Google Scholar, the Social Sciences Citation Index, publisher web pages, and other resources to find

articles that cite the article you’re reading. See what they say about it. See if on blogs, groups, etc.

d. Check out a reference work, e.g. a survey article from the Journal of Economic Literature, a Handbook

or Encyclopedia article, or a similar source, to see how this article fits in the broader context of its subject area.